

One Teleport Drive Staten Island, NY 10311 Tel 718.963.2000 Fax 718.963.2147

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June 23, 1993

Steve Tribble
Director, Division of Records and Reporting
Florida Public Service Commission
Fletcher Building
101 East Gaines Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

Re: Docket No. 921074-TP

Dear Mr. Tribble:

Enclosed for filing in the above docket is an original and 16 copies of the Direct Testimony of Paul Kouroupas on behalf of Teleport Communications Group.

Please date stamp the extra copy and return it in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope.

Please call me at 718-983-2939 if you have any questions.

Thank you.

AFA

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DIRECT TESTIMONY
OF
PAUL KOUROUPAS
TELEPORT COMMUNICATIONS GROUP

DOCKET NO. 921074-TP

JUNE 24, 1993

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE
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TELEPORT COMMUNICATIONS GROUP

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF PAUL KOUROUPAS

DOCKET NO. 921074-TP

_		1000		A CAMPANIA CONTRACTOR OF THE CAMPANIA CONTRACTOR
1	1.	Q.	Ple	ase state your name and business address.
2		A.	My	name is Paul Kouroupas and my business
3			add	ress is One Teleport Drive, Suite 301,
4			Sta	ten Island, New York 10311.
5				
6	2.		Q.	What is your current position with
7				Teleport Communications Group Inc. (TCG)?
8			A.	I am Manager of Regulatory Affairs.
9				
10	3.		Q.	Please describe your qualifications.
11			A.	In 1988, I graduated from Temple
12				University cum laude with a bachelor of
13				arts degree in communications. In 1992, I
14				graduated from the Catholic University of
15				America Columbus School of Law with a
16				Juris Doctorate degree. I also received a
17				certificate from the Communications Law
18			1	Institute of Catholic University, in
19				recognition of my completion of a
20				curriculum specializing in
21				telecommunications regulation. While
22				attending Catholic University, I worked as
23				an intern in the General Counsel's office

1			of the National Telecommunications and
2			Information Administration from September
3			1990 to December 1990. In addition, I
4			worked as an intern in the office of
5			Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett of the
6			Federal Communications Commission from
7			June 1991 until April 1992. Since June
8			1992, I have been employed by TCG.
9			
10	4.	Q.	What are your present responsibilities at
11			Teleport Communications Group?
12		A.	In my position at TCG, I am responsible
13			for development and implementation of
14			regulatory rules regarding
15			interconnection.
16			
17	5.	Q.	What is the purpose of your direct
18			testimony in this proceeding?
19		A.	I wish to address the issues identified by
20			the Commission set forth in Appendix "A"
21			of the Commission's Order No. PSC-93-0811-
22			PCO-TP.
23	6.	Q.	Have you read the petition filed by
24			Intermedia Communications of Florida for
25			an order permitting AAV provision of
26			services thorough collocation arrangements

1		in local exchange company (LEC) central
2		offices?
3	A.	Yes, and I am familiar with the broader
4		issues regarding private line and special
5		access interconnection which are raised by
6	1000	this petition.
7		
8	7. Q.	Is expanded interconnection for special
9		access and private line in the public
10		interest?
11	a.	Yes. Central office interconnection will -
12		provide significant benefits to consumers
13		in Florida. In order to prepare for the :
14		competition they will face from collocated
15	441	competitors, LECs will upgrade and improve
16		their transmission infrastructure. All
17		telephone company subscribers will then
18		benefit from improved service, better
19		quality and lower costs for the basic
20		services transmitted over these upgraded
21		networks. By acting upon competitive
22		incentives to improve service to their
23		customers, the LECs, themselves, will also
24		benefit from competition.
25	10 m	
26		Additionally, interconnection incents LECs

1 to reduce their costs and improve their 2 efficiency. Furthermore, interconnection reduces the likelihood that LECs will 3 experience stranded investment. 5 Interconnectors are purchasing and using 6 portions of the LECs' networks -- portions 7 of the network which could be stranded if 8 large customers choose to bypass the LEC 9 network by using alternative transmission facilities such as microwave. 10 11 Interconnection will allow competitive 12 local carriers to serve unmet consumer 13 demands for diversified telecommunications. 14 services and facilities. Interconnection can also alleviate the need for LECs to 15 16 build expensive, additional capacity at 17 ratepayer risk and expense: the LEC can 18 simply use the facilities of the 19 interconnector. 20 How does the FCC's order on expanded 21 Q. 22 interconnection impact the Commission's ability to impose forms and conditions of 23 expanded interconnection that are 24 25 different from those imposed by the FCC 26 order?

1 A. Florida can extend the benefits of expanded interconnection beyond the scope 2 of the FCC order in three crucial ways. 3 First, Florida should require 5 interconnection at a DS1, DS3 and DS0 6 level to extend the benefits of 7 collocation to all special access 8 customers. The FCC order required 9 interconnection for DS1 and DS3 only. 10 Such a restriction denies the benefits of 11 collocation to the large number of 12 customers who currently use special access. 13 facilities with speeds below a DS1 14 capacity. The only way for a competitor 15 to serve such customers under a 16 collocation arrangement would be to 17 purchase LEC multiplexing services and 18 individual DSO end links. This makes the 19 20 competitor captive to the LEC's 21 multiplexing prices and service quality, 22 while at the same time eliminating any 23 competitive check on the reasonableness of 24 these multiplexing prices. 25

26

Second, Florida should institute a "fresh

1	 look* provision designed to allow
2	consumers to exercise their new-found
3	freedom of choice in the special access
4	market without incurring substantial
5	penalties for doing so.
6	
7	Consumers should be free to terminate
8	their contracts with the local exchange
9	carriers without fear of incurring
10	substantial termination liabilities.
11	Precedents for such action exist at the
12	federal level where the FCC disallowed the
13	imposition of any termination liabilities.
14	for customers who switched their 800
15	service from AT&T to another carrier', and
16	for airlines who switched air-to-ground
17	radiotelephone service providers.2 Of
18	course, the most famous example of such a
19	policy dates back to Divestiture when
20	customers were free to choose the long-
21	distance carrier of their choice without

²² See, Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, 7 FCC Rcd 2677 (1992).

^{24 &}lt;sup>2</sup>See, Amendment of the Commission's Rules Relative to AMS ocation of the 849-851/894-896 Mhz Bands, 6 FCC Rcd 4582 (26991).

1	penalty.' These actions were necessary to
2	effectuate the FCC's pro-competitive
3	policies, and are as necessary in the
4	instant proceeding. Without freedom of
5	choice, there is no competition.
6	
7	Third, Florida should permit
8	interconnectors to provide the local
9	transport portion of switched carrier
10	access. The local transport portion of
11	switched carrier access service provides
12	transmission facilities between an
13	interexchange carrier ("IXC") point-of-
14	presence ("POP") and a telephone company
15	central office ("CO"). Local transport
16	switched access facilities are dedicated
17	point to point high volume facilities.
18	Although telephone companies offer these
19	services within "switched access" service
20	categories, the economic and technical
21	nature of local transport circuits are
22	much more akin to private line services.
23	Similar to private line services, local
24	transport carrier access is provided

²⁵ After a reasonable time, a minimal termination charge no gameater than \$5.00 was imposed.

1 between two discrete points, namely the 2 interexchange carrier POP and the 3 telephone company CO. There is no "switching" or call routing involved in 5 local transport. 6 7 TCG estimates that local transport service 8 represents approximately 75% of all 9 circuits between an IXC POP and a 10 telephone company central office. IXCs 11 need the quality, reliability and diversity of competitive alternatives for 12 13 these critical facilities. Moreover, 14 competition for the local transport 15 portion of switched access services 16 dramatically increases the prospects for 17 effective competition in traditional 18 private line services, which is, after 19 all, the purpose of this proceeding. 20 21 IXCs typically require both special access 22 and switched access services, and many 23 combine their traffic on one facility for the inherent efficiencies of such an 24 arrangement. TCG estimates that 75% of 25 26 the circuits between an IXC POP and a

telephone company central office are for switched services. If TCG is able to 2 3 compete for the provision of the local transport portion of switched access 5 services on the same terms and conditions as the local exchange carriers, TCG will 6 7 be better able to address the total access needs of IXCs and will be able to develop 9 the same economies of scope and scale that local exchange carriers enjoy. 10 11 12 Under current circumstances, local 13 exchange carriers are permitted to combine 14 access services on one facility and address the total access needs of 15 consumers. Without similar ability, 16 17 interconnectors cannot effectively compete. The imposition on 18 19 interconnectors of what is essentially a 20 line-of-business restriction handicaps interconnectors' ability to compete 21 22 against "un-handicapped" local exchange carrier facilities. 23 24 The removal of any artificial "shielding" 25

of the vast majority of central office

1 access traffic from competitive choice allows the proven benefits of reliable, 2 diverse and competitive central office 3 access services to benefit Florida 5 consumers. 7 Q. Does Chapter 364 of the Florida Statutes 8 allow the Commission to require expanded interconnection? 9 10 Yes. Section 364.01 grants the Commission 11 "exclusive jurisdiction" over all telecommunications matters and 12 13 specifically directs the Commission to 14 encourage cost-effective innovation and 15 competition in the telecommunications 16 industry if so doing will benefit the public by making modern and adequate 17 telecommunications services available at 18 19 reasonable prices. Collocation and 20 interconnection are two essential elements of full and effective competition in local 21 22 telecommunications markets and they will bring the benefits to the public which I 23 discussed above. 24

25

1 point to interconnection as a vehicle for promoting effective competition. In the 2 Alternative Access Vendor Docket No. 3 890183-TL, Order No. 24877, the Commission 5 determined that it was in the public 6 interest and that it had statutory 7 authority, pursuant to Section 364.337, to certificate AAVs to provide special access 8 9 services. The Commission found in this Order that AAVs have benefits to offer and 10 11 that by offering their services, the AAVs -12 have spurred the LECs, themselves, to 13 offer new services. By authorizing interconnection for AAVs and other 14 competitors, the Commission will ensure 15 16 that AAVs can offer service to many more 17 customers who desire the diversity and other benefits that AAVs can offer. 18 19 Section 364.16 authorizes the Commission 20 21 to require connections between two or more 22 telecommunications companies where connections can reasonably be made, 23 efficient service obtained and such 24 connections are necessary. When read in 25 conjunction with the other sections 26

1			authorizing the Commission to Certify
2			competitive providers and to promote
3	-		competition in telecommunications services
4			in order to form a modern and efficient
5			network for all, the Commission can
6			interpret this section to permit it to
7			order LECs to allow competitors to
8			interconnect with their networks so that
9		Sher.	competitors can reach all consumers.
10			
11	10.	Q.	Does a physical collocation mandate raise
12			federal and/or state constitutional
13			questions about the taking or confiscation
14			of LEC property?
15		A.	No. The key to the fairness of
16			interconnection to all parties is that the
17			interconnectors compensate the LECs for
18			the use of LEC facilities. Furthermore,
19			the Commission is ordering interconnection
20			for the public purpose of promoting a
21			modern, efficient telecommunications
22			infrastructure. Therefore, a physical
23			collocation mandate does not constitute a
24			taking.
25			
			Chauld the Completion remitre physical

1		and/or virtual collocation.
2	A.	The Commission should require LECs to
3		offer physical collocation. Physical
4	200	collocation ensures that interconnectors
5		are provided interconnection on the same
6	18.7	terms and conditions as the LECs
7		interconnect their own high capacity
8		networks. A physical requirement would
9		also allow for uniformity between state
10		and federal requirements.
11		
12		It is important to understand that
13		interconnection with AAV networks via
14		either physical or virtual collocation is
15		essentially the same as the
16		interconnections that take place today
17		throughout the LEC network. The
18		technologies, equipment, and procedures
19		are largely alike.
20		
21		Under either physical collocation or
22		virtual collocation, a central office
23		interconnection arrangement is composed of
24		three essential elements: (1)
25		interconnection cable; (2) interconnection
26		electronics: and (3) cross-connection facility.

24

25

26

The interconnection cable is an unbroken fiber optic facility which the AAV extends from its network into the LEC central office. The cable enters into and terminates inside the LEC central office, just as the LEC's own fiber optic cable is terminated at the central office.

The interconnection electronics are located within the LEC central office and are the most crucial element of the interconnection arrangement. The interconnection cable is terminated into .* the interconnection electronics, which are then used to derive individual circuits. This equipment may include optical line terminating multiplexers, DS3:DS1 multiplexers, DS1:DS0 multiplexers, and digital access cross-connect systems. All of this sort of equipment is today used by the LEC in its own network, and is likewise terminated into its own fiber optic facilities. The interconnection electronics are responsible for most of the customer-visible characteristics of a carrier's service: quality, reliability,

1 speed, cost. 2 Therefore, under either physical or 3 virtual interconnection, the interconnection equipment must be selected 5 by the interconnector, and the equipment 6 must be remotely monitored, configured and 7 controlled by the interconnector. The 8 interconnection electronics must also be 9 installed, upgraded, maintained, and 10 modified at the sole discretion of the 11 12 interconnector, and according to its cost . and service standards. 13 14 The cross-connection facility is usually a 15 copper (electronic) cable provided by the 16 LEC which connects the interconnection 17 18 equipment to a LEC cross connection frame (or digital access cross connect system in 19 some cases) where the interconnector's 20 circuit is cross connected to the 21 interconnected services: loops, a switch 22 port, multiplexer, etc. For special 23 access, these cables connect the AAV 24 equipment to a channel termination (i.e., 25

26

a Special Access "loop"), a channel

1 mileage facility, or a multiplexer. 2 same interconnections take place today in 3 the LECs' network. From TCG's experience, the only 5 distinction between "physical" collocation 6 7 and a workable "virtual" collocation is ownership: in physical collocation the 8 AAV owns the interconnection electronics 9 and is able to enter the LEC central 10 11 office to perform these provisioning and -12 maintenance functions, whereas in virtual . 13 collocation the LEC leases the equipment 14 to the AAV and performs provisioning and 15 maintenance for the AAV under tariff while 16 the AAV monitors and controls the 17 equipment remotely. 18 19 The burden on a LEC between having to 20 21 offer physical and virtual collocation is 22 negligible whereas it is critical for an 23 interconnector to have the option of 24 choosing a physical arrangement. The 25 ability of interconnectors to negotiate a 26 virtual collocation arrangement is hindered when a LEC knows it has no 27

28

obligation to provide physical

collocation. As monopoly providers, LECs 1 2 have an overwhelming advantage in establishing interconnection arrangements 3 and in tariffing interconnection terms and 5 conditions. 7 The availability of physical collocation thus serves as a "marketplace check" on 8 9 the reasonableness of the LEC's virtual 10 collocation proposals. With physical 11 interconnection as the default 12 interconnection method, LECs must provide . 13 reasonable virtual interconnection 14 arrangements or else AAVs will elect 15 physical interconnection. Only the 16 availability of physical interconnection arrangements will compel the LECs to 17 18 provide truly comparable virtual 19 interconnection arrangements. 20 21 Allowing the LEC to decide whether or not 22 to provide physical collocation robs the 23 AAV of its only negotiation leverage, and leaves it unable to compel the LEC to 24 provide quality, cost effective 25

26

collocation arrangements. The AAV is thus

left subject to the quality of service 1 that the LEC wishes to give it, with no 2 effective alternative. Because the LEC is 3 not only the AAV's crucial supplier, but also -- from the LEC's perspective -- its 5 primary competitor, the AAV is left in an 6 unenviable competitive posture. The AAV's 7 8 situation is akin to that which Ford Motor Company would face if it were required to 9 use General Motors engines in all of its 10 cars, and could not contract with another 11 company or build its own engines. Just as: 12 Ford would be unable to influence the 13 quality and cost of a key element of its 14 15 product, so too is the AAV left without the ability to control an essential part 16 of its service and costs if it cannot 17 18 insist on physical collocation. 19 20 11. Q. What LECs should be required to provide expanded interconnection? 21 All LECs, including non-Tier I LECs (those 22 23 with less than \$100 million in annual revenues from regulated service) should be 24 included in an intrastate interconnection 25 policy in Florida. Interconnection 26

1			permits the dynamic development of the
2			telecommunications infrastructure in the
3			most cost-effective, efficient manner.
4			Consumers benefit from a strengthened
5			infrastructure and an abundance of choice
6			made possible by competition. These
7			benefits should be available to all
8			consumers.
9			at tot
10	12.	Q.	Where should expanded interconnection be
11			offered?
12		A.	LECs should offer expanded interconnection
13			in all central offices, state-wide.
14			
15	13.	Q.	Who should be allowed to interconnect?
16		A.	LECs should offer expanded interconnection
17			for special access to all parties who want
18			to terminate their own special access
19			transmission facilities at LEC central
20			offices, including AAVs, IXCs and end
21			users.
22			
23	14.	Q.	What standards should the Commission
24			require for physical and/or virtual
25			collocation?
26		A.	TCG has pursued interconnection with LECs

1 for over seven years and has found that 2 the following standard should apply for competitive interconnection: 3 The interconnection 5 arrangement must provide 6 TCG with the same 7 capability to connect its 8 high capacity fiber optic 9 network to the LEC's 10 central office facilities 11 and the LEC's ubiquitous 12 low capacity loop network 13 in a manner which is 14 technically, operationally and economically comparable 15 16 to the way that the LEC 17 connects its own high 18 capacity facilities to the 19 LEC central office 20 facilities and loop 21 network. 22 23 Basically, a competitor must be able to 24 use its own equipment and facilities for 25 the central office interconnection to the 26 greatest extent possible and rely on its 27 dominant competitor to the least extent possible. In addition, competitors must 28 be able to select the interconnection 29 30 electronics at the central office and be able to remotely monitor and control the 31 32 equipment. 33 34 TCG's interconnection standard is as

equally applicable to virtual collocation

1 as it is to physical collocation. Virtual arrangements are acceptable if the characteristics of the non-collocated 3 interconnection are virtually the same as the characteristics of collocated 5 interconnection. This is where Florida 6 must improve on the FCC's policies if it 7 authorizes virtual collocation. 8 9 The FCC's standard for virtual collocation 10 is inadequate because it allows the LECs -11 to install, repair and maintain equipment . 12 to meet the LEC's standards rather than ... 13 the interconnector's standards. This 14 allows the LEC to control the essential 15 character of an AAV's services. Unless 16 the Commission allows the AAV to define 17 the service standards for virtual 18 collocation, it will not facilitate true 19 competition. TCG suggests the standard 20 21 New York implemented for virtual 22 collocation which is that it must be 23 *technically and economically comparable to actual collocation. " 24 25

1	15.	Q.	Should collocators be required to allow
2			LECs and other parties to interconnect
3			with their networks?
4		A.	As monopoly providers of essential
5			bottleneck facilities, LECs need to be
6			required to provide physical collocation
7			to interconnectors. However, non-
8			dominant, competitive carriers need no
9	1 1 1		such requirement. As competition for
10			private line services develops, a
11			competitor would be foolish to reject a
12			collocation request and the associated
13			revenues. The potential interconnector
14			will simply move on to the next provider.
15			For this reason, a requirement that
16			collocators should provide interconnection
17			to the LECs and other parties is
18			unnecessary.
19			
20	16.	Q.	What standards should be established for
21			the LECs to allocate space for
22			collocators?
23		A.	TCG agrees with the FCC's method of
24			requiring LECs to provide space for
25			physical collocation on a first come-first
26			served basis. However, we believe that

1 space will become less of a concern in the 2 future as transmission equipment becomes smaller and available CO space increases. 3 It is also appropriate for carriers to 5 consider interconnection demand for central office space when remodeling or 6 7 building new central offices just as they would consider future demand for other 8 9 services. 10 11 It is also important that the Commission 12 require LECs to offer virtual collocation . if physical collocation space becomes 13 filled to capacity. They should not be 14 permitted to turn away potential 15 16 interconnectors for this reason. 17 If the Commission permits expanded 18 17. Q. interconnection, should it grant pricing 19 20 flexibility to the LECs for special access and private line services? 21 No. If competitors cannot compete for the 22 23 local transport portion of switched access services, and consumers do not have 24 25 effective freedom of choice, pricing flexibility for local exchange carriers is 26

1		inappropriate and disproportionate to the
2		level of actual competition that will
3		develop as a result of ICI's petition.
4		
5		The Commission must be careful not to
6		confuse the presence of a competitor with
7		a competitive market. AT&T recently
8		stated that 99.866% of their access
9		services are handled by local exchange
10		carriers.4 Clearly there is no competition
11		for access services, even though there may
12		be the presence of a competitor.
13	38	
14		Local exchange carriers do not require any
15		pricing flexibility to compete with
16		interconnectors when those interconnectors
17		are unable to address 75% of the total
18		access needs of consumers and consumers
19		are penalized for exercising their freedom
20		of choice in those situations where they
21		desire to take service from a competitor.
22		
23		So long as interconnectors are handicapped
24		with line-of-business restrictions and

²⁵ See, Communications Daily, March 25, 1993 at 1.

1	1		consumers are denied freedom of choice,
2			local exchange carriers should not be
3			permitted to "lock up" the existing
4			special access and local transport market
5			by lowering their prices for long-term
6		Social I	contracts which consumers are unable to
7			escape.
9	18.	Q.	What collocation rates, terms and
10	-0.		conditions should be tariffed by the LECs?
11		A.	To promote uniformity and facilitate
12			effective interconnections, LBCs should
13			tariff the following non-recurring rate :
14			elements: cage construction, power cabling
15			and racking and the cable pull.
1.6			Interconnectors should have the option to
17			complete these tasks themselves.
18			
19			LECs should tariff the following recurring
20			rate elements: cable space, cross-connect,
21			floor space and electric power.
22			
23			It is critical that the Commission ensure
24	100		that LBCs indicate in their tariffs that
25			they will abide by the following terms and
26			conditions. Rearrangement charges are

those applied to a customer to reconfigure 1 special services within a central office. 2 It is crucial that these charges be non-3 discriminatory such that there is no difference in the charges to the customer 5 whether the circuits remain as the LEC's 6 circuits or are transferred from a LEC to 7 8 an interconnector or from an interconnector to a LEC. Interconnectors 9 10 must be given channel assignment control which refers to the determination of the -11 assignment of individual channels on a 12 customer circuit. An interconnector must. 13 have control over the assignments so they 14 15 can be made quickly. 16 Many customers of interconnectors insist 17 that they be allowed to order and bill for 18 19 end user circuits under a letter of agency 20 authorization. Interconnectors must be 21 permitted to use letters of agency. Escort and eviction terms must be limited 22 23 to prevent LECs from using these 24 mechanisms as a way to invalidate the usefulness of a central office . 25

interconnection arrangement. LECs should

1 only force an interconnector to relocate 2 within a central office under extreme circumstances and must give reasonable 3 notice to the interconnector. 5 Reasonable installation time frames should 7 be tariffed. Government compliance should be the responsibility of the LEC. Interconnectors should be allowed to 9 purchase their own insurance. There 10 should be no restrictions placed on 11 interconnectors by LECs regarding the 12 13 types of equipment that can be installed : as long as it can be used to terminate 14 basic transmission facilities. Finally, 15 the Commission should ensure that the 16 LECs' liability language for 17 interconnections is reasonable. 18 19 Should all special access and private line 20 19. 0. providers be required to file tariffs? 21 No. The Commission determined in Order 22 No. 24877 that customers using the 23 services of AAVs understand that they are 24 dealing with a competitor to the LECs and 25 26 can choose to go back to using the LBC for

1			all their service needs if they are
2			dissatisfied with the AAV. The Commission
3			concluded the filing of tariffs would
4			provide limited benefit. If the
5			Commission does require AAVs to file
6			tariffs, it should adopt streamlined
7			filing procedures (e.g., rate bands and
8			short notice periods).
9			
10	20.	Q.	How would ratepayers be financially
11			affected by expanded interconnection.
12		A.	Ratepayers will benefit financially from
13			expanded interconnection. To the extent :
14			that expanded interconnection leads to
15			increased competition for access services,
16			ratepayers will benefit from LEC efforts
17			to increase efficiency and lower costs.
18			The LEC should flow through these
19			efficiencies and cost reduction to
20			consumers.
21	1.55		
22	21.	Q.	Should the Commission grant ICI's
23			petition?
24		A.	Yes. Based on the points I've made about
25			the benefits of expanded interconnection,
26			the Commission should grant ICI's petition

1			to permit AAV provision of special access
2			and private line services through
3			collocation arrangements in local exchange
4			company central offices.
5			
6	22.	Q.	Does this conclude your testimony?
7		A.	Yes.
8			