BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

IN RE: Petition for expedited approval of settlement agreement with Lake Cogen, Ltd., by Florida Power Corporation.

DOCKET NO. 961477-EQ

COPY

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN JULIA L. JOHNSON COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER DIANE K. KIESLING COMMISSIONER JOE GARCIA

PROCEEDING:

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

7**PAA

DATE:

June 24, 1997

PLACE:

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148

Tallahassee, Florida

JANE PAUROT, RPR
P.O. BOX 10751
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302
(904) 379-8669

BUREAU OF REPORTING

RECEIVED 7-7-97

SC-130 1619

1 PARTICIPATING: 2 James Fama, Esquire, and Sam Nixon, representing Florida Power Corporation Shef Wright, Esquire, representing Lake Cogen, 3 Ltd. and NCP Lake Power Roger Howe, Esquire, representing Office of Public Counsel 5 6 STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS 7 Issue 1: Can the Commission deny cost recovery of a portion B of the energy payments made to Lake regardless of the outcome of the current litigation? Recommendation: Yes. Jurisdiction over retail cost 9 recovery is exclusive to this Commission. An adjudication of rights between a utility and a qualifying facility by a 10 court is not dispositive of the utility's authorization to 11 recover those costs from the ratepayers. Issue 2: Should the Settlement Agreement between Florida 12 Power Corporation and Lake Cogen, Ltd. (Lake) be approved for cost recovery? 13 Primary Recommendation: Yes. Approval of the Settlement Agreement mitigates the risks associated with the 14 uncertainty of civil litigation. On balance, because there is more monetary risk in rejecting the Settlement Agreement 15 than approving it, giving at least some intuitive recognition to the reduced need for replacement capacity due to deregulation increases the Settlement Agreement's cost-16 effectiveness, and using traditional regulatory rate base 17 accounting as the basis to calculate simple payback, the contract buy-out should be approved. 18 Alternative Recommendation: No. The proposed Settlement Agreement should not be approved because it is not cost-19 effective. The modifications to the Contract result in a net overpayment of avoided costs of approximately \$17.1 20 million NPV. Chapter 366.051, Florida Statutes, Section 210 of PURPA and this Commission's Rules require that QF 21 payments not exceed a utility's full avoided costs. Second Alternative Recommendation: No. The proposed 22 Settlement Agreement should be denied since it cannot be shown to be cost-effective. Based on reasonable economic and legal assumptions, sensitivity analyses indicate that 23 the likelihood of the agreement yielding ratepayer losses is 24 roughly equivalent to the likelihood of it yielding ratepayer savings.

revised capacity and energy payments pursuant to the

<u>Issue 3:</u> If approved, how should the settlement payment and

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1	Settlement Agreement be recovered from the ratepayers?
_	Recommendation: The energy settlement payment of \$5.5
2	million and the ongoing energy payments made pursuant to the
-	Settlement Agreement should be recovered through the Fuel
3	and Purchased Power Cost Recovery (Fuel) Clause. The
	capacity payments as determined and paid pursuant to the
4	Settlement Agreement should be recovered through the
5	Capacity Cost Recovery Clause. The recovery of payments
5	made prior to their inclusion for recovery through the adjustment clauses should include interest from the date the
6	payments were made. Should the Settlement Agreement not be
U	approved, any necessary adjustments to the Fuel Clause to
7	reflect the method of pricing energy under the Contract
•	prior to the Settlement Agreement should be made at the next
8	Fuel Adjustment hearing.
•	Issue 4: If the Settlement Agreement is approved, what is
9	the appropriate method for recovering the Special Monthly
-	Payments associated with terminating the contract on
10	December 31, 2009?
	Recommendation: If the Settlement Agreement is approved, 72
11	percent of the special monthly payments should be recovered
	through the Capacity Coet Recovery Clause and 28 percent
12	should be recovered through the Fuel and Purchased Power
	Cost Recovery Clause. This split between the clauses
13	reflects the fact that the payments are justified based on
	anticipated capecity and energy savings in the buy-out
14	years. The recovery of payments made prior to their
16	inclusion for recovery through the adjustment clauses should
15	include interest from the date the payments were made. Issue 5: Should this docket be closed?
16	Recommendation: Yes. If no person whose substantial
	interests are affected by the Commission's proposed agency
17	action files a protest within twenty-one days of the
	issuance of this order, this docket should be closed.
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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Item 7.

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COMMISSION STAFF: Commissioners, Item Number 7 is FPC's petition for approval of a settlement agreement with Lake Cogen, Ltd. This item is divided into five separate issues. The first issue asks whether or not this Commission can deny cost recovery of a portion of the energy payments regardless of the outcome of the current litigation. The second issue addresses whether or not the settlement agreement should be approved. The third agreement addresses, if approved, how should the settlement agreement and revised capacity and energy payments be recovered. The fourth addresses whether, if approved, how should the buy-out payments be recovered. And the last issue addresses whether or not the docket should be closed.

There is one correction on Page 26, the sixth line of the staff analysis. The recommendation references the year 2005, that date should be 2008. Page 26, the sixth line of the analysis.

Staff is here to answer any questions regarding each of these issues. I believe FPC and probably Lake is here, as well.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Commissioners, how would you like to proceed? Bob, were you going to run

1	through Issue 1? Is that yours?
2	MR. ELIAS: I can do that.
3	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is it true that it's
4	virtually the same as the Pasco Cogen?
5	COMMISSION STAFF: With respect to Issues 2, 3, 4,
6	and 5, yes, ma'am.
7	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Why do we have to vote
8	on Issue 1?
9	MR. ELIAS: We think that if the Commission
10	approves Issue 1, it is not inconsistent with the
11	primary and supports the first and second alternative
12	recommendations on Issue 2.
13	COMMISSIONER CLARK: You haven't answered my
14	question. Why do we have to vote on Issue 1? It's not
15	necessary to the disposition of this case, is it?
6	MR. ELIAS: You can vote on Issues 2 through 5
17	without addressing Issue 1.
18	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I mean, it's implicit in
9	those other issues depending on how you vote. And it
20	has previously been addressed in the order on the
21	declaratory statement.
22	MR. ELIAS: The one that was converted to a 120.57
23	proceeding.
!4	COMMISSIONER CLARK: The declaratory statement
5	when we said we didn't have the authority to do this.

1	MR. ELIAS:	That was	converted	to a	120.57
2	proceeding.				

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let me ask it in a different way just for my edification. What is the purpose of Issue 1?

MR. ELIAS: And, again, we think that it is consistent with the first and second alternative on Issue 2, and we think that based on the discussion at the last agenda conference when the Pasco rec was considered, that this point wasn't made clear and that perhaps some Commissioners were uncertain about what their ability was or what the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction was with respect to cost recovery pass-through after a court's decision on a contract.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So this is more of an educational -- which I'm fine with that, because -- or I'm fine with discussing it, and perhaps not voting on it, because we have raised some issues here.

MR. ELIAS: And I think, too, we could have written an awful lot more on this, and we want to pursue a course of action that will not require this Commission to address what we believe is an inconsistent interpretation by a circuit court. Whether it's through referrals where they are appropriate, whether it's through participation as a

party, or an amicus in civil court actions where they are appropriate. We think that -- if I can coin a new term of art -- informed comity, and that is C-O-M-I-T-Y -- is really the best course of action for this Commission to take. We have already brought to Internal Affairs a recommendation concerning this particular contract in the event that this settlement agreement is not approved, and there are several others, both negotiated and standard offer contracts that are in litigation now that we will probably be bringing similar recommendations to Internal Affairs as far as Commission involvement in the circuit court action. But we do not intend to let a court make a decision inconsistent with what we believe the basis for the Commission's initial approval was without actively involving ourselves in that proceeding to advance the ratepayers' and the Commission's interests.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Could you explain for me how and on what basis we could deny cost recovery of a portion of energy payments regardless of the outcome of a case?

MR. ELIAS: If it is inconsistent with the basis that the Commission initially approved and inconsistent with the statutes with respect to avoided costs, I do not believe that this Commission has any affirmative

obligation to pass those costs through to ratepayers. 1 If it is determined by a circuit court that Florida 2 Power Corporation -- well, you said energy payments, 3 that would be as far as the energy payments. But things like attorneys fees, punitive damages, interest, 5 all of those kinds of issues, I think, are appropriately a separate issue for consideration by the 7 Commission when a company seeks cost recovery through the fuel and purchased power costs. 9

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let me ask it in this way. we determined in that motion to dismiss that the courts had the authority to interpret contracts, and that Provision 9.1.2 dealt with -- and the rule that was referenced dealt with the avoided cost analysis, it appeared to me that in that motion to dismiss we stated that the courts had jurisdiction to interpret contracts and, therefore, the term that they were interpreting, the terms are the avoided cost terms.

Now, the Court came out and said avoided cost means firm at all times. You're saying that we could then say, no, the court's interpretation was wrong, and, therefore, we are not going to allow cost recovery because the court's interpretation was wrong? And if we are saying that, why did we send it to the court to interpret in the first place?

MR. ELIAS: The first step is the Commission -- if it goes to the court, or when it goes to the court, we intend to participate in whatever way possible to make sure that the appropriate assessment of avoided cost is reached by the court.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: But what if we disagree?

NR. ELIAS: I think that it's an open question. I think if a court says it's X, and at the time the Commission approved the contract the Commission said it was Y, and if that was the basis for the Commission's decision that the ratepayers should pick up the cost, and X is greater than Y, I think the difference is still at issue.

am just trying to better understand this. Why would we send it to the courts? It appears to me that somewhere -- one of these decisions is wrong. Either we shouldn't have send it to the court, because really we are saying we can second-guess the court, or we should have sent it to the court, and if we send it to the court and they determine avoided cost, we can't later say avoided cost is something else. I agree that we have the authority over cost recovery, but when someone else has defined avoided cost, then when we are looking at that for purposes of cost recovery, if that's what

1	avoided cost is, that's what it is as the court has
2	defined it. So I'm getting
3	MR. ELIAS: And what I think as a first step that
4	we will be before that judge saying this is what we
5	said avoided cost was when we approved it, and here are
6	the orders, and this was the basis that we approved the
7	contract for cost recovery. I don't ever want to get
8	to the issue of having to disagree with a court's
9	interpretation of what avoided cost is, and that's why
10	we are going to vigorously pursue participation in the
11	civil courts.
12	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: But you think we have the
13	authority to disagree and do something other than what
14	they have said in their
15	MR. ELIAS: I think you have a statutory mandate
16	to approve costs through the clause that are no more
17	than a utility's avoided cost. And I think that that
18	is an easily defined term in the context of the
19	approval, that when the contract was initially
20	approved, and I think that that's what controls as far
21	as cost recovery.
22	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And I just want to be clear on
23	this. So who gets to determine avoided cost, the
24	courts or the Commission?
25	MR. ELIAS: With respect as between the two

parties?

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: No, as between the jurisdiction of the Commission or the court.

MR. ELIAS: Insofar as -- and the reason I asked as between the parties, because we have said that the circuit courts or the civil courts have the authority to interpret those contracts between the parties. And there is a whole raft of issues that with respect to the ratepayers' obligations we are neutral on. You know, we don't really have any kind of interest in determining what the rights are between the respective parties with respect to backup fuel, with respect to whether this particular provision of the contract is met, or a whole host of things. But when it affects the bottom line amount that the ratepayers are going to be asked to pay and that amount is different, i.e., greater than what was originally contemplated when the contract was approved by this Commission, I think that that increment is a matter of Commission jurisdiction.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So in that answer are you saying that the Commission then would have the authority to interpret the contract, determine avoided cost, and then allow or disallow cost recovery?

MR. ELIAS: As between the company and the ratepayers, yes.

1 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And what was your authority for 2 that in this analysis?

MR. ELIAS: I think that that goes to 366.051, which is the avoided cost statute.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So, again, I'm getting to the point maybe the court shouldn't be interpreting avoided cost.

perspective to it, at least what my understanding is. As we all recall, there was a big debate as to whether we were going to let the court interpret the contract or not, or at least whether we thought that we had the authority to interpret the contract. And at least there was a great deal of difficulty for me given the fact that we were asked to approve the contract to begin with, but it was determined, and I think rightfully so, that we do not have the jurisdiction to interpret the contract as it relates to the parties involved in the contract.

It would be similar to whether if Florida Power entered into a contract with some independent third party to supply them, you know, office supplies, and we said, no, you're paying too much, we are going to void this contract. We don't have the authority to void the contract between those two parties. If Florida Power

entered into the contract and another party signed the contract, that's between those, and if there is a dispute in that contract, it doesn't come to us, it goes to a court. And that's what we said applied here.

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But I think this Commission has a long history of always jealously guarding our jurisdiction, what is clearly our jurisdiction, and that is to set just, fair, and reasonable rates. And just because we have said a court is going to interpret the contract as it applies between two parties, does not relieve us of our obligation to set just and reasonable rates for the ratepayers. We still have that obligation, and regardless of what the court decides, that is not going to relieve us, and we have got to make that interpretation. And it would be nice if our interpretation is consistent with the court's, but it doesn't mean that it has to be consistent. You can have an interpretation of the court as it pertains to the parties and have a different interpretation as it pertains to cost recovery and our jurisdiction to set just, fair, and reasonable rates.

That's how I understood it, as to what we did, and why it was necessary to have the contract provisions interpreted by the court. But we never relinquished any of our jurisdiction. In, fact, I don't think we

can relinquish our jurisdiction. Our jurisdiction is as it is and we have got to set just, fair, and reasonable rates.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Well, let me ask a question, because this is I think the best time for us to have this -- the only time we can have this dialogue. Then it would be your opinion that the court has jurisdiction to interpret the contract as it relates to the contractual parties, but then we also have the authority to interpret the contract as it relates to the impact that it might have on the ratepayers?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, absolutely.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is that, Bob, your --

NR. ELIAS: That is consistent with what we have recommended here, and that is the basis for our recommendation, yes.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And what do we -- at that point in time, if we disagree with what the court said, then we just -- we aren't bound -- and I want to tell you why I'm getting into this issue, because if we ever get to regulatory out, I know this gets so complicated, but if we ever get to the regulatory out clause and we say we didn't listen to what the court's interpretation, someone is going to get caught up there. How do we -- just walk me through that for purposes of the impact

that this kind of a decision might have.

MR. ELIAS: The starting point for any analysis is the avoided cost and the costs that are due under the contract as we reasonably interpreted it at the time that it was approved. That is the baseline. And above that, I think they are all at issue. I think the regulatory out clause is a whole separate and distinct matter and represents something that the parties arguing at arm's-length agreed to among themselves. It amounts to an assumption of risk under the contract. And I think -- I believe it was Mr. Watson that said in here the application of the regulatory out clause to Mr. McGlothlin is something that the circuit court might reasonably be expected to interpret. And that's not something that we have a concern about at this point, either.

Again, our focus is going to be on making sure that the circuit court's determinations or a civil court's determinations are consistent with what we approved wherever we can get in there and play or get the matter referred to hear, so hopefully we won't have to address some of these thorny issues. But I think the regulatory out clause is a separate and distinct issue and represents an allocation of the risks between the parties. And that our decision as to the costs

that were contemplated under the contract is separate and apart from any discussion of whether or not that contract has a regulatory out clause.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: But your opinion is that you could have two separate interpretations? We don't want to, and I agree, we want to be able to go into the court and convince them. But to the extent that we can and they come out with one interpretation and we come out with a different interpretation, for purposes of our ratepayers we can go with our interpretation?

MR. ELIAS: I believe so, yes.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: And then what is the effect of the regulatory out clause if we don't approve it for cost recovery, what happens then?

MR. ELIAS: I think it's to the cogenerator if the contract contains a regulatory out clause. I think that the cogenerator or the non-utility contracting party has agreed when they sign the contract that if the costs weren't approved by this Commission, it was their responsibility or that they weren't going to get paid for that.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think it would be FPC's call at that point as to whether they are going to try to invoke a reading of the regulatory out clause which relieves them of actually pay those amounts under the

1	provisions of the contract. But that would be their
2	call if that scenario plays out if they want to try to
3	enforce that provision as they understand that
4	provision.
5	COMMISSIONER CLARK: What does the regulatory out
6	clause provide in this context, what is the language?
7	COMMISSION STAFF: The regulatory out clause
8	provides that if a regulatory body were to take an
9	action that adjusted the payments which the utility was
10	making to the cogenerator, FPC would adjust those
11	payments to reflect that action and pass that adjusted
12	amount on to the QF.
13	COMMISSIONER CLARK: So if we disallow a certain
14	amount, there is no obligation for Florida Power Corp
15	to pay that amount to the cogenerator.
16	COMMISSION STAFF: I don't believe so under the
17	terms of this contract. And it's at that point that
18	the QF says, I live with this, okay, or I can't take
19	this anymore, I'm out of here.
20	COMMISSIONER CLARK: So why did we send it to the
21	court to begin with?
22	COMMISSION STAFF: I don't know, ma'am.
23	MS. WAGNER: Commissioner Clark, I would like to
24	say something on the regulatory out clause. I'm not
25	sure that we have the jurisdiction to interpret that

clause, so when staff says at this point in time that they believe that Florida Power Corp can invoke the regulatory out clause, that is just we are interpreting that clause. I would like to point that out.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Well, one of the things that concerns me, and I want to make sure we look at all of the parameters of this particular case, is that to the extent that we decide that certainly we can send this case to the court, and the court has the jurisdiction to interpret contracts, but we also have the jurisdiction to interpret contracts as it relates to the ratepayer. If we ever get to the regulatory out provision, that is going to go back to that same circuit court and they are going to look at their interpretation of the contract, I would think, as opposed to our interpretation. If we ever got to that point, and I know we don't want to get to that point, and that's why I don't want to be involved in these But it does concern me that there appears to be some inconsistency or some struggle there between the two entities that are interpreting the same provisions of the same contract and who really has the final say as it relates to, I guess, the parties or the ratepayers.

MS. WAGNER: Chairman Johnson -- I'm sorry, I

didn't mean to interrupt you, but I would like to point out when you talk about the regulatory out clause, that I came across a case which the regulatory out clause that the Commission -- and I can't recall the Commission. I think it was in the Freehold case (phonetic), but I'm not positive, or it was referenced in the Freehold case, was federally preempted from interpreting that regulatory out clause and it was taken from their jurisdiction.

NR. ELIAS: And I think factually that case is very much distinguishable from the situation that we are confronted with here. Essentially, in that case, the New Jersey Commission and a New Jersey utility were trying to use the regulatory out clause to force the cogenerator into a different deal than the one that had been originally agreed to, agreed upon by all the parties and approved by the Commission. And that is not what we are trying to do here. We want the deal that the Commission approved that the parties agreed to at the outset. And any changes to the deal need to be measured against that standard.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: See, and in that vein -- I want that deal, too, but in that vein, it appears -- it's hard for me to reconcile these theories. It's almost like then we shouldn't have sent it to the circuit

court at all. Because the way I look at it, what I thought we did was we said the court has the jurisdiction to interpret contracts, and we cited those provisions. Florida Power Corp came to us and tried to get us to interpret it, we said no. Then we sent the case to the court, and I agree that we always have jurisdiction over cost recovery, but it seems that we are limited by the definition that the court has given us for avoided cost. And you're saying we aren't limited, because if they give us the wrong definition, if we don't like that definition --

MR. ELIAS: It's not a case of liking or disliking the definition. The definition that controls for cost recovery purposes is the basis that we approved the contract on initially.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So do you really think that we should have sent this to the court? Did we kind of abdicate our jurisdiction at that point?

commissioner DEASON: I think we need to clarify something. I'm not so sure we sent it to the court. We just kind of acquiesced and backed away. The parties, or at least one party was already saying that the court had jurisdiction and we had no jurisdiction. So it wasn't like we sent it over there. I'm not so sure that was the -- we acknowledged that the court had

1	jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the
2	contract as it pertains to the parties, and I don't
3	think but by doing that we did not back away one
4	step from acknowledging our jurisdiction to set rates
5	which are just, fair, and reasonable. And to do that
6	and to protect the ratepayer we have to look at avoided
7	cost as we understand avoided cost, and under our
8	understanding of avoided cost that is the basis that we
9	approved the contract to begin with. And that's what
10	my understanding is of what
11	MR. ELIAS: And I think there are two sets of
12	interests here; there is the company/independent power
13	producer, and company/ratepayers. Company/independent
14	power producer, courts; company/ratepayers, Commission.
15	And that is the dichotomy that I would draw.
16	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And that is a dichotomy
17	that's a problem, too, to have all these different
18	entities interpreting these contracts for different
19	purposes.
20	MR. ELIAS: And if the Commission was to assert
21	jurisdiction over these contracts for all purposes, I
22	see problems with that, too.
23	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: What about for purposes of
24	avoided cost analysis and
25	MR. ELIAS: I'm sorry?

•	CUMINAMA CAMBAM! MIME SPORE HOT TOT SIT
2	purposes, but for purposes of what Florida Power Corp
3	originally did, said could you tell us if we are right
4	with respect to how we are doing this avoided cost
5	methodology?
6	MR. ELIAS: And I think that that's the policy
7	that we are pursuing now is to make sure that what we
8	believe, the basis of the contract was originally
9	approved under is before the fact-finder, wherever it
10	is, whether it's in a civil court or whether it's
11	before this Commission.
12	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And where do you think it
13	should be?
14	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Here.
15	MR. ELIAS: Well, as far as avoided cost, I think
16	clearly we have the better understanding, the better
17	familiarity with the subject matter, and the
18	institutional knowledge to put on the factual evidence
19	to make the most informed determination and consistent
20	throughout a utility and statewide. That's one of my

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So you think it should be decided here? And can it legally be decided here?

determinations among the 20 different circuits.

concerns with ceding this matter or letting the circuit

courts decide this matter is inconsistent

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1	NR. ELIAS: I'm sorry?
2	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Do you think it should be
3	decided here and do we have the legal authority to
4	decide it?
5	MR. ELIAS: Well, I think we need to seek referral
6	wherever it's appropriate.
7	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Seek what?
8	MR. ELIAS: Seek referral from the circuit courts
9	the way we did in the teleco cases and some of the
10	others, Home Shopping Network, to have those issues
11	decided here.
12	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I don't think we sought
13	referral in the Home Shopping case, I think they gave
14	it to us. And I could be wrong. But I support the
15	notion that the way to address it is through
16	intervention to make sure that the court has the
17	benefit of what expertise we may have on it. Another
18	way to address it is to be very clear when we have
19	approved the contract to say this is how we interpret
20	this contract provision, which I understand we didn't
21	do in this case.
22	MR. FLOYD: Commissioner Johnson, could I just
23	make two very brief points? I know that this is mostly
24	a legal argument, but just a couple of philosophical

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background points. And this is just my personal

opinion here, but when the Commission first analyzed and approved these contracts, the Commission took some risk on behalf of ratepayers. Regulation is not risk free. And I think part of the risk we take is that our interpretations of things may turn out to be different than the way the courts interpret it. And as much as we would like to make this process risk free for the ratepayers, I don't think we can do it.

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Now, I'm not going so far as to say if somebody got punitive damages in the court that we would have to allow that. That is where our cost recovery come in. I think we have some discretion there to come back there and say we are not giving you cost recovery because you mismanaged the company or for whatever reason you got punitive damages, we are not passing that through, but the legitimate avoided costs. That's point number one, that I don't think we can make this risk free the way that we are trying to, at least the alternate recommendation.

Point number two, very briefly is that we have raised this point of avoided cost to the ultimate law, in other words, that supersedes all other points of law and equity, and I just don't believe that. I think initially when we look at these contracts, that's certainly the primary interest is that we do not want

to exceed avoided cost. But once you get into a dispute and a possibility of litigation and that kind of thing, then I think you have to look at it broader to make sure that everybody is treated -- fairness comes in, not just points of law. And I don't think you can go to a court or tell people to go to court -- maybe we didn't tell them to go there, but they went there, and the court said one thing and we say, well, we are not going to allow but a part of this. I just don't think that's fair. And that's my second point, and I appreciate it.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I want it to be clear that it's not a matter that we gave up jurisdiction. I believe the declaratory statement was based on the fact that courts are given the authority to interpret contracts, not this Commission.

MS. WAGNER: That's correct, Commissioner Clark.

And also in Order Number 950210, which we have discussed quite a bit and Docket 940771, we have gone back to this many times and said that we can only revisit cost recovery if we can show fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. And it was my suggestion that -- and I think Chairman Johnson mentioned it earlier, that it might be premature for us to make or to have you all make a decision on cost

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2	the circuit court there is a difference of
3	interpretation, and, let's say, in the Lake court
4	proceedings that the judge interpreted it to be, let's
5	say, 39 million, whereas according to our staff
6	calculations it should be, let's say, 15 million. At
7	that time, I think it might be appropriate for it to be
8	brought back to us and then we hold some sort of
9	evidentiary hearing to find out whether or not there
10	was fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake. That would
11	be my recommendation.
12	COMMISSIONER CLARK: You're making that's with
13	reference to Issue 1?
14	MS. WAGNER: That's correct.
15	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other comments on Issue 1?
16	Did the parties want to speak to Issue 1?
17	MR. FAMA: Yes, Chairman Johnson. Jim Fama on
18	behalf of Florida Power. I would like to follow up on
19	a couple of points that were discussed among the
20	Commissioners. As far as the jurisdiction is
21	concerned, I think the Commission clearly has
22	jurisdiction over the negotiated contract, and that's
23	what you looked at at the time you approved it back in
24	1991. There is no question about that jurisdiction,
25	and that you have continuing cost recovery

jurisdiction. But also there is a concurrent

jurisdiction in the courts to interpret the contract,

and I think the Commission correctly recognized that

jurisdiction, particularly when it pertains to disputes

between the parties.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Fama, is it a concurrent jurisdiction or do they have jurisdiction over interpreting contracts?

MR. FAMA: Well, I think in this case,

Commissioner Clark, it's concurrent, because I think
that the calculation of avoided cost is a special -that's within the province of the Commission under

PURPA, and you have a situation where the calculation
of avoided cost is exactly what is at dispute in the
courts, as well. And that's why I say it that way.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And I'm sorry for interrupting, too. And do you agree with what Mr. Elias is saying?

MR. FAMA: No. No, I don't agree, because,
Chairman Johnson, I think what you did is, this
Commission has consistently and repeatedly said that
after the initial actions it takes with respect to its
jurisdiction approving a negotiated contract, that
after that, it will really decline to exercise its
jurisdiction any further. And you have said that
repeatedly. You said that -- you said that in 1995

when you, in essence, said to the -- I will let the court decide what I approved in 1991.

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You said it in your rules when you had a proceeding back in 1991 and 1992 on implementation of the cogen rules. And that order stated once the Commission's determination of prudence becomes final by operation of law, the utility cannot, absent extraordinary circumstances, be denied cost recovery of payments made to a QF under a negotiated contract. That's what you said in that order. You issued a rule that said something similar. Firm energy and capacity payments made to a qualifying facility pursuant to a separately negotiated contract shall be recoverable by a utility through the Commission's periodic review of fuel and purchased power costs if the contract is found to be prudent. So, again, sort of the notion is you do your work up front and you don't revisit absent fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation.

You talked about the reg out clause in '95, and you decided that that -- you said that we do not think, however, that the regulatory out provision of the negotiated contract somehow confer continuing responsibility or authority. Again, you didn't want to continue with the jurisdiction.

Administrative finality comes into play here. The

party that detrimentally relied on this, they have settled, they have built a project, the parties have settled the case. At what point does the Commission's order become final and pass out of its hands and so the parties can rely on it. I mean, this started in 1991. If we wait another two years for the Lake court to make a decision, could it be that the Commission is saying you have to wait eight years before this becomes final before you really know? I think that's unreasonable.

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And what I'm suggesting is that I agree that you have, you can't give away your cost recovery jurisdiction. But, in the course of the Commission's actions over the years in this area, you have pretty consistently said you were going to look at it hard initially and you won't look at it again absent fraud, mistake, or misrepresentation. And for you to switch gears now at this point, I think would be arbitrary and capricious, and I think you run a fairly high risk that a court would say, wait a minute, Commission, you can't switch gears like this eight years down the line between 1991 and say 1999, if that's when the Lake court order would finally come out.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Explain to me how we would be shifting gears? What do you mean shifting gears?

MR. FAMA: Well, you would be -- you have

consistently said you would not -- just what you said, Commissioner Johnson, you would not interpret 9.1.2. You didn't interpret it, you just interpreted it kind of in a gross way when you originally approved the contract in '91. You declined to do it in '95, you gave to the courts, you said you wouldn't look at -reg out really didn't give you anything extra. You just had the Pasco case six weeks ago, okay. And then -- but then the staff recommendations are founded upon the notion, well, if we don't like what the court does in Lake, we are going to interpret 9.1.2 the way we want to interpret it. If we disagree with the court, trigger reg out. And I'm suggesting that is a reversal eight years down the line, and I think that a court might find that arbitrary and capricious given that sort of a consistent course of action.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Elias, you were shaking your head.

MR. ELIAS: Yes. It's not a question of interpreting the clauses of the contract the way we want to, it's what they were at the time the Commission approved the contract. What the reasonable understanding of what the terms of those contracts meant at the time that they were approved. And I think that that is a fact question that we can put on

evidence to demonstrate that avoided cost was considered to be A, B, C, D, and here is the basis for it. And it's not a question of deciding that we don't like what the court did, it's a question of whether or not it is consistent with the basis that the Commission approved it at the outset.

And the second thing is that I believe, and the recommendation says that such a finding by a court that avoided cost is X+2, when we can demonstrate that it was X at the time of approval is a mistake and is consistent with every pronouncement the Commission has made concerning its jurisdiction over cost recovery in these matters. And then the other thing that I would take issue with is whether or not this constitutes revisiting the issue of cost recovery or just enforcing the deal that was made way beck when. And we think it's the latter.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So the mistake goes not to the parties, but to the court as having made a mistake, and we can do that?

MR. ELIAS: Yes. Or that it was our mistake, that we thought it meant something different from what it really did at the time it was approved, and if we had known what it was at the time that we would not have approved it in that amount. I think that's consistent

with the contract definition of mistake.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And how do we get around -- and maybe we don't, maybe this is okay, but how do we get around the awkwardness of -- and I don't think we are trying to interpret the contract the way we want to interpret the contract, I agree with you there, but that the way we intended it, the awkwardness of us putting on a case before us as to the interpretation of the contract and the whole idea of why we let courts do it. Because there seems to be some maybe balancing of the positions of the parties when it would be the Commission putting on the case before the Commission to convince the Commission as to what we meant. Is that okay, or did I just bring that incorrectly?

MR. ELIAS: Our bottom line charge here is to represent the public interest, and this is the kind of issue where there may not be somebody else willing to step forward and make an affirmative case that this is what the Commission meant at the time because it's in no one else's own self interest. And in that circumstance, you know, I think it's entirely appropriate for the staff to demonstrate to the same standard as everybody else, with competent substantial evidence, to the extent that we can that this is what the Commission meant at the time it approved the

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2 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you.

MR. FAMA: You see, Chairman Johnson, that's our problem. We asked the Commission in 1995 and in 1994 to tell us what they meant when they originally approved the contract, and the Commission declined to do that. And then to say years later, oh, now we are going to tell what we meant, we wouldn't do it in '95, but we are going to wait until after the court decides and then we are going to say, no, we meant something different. I think administrative finality prevents that sort of thing from happening.

MR. ELIAS: And the problem that you have is that there are contractual issues between the parties that are clearly outside the jurisdiction of this Commission. You know, we are not going to award punitive damages based on a failure to parform.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But, Mr. Elias, wasn't this case about the interpretation of avoided cost, and that was part of the declaratory statement when we said even that is a contract matter to be resolved in the courts?

MR. ELIAS: And I don't think that we reserved any jurisdiction, if I can use that term loosely, two years ago when we issued the order determining that the circuit court was the --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So then is what Mr. Fama said correct?

MR. ELIAS: I think you have a different set of interests as between the cogenerator and the utility and the utility and its ratepayers, and that's where the line gets drawn.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So the answer is no, he wasn't correct?

MR. ELIAS: As far as the interests between the parties, I think he is, but I don't think that that is the final word as far as an adjudication of interest between the utility and its ratepayers.

commissioner Deason: Refresh my memory. It seems to me that what was presented to us at the time that we issued the declaratory statement was there was an effort to have this Commission interpret avoided cost for purposes of what the payment would be between Florida Power Corporation and the cogenerator. It was not for the purpose of telling us, define avoided cost to tell us what is going to be the amount, the maximum amount you are going to allow cost recovery if this ever becomes an issue. It was tell us what we have to pay this cogenerator. And we said, sorry, we can't interpret the contract to tell you what you have to pay the cogenerator. But by us doing that we did not say,

but we are not ever going to interpret the contract when it becomes an issue to determine what is fair, just, and reasonable to ask the ratepayers to pay under this contract. And what truly is avoided cost under the standard under which the contract was originally approved. I think there is a difference there, and I think that's what we did. If I'm wrong, correct me, but I think that's the situation. At least that's the way I understood it.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I didn't understand it that way. Because, in effect, because there is a regulatory out clause, the answer is the same as what PPC is obligated to pay the parties. We shouldn't have sent it, we shouldn't have conceded jurisdiction.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I was very reluctant to do it to start with, and perhaps I'm sad to admit it, but I was kind of -- I was overwhelmed by all the legal argument. That was the only thing that we had to do, and I wasn't comfortable doing it then, but it appeared that legally that is the only thing that we could do.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, Commissioner Deason, let me just say that none of us, I think, were comfortable with it, but the fact of the matter is we are required to follow the law, and the question was

1	who has the authority to interpret contracts.
2	COMMISSIONER DEASON: For purposes of determining
3	what the payment is. That was what was in dispute, th
4	payment. When they write that check every month or
5	whenever it is, how much is that check going to be.
6	And we said, sorry, we can't interpret that. But by
7	saying that we did not say but we are going to
8	interpret it when it comes to ask the customers to pay
9	their monthly check to Power Corp how much that is
10	going to be, and that is our jurisdiction.
11	MR. FAMA: Chairman Johnson, I have nothing
12	further. Mr. Nixon is here to discuss the business
13	deal, but I think since we are on the legal issues
14	maybe I will defer to Mr. Wright, he has some legal
15	issues to discuss.
16	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Wright.
17	MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Chairman Johnson.
18	Commissioners, I'm going to be very brief, despite the
19	fact that I over-prepared here. As to Issue 1
20	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Wright, who do you
21	represent?
22	MR. WRIGHT: I'm sorry. Shef Wright, law firm of
23	Landers and Parsons, representing Lake Cogen, Ltd. and
24	NCP Lake Power, Incorporated, its general partner.
25	With me also is David N. Hicks, business manager for

the Lake Cogen project. Mr. Hicks is here to answer any questions. Thank you, Commissioner Clark.

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Just to follow along some remarks that were made both from this side of the bench and that side of the bench. Lake Cogen believes that you should not address Issue 1. This issue is not necessary to decide any of the issues that are properly before the Commission today. The issue before the Commission today is whether to approve a settlement agreement that we agree with Florida Power, provides significant benefits to Florida Power Corporation and its ratepayers. And, in addition, provides significant protection to FPC and its ratepayers against further contingencies in the outcome of the litigation that is still pending.

This issue, Issue 1, has not been put before you by either Lake or FPC. A decision on this issue would not determine any party's substantial interests. If anything, if you are ever going to try to get to this issue, it should be a case-by-case determination.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let me ask you a question as to the relevance of this issue. I see this issue as relevant because the primary analysis is based on risk, and risk for the ratepayers. But if this issue is saying the ratepayers don't even have a risk here, because we get to determine the avoided cost, so there

is no risk of what the courts might do, then that really does in my mind impact whether or not that whole risk analysis set out in the primary recommendation is accurate. Could you respond?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, it may take me a few seconds to get there. Again, I don't think this is part of the issue that is before you, which is whether to approve the settlement agreement. I agree with just about everything Mr. Fama has said as to why Commission precedent, I think, precludes you from revisiting cost recovery. As he put it in 1995, you guys said, no, we are not going to do this. Thet is up to the courts. I don't think that you can --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Wright, let me interrupt you just a second. When you say revisit cost recovery, it seems to me that the question has never been put before the Commission. This contract operated and there was no dispute among the parties, there was no issue under an interpretation of what constituted avoided cost. Some parameters changed and it appeared that this unit would not be dispatched as it previously was understood it would be dispatched. The question of avoided cost came into question, and that this is the first opportunity. We are not revisiting anything.

MR. WRIGHT: But, Commissioner Deason, respectfully I think you approved this contract for cost recovery in your Order 24734 on July 1st of 1991. And, furthermore, you approved recovery of payments under the Lake contract and under 7, 8, or 9, depending on how you count, other cogeneration contracts for periods well in excess of two years as requested by Florida Power that were consistent with projections that Florida Power made to you at the time they came to you, sought and obtained your approval of these contracts for cost recovery.

Now, if I could just continue briefly. I think there are a lot of good reasons not to address this issue. I have ticked off several already. I don't think it's necessary, it hasn't really been put before you by either of the parties who are supporting this settlement agreement.

Additionally, there are a lot of other issues that are implicated here. There is potentially a fact issue as to whether there was a mistake, and there are numerous legal issues. I think there is a potential issue as to whether a statement of this type in this context would be a rule. If so, it would not be validly promulgated. There are constitutional contract issues, there are separation of powers and primary

jurisdiction issues, and there is, as Ms. Wagner pointed out, the federal preemption issue.

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Not surprisingly, I don't agree with Mr. Elias that the Freehold case is very distinguishable at all from the instant case, and I would like to read to you just the final holding statement from the Freehold decision, which is reported at 44 Fed. 3d, 1178. The court stated -- this is the Third Circuit of Appeals -stated, "Finally, we hold that once the BRC, the New Jersey Board of Regulatory Commissioners, approved the power purchase agreement between Freehold and JCP&L," Jersey Central Power and Light, the utility involved in that case, "on the ground that the rates were consistent with avoided cost, just, reasonably, and prudentially incurred, any action or order by the BRC to reconsider its approval or to deny the passage of those rates to JCP&L's consumers under purported state authority was preempted by federal law."

MS. WAGNER: Chairman Johnson, may I try to -- and this is strictly my opinion here. May I try to answer the question that you just posed to -- gosh, Mr. Wright. I forgot your name for a moment, and I see you all the time. It's my opinion that -- the reason why I feel that it would be premature for you to make a decision on this issue is because unless we have

evidence in front of us or we can assert with some sort of certainty fraud, misrepresentation, or mistake, I don't feel comfortable saying irregardless of what a court's decision is we can deny cost recovery.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: One of the issues that I'm dealing with is that to me it appears as if its a legal issue whether or not -- and the whole issue that Bob Elias raised with respect to us having the authority to interpret the contract as it relates to Florida Power Corp and the ratepayer, that that's a legal issue. And if the answer to that legal issue is, yes, we have the authority, then a lot of the -- the primary recommendation says, well, we need to accept this settlement to mitigate the risk associated with litigation. But if Bob's analysis is right, there is really no risk associated with the litigation. So, that whole premise kind of falls.

And if Bob's analysis is right that there is no risk associated with the litigation and the court -- and the PSC does indeed have the authority to calculate avoided cost, then as the alternative recommendation states, if we have that authority and if we determine that avoided cost is -- that the recovery being allowed is more than the avoided cost, and we have the authority to do something about that, then we have to

do something about it. And so to me the answer to that legal question really does impact both the primary and the alternative recommendations and how I would view them.

MS. WAGNER: I understand what you're saying, Chairman Johnson, but I don't feel comfortable when we make this decision based on what we have in front of us without first letting the parties respond to this question.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I agree.

MS. WAGNER: And, therefore, I think it is premature what constitutes mistake, what constitutes fraud, misrepresentation, and I would feel it appropriate to allow some other arguments and to allow us to delve into it a little deeper to determine what actually would encompass that.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Well, I'm starting to feel that same way. This issue wasn't couched this way in the last case that we determined, but -- and Commissioner Deason is perhaps correct, that we haven't addressed this question, neither have the parties, this legal issue. And even the analysis that staff provided, it's not a very strong legal position. It just kind of lays out what happened in another case by a different attorney and what he said. So it does appear before

making a decision on something like this that at least the issue should be briefed and better understood, at least by me, before I make a vote, because I do believe that the resolution of that legal issue impacts both the primary and the alternative.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think you could not -- in my opinion, there may be circumstances under which we could deny it. To me you can reach a decision on the other issues without affirmatively deciding one way or another. You can believe there is enough of a risk in a court saying that we don't have that jurisdiction to make a decision to accept the settlement. So what I'm suggesting is we don't have the last word on that issue.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Whether even if we were to frame a position on the legal issue, you're saying the courts could still say that you're wrong.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right. Well, the Supreme Court could say we were wrong.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, that's true with everything we do here. I mean, the court could tell us we are wrong in all our decisions. So that amount of risk is going to be regardless of what we do. But I think, if I understand what Chairman Johnson is saying, is that to her it's relevant on how she evaluates the

risk factors and what is appropriate under the various staff recommendation and alternate recommendations as to how that risk is going to be evaluated in her own mind, and I tend to agree with her. It does have a bearing on it. And while I agree that a court may ultimately agree or disagree with whatever we do, there is a risk factor as to how this Commission interprets Issue 1, and if we cen discuss that and get a consensus one way or the other, then we know at least how the Commission interprets that legal issue, realizing that a court may disagree with that legal issue.

commissioner CLARK: I don't believe it's necessary to make a decision. How we personally may evaluate that risk may go into our decisions on the other one, but it's not something that I think we should do in this case, particularly when it has not been briefed and fully discussed.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Well, I agree that it -- my thoughts are that it should be briefed and fully discussed.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I would also point out if that's what you want to do, we have got to go back to the other settlement we approved.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Well, it's a new issue that has been raised by staff in this particular case. Would

you agree with that, Mr. Elias, and could we do that?

COMNISSIONER CLARK: Is that order final?

MR. ELIAS: That order is final, yes. And it is -- we raised it this time because we were concerned after the discussion at the last agenda that the question of cost recovery of amounts approved by a civil court was a question that was closed at that point in time, and that's something that we strongly disagree with.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: While I would like to reconsider the previous one, while I would like to, but I don't think we should. I mean, I was on the minority decision, I think it was a bad decision, but that being it was made and that is the decision and the order is final. So I don't think that we should be revisiting that at this point.

I do think that the question that we are debating here was raised and discussed to some extent under the previous agenda item, and I congratulate staff for bringing it forward and trying to amplify it to some extent, because I think it is very relevant to how we evaluate what the risk factors are. Because any time you approve a settlement you are trying to evaluate risk factors. And I think that if need be we can defer this matter and let the parties brief this and make a

decision later. But to me it is extremely important to have an understanding of how this legal issue impacts the risk factors that are part of the analysis of the various staff recommendations.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other comments on that?

NR. FAMA: Commissioner Johnson, can I address
that? Florida Power does not want, does definitely not
want deferral in this case. I think there is a risk
attendant to that. The risk is the benefits of the
settlement may be gone forever if we defer this case.
I think what the Commission can do is -- and we have
done some research on this -- revisit the
jurisdictional order made in 1995, and it can open a
docket to do that. And there is still another cogen
case out there, the Dade case, where you don't have
finality triggering because there is no court decision
and there is no settlement of the parties.

I'm sure Mr. Wright is going to disagree with that, but the fact of the matter is I think the cleanest way to deal with this rather than defer and run the risk of losing the Lake settlement or disrupting settlements already approved is to revisit your jurisdiction. I think the Commission always has authority to revisit its jurisdiction and what it did in 1995. That's what the court cases say, and I think

that's the correct way to do it.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Lake agrees with Florida Power
Corporation, that we do not want to see this deferred.
We don't think it needs to be deferred. I don't agree that you can revisit your order that you made in 1995.
You might possibly be able to undertake a rulemaking to try to assert this type of authority if you wanted to pursue something generic. I'm not sure, and I will tell you that Lake's position and my belief is that you don't have that authority. But if you're going to try to pursue it, it would be better to pursue it in a separate docket rather than hold up this settlement and possibly lose its benefits.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Say that again. You say you don't, but fundamentally you don't believe we have the authority to do what Florida Power Corp suggested that we have the authority to do.

MR. WRIGHT: That's what I said, yes, ma'am. I don't think you can revisit your order from 1995. I think to do so would be inconsistent with your prior orders regarding cost recovery, with your prior decisions and your 1995 decision regarding your jurisdiction with respect to contracts. And, frankly, I think federal preemption will apply.

1	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And what is your argument as to
2	why this issue that has been raised, Issue 1, should
3	not be briefed and further explored?
4	MR. WRIGHT: It's not necessary to this docket.
5	It's a generic issue. If you want to address it,
6	address it generically.
7	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And it will be applicable to
8	the Dade case?
9	MR. WRIGHT: Possibly.
10	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Madam Chairman, I don't know
11	if we are through discussing it, but I know there are
12	people on the back row that I assume they came up to
13	discuss this issue. I have seen Mr. Howe for the first
14	time on this issue. Are you here to speak on it?
15	MR. HOWE: (Inaudible).
16	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Oh, you are in line for
17	another item?
18	MR. HOWE: No, no, I just don't need to speak on
19	Issue 1.
20	COMMISSIONER CLARK: All right. I guess I'm
21	confused as to where we are. Are we just on Issue 1 or
22	the whole item?
23	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We were on Issue 1. But, Mr.
24	Howe, are you going to want to speak on some of the
25	other issues?

1	MR. HOWE: Yes, ma'am.
2	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Then we can and, Mr.
3	Wright, you had completed your comments, had you not?
4	MR. WRIGHT: At least with respect to Issue 1,
5	yes, ma'am. Thank you.
6	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Staff, any other comments?
7	MR. ELIAS: Just one very briefly. Mr. Wright
8	concluded with a quote from the holding in the Freehold
9	case, and I think the operative word there was that the
10	New Jersey Commission could not reconsider its decision
11	to approve those rates. Those rates were the ones that
12	were approved in the contract when it was initially
13	approved, and that is what we believe the ratepayers
14	should be responsible for here. And we don't think
15	that assuring that what is passed through for cost
16	recovery as consistent with what was initially approved
17	is inconsistent with the holding in the Freehold case.
18	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. On the other issues, did
19	staff want to make any preliminary comments or go
20	directly to the parties?
21	MR. ELIAS: We don't have any initial comments to
22	make.
23	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Does Florida Power Corp have
24	anything else to add?
25	MR. NIXON: Yes. My name is Sam Nixon with

Florida Power Corporation, and I just would like to make a brief comment. We have a handout that is very similar to the Pasco handout that we made in that docket, and that is before you to answer any questions that may come up on those issues or how this settlement compares to other settlements approved by the Commission.

Basically, this settlement is almost identical to the Pasco settlement approved by this Commission on April 1st, 1997, and no new information or facts have been presented by any party which could cause the Commission to reach a different decision. And, therefore, the Commission should adopt staff's primary recommendation and approve the Lake settlement.

Only the primary recommendation recognizes that the Commission decided that only the courts have the authority over the correct interpretation of Section 9.1.2 of the negotiated contracts. And as a result, does not base its analysis of the settlement and recommendation on contract interpretation.

The alternative and second alternative recommendations are somewhat identical to those presented by staff in the Pasco docket. The alternative recommendation requires the Commission to interpret the terms of a negotiated contract, while the

second alternative recommendation identifies no new information for the Commission different from what was presented in the Pasco docket. And, further, the staff states that the likelihood of the agreement yielding ratepayer losses is roughly equivalent to the likelihood of it yielding ratepayer savings. This statement was true of the Pasco settlement approved by this Commission on April 1st, 1997, and is definitely true of the Lake settlement. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Wright.

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MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Chairman Johnson. I will be as brief as I can. Lake agrees with Florida Power that you should adopt the primary staff recommendation and deny both alternative staff recommendations. This settlement agreement provides substantial banefits to FPC and its ratepayers, and protection against significant additional risks to FPC and its ratepayers if you should approve it.

With respect to the alternative staff recommendations, I agree with the brief points that Mr. Nixon made. I would like to make a couple in addition more specifically. The first alternative staff recommendation incorrectly criticizes the modified contracts requirement that Lake will be paid a firm energy price for all energy delivered to FPC. Now,

it's true that the contract as it would be modified by the settlement agreement would pay Lake a firm energy price for all energy delivered. But this is not the same as the firm energy price under the existing contract. This is a convenience that was negotiated by Lake and FPC hopefully to avoid any future similar disputes such as the one pending in the current litigation.

The firm energy prica under the modified contract is simply the weighted average cost of fuel at the avoided unit fuel reference plant under the contract. The totality of the payments to be effected and to be made by FPC to Lake under the amended contract reflects a splitting of the difference, a pretty sizable splitting of the difference between the firm energy payments according to Lake's position in the litigation and FPC's position in the litigation. It is not correct to say you get firm all the time when other modifications to the contract make it clear that Lake is giving up its right to firm all the time as it believes the contract should be interpreted.

In addition, the first alternative staff, in my opinion, have used the wrong framework for analysis. They assert that approval of the settlement agreement would violate Section 366.051 and PURPA on the grounds

apparently that they are comparing the payments under the contract to FPC's now current avoided costs. In the handout that Mr. Nixon has given you, he points out correctly that the correct standard for reviewing negotiated contracts is avoided cost at the time the contract is executed and initially approved for cost recovery. At Page 18 of the recommendation the staff states, "Staff recommenda that FPC's modeling of the avoided unit more closely approximates avoided cost." The only way that has any meaning is to any that it more closely approximates FPC's current avoided costs, and they proceed to argue that approval of the settlement would thereby violata 366.051.

I think the fallacy of this approach is easily seen by applying the time honored legal principle that what is good for the goose is good for the gander. Consider the following: Suppose that the reverse of the recent trend in electric generation costs had actually come to pass. That current avoided costs, today's current avoided costs were greater than projected at the time the contract was approved. And then suppose that a QF came into court or wherever and said, you know, we don't think this contract is being interpreted correctly, and we think the right interpretation is we get paid more. And that's closer

to avoided cost and, therefore, you guys should approve it. Would the staff apply the same analysis? Would the Commission countenance it? Would FPC think it was fair? I don't think so. On the contrary --

question on that point. I don't understand that to be staff's position and part of their alternative analysis. What I understand their position to be is that avoided cost is subject to interpretation. It is based upon the cost of a pulverized coal unit at the time the contract was approved. That is not being changed one iota. The question is if that unit had been built by Power Corp, how would that unit be dispatched? And what staff is saying is that the cogenerator is not entitled to any more payment than what the cost would be for that fictitional pulverized coal unit to run if it had been built, and how it would be dispatched if it had been built. And that is the issue.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir. And the way Power Corp is administering the contract today effectively amounts with very, very few exceptions, effectively amounts to a lesser of. If the as-available price falls below the firm price as calculated, then they say the unit would be off. They don't take anything else into

consideration. That's their extreme end of the spectrum.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So you admit, then, there is room for interpretation under what constitutes avoided cost and perhaps we need to have a proceeding here at the Commission and get the facts and determine that?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, I don't agree with you that it is appropriate for you to have the proceeding here because that would be interpreting the contract. I do think the issue is how much of the time the avoided unit had it been built, the fictitious, hypothetical avoided 1991 pulverized coal unit that is specified in the contract would have operated.

Now, one thing is clear, and that is Florida Power Corporation's extreme position that that unit is to be dispatched on the basis solely of four parameters that are in our opinion set forth in the contract for pricing purposes only has been rejected by the circuit court in the Lake Cogen v. Florida Power Corporation litigation. And I would submit to you that the outcome is somewhere between something significantly greater than Power Corp's position and what staff has represented is Lake's position, which is firm all the time. Lake's position is we get paid according to the operation of the real unit. We happen to balieve that

1	the appropriate factual determination by the
2	appropriate trier of fact as to the intent of the
3	parties when they entered into this contract will
4	indicate that that unit would have run nearly all the
5	time.
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And it's your position the
7	court should decide that?
8	MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: For purposes of the payment
10	between you and Power Corp, from Power Corp to you?
11	HR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.
12	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And for purposes of cost
13	recovery?
14	MR. WRIGHT: I believe that once I think you
15	approved this contract for cost recovery in 1991.
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: How could we have known all
17	of that when we approved that contract when you, the
18	two parties that signed the contract, are in
19	disagreement over that? And it seems to me that only
20	with evidence and facts to determine how that unit
21	would be dispatched could we make an appropriate and
22	intelligent determination as to what constitutes
23	avoided cost and what is fair for the ratepayers to
24	pay.
25	MR. WRIGHT: Well, I think you had a lot of

information about what that avoided unit was, and I think that any reasonable determination will show that the avoided costs were well within the range of what you approved. If you want to talk about hypothetical mistake, I ask you to consider what you would have to say to say there had been a mistake in this case. You would have to say that if Lake won and was getting paid firm all the time, Lake would be getting paid exactly consistent with the projections that FPC made to the Commission when it sought and obtained your approval for cost recovery. Lake would be getting paid exactly consistent --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Wasn't that a worst case scenario projection to show that it was cost-effective even under that scenario, and it was not to say this is the way the contract should be interpreted?

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Deason, I don't recall any discussion of that being a worst case scenario. I recall that being projections as to the projected payments to be made under the contract. That's what the exhibits your order reflects and that's what FPC's performance and your approval of the contract and the other negotiated contracts --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, if that was the case, why didn't the contract specifically say that and have

1 that amount in the contract? There would not be any 2 dispute as to what that number was. 3 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, and the point is we probably should have explored it at the beginning so it 5 was clear what we were approving. COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm sorry, what? ĸ 7 MR. WRIGHT: I think the answer is --COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question. 8 sorry, we should have done what? 9 COMMISSIONER CLARK: That's it. That is the 10 11 point, is that if that was our interpretation from the beginning it should have been clear, and I have asked 12 13 staff, and they don't find it in the information that 14 that was how we were interpreting that contract. 15 Because that way we could point to it and say that was the basis on which we approved it, but we don't have 16 17 that. COMMISSIONER DEASON: We don't have that 18 information. All we have is language in the contract 19 20 that says it is going to be avoided cost. And that gave comfort to the Commission to know that in no 21 22 circumstance was there going to be a payment to the 23 cogenerator in excess of avoided cost. In fact, that's 24 what PURPA acquires, correct? It all depends on how

you interpret what avoided cost is.

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MR. WRIGHT: At the time the contract is entered into and approved by the Commission. On the contract buy-out issue --

means to me is we need -- and I have discussed it with staff -- is we need to be very careful at the beginning as to fully explain the besis on which we are approving it, and be more careful about the terms of the contract. And to intervene at a very early point in these court cases when the courts are going to be interpreting these, you know, terms of our regulations to make sure that our view is represented and hopefully adopted by the court. But it doesn't change the fact that I think the courts have the authority to interpret the contract. And that's where the dilemma --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And the authority to interpret the contract for cost recovery purposes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: If you believe that you can come up with a different interpretation and, therefore, deny cost recovery, then you have, in effect, voided their interpretation.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: We have not voided for purposes of what constitutes the way the contract is to be interpreted for the parties and what the payment is between Power Corp and the cogenerator, I agree with

1 that.

2 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Chairman Johnson. I have about five more points that I will make as briefly as possible.

On the contract buy-out issue, Lake agrees with the primary staff that there are several assumptions underlying the alternative staff's analysis, not all of which are likely to come to pass. We agree that you do need to give some intuitive credence and recognition to the probability that future market costs will be less than what the staff has assumed, which would render the buy-out even more cost-effective.

On the coal transportation issue, which implicates the \$1.76 per million BTU coal floor price that the parties have agreed to, I just want to make one simple point. This is a compromised resolution of a potentially major issue in the litigation. It is not a one-way issue in Lake's favor. It is a split the difference resolution of a contended issue.

As to the second alternative recommendation, we agree with the primary staff that all that the second alternative recommendation really does is include certain inflation and fuel price sensitivities, none of which alter the outcome of the analyses if either Lake

wins or FPC wins. We agree with the primary staff that the second alternative staff's recommendation is based on numerous assumptions that are not likely to come to pass. Key among these, in my view, as somebody who is around this a lot, is the assumption that generation technology will be frozen at the efficiency and cost levels associated with Polk 1 and 2.

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Finally, we think that the second alternative staff recommendation is methodologically flawed because it gives no weight to the fact that the court in the lawsuit that is being settled by the proposed settlement here today has already been decided against FPC on the key issue. The outcome cannot and will not be way down here at the effectively lessor of interpretation advanced by Florida Power. It may not be all the way up here. We think it's likely to be very close to up there, but a proper methodological analysis of this settlement agreement would reflect the fact that that issue has been decided and that the range is not from here to here, the range is probably from here to here. And my guess is that the low end of this range is probably above the agreed upon settlement.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Fama, do you agree with that?

1 MR. FAMA: Commissioner Deason, I need to hear the 2 last part of it again. COMMISSIONER DEASON: He is basically saying the 3 court has already decided this to an extent, and just to get to the point, Mr. Wright is saying that they 5 already have one and that the extent to your 6 interpretation is already out the window and now it's a 7 question of somewhere between the middle and his 8 position as opposed to your position and his position. 9 In the Lake case, I think we did lose 10 MR. FAMA: the issue on four parameters, that's what we argued. 11 The court ruled on a real unit, but we haven't gotten 12 to the point of fleshing out the real unit. And in 13 14 Florida Power's opinion, the real unit will stay off a 15 lot of the time under the facts that we have. So in our opinion we would ultimately hope to show in that 16 case that the real unit will operate in a fashion 17 similar to the four parameter unit, and it won't be on 18 all the time. So I think we are in the middle. I 19 think hopefully we are closer to four parameters than 20 21 we are to on all the time. 22 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Anything else, Mr. Wright? MR. WRIGHT: No, ma'am. You all ought to approve 23 the settlement. Thank you. 24

MR. HOWE: Commissioners, I'm Roger Howe with the

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Public Counsel's office. I would like to just address a narrow issue that I don't think you have looked at yet. And mostly I'm focusing on the staff's second alternate recommendation and the statement there on Page 23 that FPC ratepayers are not expected to realize positive net savings until 15 years after occurring costs associated with the FPC/Lake agreement.

Commissioners, I think one of the things you need to consider in all of these purchased power buy-outs is whether you can compare a benefit horizon for the company with a benefit horizon for the customers and reach a meaningful result. I asked -- in our building we have the legislature's economic and demographic research division, and I asked for them to give me an idea of the age groups of the people that live in the counties served by Florida Power Corporation.

And I'm not saying this is exactly scientific, but I think it's a reasonable approximation. And, for example, in Pinellas County, 266,000 people out of 880,000 residents are 60 and above. You're asking them to wait for 15 years to see any benefit. I also asked the economic and demographic research division to give me data for all the counties that Florida Power Corporation serves. And as of January 1st, 1997, from the demographic estimating conference data base, which

was updated January 1st, 1997, of 4,776,631 people residing in Florida in the counties served by Florida Power Corporation, 1,203,013 are 60 and above. Now, here we are just talking about age groups, but I think you also have to consider such things as --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Howe, I want to make it clear that I hope they all live to see the benefits of this, and if you are suggesting they are not, I want to make it clear that I'm hoping that they do.

MR. HOWE: I hope they do, too. But one of the things you have to consider is, of course, the age and the migration in and out of the service area. So, where on the one hand you have a long lived or basically an indefinitely lived corporation, and you compare that against customers I think you need to give some meaningful thought to can you reasonably expect that a large percentage of the customers who are going to pay these up-front costs are going to see any benefit either because of age or because of migration in and out of the service area. And it's just a point I wanted to bring to your attention. I should say also this is consistent with a position we were taking in the Tiger Bay buy-out and with which we have taken in the Orlando Cogen buy-out.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And your position in those

was what?

MR. HOWE: Our position as stated in those was that when you consider the age groups, the migration in and out of the service area, that it is not reasonable to assume that a significant portion of Florida Power Corporation's customers will see any benefit over the buy-out terms.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So what should we do? What is the Public Counsel recommending we do?

NR. HOWE: I guess right now I'm just recommending that you take this into consideration. And the reason I'm equivocating is that I realize that the Lake contract has certain nuances that aren't there with some of the others, and you have to consider the fact that there has been a circuit court proceeding and so forth. Were this just a typical buy-out, I would suggest that that buy-out term is too long and the company has not even tried to show any demonstrable benefit to a significant group of customers.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask you this. Would you address the notion that there is a benefit if you compare it to them actually building a plant which has a loaded up-front cost because you begin depreciating it, or I think staff mentioned it, that you would consider in this analysis also a comparison to actually

1	building it? To that let me put it a different way.
2	Does that to some extent mitigate a concern about
3	benefits?
4	MR. HOWE: Probably not, because it's just not the
5	factual circumstances we are faced with. The factual
6	circumstances are the buy-out versus the purchased
7	power contract. I think what you're suggesting is
8	another alternative where if there had not been a
9	purchased power contract.
10	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right.
11	COMMISSIONER DEASON: One thing is clear though,
12	under that scenario if Power Corp had built the plant
13	they would be responsible for dispatching and hopefully
14	they would be dispatching in an economic manner, and
15	there would be no way that there would be additional
16	costs being asked to be passed onto the ratepayers.
17	NR. HOWE: They would have to dispatch it in a
18	economic fashion.
19	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Howe, just so I'm clear,
20	Public Counsel takes no position on this case?
21	MR. HOWE: We are looking at this case closely.
22	We have looked at all of these purchased power buy-outs
23	closely.
24	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Oh, so does this get issued
25	as a Proposed Agency Action?

MR. HOWE: This is a Proposed Agency Action, so we have an opportunity to look at it based on how the Commission finally acts.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Howe, let me ask you a question, and I will just be very direct. If the Commission approves the settlement agreement and we know that is going to impact fuel adjustment, is it going to be Public Counsel's position, then, that that constitutes suitable and adequate evidence to support an increase in fuel adjustment charges?

NR. HOWE: Commissioner Deason, I guess if we did not protest it, it would be an implicit concession that those amounts should be flowed through the fuel clause.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let me ask you another question, Mr. Howe. I know you stated that you haven't had an opportunity to make a determination on the case, but how do you feel about briefing a legal issue, the issue regarding whether or not the Commission has the authority to interpret the contract as it relates to the company and the ratepayers for purposes of fuel cost recovery?

MR. HOWE: Well, on this I'm going to have to kind of speak off the top of my head from long experience.

I agree that the Commission has jealously guarded its jurisdiction in the past. I do believe that they are

and the cogenerator and the question of cost recovery.

Now, I'm not sure it's a good analogy but, for example, if the Commission were to approve the purchase price of vehicles at a Chevrolet price and later in a dispute between the parties the vendor was able to establish they were entitled to Cadillac payments, the Commission would not have to let those higher costs be flowed through to the customer.

An element that I'm not clear on here is what is the effect of PURPA and what is the effect of the fact this is a cogeneration contract under PURPA. I just don't know. I do believe that generally, though, the Commission has the primary end the preemptive jurisdiction under relevent Supreme Court decisions to determine the coet that Florida Power Corporation can pass on to its customers.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any final comments?

MR. FAMA: Chairman.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Uh-huh. Could you, and after you make whatever comments you want to make, you had stated earlier, because I am very interested in seeing this legel issue eddressed to make sure that we are making the proper determination and assessment as to Issues 2 and 3.

You stated that if we were to do that, that somehow impacts the settlement and the negotiation and where we are. After you have made whatever initial points you were going to make, could you address that and help me understand why delaying this to allow the parties to brief the legal issue would have a detrimental impact on this.

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MR. FAMA: I can address that up front. We have a settlement agreement, it has conditions in it. One condition is Commission approval. Another condition is lender approval. Partnership approval is another condition. We had been struggling to get all of that done. The court in the Lake case basically gave us a deadline and said if you can't get these approvals by a date certain, and I believe the date was June 1st -- 2nd, June 2nd, that the court is going to move ahead in the Lake case, and set a schedule and we are going to go to trial.

MR. WRIGHT: Could I just clarify that. The specific approvals that Judge Griggs (phonetic) required us to obtain were approval of the partnership or the partners in the partnership to the extent required. We took care of that by buying out. The partners first went to a preexisting option contract and the approval of the lender, GECC, General Electric

Capital Corp. We also obtained GECC's approval. The judge did not -- the judge recognized that there would be some time lag up to the time that you all would vote.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So is there a problem or not?

MR. WRIGHT: There is a problem.

MR. FAMA: There is a problem, Chairman Johnson, and the problem is that if we have a significant delay and we brief this issue, the court is going to move shead in the Lake case. The settlement terminates, the settlement is gone. No parties are bound by it. Did we extend it one month until July 1? I think we extended it -- the settlement vaporizes on July 1. The parties are no longer bound. And I would suggest to you that the parties will attempt to retrade the deal, basically, and it will be another protracted settlement.

I mean, it took us -- it has taken us a couple of years to settle the Lake case. As a matter of fact, I have settled it about three or four times personally myself. And the settlement, you know, keeps falling apart because of different things. So if some of the parties think they are advantaged by the Commission's briefing schedule, they are going to be reluctant to settle, and the benefits to the ratepayers that the

primary recommendation sees here today are probably gone for the foreseeable future. The parties may be back and settle, I don't want to say this will never settle again, but I don't think the parties will settle while it is being briefed before the Commission, that's for sure.

COMMISSION STAFF: Chairman Johnson, I would like to point out something. In the Lake proceeding, this is one of the proceedings in which the judge has asked for the Commission's expertise, and all along the way we have been involved in the proceeding. And this is the proceeding that we went to the Internal Affairs conference and spoke to you about, I guess, doing an amicus brief, end I'm not for sure how that was resolved, but we have been involved in the litigation. So if you decide to have the parties file a brief, I think that we could continue and give our expertise and help facilitate the judge's decision with regard to this terms of the contract.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. Any other -- I interrupted you.

MR. FAMA: Yes. Chairman Johnson, just one other point. I think that as Commissioner Clark said earlier, there is a risk if we let this settlement go, and, therefore, we don't want deferral, we want the

1 Commission to move forward. We think the cleaner way 2 is to revisit your jurisdiction. I did some research on res judicata before coming here today to satisfy 3 myself that you could revisit what you did in 1995, 5 because clearly the Commission has had a lot of angst about this. I mean, you had it six or seven weeks ago 7 in the Pasco case, you had it back in 1994 and '95 when you first looked at it. The staff recommendations have flip-flopped on this issue. Res judicata is just a 9 10 legal notion that the thing has already been decided. 11 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm sorry, Mr. Fama, you said the staff recommendations have flip-flopped on this 12 issue. What issue and what staff recommendations? 13 MR. FAMA: The staff recommendation -- originally 14 15 the staff thought the Commission should -- back in 1994, the original staff recommendation said the 16 Commission should take jurisdiction over --17 18 COMMISSIONER CLARK: All right. Was that a 19 Proposed Agency Action? And then we had a hearing or an argument, because it was a declaratory statement, 20 right, and then we converted to a 120.57, and then the 21 recommendation was different. Is that what you're 22 talking about? 23 MR. FAMA: I can't remember the procedural history 24

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that well, Commissioner Clark, but I just recall the

1	original staff recommendation.
2	MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Clark.
3	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, it's important. I
4	mean, I don't think the staff has flip-flopped on this
5	issue.
6	MR. WRIGHT: If I may.
7	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Not withstanding the fact I
8	may disagree with them on some points, I don't think
9	they have been inconsistent.
10	MR. WRIGHT: May I, Chairman Johnson?
11	COMMISSIONER CLARK: It may not be relevant.
12	MR. WRIGHT: I think I can answer Commissioner
13	Clark's question.
14	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Go ahead.
15	MR. WRIGHT: I think that Mr. Fama is possibly
16	confusing the dispute docket that related to a
17	different provision of the contract between FPC and
18	Orlando Cogen in which the staff initially recommended
19	something to the effect that they had jurisdiction or
20	something along those lines. I'm not exactly sure
21	about that. My recollection is that the initial
22	recommendation that was rendered in 940771, the
23	so-called energy pricing docket that was initiated by
24	Florida Power Cooperation's initial petition for
25	declaratory statement was that that petition as posed

to the Commission was not appropriate for resolution by a declaratory statement.

On motion by Florida Power, I believe, the issue was never discussed at the agenda conference after the staff recommendation was issued. Florida Power then filed an amended position -- petition, I'm sorry, by which it attempted to reframe the issue as a 120.57 proceeding. And it was that petition that my client and several others moved to dismiss, that the staff ultimately recommended dismissal, and the Commission voted it to be dismissed in February of 1995.

MR. FAMA: I stand corrected, Commissioner Clark.

I just said that as a way of prologue just to point out that the --

that it has been a difficult point for all of us, and it's difficult from the standpoint of risk. I think Roland Floyd sort of summed it up very well that to the extent we can we would like to eliminate all risk to the ratepayers. I don't believe we have, and I think in this particular case the issue of our jurisdiction, and what the court's jurisdiction was, and what our jurisdiction was was one of the best researched and briefed and argued cases we have ever had before us. So I'm not interested in going back and reviewing that.

I thought it was well done the first time, and I thought we reached the right decision. It may have some consequences that are less than optimal.

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MR. FAMA: Well, Commissioner Clark, my point is simple. I think you have the authority to revisit your jurisdiction if you want to. You are not barred by residuicata. That is what the law says, and I think that's a cleaner way to do it than to walk away from the settlement you have got in your hand right now. That is the only point. Thank you. That's all I have.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Commissioners.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Madam Chair, just to move us off dead center on this, I'm not going to move Issue Number 1. I will move primary staff on Issue 2, but with the understanding that there is some language in the recommendation that I don't agree with, and I don't want to see it in the order. There is a gratuitous statement that deregulation at the retail level is on the horizon and many customers may be switching power supplies. That doesn't figure into my decision, and I don't think it should be a statement we are making.

COMMISSION STAFF: Commissioner Clark, what page was that on, so I will know --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Page 9, the bottom of Page 9, and over to Page 10. But other than that, I'm willing

to move staff on Issues 2 through 5, is it? Issues 2 through 5.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Second.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There is a motion and a second. All those in favor signify -- any discussion? I will provide some. I don't know if that's where I would be or not. I think that it is necessary to do the additional research. I would defer this and have that question answered, or at least briefed by the parties as to the legal issue. Particularly the issue of whether or not the Commission has the authority or is actually bound to look at the contract in terms of the relationships between the company and the ratepayers for purposes of fuel cost recovery. I think that's important enough to have it briefed. To the extent that the settlement falls apart, I still feel so strongly enough that I would want to have that issue further discussed and resolved before making a vote on this particular issue. There is a motion and a second. All those --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, before we proceed further, is it necessary to take 2 -- the motion is --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Commissioner Deason, we can do that. I will just move Issue 2. I'm willing to amend my motion to just do 2.

1	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: That's fine.
2	COMMISSIONER CLARK: And the second still stands.
3	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There is a motion and a second
4	on Issue 2. All those in favor signify by saying aye.
5	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye.
6	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye.
7	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Aye.
8	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Opposed. Nay.
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Nay.
10	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Issue 2 passes on a
11	three-to-two vote.
12	COMMISSIONER CLARK: And I will move staff on
13	Issue 3.
14	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Second.
15	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There is a motion and a second
16	on Issue 3. All those in favor signify by saying aye.
17	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Aye.
18	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aye.
19	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye.
20	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Aye. And let me clarify. I
21	don't think that the settlement should be approved, but
22	now that it has been approved, I don't have a problem
23	with the way staff is recommending that it be recovered
24	within the confines of Issue 3.
25	CONNICCIONER CLARK. Can I move Issue 4 and 5 then

1	together, too?
2	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Second.
3	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And I have a question, I
4	think, on Issue 4, if you will give me just a moment.
5	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. So we will show Issue 3
6	approved unanimously. And you have moved 4, but we are
7	into discussion. There is a second on 4. Discussion?
8.	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Where do issue I see it.
9	Issue 4 begins on Page 26. In your recommendation when
10	you make the statement that I will just read it.
11	It's within the recommendation at the top of Page 26
12	about middle ways in the paragraph there. It states,
13	"This split between the clauses reflects the fact that
14	the payments are justified based on anticipated
15	capacity and energy savings in the buy-out years."
16	When you say in the buy-out years, what years are
17	those?
18	COMMISSION STAFF: It's the years shown on Page 27
19	of the recommendation, and what that did was take a
20	comparison of the contract. First is the replacement
21	capacity and energy cost during those years, and then
22	based on where the dollars fell, whether that was
23	capacity or energy is how you arrived at the 72 percent
24	and the 28 percent ratio.
) E	COUNTESTONED DELEGAT. And why did you do it in

that way, looking at only those years as opposed to all of the years that constitutes the settlement agreement?

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COMMISSION STAFF: I may be speaking a little out of turn given that this was a rate sponsored issue, but I understand that the methodology behind that was the costs incurred were for the sole purpose of deferring or replacing capacity energy in those particular years. The reason, then, that you take and only look at those years is that is where you are receiving your benefit from.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I'm looking at Pages 12 and 13 of the recommendation. Now, one may dispute the exact numbers shown in that table, but it appears that the buy-out portion of this agreement is very small in comparison to the issue of what constitutes the total net present value of the settlement. There are a number of other issues involved in this. seems that the buy-out, which is only for the shortness of length of the contract by some three years and ten months or three years and seven months, is just a small portion of what goes into this settlement. Things concerning the agreement on transportation and energy pricing appears to be the most significant item, and I assume that that's for the entire period of the settlement agreement.

1 And so I quess I'm having a problem of why you're trying to divide or allocate the costs between energy 2 and capacity based upon the buy-out years, when it 3 appears that's just a small portion of what constitutes the net present value of the settlement. Can you 5 comment on that? COMMISSION STAFF: Only to the extent that those 7 were specifically identified costs and associated with 8 that provision of the contract. Looking at the costs 9 incurred versus where the savings materialize is how 10 that methodology came about is my understanding. 11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, if we assume that the 12 majority of the savings, and I'm sure it's up to some 13 debate, but that the majority of the savings is related 14 to transportation and energy pricing, shouldn't then 15 that mean that that's the majority of the reason for 16 the settlement agreement and that the majority of that 17 associated with energy, kilowatt hours as opposed to 18 19 capacity? COMMISSION STAFF: As you referenced on Page 12, 20 21 that 24.9 is not a savings, that is a cost. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. Where are the savings 22

COMMISSION STAFF: The savings come when we get back to this legal issue and whether or not you base it

23

24

25

then?

on the settlement agreement, and compare that to Lake's -- compare it to the 100 percent firm position or FPC's position.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And the fact that the savings don't start until well into the settlement period, some 15 years into the settlement period, is that correct?

COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: So we are hinging not only the recovery of the costs, but the allocation of those costs based upon the assumption that the whole reason for this settlement agreement is to achieve those savings which start some 15 years out, and that is the reason for allocating costs right now upon your recommendation of -- what is it, 28 and 72 percent split?

COMMISSION STAFF: No, I don't think that the allocation has to do with the time lag. It doesn't. It is simply a weighing of costs which you have to recover, versus where the benefits are derived from. It's irrespective of when it occurs.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, you are saying that the primary driver for this settlement agreement is the fact that there has been a buy-out of some three years and seven months, and that because of that buy-out

1	there are savings in capacity dollars that otherwise
2	would exist during those years and, therefore, you are
3	recommending that 72 percent of these costs be passed
4	through the capacity cost recovery as opposed to the
5	energy cost recovery clause, is that what you're
6	saying?
7	COMMISSION STAFF: Kind of. It's not so much that
8	there is capecity dollars that the capacity dollars
9	that would have occurred, it is not 72 percent. It is
10	the difference between the contract versus the cost of
11	replacement. So that is your savings being derived.
12	Do you understand that part?
13	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Savings in cost of
14	replacement. I thought that the savings was between
15	what
16	COMMISSION STAFF: What you would have paid versus
17	what you are going to pey.
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Under the contract.
19	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir. During the buy-out
20	period. I don't think I'm answering what you're
21	asking.
22	COMMISSIONER DEASON: It just seems to me that we
23	are putting a whole lot of cost for recovery purposes
24	under capacity, which we know under the way costs are
25	allocated which primarily falls on the residential

1	class of customers.
2	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir.
3	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that causes we come
4	problems. And I have difficulty understanding why that
5	this analysis was done strictly on the buy-out years
6	and how that result is obtained. Now, if you can
7	explain it to me, fine. That's my difficulty.
8	COMMISSIONER CLARK: And would you clarify whether
9	or not it's similar to what we did in Pasco.
10	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, ma'am, it is.
11	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Excuse me?
12	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, ma'am, it is. All I can
13	say, Commissioner Deason, is the methodology that was
14	implemented here was the ratepayers are going to
15	realize an expense. That expense is going to be paid
16	up front for the purpose under these contract terms of
17	avoiding more expensive capacity and energy costs
18	during the buy-out years. In order to what was
19	implemented here, fairly
20	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me interrupt you just a
21	second. During the buy-out years, that is the last
22	years, the tail end of this thing.
23	COMMISSION STAPF: Yes, sir.
24	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I thought part of the reason
25	why this is determined to be cost-effective is that

during those later years, if there is going to be any needed more capacity, it's probably going to be at a lessor cost.

COMMISSION STAFF: That is correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. And so that is the reason that you are primarily allocating this on a capacity basis, these costs?

COMMISSION STAFF: No, sir.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: As I understand it, the reason that they are doing it on -- that they allocate it to capacity is just because its a capacity cost. Capacity cost in a later year, so therefore they are treating it as a capacity cost in this year. And if that is inappropriate to do, I think that should be explored.

COMMISSION STAFF: We are not trying to assign it as a capacity or energy cost. It is merely -- this is an expense, here are capacity and energy related costs that you would have incurred under the contract during those years versus what FPC anticipates they will incur because they no longer are under the contract, taking the difference between those two is where the sayings are being derived from. The bulk of those savings is in capacity costs versus energy costs simply because -- I hope I speak right here -- you've got these

escalating 1991 pulverized coal capacity payments, they are getting larger, larger, and larger.

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In those buy-out years you have placement capacity being based on a combined cycle unit. There is a larger difference there in between -- this is the part I may mess up on -- in between the energy differential. That is the reason you see the bulk of your dollars being recovered through the capacity clause or being recommended to be recovered through there, because the largest savings that they are deriving because of avoiding the contract payments is under the capacity clause.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. But by buying out the contract, the contract goes away three years and seven months earlier. So to the extent that Power Corp needs more capacity at that point they are going to go out on the market and buy it. And what I have been telling you is that is going to be cheaper than what is currently the avoided pulverized coal unit and probably due to competition and all the other benefits that are going to be derived even cheaper than what is contemplated in the contract.

COMMISSION STAFF: That may be, and that's what is addressed in the primary of Issue 2.

COMMISSION STAFF: But, Commissioner, if they go

out and buy that power it will be allocated on a capacity and energy basis and recovered through the separate clauses the way it is proposed here. So it doesn't avoid the problem that you are talking about. Purchased power capacity generally has a demand portion and an energy portion. The demand portion goes to capacity cost recovery and energy goes through fuel. So even if they purchase power out in the future, you're going to have the same bifurcated recovery.

It may be less, I agree, but you will still have the bifurcated recovery. And that is what this attempts to capture, is that if you are talking about capacity or avoiding capacity, it just seemed to make sense to ue from a cost allocation viewpoint to treat a certain portion as demand and a certain portion as energy. And this is the way that it was done in Pasco. This is exactly the way we are recommending in Pasco.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And let me make one other clarification or ask for one other clarification. The reason you're doing it over the last three years and seven months is because that's where the savings occur.

COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Because that's where the savings are in those last three years and seven months, and then we are using that as the allocator for the

1	entire period of time that this settlement is in
2	effect?
3	COMMISSION STAFF: The entire time period in which
4	they are recovering the buy-out costs, yes, sir, that
5	is correct. It's what, 1998 or so through 2008, like
6	it says in the recommendation. The allocators will be
7	used to recover those costs.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: All right. Thank you.
9	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Issue 4 has been moved and I
10	think there was a second. Any further discussion?
11	Seeing none, all those in favor signify by my saying
12	aye.
13	(Unanimous affirmative vote.)
14	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Opposed. Show it approved
15	unanimously. Issue 5.
16	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I move staff on Issue 5.
17	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is there a second?
18	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Second.
19	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Show it approved unanimously.
20	Yes, ma'am.
21	COMMISSION STAFF: Chairman Johnson, with regards
22	to Issue 1, did you
23	COMMISSIONER CLARK: There has been no motion.
24	COMMISSION STAFF: No motion. Did you still want
25	to are you recommending that we open up a generic

1 docket and take up what Mr. Fame said was the res 2 judicata and look at cost recovery on that basis to whether or not you had continuing jurisdiction? How do 3 you want staff to proceed? 5 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let me think about that. don't want to do anything unless some of the other Commissioners want to act on it right now, but I will 7 get together with the legal staff and we will make a A determination as to how to proceed and make a 9 recommendation back to the Commission. 10 COMMISSION STAFF: Then I would like to mention on 11 Issue 5 on close the docket, you just voted to close 12 the docket. Should we keep it open pending --13 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: No. I think if we do anything 14 it will probably be through a separate docket anyway. 15 COMMISSION STAFF: 16 Thank you. Thank you for clarifying that. 17 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask a question. Are 18 19 there any more of these out there? 20 MR. FAMA: The last one, the last 9.1.2 piece of 21 litigation involves Dade County Cogen, and that is --22 at this point the posture of that case is it is 23 partially in federal district court in the Southern District, and it's partly in Dade County circuit court. 24 25 The antitrust piece is in federal court, the other

1	piece is in circuit court. The only other outstanding
2	cogen litigation Florida Power is involved with is
3	Panda, but that does not involve 9.1.2.
4	COMMISSION STAFF: There are also some cases
5	pending involving Florida Power & Light in some
6	standard offer contracts.
7	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: With similar issues?
8	MR. ELIAS: Yes. Not avoided cost, but issues of
9	contract interpretation, yes.
10	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Have we intervened in those?
11	MR. ELIAS: Not yet. That's something that I had
12	mentioned to you the other day that we needed to talk
13	about and bring to Internal Affairs in fairly short
14	order.
15	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you.
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3	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
4	STATE OF FLORIDA)
5	COUNTY OF LEON)
6	I, JANE FAUROT, Court Reporter, do hereby certify
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14	DATED THIS 30th day of June, 1997.
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16	O. 1
17	JANE FAUROT, RPR
18	P.O. Box 10751 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
19	(904) 379-8669
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	