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FLORIDA CITIES WATER COMPANY RATE APPLICATION FOR RECOVERY OF LEGAL EXPENSES

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TESTIMONY OF GARY H. BAISE

> DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE 13270 DEC 295 PPSC-FELORCS/REPORTING

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- 1 Q: Please state your name and business address.
- 2 A: Gary H. Baise, Baise & Miller, P.C., 815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 620,
- 3 Washington, D.C. 20006-4004.
- 4 Q: By whom are you employed and in what capacity?
- 5 A: I am a partner in the law firm of Baise & Miller, P.C.
- 6 Q: Have you previously testified before the Commission?
- 7 A: No.

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- 8 Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?
- 9 A: The purpose of my testimony is to describe (1) my assessment of the alleged
- 10 violations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") pertaining to the Florida Cities Water
- 11 Company ("FCWC") Waterway Estate Wastewater Treatment Plant
- 12 ("Waterway") prior to the United States filing a complaint, as amended, against
- 13 FCWC on October 1, 1993 (Original Complaint), (2) the legal issues, legal
- 14 proceedings, and settlement discussions after the filing of the complaint by the
- 15 United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") on behalf of the United States, and
- 16 (3) the outcome of the litigation. This testimony explains almost four years of
- 17 very complex litigation which took many legal twists and turns. The attempt here
- 18 is to provide detail sufficient to cover the most important aspects of the litigation.
- 19 See Exhibit _____ GHB-1 (which provides an outline of the various individuals
- 20 involved in the litigation).

21 Q: What was your role in this litigation?

- I was retained by FCWC approximately four months prior to the complaint being
 filed and was the lead attorney in defending FCWC against these allegations.
- 24 Q: What did you rely upon for your testimony?
- 25 A: I relied upon my first-hand knowledge, a review of applicable documents, as well

- 1 as the knowledge and efforts of the litigation team.
- 2 Q: Did you prepare documents describing in summary form the most significant
- 3 events and activities from the time you were retained until the final
- 4 **conclusion of this litigation?**
- 5 A: Yes. We prepared a document styled <u>TIME LINE</u>, U.S. v. Florida Cities Water
- 6 <u>*Company*</u> which is attached as Exhibit _____ GHB-2 and contains an overall
- 7 timeline and other outlines of the efforts undertaken.
- 8 Q: Do you understand the purpose of FCWC's application in this docket?
- 9 A: Yes.

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- 10 Background of Gary H. Baise
- 11 Q: Please describe your education and experience.
- 12 A: I received my law degree from Indiana University in 1968. I was then hired by
- 13 the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Division, where I served as an attorney in
- 14 the general litigation section. In this position, I handled cases for the U.S.
- 15 Department of Agriculture and other agencies. After serving approximately two
- 16 years in the U.S. Department of Justice, I was asked to help the new
- 17 Administrator organize and lead the then newly-created U.S. Environmental
- 18 Protection Agency ("EPA"). I was named Assistant to the Administrator, and
- 19 served as Chief of Staff at EPA from November 1970 until 1972. At the
- 20 beginning of 1972, Administrator Ruckelshaus asked me to lead the EPA Office
- 21 of Legislation, Legislative Counsel and Intergovernmental Affairs.
- In 1973 I was asked to become Executive Assistant to the Director of the FBI.
- 23 Later that same year I became Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United
- 24 States. I then served as Acting Deputy Attorney General of the United States
- from October 1973 to April 1974.
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1	In April 1974 I left government service and entered private practice. I practiced
2	environmental law at the law firm of Beveridge and Diamond from 1974 until
3	April 1989 when I joined the Browning-Ferris Industries Corporation ("BFI"). I
4	served as BFI's Vice President of External Affairs until December 1991. I then
5	resumed the private practice of law in the environmental field, where I continue
6	until this day. A copy of my resume is attached as Exhibit GHB-3.
7 Q :	Please describe your experience and background relating to environmental
8	regulation and litigation.
9 A:	I have handled cases concerning the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), Clean Air Act,
10	wetlands, National Environmental Policy Act, pesticides, and Superfund issues,
11	and virtually every other area of environmental law. I have represented numerous
12	industries in filing challenges to EPA regulatory actions in the U.S. Court of
13	Appeals in Washington, D.C. I have also counseled companies and trade
14	associations on their problems with EPA. A list of my reported cases is attached
15	as Exhibit GHB-4.
16	First Contact With Case
17 Q :	When did you first become aware of this case?
18 A:	Edwin Jacobson, president of Avatar Holdings Inc., contacted me in December
19	1992 and asked about my litigation experience relating to the CWA. He described
20	the difficulties that his company was having settling a case in EPA's Region IV.
21	Mr. Jacobson indicated that settlement discussions had been occurring for some
22	time and looked increasingly futile. He said that the company may have no
23	alternative but to litigate the case, and wanted to know if I was available.
24 Q :	When were you retained to handle this case?
25 A:	I received a call from Dennis Getman and was retained in June of 1993. Mr.

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1	Getman is General Counsel of FCWC and Executive Vice President and General
2	Counsel of Avatar Holdings Inc. As I recall, he asked me a number of questions
3	and requested that I review some documents, which would be sent to me by the
4	firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges. I received a memorandum from Weil, Gotshal
5	and Manges on June 2, 1993, which provided a general outline of the facts and
6	suggested one possible defense that FCWC might have to this action.
7 Q :	With what firms (give periods) were you associated during your engagement
8	by FCWC?
9 <i>A</i> :	I was associated with the following firms:
10	Jenner & Block from initial engagement until December 1994
11	Gabeler, Baise & Miller from January 1995 until October 1995, and
12	Baise & Miller from October 1995 to present.
13 <i>Q</i> :	What did you do during the period following your engagement by FCWC
14	until the Original Complaint was filed by DOJ on October 1, 1993?
15 A:	In June 1993, we began reviewing documents sent to us by FCWC, and the law
16	firms of Alston & Bird, and Weil, Gotshal & Manges. These records showed that
17	Waterway, owned by FCWC, was a privately-owned and governmentally-
18	regulated wastewater treatment facility operating in N. Fort Myers, Florida. The
19	documents also indicated that on two prior occasions Waterway had been granted
20	CWA permits, known as National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
21	("NPDES") permits, which allow a discharger to discharge treated wastewater
22	effluent into waters of the United States.
23	The Permit Renewal Problem
24 <i>Q</i> :	How did Waterway's situation change?
25 A:	In 1986, FCWC was required to renew its NPDES permit for Waterway to

1	discharge into the Caloosahatchee River adjacent to Fort Myers. In the summer of
2	1986, FCWC officials were notified by EPA Region IV that the permit renewal
3	application would be denied, which would require the facility to cease its
4	discharge into the river. EPA Region IV based its decision upon its understanding
5	that Waterway lacked a wasteload allocation from Florida Department of
6	Environmental Protection ¹ ("FDEP") that allowed the plant to discharge into the
7	canal that connected to the Caloosahatchee River. EPA's understanding was
8	incorrect. Nevertheless, based upon this erroneous information, EPA denied
9	renewal of the NPDES permit for the facility in December of 1986, even though
10	the facility had no record of violating Florida water quality standards or its
11	NPDES permit.
12	FCWC officials immediately started working with the FDEP and EPA to develop
13	a resolution of the matter because this was a public health facility and, unlike a
14	manufacturing facility, could not shut down for repairs or cease operations.
15 Q.	What steps did you take to initiate your investigation of this case?
16 A.	In the summer of 1993, we began the development of a timeline of events, based
17	on documents provided by FCWC, to demonstrate that the company had moved
18	as expeditiously as possible to construct a new pipeline to the Caloosahatchee
19	River and meet the water quality limits of the new NPDES permit issued in
20	September 1989 (See Exhibit MA-9). This timeline served to prove that any
21	delay in compliance was not FCWC's fault. We reviewed FCWC's documents in
22	order to determine facts to take to DOJ to demonstrate that Waterway was
23	technically discharging into the Caloosahatchee River, not in an unapproved

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¹Formerly known as the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation.

1	location as alleged by EPA. In this regard, we researched the specificity required
2	in defining "outfall location." In addition, we researched and prepared
3	memoranda on the denotation of "receiving waters" and the definition of "outfall
4	location." We also reviewed administrative decisions of what constitutes a
5	"receiving water" under the CWA and how such waters are designated in the
6	renewal of a permit. The facts that we developed contradicted DOJ's position that
7	the company delayed its compliance with the CWA by taking too long meet these
8	requirements.
9	Discussions With EPA
10 Q :	Please describe any additional effort to settle this matter after you were
11	retained by FCWC?
12 <i>A</i> :	On July 21, 1993, we met with DOJ and EPA Region IV staff in Atlanta. DOJ
13	counsel's key points at the meeting were that FCWC discharged pollutants
14	without an NPDES permit, discharged in the wrong location, and that FCWC
15	delayed its compliance efforts in order to save money. We demonstrated to DOJ
16	counsel that outside government regulatory bodies were responsible for much of
17	the delay in moving the discharge point from the canal to the middle of the river.
18	In addition, we pointed out how extremely rare it was for EPA to rescind an
19	NPDES permit from a facility that was meeting water quality standards and the
20	effluent limitations in its NPDES permit. We also suggested in this meeting that
21	EPA failed to follow its own regulations for rescinding an NPDES permit.
22	Finally, we raised with DOJ and EPA staff the fact that a discharge outfall could
23	be within the "15 second rule," and therefore the current discharge location was
24	covered by the permit.
25	As a result of this meeting, DOJ counsel and EPA staff agreed to review our

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arguments and the timeline we submitted. In the meeting EPA indicated that
 there may be some time for which the agency would give credit to FCWC and not
 seek a penalty.

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4	On September 1, 1993 David Berz, of Weil Gotshal & Manges, representing
5	FCWC, and I met with DOJ counsel, Daniel S. Jacobs, to discuss our research on
6	a number of issues. We presented him with our results and memorandum which
7	we believed demonstrated that DOJ and EPA did not have a compelling case
8	against FCWC that merited substantial penalties under the CWA. We suggested
9	that given the facts we had developed for Waterway, the case did not support
10	penalties of more than two hundred thousand dollars, if that.
11	Mr. Jacobs stated that FCWC's position was not close to the number that DOJ
12	was seeking. DOJ had already demanded \$5 million in penalties from FCWC and
13	never moved from this amount at the meeting. We referred him to awards in
14	previous CWA cases in an effort to convince him that the settlement offer
15	presented by him in December 1992 was much too high. See Exhibit GSA-4.
16 Q:	What other actions did you undertake in August and September 1993?
17 A:	In September, in a telephone conference call, Mr. Berz and I again tried to
18	convince Mr. Jacobs that EPA and DOJ were in error with regard to the
19	allegations against FCWC. We discussed our continuing research and explained
20	to Mr. Jacobs that an NPDES permit could not be rescinded unless one of four
21	criteria set forth in EPA's regulations were met. Mr. Jacobs rejected our
22	arguments and made it clear that DOJ would be filing a complaint in U.S. District
23	Court, an action that he had been threatening for well over a year.
24	The Complaint and Answer
25 O :	When and where was the complaint filed by DOJ and what did it allege?

25 Q: When and where was the complaint filed by DOJ and what did it allege?

1 A:	DOJ filed the complaint on October 1, 1993 in the U.S. District Court, Middle
2	District of Florida initiating an action for civil penalties under the CWA. The
3	complaint alleged that FCWC had been discharging without an NPDES permit at
4	Waterway, discharging in the wrong location, and violating the provisions of its
5	NPDES permit issued in September 1989. ("Original Complaint"). See Exhibit
6	GSA-3. Each of these allegations were asserted to be separate, daily violations of
7	the CWA. FCWC faced penalties of up to \$25,000 per day, per violation.
8 Q:	What steps did FCWC take to respond to the DOJ Complaint?
9 A:	In October and November 1993, we undertook substantial amounts of legal
10	research to determine and analyze potential defenses including statute of
11	limitations and other affirmative defenses. In addition, we reviewed a large
12	number of FCWC documents and on November 12 and 19 met with FDEP
13	officials concerning the compliance history at Waterway. We determined that
14	delays in state and local review of FCWC construction plans contributed to
15	FCWC's difficulties in coming into compliance with the EPA Administrative
16	Order issued in May 1987 and the 1989 NPDES permit. See Exhibit MA-8.
17 Q :	Did FCWC file a response to the Original Complaint?
18 A:	Yes. On November 22, 1993, we filed an answer to the Complaint. See Exhibit
19	GSA-2. FCWC denied the allegation that it was not authorized to discharge
20	pollutants into the Caloosahatchee River. FCWC also denied the allegation that
21	the unnamed canal was not a permitted discharge location. Regarding plaintiff's
22	claim that FCWC violated the 1989 NPDES permit, FCWC answered that these
23	allegations were conclusions of law requiring no response. FCWC pleaded ten
24	defenses, including that its application for the renewal of its permit was
25	improperly denied by EPA and that Plaintiff's claims were barred because FCWC

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1	had paid penalties at the Waterway facility assessed by the FDEP under
2	comparable Florida law. In addition, we plead the following affirmative defenses:
3	the doctrines of impossibility, estoppel, waiver, and laches. FCWC also plead
4	that state, local and federal governments unnecessarily delayed issuing permits
5	and enacting zoning changes necessary before it could initiate construction of an
6	advanced wastewater treatment facility or relocate the outfall, which prevented it
7	from meeting compliance schedules. FCWC also plead that it had at all times
8	acted in a proper and reasonable manner, had caused no environmental harm,
9	exercised due care, and acted in good faith to fill all requirements of the CWA.
10 <i>Q</i> :	Did FCWC retain additional counsel following the filing of the Original
11	Complaint?
12 A:	Yes. In early 1994 FCWC retained the firm of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes &
13	Holt, located in Ft. Myers where the action was filed.
14 Q :	Why was this firm needed?
15 A:	We needed a firm to move our admission pro hac vice and to serve as local
16	counsel. The local rules for the Middle District require the retention of local
17	counsel. This firm was familiar with the Federal District Court, its rules and
18	procedures, and could respond rapidly to emergency filings. It also filed most
19	pleadings before the Court. Also, we sought and relied upon Henderson,
20	Franklin's advice regarding strategy on a regular basis.
21	Beginning of Discovery
22 Q :	What was your next action after answering the Complaint?
23 A:	We began the discovery phase of the case by interviewing potential witnesses at
24	FCWC and at FDEP with respect to wasteload allocation and CWA water
25	certification issues. We also began drafting initial document requests. We

1	reviewed an enormous number of documents at FDEP's offices in an effort to
2	prove that Waterway did have a wasteload allocation to discharge into the
3	Caloosahatchee River. FDEP officials such as Dr. Abdul Ahmadi and his
4	colleagues repeatedly stated that they were unaware of any reason that a waste
5	treatment facility would be issued a "no discharge" wasteload allocation because
6	the state permit contained an implicit wasteload allocation. Concurrently, we
7	filed Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") inquiries with at least four EPA
8	regional offices. The purpose of these FOIA requests was to obtain EPA records
9	to demonstrate how rare it was to deny an NPDES permit and also to determine
10	the circumstances nationwide under which an NPDES permit had ever been
11	denied.
12	In November and December 1993, we began preparing responses to the Court's
13	standard interrogatories that required the Plaintiff to set forth a brief statement of
14	the case, describe the basis of federal jurisdiction, outline the discovery
15	anticipated by the Plaintiff, and describe any dispositive motions that the Plaintiff
16	anticipated filing. Exhibit GHB-5. FCWC was asked to agree or disagree
17	with the Plaintiff's statement of the case, state whether all parties that should be
18	joined had been joined, outline the discovery anticipated by FCWC, and describe
19	any dispositive motions that the Defendant anticipated filing. The parties were
20	asked to estimate the time required to complete all discovery, the time required for
21	trial, and whether a preliminary pretrial conference was necessary.
22	The U.S. filed its answers to the Court's standard interrogatories in January 1994.
23	Exhibit GHB-6. DOJ anticipated that following a period of informal
24	discovery it would commence formal discovery, including interrogatories,
25	document requests, oral depositions, and requests for admissions.

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1	FCWC filed its answers to the Court's standard interrogatories in February 1994.
2	Exhibit GHB-7. FCWC stated that it did not believe that it had committed
3	the violations of the CWA alleged in the Complaint. FCWC told the Court, "[t]he
4	crux of this litigation is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's improper
5	denial on December 8, 1986 of FCWC's application to renew its NPDES permit."
6	FCWC advised the Court that settlement negotiations had taken place and would
7	continue as events warranted, and that discovery was required by both parties.
8	FCWC anticipated that it would need to take 15 fact depositions, a number of
9	expert depositions, and serve written discovery, including interrogatories and
10	requests for admissions. FCWC stated that it anticipated filing a motion for
11	summary judgment.
12 Q :	Did DOJ respond to FCWC's answer and affirmative defenses?
13 A:	Yes. On December 15, 1993, DOJ filed a Motion for an Extension of Time in
14	which to file a motion to strike FCWC's affirmative defenses. Exhibit
15	GHB-8.
16 Q :	Did the DOJ move to strike FCWC's affirmative defenses?
17 A:	Yes. On February 3, 1994, DOJ filed its motion to strike FCWC's affirmative
18	defenses. Exhibit GHB-9. DOJ argued that all of FCWC's affirmative
19	defenses should be stricken as a matter of law. DOJ filed a 16-page memorandum
20	in support of its motion. Exhibit GHB-10.
21 Q :	Did the DOJ file a request to produce documents?
22 A:	Yes. On February 14, 1994, FCWC received the DOJ's first request for
23	production of documents, which contained 45 separate document requests.
24	Exhibit GHB-11. These were extensive requests, which required FCWC to
25	undertake massive efforts to obtain, for example, "all financial reports, statements,
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1	balance sheets, budgets, prepared by or on behalf of FCWC since January 1,
2	1980." This encompassed reviewing data developed over a period of 14 years.
3	DOJ also requested: all noncompliance reports submitted by Defendant to EPA
4	or the State of Florida; all documents relating to discussions, meetings, and
5	correspondence between FCWC and its contractors and subcontractors; all
6	documents relating to any test results, laboratory analyses, flow measurements or
7	concentration analyses of any pollutants discharged from the facility; all designs,
8	including any plans and specifications, and modifications thereof, for the
9	treatment elements and processes at the Facility; all documents that identify,
10	describe or explain the treatment processes and operations at the Facility; all
11	documents relating to all operating, maintenance and inspection procedures at the
12	Facility, and any and all changes in these procedures, which were designed to, or
13	had the effects of, preventing, increasing, reducing, or otherwise affecting
14	discharges, violations of water pollution laws, regulations, or violations of your
15	NPDES Permit. Each of these requests required a substantial effort to search and
16	review FCWC files which covered a six to fourteen year period.
17 Q :	What did you do after receiving the document request?
18 A:	We asked FCWC to use its staff to retrieve as much of the material as possible in
19	order to hold down costs. Notwithstanding this effort, we still had to review what
20	amounted to tens of thousands of pages of material, which were assembled, for
21	the most part, by FCWC, reviewed in part by counsel, and submitted to the DOJ

22 pursuant to its request.

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23 Q: What was the next step you took on behalf of FCWC?

24 A: During March and April of 1994, we continued our document review and filed
25 additional FOIA requests to EPA regional offices regarding other NPDES permit

1	denials. By April 6, 1994, we had produced all the documents in response to
2	DOJ's first document production request. My estimate is that we turned over tens
3	of thousands of pages of material. In addition, in April 1994, we filed our first
4	request for production of documents to DOJ and we started preparing for the first
5	of what became approximately fifty (50) depositions taken by both sides.
6 Q :	What occurred next in the litigation?
7 A:	On April 12, 1994, FCWC submitted its first request for production of documents
8	to DOJ covering 30 different categories. FCWC wanted all documents relating to
9	the denial or issuance of permits for Waterway; all documents relating to EPA's
10	analysis of any impacts that Waterway's discharges may have had on the
11	receiving waters or public health; all documents relating to water quality impacts,
12	water quality certifications, waivers of water quality certification, determination
13	of significant noncompliance, water quality based effluent limitations
14	("WQBELs"); wasteload allocations; compliance/noncompliance indexes; and
15	memoranda of agreements between EPA and the State of Florida regarding the
16	approval process for wasteload allocations under the permitting programs. FCWC
17	also sought documents regarding all communications among various agencies,
18	federal and state, about this facility.
19	Depositions Begin
20 Q :	When did DOJ begin its depositions?
21 A:	DOJ took its first deposition on April 21, 1994, when it conducted the
22	examination of Julie Karleskint. Exhibit GHB-12. Ms. Karleskint,
23	FCWC's Manager of Operations, was the person knowledgeable about the
24	
	FCWC's discharges and alleged exceedences and could explain the apparent

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1	not necessarily responsible for those exceedences. In addition, Ms. Karleskint
2	was questioned at length on construction issues at Waterway; and about her
3	knowledge of Fiesta Village, Golden Gate, Southgate, Poinciana, Barefoot and
4	Carrollwood even though these facilities were not at issue at this time. Ms.
5	Karleskint was also questioned about environmental audits and audit programs
6	undertaken by FCWC. She was asked about components of a typical
7	environmental audit and what she had done to audit FCWC's facilities. She also
8	discussed her job responsibilities regarding regulatory compliance and how she
9	reviewed all discharge monitoring reports and operating reports looking for
10	exceedences. DOJ asked about other individuals within FCWC who would be
11	knowledgeable and attend meetings regarding regulatory compliance. DOJ asked
12	what caused the nitrogen violations and some of the modifications which had
13	been undertaken to resolve exceedence issues at Waterway. She was also
14	questioned by DOJ on what steps FCWC undertook to bring Waterway into
15	compliance with EPA's Administrative Order.
16	Expansion of the Litigation
17 Q :	Did DOJ then attempt to expand its discovery requests to include FCWC
18	facilities other than Waterway?
19 <i>A</i> :	Yes. DOJ did this for the first time during the deposition of Ms. Karleskint,
20	stating that it would seek information on other FCWC facilities. In response to
21	this expansion FCWC filed a motion for a protective order to limit the
22	government to documents relevant to the Complaint at that time, which concerned
23	only Waterway. Exhibit GHB-13. DOJ further demanded production, in
24	two days, of all previously redacted documents in their entirety, including
25	documents relating to other FCWC facilities. FCWC objected, noting that the

1		complaint was limited to claims concerning Waterway, and that the schedule to
2		produce these additional documents was patently unreasonable. FCWC opposed
3		this substantial expansion of discovery, as it had already produced more than
4		100,000 pages of documents for inspection and copying by DOJ. On April 18,
5		1994, the Court granted, in part, FCWC's motion for a protective order. Exhibit
6		GHB-14. This order granted FCWC's request, in part, by not requiring
7		FCWC to immediately produce all redacted documents in their entirety. The
8		documents did, however, have to be produced within 20 days of the Court's order,
9		subject to claims of confidentiality and privilege.
10	Q:	During this time did you become aware that DOJ counsel was attempting to
11		contact former FCWC employees?
12	A:	Yes. In April of 1994, we became aware that DOJ was calling and pressuring
13		former employees to meet with its counsel. DOJ urged these former employees
14		not to inform FCWC of these meetings or to permit FCWC counsel to attend these
15		meetings. In our letter of April 19, 1994, we objected to DOJ's efforts to
16		undertake ex parte contacts with former FCWC employees, which was
17		specifically prohibited under Florida caselaw and the Canons of Ethics. Exhibit
18		GHB-15. In a letter of April 20, 1994, DOJ acknowledged that there could
19		be a conflict with appropriate procedure and acquiesced in our request until they
20		completed their study of the matter. Exhibit GHB-16.
21		After its review of this matter, DOJ, in June 1994, moved to allow such ex parte
22		contacts. Exhibit GHB-17. The DOJ filed an 11-page memorandum in
23		support of its motion, with attachments, arguing that it had a right to have ex parte
24		contacts with former employees of FCWC. DOJ took exception to the cases in
25		the Middle District of Florida prohibiting such ex parte contacts, and attempted to

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1	distinguish them from the facts in FCWC's case. DOJ's memorandum discusses,
2	in great detail, the applicable rule of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct,
3	the ABA model rule on which it was based, the ABA interpretation of this model
4	rule, the Florida Bar opinion on the Florida rule, and the caselaw. The general
5	rule is that a lawyer may not contact a party the lawyer knows to be represented
6	by counsel, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer. For corporate
7	parties, this rule applies to persons with managerial responsibility on behalf of the
8	organization. In the Middle District of Florida the prohibition applies to former as
9	well as current employees.
10	On July 15, 1994, FCWC filed its memorandum in opposition to DOJ's request.
11	FCWC explained the facts concerning DOJ's contacts with former FCWC
12	employees and its interest in protecting privileged information from disclosure.
13	See Exhibit GHB-18.
14	On August 5, 1994, DOJ sought permission to file a reply memorandum, in
15	conflict with the local practice. Exhibit GHB-19. This reply brief did not
16	effectively attack our legal arguments, but rather contained spirited arguments
17	about whose version of the facts was correct. On August 17, 1994, FCWC filed a
18	memorandum in opposition to DOJ's reply motion, arguing that local practice
19	does not permit reply memorandum and defended FCWC's view of the facts.
20	Several months later, on February 13, 1995, the Court granted a protective order
21	barring DOJ from ex parte contacts. See Exhibit GHB-20. On March 16,
22	1995, the Court issued an order denying DOJ's motion to allow ex parte contacts,
23	and specifically required DOJ to give FCWC counsel notice before it contacted
24	former FCWC employees. The Court also denied FCWC's motion to disqualify
25	DOJ due to these <i>ex parte</i> contacts which are discussed below. Exhibit

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GHB-21.

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2 Q) :	When did FCWC begin taking depositions and for what purpose?
3 A	1:	On May 5, 1994, we deposed John Marlar, one of the key EPA Region IV water
4		experts. Exhibit GHB-22. I considered Mr. Marlar one of the three or four
5		most knowledgeable persons in EPA on permitting issues under the CWA.
6		Therefore, I wanted to use Mr. Marlar's deposition to demonstrate how wasteload
7		allocations are developed under Sections 201 and 303 of the CWA. I questioned
8		Mr. Marlar about the 1975 "Lower Florida River Basin Water Quality
9		Management Plan, December 1975" that demonstrated how wasteload allocations
10		were developed and approved by EPA and the state. The deposition also
11		demonstrated that EPA was not following its regulations regarding wasteload
12		allocation approvals. Mr. Marlar testified that it was EPA's general practice that
13		all wasteload allocations to be approved by the agency before including them in
14		an NPDES permit. Mr. Marlar stated that the wasteload allocation approval
15		process was necessary to keep the process orderly. Mr. Marlar also testified that a
16		1981 document was a planning document and not a requirement for EPA to use in
17		issuing an NPDES permit. This key document, entitled "The Caloosahatchee
18		River Wasteload Allocation Documentation, Lee County," was relied upon by
19		Ms. Kagey to deny renewal of Waterway's NPDES permit. His admission in this
20		first deposition that the 1981 document was a planning tool convinced me that we
21		were on the right track regarding the entire wasteload allocation issue. I also
22		questioned him on how EPA could rescind an NPDES permit when there was no
23		evidence of Florida's water quality standard being violated and no effluent
24		limitation violations. He admitted that denial of a permit renewal appeared to be a
25		rare event. Mr. Marlar had signed some of the documents denying the renewal of

1	Waterway's permit; therefore, we wanted to determine what he knew about
2	Waterway and to explore his knowledge relating to the general issue of the
3	number of permits for which renewal had been denied where a facility was
4	meeting water quality standards and effluent limitations set forth in the NPDES
5	permit and the specific issue of the authority EPA used to deny renewal of
6	FCWC's permit. We questioned Mr. Marlar in detail about the process for issuing
7	administrative orders and NPDES permits and about FCWC's permit renewal
8	application and the basis for the denial of that permit.
9	On May 17, 1994, we deposed Peter McGarry, who was Chief of the Region IV
10	Enforcement Unit from 1982 to 1992. He had referred the matter to DOJ for an
11	enforcement action against FCWC regarding the Waterway facility. Exhibit
12	GHB-23. He did not participate in the EPA denial of FCWC's permit
13	renewal application. In his testimony, Mr. McGarry did not recall whether
14	anyone contacted FDEP to determine FCWC's wasteload allocation.
15	Additionally, he did not have knowledge of any other situation when a facility's
16	NPDES renewal application was denied while it was meeting effluent limitations
17	and water quality standards. I questioned Mr. McGarry about his knowledge
18	regarding EPA's wasteload allocation process and how that process related to
19	Section 303 of the CWA. Mr. McGarry also testified about how a wasteload
20	allocation is developed and about his knowledge regarding Waterway's wasteload
21	allocation. I also questioned Mr. McGarry about the DOJ charge that Waterway
22	was discharging in the wrong location. He could not point to any aspect of the
23	Waterway NPDES permit which indicated that Waterway was discharging in the
24	wrong location. Finally, Mr. McGarry identified additional individuals in EPA
25	who would be knowledgeable regarding enforcement issues related to Waterway.

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2 Q: What steps did you take after the depositions of Ms. Karleskint, Mr. Marlar
3 and Mr. McGarry were taken?

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- During the months of May, June, and July of 1994, we reviewed the documents 4 A: 5 produced by EPA Region IV as well as FOIA materials from several EPA 6 regional offices. The documents obtained through FOIA requests confirmed my 7 view that it was exceedingly rare for EPA to rescind or deny renewal of an 8 NPDES permit where the facility was meeting water quality standards and 9 NPDES permit effluent limitations. We also examined all of EPA's manuals, 10 policy directives and training course materials that in any way explained EPA's 11 permitting process, water quality standards setting, wasteload allocation 12 development, total maximum daily load studies, and state approval procedures as 13 they related to water quality management plans. During this time, FCWC 14 received the DOJ response to our first request for production of documents. 15 Motion to Disgualify 16 *Q*: Did you have occasion to move to disqualify DOJ counsel? Yes. On October 25, 1994, FCWC moved to disgualify DOJ counsel from further 17 A: 18 participation in this case because of his possible violation of ethics rules and case 19 law. Exhibit GHB-24. As discussed above, plaintiff's counsel had *ex* 20 *parte* communications with a former high level managerial employee of FCWC. 21 *Ex parte* contacts with parties represented by counsel, without advance notice to 22 the counsel, are inappropriate and may be grounds for dismissal from 23 representation. FCWC's memorandum set forth the facts regarding a trip to 24 Australia by DOJ counsel and his contact, while allegedly on vacation, with Mr.
- 25 Robert H. French, former Senior Vice President of FCWC who was living in

1	Australia. We argued that under the law in the Middle District of Florida relating
2	to such contacts, these contacts should result in the disqualification of the DOJ
3	attorney. DOJ opposed this motion to disqualify. On February 15, 1995, the
4	Federal Magistrate held a hearing on DOJ's motion to allow ex parte contacts and
5	on FCWC's motion to disqualify DOJ counsel. Exhibit GHB-25.
6	Although the judge did not issue an order that day, he made it clear that he was
7	not pleased with DOJ counsel's activities in Australia and in the United States and
8	indicated that there should be no more ex parte contacts by DOJ's counsel with
9	FCWC's former employees. In court, Magistrate Judge Swartz stated that he
10	would only disqualify counsel if their actions were "unconscionable" and
11	indicated, however, that he did not agree with DOJ's actions stating: "[they don't]
12	have carte blanche authority to go contact every witness in a lawsuit." The court,
13	on March 16, 1995 denied our motion to disqualify counsel, because the court did
14	not see Mr. Jacobs' actions as sufficiently unconscionable. Exhibit GHB-
15	26.
15 16 Q :	26. What additional discovery work was done during this time?
16 <i>Q</i> :	What additional discovery work was done during this time?
16 Q: 17 <i>A</i> :	What additional discovery work was done during this time? On June 16, 1994, DOJ launched a major expansion of the litigation by requesting
16 Q: 17 <i>A</i> : 18	What additional discovery work was done during this time? On June 16, 1994, DOJ launched a major expansion of the litigation by requesting documents from many of FCWC's wastewater treatment plants and related
16 <i>Q</i> : 17 <i>A</i> : 18 19	What additional discovery work was done during this time? On June 16, 1994, DOJ launched a major expansion of the litigation by requesting documents from many of FCWC's wastewater treatment plants and related sewage systems. Exhibit GHB-27. DOJ sought virtually every document
 16 <i>Q</i>: 17 <i>A</i>: 18 19 20 	What additional discovery work was done during this time? On June 16, 1994, DOJ launched a major expansion of the litigation by requesting documents from many of FCWC's wastewater treatment plants and related sewage systems. Exhibit GHB-27. DOJ sought virtually every document relating to the Fiesta Village, Golden Gate, Poinciana, Gulf Gate, South Gate,
 16 <i>Q</i>: 17 <i>A</i>: 18 19 20 21 	 What additional discovery work was done during this time? On June 16, 1994, DOJ launched a major expansion of the litigation by requesting documents from many of FCWC's wastewater treatment plants and related sewage systems. Exhibit GHB-27. DOJ sought virtually every document relating to the Fiesta Village, Golden Gate, Poinciana, Gulf Gate, South Gate, Barefoot Bay, Carrollwood and Waterway facilities. In its 15-page, 62-paragraph
 16 Q: 17 A: 18 19 20 21 22 	What additional discovery work was done during this time? On June 16, 1994, DOJ launched a major expansion of the litigation by requesting documents from many of FCWC's wastewater treatment plants and related sewage systems. Exhibit GHB-27. DOJ sought virtually every document relating to the Fiesta Village, Golden Gate, Poinciana, Gulf Gate, South Gate, Barefoot Bay, Carrollwood and Waterway facilities. In its 15-page, 62-paragraph request, DOJ sought: all environmental audits of any FCWC wastewater

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daily operation and maintenance logs for these facilities; all documents relating to
minutes, notes, and memoranda describing meetings held by the Defendants at
any of their facilities where compliance with the CWA was discussed; and all
documents relating to capital, operating or maintenance costs of water pollution
control equipment installed or considered for installation to achieve water quality
standards or water quality limits. DOJ even requested employee desk calendars
and appointment books.

8 Regarding the environmental audits prepared by FCWC officials, FCWC

9 seriously considered opposing the release of these audits to DOJ, as these audits 10 had been prepared under the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Yet after 11 reviewing the audits from all of the facilities, it appeared that the audits actually 12 helped FCWC. We also advised FCWC that if it opposed the request by DOJ for 13 the production of these documents, it would be a legal side-show and cost tens of 14 thousands of dollars. At the end of the effort a court would likely order disclosure 15 of the audits or allow FCWC to redact only small portions of the documents, and 16 FCWC would appear as if it had something to hide. Based on all of the facts,

17 FCWC produced the audit documents to DOJ.

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18 This massive document request from DOJ appeared to be an attempt to put 19 pressure on FCWC to settle. The new expansion of the principle case suggested 20 that DOJ knew at this point that its initial case was weak and it needed to place 21 additional pressure on FCWC to force a settlement by attempting to increase 22 FCWC's legal and internal company costs.

By early July FCWC had begun its response to this request which required a substantial effort by lawyers, paralegals and FCWC personnel. This document production continued through July and August of 1994, and we completed our

response to the Second Request for Production of Documents on August 24, 1994.
We collected, reviewed, considered thousands of documents for privilege and
produced thousands of pages to DOJ. FCWC also produced significant amounts
of financial data from its computer database. FCWC personnel handled much of
this work, but we also spent substantial time on this request, particularly to ensure
that no privileged material was produced.

7 <u>Additional Depositions</u>

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8 Q: What occurred next?

9 A: Throughout the fall of 1994, DOJ deposed a number of FCWC personnel. These
10 depositions were part of the expansion of the case and were intended to provide
11 DOJ with information regarding the operation of the Barefoot Bay and

12 Carrollwood facilities.

13 DOJ deposed Larry Good, regional manager at FCWC, on October 10, 1994, in

14 order to explore his knowledge of the facts surrounding the Carrollwood plant

15 during the 1980s. Mr. Good testified regarding FCWC's effort to connect with

16 the Hillsborough County wastewater system and the City of Tampa wastewater

17 treatment system, as well as FCWC's efforts to upgrade the Carrollwood facility

18 to advanced wastewater treatment ("AWT").

19 On October 11, 1994, DOJ took an extensive, 221 page deposition of William

20 Sansbury, the Division Manager of the Barefoot Bay Division of FCWC. DOJ

21 questioned Mr. Sansbury extensively about Barefoot Bay, its spray fields, and

22 overflows. Mr. Sansbury explained that major storms had caused problems at the

23 spray fields. DOJ also sought information as to who knew about the lack of

- 24 federal NPDES permits at Barefoot Bay. Mr. Sansbury was asked about the
- discharge monitoring reports ("DMRs") and the exceedences relating to the

DMRs.

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On October 12, 1994, DOJ deposed Glen Siler, one of the wastewater operators at the Barefoot Bay plant. DOJ counsel questioned Mr. Siler about the history of the Barefoot Bay facility as it related to spray fields and the operation of the facility, and regarding toxicity testing and the Barefoot Bay discharge. DOJ attempted to establish that there were a number of unpermitted discharges from Barefoot Bay.

7 Q: What depositions did FCWC take during this period?

We deposed Connie A. Kagey, the EPA permit writer who denied the Waterway 8 A: permit renewal application. Exhibit GHB-28. Ms. Kagey testified that she 9 performed little or no investigation before denying the permit. Her file contained 10 the two pages that formed the sole basis for revoking the Waterway permit. These 11 two pages were from a 1981 non-binding planning study, ("The Caloosahatchee 12 River Wasteload Allocation Documentation, Lee County"), which assessed the 13 need for a regional wastewater treatment facility in the Fort Myers area. This 14 15 study did not in fact require a zero or no wasteload allocation for FCWC's Waterway facility. This study was merely a planning document, and, assuming 16 17 that the Waterway facility would be shut down at some point in the future, the 18 drafter of the study assigned a zero wasteload allocation to the Waterway facility. 19 This planning study had no effect on Waterway's existing wasteload allocation. 20 Ms. Kagey never requested the entire document, did not determine that this was a 21 planning document, and from these two pages improperly denied FCWC's 22 NPDES permit application for a new permit. Dr. Abdul Ahmadi, Professional Engineer and Administrator of FDEP, later 23 testified that this 1981 report was a planning report, not an official document 24

25 which could be used to determine wasteload allocations for NPDES discharge

permits. A review of the report or a telephone call by Ms. Kagey to Florida state
officials would have revealed this fact. Instead, Ms. Kagey's failure to look
beyond the two pages in her file created havoc and substantial costs for FCWC.
Through her deposition we sought to determine Ms. Kagey's level of knowledge
with regard to writing NPDES permits. Her testimony confirmed that although
she had been writing these permits since 1984, she had a limited understanding of
EPA's regulations regarding permit writers.

8 It was very important to establish in her deposition that the 1986 Waterway permit 9 denial was based on either EPA effluent limitation guidelines or water quality 10 standards. If she admitted that fact, it would demonstrate that she had not written 11 an NPDES permit based on best professional judgment. Ms. Kagey, as a permit 12 writer, could have used the 1981 wasteload allocation if she was drafting a "best 13 professional judgment" permit. In her deposition testimony, she admitted that she 14 based her decision on effluent limitations, not upon her best professional 15 judgment. By this time we had determined that the Caloosahatchee River 16 wasteload allocation study of January 1981 had never been officially approved by 17 either the State of Florida or EPA's Region IV. Ms. Kagey's only excuse for 18 using the 1981 no-discharge wasteload allocation was that it was the most recent 19 information she had in her file. She also testified that she did not know for a fact 20 whether the 1981 wasteload allocation was approved by EPA. We also spent time 21 on questioning her about her review of the State of Florida operating permits 22 which were attached to the Waterway NPDES application. She knew that 23 Waterway had a valid state operating permit and yet she made no effort to make 24 sure her decision was consistent with FDEP's prior decisions. It was clear from 25 her deposition that she did not know what the status was of the 1981 document;

1	however, she proceeded to make a decision which was not reviewed by her
2	supervisors and that decision led to FCWC being forced to spend millions of
3	dollars which did not improve the water quality of the Caloosahatchee River. The
4	deposition also demonstrated that Ms. Kagey could not recall a single instance
5	where EPA had denied an NPDES permit to a permit holder who was in
6	compliance with state water quality standards and the permit's effluent
7	limitations. She admitted that she did not consider or use any of the four reasons
8	EPA can use to deny renewal of an NPDES permit to an applicant as the basis for
9	her decision.
10 Q:	What other depositions did you take that supported your position in the
11	case?
12 A:	In October of 1994, we deposed Bruce Barrett, who served as the Director of the
13	Water Management Division for EPA's Region IV from April 1985 to September
14	1989, and one of Ms. Kagey's supervisors. Mr. Barrett admitted that FCWC had
15	a unique situation, and that, knowing the circumstances as he did now, he would
16	not make the same decision again. He stated in his deposition that "I don't see the
17	basis for the federal action denying the permit based on the correspondence." He
18	was unable to name any circumstances in which the EPA had denied a permit
19	renewal and stated that such a decision is an "unusual event." He further stated
20	that "on the basis of the limited review that I've done today, there would appear to
21	be some inconsistencies." Exhibit GHB-29.
22 Q :	Did you determine whether the denial of the permit to Waterway was a rare
23	event?
24 A:	Yes, we did come to a conclusion with respect to that matter. In testimony given

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25 by several EPA officials, no one could remember more than possibly one NPDES

1	permit renewal being denied during the entire period of time they had served with
2	the agency. Through inquiries to several EPA Regions, we could never find any
3	evidence of a permit renewal being denied where the facility and its discharge did
4	not violate water quality standards or its effluent limitations as set forth in the
5	permit.
6 Q :	Where were the new facilities located that DOJ raised in its discovery?
7 A:	Gulf Gate and Southgate are in Sarasota County, Carrollwood is in Hillsborough
8	County (Tampa) and Barefoot Bay is in Brevard County.
9 Q :	Why did DOJ seek new information on the Barefoot Bay and Carrollwood
10	facilities, and what was the concern?
11 A:	The Barefoot Bay wastewater treatment plant ("Barefoot") was placed into service
12	in the early 1980's using percolation ponds.Under certain conditions the ponds
13	overflowed, discharging treated effluent into a nearby agricultural canal. These
14	discharges were not covered by an NPDES permit. FDEP was informed by
15	FCWC of these discharges and had given the facility a temporary operating
16	permit ("TOP"). Throughout the 1980's, FCWC officials worked with FDEP to
17	develop alternatives to discharge; however, none of these options proved viable.
18	During this period, Barefoot had Florida TOPs but did not have an NPDES
19	permit.
20	From 1975 to 1984, Carrollwood operated pursuant to an NPDES permit as well
21	as under Florida's regulatory scheme. After 1984, FCWC was unable to obtain an
22	NPDES permit from EPA because Florida would only grant a TOP. Carrollwood
23	continued to operate under Florida TOPs as well as under an EPA administrative
24	order. Although DOJ argued that FCWC was not complying with the CWA, it
25	ignored EPA's own administrative record regarding these two facilities. EPA had

1	undertaken administrative actions against both facilities through Consent
2	Agreements and Orders Assessing Administrative Penalties, assessing a penalty
3	of \$6,000 against Barefoot Bay on November 6, 1991 and \$15,000 against
4	Carrollwood on March 3, 1992. The administrative record demonstrates that in
5	setting these penalties, EPA Region IV considered FCWC's good faith
6	cooperation and the lack of any environmental harm caused by any violations.
7	See Exhibit GSA-22 and Exhibit GSA-11.
8	Discovery later demonstrated that DOJ had failed to review key documents in
9	EPA files or talk with EPA's own employees who had knowledge of the facts at
10	issue at both Barefoot and Carrollwood. The administrative record showed that
11	an EPA enforcement officer, Roy Herwig, had issued the Administrative Order at
12	Barefoot which proposed the \$6,000 penalty. Mr. Herwig's notes indicated that
13	EPA had reviewed FCWC's actions in light of the statutory mitigation factors
14	under CWA § 309(g)(3). Mr. Herwig's notes also indicated that at Barefoot
15	FCWC's economic benefit from noncompliance was approximately \$73. Under
16	the mitigation factor "Other matters that justice may require," Mr. Herwig noted
17	on EPA's behalf: "The enforcement team considered the fact that Respondent
18	[FCWC] has been working closely with the Florida Department of Environmental
19	Regulation since 1985 to develop a solution to the problem. Since being
20	contacted by EPA, Respondent has been very cooperative. Consideration was
21	given to calculating liability on a daily basis beginning with the initial overflow in
22	1985. However, since the respondent had been working with DER and since the
23	effluent being discharged would have met the limitations contained in the permit
24	now being issued by EPA, it is believed that the true violation was limited to that
25	of not applying for an NPDES permit." Exhibit GHB-30

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1		Mr. Herwig concluded that he thought Barefoot was fully resolved and "none of
2		this would be revisited." Exhibit GHB-30
3		The administrative record for the Carrollwood Consent Agreement showed that
4		EPA estimated the delayed compliance penalty at the facility to be worth \$203.
5		The EPA official who investigated Carrollwood, Thomas Plouff, testified in his
6		deposition that "the case was settled, long since settled." Exhibit GHB-30.
7		Based on this information it was clear that EPA and DOJ had failed to check with
8		the EPA enforcement officers before bringing new actions against FCWC. The
9		testimony of these key employees and the documents contained in the
10		administrative record demonstrated that DOJ failed to conduct a competent
11		preliminary review and factual inquiry before pursuing claims against these two
12		facilities.
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13	Q:	What did DOJ do in an attempt to prove its case at Barefoot Bay and
13 14	Q:	What did DOJ do in an attempt to prove its case at Barefoot Bay and Carrollwood?
14	<i>A</i> :	Carrollwood?
14 15	<i>A</i> :	Carrollwood? In addition to extensive requests for production of documents, discussed above,
14 15 16	<i>A</i> :	Carrollwood? In addition to extensive requests for production of documents, discussed above, DOJ deposed several additional FCWC employees with regard to Barefoot Bay
14 -15 16 17	<i>A</i> :	Carrollwood? In addition to extensive requests for production of documents, discussed above, DOJ deposed several additional FCWC employees with regard to Barefoot Bay and Carrollwood.
14 -15 16 17 18	<i>A</i> :	Carrollwood? In addition to extensive requests for production of documents, discussed above, DOJ deposed several additional FCWC employees with regard to Barefoot Bay and Carrollwood. DOJ continued to press its case by taking the depositions of additional FCWC
14 -15 16 17 18 19	<i>A</i> :	Carrollwood? In addition to extensive requests for production of documents, discussed above, DOJ deposed several additional FCWC employees with regard to Barefoot Bay and Carrollwood. DOJ continued to press its case by taking the depositions of additional FCWC employees, including Johnny Overton, Paul Bradtmiller, Gerald Allen, Jack
14 -15 16 17 18 19 20	<i>A</i> :	Carrollwood? In addition to extensive requests for production of documents, discussed above, DOJ deposed several additional FCWC employees with regard to Barefoot Bay and Carrollwood. DOJ continued to press its case by taking the depositions of additional FCWC employees, including Johnny Overton, Paul Bradtmiller, Gerald Allen, Jack Tompkins and Jim Elder.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	<i>A</i> :	Carrollwood? In addition to extensive requests for production of documents, discussed above, DOJ deposed several additional FCWC employees with regard to Barefoot Bay and Carrollwood. DOJ continued to press its case by taking the depositions of additional FCWC employees, including Johnny Overton, Paul Bradtmiller, Gerald Allen, Jack Tompkins and Jim Elder. Mr. Bradtmiller was deposed for two days by DOJ on November 18 and 21, 1994.
14 -15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	<i>A</i> :	Carrollwood? In addition to extensive requests for production of documents, discussed above, DOJ deposed several additional FCWC employees with regard to Barefoot Bay and Carrollwood. DOJ continued to press its case by taking the depositions of additional FCWC employees, including Johnny Overton, Paul Bradtmiller, Gerald Allen, Jack Tompkins and Jim Elder. Mr. Bradtmiller was deposed for two days by DOJ on November 18 and 21, 1994. Exhibit GHB-31. He was questioned about the various facilities' discharge

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Atlanta and noted that Mr. McGarry did not have a favorable attitude toward FCWC.

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3	Mr. Overton was Executive Vice President of Avatar Utilities Services, Inc. and
4	reported to Mr. Allen at the time his deposition was taken. He had previously
5	been the Senior Vice President of FCWC. Exhibit GHB-32. Mr. Overton
6	was questioned extensively about sprayfield overflows, FCWC's efforts to correct
7	the problems and the company's efforts to buy additional sprayfield capacity. In
8	addition, DOJ attempted to intimidate FCWC by staging inspections of the
9	Carrollwood, Southgate and Barefoot facilities. In addition to DOJ personnel, the
10	inspectors were accompanied by Mark Klingenstein, who later testified as an
11	expert witness for the government at trial on the issue of alleged environmental
12	harm.
13	Mr. Tompkins was the Operations Manager at FCWC and reported to Mr.
14	Bradtmiller. Exhibit GHB-33. He was responsible for obtaining permits
15	for Waterway. He also handled construction issues at Waterway. In his
16	deposition, DOJ wanted to demonstrate that the delay in constructing Waterway's
17	new facilities caused the nitrogen violations at the facility and that various FCWC
18	employees knew that the facilities were discharging without federal permits,
19	particularly at Barefoot and Carrollwood.
20 Q :	In addition to the depositions already taken, was there a further dispute
21	concerning interviews of former employees?
22 A:	Yes. As I described earlier in my testimony, DOJ's attempts to undertake ex parte
23	contacts with former FCWC employees was a major issue in the conduct of this
24	litigation. After filing our papers on the matter in 1994, on January 30, 1995, I
25	was notified again by DOJ that it would no longer voluntarily refrain from

1	conducting interviews of former employees of FCWC and its parent company.
2	Exhibit GHB-34. DOJ counsel stated that: "any such interviews will be
3	conducted without further notice to Florida Cities and its parent companies." On
4	February 3, 1995, FCWC filed an emergency motion seeking a temporary
5	protective order preserving the status quo until the Court heard our motion. This
6	issue was intertwined with FCWC's motion to disqualify government counsel
7	because DOJ counsel had been contacting former high-level, managerial
8	employees without notice to FCWC's counsel, in contravention of caselaw in the
9	Middle District of Florida. DOJ counsel acknowledged that it had engaged in ex
10	parte contacts with FCWC's former employees, and defended those actions,
11	claiming that specific DOJ regulations superseded the ethical rules and decisions
12	of the local courts. DOJ counsel replied to our motion on February 9, 1995. See
13	Exhibit GHB-35. On February 13, 1995, the Court granted our request for a
14	temporary protective order until a hearing could be held. See Exhibit
15	GHB-20. On March 16, 1995, U.S. Magistrate Judge Swartz issued an order,
16	discussed above, which barred DOJ counsel from interviewing former high-level
17	FCWC employees without notice to FCWC counsel. Magistrate Judge Swartz's
18	order was affirmed by the Honorable Ralph W. Nimmons, Jr., the U.S. District
19	Judge assigned to try this matter. Exhibit GHB-26.
20 Q :	Did some witnesses called by DOJ for depositions avail themselves of their
21	rights under the Fifth Amendment and decline to testify at deposition?
22 A:	Yes.
23 Q :	Please explain.
24 <i>A</i> :	In January of 1995, I learned of the case of U.S. v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th
25	Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 939 (1995). Exhibit GHB-36. The

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1	holding of the case was particularly troubling as it related to potential criminal
2	liability under the CWA. The case held that if a potential party was aware of the
3	requirement for an NPDES permit and had knowledge that the party's facility did
4	not have a permit or was violating the permit, such a person could be charged with
5	a criminal violation of the CWA. I immediately forwarded this case to the general
6	counsel of FCWC. In an abundance of caution, and because DOJ counsel had
7	suggested criminal action on occasion by alleging that a number of our employees
8	had knowingly violated the CWA, we recommended that current and former
9	employees discuss this matter with independent counsel. I believed it important
10	that each employee examine the Weitzenhoff case and his or her situation and act
11	accordingly. As a result, in the early part of 1995, a number of current and former
12	employees invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. However, these employees
13	were willing to testify if given immunity for the matters which were at issue in
14	this litigation. We formally advised DOJ counsel of our position on July 13,
15	1995. DOJ counsel never responded to our request for immunity.
16 Q :	What occurred next?
17 A:	During the first part of March 1995, we responded to interrogatories served by the
18	U.S. Exhibit GHB-37. These interrogatories requested information on
19	"all directors, officers, and employees of Defendant from January 1, 1980 to the
20	present." It was an extraordinary undertaking to identify all employees over a 15-
21	year period. Moreover, for each employee DOJ counsel wanted to know the term
22	of employment, the reason for termination, total compensation, and each person's
23	responsibilities as they related to environmental laws and regulations. Another
24	interrogatory requested any violations of federal, state, or local environmental
25	laws or regulations from 1988 to the trial of this matter, by date and type of each

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1	violation, including all violations of any permit at any facility owned or operated
2	by FCWC. Another request was to identify, for each violation, from 1980 to
3	present, the nature of the violation, the reason for the violation, any and all
4	measures taken to prevent the violation, persons who were aware of the violations,
5	and the date they became aware of the violation. FCWC was also requested to
6	identify each wastewater treatment plant owned or operated by it since 1980, and
7	the years the plant discharged into waters of the United States. We spent
8	substantial time in March 1995 preparing responses to these interrogatories and
9	reviewing documents for these responses and for upcoming document production.
10	We also prepared and filed our own interrogatories upon the U.S. and on March
11	22, 1995, we filed our second request for production of documents. See Exhibit
12	GHB-38. FCWC's first set of interrogatories and second request for
13	production of documents represented an opportunity to determine the basis of the
14	Plaintiff's case against FCWC. We requested answers to basic questions, for
15	example: summarize the facts supporting allegations in the complaint; identify all
16	persons who have knowledge of the allegations in the complaint; identify persons
17	to be called as fact or expert witnesses; and identify the facts relevant to the
18	determination of the penalty. The documents requested included: the procedures,
19	practices and internal agency guidelines regarding water quality-limited stream
20	segments; coordination with state and local permitting authorities; Region IV
21	permit renewal denials; and environmental harm, if any, caused by FCWC's
22	discharges. The responses to these requests would provide FCWC with an
23	understanding of why Plaintiff thought that FCWC had violated the CWA and
24	with the evidence supporting that belief.

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25 Q: Did you undertake additional efforts to settle the case at this time?

1 A:	Yes. We believed that we had such a strong case that DOJ should reconsider
2	reducing its claim from \$5 million down to \$500,000 or less. We still believed
3	that the fine should be no more than $100,000$ to $200,000$, and FCWC and I
4	agreed that we should add an additional amount for the value of saving the
5	expense of further litigation. On March 14, 1995, FCWC served DOJ with a Rule
6	68 Offer of Judgment in the amount of \$500,000. That is, we offered to pay
7	\$500,000 to settle the case. Exhibit GHB-39. We thought this offer would
8	add some pressure on the government to settle. The letter was handed to DOJ
9	counsel at the beginning of a deposition. DOJ counsel indicated that this was not
10	a "serious" offer and, I was told, proceeded to literally throw the letter across the
11	room without reading the three page offer. DOJ counsel then stated that he would
12	proceed to add other claims to his complaint.
13	The Amended Complaint

13 The Amended Complaint

14 Q: What steps did DOJ then take?

15 A: On March 30, 1995, after engaging in extensive discovery, the U.S. amended its 16 complaint to include a number of charges against Barefoot and Carrollwood 17 which increased FCWC's liability to over \$100 million. (Amended Complaint). 18 See Exhibit GSA-7. At Barefoot the government claimed that from April 1, 1990 19 to November 1, 1991, FCWC discharged into Sebastian Creek without a federal 20 NPDES permit. The government further claimed that from November 1990 to 21 June 1991, FCWC violated provisions of an administrative order by exceeding the 22 order's allowance for total suspended solids, fecal coliform, dissolved oxygen and biological oxygen demand. Finally, the government claimed that provisions of a 23 24 particular NPDES permit involving test methods for total residual chlorine were

also violated.

1		At Carrollwood, the government claimed that FCWC discharged effluent without
2		a federal permit from August 1990 to June 1991. It further claimed that during
3		October, November and December of 1991, FCWC discharged in violation of an
4		NPDES permit with regard to its allowances for total suspended solids, total
5		phosphorus, fecal coliform, total nitrogen, carbonaceous biochemical oxygen
6		demand and total residual chlorine.
7	Q:	Did the Amended Complaint name Avatar Holdings Inc. as an additional
8		defendant?
9	<i>A:</i>	Yes.
10	Q:	Did you provide Avatar Holding's defense to the allegations contained in the
11		Amended Complaint?
12	<i>A:</i>	No. Avatar Holdings retained Weil, Gotshal and Manges as its attorneys. We
13		believed DOJ counsel would subsequently argue that Avatar exercised complete
14		control over FCWC and we wanted to demonstrate there was a corporate structure
15		in place separating the two entities.
16	Q:	Did you coordinate the work involved with Weil, Gotshal and Manges
17		attorneys from the time after the Amended Complaint was filed until the
18		conclusion of the litigation?
19	<i>A:</i>	Yes, but neither myself nor any of my co-counsels provided services for Avatar
20		Holdings.
21	<i>Q</i> :	What action did you take to protect FCWC's interest with respect to the
22		Amended Complaint?
23	A:	On April 4, 1995, FCWC filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose the U.S. for leave
24		to file an amended complaint. See Exhibit GHB-40. On April 14, 1995,

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1	amend the complaint. See Exhibit GHB-41. In our memorandum, we
2	argued that DOJ should be denied leave to amend the complaint under Federal
2	argued that DOJ should be defined leave to amend the complaint under Pederal
3	Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). This rule sets forth the standard that leave to
4	amend be freely granted, unless there exists a substantial reason to deny such
5	leave. The futility of a proposed amended complaint, however, is sufficient
6	reason to deny a motion to amend. Applying these principles to our case, we
7	argued that it would be futile for the government to amend the complaint in light
8	of the CWA provision (Section 309(9)(b)(A)) that expressly forbids EPA from
9	seeking to collect in court penalties for which EPA has already collected in an
10	administrative proceeding. Specifically, EPA had issued a Consent Order for
11	\$6,000 at Barefoot on November 6, 1991. With respect to Carrollwood, EPA had
12	settled all claims for discharging without an NPDES permit for \$15,000; EPA
13	closed out the Carrollwood matter on March 3, 1992. FCWC further argued that
14	EPA's original case had suffered a potentially lethal blow from the improper
15	denial of the permit renewal for Waterway. We also argued that DOJ was
16	attempting to salvage its initial case by engaging in open-ended and massive
17	discovery in a transparent attempt to support its failed case by seeking to find any
18	technical violation, no matter how trivial, at any of the several other facilities
19	owned and operated by FCWC.

20 Q: How did the court rule on your motion?

21 A: On April 26, 1995, the Court granted FCWC's motion, and ordered DOJ to file a
22 Revised Amended Complaint on or before May 5, 1995. This Revised Amended
23 Complaint was to be filed with the limitation that paragraphs 16 and 30 of the
24 Proposed Amended Complaint and any allegations relating to paragraphs 16 and

25 30 that were not relevant to the remaining claims "shall not be permitted." See

- 1 Exhibit _____ GHB-42. Paragraphs 16 and 30 of the Amended Complaint
- 2 concerned discharges at Barefoot and Carrollwood without a permit, allegations
- 3 covered by the Consent Agreements and Orders Assessing Administrative
- 4 Penalties previously settled with EPA.
- 5 <u>Revised Amended Complaint</u>
- 6 Q: Did DOJ file a Revised Amended Complaint?
- 7 A: Yes. On May 4, 1995, DOJ filed its Revised Amended Complaint. Exhibit ______
 8 GHB-43. To our surprise, the government filed substantially the exact same
 9 complaint as it had proposed prior to the court's order.
- 10 Q: Did FCWC respond to this new complaint?
- 11 A: Yes. On May 9, 1995, FCWC moved to strike portions of the Revised Amended
- 12 Complaint. Exhibit _____ GHB-44. FCWC argued that the Court, in its April
- 13 26, 1995 order, had already ruled that certain claims regarding Barefoot and
- 14 Carrollwood would not be permitted. We relied on the Court's order,
- 15 incorporating into our motion the Court's own words for not permitting these
- 16 claims: "It is evident that even if the Plaintiff had viable claims against Barefoot
- 17 Bay and Carrollwood, it should have been aware of these claims at the time of the
- 18 filing of the original complaint. Raising such claims [shortly] before the
- 19 expiration of discovery is clearly prejudicial to the Defendant."
- 20 Q: Did the government respond to this Motion to Strike?
- 21 A: Yes. On May 12, 1995, DOJ moved for reconsideration of the Court's April 26,
- 22 1995 order disallowing claims for unpermitted discharges at Barefoot and
- 23 Carrollwood. Exhibit _____ GHB-45. DOJ filed a 20-page memorandum, with
- 24 more than 25 pages of exhibits supporting this motion. The main point of DOJ's
- 25 position was that the earlier consent decrees did not bar the present action because

1	the consent decrees only settled matters for the dates noted on the orders. For
2	Barefoot, the government argued that the Administrative Order only resolved the
3	violation on September 14, 1989. For Carrollwood, the government argued that
4	the Administrative Order in question only resolved violations during June 1987
5	through July 1990. As the dates of violations in the revised amended complaint
6	differed from the dates mentioned in the two Administrative Orders, the
7	government argued that the new complaint was not futile. The government
8	bolstered its argument with a basic principle of contract law that "the terms of an
9	unambiguous contract are exclusively contained within the four corners of the
10	document itself, and 'the instrument must be construed as it is written.""
11 Q :	Did FCWC answer the new DOJ amended complaint?
12 A:	Yes. On May 20, 1995, FCWC in its answer denied DOJ's complaint. See
13	Exhibit GHB-46. Additional affirmative defenses were added: 1) that
14	plaintiff's claims were barred because FCWC had paid administrative penalties at
15	the two new sites and therefore could not be charged with the violations that DOJ
16	alleged in its complaint; 2) that plaintiff's claims were barred because they were
17	the subject of earlier settlement agreements with EPA; 3) that plaintiff's claims
18	were barred by the doctrine of <i>res judicata</i> ; 4) that plaintiff in some instances
19	improperly sought duplicative penalties for the same violation; and 5) that
20	plaintiff violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment due process rights.
21 Q:	Did the government respond to FCWC's motion to strike portions of the
22	Revised Amended Complaint?
23 A:	Yes. On May 25, 1995, DOJ filed its opposition to FCWC's motion to strike
24	substantial portions of their Revised Amended Complaint. See Exhibit
25	GHB-47. DOJ argued that in its April 26, 1995 order, the court sustained

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1	FCWC's opposition to the Barefoot and Carrollwood unpermitted discharge
2	claims, but otherwise allowed the filing of the amended complaint. DOJ further
3	claimed that FCWC was belatedly seeking to preclude DOJ from asserting all
4	claims for violations of the CWA at the two additional facilities.
5 Q :	Did discovery resume?
6 A:	Yes. In addition to the controversy surrounding the amended complaint, a
7	number of other activities were ongoing in April and May of 1995. In terms of
8	discovery, in mid-April, FCWC responded to the U.S.'s Third Document Request.
9	Exhibit GHB-48. The government's third request for production of
10	documents again required a substantial effort. This request sought: various
11	minutes of board of directors meetings; all FCWC monthly operating statements,
12	regardless of date; substantial financial records; and all documents reviewed by
13	any expert retained by FCWC for the purpose of testifying in this case.
14	Documents responsive to this request were made available throughout April 1995,
15	in Sarasota, Barefoot Bay, and Miami. Portions of the document request required
16	additional time, and production was made by June 1995.
17	Early in May, we prepared for further document production and also for
18	upcoming 30(b)(6) depositions.
19	FCWC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
20 <i>Q:</i>	Did FCWC file other motions?
21 <i>A</i> :	Yes. April 26, 1995, we filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Exhibit
22	GHB-49.
23 Q:	Did the government respond to FCWC's motion for summary judgment?
24 <i>A</i> :	Yes. On June 7, 1995, DOJ filed its Opposition to FCWC's Motion for Partial
25	Summary Judgment. Exhibit GHB-50. On June 21, 1995, the Court

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denied FCWC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the void ab initio

2 issue. Exhibit ____ GHB-51.

- 3 Q: Did the Court respond to additional motions at this time?
- 4 A: Yes. The Court also reversed its earlier rulings and allowed DOJ to proceed with
 5 its causes of action for discharge without a permit at Barefoot and Carrollwood.
- 6 Q: What happened next?

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7 A: The next day, June 23, 1995, DOJ filed its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
8 Exhibit _____ GHB-52. This massive brief and exhibits required substantial legal

9 and factual research to oppose. The main thrust of the government's motion was

- 10 to argue strict liability at three FCWC facilities and establish that Avatar
- 11 Holdings, FCWC's parent, could be held liable for violations under the CWA.
- 12 Under the CWA, the government noted, a strict liability standard is imposed for
- 13 all "violations." To the degree that the government could prove a "violation," it

14 argued that it should be afforded the benefit of summary judgment. The brief then

- 15 went on to demonstrate that FCWC did indeed violate the CWA as alleged in the
- 16 complaint. The District Court rejected DOJ's Motion because it exceeded the
- 17 applicable page limitations under the local rules.

18 Q: Were additional efforts undertaken to settle the case during 1995?

19 A: Yes. Earlier, FCWC had hired Richard Leon of the firm of Baker & Hostetler to

20 help with settlement negotiations. Mr. Leon, a former senior member of DOJ's

- 21 Environmental Enforcement section, was personally acquainted with Mr. Jacobs.
- 22 After several attempts by Mr. Leon to get settlement moving, he was unable to
- 23 convince DOJ that our position regarding the three facilities was correct; therefore
- 24 we suspended our efforts to settle the case for a period of time.
- 25 <u>Additional Discovery</u>

1 Q:	What other litigation activities were ongoing in or about May 1995?
2 A:	In addition to moving to strike portions of the Revised Amended Complaint, we
3	undertook an additional round of depositions (James Greenfield and Roosevelt
4	Childress), document production, research, and interrogatories.
5	The deposition of Roosevelt Childress, of EPA Region IV, was important in
6	establishing the facts of EPA's denial of FCWC's permit renewal, the process for
7	reviewing wasteload allocations in permit decisions at EPA, the status of
8	Waterway under Florida's water program, and the rarity of permit denials. Mr.
9	Childress agreed that Ms. Kagey had relied exclusively on two pages from a 1981
10	Florida planning document in denying FCWC's permit. He then explained the
11	method by which EPA is supposed to review wasteload allocation documents for
12	permit decision and described a special wasteload allocation unit within EPA
13	which determines the official, applicable wasteload allocation for permitting
14	decisions. According to Mr. Childress, Ms. Kagey did not follow EPA
15	procedures in relying on the 1981 planning document for a wasteload allocation,
16	without confirming this critical assumption through additional research. Mr.
17	Childress agreed that Waterway continued to have a Florida discharge permit
18	throughout the 1980s, and that FDEP did not require "no discharge" from the
19	Waterway facility. According to Mr. Childress, by certifying that a federal permit
20	for Waterway was acceptable to it, Florida indicated that it did not require that
21	Waterway cease discharging. Mr. Childress further testified that he was unaware
22	of any other permit renewal denial in Region IV, which had at that time more than
23	13,000 active NPDES permits.
24	Mr. Greenfield, EPA Region IV wasteload allocation TMDL coordinator, also
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25 testified in his deposition about the development and use of wasteload allocations.

1	His testimony explained the rules for determining whether a stream is a "water-
2	quality limited stream," when wasteload allocations are required, the state role in
3	developing wasteload allocations, and EPA's role in approving wasteload
4	allocations. Both Mr. Childress's and Mr. Greenfield's depositions were
5	important in understanding EPA's wasteload allocation and permitting systems,
6	what happened when FCWC's permit renewal was denied, and why that denial
7	did not follow EPA procedures or regulations.
8	We also responded to the U.S.'s second set of interrogatories and first request for
9	admissions. Exhibit GHB-53. The government's second set of
10	interrogatories required FCWC to gather substantial factual information. DOJ
11	requested: the facts supporting the denials by FCWC of the allegations in the
12	revised amended complaint; the facts supporting each of FCWC's affirmative
13	defenses; and the facts supporting any denials in response to the government's
14	requests for admission. FCWC counsel and FCWC personnel spent much of May
15	and June 1995 responding to these requests.
16	DOJ's first requests for admission also required a substantial legal and factual
17	effort. DOJ made 41 requests for admission, including: the relationship of FCWC
18	to its parent corporations; the elements of a CWA violation, that is, whether
19	FCWC's activities constituted a discharge of pollutants; the number and type of
20	exceedences by FCWC; the facts concerning the alleged discharges without an
21	NPDES permit; and the administrative orders at Barefoot and Carrollwood.
22	We also served the government with a request for Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23	30(b)(6) depositions in order to get the agency on record regarding its position
24	was on wasteload allocations, EPA's administration of its own regulations, and
25	the fact that the agency had contracts with states in the southeast which set forth

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1	the procedures on how wasteload allocations were to be approved by EPA and the
2	states. That spring and summer our research also included a substantial legal and
3	factual inquiry into the inferences to be drawn from invoking the Fifth
4	Amendment at depositions; the legal standard for comparability between state and
5	federal enforcement under the CWA; the possibility of a Bivens claim against the
6	government; the upset defense; the effect of an administrative order on permit
7	requirements; the potential for Rule 11 sanctions against the government; claim
8	splitting and issue splitting under the CWA; the discoverability of expert reports;
9	the standard for scientific experts; attorney client and work product issues, and
10	other matters. Exhibit GHB-54. Briefly, I'll explain why each subject of
11	legal research was important.
12	The comparability between state and federal enforcement was an issue because
13	the CWA states that the government may not impose a civil penalty for a violation
14	that has already been the subject of an administrative order. In addition to the
15	federal administrative orders, which we successfully argued barred a portion of
16	the government's case, there were state administrative orders applicable in this
17	case. We considered whether these state administrative orders might be used to
18	bar additional parts of the government's case.
19	The upset defense was a fact-based potential defense to some of DOJ's claims.
20	The CWA recognizes that equipment failures and the like may cause temporary
21	exceedences of permit limits, and under certain circumstances may excuse an
22	apparent violation. We considered whether this defense might be used to defend
23	against some alleged violations.
24	In a number of instances where an administrative order had been issued,

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25 construction schedules and compliance limits were set forth that were at variance

with the permit limitations. We considered whether these administrative order
 limitations might vary the permit requirements to some extent, thereby reducing
 the number of alleged violations.

4 DOJ counsel had obstructed our discovery and had vexatiously multiplied the 5 proceedings. We therefore considered filing a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 6 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After some research, we concluded that 7 the Court was already aware of the conduct of DOJ counsel. We also decided that 8 it would not be cost-effective to pursue Rule 11 sanctions, particularly given the 9 1993 federal rule changes, which made imposition of monetary damages against 10 the government unlikely.

11 We also began researching EPA administrative decisions on claim splitting and 12 issue preclusion with the idea of knocking out a portion of the plaintiff's claims 13 should the Court agree with the government's Motion to Reconsider. We found 14 that several administrative and court decisions had held that if EPA had an 15 opportunity to pursue a claim administratively, but did not, then it was precluded 16 from pursuing the same claims later in court. Ultimately these decisions were 17 used, after a complex series of filings, to ensure that even if the EPA 18 administrative orders were held to cover only a limited set of violations, the fact 19 that EPA clearly knew of other alleged violations at the time of the administrative 20 orders prevented EPA from taking another bite at the same apple and bringing

- 21 these claims in a later action.
- 22 Q: What was the result of this research?
- 23 A: Our research culminated in FCWC's second Motion for Partial Summary
- Judgment, filed on September 11, 1995. Exhibit _____ GHB-55. In this motion,
- 25 FCWC sought to dismiss the vast majority of the DOJ's claims related to Barefoot

and Carrollwood, particularly those claims which had been the subject of prior
 administrative settlements. The memorandum of law that accompanied the
 motion not only addressed FCWC's affirmative motion but also responded to
 DOJ's earlier motion.

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5 Q: What did you do after filing the Second Motion for Partial Summary 6 Judgment?

7 A: In the fall of 1995, we began to examine a number of discovery issues, including 8 discovery of expert reports and attorney-client privileged documents. DOJ and 9 FCWC fought over whether certain expert reports would be discoverable. As 10 noted above, FCWC produced to DOJ tens of thousands of pages of documents. 11 Finally, the standard for use of scientific testimony was likely to be an issue for 12 trial, as FCWC depended for its case in mitigation on the expert testimony of 13 engineers and others about the unavoidable construction delays that occurred. 14 Also, DOJ was relying on economic assumptions and calculations of dubious 15 merit; therefore, we knew we had to have experts to respond to DOJ's case. 16 Accordingly, it was important to understand the evolving legal standard for 17 offering expert scientific testimony.

18 Q: What depositions were taken during the summer and fall of 1995?

19 A: Numerous follow up depositions were taken and defended, including, in addition
20 to Roosevelt Childress and James Greenfield discussed in the forgoing, those of:

- 21 John Marlar, Branch Chief for EPA's Environmental Compliance Branch; Fritz
- 22 Wagener, Chief of the Water Quality Standards Section, EPA Region IV; Ken
- 23 Kwan, EPA Region IV Environmental Engineer, who testified both personally
- and as EPA's Rule 30(b)(6) witness; Roger Pfaff, Acting Branch Chief for the
- 25 Water Permits and Enforcement Branch, EPA Region IV; Roy Herwig,

1	Environmental Engineer in NPDES Enforcement Section, EPA Region IV;
2	Thomas Plouff, EPA Region IV Environmental Engineer; and Michael Hom, EPA
3	Region IV Supervising Environmental Engineer. These depositions, all taken by
4	FCWC, required substantial preparation, including review of the relevant
5	documents, EPA regulations and policies, and permits. A summary of these
6	depositions is attached as Exhibit GHB-56. DOJ took numerous
7	depositions as well, including those of Ed Jacobson, John Sladkus, Leon Levy
8	(two days), Julie Karleskint (two additional days), Paul Bradtmiller, Pat Lehman
9	(one and one-half days), Gerald Allen (two days), and our experts Douglas Smith
10	and Randall Armstrong. Exhibit GHB-57. In Mr. Allen's deposition,
11	DOJ counsel sought information about FCWC company structure and
12	organizational information. The deposition included extensive questioning
13	concerning the NPDES permit situation at Barefoot, Carrollwood, and Waterway.
14	DOJ attempted to establish connections between the subsidiary, FCWC, and the
15	corporate parent, Avatar Holdings Inc., in an attempt to hold the parent liable for
16	knowing violations of the CWA. Mr. Allen's testimony highlighted the
17	extraordinary efforts to solve the problems at Barefoot.
18 <i>Q</i> :	During the fall of 1995, what major litigation activities were ongoing?
19 <i>A</i> :	During September 1995, we engaged in additional discovery activities. We
20	served our third set of interrogatories and fourth request for production of
21	documents upon EPA. Exhibit GHB-58. The government, in turn, filed its
22	fifth request for production of documents. Exhibit GHB-59. FCWC's
23	third set of interrogatories sought information on the referral by EPA to DOJ for
24	civil enforcement of this matter. FCWC's fourth request for production of
25	documents sought information on the government's experts and the referral by

1	EPA to DOJ for civil enforcement. In contrast to these limited, targeted requests,
2	DOJ sought a huge, additional amount of data in its fifth request for production of
3	documents. DOJ sought: complete audited financial statements for 1994;
4	documents on the effluent and influent at Barefoot during 1990 and 1991; all
5	documents regarding the negotiations between FCWC and EPA on the
6	administrative orders; and additional documents on the discharges at Waterway,
7	Barefoot and Carrollwood.
8	We also interviewed potential witnesses: Dr. Ahmadi, Jack Schenkman, Larry
9	Griggs, Patrick Lehman, Christianne Ferraro, and Al Castro. We also interviewed
10	FDEP officials in the Tampa regional office, and we met with Hillsborough
11	County officials to discuss Carrollwood.
12 <i>Q</i> :	What major litigation activities were ongoing in October of 1995?
13 A:	The dominant litigation activity during this month consisted of the taking and
14	defending of depositions. Julie Karleskint's deposition was reopened for two
15	additional days, October 2 and October 16, 1995. During these additional days of
16	testimony, Ms. Karleskint testified about the operation of and the upgrades to the
17	Barefoot and Carrollwood facilities. She reviewed the steps that FCWC took to
18	raise the performance levels of Barefoot during the construction of the AWT
19	facility, allowing both plants to operate at levels that provided treatment above the
20	level of secondary treatment. In addition, Ms. Karleskint was questioned
21	extensively by DOJ counsel regarding each of the permit (or administrative order)
22	exceedences at these two facilities. Ms. Karleskint's testimony established that
23	these exceedences were de minimis and did not result in violations of water
24	quality standards.
25	On October 3, DOJ deposed Paul Bradtmiller and Patrick Lehman. On October

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1	17, Patrick Lehman was further deposed. On October 18, DOJ deposed Charles
2	McNairy. On the 20th, DOJ deposed Dr. Abdul Ahmadi. On October 23, we
3	deposed DOJ's expert, Mark Klingenstein. On October 26, FCWC deposed
4	DOJ's other expert, Eileen Zimmer. These depositions were all part of the push to
5	prepare for trial.
6	On October 31, FCWC filed a Notice of Dispositive Authority citing the just-
7	decided case Borough of Ridgway for the proposition that res judicata bars the
8	government from raising claims it could have raised in an earlier action. Exhibit
9	GHB-60.
10 <i>Q:</i>	Did the District Court rule on any of the Motions the parties kept filing?
11 <i>A</i> :	Yes. On November 22, 1995 the District Court ruled on the various summary
12	judgment motions that each party had filed. This was a major victory for FCWC
13	because the Court virtually eliminated DOJ's case against Barefoot and
14	Carrollwood and eliminated over \$50 million in potential penalties. Exhibit
15	GHB-61. Adopting the res judicata argument, the court granted FCWC's
16	request for summary judgment to FCWC on paragraphs 11-23 and 30 of the
17	second amended complaint. The court denied summary judgment to FCWC on
18	other claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the government on all
19	NPDES permit violations at each facility. The Court's order narrowed the case
20	considerably, and it signaled to us to focus on mitigation of penalties as to the
21	remaining claims at the three facilities. DOJ had, up to this point, focused almost
22	exclusively on Barefoot and Carrollwood. The Court's ruling changed the
23	direction of DOJ's case significantly.
24 Q :	What other major litigation activities were ongoing during November 1995?

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25 A: During November we were also preparing for the depositions of Gerald Allen (by

1	DOJ) and Bennie Shoemaker, FDEP, Department of Environmental Protection
2	(by FCWC). We deposed Mr. Shoemaker regarding his role in working with EPA
3	to provide information on Waterway. Mid-month we interviewed Michael
4	McWeeny, Director of the Hillsborough County Utility Department, and William
5	Schafer, Director of Planning for the Sanitary Sewer Department of the City of
6	Tampa, potential witnesses for trial. In addition, throughout November we
7	examined all the documents we had gathered in order to select trial exhibits. Also
8	in November, DOJ, FCWC and Avatar Holdings conducted our required pre-trial
9	meeting to exchange exhibits, provide witness lists and discuss settlement.
10	During this meeting, DOJ orally issued a revised settlement offer of \$2,200,000,
11	its first revised proposal since its initial offer of \$5,000,000 in 1993. This
12	reduction of the proposed penalty by DOJ indicated to me we were making
13	progress but this new proposal was still not reasonable in view of the facts
14	developed through discovery.
15	Preparation for Trial
16 Q :	What did you do in December 1995 to prepare for trial?
17 <i>A</i> :	In December 1995, we continued our ongoing trial preparation. We forwarded to
18	DOJ our list of exhibits. We designated portions of depositions and proposed
19	stipulations. Exhibit GHB-62. There were also extensive discussions
20	regarding the proposed stipulations, which would have limited the scope of trial.
21	DOJ counsel asked FCWC to stipulate that the discharges from Waterway to an
22	unpermitted location were intentional. FCWC rejected this proposed stipulation.
23	In addition, DOJ wanted FCWC to stipulate that each discharge had the potential
24	to cause environmental harm. FCWC rejected this proposal as well because
25	FDEP personnel and our experts were prepared to testify that FCWC discharges

1	did not cause environmental harm. DOJ also sought agreement with a stipulation
2	that FCWC's parent, Avatar Holdings, had derived wrongful profits of more than
3	\$7 million during the period of the violations. Because DOJ's proposed
4	stipulations bore no relationship to reality, it was impossible to agree to any item
5	and therefore we were unable to agree to limit the issues in dispute at trial.
6	During November and December 1995, we were also reviewing DOJ's intended
7	trial materials. For example, in late November 1995, DOJ had identified more
8	than 900 potential trial exhibits. Exhibit GHB-63. We were required to
9	understand and develop responses to the evidence represented by each of these
10	exhibits, a lengthy and complex process. Concurrently, FCWC continued to
11	narrow the list of exhibits it planned to use at trial. Prior to the Court's November
12	22, 1995 Order, FCWC had initially identified approximately 1800 trial exhibits
13	which would be used to defend FCWC's actions at Barefoot and Carrollwood.
14	After the Court's ruling, we refined that list, first to 600 exhibits, and then to 200
15	exhibits because various issues had been dismissed by the Court's November 22,
16	1995 decision. This refining process was needed both to clarify our points for
17	trial and because trial time was limited, because at that time the trial was
18	scheduled for the first week of January 1996.
19	Joint Pretrial Statement
20 Q :	Was there a Joint Pretrial Statement filed with the Court?
21 A:	Yes. On December 6, 1995, the parties filed a Joint Pretrial Statement that
22	described the respective viewpoints of the case. Exhibit GHB-64. DOJ
23	claimed that the Court had found FCWC liable for NPDES permit violations at
24	Waterway, Barefoot, and Carrollwood. DOJ argued that Avatar, the parent
25	company, either directed or caused these violations, and pervasively controlled

1	FCWC's environmental practices. DOJ further claimed that applying CWA
2	Section 309 required the Court to reach the conclusions that (1) the violations
3	were serious, (2) Avatar had derived substantial economic benefit from the
4	violations, and (3) each defendant could afford a substantial penalty.
5	FCWC acknowledged that it was technically liable only for certain violations
6	under the CWA. The heart of FCWC's case, however, involved presenting
7	evidence in light of the six mitigation factors listed in Section 309(d) that the
8	Court must consider in determining a penalty. These factors are: (1) the
9	seriousness of the violations; (2) the economic benefit, if any; (3) any history of
10	violations; (4) any good faith efforts to comply; (5) the economic impact of a
11	penalty; and (6) such other factors as justice may require.
12	In the pretrial statement, DOJ indicated that it would call 11 witnesses at trial.
13	DOJ stated that it would rely on an expert witness, Mark Klingenstein, as its
14	principal witness to make its case against FCWC. DOJ was intending to call this
15	witness even though from our discovery it was evident that he apparently had
16	spent little time talking to EPA personnel about prior enforcement actions taken
17	against Barefoot Bay and Carrollwood. Indeed, Mr. Klingenstein had no
18	involvement with the three facilities until he reviewed the paper record contained
19	in the EPA file, some four years after the events at issue.
20	FCWC advised the Court that the evidence and admissions established the fact
21	that DOJ had no evidence that any of FCWC's actions had caused environmental
22	harm at any of the three facilities. FCWC stated that the evidence would further
23	establish that each of the facilities was authorized to discharge secondarily treated
24	effluent pursuant to rigorous regulation by the State of Florida. Moreover, FCWC
25	had evidence that established that it had received no economic benefit from any

violation. EPA's own documents demonstrated that FCWC was acting in good
faith to resolve the problems at issue. FCWC could also establish that even a
modest penalty would cause a severe economic impact on the company. Finally,
FCWC would be able to demonstrate that this entire action was the result of
EPA's failure to follow its own regulations when FCWC properly applied for the
Waterway NPDES permit renewal.

7 FCWC indicated that it might call as many as twenty-five (25) witnesses.

8 To counter DOJ expert Mr. Klingenstein's background and testimony, we advised 9 the Court that among others, we would be calling four expert witnesses who had 10 prepared expert reports: Roger Hartung, Douglas Smith, Randall Armstrong and 11 Keith Cardey. Mr. Hartung is a former EPA enforcement official, who had the 12 responsibility of overseeing thousands of enforcement cases within EPA. His 13 testimony would demonstrate that EPA had violated its own regulations regarding 14 wasteload allocation approvals, and that EPA did not normally pursue enforcement cases against small facilities, such as those of FCWC. In his 15 16 testimony he also explained to the Court how the CWA actually worked so the 17 Court understood terms and the framework with which FCWC had to comply. 18 Douglas Smith, a senior partner with the consulting engineering firm Black & 19 Veatch, would testify as to FCWC's record in operating the facilities and how 20 well these facilities were run. He also could discuss the improvements at 21 Waterway and whether they had been undertaken in a reasonable amount of time. 22 Mr. Smith had both an academic background and practical experience with respect to the design and environmental impacts resulting from the operation of a 23 24 wastewater treatment plant.

25 Randall Armstrong had worked at FDEP and would testify about water quality

1	issues and the development of the 1981 study relied upon by EPA to deny FCWC
2	an NPDES permit. He also was needed to give his analysis of water quality data.
3	Keith Cardey is an expert in the area of Florida Public Service Commission
4	regulation and the economic effects of PSC regulation on privately-owned,
5	publically regulated utilities. He was needed to show that FCWC had no
6	economic incentive to delay expenditures for CWA compliance at any of its
7	facilities.
8	In addition to preparing and filing the pre-trial statement, a number of pre-trial
9	disputes were ongoing at this time, including DOJ's efforts to depose six
10	witnesses after the close of discovery. Exhibit GHB-65. FCWC opposed
11	this request, noting during the normal discovery period, that DOJ had ample
12	notice of all of these potential witnesses, except for Mike McWeeny, Director of
13	the Hillsborough County Utilities Department. FCWC consented to the
14	deposition of Mr. McWeeny. Exhibit GHB-66. Magistrate Judge Swartz
15	agreed with our position and permitted the deposition of Mr. McWeeny only.
16	Exhibit GHB-67. Additionally, DOJ filed two motions to compel
17	production of documents. FCWC filed its own motion to compel DOJ to
18	respond in full to our first set of interrogatories, and a motion for a protective
19	order to quash a deposition subpoena to Leon Levy.
20	FCWC's Trial Brief and Proposed Findings of Law and Fact
21 <i>Q</i> :	What else did you do to prepare for trial this month?
22 A:	In December 1995, FCWC began drafting its trial brief and proposed findings of
23	law and fact. During the preparation of these documents, DOJ filed a motion for
24	expedited reconsideration of the Court's November 22, 1995 opinion. Exhibit
25	GHB-68. DOJ counsel moved for reconsideration, asserting that the claims

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1	that the Court had dismissed on November 22, 1995 were not barred by the
2	doctrine of res judicata. DOJ filed an 11-page memorandum claiming that the
3	earlier administrative proceedings undertaken against FCWC's Barefoot and
4	Carrollwood facilities did not bar the later judicial proceedings.
5	The Court denied DOJ's motion within three days without waiting for a response
6	from FCWC. The Court made it clear to DOJ counsel that it had not "patently
7	misunderstood" DOJ's position, and that there had been no change in law or facts
8	since the prior submission. The Court ruled that it "has reviewed the Plaintiff's
9	additional arguments and finds them unpersuasive regarding [the applicability of
10	res judicata.]" Exhibit GHB-69.
11	On December 28, 1995, FCWC filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law,
12	and the following day we filed our pre-trial brief. Exhibits GHB-70, GHB-71.
13	The findings of fact set forth in detail the facts we had been able to establish at
14	Waterway, Barefoot, and Carrollwood which I shall summarize.
15	At Waterway, we were able to establish conclusively that in May 1986, seven
16	months before EPA denied Waterway's permit renewal because Waterway
17	supposedly had a zero or no discharge wasteload allocation, FDEP had sent a
18	letter to EPA Region IV indicating that Waterway had a wasteload allocation. We
19	argued that EPA made a mistake of monumental proportion and then the Agency
20	failed to consider its own record.
21	The facts at Barefoot established that DOJ was attempting to seek substantial
22	penalties based on a mistaken belief that Barefoot's discharges were violating
23	total residual chlorine levels. Our discovery efforts had established that the
24	Barefoot facility was using the correct chlorine testing equipment, and that it was
25	known that this equipment would not report accurate levels at certain

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1	concentrations. EPA itself, in a memorandum that EPA officials had refused to
2	provide in discovery, required FCWC to report "nondetect" rather than an actual
3	number, which EPA knew would be flawed. DOJ also sought penalties for
4	FCWC's reporting of the Carbonaceous Biochemical Oxygen Demand ("CBOD")
5	rather than the Biochemical Oxygen Demand ("BOD") parameter. The facts
6	indicated that CBOD was the more accurate indicator of wastewater treatment
7	plant performance. Indeed, EPA had revised the Barefoot NPDES permit to allow
8	FCWC to report CBOD as opposed to BOD, in accordance with the Florida
9	permit.
10	The most telling fact FCWC was able to put before the Court before trial was that
11	DOJ and EPA counsel had admitted that they had no evidence of environmental
12	harm at these three facilities. As a result of this admission alone, the facts and the
13	law entitled FCWC to a significant mitigation of the penalty requested by DOJ.
14	In FCWC's pre-trial brief of January 2, 1996, we argued to the Court that
15	mitigation factors must be considered and that EPA had improperly denied
16	FCWC's NPDES permit at Waterway. We directed the Court's attention to a
17	Rule 30(b)(6) deposition where two supervisors in EPA's Region IV had testified
18	that EPA staff member, Connie Kagey, had improperly denied FCWC's permit
19	renewal, and she had failed to follow EPA's own regulations and procedures.
20	Regarding Carrollwood, FCWC argued in its brief that the NPDES permit
21	exceedences which occurred between July 1991 and January 1992 were technical
22	violations that had to be considered in light of the permitting history of the
23	facilities. Carrollwood's permit difficulties were created by one agency in
24	Hillsborough County being unwilling and unable to allow Carrollwood to connect
25	to Hillsborough County at the same time that FCWC was being ordered to

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connect by another agency of Hillsborough County. DOJ counsel argued that

- 2 Carrollwood should have ignored its permit requirements and connected with the
- 3 City of Tampa. This was not economically feasible, and might well have been
- 4 considered an unreasonable expenditure of funds.
- 5 Q: Was the trial conducted as scheduled in January 1996?
- 6 A: No. Even though the Court's opinion on November 22, 1995 caused us to begin
 7 readjusting our case, FCWC was prepared to go to trial; however the trial was
 8 postponed until March 1996 due to the sudden illness of Gerald Allen, President
 9 of FCWC and a key witness at trial.
- 10 <u>Motions in Limine</u>

- 11 Q: What happened next?
- 12 A: Before the trial began, FCWC and Avatar Holdings, submitted a motion in limine 13 and memorandum in support to exclude the expert testimony and report of Mark Klingenstein in order to highlight the fact that DOJ's key witness could not meet 14 the test for expert testimony. Exhibit GHB-72. We argued that under 15 16 Federal Rule of Evidence 702, large portions of Mr. Klingenstein's report 17 addressed DOJ allegations that had been dismissed by the Court. Accordingly, the report was largely irrelevant and unhelpful. Moreover, Mr. Klingenstein's 18 19 opinions were stated as "possibilities," not to reasonable degrees of scientific 20 certainty. We concluded that Mr. Klingenstein's report was biased and based 21 upon nonexistent analysis and therefore did not meet the standard of Rule 702. 22 DOJ also filed a broad motion in limine, containing a multitude of requests. 23 Exhibit GHB-73. First, DOJ attempted to bar any evidence regarding 24 EPA's unlawful denial of FCWC's 1986 NPDES permit renewal at Waterway. Throughout this action, DOJ had characterized FCWC's actions at Waterway "as 25

1	the wanton violations of a renegade company that was operating outside of the
2	CWA's regulatory scheme." At this point, FCWC had clearly demonstrated that
3	it had cooperated with federal and state regulatory officials, and we raised this in
4	our response. Most importantly, however, we argued that DOJ's request
5	unreasonably sought to limit the scope of the trial and to prevent the full scope of
6	mitigating evidence permitted under the CWA.
7	In a particularly stunning move, DOJ next sought to exclude the testimony of
8	current and former EPA officials, who had stated that EPA had operated in
9	violation of its own regulations, including the testimony of Connie Kagey, Bruce
10	Barrett, James Greenfield, and Roosevelt Childress, all present or former EPA
11	employees. DOJ counsel knew that if these witnesses testified, they would
12	confirm that EPA's own employee, Ms. Kagey, had failed to follow EPA's
13	regulations for issuance of the Waterway permit renewal.
14	DOJ counsel further requested that all evidence relating to Barefoot's and
15	Carrollwood's administrative orders, and the testimony of EPA's own
16	enforcement officers, Roy Herwig and Tom Plouff, be excluded. We countered
17	with the argument that DOJ could not prevent the full scope of mitigating
18	evidence from coming into the trial.
19	DOJ further attempted to strike as witnesses any of FCWC's employees that it had
20	not deposed. We countered that this was merely an attempt to circumvent
21	Magistrate Judge Swartz's opinion of December 8, 1995, which barred
22	depositions of these individuals as too late, DOJ having had two years to depose
23	these individuals and not having done so. The Court disallowed the request to
24	depose them after the close of discovery.
25	Finally, DOJ sought to bar FCWC from presenting any evidence showing that

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delays in coming into compliance were caused by third parties, including federal,

2 state, and local regulatory agencies. All of DOJ's motions in limite to limit

3 testimony were rejected by the Court on the day the trial began.

4 Q: Did FCWC file any other motions in limine to exclude expert testimony?

- 5 A: Yes. During this time, FCWC also moved to exclude portions of the report and
 6 testimony of the government's expert witness Eileen Zimmer. Exhibit _____
 7 GHB-74. This testimony was to have discussed the economic benefit allegedly
- 9 entitled "Analysis of Wrongful Profits and Ability to Pay in U.S. v. Florida Cities

resulting from FCWC's violations. The stated goal of Ms. Zimmer's report,

- 10 Water Company," was to quantify the so-called wrongful profits realized by
- 11 Avatar Holdings through its Barefoot Bay Development Corporation operations
- 12 and by FCWC, and to determine the ability of Avatar and FCWC to pay a civil
- 13 penalty for the alleged CWA violations. FCWC objected to Zimmer's testimony
- 14 and report in part because she calculated alleged wrongful profits on claims for
- 15 which the Court had already granted judgment for FCWC.
- 16 The Months Before the Trial

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17 Q: What other litigation activities were going on during late January and 18 February of 1996?

We used this time to readjust our case in light of the Court's November 22
decision. This decision, as mentioned earlier, changed the focus of the entire
case. Given the extra time, we continued document preparation and developing
lists of proposed joint exhibits to be more efficient at trial. One effort that was
undertaken involved the substantial reduction of the number of trial exhibits in
light of the Court's November decision. We did maintain as exhibits some

25 documents from Barefoot and Carrollwood, however, because we believed we

- 1 would have to answer certain evidence in trial from DOJ counsel regarding these
- 2 facilities.

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2	facilities.
3	In February 1996, there were additional settlement discussions. Once again, we
4	attempted to convince DOJ counsel and a representative from the Assistant
5	Attorney General's office how strong FCWC's case was with regard to all three
6	facilities. We had specific arguments and documents that we made available to
7	David Berz, settlement counsel for Avatar Holdings, which he in turn discussed
8	with DOJ officials. Notwithstanding our efforts and evidence, settlement could
9	not be reached.
10	In mid-to-late February 1996, we continued preparation of questions for witnesses
11	at trial and cross-examination questions. We also continued preparation of a list
12	of joint exhibits for DOJ and FCWC to file in Court.
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13 Q:	What activities occurred in March 1996?
13 <i>Q</i> :	What activities occurred in March 1996?
13 Q: 14 <i>A:</i>	What activities occurred in March 1996? Early in March 1996, in our continuing effort to convince DOJ of the
13 <i>Q:</i> 14 <i>A:</i> 15	What activities occurred in March 1996? Early in March 1996, in our continuing effort to convince DOJ of the incorrectness of its position, David Berz sent a letter on behalf of defendants to
 13 <i>Q</i>: 14 <i>A</i>: 15 16 	What activities occurred in March 1996? Early in March 1996, in our continuing effort to convince DOJ of the incorrectness of its position, David Berz sent a letter on behalf of defendants to DOJ in one final effort to settle this case and save additional expense of trial and
 13 <i>Q</i>: 14 <i>A</i>: 15 16 17 	What activities occurred in March 1996? Early in March 1996, in our continuing effort to convince DOJ of the incorrectness of its position, David Berz sent a letter on behalf of defendants to DOJ in one final effort to settle this case and save additional expense of trial and possible appeals. Exhibit GHB-75. This effort was not successful, because
 13 <i>Q</i>: 14 <i>A</i>: 15 16 17 18 	What activities occurred in March 1996? Early in March 1996, in our continuing effort to convince DOJ of the incorrectness of its position, David Berz sent a letter on behalf of defendants to DOJ in one final effort to settle this case and save additional expense of trial and possible appeals. Exhibit GHB-75. This effort was not successful, because DOJ once again rejected FCWC's settlement position.
 13 Q: 14 A: 15 16 17 18 19 	What activities occurred in March 1996? Early in March 1996, in our continuing effort to convince DOJ of the incorrectness of its position, David Berz sent a letter on behalf of defendants to DOJ in one final effort to settle this case and save additional expense of trial and possible appeals. Exhibit GHB-75. This effort was not successful, because DOJ once again rejected FCWC's settlement position. During this time we also continued our efforts in preparing to address DOJ's
 13 Q: 14 A: 15 16 17 18 19 20 	What activities occurred in March 1996? Early in March 1996, in our continuing effort to convince DOJ of the incorrectness of its position, David Berz sent a letter on behalf of defendants to DOJ in one final effort to settle this case and save additional expense of trial and possible appeals. Exhibit GHB-75. This effort was not successful, because DOJ once again rejected FCWC's settlement position. During this time we also continued our efforts in preparing to address DOJ's objections to our exhibits, and we prepared our objections to their exhibits. We

23 <u>The Trial</u>

24 Q: When and where was the trial conducted?

25 A: The trial was conducted on March 25, 27, 28, 29 and April 1, 3, 4, 5 (eight days),

- 1 1996 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida in Tampa.
- 2 Q: Is a transcript of the trial included as part of your testimony?
- 3 A: Yes, at Exhibit _____ GHB-76.
- 4 Q: Who represented FCWC at trial?
- 5 A: I was lead trial attorney and was assisted by Alexander M. Bullock, Lance W.
- 6 High and Don G. Scroggin.

7 Q: Were both FCWC and Avatar Holdings cases heard together?

- 8 A: Yes.
- 9 Q: Who represented Avatar Holdings at trial?
- 10 A: Mr. David B. Hird was the lead trial counsel, and his co-counsel was Joanne M.
 Tsotsos.
- 12 Q: What happened on the first day of trial?

13 A: The trial began with the Court ruling in FCWC's favor to exclude the wrongful

14 profits analysis of DOJ's expert Eileen Zimmer. The Court then denied DOJ's

15 motion to exclude any of our experts and their testimony. In addition, the U.S.

16 offered an official offer of proof in lieu of the testimony of witnesses who asserted

- 17 their Fifth Amendment privileges. Exhibit _____ GHB-77. DOJ argued that due
- 18 to the unavailability of knowledgeable Avatar officers, and the subsequent

19 absence of depositions or testimonial evidence, the U.S. should be able to draw

20 adverse inferences as it deemed necessary. DOJ further argued that Avatar

21 Holdings pervasively controlled the environmental practices of FCWC and must

- 22 therefore be held liable for FCWC's violations of the CWA. The Court requested
- 23 on the first day of trial we respond to this offer of proof. FCWC and Avatar
- 24 Holdings submitted a joint memorandum addressing this issue on April 5, 1996.
- 25 Exhibit _____ GHB-78. When we filed our response, we argued that adverse

1	inferences should not be drawn for several reasons. First, we noted that the
2	Weitzenhoff case created an extremely broad standard of criminal liability under
3	the CWA which triggered the personal decision of certain individuals to invoke
4	the Fifth Amendment. If the government removed the threat of criminal
5	prosecution, as requested by counsel, these individuals would have been willing to
6	offer their testimony. But the government refused to grant immunity. We further
7	noted that the government failed to ask these individuals particularized questions
8	at their depositions and could not subsequently ask the Court to speculate as to
9	what questions the government might have asked for the purpose of the Court's
10	drawing adverse inferences. We also pointed out that the government had not
11	been prejudiced by the invocation of the Fifth Amendment because it had a full
12	and fair opportunity to learn the facts of this case through numerous depositions
13	of high ranking corporate officials, broad document requests, and site inspections.
14	Ultimately, the Court ruled against DOJ with regard to this motion.
15	After these preliminary matters were raised by the Court and DOJ, FCWC filed its
16	witness list. Exhibit GHB-79. The Court next called for opening
17	statements, which Mr. Jacobs handled for DOJ, I handled for FCWC, and Mr.
18	Hird handled for Avatar Holdings, Inc. In addition to the arguments already
19	mentioned in this testimony, I pointed out that this case came down to the Court
20	applying common sense in levying a penalty in light of the facts of this case,
21	particularly where the evidence showed that DOJ had a "real inability to be able to
22	get its facts straight." I told the Court that we would lay out the facts, which
23	would show that significant mitigation should be applied with regard to any
24	penalty assessed.
25	After the opening statements, DOJ called its first witness, Mark Klingenstein.

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1 This testimony involved his review of all of the documents he had read with 2 respect to all three facilities. Mr. Klingenstein made the general arguments that 3 FCWC's violations were serious and possibly could have been prevented if 4 FCWC had been more concerned about the environment. Mr. Klingenstein's 5 general purpose seemed to be to show that FCWC could have moved much faster 6 had it adopted alternatives available to it, which had not been sufficiently 7 explored.

8 Q: What happened on the second day of trial?

9 A: The second day, March 27, 1996, Mr. Bullock conducted the cross-examination of 10 Mr. Klingenstein. From the cross-examination, it appeared that Mr. Klingenstein had done little work in terms of interviewing EPA employees with respect to the 11 12 facts of the case and had not reviewed the complete administrative record for any of these facilities. Throughout cross-examination Mr. Bullock established that 13 14 Mr. Klingenstein was unable to present any proof of environmental harm but 15 nevertheless offered a professional opinion that there was a potential for harm 16 from the discharges from Waterway. This testimony was later refuted by FDEP 17 officials who testified that they found no evidence of any actual harm created by 18 the Waterway facility. Mr. Klingenstein also offered an opinion as to 19 Carrollwood and Barefoot, although he had no personal knowledge of the 20 facilities other than the knowledge he gained from having read selected 21 documents provided to him by DOJ counsel. During his testimony, DOJ 22 stipulated that it had no evidence of environmental harm at any of the three 23 facilities. It was apparent that Mr. Klingenstein was straining to reach a 24 conclusion without having sufficient documentation and information to prove his 25 point.

1 Q: What else happened on the second day of trial?

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2 A:	DOJ had a short re-direct of Mr. Klingenstein and then called Jack Schenkman,
3	Chairman of the Board of North Fort Myers Utility. DOJ called Mr. Schenkman
4	in an effort to bolster Mr. Klingenstein's testimony that FCWC could have
5	connected Waterway with the North Fort Myers Utility wastewater treatment
6	plant very quickly and therefore would not have been discharging without an
7	NPDES permit and discharging in the wrong location for a long period of time.
8	FCWC had rejected this option based on a study of the options because the
9	company would have had to build a very expensive pipeline and pay substantial
10	connection fees to a utility which was financially unstable. Furthermore, these
11	substantial fees would have passed on to FCWC's customers.
12 Q :	What happened on the third day of trial?
13 A:	On the third day, DOJ called William Schafer, Director of Planning for the
14	sanitary sewer department for the City of Tampa. DOJ's purpose for calling Mr.
14 15	sanitary sewer department for the City of Tampa. DOJ's purpose for calling Mr. Schafer was to attempt to demonstrate that FCWC could have connected
15	Schafer was to attempt to demonstrate that FCWC could have connected
15 16	Schafer was to attempt to demonstrate that FCWC could have connected Carrollwood to the City of Tampa at an earlier date than the facility actually was
15 16 17	Schafer was to attempt to demonstrate that FCWC could have connected Carrollwood to the City of Tampa at an earlier date than the facility actually was connected to the Hillsborough County facility. DOJ's argument was that FCWC
15 16 17 18	Schafer was to attempt to demonstrate that FCWC could have connected Carrollwood to the City of Tampa at an earlier date than the facility actually was connected to the Hillsborough County facility. DOJ's argument was that FCWC could have avoided CWA violations by implementing different options sooner.
15 16 17 18 19	Schafer was to attempt to demonstrate that FCWC could have connected Carrollwood to the City of Tampa at an earlier date than the facility actually was connected to the Hillsborough County facility. DOJ's argument was that FCWC could have avoided CWA violations by implementing different options sooner. Our cross-examination demonstrated that the connection line would have been
15 16 17 18 19 20	Schafer was to attempt to demonstrate that FCWC could have connected Carrollwood to the City of Tampa at an earlier date than the facility actually was connected to the Hillsborough County facility. DOJ's argument was that FCWC could have avoided CWA violations by implementing different options sooner. Our cross-examination demonstrated that the connection line would have been over 15,000 feet long and would have to have been constructed through
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15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Schafer was to attempt to demonstrate that FCWC could have connected Carrollwood to the City of Tampa at an earlier date than the facility actually was connected to the Hillsborough County facility. DOJ's argument was that FCWC could have avoided CWA violations by implementing different options sooner. Our cross-examination demonstrated that the connection line would have been over 15,000 feet long and would have to have been constructed through residential areas, which would have been exceedingly expensive and difficult to undertake because of disturbing roads and trees. Moreover, FCWC would have

1 Next DOJ called Avatar Holdings Chairman of the Board, Leon Levy, in an 2 attempt to establish the respective roles and lines of authority and communication 3 between Avatar Holdings and FCWC. DOJ was unable to demonstrate that Mr. 4 Levy had any day to day control over the activities of Avatar's subsidiary FCWC. 5 DOJ's final witness on this day was Eileen Zimmer who offered her opinion as to 6 FCWC's and Avatar's ability to pay a penalty. 7 *Q*: What happened on the fourth day of trial, March 29, 1996? 8 A: On this day, DOJ called Roger Pfaff, an employee of U.S. EPA in Atlanta, where 9 he is the Chief of the Enforcement Section in Water Management. Although DOJ 10 attempted to use Mr. Pfaff to testify about the government's BEN model for 11 showing economic benefit of avoided or delayed costs during noncompliance, the 12 Court struck his testimony from the record because he had not been listed as a 13 witness on this subject. 14 On the same day, we began our direct case by calling Michael McWeeny, Director 15 of the Hillsborough County Utilities Department. The purpose of his testimony 16 was to establish that FCWC had attempted to hook up with the county, and the 17 county had in fact delayed the process for FCWC. 18 Our next witness was Douglas G. Smith, Senior Partner and Regional 19 Environmental Manager for Black and Veatch, an engineering consulting firm. 20 Mr. Smith explained to the Court how wastewater treatment facilities work, 21 defined terms, explained levels of treatment in a plant, described the types of 22 discharge, and, as an expert, offered his opinion on the environmental impacts 23 effluent from wastewater treatment facilities have on receiving waters. Exhibit 24 GHB-80. Mr. Smith demonstrated to the Court the excellent job FCWC 25 had done in operating the three facilities at issue and he explained all the

1	engineering, chemical, and environmental actions undertaken by FCWC to the
2	Court. Mr. Smith testified with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty that
3	none of the discharges from any of FCWC's plants had a negative impact on the
4	receiving waters of Florida. He also testified that FCWC had taken a reasonable
5	amount of time to do its work at Waterway in contrast to DOJ's allegation
6	concerning substantial delay.
7 Q:	What happened on the fifth day of the trial, April 1, 1996?
8 A:	DOJ continued its cross-examination of Mr. Smith and FCWC conducted its re-
9	direct.
10	We then continued the presentation of FCWC's case by calling Randall
11	Armstrong, Executive Vice President of Phoenix Environmental Group. Mr.
12	Armstrong testified as an expert witness. He was employed by FDEP during the
13	1980s and participated in the 1980 and 1987 water quality surveys of the
14	Caloosahatchee River. Mr. Armstrong was also involved in the creation of the
15	1981 planning document upon which Connie Kagey relied to reject the NPDES
16	permit renewal. Mr. Armstrong testified that the 1981 study was for planning
17	purposes only, and had no effect upon any existing wasteload allocation. In
18	addition, Mr. Armstrong had reviewed over ten years of data for the section of the
19	Caloosahatchee River near the Waterway plant outfall and he found no dimunition
20	in water quality. He was an expert on computer modeling and water quality
21	impacts on surface water and his opinion was important to show FCWC's
22	discharge into the canal caused no environmental harm.
23	FCWC next called Roger Hartung, who held a number of positions in EPA
24	Region VI during his twenty-three year tenure at EPA, including Deputy Water
25	Division Director. FCWC called Mr. Hartung because he is considered one of the

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1 top enforcement and permitting experts in all of EPA. He testified on EPA 2 permitting and enforcement issues, how permit writers perform their job duties, 3 and how wasteload allocations are developed, approved, and inserted into NPDES permits. He testified that in his twenty-three years experience with the EPA, he 4 5 had never known of an NPDES permit being denied whenever a facility treating 6 human wastes was meeting water quality standards and effluent limits. His 7 testimony demonstrated that in denying the Waterway NPDES renewal, EPA had 8 violated its own regulations.

9 Q: What happened on the sixth day of trial?

10 A: Our first witness was Patrick Lehman, the former Vice President for Operations at 11 FCWC during the period of time when the Waterway renewal application was 12 denied. Mr. Lehman testified as to the steps FCWC took in attempting to solve its 13 permitting dilemma. Mr. Lehman had been involved in developing a report that 14 reviewed all of FCWC's options, including the possible connection to North Fort 15 Myers Utility. He also testified on how FCWC had come to a decision to move 16 the Waterway discharge from the unnamed canal into the middle of the 17 Caloosahatchee River. Mr. Lehman's testimony demonstrated that FCWC took 18 its environmental responsibilities seriously, and knew that it could not shut down 19 its facility and thereby create a significant public health problem. 20 On the afternoon of April 3, 1996, FCWC called Connie Kagey, the EPA permit 21 writer who had caused the entire problem for FCWC at Waterway by relying on a 22 1981 Florida planning document to deny the NPDES permit application, in 23 violation of EPA's regulations. Ms. Kagey admitted, pursuant to Mr. Bullock's 24 cross examination, that she would not use a draft wasteload allocation in writing a

25 permit. Thee evidence established that the 1981 wasteload allocation was never

1	officially approved by EPA or FDEP, therefore it was a violation of EPA's
2	regulations to use this document to deny FCWC's 1986 permit renewal
3	application
4	After this testimony, we read in portions of depositions of EPA Region IV
5	employees, which further demonstrated that EPA had violated its own rules with
6	regard to denying the Waterway NPDES permit.
7	After reading these depositions, FCWC called Paul Bradtmiller, a Senior Vice
8	President, who joined FCWC in 1991. He testified as to how after a long and
9	tortuous process, FCWC was finally able to interconnect its Carrollwood facility
10	with Hillsborough County. He also testified as to the difficulties FCWC
11	experienced in reaching the point of building an advanced waste water treatment
12	facility at Carrollwood. However, the county finally decided to allow an
13	interconnect rather than an additional facility.
14	After this, FCWC called Ronald D. Blackburn, an environmental administrator for
15	FDEP, Fort Meyers District. The purpose of Mr. Blackburn's testimony was to
16	prove that the wasteload allocation number and document relied on by Ms. Kagey
17	was merely a planning document and not valid for use in an NPDES permit. He
18	also testified that FCWC's Waterway had always had a wasteload allocation to
19	discharge into the canal and the Caloosahatchee River and established that EPA's
20	1986 decision was based on incorrect information.
21	FCWC's next witness was Mike Acosta, Vice President of Engineering and
22	Operations for FCWC. The purpose of this testimony was to explain the
23	permitting procedure Waterway experienced, and to explain why it took several
24	years to obtain all the state, local, and federal permits to construct the facility.
25	Mr. Acosta outlined in detail the delays caused by the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, FDEP, and county authorities. His testimony demonstrated that
 FCWC took its environmental responsibilities seriously and that FCWC was
 frustrated by these delays.

Following Mr. Acosta, FCWC called Larry Good, Regional Manager for FCWC. 4 5 Mr. Good testified about FCWC's extensive efforts to connect Carrollwood with 6 one of the Hillsborough County regional wastewater treatment plants. He also 7 discussed FCWC's efforts to find other alternatives to discharge during the 1980s. As our next witness, we called Gerald Allen, President of FCWC, whose 8 testimony covered several significant areas. Mr. Allen explained the process by 9 10 which a privately owned, governmentally regulated utility must approach all decisions regarding substantial capital investment under the Florida Public 11 12 Service Commission's "prudence standard." Using a hypothetical scenario, Mr. 13 Allen performed a sample rate base calculation for the Court to demonstrate the 14 decision making process used by public utilities to determine the prudency of an investment. Using this discussion as the basis of his testimony, Mr. Allen 15 16 explained why each of the options reviewed by FCWC at Barefoot during the 17 1980s was neither a feasible nor prudent alternative to discharge. His testimony provided a clear picture of FCWC's efforts to convince FDEP to grant permission 18 19 for FCWC to upgrade its treatment plant to advanced secondary treatment and then to AWT status. In addition, Mr. Allen also testified about the process to 20 21 upgrade the Waterway plant to AWT status and the reasons that any other 22 alternatives were neither prudent nor practical. His testimony lasted into April 5, 23 1996.

24 Q: What else happened on the last day of trial, April 5, 1996?

25 A: After Mr. Allen completed his testimony, FCWC called Julie Karleskint, the

1	operations manager for FCWC. The purpose of this testimony was to describe the
2	problems FCWC had with BOD/CBOD reporting, and the fact that what FCWC
3	had reported was more accurate than what EPA had required FCWC to report.
4	She testified that EPA was in fact attempting to assess penalties on a mere
5	reporting error. She also testified concerning the total residual chlorine violations
6	at Waterway and the fact that EPA had a document which exonerated FCWC's
7	reported TRC violations. She advised the Court that FCWC was using a testing
8	method required by EPA and if that method was used it was understood that it
9	would measure to the levels necessary to report accurately. Her testimony
10	destroyed DOJ's case with regard to CWA violations based on TRC exceedences.
11	FCWC then called Keith Cardey, an expert in the areas of Florida Public Service
12	Commission regulation and the economic effects of PSC regulation on privately-
13	owned, publically-regulated utilities. The purpose of this testimony was to show
14	that FCWC had no economic incentive to delay environmental expenditures at
15	any of its facilities.
16	After Mr. Cardey, FCWC called Dr. Abdul B. Ahmadi, the FDEP's engineer in
17	charge of domestic wastewater facilities for the state of Florida, South District.
18	Dr. Ahmadi testified that the Waterway facility had a wasteload allocation and did
19	not violate Florida water quality standards by discharging into the canal. He
20	further testified that the Waterway facility always had a wasteload allocation to
21	discharge in 1985 and 1986, in spite of EPA's determinations in 1986. This
22	testimony further undermined DOJ's position. Dr. Ahmadi then testified as to the
23	length of time it took Waterway to go through the permitting procedure and the
24	construction plan approval by FDEP. The testimony indicated that Waterway
25	could still be discharging into the canal leading to the Caloosahatchee River to

1	this day without violating the permit. Dr. Ahmadi was FCWC's final witness.
2	Mr. Ed Jacobson, President of Avatar Holdings Inc., was then called by Avatar to
3	explain the company's structure and the relationship of certain employees with
4	Avatar. Avatar also called Ms. Georgia Metcalf, President of Barefoot Bay
5	Development Corporation, to testify as to financial issues relating to the
6	development corporation.
7	Avatar then called Charles McNairy, a certified public accountant and chief
8	financial officer, of Avatar Holdings. He testified as to that company's income
9	and losses.
10	After this, DOJ moved to enter the deposition of Jack Tompkins as rebuttal
11	testimony to the testimony of Mr. Allen, Mr. Bradtmiller, and Ms. Karleskint.
12	Mr. Jacobs then proceeded to read in portions of Mr. Tompkins depositions, to
13	which we objected on the ground that the testimony was confusing, cumulative,
14	and misleading. Finally, the Court asked that the parties submit brief regarding
15	the admissibility of Mr. Tompkins' deposition. After some procedural issues
16	were discussed on the filing of post-trial briefs, the trial was concluded. This
17	occurred at approximately 7:00 p.m. on Good Friday evening.
18	Post-Trial Activities
19 <i>Q:</i>	Upon conclusion of the trial, what was the next work undertaken?
20 A:	Soon after the trial was concluded, DOJ filed a memorandum of law that once
21	again raised the issue of drawing adverse inferences from those who asserted the
22	Fifth Amendment privilege. In addition, on April 16, 1996, FCWC moved to
23	strike the deposition testimony presented in Court by DOJ of Jack Tompkins.
24	Exhibit GHB-81. On April 18, 1996, the parties submitted proposals for
25	post-trial submissions. Exhibit GHB-82. FCWC continued its review of

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trial transcripts, in preparation for the filing of post-trial motions and its post-trial

2 brief.

- 3 Q: Did the Court rule on any motions during this time?
- Yes. On May 8, 1996, the Court denied FCWC's and Avatar's motions to strike 4 A: the Jack Tompkins deposition. Also, by order of May 8, 1996, the Court denied 5 DOJ's motion to draw adverse inferences from the assertion of the Fifth 6 Amendment privilege, and ruled that depositions of several FCWC and Avatar 7 8 personnel deposed by DOJ were inadmissible. The Court found that Plaintiff's 9 assertions that the witnesses would have provided evidence in support of its claims did not form a "sufficient predicate upon which to base adverse 10 11 inferences." The Court stated that "the mere fact that the witnesses held positions 12 of authority and responsibility does not without more lead to the conclusion that they could have given testimony that would support Plaintiff's liability case. . . 13 14 Further, Plaintiff has not set forth the substance of any documentary evidence... 15 which demonstrates that the witnesses could have given adverse testimony." 16 Exhibit GHB-83. 17 *O*: Did the government file a post-trial brief? 18 A: Yes. On June 5, 1996, the Plaintiff filed a post-trial brief and proposed findings 19 of fact and conclusions of law, requesting that the Court impose a civil penalty of
- 20 \$4,861,500 on FCWC and a similar penalty on Avatar. Exhibits _____ and _____
- 21 GHB-84 and GHB 85. The key point expressed in this pleading was that "a
- substantial civil penalty [was] warranted in this case, primarily because of the
- 23 extensive history of serious Clean Water Act violations at their plants and the
- 24 Defendant's lack of serious, timely efforts to remedy them." DOJ went on to state
- 25 that "[i]n each instance, Defendants simply chose not to take the steps necessary

1	to remedy long-standing problems, putting their short-term financial self-interest		
2	ahead of compliance with the law and care for the environment." DOJ's brief		
3	ignored the evidence developed at trial, failed to consider all of the mitigation		
4	factors of the CWA, ignored the fact that EPA had violated its own regulations		
5	with respect to Waterway, and that it had conceded that there was no actual		
6	environmental harm caused by the discharges at the three facilities.		
7 Q :	Did FCWC file a post-trial brief and proposed findings of fact and		
8	conclusions of law?		
9 A:	Yes. This brief, like the trial itself, focused on the mitigation evidence. We		
10	argued that this evidence "demonstrates that none of Florida Cities' actions		
11	resulted in serious violations of the CWA, that none of those violations caused		
12	any environmental harm or placed the State of Florida's surface waters at risk, and		
13	that Florida Cities at all times cooperated in good faith with EPA and FDEP." We		
14	further stated that "more than one-third of the violations at issue (those relating to		
15	discharges without a permit at Waterway and total residual chlorine at Barefoot)		
16	would not have occurred but for EPA's own mistakes or omissions." In light of		
17	the evidence, we argued for a <i>de minimis</i> penalty. Exhibits and		
18	GHB-86 and GHB-87.		
19 Q :	Did DOJ file additional motions during this period?		

Yes. On May 16, 1996, DOJ filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's
order on adverse inferences and the Court's imposed page limits for post-trial
brief submissions. Exhibit _____ GHB-88. In its memorandum in support of this
motion, the government reargues at length its position that Avatar Holdings
controlled the environmental policies of FCWC. DOJ did not really explain why

25 adverse inferences should be drawn, but rather just argued for finding Avatar

Holdings liable.

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2	On May 21, 1996, FCWC filed a memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's motion		
3	for reconsideration. Exhibit GHB-89. FCWC objected to DOJ's motion,		
4	arguing that DOJ failed to explain either why the Court had fundamentally		
5	misunderstood the government or that there had been a change in law or the facts		
6	since the prior decision. On May 31, 1996, the Court denied the government's		
7	motion for reconsideration on the drawing of adverse inferences. The Court		
8	concluded that DOJ had argued for holding Avatar Holdings liable and not for		
9	drawing adverse inferences, and had confused the issue by including evidence not		
10	at all relevant to the inference issue. Exhibit GHB-90.		
11 Q :	Were there additional briefs filed by DOJ?		
12 <i>A</i> :	Yes. On July 16, 1996, DOJ filed a brief citing additional authoritytwo cases		
13	that it believed to be relevant that had been decided since the trial of this matter.		
14	See Exhibit GHB-91. One case dealt with the amount of the penalty		
14	See Exhibit GHB-91. One case dealt with the amount of the penalty		
14 15	See Exhibit GHB-91. One case dealt with the amount of the penalty assessed against a defendant in a similar CWA case. The other case was relevant		
14 15 16	See Exhibit GHB-91. One case dealt with the amount of the penalty assessed against a defendant in a similar CWA case. The other case was relevant to the unpermitted discharge violations at Barefoot and Carrollwood, where the		
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14 15 16 17 18	See Exhibit GHB-91. One case dealt with the amount of the penalty assessed against a defendant in a similar CWA case. The other case was relevant to the unpermitted discharge violations at Barefoot and Carrollwood, where the Court had held in its November 22, 1995 decision that certain claims were barred by <i>res judicata</i> . On July 19, 1996, we responded that the penalty case, <u>Dean</u>		
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1	judicata. Exhibit GHB-93. Specifically, the Court directed us to file a
2	memorandum addressing the effect of In re: Borough of Ridgway and Manning v.
3	City of Auburn on the Court's November 22, 1995 Order precluding claims in the
4	Second Amended Complaint on the basis of res judicata. As a result of this Court
5	Order of July 23, 1996, DOJ filed a reply memorandum in support of
6	reinstatement of those claims on August 8, 1996. Exhibit GHB-94. If we
7	lost this issue it meant FCWC would have to return to trial. On August 9, 1996,
8	FCWC filed a joint response with Avatar. Exhibit GHB-95. We argued
9	that in both <u>Ridgway</u> and <u>Manning</u> , the courts would have applied <i>res judicata</i> if
10	the facts supported such application of the doctrine. We distinguished FCWC's
11	case from these two, demonstrating how the necessary factual prerequisites for
12	application of res judicata were met in FCWC's case. On August 16, 1996, the
13	Court reaffirmed it November 22, 1995 Order granting res judicata effect to
14	claims in paragraphs 16, 17-23, and 30 of the Second Amended Complaint,
15	agreeing with our argument that the facts in FCWC's case did indeed mandate
16	application of <i>res judicata</i> . Exhibit GHB-96.
17	The Judgment
18 Q :	When did the Court issue its judgment on the litigation?
19 <i>A</i> :	On August 20, 1996, the Court issued its opinion. Exhibit GHB-97. This
20	opinion described the statutory maximum penalty that could have been levied
21	against FCWC. The Court's computation concluded that FCWC could have been
22	liable for \$6,600,000 at Barefoot Bay for 264 violations. Yet, after reviewing all
23	of the statutory mitigation requirements, the Court assessed a penalty of only
24	\$5,610. The Court computed that the Carrollwood violations could have
25	amounted to \$14,675,000 for 587 violations. Incorporating the mitigation factors,

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1	however, the Court assessed an actual penalty of \$14,675. At Waterway, the	
2	Court computed 1281 violations, which could have amounted to a \$32,025,000	
3	penalty. The Court assessed an actual penalty of \$289,425 for violations at	
4	Waterway. This amounted to an assessed total penalty of \$309,710 out of a	
5	potential penalty of \$104,325,000.	
6 Q :	After the Court issued its opinion, did FCWC take all appropriate action to	
7	recover legal fees and other litigation costs?	
8 A:	Yes. Virtually immediately we began preparations to apply for costs and	
9	attorneys' fees under Federal Rules 54 and 68. Exhibits and GHB-	
10	98 and GHB-99. FCWC argued that it was entitled under Federal Rules of Civil	
11	Procedure 54 and 68 to recover costs it incurred because the amount eventually	
12	awarded was less than the Offer of Judgment FCWC had made in March 1995.	
13	Under Federal Rule 68 a Defendant who makes an offer of settlement to a	
14	Plaintiff, who then rejects the offer, and where the verdict at the close of the case	
15	is for an amount less than the rejected offer, the Plaintiff is then liable to the	
16	Defendant for all costs incurred by the Defendant after the offer was made.	
17	FCWC argued that because the government rejected its \$500,000 Rule 68 offer of	
18	judgment, and the ultimate judgment was for less than this amount, the	
19	government must pay FCWC's costs, as specified in Rule 68. For fees we argued	
20	that attorneys' fees are recoverable under the Equal Access to Justice Act	
21	("EAJA"), to "prevailing parties" that prove that the government has litigated in	
22	"bad faith." FCWC argued that the government's repeated maintenance of claims	
23	that were found to be barred by res judicata amounted to bad faith, and that	
24	attorneys' fees were therefore recoverable. On September 23, 1996, DOJ	
25	opposed FCWC's motion for costs and attorneys' fees. Exhibit GHB-100.	

1	On February 3, 1997, the Court reluctantly denied FCWC's motion for costs and			
2	attorneys fees. Exhibit GHB-101. The Court ruled that where the United			
3	States is the Plaintiff, Rule 68 for costs cannot be put into effect without an			
4	underlying waiver of sovereign immunity. Because the CWA is silent on this			
5	issue, the Court concluded that the EAJA was the only other provision that could			
6	provide such a waiver in this instance, and it held that the EAJA's waiver was			
7	only for "prevailing parties." As FCWC was found liable for at least some			
8	penalties, FCWC was held not to be a prevailing party, notwithstanding the offer			
9	of judgment. On attorneys' fees, the Court ruled that the application of res			
10	judicata was not clear cut, and that the government's action did not amount to			
11	litigation undertaken vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.			
12	Accordingly, the Court ruled that FCWC was not entitled to recover its attorneys'			
	fees as a strict matter of law.			
13	tees as a strict matter of law.			
13 14	The Appeal			
14	The Appeal			
14 15 Q :	<u>The Appeal</u> Did either party appeal the Court's decision of August 20, 1996?			
14 15 Q: 16 <i>A</i> :	The AppealDid either party appeal the Court's decision of August 20, 1996?Yes. On October 18, 1996, DOJ filed an appeal, as appellant. Exhibit GHB-102.			
14 15 Q: 16 <i>A</i> : 17	The AppealDid either party appeal the Court's decision of August 20, 1996?Yes. On October 18, 1996, DOJ filed an appeal, as appellant. Exhibit GHB-102.The issues raised on appeal were the following: (1) did the district court impose			
14 15 Q: 16 <i>A</i> : 17 18	The Appeal Did either party appeal the Court's decision of August 20, 1996? Yes. On October 18, 1996, DOJ filed an appeal, as appellant. Exhibit GHB-102. The issues raised on appeal were the following: (1) did the district court impose the proper standard of parent corporation liability under the CWA; (2) did the			
14 15 Q : 16 <i>A</i> : 17 18 19	The AppealDid either party appeal the Court's decision of August 20, 1996?Yes. On October 18, 1996, DOJ filed an appeal, as appellant. Exhibit GHB-102.The issues raised on appeal were the following: (1) did the district court imposethe proper standard of parent corporation liability under the CWA; (2) did thedistrict court err in determining that prior administrative orders should be given			
 14 15 <i>Q</i>: 16 <i>A</i>: 17 18 19 20 	The AppealDid either party appeal the Court's decision of August 20, 1996?Yes. On October 18, 1996, DOJ filed an appeal, as appellant. Exhibit GHB-102.The issues raised on appeal were the following: (1) did the district court imposethe proper standard of parent corporation liability under the CWA; (2) did thedistrict court err in determining that prior administrative orders should be given <i>res judicata</i> effect in subsequent judicial proceedings; (3) did the district court err			
 14 15 <i>Q</i>: 16 <i>A</i>: 17 18 19 20 21 	The AppealDid either party appeal the Court's decision of August 20, 1996?Yes. On October 18, 1996, DOJ filed an appeal, as appellant. Exhibit GHB-102.The issues raised on appeal were the following: (1) did the district court imposethe proper standard of parent corporation liability under the CWA; (2) did thedistrict court err in determining that prior administrative orders should be given <i>res judicata</i> effect in subsequent judicial proceedings; (3) did the district court errin prohibiting the plaintiff from conducting interviews of ex-employees of the			
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in applying the statutory penalty factors of seriousness and history of violations in
 assessing the penalty in this case.

3 Q: Did FCWC appeal?

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- 4 A: Notwithstanding that FCWC felt the penalty was not fully warranted. FCWC did 5 not initiate an appeal on the merits of the District Court's decision because the 6 opinion was well reasoned and well supported by the law and the evidence. In 7 effect, FCWC determined it had won in the District Court. Once the government 8 appealed, however, FCWC decided to file a cross-appeal regarding the District 9 Court's denial of its motion for costs and attorneys' fees on November 1, 1996. 10 Exhibit _____ (GHB-103). FCWC believed that there were strong arguments for 11 the Eleventh Circuit to reverse the District Court's ruling that the doctrine of 12 sovereign immunity prevented FCWC from recovering its costs against the 13 government under Rule 68. 14 *Q*: Did anything else occur in December? 15 A: Yes. DOJ then failed to file a civil appeal statement form on time. On
- 16 December 31, 1996, DOJ moved to file its civil appeal statement out of time. We
- 17 did not oppose this motion because we thought it would be expensive to argue,
- 18 unproductive, as the Court was likely to grant DOJ's motion to file out of time.
- 19 On January 29, 1997, the Court in fact granted DOJ's motion.
- 20 Q: Were any settlement discussions undertaken after the filing of the appeal and
 21 cross-appeal?
- 22 A: Pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit rules, both parties agreed to attempts at
- 23 mediation. Mediation conferences were held on March 19, 1997, April 9, 1997,
- April 25, 1997, May 9, 1997, and May 21, 1997. During these discussions, DOJ's
- appellate counsel attempted to obtain FCWC's consent to a DOJ attempt to seek

1	vacatur of the opinion of Judge Nimmons of August 20, 1996. We believed that		
2	DOJ was desperate to expunge this opinion from the record, specifically with		
3	regard to res judicata. On occasion, there were discussions with DOJ about		
4	whether FCWC's penalty could be significantly reduced or eliminated if FCWC		
5	joined in DOJ's vacatur motion. DOJ, however, insisted on having it both ways;		
6	it wanted FCWC's agreement to join or not oppose vacatur, but also wanted to		
7	preserve its appeal if the vacatur motion was denied. DOJ wanted FCWC's		
8	agreement essentially for nothing, since any reduction in penalty was contingent		
9	on the Court granting the motion.		
10 Q :	What was the outcome of these mediation efforts?		
11 A:	After many telephone conference calls, and individual calls with appellate counsel		
12	for DOJ, FCWC advised DOJ that it would not agree to any further extensions of		
13	time for DOJ to file its appellate brief. After internal DOJ discussions, DOJ		
14	counsel advised us that DOJ and EPA would agree to abandon its appeal if FCWC		
15	abandoned its cross-appeal, and both parties would accept Judge Nimmons's		
16	decision as final. FCWC agreed. On August 6, 1997, the Eleventh Circuit issued		
17	an order dismissing the government's appeal and FCWC's cross-appeal with		
18	prejudice. Exhibit GHB-104.		
19	Overview of Litigation Effort		
20 Q :	What is your estimate of the number of documents produced by FCWC in		
21	response to discovery requests?		
22 A:	Over 400,000 individual documents were produced by FCWC in response to		
23	DOJ's discovery requests. These documents ranged from one page to over one-		
24	hundred pages in length. My best estimate is that FCWC produced a million plus		
25	pages to DOJ for review and copying. On occasion when FCWC produced the		

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1		documents, DOJ did not make a copy of the documents after review.			
2	Q:	How many pleadings did FCWC and the DOJ file during the course of the			
3		litigation?			
4	A:	132 pleadings were filed, which amounted to a total of 1,566 pages of written			
5		material, plus an additional 751 pages of exhibits. See Exhibit GHB-105.			
6	Q:	How many witnesses did FCWC and the DOJ depose and how many days of			
7		depositions did each represent?			
8	A:	FCWC took 22 depositions of 17 witnesses (some witnesses being deposed more			
9		than once). This represented approximately 20 days of depositions or 133.25			
10		hours of deposition. See Exhibit GHB-106. DOJ took 32 depositions of			
11		26 individuals over 33 days.			
12	Q:	Did you take steps to keep costs as low as possible?			
13	A:	Yes. Throughout the litigation I examined the bills thoroughly and reduced legal			
14		fees, quite substantially at times, whenever it appeared that any work was			
15		duplicated or any billed time resulted in value not being added. See Exhibit			
16		GHB-107 for correspondence with the client about my ongoing reduction			
17		of legal fees. Exhibit GHB-108 provides a month-by-month breakdown of			
18		the hours worked and the average hourly billing rate. In addition to reducing			
19		hours billed when necessary, I never billed for dinner meetings with clients, nor			
20		was non-working travel time (between Washington, D.C. and Florida, for			
21		example) billed. I carefully monitored airline ticket charges and tried to get			
22		attorneys to fly Valu Jet as frequently as possible to keep travel costs down. Soon			
23		after it was determined that DOJ intended to review tens of thousands of			
24		documents and after consultation with FCWC's general counsel, it was concluded			
25		that substantial FCWC attorney time could be avoided and thus legal expenses			

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1	reduced if the DOJ was given substantial latitude in reviewing documents without	
2	prior screening for confidential and privileged content which is the usual practice.	
3	This practice was adopted for a substantial part of the discovery and significantly	
4	reduced legal expenses. Finally, I reduced billed hours when it appeared time	
5	was not being used by a given attorney as efficiently as it could have been. All	
6	these matters are discussed in the cover letters to the bills. Exhibit GHB-	
7	109. In addition, rates for attorneys' fees and paralegal fees were set at levels	
8	below market rates in Washington, D.C. at times to ensure that bills would not be	
9	excessive. See Exhibit GHB-110 for a discussion of one such reduction,	
10	reducing my time from \$275 per hour to \$250. The rates discussed in this letter	
11	actually came down further, and my time and Don Scroggin's time was billed	
12	from this point on at a rate of \$200 per hour for us both. Finally, all assignments	
13	were structured taking into account the billing rates of individuals and work was	
14	shared with Avatar's attorneys whenever that proved most efficient.	
15 Q:	In your opinion, did FCWC prevail in this litigation?	
16 <i>A:</i>	Yes.	
17 <i>Q:</i>	Why?	
18 A:	We prevailed because we successfully barred more than half the government's	
19	claims. Moreover, as to the remaining claims, we successfully put forth evidence	
20	that compelled the judge to seriously mitigate all penalties to just 10 and 25 per	
21	day. FCWC agreed to certain penalties in order to enhance its credibility with the	
22	Court that it was not disagreeing with EPA on every issue. We were able to	
23	reduce \$104,000,000 in potential penalties into \$309,710 in actual liability. It is	
24	indeed ironic that the Court's finding of penalties was substantially less than	
25	FCWC's settlement offer of \$500,000 made almost four years earlier in January	

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- 1 1993, nine months before the Original Complaint was filed by the U.S., and well
- 2 before FCWC had sustained legal expenses of any significance.
- 3 Q: In your opinion, was the government overzealous in bringing this litigation
- 4 against FCWC?
- 5 A: Absolutely.
- 6 Q: Does this conclude your testimony?
- 7 A: Yes.

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Parts 2 - 8 of DN 13270-97 Were publied + marked as exhibits for use in the second on appeal. When the second is returned from 1St DCA, do not return the documents to the file. They can be found in the exhibit pouches. KF 5-17-99

FCWC LEGAL FEES AND SERVICES PAID TO LAW FIRMS

	TOTAL:	\$ 3,615,264
Weil, Gotshall & Manges		45,250
Landers & Parsons		5,404
Jenner & Block		1,158,675
Hopping, Green, Sams & Smith		4,111
Henderson, Franklin & Starnes		34,635
Gabeler, Battocchi & Griggs		252,787
Gabeler, Baise & Miller		1,118,792
Baker & Hostetler		30,941
Baise & Miller		936,423
Alston & Bird		\$ 28,246

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
NO 97/663-WSEXHIBIT NO 8
WARANY Seddie
CATE: 8-12-98