BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

IN RE:

Proposed amendments to Rule 25-4.002, F.A.C., Application and Scope; 25-4.141, Minimum Filing Requirements for Rate of Return Regulated Local Exchange Companies; Commission Designee; 25-4.202, Construction and Waivers; 25-24.555, Scope and Waiver; 25-6.002, Application and Scope; 25-6.043, Investor-Owned Electric Utility Minimum Filing Requirements; Commission Designee; 25-6.043.8, Non-Firm Electric Service - Terms and Conditions; 25-17.087, Interconnection and Standards; 25-30.010, Rules for General Application; 25-30.011, Application and Scope 25-30.436, General Information and Instructions Required of Class A and B Water and Wastewater Utilities in an Application for Rate Increase; 25-30.450, Burden of Proof and Audit Provisions; 25-30.455, Staff Assistance in Rate Cases; 25-30.456, Staff Assistance in Alternative Rate Setting; 25-30.570, Imputation of Contributions-in-Aid-of-Construction; and 25-30.580, Guidelines for Designing Service Availability.

DOCKET NO. 980569-PU

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN JULIA A. JOHNSON COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER JOE GARCIA COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR.

PROCEEDING:

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ITEM NUMBER:

DATE:

PLACE:

Tuesday, December 15, 1998

AGENDA CONFERENCE

Betty Easley Conference Center 4075 Esplanade Way Room 148 Tallahassee, Florida

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1-7-98

JANE FAUROT, RPR P. O. BOX 10751 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302 (850) 561-5598

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

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TPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING

APPEARANCES:

MATTHEW M. CHILDS, representing Florida Power & Light Company.

STAFF RECOMMENDATIONS

Issue 1: Should the Commission repeal Rules 25-4.141(4), 25-4.202(3), 25-24.555(4) and (5), 25-6.002(2) and (4), 25-6.043(3), 25-6.0438(9), 25-17.087(2), 25-30.011(2) and (4), 25-30.436(6), 25-30.455(11), 25-30.456(11), 25-30.570(2), 25-30.580(2), F.A.C., the individual provisions for rule variances and waivers; amend Rule 25-30.010 to delete the general provision for exceptions; amend 25-30.450, to delete the general provision for a waiver of the rule; and amend other provisions of these rules to update cross references? <u>Recommendation:</u> Yes. <u>Issue 2:</u> If no requests for hearing or comments are filed,

should the rule as proposed be filed for adoption with the Secretary of State and the docket closed? Recommendation: Yes.

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Item 5.

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MS. MOORE: Commissioners, Item 5 is a proposal to repeal numerous rule provisions for waivers of our rules pursuant to Section 120.536 of the Statutes.

The Commission, last year, sent a list to the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee, submitting the rules that we have reviewed and the Commission approved at Internal Affairs as rules that we no longer had authority for and should be repealed.

The ones in this docket are ones that we didn't ask for or get separate statutory authority for. The other rules on the list are water and wastewater rules and our purchasing rules, we did get statutory authority for.

Rule waivers and variances are now covered by Section 120.542 of the Statutes and uniform rules adopted thereunder. We are required to -- by statute to begin proceedings to repeal these rules by January 1, 1999.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is that it?

MS. MOORE: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Any questions, Commissioners?

Are you here to speak to this item?

MR. CHILDS: Commissioners, my name is Matthew Childs. I'm appearing on behalf of Florida Power and

Light Company. I have a few comments on this proposal. I understand that the Commission will very likely go forward with the proceeding to consider the repeal of these rules, but I want to urge that there be some serious attention and caution as you go forward.

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I respectfully disagree with the rationale that the staff has presented in their recommendations. I realize and accept that it's a complicated area; it's a new area, because of the comprehensive revisions to the Administrative Procedure Act in 1996. I don't intend to argue that at length.

However, I would point out that the Commission, this Commission, has broad authority. Unlike many agencies in the state, it regulates a few comprehensively, rather than a lot of individuals a little bit. It has historically been recognized as having broad, comprehensive powers to regulate in the public interest.

There was a theory that the revisions to 120, Chapter 120 restricted the agency power to those particular actions that have been expressly granted by the Legislature. That's not how this Commission has regulated ever. It has regulated broadly. Since the amendment to the APA and since this Commission sent its list to the Legislature of rules that may be beyond its expressed authorized power, the First District Court of

Appeal has ruled in the Consolidated Tomoka (phonetic) case. I'd like the Commission to consider the implications of that, because that has a very different view as to the authority of agencies. We are concerned that this Commission has the broad power to regulate and would be giving up its discretion to determine when it might want to waive those rules. I think it would then put the Commission also in the position that when it adopts a rule that it's going to have this view, that it can't waive the rule in the future except pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.542. It will, I think, be much more limited in the rules that it wants to adopt.

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It's a serious matter. I think there is a respectful disagreement. I don't read as the staff does, for instance, that Section 120.542 is the exclusive avenue for waiver. They have presented that as an argument. I think the statute clearly says that it is an avenue for waiver, but it also says it's intended to be remedial. It is remedial to address the problems of inflexibility. I think with the Consolidated Tomoka decision, which says that agencies have the power to adopt rules that are within the areas that it directly regulates, that it certainly has the authority. This is my argument, to waive its rules for cause shown.

Please pay attention to that as you go forward. And

I ask that you do that because I think it has a serious 1 impact on the authority of this Commission in the future. 2 3 Thank you. CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. 4 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Do you think the Tomoka 5 decision pronounced a different standard of review than 6 set out -- than the original interpretation of the 7 statute that JAPC (phonetic) gave us? 8 Yes. MR. CHILDS: 9 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: And it will be as stated in 10 the case? 11 MR. CHILDS: It is stated in the case. And the --12 you know, they stated expressly that the statute 13 delegates whether the -- the extent to which Section 14 120.58 -- 52, Subsection 8, restricts an agency's 15 rulemaking authority in general. I would point out that 16 that subsection has the same language as .536 that we're 17 referring to here. And they go through an extensive 18 discussion of that, where some had argued that agencies 19 could only adopt rules if there was an expressed 20 authorization for that rule adoption. 21 And, you know, I would point out, Commissioner, in 22

And, you know, I would point out, commissioner, in that area that one of the rules that would be repealed here is in Chapter 25-6. This is the rules -- general rules for customer relations, et cetera. Well, you know,

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1	I don't find any of those rules in the Florida Statutes.
2	They are not there, because you regulate generally.
3	And I think Consolidated Tomoka says, "No, we don't
4	have to look to the specific expressed authorizations;
5	instead, we look more broadly." And I think the
6	administrative bar in Tallahassee was maybe somewhat
7	surprised by the decision in Consolidated Tomoka.
8	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Mr. Childs, what is the date of
9	that case?
10	MR. CHILDS: That case is the opinion was filed
11	July 29th, 1998.
12	COMMISSIONER CLARK: And it was interpreting the new
13	section?
14	MR. CHILDS: It was interpreting the revisions in
15	1996, and it was interpreting expressly Section 120.52,
16	Subsection 8, which had to do with the language about
17	whether a general grant of authority is sufficient or
18	whether it had to be a specific grant of authority to
19	adopt a rule.
20	MS. MOORE: Commissioner, from my it had to do
21	with the law implemented.
22	MR. CHILDS: Excuse me one moment. The citation,
23	just for information, the citation of that opinion is at
24	717 So.2d, Page 72.
25	COMMISSIONER CLARK: And it's your view that that

well, give me your rationale again for cautioning the Commission with respect to repealing these rules.

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MR. CHILDS: Well, there are two grounds, as I understand it that are presented by the staff. One is that there is the more restrictive -- there are more restrictions on your authority under Section 120.536 to adopt rules. Now you have to have specific authorization to adopt rules, and the argument is you don't have any specific authorization to adopt a rule granting a waiver. So, therefore, you lack authority. That's one argument.

The other argument is that a separate section, Section 120.542 is now the exclusive avenue for rule waivers and variances to be addressed. I don't see that in the statute.

This is our argument. The argument is that the statute itself expressly notes that it's supposed to be remedial to address the problem when there was the blind application of rule without regard to its impact.

I also think that the Consolidated Tomoka decision affects that separate argument as well, because that Consolidated Tomoka decision, in effect, says an agency can have power. Well, if it can have the power without there being an expressed authorization, I can't understand how Section 120.542 can preempt or repeal that power without doing so expressly. And there is no

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express repeal or statement of preemption.

So the concern is, Commissioner, that the Commission operates broadly and regulates broadly in the public interest, and that it ought not to be restricted when it adopts its rules to some separate method and avenue for waiver. And I happen to think that there are lots of problems with the model rules and how they apply and the restrictions they place on agencies.

But what I'm asking and suggesting is that I think there are some problems as to how this agency, the Public Service Commission, operates and how other agencies do, and that that should be reviewed. And if further action needs to be taken, to urge that you do that.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Childs, what would you have us to do today? Are you asking for a change, or are you just putting us basically on notice that you're going to request a hearing on this particular matter?

MR. CHILDS: We will be requesting a hearing. I had thought to say -- to urge you to not go forward with rulemaking, you know. And I don't think that would be the proper course, you know. Because I think that the Commission has already taken the step of identifying rules that it thinks it lacks the authority to do -- to continue. And I believe it's important that you consider -- you continue that process to evaluate them. But my

purpose here is to simply urge that as you go forward, to please don't treat some comments that you may have about the scope of your authority as being just a bother. Because they are intended, really, to urge you to think about the implication that they have on the authority of this Commission.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other questions? Staff? COMMISSIONER GARCIA: We are going to go back and discuss this anyway, right? And that's what we're doing is going --

MS. MOORE: Apparently, if they are going to ask for a hearing.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Right.

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MS. MOORE: Or file comments.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: With that said, I don't think there's much we can do here today, so I'll just move staff.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is there a second?

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess I was interested in hearing the response.

I guess, Mr. Childs, my concern is that it does seem that 120.542 is specific as to waivers. And as I read the staff recommendation, that it's exclusive.

And while you may have general authority, as you describe it, and Consolidated Tomoka affirms that, where

there is a specific legislative -- sort of an enactment on the subject of waivers, that that takes it out of the Consolidated Tomoka case.

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MR. CHILDS: I don't think so, and there are several reasons. One is that when this section was being discussed, various agencies were -- were commenting that they thought they lacked the power to grant a waiver. And I would suggest to this Commission that by the very rules that are identified here, that this Commission never thought it lacked the power to grant a waiver or variance from its rules. And that, therefore, a principal purpose of the statute was, as it says in the first sentence, "Strict application of uniformly applicable rule requirements can redound reasonable, unfair and unintended results in particular instances." And I would take it that that's what this statute was intended to address.

Also, Commissioner, in the last sentence of Subsection 1, it states that, "This section is supplemental to and does not abrogate the variance and waiver provisions in any other statute." Now, I realize it doesn't say "or rule," but my argument about the Consolidated Tomoka is that if under that case it is permissible for an agency to act on the basis of a more general grant of authority, then certainly that action

can include a waiver. I mean, if you don't have the authority to adopt the substantive rule without an expressed grant, then you don't have the authority to grant a waiver. I agree with that.

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But what we're doing here is addressing repealing the waiver provision of a rule without addressing the expressed substantive grant. And I think they go together. That this agency is -- for one, it's different. It has always regulated broadly. It has not regulated specifically where the Commission -- excuse me, the Legislature would say, "You will grant a license under these conditions." It regulates broadly in the public interest.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Childs, am I understanding the basis of your argument simply to be that if we have the authority to adopt a rule, we have the authority to grant a waiver of that rule?

MR. CHILDS: I think you do. And as to -- and as to the argument or the point that Commissioner Clark brought up, you know, I look to the standards of Section 120.542, and asked somewhat the rhetorical question. And say, "Well, if I have a rule that is not expressly authorized by statute, and I want a waiver of that rule, then I have to go under the standard of the statute, under her postulated approach." And I say, "How do I make a

statement, how do I make a showing that the underlying purpose of the statute is fulfilled when there is no expressed underlying purpose of the statute?" It's the Commission that determined that under its general, broad powers. Because there is no expressed statement in the statute.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask you this: If an agency has the authority to adopt a rule; and, therefore, you believe we should have the authority to waive it, why did the Legislature -- what is the need for 120.542?

12 MR. CHILDS: Because most and many agencies thought 13 that they did not have the power to waive the rule, any 14 rule. And, secondly, there was a concern about the 15 separation of powers. Many of these agencies, or most of 16 these agencies, are part of the executive branch. 17 Therefore, there was a concern that if the Legislature enacts a statute saying, "You will regulate in a 18 19 particular way," could that agency, then, waive the rule? 20 And the answer was, "Well, we don't think we can." I 21 don't think that's ever been the case. This Commission functions as part of -- as a legislative branch, and acts 22 23 in a legislative way. But independent of that, you now 24 have a case, I think, that says that you don't have to 25 have a specific grant of authority for a substantive

rule. And I have -- I don't have -- I have difficulty separating those two. If you don't have to have the specific, particular grant for a substantive rule, why do you now have to have a particular grant to waive that substantive rule? The logic doesn't seem to be there. It may be that you disagree, but I think it has serious implications as to this Commission's authority; and that we ought not to treat it as simply, well, we have a list of rules, and we have to send them up, and so let's get on with it.

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MR. SMITH: Could I interject something here as a note of historical precedent? In about 1984, the Legislature amended Chapter 120 to make it a grounds for automatic remand if an agency departed from the substantive rule. So that's sort of the precursor restriction on an agency's action that occurred before this waiver section was adopted.

And, in fact, I think the Commission basically took the position after that was pointed out, that is the change in 1984, which, essentially, made it more difficult, or at least a subject of judicial remand if you departed from your substantive rule. I think the Commission at that point said, basically, we can waive our procedural rules, but we won't waive our substantive rules, even though we did, in fact, do it over several

years. But that was fundamentally the position that was taken, and we submit advice provided to you.

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MR. CHILDS: But at that time, after that 1984 amendment to the APA, is when the agency was urged and, in fact, did in particular instances, put the waiver provision in the rule, so that -- you know, no one is suggesting, I don't think, that the waiver would be arbitrary or capricious or without standards. I'm not. I think that is in violation of the APA. And I don't think you can have an absolute rule and then just come along and say, "Well, we're not going to apply it here." But if the rule itself has a provision in it for waiver, then our position is that's permissible, and was under the '84 amendment.

COMMISSION CLARK: Let me ask a question. Does it make any sense on some of those things to say the waiver section is authority for putting in there specific language on waivers?

MS. MOORE: I don't believe so, because there are uniform rules already adopted to implement that. And 120.542 and the uniform rules that we're suppose to follow have particular procedures. Our rules don't do that, and I don't -- and as -- the statute, I don't think, authorizes or allows us to create different standards.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, what does the -- what is the -- I guess it's 120.542, say with respect to what you have to show to get a waiver?

MR. CHILDS: Well --

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MS. MOORE: You have to demonstrate that the purpose of the underlying statute will be, or has been achieved by other means. And I think Mr. Childs spoke to that, and I think the Commission does have discretion there in determining it knows best whether the statute is being met for the purpose. The person, petitioner, also has to show that it would create a hardship, or that it would violate principles of fairness for the rule to apply to the person in the way it's written. And those terms are defined in the statute.

I note that -- well, the Commission may be different and have more discretion than some agencies and be a part of the legislative rather than the executive branch. 120 applies to us just like it does any other agency, Chapter 120 does. And there aren't any exemptions or exceptions to it for the PSC. Now, the statute recognizes that there may be other statutes that -- substantive statutes that allow waiver, and we do have the telephone statutes that specifically say the requirements of the statute, and in some cases rules may be waived. That's what it's referring to. I don't think it's referring to broad, general rule.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask -- let me be more specific. If we look at, say, the minimum filing requirements for electric utilities, would there be anything wrong with putting in Subsection 3 that for purposes of Section 120.542, if it is shown that the data production would be impractical or impose an excessive economic burden on the utility, we find it has met the requirements -- it will meet the requirements of the waiver rule? What I'm suggesting is that we could put --

MS. MOORE: Sort of define hardship, or give examples of what we've already found to be hardship? I think the -- under -- you know, each year we have to report and keep track of the waivers and variances that we grant. And part of the -- I think the purpose of that is to see whether the exceptions ought to be codified. And, yes, we can do that. I believe we can.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But it's your view that this -by repealing these sections, we don't necessarily narrow what authority we have. If we have the authority, we can exercise it as a waiver?

MS. MOORE: Yes. We have to follow the procedures of the statute, unless we have something separate. In reviewing -- the technical staff went over some of the waivers that we have been granting and asked whether in

their opinion we were losing something by repealing these rules. Were there petitions for waivers that would have qualified under ours and now are not, and so, thus, maybe we ought to adopt other rules to provide for that. And the answer was, no, for the most part, the procedure under the statute, under the new statute, has worked fine.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I can think of one instance it caused us a little difficulty being able to find that it met -- it met the statute, having to do with changing the time for the cost recovery clauses. It didn't exactly fit into what was in the statute.

MR. CHILDS: Well, I would ask that the Commission look, as well, to the uniform rule, because that's one of the -- one of the things that, I think, is of concern. And, you know, I think to say that the rule -- the rule -- the uniform rule itself makes it clear that this is preemption, I disagree. But look at what you have to do under that procedurally. It's 28-104.002. You know, you have to file a copy of the petition with the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee, and go through specific allegations and petitions as to how the underlying statute's purpose is met.

24 COMMISSIONER CLARK: And you're saying you think we 25 have a choice?

I think you -- I think this is a rule MR. CHILDS: of procedure under -- under implementing this statute. Ι think now that we have seen that there's -- the Consolidated Tomoka decision, that the Commission, particularly that the Commission should step back and say, "Well, what do we have to do now? Does this have an impact, and procedurally, is there a way around it if there is a problem that we perceive under the Uniform Rules of Procedure?" Because I think -- I think it's important that the agency have that discretion. And I would urge you under any instance not to say that the reason that you would repeal the waiver rule is because you have to have specific authorization for it. I think once you do that, then the next question I would say is, "Well, where is your specific authorization for the substantive rule?" And it's not there.

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MS. MOORE: Commissioners, Consolidated Tomoka had to do with the law implementing a statute for an agency's authority, but particularly the law, whether the agency had a law to implement, which is something different than its general authority to adopt rules. You also have to have a law to implement. And what Consolidated Tomoka said was that the rule and what you're governing has to be within the class of powers. It has to do more with our substantive rules and whether we can impose certain

requirements on utilities.

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My point is that 120.542 does provide the authority and the -- it is not to preclude other authority where it is specific in our statutes. But this statute and the uniform rules govern the procedure and provide for notice, and apparently is what the Legislature thought ought to be the requirements when a variance and waiver is granted. I suggest if there is a problem with the uniform rules, that Mr. Childs can join with us, and we'll petition for an exception.

MR. CHILDS: We could do that.

MR. VANDIVER: Commissioners, there's also some 12 13 significant history here. I don't know if Mr. Childs is 14 aware of it or not. Florida Power & Light didn't 15 participate before the Cabinet. And we made many of these same arguments that the Commission is a little bit 16 17 different kind of creature, and we need specific rules. 18 For the most part, those arguments fell on deaf ears. And we were told to follow the Uniform Rules of 19 Procedure, and the like. 20

And Consolidated Tomoka came after that decision, but I just wanted it to be clear that there were extensive negotiations with the Administration Commission, the Governor and Cabinet in getting these rules adopted. And that's just in a historical context

for how we came to have the uniform rules and how many of these rules got repealed.

MR. CHILDS: Well --

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MR. VANDIVER: Because we asked, and they said no. And Mr. Childs was not there standing with us to say this agency is different. And it's a shame. And here we are today. And I just thought you'd like that historical context, because I think it's important.

> CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you, Rob.

Mr. Childs?

MR. CHILDS: Well, I'm not going to get into all that history, but I think that I understand some of that frustration about going to the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee and the Legislature and speaking to them about the distinction of this agency.

Part of what I'm urging this Commission to do, 16 however, is to say, "Well, maybe there are some 17 differences, and maybe there are some valid reasons for those differences; and, therefore, let's take a second 19 20 look and not just say, "Well, early last year we thought there was this theory about the restriction on our 21 authority." And as addressed in Consolidated Tomoka, the 22 argument was that you had to have a rule that was in the, 23 quote, "particular powers and duties," end quote, granted 24 25 by the enabling statute. Particular powers and duties,

that was meant to -- it was argued to be specific. And the court said, "No." And what you just heard is the interpretation. And it said, "No, that's not so. T+ doesn't have to be within the particular powers. It's a valid exercise that delegated legislative authority if the rule regulates a matter directly within the class of powers and duties identified in the statute to be implemented." And I'm saying now, think about it when you do that. When you have -- when you implement that broad power, which this decision says you can, that you should not conclude that you have to be bound by the other argument and restrict your authority to waive those rules under appropriate circumstances. I think in the long run it's going to have a real serious impact on the ability to adopt rules that are applicable in the utility sphere because of the way you regulate.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, Mr. Childs, you know, 17 I've -- I've been frustrated with what the amendments to 18 the APA have done, and you certainly made our pitch over 19 to the Governor and Cabinet, I guess, where people are 20 reviewing it, how we thought it would affect us. `21 And I seem to recall that whenever we make an argument in a 22 court that we are different; and, therefore, certain 23 provisions of the APA are not applicable to us, we 24 25 haven't been very successful.

And, you know -- and the staff says that they think they can live within the -- that what we need to get done in terms of waivers can be accomplished by using the uniform waiver rule. And I'm not so sure that the requirement of requiring a petition and explanation of how you -- how it's appropriate to give the waiver is unreasonable.

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MR. CHILDS: I'm not arguing that this Commission doesn't have the discretion to eliminate the waiver provision in any of its rules. What I'm arguing is that the Commission should not do so on the basis of the belief that the law compels it. If the Commission decides that it wants to eliminate all the waiver provisions that it has, then that's certainly within its discretion to address.

I'm arguing as to the conclusion that 120.536 and 120.542 compel that results. And I'm saying to you that I don't think it does. I understand the staff's arguments, and I've read them and spent a lot of time trying to understand how they should be applied here. And I think there's a lot of pressure on agencies to go forward and simply list and repeal everything, because we now have uniform procedures, and so repeal it and just go do it that way.

And I'm concerned, for instance, that when you adopt

a rule in the future, for instance: You adopted a rule and you addressed it recently as to the reporting on bills or bill inserts of the type of fuel that's burned and used by utilities. Well, one of the things that I would think that a utility might be concerned about is whether in the future it could have a waiver from that rule. If the idea was, no, you couldn't have a waiver, unless you complied with the statute, then I think you might see a different response to that rule provision, including where's your underlying authority for the rule? Because we don't want to be in the position down the road where the only way out of the rule is to go through a more stylized proceeding for you and argue about underlying legislative intent. That's the difficulty.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other questions, Commissioners?

MS. MOORE: I have one correction to make in the issue statement. It should be Rule 25-24.555, that's the rule having to do with STS, shared tenant service, and that rule is correct in the discussion. It's the issue statement that misidentifies it.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any further discussion?

Is there a motion?

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think there has been a motion and a second.

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1	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Was there a motion?	
2	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yeah, I think you did.	
3	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: All those in favor, signify by	
.4	saying "aye."	
5	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Aye.	
6	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Aye.	
7	Show it approved unanimously.	
8	Thank you for your comments, Mr. Childs.	
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

STATE OF FLORIDA)

COUNTY OF LEON)

I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was transcribed from cassette tape, and the foregoing pages numbered 1 through 25 are a true and correct record of the proceedings.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor relative or employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially interested in the foregoing action.

DATED THIS 7th day of January, 1999.

mo fauret

JANE FAUROT, RPR P. O. Box 10751 Tallahassee, Florida 32302