BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBL⁺C SERVICE COMMISSION TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA

IN RE: Complaint of AGI Publishing, Inc. d/b/a Valley Yellow Pages against GTE Florida Incorporated for violation of Sections 364.08 and 364.10, Florida Statutes, and request for relief.

DOCKET NO. 990132-TP



BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN JOE GARCIA COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK

COMMISSIONER JULIA A. JOHNSON COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS

PROCEEDING:

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

28**

DATE:

March 30, 1999

PLACE:

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148

Tallahassee, Florida

JANE FAUROT, RPR
P.O. BOX 10751
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32302
(850) 561-5598

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APPEARANCES:

Patrick K. Wiggins, Esquire, representing Valley Yellow Pages

Kim Caswell, Esquire, representing GTE

STAFF RECOMMENDATION

<u>Issue 1:</u> Should the Commission grant GTEFL's Motion to Dismiss and deny Valley's Petition for Declaratory Statement?

Recommendation: Yes. The Commission should grant GTEFL's Motion to Dismiss and deny Valley's Petition for Declaratory Statement. The complaint and petition see relief that is beyond the Commission's jurisdiction to provide. Thus, Valley has failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. The petition is based upon the same facts alleged in the complaint.

Issue 2: Should this docket be closed?

Recommendation: Yes. If the Commission accepts staff's recommendation in Issue 1, this docket should be closed. The issues contained in the Request for Expedited Treatment, the Request for Prehearing Conference, the responses and oppositions contained in this docket would then be moot.

PROCEEDINGS

2 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Number 28.

COMMISSION STAFF: Commissioners, Chairman

Garcia, Item 28 is staff's recommendation on Valley

Yellow Pages' complaint against GTE regarding

termination of its billing services agreement. And

staff wants to start out by making one fairly major

modification to the recommendation.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Did you say fairly major?

COMMISSION STAFF: Fairly major. And that is that we strike or modify the recommendation so that we aren't addressing the declaratory statement at this time. It has come to our attention through discussions with our appeal staff that it would be more appropriate for the appeal staff to bring back a recommendation on the declaratory statement. We have not followed the proper FAW noticing requirements.

And, therefore, we would just like at this time to rule on -- the Commission to rule on the motion to dismiss on the complaint.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

COMMISSION STAFF: Valley is an independent yellow pages publisher that provides services in GTE's service territory. And GTE, as we understand it, has notified Valley that it will terminate the billing and

collection services that it provides to Valley according to the parties, GTE and Valley's, billing services agreement. And that will occur on March 31st, which is tomorrow.

As a result of the impending termination of service, Valley has filed its complaint and filed multiple requests for expedited treatment there of the complaint. And Valley essentially requests that the Commission ordered GTE to continue to provide its billing and collection services after tomorrow. And I think Valley believes that to do otherwise would be discriminatory in violation of Chapter 364.08 and .10, Florida statutes.

GTE essentially moves to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the Commission doesn't have jurisdiction over this type of service that is in question. And we essentially -- staff, our recommendation is that we agree with GTE. The third party billing and collection service is not a telecommunications service for hire. And we believe it's a noncommunications service that doesn't fall under our jurisdiction. This may be appropriate in a court of law. I'm not sure, but this is not the proper venue.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Great. Thank you. Do you want

to hear from the parties? I was going to say that before you began, so you would have to think of another one on the fly. Go ahead.

MR. WIGGINS: All right. Thank you. Even though this is on the motion to dismiss, we thought it might be the most useful if I went first and then see if you can demolish my arguments.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Do you want that to happen?

MR. WIGGINS: No, I definitely do not want that
to happen. But I want to focus on three major aspects
of this particular item before you, the jurisdictional
question, the legal basis for jurisdiction, and the
policy reasons that you do not grant the motion to
dismiss.

Let's be clear about this. This is a motion to dismiss. Staff is saying and General Telephone is urging that you close the door in my client's face and say, no, you cannot come here for any kind of relief. You have no jurisdiction. There is nothing under Chapter 364 that allows you to do this, no matter how offensive you might prove up General Telephone's behavior to be. How inconsistent with the purposes of this Chapter 364 you might be able to prove that up, we can't do anything for you.

Now, there are certain advantages to this

recommendation. It's certainly efficient. You don't have to deal with us. We're out. And you certainly don't have to deal with -- you can also get rid of the proposed rule the staff has suggested, where they are suggesting that the Commission adopt rules concerning billing and collection of both regulated and nonregulated services.

When consumers call to complain about cramming or what the LEC does with their new sort of police power in regulating this area, you can say, I'm sorry, our hands are tied. And if the legislature calls and asks what's going on, you can say, well, we don't have any jurisdiction, our hands are tied. I think that's efficient. It possibly is required under the statute, but it's certainly not in the public interest.

I think you are faced here with a classic -- what I call overinclusive/underinclusive dilemma on jurisdiction. On the one hand, you don't want to open the door to everything, you do not want to be overinclusive. You have to have some discipline in how you look at your jurisdiction. You cannot be a roving Commission looking to just do good. It has to be within the framework of the chapter.

On the other hand, you do not want to be underinclusive so that you tie your hands or exclude

yourself from helping in those kind of situations where you should help and you were intended to help.

Now, I think staff suggests, and I believe General Telephone's motion to dismiss suggests that accepting jurisdiction would be overinclusive, that where would you draw the line.

I just want to be clear and pragmatic here.

Yellow pages are not psychic hotlines. They are not

T-shirts. They are not any number of things that

could be billed through the LEC. Yellow pages has a

traditional integral relationship with telephone

service. And this goes to the legal basis for your

jurisdiction. Staff says that yellow pages are not

telecommunications services, period.

Were this for Alabama, that would be true. Were this for Georgia, that would be true. If it were even before the FCC, that would be true. That's not where we are. We are in Florida. And in Section 364.037, the statute provides that a certain portion of yellow page revenues are above-the-line revenues. General Telephone, BellSouth, Southern Bell in those days, Centel, and I believe United went with Commissioners Cresse and Gunter to the legislature and got that section passed.

It provides that yellow page revenues are

revenues from telecommunications services because it goes to the rate of return. Some doesn't. Some are outside.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Wiggins, let me ask, does that have any relevance for a price cap? For a regulated -- for a price cap regulated company?

MR. WIGGINS: Yes, sir, I think it does. Because the issue here is whether this Commission can put its arms around yellow page operations, whether yellow pages are -- let me use a little Latin here, telecommunications services vel non, or not. And what I have pointed out in my pleadings is that we are no longer in a black and white kind of environment where we used to be. Even in the statute before, we had a hybrid situation.

Now, when the LEC elected price cap regulation, at that time the revenue streams, the rate of return, all of that was considered to be fair, just, and reasonable within those Commission's jurisdiction.

I'm hesitant to go down this road, but should a LEC --BellSouth, for example, because I don't want to pick on General Telephone -- I come in for a changed circumstances case. I suspect that the Public Counsel is going to want to look at what is happening with the yellow page revenues, and Public Counsel would be

asserting that you had the ability to look at those.

Is this a very clean, clear kind of situation?

No, sir, it is not. It is definitely not. But to suggest that yellow pages are not -- in Florida are not telecommunications services in the way, let's say, computers are not, or T-shirts are not, or psychic lines are not, simply ignores the statutory basis for you looking at yellow pages.

The next thing is historically, yellow pages always --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask another. Do we include then under -- have we historically included billing services revenue as part of regulated service?

MR. WIGGINS: I don't know the answer to that. I think the answer is no, but I do not know. But with respect to billing and collection, if I could just back up one second and just say that when we divested AT&T, Judge Greene placed yellow pages in the Bell companies because he concluded that yellow pages are so integral to the local company's operation that's where it should be. But historically there has been this relationship there that has always been there.

Now, with respect to billing and collection -COMMISSIONER CLARK: Now, let me ask a question.

I thought that was because of the substantial revenues

that would go away, and that was the reason -- the motivating factor for including it.

MR. WIGGINS: Since I actually argued that case to NARUC, I think that's absolutely right. But a point was made -- and if I get these numbers wrong, I apologize, but if memory serves me correctly, BellSouth was generating around \$64 million in revenue from that on about less than \$10,000 in investment.

Now a lot of that was tossed in there because it was all leaked out, but the idea was is that only -- that was such an indication of monopoly service that it should go as a local telephone company.

Now, I just want to say that that's history. I mean, in a sense, because that is -- what is this, 1999? That was what, 1985? I mean, we are talking about a lot of water has gone under the dam since then. But what I'm trying to point out here is that when we bring you a complaint on yellow pages, we are talking about something that has a historical relationship to the local market.

And with respect to billing and collection, it is clearly something also tied up with competition.

Congress recognized in the telecom act that for the RBHCs to get 271 released, they had to, in fact, do billing and collection for CLECs. So it may not be a

telecom service, but it is very, very vital to competition in the local market. Because we've got two things here, yellow pages, which we think are important to the local market with its statutory basis, and billing and collection, which is also.

But it's a hybrid world. This is not all clean.

And this is what I can say about General Telephone's pleading and staff's recommendation. I don't think they are exactly wrong, you know. But being not exactly wrong is not the same thing as being right.

If that were the case, you wouldn't be able to -- there wouldn't be the hybrid situation with the yellow pages.

I think there is also a policy basis for why you don't want to dismiss this. You don't have to -- if you dismiss this, there is a good chance your hands will be tied in the future when people come to you for relief. You will be closing the door to your ability to address these issues. And in a sense you will be delegating to the LEC the responsibility for policing their own behavior in this area. To me that's a little bit -- and this is no disrespect to the LECs, but that's like giving a teenage kid the keys to the car and the home and going off and saying have a good time.

Companies follow their rational economic interests, and it will be in their interest to maximize their profits, not preserve and promote the public interest. So things are not always mutually exclusive, but that's the facts of life.

In this situation, the point has been made in one of the pleadings that this is supposedly a competitive market, but I think that's our whole point. If this is truly a competitive market, then General Telephone would be competing for Valley's services, for their royalties.

Valley pays them \$20,000 for this contract.

Valley has produced no real problems for them. There is no consumer complaints. And yet for some reason

General Telephone has pushed that money away and said we don't need it. If this were a competitive market, they would be competing for that. There is only one way that makes sense and that is if it's worth more to General Directories, GT Directories, to have them not bill for General Telephone than it is to General Telephone for them to bill for that.

That suggests to me a noncompetitive market.

That suggests to me that Chapter 364 says you should be looking at that and that you should take the authority you have in there to try to draw careful

1	lines in exercising your jurisdiction.
2	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Wiggins, in a
3	competitive environment, if a participant in that
4	market decides to walk away from some revenue, what
5	business is it of ours?
6	MR. WIGGINS: It is of no business to you unless
7	well, it's of no business to you. But the question
8	I would ask is, is that undermining or supporting the
9	development of competition in the local market? And
10	in this context, within the telephone context, it is
11	undermining.
12	The second thing I would ask is why did they
13	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Undermining development of
14	competition in yellow pages?
15	MR. WIGGINS: And in the telephone market in the
16	community, yes.
17	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And telephone
18	traditional telephone service?
19	MR. WIGGINS: Yes, because yellow pages promotes
20	the use of telephone service. And the if I can
21	recapture my train of thought I had there. With
22	respect to a private company saying we don't want to
23	take your money anymore, we don't want you as a
24	client, we don't want you as a customer. And I have
25	let go of clients, and I know there are some companies

that have let go customers. There is generally a rational, economic reason for this. In this situation, I'm not aware of any. That would be something we get into the truth in the light.

But I do not want to take this too far afield from the motion before you, which is a motion to dismiss. I would like to address, if I could, the declaratory statement only in a way of relieving some procedural snafus here. We were looking for a response from the Commission, a clarification of what your role would be, and to the extent that we get either a dismissal or not a dismissal, we are more informed, and it may not be necessary to go forward with the declaratory statement.

In addition, I can assure you if this were the most black and white situation I've ever brought a pleading to you on, I would not have filed a declaratory statement. I do believe it's a hard call. But I also believe that you are in danger of being -- of locking yourself into an underinclusive interpretation of your jurisdiction.

Because if you grant this motion to dismiss, I predict that before too long, you will be going to do something, and you will have in front of you a pleading that says, but, look, you don't have any

jurisdiction here. You can't do anything about it.

It's out of your hands. And so I think it would be wiser for us not to grant the motion to dismiss, and I think you have the statutory basis not to do that.

And I really appreciate your time.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask another quick question for Mr. Wiggins before Ms. Caswell begins. I assume you are alluding to then that if we were to follow staff's recommendation then that if we tried to take some proactive stance on truth in billing and that sort of thing, that we would be precluded from exercising that assertion of jurisdiction?

MR. WIGGINS: I certainly think that would be undermined. Without knowing the exact hypothetical, it's hard to know. But I do know that your staff draft rule in Docket Number 980170 would impose specific requirements for any company that bills for itself or on behalf of companies providing regulated or nonregulated services.

So you've already had one part of your staff suggesting that they could assert jurisdiction over billing for nonregulated services --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Doesn't that say if you are going to engage in this activity, here is the way you've got to do it. And what I'm hearing staff say

is we don't have the authority to require in this case GTE to bill for your client.

MR. WIGGINS: But they are billing for their own unregulated activity, sir. It's not that they are not billing for -- they are choosing who they bill for. They are billing for GTE directories, but they are tossing us out. And that's the rub.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: It seems to me that's more of an antitrust complaint than it is the jurisdiction of this Commission.

MR. WIGGINS: It may very well be an antitrust complaint, but I suggest you are drawing a very fine line, maybe even finer than the one I'm drawing when you say that you can adopt a rule that says we will assert jurisdiction on behalf of a company of how it bills providing regulated or nonregulated services billings, and that's okay, even if it's billing nonregulated on itself.

But the statute gives you no jurisdiction to address the not billing for a nonregulated person, when your staff is saying billing and collection services themselves are not regulated. Maybe that has confused the matter more, but --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess, it strikes me that the notion of how the bill is presented to customers

and the fact that we may regulate that is more directly related to telecommunications in the sense that you need to make sure you know what you have to pay for, what services you are getting. But to say that also gives us authority to dictate who they have to allow to be on the bill, I think maybe -- I don't see that our exercising jurisdiction with respect to that one area necessarily is undermined by (inaudible).

MR. WIGGINS: Or necessarily implies that you would go that extra step.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right.

MR. WIGGINS: I can understand the observation.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Ms. Caswell.

MS. CASWELL: Mr. Wiggin's jurisdictional arguments are very interesting, but they don't have much to do with this motion to dismiss. The issue here is whether the statutes that Valley has cited give you any ability to grant the relief they have requested.

First and foremost, I'd like you to remember that this is a contract matter between the parties. That contract says that any party, either party can terminate the contract upon 180 days notice. GTE complied with that notice provision. There is no

allegation from Valley that we did not or that we somehow violated the contract. It's precisely because they don't have a legitimate contract claim that they've come to this Commission to seek some relief.

So that leads us to the statutes they have cited.

364.08 is a tariffing provision. Is there any requirement for us to tariff billings for yellow pages? No, there is not and there never has been.

364.10 embodies our common carrier nondiscrimination obligations. Has the Commission ever interpreted that statute to apply to nontelecommunications nonregulated services? No, it has not. Therefore, you can't grant the relief that Valley wants you to grant.

The motion to dismiss. We don't need to engage in any factual arguments, but since Valley has raised the issue of whether the billing market is competitive or not, I can speak to that briefly. I have a list here of forty or fifty companies which bill for telecommunications services, and that's just telecommunications services. We are talking about a nontelecommunications service here.

I can pay for a yellow pages ad just the same way
I can pay for any class fied ad or any product for
that matter. I can use a credit card. I can use a
check. You know, I can step out to a printing company

to send out bills. There is no rating or recording here, so it's very easy to get billing for yellow pages ads. And, in fact, GTE Directories publishes in places like Akron and Dallas where we are not the ILEC and we do not have the ILEC bill for us.

That is not the standard industry practice as I understand it. And, in fact, I would imagine that Valley has --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: That addresses a broader question. This is not a contractual issue. And I know that you may find that where Valley wants to take us is not precisely where we need to be. But about the fact that, you know, we are going to have a market where people can enter, yellow pages are part of that market, and you are billing for his client does give certain benefits to him and his client.

MS. CASWELL: Right. But the standard for whether I have to give those benefits to him has never been whether it's the most convenient or efficient or best way for him to bill. It's whether that service is a monopoly. And no commission anywhere has used the standard that Valley advocates to you today that you use.

And if you decide that you want to use that standard, then I've got to offer my billing services on a common carrier basis. That means anybody who wants them, gets them. And I would submit that this is going to make your cramming problem a lot worse. And that would be far, far broader than any action ever taken by any state commission or of the FCC.

(Simultaneous conversation.)

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: -- your argument then be used against our cramming rule in saying, well, you know, the Commission has no jurisdiction to enter this area. We are a beeper company, we are not regulated by the Commission. We provide beepers. And if GTE wants to bill for beepers on its phone, that is our right, and the PSC can't say anything about it.

MS. CASWELL: Well, I think there is a fundamental distinction here between -- I would disagree, first of all, that deciding this complaint or issuing this motion to dismiss would somehow undermine your jurisdiction in the billing area. Because you have -- I do agree you do have some jurisdiction in billing. We do have an access tariff for billing for telecommunications services. And you have engaged in some discussion about billing format issues, just as the FCC has. You can regulate my billing format to some degree.

What you can't do, it strikes me, what you have

never decided you can do is force me to offer nonmonopoly, nontelecommunications services to anybody who wants them. And that to me is a much, much better question --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: But we can decide what you can offer to yourself? You have a right to say, you know, let's say GTE tomorrow decided to sell furniture and bill it through its --

MS. CASWELL: Well, there are a series of affiliate rules, and we comply with those affiliate rules, and those are FCC rules. I suppose if you want to institute some affiliate rules, sure, we'd have to comply with those. But this would be absolutely unprecedented anywhere.

I mean, the FCC decided twelve years ago this was a competitive market, and they were deciding about telecommunications billing. This goes far, far beyond to the market includes credit cards and things like that. I mean, to decide that that market is a monopoly would just be completely irrational.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I just go further. I mean, take for example an area that I have some worry in. I guess it falls out that is in telecommunications, in ancillary services, and GTE made a presentation to this Commission which I thought was very good about

how it is addressing the psychic lines and all others who bill through.

I would hesitate to say that without you those services would probably be very difficult to survive. In other words, if you offer a psychic hotline and you advertise in Tampa, if GTE doesn't let you get on their bills, I think that that psychic hotline is going to have problems as far as that area.

Now, I understand you've got your internal rules and to make sure people don't get ripped off and whatever. But then it begs the next question. What if GTE started offering a psychic hotline, or GTE could decide who -- which is what GTE, in essence, is doing -- is who comes on and who does not come on.

Now, I know GTE -- I think GTE doesn't have a psychic hotline, and not to say that psychic hotlines are wrong, but what I'm saying is that your ability to control those who participate in the market controls the market. And the truth is, you are the only one that can turn off someone's phone bill in your market as far as the residential customer and the majority of business. I guess in downtown GTE that's probably 98 percent, and in your territory it's about 98 percent.

So, it sort of begs the question, what areas you can do or can't do and how you can do it. Now I

understand you may feel that we are going far afield by saying you've got to bill for Mr. Wiggins, but I wonder -- we're not saying who you have to bill or not bill to, and I wonder if I don't have a problem with the fact that you can decide who you bill and who you don't bill when you are the monopoly power.

I mean, your billing service is the most ubiquitous, yours is the most powerful, yours is the most significant.

MS. CASWELL: Okay. Again, I think we're looking at -- if we look at LEC billing services as the relevant market here, then, yeah, I probably do have a monopoly in that. But the market is not LEC monopoly billing services, it's all types of billing services.

There are many, many companies that bill for telecommunications services as well as nontelecom services. In this case particularly, it would be very easy to bill for these ads, just like I said on a credit card. And these other companies that you mentioned, now, it might be harder for them to get into market psychic hotlines and things of that nature. That may be true, but they do have options.

I have listed numerous billing companies, and this list grows every day as more and more providers enter the market and look for new billing options that are independent of the ILEC.

So, you know, I would take some issue with the fact of whether, you know, these markets can't grow without ILEC participation. And, again, I'm going to make the point that it has never been found that we have to offer anything that is not a monopoly service. And I have cases from this Commission that say even that I don't have to offer things that are monopoly services to everyone on an unconditional basis.

So you've never even looked at the question of nonmonopoly services. No one has even ever raised that because it's just so far afield of anything that anybody has ever done in this country or at the FCC.

MR. WIGGINS: May I respond just very briefly?

I'd like to bring this back to the statute, since Ms.

Caswell said that we didn't really show how it

violated the statute.

364.10 says the telecommunications company may not make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any person or locality or subject, any particular person or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.

There is no rule adopted under this about billing for yellow pages. If there was, we wouldn't be here.

1	That's why we're breaking new ground here. Yes, we
2	are. But we are saying that when General Telephone
3	uses billing and collection services to bill for its
4	unaffiliated directory services and purposefully
5	excludes Valley to not, then that conveys an undue
6	prejudice and advantage on their affiliate's behalf
7	and against us.
8	Staff and General Telephone are of the view that
9	because billing and collection services are not a
10	common carrier service, that they are not
11	traditionally viewed to be telephone services, and
12	because yellow pages are not telephone services,
13	within their understanding that you are powerless to
14	do anything about that if you feel like that practice
15	is incompatible with this requirement.
16	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Is your
17	MR. WIGGINS: We disagree.
18	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Is your argument so much
19	that you are excluded, or is it that you are being
20	MR. WIGGINS: Discriminated against.
21	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Because if I understand it,
22	you already had a contract and the contract is now
23	being terminated. Arguably for cause.
24	MR. WIGGINS: No.
25	COMMISSIONER JACOBS: There is no provision in

you all's agreement on what --1 MR. WIGGINS: It's 180 days for whatever reason. 2 3 No reason, good reason. COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Just pursuant to that 5 agreement. MR. WIGGINS: True. 6 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But your argument is that 7 the -- that there is an underlying reason and that 8 9 reason is not adequate. MR. WIGGINS: No, sir. Our argument is that they 10 are terminating the contract as they are allowed to 11 under the contract, which is why we haven't filed a 12 contract action, and we did not, you know, stress the 13 contract in the pleading. But at the same time, they 14 15 are continuing to bill for their affiliate. So when they send the notice out that we are not 16 going to bill for nontelecom services anymore because 17 there is a problem with that, but they continue to 18 bill for theirs, we say we think this raises an issue 19 under 364.10(1). And what I would simply like to say 20 21 here is I can well understand why General Telephone, staff, and maybe you would look at this and say, no, 22 you know, nice try, but billing and collection doesn't 23 rise to that level and we're not going to touch it. 24 But I do say this, that I have trouble 25

distinguishing between seeing how that can be the position, when at the same time the staff is floating a rule that says you are going to exercise jurisdiction over billing and collection. And maybe more to the point, my client has trouble understanding that, as well. If it were not for that rule proposal, we would not be here.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Let me ask this, and I guess, the company or staff could answer this. But you sent this notice out to other companies?

MS. CASWELL: I'm sorry, I missed that.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Is this notice going out to all the companies that --

MS. CASWELL: Yes, and that's another good point. We're not singling out Valley here. This notice has gone out to all nontelecommunications providers. So we're foregoing those revenues, we're cutting off all those people in a nondiscriminatory fashion because they are nontelecommunications providers.

And it's because I'm getting lawsuits like this which say -- I've got a class action suit now that says I'm not doing enough to stop cramming. So, you know, either way I lose, I guess. But, you know, I'm trying to pursue that angle while getting complaints, you know, from people telling me that I have to treat

my billing as a common carrier service. Well, those 1 two things are seriously incompatible. 2 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: To avoid that couldn't you 3 just narrow that down to excluding people who have 4 been determined to have engaged in cramming. In other 5 words, isn't this an --6 7 MS. CASWELL: The standard does not say that you have to have complaints against you. We are 8 eliminating billing for all nontelecommunications 9 services, and yellow pages is a nontelecom service, so 10 they came within that category. 11 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Are you thinking of hiring out 12 as a billing company to do yellow page ads? 13 MS. CASWELL: I can't tell you if that's true. I 14 15 know that we have a nonILEC billing in other states, but I would, you know, I would doubt we're doing that 16 in Florida. 17 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But if -- what you're 18 saying is that you're sure that your subsidiary would 19 never ever engage in this, and so you feel it 20 adequate --21 MS. CASWELL: We can police our subsidiary much 22 better than we can police third parties. 23 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Then that goes against the 24 argument, because what you're saying is you shouldn't 25

terminate people who can effectively police their conduct. And you have effectively done that for your subsidiary, but everybody else can't make that showing to you. They can't come to you and say, we can effectively police our conduct and, therefore, we shouldn't be caught up in the broader scheme here.

MS. CASWELL: No, we don't provide for that opportunity, and we don't see a need to provide for that opportunity. I mean, we comply with all of the affiliate rules of the FCC, we comply with all of the affiliate decisions of this Commission. So, I mean, our behavior is perfectly permissible under the statutes and under your rules and under the FCC's rules.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Well, then I guess my question then goes to staff. I mean, Mr. Wiggins makes a good point. I mean, here we are trying to step into this area of cramming. Something that this Commission is trying to be progressive on, and yet isn't this a similar service? And, Ms. Caswell, I understand your position, and I appreciate it, but this is a form of cramming, isn't it? I mean, if I sell -- let's say I put on someone's bill Joe Garcia phonebook ad. Bell bills for it, to leave GTE out of it. Bell bills for it. That would be cramming as we see it. What is the

difference between that and offering a beeper service, offering all the myriad of different things we have seen added onto people's bills, or crammed onto people's bills? What is the difference between Valley and the other cramming services that we are trying to write rules on?

COMMISSION STAFF: I think there is a big difference. I think we're mixing apples and oranges all over the place here today, personally. Let me start and do my best to sort it out.

I mean, first off, when you cited to this 337 statute about a ratesetting proceeding considering advertising and yellow page revenues, well, that's all well and good, but it's not requiring GTE to provide billing and collection services to you or me or to anyone.

Secondly, the rulemaking that Mr. Wiggins has repeatedly referred to is the result of a specific statutory mandate on truth in billing in 364.06, or at least that's my understanding. I'm not directly involved in that proceeding, but that's my understanding.

And he said it includes communications and noncommunications service, something like that, and the statute does talk about addressing -- each billing

party must clearly identify on its bill the name and toll free number of the originating party of the telecommunications service or information service billed and it does specifically define information service as telephone calls made to a 900 or a 976 type service, but does not include internet services.

So to me he's kind of twisting things, in my opinion. And although I might sympathize with the plight he is in, I just don't see it under -- coming under the authority of this Commission.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Give me the difference so that

I can understand it between a yellow pages ad and

charging for a beeper company.

COMMISSION STAFF: What specific --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: For beeper usage, or for something else that is being crammed on.

COMMISSION STAFF: Well, if it came up in the cramming context, sure. I mean, if a customer was being crammed for unauthorized charges you might be able to make the argument that was the case. But we're talking about requiring a company to provide a service that is not a telecommunications service.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: To me the difference is if a company such as GTE or BellSouth is going to engage in billing for nontelecommunications services, the

question is how do we regulate it? How de we let the 1 2 customer know what is required and educate the customer and give the customer the benefit of having 3 those matters resolved. 4 But what Mr. Wiggins is saying is that he has the 5 right to have his client be billed through the 6 7 incumbent telephone company. And I see a distinction there. And Mr. Wiggins is at the microphone --8 MR. WIGGINS: There is one clarification. If 9 they bill for themselves -- if they bill for 10 themselves. If they don't want to bill for GTE 11 12 Directories, our guys go away happy. 13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: See, that has nothing to do with truth in billing, that's an antitrust argument. 14 MR. WIGGINS: I understand. 15 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And the question was how do 16 17 we distinguish exercising jurisdiction when a company engages in billing for nontelecommunications. 18 MR. WIGGINS: Well, that's why we cited 364.10, 19 20 and not the truth in billing statute. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me ask you a 21 question, Mr. Wiggins. If we were to agree with your 22 argument and to say -- tell GTE that they have to bill 23 for your client, then it seems to me the next question 24

is going to be, okay, we have to bill at what rate?

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1	Then we get into a situation, well, it's an unbundled
2	network element, and we've got to look at the
3	forward-looking costs of billing services, and it's a
4	quasi-monopolistic service, therefore we're going to
5	have an arbitration and a proceeding to determine what
6	the cost is that you're going to because if they
7	really don't want you as a client they'll just bill
8	you some exorbitant rate that you don't want to pay.
9	And then the next thing is you're going to be
10	filing a complaint, well, the rate is too high, and it
11	should be the cost should be determined on some
12	type of forward-looking, economic avoided cost base.
13	I don't know. But we're just asking for trouble, it
14	seems to me.
15	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: That said, I'll entertain a
16	motion if I can get one.
17	COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Move staff.
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Second.
19	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: We have a motion and a second.
20	All those in favor signify by saying aye.
21	(Unanimous affirmative vote.)
22	MR. WIGGINS: Thank you for your attention.
23	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Thank you, Mr. Wiggins.
24	COMMISSION STAFF: Commissioner Garcia, there is
25	one added tweak, because we did the modification to

1	not rule on the declaratory statement, therefore, we
2	should probably keep this docket open. But Mr.
3	Wiggins indicated that he might withdraw the petition
4	for the declaratory statement based on this ruling.
5	MR. WIGGINS: Well, let me be very careful with
6	my language, because I haven't checked that with my
7	client. I said any future activities will be informed
8	by the response we got from the panel today.
9	COMMISSION STAFF: Okay. So it would be staff's
10	recommendation that we keep the docket open and change
11	the issue.
12	MR. WIGGINS: We'll address that. We don't want
13	to subject you to procedural hassles you don't need.
14	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Thank you, Mr. Wiggins.
15	All right, so the docket will be kept open and there
16	is no disagreement with that.
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5	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
6	STATE OF FLORIDA)
7	COUNTY OF LEON)
8	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, do hereby certify that the
9	foregoing proceeding was transcribed from cassette tape,
10	and the foregoing pages number 1 through 34 are a true and
11	correct record of the proceedings.
12	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee,
13	attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor relative or
14	employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially
15	interested in the foregoing action.
16	DATED THIS 12th day of April, 1999.
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18	
19	Jane Fauroti
20	JANE FAUROT, RPR P. O. Box 10751
21	Tallahassee, Florida 32302
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