# BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Proposed Rules : 25-4.300, F.A.C., Scope : and Definitions; 25-4.301, : F.A.C., Applicability of : Fresh Look; and 25-4.302, : F.A.C., Termination of LEC : Contracts.

: DOCKET NO. 980253-TX

PROCEEDINGS:

HEARING

BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN JOE A. GARCIA COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK

COMMISSIONER JULIA L. JOHNSON COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR.

DATE:

Wednesday, May 12, 1999

TIME:

Commenced at 9:45 a.m. Concluded at 12:20 p.m.

PLACE:

Betty Easley Conference Center

Room 148

4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida

REPORTED BY:

MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR

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DAVID V. DIMLICH, 2620 Southwest 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33133, appearing on behalf of Supra Telecommunications and Information Systems, Inc.

PETER M. DUNBAR, Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, Post Office Box 10095, Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095; LAURA L. GALLAGHER, 204 South Monroe Street, Suite 201, Tallahassee, Florida 32301; and CAROLYN MAREK, Time Warner Telecom, Inc. 233 Bramerton Court, Franklin, Tennessee 37069, appearing on behalf of Time Warner Telecom, Inc.

MICHAEL GOGGIN, 150 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130, and NED JOHNSTON, BellSouth Telecommunications, 701 Northpoint Parkway, Suite 400, West Palm Beach, Florida, appearing on behalf of BellSouth Telecommunications.

ANGELA B. GREEN, 125 South Gadsden Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, appearing on behalf of Florida Public Telecommunications Association.

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CHARLES J. REHWINKEL, 1313 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, and BEN POAG, Sprint Florida, Inc., Post Office Box 2214, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, appearing on behalf of Sprint Corporation.

### APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

MICHAEL R. ROMANO, Swidler Berlin Shereff Friedman, 3000 K Street N.W., Suite 300, Washington, D.C. 20007, and MICHAEL DUKE, KMC Telecom, Inc., 3025 Breckenridge Boulevard, Suite 170, Duluth, Georgia 30069, appearing on behalf of KMC Telecom, Inc.

MARSHA RULE, 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 7000, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, appearing on behalf of AT&T and TCG.

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## PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Good morning. Julia is on a conference call, and Susan Clark is going to be a little bit delayed, so we want to get this going.

Several incidents are going to be happening today, so I want to warn you before they happen.

Charles Rehwinkel's alarm goes on periodically, on and off, so you'll be hearing about that. And Pete Dunbar, while he looks like he'll be moving in slow motion, it's simply that the light above him is broken. So we will -- at lunch, hopefully Meridian Management will be here to fix it. Our attorneys have agreed to sit and work under these perilous conditions.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Is that Charles'

personal alarm? Because his car alarm went off -
CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Right. No, it's his car

alarm has been going off periodically, so we'll break

every time that happens.

We'll take appearances.

MS. BROWN: Could I read the notice first?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Oh, I'm sorry. Read the notice, please. I'm sorry.

MS. BROWN: By notice issued April 2, 1999, this time and place was set for a hearing, rule

hearing in In re: Proposed Rules 25-4.330, Florida
Administrative Code, 25-4.301 and 25-4.302. The
purpose of the hearing is set out in the notice.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right. We'll take

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right. We'll take appearances.

MR. DUNBAR: Mr. Chairman, Peter Dunbar with the Pennington firm, 215 South Monroe, Tallahassee, representing, Time Warner Telecom. Also appearing on behalf of Time Warner Telecom, Laura L. Gallagher, 204 South Monroe, Suite 201, Tallahassee.

MS. MAREK: Carolyn Marek with Time Warner Telecom, Vice President of Regulatory Affairs for the Southeast Region, 233 Bramerton Court, Franklin, Tennessee 30769.

MR. ROMANO: Mr. Chairman, Mike Romano -- CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mike, turn your mike on.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: It's on.

MR. ROMANO: Michael Romano from Swidler,
Berlin, Shereff, Friedman, 3000 K Street, Washington,
D.C., 20007, appearing for KMC Telecom, Inc., and with
me, Michael Duke from KMC Telecom, Inc.

MR. DUKE: Michael Duke, KMC Telecom, 3025
Breckenridge Boulevard, Suite 170, Duluth, Georgia
30096.

MS. CASWELL: Kim Caswell, GTE, One Tampa

City Center, Tampa, Florida 33601. 1 MR. REHWINKEL: Charles J. Rehwinkel, 1313 2 Blair Stone Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, 3 appearing on behalf of Sprint Corporation. 4 MR. DIMLICH: David Dimlich, legal counsel 5 for Supra Telecom, 2620 Southwest 27th Avenue, Miami, 6 7 Florida. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I'm sorry. I didn't get 8 9 your name. MR. DIMLICH: David Dimlich. 10 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Dilnick? 11 MR. DIMLICH: Dimlich, D-i-m-l-i-c-h. 12 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. 13 MR. HORTON: Norman H. Horton, Jr., 14 Messer, Caparello, and Self, 215 South Monroe Street, 15 Tallahassee, appearing on behalf of e.spire 16 Communications. 17 MS. KAUFMAN: Vicki Gordon Kaufman of the 18 McWhirter Reeves law firm, 117 South Gadsden Street, 19 Tallahassee, 32301. I'm appearing on behalf of the 20 Florida Competitive Carriers Association. 21 MR. GOGGIN: My name is Michael Goggin. 22 I'm here representing BellSouth Telecommunications. 23 My address is 150 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 24

33130. And with me today is Ned Johnston of

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BellSouth. His address is 701 Northpoint Parkway,
Suite 400, West Palm Beach, Florida 33407.

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MS. RULE: Marsha Rule with AT&T, 101
North Monroe Street, Suite 700, Tallahassee, also representing TCG.

ANGELA GREEN with the Florida Public

Telecommunications Association, 125 South Gadsden,

Tallahassee, Florida 32301.

MS. BROWN: Martha Carter Brown, representing the Florida Public Service Commission Staff.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Martha, are there any preliminary matters?

MS. BROWN: There are just a couple,
Mr. Chairman. The first thing I would like to address
is Staff's composite exhibit, which consists of two
volumes. One is the pleadings filed in the case and
the comments, and the second volume is Staff's data
request to the incumbent companies and their
responses.

I would like to have those marked and admitted into the record at this time, if I could.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: There being no objection, show it admitted, and I guess that would be Exhibit 1.

(Exhibit 1 was marked for identification

and received in evidence.)

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

MS. BROWN: The second matter concerns the establishment of the order of presentations for this morning by those participants who want to speak. We have established a ten-minute time limit for all presenters to include anything that they want to say, covering any testimony or comments that they filed. That order will go this way. Time Warner will go first, then the FCCA. KMC, I think they have a presentation, am I correct? And then BellSouth, GTE, and Sprint. And if I missed anyone, I would like them to raise their hand. And the Pay Telephone Association will go after KMC.

That's the other --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Martha, could you go over that order one more time?

MS. BROWN: Yes. Time Warner, FCCA, KMC, the Pay Telephone Association, BellSouth, GTE, and Sprint.

I have no other preliminary matters, unless the parties have something.

MR. REHWINKEL: Yes. Chairman Garcia,
Charles Rehwinkel with Sprint. Just as a housekeeping
matter, I passed out a copy of Mr. Poag's comments and

the Attachment 1 to his comments. When we filed the comments, the copies we filed with the Commission had proposed legislative changes highlighted in yellow. When they were Xeroxed and served on the parties, the highlighting didn't show up, so I provided the parties with a copy with the highlighting showing up in gray. So I just -- that's what I've distributed to the parties. What you have is correct, and what the parties have is the same.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Correctly highlighted.

Thank you very much, Mr. Rehwinkel.

Anything else? Good.

MS. BROWN: Thank you. Mr. Dunbar just reminded me of something that I forgot to mention, which is that in rule hearings we have an opportunity for the public to comment. It would my suggestion that we offer that opportunity now before we start the presentations of the participants.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Is there anyone here?

Anyone related to Mr. Dunbar here to speak?

All right. That said, we offered the opportunity. I guess we're going -- a ten-minute time frame. Martha, will you have someone there keep an eye on their watch? Please try to keep within that so that we can get the fullest presentation possible from

1 all the parties. Do you need anything else? Does anyone 2 need any -- well, then let's go ahead and start. 3 Mr. Dunbar? MR. DUNBAR: Mr. Chairman, it's my 5 understanding that there's going to be one 6 representative per party, and Carolyn Marek, our 7 Regional Vice President, will make the Time Warner 8 9 presentation. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. 10 MS. BROWN: If I might interject, I think 11 GTE has proposed to divide up their time. Is that 12 13 correct? MS. CASWELL: Yes. We have about a 14 five-minute statement on legal issues that I'll do, 15 and about five minutes of policy. 16 MS. BROWN: Staff has no problem with 17 18 that. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. There being no --19 20 you're ready? MS. MAREK: Okay. We're going to defer our 21 legal comments to the post-hearing brief. 22 23 My name is Carolyn Marek. I'm the Vice 24 President of Regulatory Affairs in the Southeast

Region for Time Warner Telecom, and I appreciate the

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opportunity to address this Commission.

I would like to start by asking a few questions, and I think the first question is, why are the ILECs so afraid of Fresh Look? The proposed rule does not mandate that we take the contracts away from the ILECs' customers and hand them over to the ALECs. It does, however, mandate that the ILECs compete head to head with the ALECs for the business of some significant customers. But the ILECs will only lose the revenues or termination charges if they can't compete. So why are the ILECs so afraid to compete?

In my opinion, the ILECs should not be afraid to compete, since they still control nearly 100% of the market. They have a ubiquitous network, they have brand identity, they have customer loyalty, and they still control the essential facilities that some of the ALECs need to offer their services. But even though they have all of these advantages, the ILECs argue that their customers should have known that competition was coming, and therefore they should be held to their contracts.

The ILECs made a deliberate attempt to forestall competition by locking in these large customers before facilities-based competition was barely out of the gate. Even if the customers knew

that competition was coming, they couldn't be assured exactly when it was going to come and knock on their door. And it's very tempting when you have immediate savings that can be realized to take advantage of those savings. And in some cases, it was necessary possibly just for survival. After all, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.

Well, then why would these seemingly happy ILEC customers even want to get out of their existing contracts and switch to another carrier? The answer is because another carrier's offering is more competitive in some way. So if the ILEC cannot be more competitive, the customer is going to switch to a more competitive provider, someone who can give the consumer additional benefits. And wasn't that the point of competition to begin with, to offer the consumers more benefits and choice?

I submit that this Fresh Look rule is the most tangible consumer-oriented rule to be considered by this Commission since the passage of the legislation opening up the local exchange to competition.

Now, don't get me wrong. I think that a lot of the other regulatory proceedings we have done have been incredibly important to establish the rules

for the ALECs in order to allow them to compete and to establish the rules so that players are ensured that we're competing fairly amongst each other.

But this rule really only takes effect if the customer invokes it. You all can order a Fresh Look rule, and the ALECs can't force the consumer to take advantage of it. So it's only if the customer chooses to take advantage of Fresh Look will it actually become effective. It directly gives the consumer the opportunity to consider competitive alternatives not previously available to them and allows the consumer to realize the benefits of competition now instead of waiting for these less competitive contracts to expire.

There has been a lot of controversy in this proceeding about whether or not there were any competitive alternatives available to consumers who entered into these CSAs. As I recall, the legislation opening up the local exchange to competition was enacted on July 1st of 1995. So why are the ILECs talking about competitive alternatives from the 1970s and the 1980s? These references are totally irrelevant to this proceeding where we're talking about local exchange telecommunications services that would be affected by the Fresh Look rule.

Additionally, on July 1st of 1995, the facilities-based providers were not able to wave this magic wand and become operational overnight. It takes time and money to negotiate interconnection agreements, to get switches in place, and to build facilities. In fact, Time Warner was the first ALEC to negotiate their interconnection agreement with BellSouth, and we did not become operational in Florida until February of 1997.

The comments of the ILECs would also lead us to believe that Fresh Look is a new concept, or where it has been considered, it has been summarily rejected. Well, hasn't this Commission already adopted Fresh Look in the past in the expanded interconnection docket, and hasn't the FCC adopted Fresh Look provisions on at least three separate occasions? And should we just forget about the other ten states that have either accepted a Fresh Look rule or are considering it as we speak?

Again, I would submit that Fresh Look is a tool that has been used at the state and federal levels to jump-start competition. There has been a lot of pressure from the U.S. Congress on the FCC, and there's a lot of pressure from the State Legislatures on this State Commission and others to advance

facilities-based competition.

As the record in this docket will reflect, as of September 30, 1998, only 1.6% of the voice grade lines in the BellSouth serving area and 2% of the lines in GTE's service area were served by ALECs, and the vast majority of these lines were actually served by resellers.

So again, I think the CSA resale requirement that was ordered by this Commission was incredibly effective in terms of stimulating resale, which brings me to my last question, and that is, well, then how can this Commission stimulate or foster facilities-based competition. And I really believe that the answer is by adopting your proposed Fresh Look rule and giving the ALECs the opportunity to offer consumers the benefits of competitive alternatives.

In conclusion, Fresh Look will not require the ILECs' existing customers to change providers, but it will enable the customers to access innovative and cost-effective products and services in a competitive environment. It will allow customers to avoid potentially exorbitant termination liabilities. It will further the public interest and the Commission's objectives by promoting facilities-based competition.

And it will make the benefits of competition available now which would otherwise be delayed for many years for many customers. Thank you.

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MS. BROWN: Chairman Garcia, this would be the time for anyone to pose any questions if they have any.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Any questions?

MS. BROWN: Staff has some if no one else does.

MS. CASWELL: Yes, I probably have a couple of questions.

MS. BROWN: Okay.

MS. CASWELL: Ms. Marek, just for clarification here, I'm looking at the Commission's December 1996 competition report, and it says that Time Warner was providing local service as of September 1, 1996, in Florida, and I think you gave a February 1997 date.

That's really when we started MS. MAREK: offering services on a more widely available basis. We had test customers in September.

MS. CASWELL: Okay. You mentioned some Fresh Look decisions elsewhere. One of those was the FCC's and the expanded interconnection docket. Do you remember how long the Fresh Look window there was?

MS. MAREK: I don't.

MS. CASWELL: It was 180 days. Do you remember what length of contracts it applied to?

MR. DUNBAR: Mr. Chairman, I will just make a brief inquiry, if I might. And I apologize for interrupting, but I think it's appropriate if we're going to do clarification. If we're going to do cross, that's different than what I had anticipated, although we're prepared to engage in that if that's what the Commission would like. If Ms. Caswell wants to put material of record, she has reserved time to do so, and she can certainly make her points as she wishes at that time.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Martha, had we contemplated this, and do you have a reaction or suggestion on this?

MS. BROWN: Chairman Garcia, I would point you to the order establishing procedures to be followed at rulemaking hearing issued March 26, 1999, by the prehearing officer in this docket. And on page 4, in the middle paragraph, the last sentence says, "Persons making presentations will be subject to questions from other persons. Such questions shall be limited only to those necessary to clarify and

understand the presenter's position." 1 I think that's very CHAIRMAN GARCIA: 2 clear, Ms. Caswell, so let's try to keep them there. 3 MS. CASWELL: Fine. Okay. That's it. MS. BROWN: We just really basically have 5 one question for you. In a lot of the comments that 6 were filed in this case, mention has been made of the 7 term "long-term contract." We're somewhat uncertain 8 of what that actually means. What is your view on 9 what a long-term contract is? 10 MS. MAREK: Time Warner's position would be 11 that any contract that is over a year would be 12 13 considered long-term. MS. BROWN: Thank you. 14 MR. GOGGIN: Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry. 15 16 Michael Goggin, BellSouth. If we could ask just a 17 couple of clarifying questions. That's fine. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: 18 19 could, I would just ask that you let Staff close. MR. GOGGIN: I apologize. I realize 20 21 we're --CHAIRMAN GARCIA: No problem. 22 23 MR. GOGGIN: -- speaking out of order. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Go right ahead. 24 Ms. Marek, you mentioned that 25 MR. GOGGIN:

Time Warner actually began to offer service on a large scale in February 1997. Did Time Warner offer proposals to provide service in advance of that date to business customers?

MS. MAREK: I'm certain they did.

MR. GOGGIN: Wouldn't that, from the customer's standpoint, be the time at which competitive alternatives became available?

MS. MAREK: Potentially. However, really, until -- if we're talking about the number of proposals, it may have been under a dozen proposals that were actually made, and then actually customers in service in February of '97. So in order for a customer to have been in service in February of '97, a proposal would have had to have been made and the customer made a decision in order for us to build the facilities to the customer and actually have them up and working in February of '97. So "operational" I guess is a term -- I would say is when we're actually providing service to a customer.

MR. GOGGIN: Does Time Warner employ long-term agreements as you've defined them in signing up customers, business customers?

MS. MAREK: Yes, we do.

MR. GOGGIN: And do the long-term contracts

that Time Warner employs contain termination provisions that impose monetary liability if customers should terminate the contracts prior to the end of the term?

MS. MAREK: I'll answer your question that it does. I'm not sure -- the ALEC contracts are not at issue, so again, they're totally irrelevant for this proceeding while we're looking at the contracts of the ILECs, since you all are in the monopoly position.

MR. GOGGIN: For an ALEC entering the market today, wouldn't a long-term agreement --

MR. DUNBAR: Mr. Chairman.

MR. GOGGIN: Wouldn't a long-term agreement with Time Warner present the same sort of obstacle that a long-term agreement with BellSouth might present?

would not. I mean, the whole point of the Fresh Look is because the ILECs have the monopoly power that you're giving an opportunity, and because those contracts were closed at a time when the ALECs were just beginning to emerge. That's the whole purpose of being able to promote facilities-based competition. So the contracts of the ALECs are totally irrelevant

to this proceeding.

MR. GOGGIN: Is there any mention in your prefiled testimony or in your presentation today about evidence that would tend to support an assertion of market power?

MS. MAREK: Well, I did assert that you have -- yes, on two things. One, I assert that you have nearly 100% of the market, and I reflected back on the record that it was 2% of the total lines available in Florida are being served by ALEC customers. So whether that's 2%, 3%, I'll give you 4%, that's still market dominance by the ILEC.

MR. GOGGIN: Can you define for me what most courts and economists would -- the way they would define market power?

MS. MAREK: That was not part of my prefiled testimony.

MR. DUNBAR: Mr. Chairman, if Bell would like to make presentations or points, my understanding is we're not engaged in traditional cross. Now, we are prepared to engage in that, but that's not my understanding from talking to Staff of what we were intending to do today.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: The hope is to elucidate the testimony that has been made before. You have an

opportunity to present exactly the same or different information that you have.

MR. GOGGIN: We understand. I just -- if she's going to employ terms like "market power," I think it would be important to the Commission to understand what her understanding of the term "market power" is. That was the purpose of that line of questions.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Is that it?

MR. GOGGIN: That's it. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. The next presenter?

MS. BROWN: The next presenter will be

offered by FCCA.

MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Vicki Gordon Kaufman on behalf of the FCCA. We did

not file traditional testimony. We essentially filed

comments, and what I would like to do is basically

summarize the comments that we have filed.

As you know, the FCCA is an organization composed of competitive carriers, as well as the Telecommunications Resource Association is one of our members. And we are very interested in seeing the Commission take this step forward to bring some more local competition into the marketplace.

When this proceeding began, the FCCA filed

its own rule proposal, and that rule proposal is remarkably similar to what is before you from the Staff, or I guess I should say the rule that you have proposed. It essentially has two differences.

One difference is that in the proposed rule you have a two-year Fresh Look window. The FCCA has proposed a four-year window. And our thinking behind the longer window is that it's fairly obvious that competition is going to come at a different pace to different areas of the state, and so we believe that a longer window would be helpful in making sure that competition reaches various areas as it's going to progress at a different pace.

The second difference between the rule we have put forward and your Staff's rule is that we do not have any provision in our rule for any termination liability. And our thinking behind that is that that is going to be a barrier to customers who want to switch carriers, to become involved in a dispute over what is the termination liability, to have to go through a proceeding in order to figure that out. We think that's going to be a great barrier. So our rule takes a little bit of a more simplified approach, and it has a longer window, but it has a lot in common with the rule that you've proposed.

I just want to take a minute and respond to some of the comments that were filed by the incumbents in this case. And I judge from what Ms. Caswell said, you're going to hear some argument on that from them.

One has to do with the alleged constitutional infirmities that the LECs have suggested this rule would pose. And we've done an analysis in the comments we filed, and we would suggest to you that there is no constitutional bar to you proposing this rule. This is a rule in the public interest. It's a rule that implements state and federal policy vis-a-vis competition. We don't see any constitutional infirmity here, and I would suggest to you that that's somewhat of a smoke screen.

Secondly, the LECs have suggested that because there's resale of CSAs that that sort of takes care of any Fresh Look problem or opportunity that competitors should have. I think it's important to understand that resale means that a competitor can take the exact contract services, the package that the LEC is offering, and resell it. It does not give the competitor the ability to offer innovative services, innovative packaging, something that would be more attractive and more useful and more tailored to the customer's needs. So we don't see this argument that,

"Well, you've got resale; therefore, Fresh Look is unnecessary," as something that's very persuasive.

So what we would urge you to do is take a close look at the rule that the FCCA has proposed, compare it with the one you have proposed in this proceeding, and we would suggest that you either adopt the rule as we've proposed it or make those changes to the rule that you have proposed and go forward and let this rule work in the marketplace.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Questions?

Charles, just so we don't get hopping around, we'll just go this way. Is there anyone?

Ms. Caswell?

Charles, go right ahead.

MR. REHWINKEL: Yes. Just a clarification on the level of support for the proposed rule,

Ms. Kaufman.

Do you have any problem with a limitation in whichever version of the rule the Commission adopts that would limit limitation of termination liability to only customers seeking to go to another competitive provider?

MS. KAUFMAN: I'm not sure I understand what you're asking me. I think this rule is only

applicable to people that change providers.

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MR. REHWINKEL: If the rule isn't clear on that, would you agree that such a limitation would be appropriate, or such a clarification would be appropriate?

MS. KAUFMAN: Well, I guess you would have to point out to me how the rule is not clear on that. I think it's our position that the rule is intended to and applies only to people that are seeking to switch from an incumbent to a competitor. I don't think that termination provisions or lack thereof would apply to any customers that remain with the LEC, if that's what you're asking me.

MR. REHWINKEL: Well, what if a customer just wanted to get out of a contract because of a reason other than moving to another provider, such as -- I don't know, his business plan changed. That's my only question, is if a customer is not switching carriers, should he not be allowed to avoid termination liability in a contract?

MS. KAUFMAN: I don't think the situation you're describing is contemplated by this rule, Charles.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Charles, why don't you just for my own edification tell me what situation

you're contemplating so that I can understand what you're trying to get at?

MR. REHWINKEL: Mr. Poag can address this.

I was just trying to see what the other parties thought about this issue. In our original rule proposal that we filed last year, we had such a limitation. It's our view that the way the rule is written, it would not prohibit a customer from coming to Sprint and seeking limitation of termination liability or abrogation entirely, even in a case where they were just changing -- moving out of town, disconnecting service, changing their business plan.

So all we wanted to do was to ensure that this rule would not be abused in that way. And I don't think anybody here would disagree with that. That was the whole purpose of my question.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Very good. BellSouth?

MR. GOGGIN: I have just one question.

You've advocated a rule with a four-year window that would permit customers who want to switch carriers to avoid all termination liability if they're subject to a long-term contract. As you know, the rule as it's currently written would affect all contracts that are entered into up to the effective date of the rule, which would include, obviously, contracts signed in

1999.

For a new ALEC entering the market at that time, they might just as easily encounter a long-term contract subject to termination liability that has been entered into between a customer and, say, Time Warner, as they would a long-term contract entered into between a customer and BellSouth. The contract may have been entered into as late as December '99 if the schedule for implementing the rule holds true.

Would you favor amending the rule in a way that would sweep away what you believe to be obstacles, long-term contracts subject to termination liability, even if those contracts are signed by ALECs rather than ILECs?

MS. KAUFMAN: I think the same scenario was posed to Ms. Marek, and I agree with her. I think what we're dealing with here is an incumbent that controls, you know, the vast majority of the market, and that's what this rule is intended to address. So, no, I would not be in favor of your proposal.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Is that it? Okav.

MS. BROWN: Ms. Kaufman, in FCCA's prefiled comments, they mentioned that they believed a long-term contract would be 180 days or more. Am I correct on that?

1	MS. KAUFMAN: Yes, ma'am.
2	MS. BROWN: 180 days, that's six months?
3	MS. KAUFMAN: Yes.
4	MS. BROWN: What's the rationale for
5	considering that to be a long-term contract?
6	MS. KAUFMAN: Well, I think Ms. Marek
7	answered that her definition was a year, and I don't
8	think that there's any magic, you know, six months, a
9	year, nine months. It just seemed to us that if you
10	entered into a contract for six months or longer, you
11	are locking yourself in and not having the advantages
12	of the marketplace. But I don't think that we would
13	object if it was changed to nine months or 12 months.
14	MS. BROWN: All right. Thank you.
15	The next presenter on my list is KMC.
16	MR. DUKE: Good morning. I am Mike Duke.
17	I am Director of Regulatory Affairs for KMC Telecom.
18	I've spoken here before in favor of the proposed Fresh
19	Look rule.
20	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Sir, you're going to need
21	to bring the mike a little bit closer.
22	MR. DUKE: A little bit closer? Okay.
23	But just to remind everyone, KMC is a
24	facilities-based ALEC operating networks in 23 Tier 3

markets across the U.S. Right now our largest

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investment is in the State of Florida. We are currently serving customers in six cities in Florida. They are Pensacola, Tallahassee, Daytona Beach, Melbourne, Fort Myers, and Sarasota. And we have plans to make additional significant facility-based investments in Florida.

There is a need for Fresh Look in Florida.

The incumbent local exchange carriers in Florida

continue to exercise market power even as the local

exchange market has theoretically been opened to

competition through legislation and regulation.

Opening the local market in 1995 and granting a number of ALEC certificates are important steps in providing the benefits of competition to customers, but they don't guarantee the development of a competitive market. ALECs cannot offer a true competitive option in the local market the day after they receive their certificate.

Passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 didn't mean that customers could choose from among several carriers the day after the Act became law, or even a year later, for that matter. As KMC noted in its comments, both BellSouth and GTE still hold near monopoly market shares in Florida.

Since there hasn't been a flash-cut to

competition, the Commission should not assume that contracts entered into in the past several years are necessarily the product of a competitive environment. In fact, KMC's experience in its six Florida markets indicates that the ILECs still possess market power and the ability to use long-term contracts to lock up customers. KMC therefore disputes the ILECs' assertions that they formed these contracts in a competitive environment.

Further, the ILECs' assertions that we could always resell their long-term contracts also missed the mark. Even if we do resell a BellSouth customer's contract, for example, the customer really doesn't see the benefit of competition, because he's still locked into the same terms, conditions, and services for the duration of the contract just as if he never switched from BellSouth at all. Only a fresh look will give Florida consumers an adequate opportunity to take advantage of other services and providers in the local exchange market.

KMC supports the Fresh Look rule because we believe it will prove to be a necessary and effective tool in opening the Florida local exchange market to competition. However, we recommend that the rule be modified in two respects to ensure that it serves its

purpose most effectively.

First, the rule should be clarified by separately defining what constitutes an eligible contract. This separate definition would spell out clearly the kinds of services, such as advanced telecommunications services and private line services, that would fall within the Fresh Look rule. KMC also believes it important to make clear that an ILEC's tariffed term plans will be covered by the Fresh Look rule so that it is unmistakable that customers under such plans have the ability to exercise a fresh look just like customers under contract with the ILEC.

Secondly, it is likely that disputes over the extent of termination liability could undermine the effectiveness of the rule. Customers facing termination liability or disputes over how much a termination penalty they owe are going to be deferred -- deterred, excuse me, from taking advantage of a fresh look. KMC therefore believes that the Commission should revise its rule so that no termination liability will be imposed where customers exercise a fresh look.

If the Commission decides that the ILECs should be able to impose a termination liability for non-recurring investment, the Commission should

provide for a quick resolution of disputes over such a liability. A Fresh Look rule will be of little use if a customer needs to spend months fighting with the ILEC over how much he owes for taking a fresh look.

KMC therefore recommended that if the ILECs are allowed to impose some termination liability, the Commission should set up a separate dispute resolution procedure in which the ILEC bears the burden of proving the costs it wants to recover are warranted. This kind of expedited procedure would allow end users and their new carriers to ensure that disputes over termination liability won't undermine the fresh look opportunity provided by the rule.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Questions?

MS. CASWELL: I have a couple of questions.

As I understand your presentation, you believe that a Fresh Look rule is necessary because there hasn't been competition in the local exchange market. How do you define competition?

MR. DUKE: KMC would define competition as the ability to deliver facility-based solutions as envisioned by the Act. Clearly, customers have been able to avail themselves of resale of CSAs, that is,

1 assuming they sign something called a CLEC assumption 2 agreement, by which they take on all the terms and liabilities under the existing contract. 3 would say that true competition needs to be 4 5 facility-based. 6 MS. CASWELL: And have there been 7 facility-based providers providing service in some areas of the state for some time now? 8 9 MR. DUKE: There may be. I'm mostly familiar with KMC. 10 11 MS. CASWELL: Okay. Thank you. 12 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: BellSouth? 13 MR. GOGGIN: This is Michael Goggin with 14 BellSouth. 15 The first question was, when did KMC begin 16 to offer facilities-based services in Florida? 17 MR. DUKE: KMC's first city that its 18 network became operation is Melbourne, Florida, and it 19 was basically operational the first quarter of 1998. 20 MR. GOGGIN: At what time? I'm sorry. 21 MR. DUKE: I believe it was the first 22 quarter of 1998. 23 MR. GOGGIN: And prior to KMC's entry, were 24 there predecessor companies acquired by KMC that had

been offering service in Florida prior to that date?

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MR. DUKE: Yes. I believe the Melbourne 1 2 operation -- it's my understanding KMC did purchase the Melbourne operation, but I'm not sure when that 3 4 actually was. 5 MR. GOGGIN: What about KMC's operations in the other five cities? 6 7 MR. DUKE: Those were basically started. 8 Tallahassee I think became operational in September of 9 '98, and then the remaining cities in the fourth 10 quarter, or really the first quarter of 1999. MR. GOGGIN: Were those all cities in which 11 12 KMC built facilities, or did --13 MR. DUKE: Yes, yes. MR. GOGGIN: So apart from the Melbourne 14 15 operation, which apparently began to operate sometime 16 before you acquired it, the rest of them were green 17 field built? 18 MR. DUKE: That's correct. 19 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: That's it? 20 Staff? 21 MS. BROWN: KMC in its comments did mention 22 that -- on page 2 at the bottom of the first paragraph 23 and the beginning of the second paragraph that the

only service options are to take a month-to-month

service from the ILEC or service for several years

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from the ILEC at a lower rate. Do you see that? Then you talked about long-term contracts in the next paragraph. You are referring to contracts of more than one year?

MR. DUKE: Yes, generally. I would say that it's my experience right now that the majority of what I would call tariffed term plans -- and that's really what we're most familiar with, are either month to month, straight out of the tariff, or they jump to a 36-month.

MS. BROWN: Now, that's your experience from your operations and --

MR. DUKE: That's correct.

MS. BROWN: -- marketing and negotiations?

MR. DUKE: That's correct.

MS. BROWN: Okay. You spoke just a minute ago about modifying the rule to include a dispute resolution process?

MR. DUKE: Yes.

MS. BROWN: Do you have any more details on what that would involve or --

MR. DUKE: No. We would leave the details up to the Commission at their discretion. But it's just anticipating that in the current rules, that there really is no provision that should the ILEC come

back with some charges after their ten-day period in their statement of liability, that if the customer were to say that this is totally wrong, where did you get these figures, we don't see any way right now for that to be quickly resolved without there being some way to do it in an expedited procedure here at the Commission.

MS. BROWN: Okay. Thank you.

MR. ROMANO: One other thing, if I may clarify further. The attachment to KMC's initial comments contains that dispute resolution language as a proposal.

MS. BROWN: Great. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Next presenter?

MS. BROWN: Next is the pay telephone association.

MS. GREEN: Good morning, Chairman and Commissioners. Angela Green on behalf of the Florida Public Telecommunications Association.

We have not filed formal comments in this proceeding because we've been monitoring and reviewing what has been going on, and we believe overall that our interests have been very adequately represented by the able participants in this docket. However, in final review of all the things that have been filed up

to this point, a couple of things have come to light that have caused us some concern.

KMC touched on one of these issues in their comments, and that is the definitional problem with the eligible contracts. It's not clear to me in my review of what the ILECs have filed that all eligible contracts are being captured or identified by the incumbent local exchange companies. It appears that some of the participants in this docket are being very literal with their definitions, and when terms are used such as contract service arrangement, they are identifying documents that have this on the title, that say "contract service arrangement." And if the term "tariffed term plan" is being used, then if they have something in their tariff that is called that exact thing, then they have identified those contracts.

Now, I have seen something in BellSouth's contract -- in its tariff in Section A2.12 called a comprehensive discount. Now, I will gladly be corrected if I am wrong on this, but I have not seen anything identified by BellSouth in their filings related to these comprehensive discounts, and yet to me these are nothing but contract service arrangements with another name attached to them. They give

discounts of up to 7%, and that's above and beyond whatever discount might be available in the tariff otherwise, and they require a period of time. They require a commitment to keep your service with the company for that length of time, and they have termination penalties. So I don't see how those are any different than a contract service arrangement, and they appear to fall under the language in this rule, or what I believe to be the intent of the proposed rule.

There's also -- I believe that in GTE's filing, I did see the tariffed term plans identified. And I'm not an expert on everyone's tariffs, so there may be things other companies have. I'm just trying to point out what I found as some of the most obvious examples of this problem.

BellSouth also has something they're offering that I've only recently found out about that they call an MSA. What is an MSA? A master service agreement or arrangement. That appears to be a multistate discount plan with a term and volume commitment that combines basic and non-basic service, access lines, and various and sundry other types of non-basic services and combines the customer's business in multiple states. I've not seen any

evidence that any of those have been identified or filed here.

I would have loved to bring you one today to show it to you, but these contracts all require the customer to swear to confidentiality and be subject to all types of penalties if they show them to anyone. So I haven't been able to actually see one of these, but it's on my best knowledge and belief that this item does exist, and I believe it should fall under this rule. They should be identified before this proceeding is wound down and made subject to the Fresh Look.

Another type of contract that I haven't seen identified in here is for placements of pay telephones with end user customers. These are long-term contracts. They typically last five years.

I think some people would say, well, there's competition out there. Well, yes, that's true. My members have been working for 15 years fighting to combine the minority share of the market, and yet I see no evidence that the new competitive carriers have had a fair opportunity to enter that marketplace. We would welcome the opportunity for them to be able to serve the customers as well.

And in light of those -- those type of

contracts are typically for something like five years, and they have substantial termination penalties in there, and they appear to be covered under the definition or my understanding of what is meant to be encompassed here.

And as far as those particular types of contracts, some of those are going to be shielded from this Commission's purview by virtue of the fact that two local exchange companies have created separate subsidiaries and transferred those contracts that were negotiated, if you want to use that word, by the incumbent local exchange company, and have transferred those into separate subsidiaries. So if pay telephone contracts, placement contracts fall under the purview of the rule, some incumbents will be required to open theirs up, whereas others could effectively shield those.

Now, I'm not asking that those contracts that the subsidiary itself entered into be opened up, but that those that the local exchange company secured and transferred over there, that they should fall under the rule, because the other LECs that don't have separate subsidiaries will have to open theirs up.

That concludes my comments.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Any questions? There

being no questions -- do you have some? 1 2 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have a question. 3 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. COMMISSIONER CLARK: Ms. Green, tell me why 4 5 the fact that it's -- why are you taking the position that if they were transferred, they shouldn't be 6 opened up? Or maybe I misunderstood you. 7 8 MS. GREEN: If they were transferred over 9 by the incumbent local exchange company and they're 10 still in existence and they would otherwise meet this definition, those I think should be opened up. 11 12 not asking that the separate sub who has gone out on 13 its own since its creation have to open its up, 14 because presumably they did that under the same terms 15 and conditions as everyone else. But there are 16 incumbent local exchange companies in this state that 17 still refuse to allow resale of pay telephone lines 18 to competitive local exchange carriers, so there can't 19 be competition in that arena. 20 MR. REHWINKEL: Mr. Chairman, can I ask --21 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: How is that process 22 of --23 MR. REHWINKEL: Oh, I apologize. I'm 24 sorry.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: How is that process

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of -- what's happening? You said they're transferring contracts to their new -- how does this work? Could you explain what's happening? And --

MS. GREEN: Well, I'm --

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And I'm assuming the parties had to agree that someone else then -- that their contracts be transferred. Or how is that process working?

MS. GREEN: Well, two companies, BellSouth and Sprint, have created separate subsidiaries that deal only in pay telephone services. And on whatever date they picked, they just wholesale took all the LEC contracts and put them into this separate subsidiary. Now, presumably some things went on with their books, and I'm really not here to address that issue. I just feel that you've got other LECs like GTE, Alltel, they don't have those subsidiaries. And so if my view of what contracts should be opened up is adopted, you're going to have two of the largest players in this industry allowed to shield some of those contracts from a fresh look.

MR. REHWINKEL: Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Sure.

MR. REHWINKEL: Ms. Green, are you talking

about dial tone contracts, or are these location contracts for pay phone?

MS. GREEN: They are providing dial tone services.

MR. REHWINKEL: Isn't the contract you're talking about for locations for pay phones that are compensated through commission payments?

MS. GREEN: Well, I suppose if we want to get into a hypertechnical definition, we could isolate it like that. But the fact remains, Mr. Rehwinkel, your company still refuses to allow competitive local exchange companies to purchase pay telephone lines under resale so that they can go out and install pay telephones themselves. So they cannot compete with you when you will not resell your lines to them.

MR. REHWINKEL: Mr. Chairman, I think this last answer is not germane at all to the rulemaking that's before us. This is not an issue that's relevant to what the Commission has proposed.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I have a question.

Let me ask Staff, was it intended that this Fresh Look apply to pay telephone contracts?

MS. BROWN: We don't -- I don't think so.

I'm not certain of that.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. I didn't think

so either.

Ms. Green, why should it apply to pay telephone? Because it strikes me that we've had competition in pay telephones for a whole lot longer than other local service. Why should we have a Fresh Look?

MS. GREEN: Well, maybe the Fresh Look should be limited to the new competitive carriers being allowed an opportunity to compete with the incumbent on it.

The people that I represent have been working for 15 years, and they still combined do not have 50% of the market. That tells you how hard it is to break into any of these businesses when someone else is already sitting there holding all the contracts.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: That still doesn't answer my question. Why should we do it at all for pay telephones?

MS. GREEN: Well, my reason is that, as I said, for instance, Sprint will not allow resale of its pay telephone lines, so that a company who wants to compete as a local exchange carrier will either have to build facilities or they'll have to buy pay phone lines at retail rates, so they have no effective

opportunity to place pay telephones themselves. 1 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I still don't 2 understand. Are you saying competitive providers 3 cannot place pay telephones in Sprint's territory? 4 MS. GREEN: If you're trying to do -- if 5 you're trying to be a full service local exchange 6 company with a full range of services --7 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Including pay 8 telephones? 9 MS. GREEN: Yes. My point here is that --10 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm sorry. 11 I'm confused. Yes, they will resell in that situation, or 12 no, they will not resell in that situation? Your 13 answer was yes. I want to clarify what it is. 14 MS. GREEN: Well, maybe I didn't understand 15 16 the question. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I'm not trying 17 to reask the question. I'm just trying to understand 18 what your answer was. What is your understanding of 19 20 the question, and what was your answer to that question? 21 MS. GREEN: I don't know. I don't know 22 23 anymore. COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm just trying -- it 24 seems to me that the argument being made is that we 25

haven't had competition in local exchange service, significant competition that's new. We have had it in pay telephones for a long time. The fact that you don't have -- what you're suggesting is because you don't have over 50% of the market share because competitive providers don't have over 50%, then you should do Fresh Look.

MS. GREEN: Well, I mean, we've had competition in ESSX, PBX, and all that. But because they're under these long-term contracts and they have substantial cancellation penalties in them, the new entrants in the market are being deprived of an opportunity to compete with these customers.

You have to understand, Chairman Clark, these incumbent local exchange companies that you see sitting here today, they have a huge sales force outside there that is aggressively marketing to the customers that they know that the competitive carriers want. And they're offering them deals that are unbelievable, and they have substantial termination penalties, and they have confidentiality clauses in them so that we can't even see what we're out there fighting against.

MR. REHWINKEL: Commissioner -COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm still trying to

get at the notion of why we should apply this to pay telephones. We have had competition in pay telephones for I guess 15 years. Is that what you've indicated?

MS. GREEN: I would say we have had alternative carriers for 15 years, yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let's just talk about pay telephones. Why should we have Fresh Look for pay telephone contracts?

MS. GREEN: Because that's an area that the new carriers would like to get into as well.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But they've been allowed to get into it for 15 years.

MS. GREEN: If they want to be a traditional -- just a pay telephone provider, yes.

But I just submit to you that if you're trying to be a full service local exchange company, you need to be able to do all of these things and offer all of these things and have an opportunity on all of them. And I'm just not sure how you differentiate those contracts from any other type of service that the LEC is offering.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: One of the arguments that has been made with regard to the ILEC services is that there's market power, that the ILECs have market power here. I guess the thing that troubles me is

that in pay phones, do you still see that there's 1 entrenched market power by the ILECs such that any 2 entrant would face that as a substantial barrier? 3 MS. GREEN: Well, when someone is willing 4 to pay substantial up-front money of \$1,000, \$2,000, 5 \$3,000 a phone in order to secure a contract, I see 6 that as market power. When I see numbers like \$19 7 million a year in Dade County floating around, I see 8 that as market power too. 9 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Help me understand 10 how those -- how that works. What happens there? 11 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I'm sorry. Angela, 12 She threw something out there, and I was just 13 wait. curious what it was before we get by it. 14 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yes, that's what I 15 16 was asking. 17 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: When you see what in Dade 18 County? Millions of what? 19 MS. GREEN: I'm going to withdraw that 20 comment. It's not appropriate here. 21 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well, tell me what's 22 happening when ILECs exercise -- in your view, how are 23 ILECs exercising market power to restrain competition 24 in pay phones?

MS. GREEN: Well, the foremost example that

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I can give you is the issue of resale of pay telephone lines. One by one, every single incumbent has had to be beat around the head and shoulders to allow resale, including GTE had to do it as a result of a hearing in one of its arbitrations. BellSouth agreed to do it after the results of GTE's arbitration. Sprint will still not allow resale of its pay telephone lines at a discount to a competitive local exchange carrier. That's what I am focused on.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So that goes to an existing marketplace out there that you're trying to enter, as opposed to new, new --

MS. GREEN: There's a difference between being the pay telephone carrier like our guys are and being a full service, a KMC or a Supra or whoever you are. That is a totally different thing than being the guy in the van with the tool belt. And they need to be able to offer the full range of services. Yes, if they wanted to be the guy in the van with the tool belt, they could have done that, that's true.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right. Let's go -no, let's not. We're going to take a ten-minute
break, and then the next presenter will be -MS. BROWN: BellSouth.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: BellSouth. Okay. 1 (Recess from 10:35 to 10:55 a.m.) 2 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: All right. We'll start 3 up. BellSouth? 4 MS. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, if I might 5 interrupt for just a second. 6 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Sure. 7 MS. BROWN: AT&T asked me at the break if 8 they might just have a minute of the Commission's 9 time, not to make a presentation, but just to make a 10 11 little speech. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: 12 Sure. Thank you. This is Marsha Rule 13 MS. RULE: 14 with AT&T. And we have filed comments in this case, and I don't intend to reiterate them, but I would like 15 16 to say that AT&T supports the comments of FCCA. 17 to the extent that FCCA's position and comments may 18 expand upon or go further than AT&T's, we would 19 support FCCA. 20 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Thank you. Are you going 21 to ask to be excused, Ms. Rule, or are you going to --22 MS. RULE: No. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Oh, okay. Well, thank 23 24 you, Ms. Rule. 25 BellSouth.

MR. GOGGIN: Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, I'm Michael Goggin. I represent BellSouth in this matter. Ned Johnston of BellSouth is also here with me today. We would like to split our presentation. I'll spend some time at the beginning talking about the legal issues, and Mr. Johnston will address more the factual issues.

I'm sorry to say that because it's largely outside the scope of the rule, we're not in a position to address the issues that were raised by the Public Phone Association, so we'll leave that issue aside.

In reviewing the proposed rules, there's one key issue. Obviously, BellSouth has many issues with the proposed rules, including some constitutional concerns and statutory concerns, but ultimately you don't need to reach those issues.

The one key issue is, is there any justification for this? The purported justification that has been offered by all of the rule's proponents is that the contracts that would be authorized to be abrogated by this rule were all entered into at a time when there were no alternatives to ILEC service.

Now, some of the supporters of the rule have tempered that by saying there were virtually no alternatives, or just describe it generally as a

monopoly environment. But the rule as drafted would affect contracts that haven't even been entered into yet, contracts that would be signed even to the end of this year.

And in looking at contracts that were signed even before the advent of switched competition back in '80s, the Commission recognized that there were substitutes for dial tone service available to business customers. But for that competitive pressure, we would not have been authorized to offer contract service arrangements or tariffed term agreements, for example.

Before I go any further, we've distributed a list of Commission orders and a few BellSouth filings that are public documents with the Commission that we would ask that the Commission take official recognition of and that these orders be made part of the record. And we've also distributed an exhibit to Mr. Johnston's prefiled testimony that had not been distributed with the prefiled testimony that we would like to have entered into the record in this matter, and he'll address that in just a moment.

The justifications for the rule are really two, according to the proponents. One is that these contracts were entered into at a time when there was

no competition, and the other is that they represent a barrier to entry, to new entrants. Neither one of these purported justifications hold water.

There is no factual evidence that has been provided by the alternative carriers that these contracts were entered into at a time when there were no competitive alternatives available. As we've mentioned, prior to 1995, there were competitive alternatives. Admittedly, they were access line substitutes rather than switch-based service. But since Florida deregulated local exchange services in 1995 and since the Federal Telecommunications Act, the competition reports filed by the Commission demonstrate the steady growth of competition in the local exchange market, and in particular, in the local exchange market for business customers.

The business growth in this area has -CHAIRMAN GARCIA: How much is that growth?
What does that represent in percentage of the market?

MR. GOGGIN: I'm sorry?

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: What does that -- you probably have the figures better at hand than I would. What competitive growth has there been there? Let's segment it. Let's not touch residential, but just in the business market.

MR. GOGGIN: Just in the business market, the percent of access lines, the number of access lines served by alternative local exchange carriers is growing at a rate of over 300% annually.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: And what's the total rate of the market out there?

MR. GOGGIN: Well, the market is -
CHAIRMAN GARCIA: What percentage of that

market is --

MR. GOGGIN: The market is growing, that is for certain. BellSouth's number of access lines is growing by 5% a year, yet BellSouth's market share is eroding. And that is something I would like to respond to. A number of the ALECs have stated, without any proof at all whatsoever, that BellSouth has market power and continues to enjoy market power. None of them have stated what it means to have market power.

It's fairly fundamental as a rule of economics and of law that market power is defined as the ability to raise prices and restrict output.

Other courts have said that it may be the power to raise prices and exclude competition. You cannot -- courts have found, and economists agree, you cannot assume market power simply because market shares are

| high.

The more salient point to be made with market shares are, number one, that the figures that they're quoting are not accurate, because they don't include access line substitutes that would boost the share of the alternative to the ILECs. They do include residential lines, where admittedly competition is not nearly as fierce as in the business market.

And moreover, they take a static view of what market share is. The salient point to consider when you're looking at market shares or price levels or anything else is what's happening over time. If you look at the market share of the ALECs for business lines between 1997 and 1998, there was over a 300% increase in their market share. What that tells me is that there are no barriers to entry, or at least these contracts do not represent barriers to entry sufficient to keep these ALECs from growing their business.

Moreover, the presence of facilities-based

ALECs --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: A 300% increase you would say 19 what?

MR. GOGGIN: 1997 to 1998. As Mr. Johnston

will note in just a minute --

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Can you give me the concept -- I don't necessarily mean percentage, because 300%, if you had one client two years ago and you have three this year, and you have --

MR. GOGGIN: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: -- nine the year before that, that's 300%.

Unfortunately, if you're starting with this very thin sliver, it makes -- that's meaningless, 300%. So what percent of the market is today held by your competitors as opposed to you, or what percent of growth in business lines has occurred in comparison to your diminishment of the percentage of the market that you hold?

And I don't want to use residential, because it really does skew it, and I don't -- I'm not trying to skew it. I just want to get a better understanding of where you stand.

MR. GOGGIN: According to the Commission's figures, the number of business access lines in terms of share as of year-end 1998 was roughly 95% for BellSouth and 5% for its competitors in the business market.

Now, it doesn't sound like a great deal,

but when you consider that a year earlier that estimate was somewhere like 1.7% versus 98.3%, that's an astounding increase.

When you look at the markets in which facilities-based ALEC competitors were operating, virtually every exchange in BellSouth's territory that had a significant concentration of businesses to whom services could be offered was served. Many of these exchanges were served as early as 1996. Virtually all of them were served by 1997. And the numbers of ALECs serving these exchanges multiplied greatly between 1997 and 1998.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: That numbers are particularly worse in large business centers; right?

I mean, for example, in Miami-Dade or in the Orlando area, Jacksonville.

MR. GOGGIN: In Jacksonville, in Melbourne and Daytona and Orlando, all over our territory.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I'm sorry for interrupting. Go ahead.

MR. GOGGIN: That's okay.

In short, no rule proponent has submitted any evidence to demonstrate that customers had only one choice, or even only one choice of a switch-based provider, at the time that the contracts that would be

subject to this rule were entered into. There have been assertions that there was no competition, but there's no factual evidence to support it.

On the question of whether these contracts are barriers to entry, the evidence is even weaker. When you consider the growth in ALEC business lines, it's pretty clear that these contracts do not represent barriers to entry. When you consider the makeup of the contracts that would be subject to this rule, it's pretty clear that it's not a barrier to entry. The majority of these contracts, the bulk of them were entered into after January 1, 1997.

As Mr. Johnston will note in a minute, if the rule were to go into effect, say, July 1st, based on contracts that BellSouth has now, roughly half of them would have expired by the end of year 2000. It hardly seems that these people are captive to BellSouth in a manner that prevents ALECs from marketing services to them.

Moreover, BellSouth has a number of customers who purchase additional services from other carriers. And although much has been made about the inadequacies of resale as a form of competition, it does permit ALECs to establish a relationship with the customer, to provide customer service to the customer,

to increase their brand presence, and to identify during the remaining term of the resold contract what those customers' needs are and how the ALEC can best serve those needs. So it's far from an ineffective form of competition.

The most telling remark made in the comments about the inadequacies of resale were in KMC's comments, where they said that one of the reasons why resale was inadequate is because BellSouth would still get revenues. That's really what the ALECs are going for here. They're not looking for an opportunity. They're looking for a handout. There's a difference.

MS. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, the time is passing.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I understand, but I took a significant portion of that time with my probably irrelevant questions. Go right ahead.

MR. GOGGIN: I will quickly finish.

ALECs also, at least a couple of them, KMC and AT&T in particular, have indicated that they do not view long-term agreements as barriers per se.

Time Warner said that they offer long-term contracts subject to termination liability and have been doing so since 1997.

It's unclear to us why a contract signed by BellSouth in 1998 for, say, a three-year term subject to termination liability is a barrier to entry, when a contract signed by Time Warner, or KMC, or any of the other competitors who have been in this market, for a three-year term subject to termination liability does not represent a barrier to entry. No one has been able to explain why that is so.

The unspoken premise is that it's a barrier to entry because that person, the BellSouth customer, signed the contract at a time when there was no competition. As we stated before, there's no evidence to support that.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Let me ask you just sort of a hypothetical. If this rule applied to everyone, how would you feel about that rule?

MR. GOGGIN: Well, we would certainly -- we would be no more in favor of it than we are now. We believe that the rule does have serious constitutional issues attached. We believe there are serious questions about whether the Commission has the statutory authority to enter into it.

Moreover, we think that the Legislature's intent in deregulating telecommunications was to establish a market for telecommunications service

where market forces would determine, for example, how long a term a contract should be offered and what terms in terms of termination liability should be offered.

You see in the wireless market that termination liability is not offered -- is not part of many carriers' offerings. The same sort of competitive alternatives will and have been occurring in this market.

The reason why we would oppose a rule that applied to everybody is that it would shake the confidence of carriers and customers that their expectations when they strike a deal, that -- for example, that Time Warner can rely on the revenues that it has contracted for, or that BellSouth can rely on the revenues that it has contracted for. It would end up in a situation where contracts basically do not have much meaning anymore.

On the other hand, if a rule were to be passed and were to be found valid as a valid exercise of statutory authority and not violate -- didn't violate the Constitution in any manner, we would certainly favor a rule that applied equally to everybody. We think that it's disingenuous for the ALECs to say that they want a rule that is carrier

neutral, when in fact the rule would only apply to ILECs.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

MR. GOGGIN: I'm sorry. I would like to turn it over at this time to Mr. Johnston.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Mr. Johnston, you have five minutes.

MR. JOHNSTON: Thank you, Commissioner.

I just would like to reiterate that competition in this market segment -- and you hit it on the head, Commissioner, it is large businesses.

Not 6 million access lines in BellSouth's case. It's about 1.2 million that are BellSouth access lines in the segment of medium and large size businesses.

Competition in that market segment has been around for a very long time in a lot of different forms, mainly in the form of substitutes, as Michael said. You've had competition since the 1970s for Centrex and ESSX, private line since the '80s. And the Commission has recognized this in several orders, for example, in the initial access charge order that it issued in Docket 820537-TP, Order No. 12765. And I quote from that order, "We believe that the ability to contract or use bulk rate discounts with customers will allow the LECs greater flexibility in dealing

with market situations and should be permitted in order for LECs to remain viable in a competitive environment."

Subsequent orders issued in there have been passed out and are part of the record, but basically they enhanced our position to compete through the use of contract service arrangements.

As competition continued to evolve, we have come to the point where today you have a proceeding where the market is most competitive in the large business segment. You found that in your 271 proceeding order, and that was Order No. 960786-TL -- or Docket No., I'm sorry, 960786-TL, Order No. PSC-97-1459-FOF-TL. I'm quoting, "Based on the evidence in this proceeding, we find that there are ALECs operating in Florida. These ALECs are providing a commercial alternative to local exchange business subscribers, thereby satisfying the phrase 'competing provider' contained in the Act and recently defined by the FCC in the Ameritech order."

The type of contracts that are involved here we have entered into in good faith with our customers. Certainly in the last four years, maybe even longer, the marketing efforts of the ALECs have been pronounced. They may have cut over some of their

central offices or started actually providing service to customers in the '97, '98 time frame, but their sales force was out long before that, because they had to assemble the critical mass in order to make the investment to do it. So the customers have been aware of these folks for a very long period of time, at least in the telecommunications world.

The exhibits passed out to my testimony show -- lend basically evidence that our contracts all do expire. They are not excessively long. They're averaging around 36 to 37 months in length. So they do expire, as my testimony said, about one-third every year.

Therefore, we would like to keep the good faith efforts that we've gone into with our customers. And again, I can't repeat enough, this is large business. The customers are sophisticated. They know what they're doing. These ALECs have had no problem going in there and selling, in addition to our contracts, supplementing services. In some cases the customers have gone ahead and taken it out and paid the penalty and gone with the ALECs. We don't see any issue market wise that they're inhibited in any way. They're all over the place, they're very active, but they're all going after the same large business

segment. So this would be a -- I don't think an appropriate use of the rulemaking proceedings.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Don't you think -
I'm sorry. Don't you think that argument cuts both

ways? These sophisticated customers would be very

capable of understanding what these companies have to

offer in making a decision whether or not to --

MR. JOHNSTON: Oh, I agree. But they've been in that decision-making mode for the last three years, and so they've been able -- by virtue of the fact that these folks have been out there, they've been able to make decisions. In a lot of cases, they've made the decision for the ALEC. In a lot of other cases, they've made the decision for us. So that decision-making process has been going on quite a bit longer than the ALECs are representing, and that's all I'm trying to convey.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Okay.

MR. JOHNSTON: But basically it's our position that there is no need -- because of the market they're going after, and the sophistication of the customers, and the length of time they've been there, there's no need for the Commission to promote competition further, because it's already there, through this Fresh Look rule.

Thank you.

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MR. DUNBAR: Mr. Chairman, if I could, I think I have one clarifying question for Mr. Goggin and one for Mr. Johnston.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Go ahead.

MR. DUNBAR: Mr. Goggin, the 300%, can we clarify that? Are we talking about the 1998 December PSC report where we go from .5 to 1.8? Is that the 300% that you're referring to?

MR. GOGGIN: No. We're talking about the December 1998 report where business access lines go from 1.7% to 4.5%.

MR. DUNBAR: And for Mr. Johnston,
Mr. Johnston, you made reference to an Ameritech
order. What is that? Could you be more specific?

MR. JOHNSTON: I have not seen the Ameritech order and can't be more specific. The only reason that I was referencing this particular part of the 271 order was because it acknowledged that competition exists in the marketplace here.

MR. GOGGIN: If I might help out, I believe this Commission was referring to an order of the Federal Communications Commission reviewing a 271 application that had been filed with the FCC by Ameritech. And the Commission's order is in the list

of orders here.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: BellSouth's counsel will get that information to us so that we have the right reference.

MR. GOGGIN: There's also a jump cite in our comments to the Commission.

MR. DUNBAR: Yes. I'm just trying to orient myself as to what -- so the Ameritech order you're citing is on the list you handed out?

MR. GOGGIN: No. The Ameritech order was referred to by this Commission in the order that was cited by us. The order that's cited by us is a 271 application submitted by BellSouth to this Commission. In this Commission's order, this Commission referred to a definition from an FCC order that involved an Ameritech application. If you read the 271 case, the order of this Commission, you will see that cite in that order.

MR. DUNBAR: Okay. And maybe Mr. Johnston could tell me why he cited it, for what point then.

I'm just trying to get some clarification.

MR. JOHNSTON: Simply to show that it was a finding of this Commission that competition did exist.

MR. GOGGIN: He was not citing the Ameritech order. He was citing the order of this

Commission, a finding, a factual finding of this 1 Commission. 2 Right. MR. JOHNSTON: 3 MR. DUNBAR: So we don't rely on the Ameritech order for any purpose? 5 MR. GOGGIN: No, we're relying on the order 6 of this Commission. 7 MR. DUNBAR: Thank you. 8 That's it? CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. 9 10 MR. ROMANO: If I may have a few questions for -- first for Mr. Goggin. You had referenced --11 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Can you identify 12 1.3 yourself? MR. ROMANO: Oh, certainly. Michael Romano 14 15 for KMC Telecom. Mr. Goggin, you referred to the 95% and 16 4.5% market share figures from the report. Do those 17 figures include ALEC lines provided through resale? 18 19 MR. GOGGIN: Yes, they did. MR. ROMANO: And do they also include what 20 I think you called access line substitutes, such as --21 22 well, do they include the access line substitutes as well? 23 MR. GOGGIN: I don't believe they do, no. 24 25 They refer to access lines of ALECs compared against

access lines of ILECs. And PBX vendors, for example, would not be necessarily considered an ALEC.

MR. ROMANO: Okay. And then I think,
Mr. Johnston, you may have referred to some discussion
of -- or, actually, this may have been Mr. Goggin
talking about alternative carriers and whether the
rule may apply to alternative carriers as well. I
think there was some discussion of that.

MR. GOGGIN: Uh-huh.

MR. ROMANO: Isn't it true that by
definition, an alternative carrier would always
provide service or contract for service where a
customer has at least two service alternatives?

MR. GOGGIN: I'm sorry. I'm not following
that.

MR. ROMANO: I mean, if you're an alternative carrier, isn't that by definition, by being alternative, the customer has at least two service options when choosing an alternative carrier or BellSouth? By definition, alternative carrier would always be in a market where there is an alternative and an incumbent; correct?

MR. GOGGIN: It depends on how you define carrier. I mean, if you -- I think that the proper way to look at it is, is there a provider of some

product or service that represents a substitute to the switched service that BellSouth offers. With that definition, yes, if there's somebody that offers a service or product that would be a substitute for what we're offering, we would say yes, that customer had at least one competitive choice.

It's not our position that customers had only two choices, although certainly that would not necessarily preclude a finding that there were competitive alternatives if only one alternative existed.

I also -- if I may, I think I misspoke earlier. The 300% increase in market share statistics are actually based on 1998 -- I'm sorry, 1997 figures in the business market of 1.4% and 1998 figures of 4.3%. I think I said 1.7 and 4.5.

MR. ROMANO: And Mr. Johnston, I think you had spoken about customers being aware of competitive service alternatives.

MR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

MR. ROMANO: Under your understanding of competition, is awareness sufficient competition?

MR. JOHNSTON: It gets the ball rolling in terms of our having to respond competitively, because the minute the customer is aware of competitive

alternatives, the negotiation process is quite different from when a customer does not perceive that he has any alternatives.

Now, in Florida, as we've mentioned, customers have perceived alternatives for a long time. What I was trying to say in that particular statement was that the marketing efforts for the ALECs started long before the physical plant efforts in some cases, and therefore, customers were receiving proposals prior to the fact that the plant may have been deployed. Although I would never infer that they didn't have approval to do that from this Commission, a lot of times they did sell before the plant was deployed to the customer.

MR. ROMANO: So a customer that happens to see an advertisement in one paper, but the advertisement doesn't actually pertain to service being provided in his or her area, or if the customer reads about the State of Florida having enacted a law to open the market to competition, in your mind, that's -- in your opinion, is that sufficient?

MR. JOHNSTON: Well, that's not what we're facing. What we're facing is a situation where actual competitive proposals are given to customers, where competitive salesmen visit customers. They tell them

that the law has passed, possibly. They tell them in fact that this docket is going on. And we've had that situation out in the marketplace.

The marketplace for large business is very, very active. Sales forces for all these ALECs are out there. They are very busy. They are seeing customers all over the place.

I don't think this is particularly exclusive to BellSouth. I think that's happening pretty much all over the state, particularly in the urban areas, and particularly for large businesses.

MR. ROMANO: Okay. One final question.

You had referred to the sophistication of customers.

MR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

MR. ROMANO: Would you agree that a sophisticated customer that has no choice for service but BellSouth would sign a long-term contract rather than taking month-to-month service because of the lower rates?

MR. JOHNSTON: I've hardly ever seen a customer that had absolutely no choice, except in certain situations where dial tone was concerned and contracts for that type of dial tone -- and I'm saying individual flat business lines and PBX trunks are not tariffed. They're not tariffed contracts at all. So

you don't have a situation where contracts were offered if you had absolutely no competition. You may have had substitutes for the service, and that was when we started developing tariffed contract alternatives.

MR. ROMANO: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Any other questions?

MS. BROWN: Staff has just a couple, one
for Mr. Goggin and a couple for Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Goggin, you said that Bell's position is that the Commission doesn't have any statutory authority to issue these rules. Are you considering the Florida Statutes or the federal statutes when you say that?

MR. GOGGIN: We base that on our reading of the Florida Statutes.

MS. BROWN: All right.

MR. GOGGIN: In particular, 364.051, which exempted carriers that are subject to price regulation from a number of requirements that would otherwise apply to them. We recognize that there are statutory provisions that give the Commission the right to review our contracts, but we don't think that the statutory authority to modify contracts that have been previously approved, at least in principal, and have

been entered into, that the statutory authority exists to authorize the abrogation of those agreements after the parties have begun to perform based on the promises they have exchanged.

MS. BROWN: Right. Thanks.

Mr. Johnston, how long-- what would you consider to be a long-term contract?

MR. JOHNSTON: A long-term contract in my opinion would be anything over 18 months, 24 months. Most of our contracts don't start until -- they start with a 24-month premise and then go longer than that. We have a very, very few cases where we've done shorter than that, but it's not the norm.

MS. BROWN: Over 18 months?

MR. JOHNSTON: Yes, ma'am.

MS. BROWN: That opinion is somewhat different than has been expressed here earlier. The consensus really is anything over a year so far. How do you explain the difference?

MR. JOHNSTON: If it's under a year, we don't go into contract on it at all. So, I mean, it's just a matter of semantics. What we would define as a term of contract might be different from someone else's.

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MS. BROWN: Well, I understand that. We're

trying to get a handle on what contracts we should focus on in this rule, and that's why I asked you the question.

MR. JOHNSTON: Sure.

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MS. BROWN: In your response to the Staff's data request, the April 29th response -- do you have that with you? We can bring you --

> MR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

> MS. BROWN: You do?

MR. JOHNSTON: Yes.

MS. BROWN: Okay. And for the Commissioners' convenience, it's in Volume 2 of the composite exhibit. It's the BellSouth Tab 1 near the end.

Items 3 and 4 we're interested in here. They are matrices that show BellSouth's outstanding contracts.

Would you agree with me that based on the information contained in those matrices -- am I going too fast? I can wait a minute.

MR. JOHNSTON: I'm there now. Thank you.

MS. BROWN: Okay. Would you agree that those matrices seem to show that there has been a dramatic increase in both CSAs and tariffed term plans since 1997?

MR. JOHNSTON: Yes, I would agree to that.

MS. BROWN: Okay. Why is that?

MR. JOHNSTON: The way our CSA tariffs are written and the way the orders have come to us from the Commission on CSAs, you can only have CSAs in a competitive situation. So, yes, we have identified a large, much larger number of competitive situations in the last couple of years than we did before, and I think that lays down with everything that has been heard here. Tariffed contracts are also a response to competitive situations. Sometimes you don't need a special CSA in order to provide a viable alternative to the customer and win the business, so that would also be the case with the tariffed contracts.

MS. BROWN: Okay. Now, I just want to ask you a couple of questions about some matters that Ms. Green brought up. I realize Mr. Goggin didn't want to address too much, but the first part of what Ms. Green said concerned the definition of what would be an eligible contract pursuant to the rule. It seems to me that's fairly relevant for purposes of our discussion here.

I would like you to respond to some of the things Ms. Green said. She was taking about the MSAs, the master service agreements, and she was also

talking about the tariffed A2.12 comprehensive discount plans.

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Can you respond to what she said? Her premise was that they should be included in our definition of what would be an eligible contract.

MR. JOHNSTON: Okay. I'll start with MSA stands for master service agreement, and MSAs. what it is is a -- the document itself simply allows the customer to place orders for a variety of services with us that are under contract with us without signing another document. It's simply a vehicle by which the customer is able to order without signing our particular document. He can order via E-mail, he can order via fax, he can order any way that's convenient for him. But what that MSA covers is a CSA for a variety of services. So it would be basically a multi-service CSA, which we call a volume and term It could be more than one state in origin, but the agreements are set up state by state to conform to various and sundry state statutes and Commission rules.

MS. BROWN: So any CSA that the MSA covers would be eligible under the terms of this rule; is that correct?

MR. JOHNSTON: We've identified all the

MSA-covered CSAs and included them in the data that we provided to you, to the extent that they're defined in this rule, yes.

MS. BROWN: Okay. What about the A2-2 comprehensive discount plans?

MR. JOHNSTON: It would be nice to have the tariff in front of me so that I make sure that I'm reading, but basically what A2.12 gives you are different types of payment arrangements and credit allowances, including tariffed contract term plans and what the penalties are if you disconnect, and a lot of the generic language on what that is. So to the extent that those tariffed payment plans are involved in that language, they are also in the data that was provided to you.

MS. BROWN: Okay. All right. Are there any other similar contracts that you have not included that you can think of that might be subject to a definition of eligible contracts for purposes of this rule?

MR. JOHNSTON: Based often our reading of the rule, we saw that it covered ESSX, Centrex, MultiServ, basic and primary rate ISDN.

MS. BROWN: Okay.

MR. JOHNSTON: That's how we define it.

primary rate ISDN. That's how we define it.

MS. BROWN: Thank you very much.

MR. JOHNSTON: You're welcome.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. That does it.

MS. BROWN: We have GTE and Sprint.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

MS. CASWELL: I have about five minutes, and then I'll turn it over to Mr. Dave Robinson.

Today the Commission has heard testimony mostly about policy, telling you why you should or shouldn't adopt a Fresh Look rule, but the Commission should keep in mind that the proposed rule raises legal questions as well. And it's the answers to these questions that will tell you whether you can or can't adopt a Fresh Look rule.

GTE will address the legal issues in detail in its post-hearing comments, but I think it's worthwhile to point out two of the biggest concerns at the outset to avoid losing sight of the critical importance of the legal concerns in this docket.

First, the U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. As the Florida Supreme Court has pointed out in a case involving this agency, a state regulatory agency cannot modify or abrogate private

contracts unless such action is necessary to, quote, protect the public interest. To modify private contracts in the absence of such, quote, public necessity constitutes a violation of the impairment of contracts clause of the United States Constitution.

The Fresh Look rule can't meet this high standard. There is no public interest that needs protecting in this case. Fresh Look would apply to valid and lawful contracts. These contracts were executed by large businesses to secure advantageous rates or conditions not available to smaller customers. There has been no finding that the termination provisions in these contracts are unconscionable or excessive. There is no public interest harm in allowing these contracts to finish out, and no public necessity to modify them. Doing so, we submit, will violate the contracts clause.

But before we even reach the constitutional questions, there's a state-specific question of whether you have the statutory authority to adopt a Fresh Look rule. As you know, your authority comes from the Legislature. The courts have held that if there's a reasonable doubt as to the existence of a particular power being exercised, the exercise of that power should be arrested.

There's more than a reasonable doubt here.

Nothing in Chapter 364 gives the Commission the authority to abrogate contracts. In fact, any Commission finding that the contracts at issue are contrary to the public interest would directly conflict with the Legislature's own actions.

In 1995, as you know, Chapter 364 was revised to allow full local competition. But the Legislature did not take this step without first giving the LECs the flexibility to meet the increased competition. It specifically directed that nothing shall prevent the ILEC from meeting competitive offerings by deaveraging non-basic service prices, packaging basic and non-basic services together, using volume and term discounts, and offering individual contracts.

This specific approval of volume and term discounts and contract authority did not appear in the previous version of the statute. It was instead part of a new and carefully considered scheme in which the ILECs would give up their exclusive franchises, but not without gaining in return greater flexibility to meet competitive challenges. The Legislature did not place any constraints on the contract or discount authority of the LECs. It did not prohibit long-term

contracts. It did not say contracts could not be used until there was a certain level of competition in a particular area.

The Legislature could have done these things. In fact, it knew precisely how to condition competitive flexibility on the level of competition in a market.

Before Chapter 364 was changed in 1995, it contained language that LECs could be granted pricing flexibility where the Commission determined a particular service was, quote, effectively competitive. And that was the old Section 364.338.

In making this determination, the Commission was told to evaluate, among other things, the ability of consumers to obtain equivalent services and the ability of competitors to make equivalent services available at competitive rates, terms, and conditions.

All of this language was eliminated in 1995. The CLECs, however, act as if it's still there. They argue that the local exchange market is not now and was not, quote, effectively competitive, whatever that means, when the ILECs executed contracts with big customers. They want the Commission to do exactly the kind of analysis it was charged with under

the old statute. But that's not what the Legislature intended. It removed that language. It explicitly confirmed that the ILECs had contract authority and declined to attach any conditions to this authority. Tying contract or term plan authority to the existence of a certain level of competition in the local exchange market would directly contravene the statutory scheme.

A number of other commissions have rejected fresh look rules for legal or policy reasons, or both. As the North Carolina Commission observed when it dismissed a fresh look petition for lack of jurisdiction, "Congress, the FCC, and the State Legislature have each had the opportunity to impose fresh look requirements in the context of implementing local competition, but none have elected to do so."

Likewise, GTE urges you to vote against the Fresh Look rule here.

We have about a five-minute presentation by Mr. Robinson at this point focusing on policy issues.

Thank you.

MR. ROBINSON: Good morning. I'm Dave
Robinson, GTE Service Corporation. I'm the Manager of
Regulatory Planning and Policy, and I'm located in
Irving, Texas.

GTE believes that there's no need for a Fresh Look rule in Florida. Fresh Look will benefit the very same group of consumers that has had the most competitive options for quite some time, large business customers mostly in metropolitan areas.

These sophisticated customers are well able to protect their own financial interests. They would have reasonably been aware that local competition was expanding in 1995 when the Florida Legislature opened the local exchange, and certainly in 1996 when the federal act was adopted. They were able to factor into their contract negotiations potential competitive changes, just as they factored in a host of other things, including possible technological change. This Commission has no responsibility to assure that these large customers get the best possible deal.

As I said in my testimony, and as the Staff agrees, the issue here is not how many competitive alternatives were available to customers at some point, but rather, whether these customers knew those alternatives were on the horizon.

Even so, the Commission should not accept the ALECs' premise that these customers have not had and still do not have a choice of providers. There are over 270 certified -- certificated carriers in

Florida. GTE has signed 110 interconnection agreements with the ALECs. ALECs have made significant inroads in the business market. In some exchanges, they have up to 14% of the business access lines. ALECs are making much greater inroads into the local market than the IXCs made in the toll market after divestiture. Nationally, they are adding more business lines than the ILECs.

There is no reason to think this trend will be particularly pronounced -- will not be particularly pronounced in Florida, where business markets are rapidly expanding. Indeed, as the BellSouth witness explained to us, the CLECs have tripled their access line gains in just one year from '97 to '98.

The CLECs, many of which are affiliated with huge, well-financed corporations, have made these substantial strides in the absence of Fresh Look.

They will continue to do so without it, especially since they can already resell the ILECs' contracts.

If, despite all these facts, the Commission believes that a Fresh Look rule is still necessary, it must reasonably be tailored for that purpose. Staff's proposed rule, and certainly the CLECs' suggested revisions, go far beyond anything that has been

adopted anywhere. In this regard, it is worth noting that fresh look has not been popular among the states. Many states have rejected completely on legal or policy grounds those proposals.

Careful examination of the CLECs' pleadings here reveal only two states that have adopted any fresh look rules in the local exchange market, and even then, they were much more limited than anything proposed here. Indeed, in all of the rules of which I'm aware in both the state and the federal jurisdictions, the Fresh Look windows are much shorter, measured in terms of days and not years, and termination liability is based on repricing the contract to the shorter term the customer actually took.

If the Commission feels compelled to adopt any Fresh Look rule, then there are three aspects that need to be revised.

First, the contract eligibility cutoff date should be no later than February of 1996, when the Telecommunications Act was passed. By then, large business customers certainly would have known of the advent of competition, if not the competitive alternatives themselves. Indeed, CLECs started to be certified or certificated here in Florida as early as

1995, even before the January 1996 opening of the local exchange.

Since then, the number of CLECs has grown, as I've mentioned, to 270. These 270 firms are either operating or preparing business plans to begin operations.

Given the existence of these competitors, along with the flood of information for years about competitive changes in the industry, the year 2000 is plainly unreasonable as a cutoff date for eligibility of contracts for Fresh Look.

The second change that needs to be made in the Fresh Look window is the Fresh Look window. Staff has proposed two years. This is longer than any Fresh Look window I've ever seen in any context. Usually the assumption, and I think it's a correct one, is that competitors will capture customers in the first few months, if at all.

Even if one were to assume, albeit incorrectly, that big customers could not have known about competitive alternatives until 2000, they do not need a period as long as two years to educate themselves and to initiate the contract termination process if they wish to do so. Four to six months should be the outside for any Fresh Look window. Six

months is the longest I've ever seen.

The third necessary revision to the Staff's rule is that the ILECs must have the right to reprice contracts to recognize that the customer exercising Fresh Look is taking a term length shorter than that for which they had originally contracted. That is, the customer would pay the difference in rates between the term he actually took and the longer term he originally agreed to. This is the measure of termination liability that the FCC has used in its limited Fresh Look rules and the measures I've seen everywhere states have implemented Fresh Look for any purpose.

Contract repricing puts the ILEC back in the position it would have held if the customer had originally taken a shorter term contract. It recognizes that a shorter contract will usually be priced higher than a longer one and that the customer has already received benefits under the contract up until the point he decides to terminate it.

Contract repricing will, moreover, be easier, less costly, and less contentious to administer than the NRC recovery scheme the Staff proposes. For example, the question of identifying and recovering certain non-recurring costs, which

obviously would differ for each contract and customer, would not be an issue under this method.

In summary, GTE urges the Commission not to adopt any Fresh Look rule, and if it does adopt a rule, it should be modified as I've proposed.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Ouestions?

MR. DUNBAR: Mr. Chairman, I have three brief ones for Ms. Caswell.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: You're not on.

MR. DUNBAR: Thank you.

Ms. Caswell, let me see if I can clarify a couple of points that you raised. In addressing the contract clause issue and your statement on public interest, is it GTE's position that there is no statement in Chapter 364 concerning whether or not competition is in the public interest? Is it GTE's position that that is not in the statute?

MS. CASWELL: No, it's not.

MR. DUNBAR: So we do agree that it is a clear statement of public policy in Florida that competition is in the public interest?

MS. CASWELL: Yes, but I think my point is that there's no public interest to be protected here, and there's no public necessity for such a rule.

Going back to Mr. Goggin's remarks, there have been no facts here adduced that tell us that there has been no competition and that there's no competition now. In fact, an AT&T witness testified recently in Ohio, and before that in Illinois, that competition was a meaningful choice between two providers. That's competition from the customer's perspective. So if that's the case, there has been competition for quite some time, and it's here now. Thus, there's no need for a Fresh Look rule. There's no public necessity. There's no public interest to be protected, particularly when these consumers can well protect their own interests. They knew competition was coming, if not already there, when they executed these contracts.

MR. DUNBAR: So GTE's position would be that we knew all the rules of competition well before the United States Supreme Court ruled in January of this year where the jurisdictional lines lay? I mean, we were all able to intelligently guess at that time? Is that GTE's position?

MS. CASWELL: I'm not sure I understand your question or how it relates to anything I've said.

MR. DUNBAR: Well, you talked extensively about the composition of competition, how it works,

what it should be, what people should know. And my observation is that all of us have just recently received the benefit of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in January of this year as to where the jurisdictional lines fall and how they will be implemented. But GTE does not agree with that?

MS. CASWELL: No, because even before that decision, you had interconnection contracts executed. You had those after the Telecoms Act of 1996, and you had them even before, because there were state statutes, interconnection statutes when the Legislature made the revisions in 1995. So to say you're just getting the benefits of competition now because of that January decision would not be correct. And in fact, the FCC hasn't even come up with rules in response to that decision.

So, I mean, if you're tying somehow competition and level of competition to that January decision, I completely disagree.

MR. DUNBAR: Oh, I'm not asking you to agree or disagree.

MS. CASWELL: Okay.

MR. DUNBAR: I just wanted to see if you acknowledge that order.

And finally, I wonder if you and I could

both agree -- you went through a number of things that are not contained in Florida's telecommunications act. But could you and I both agree that 364.19 provides that the Commission may regulate by reasonable rules the terms of telecommunications service contracts between the telecommunications companies and its patrons?

MS. CASWELL: Absolutely. But we don't interpret that to mean the Commission can cancel the contracts or even that it can modify an existing contract. And I think the interpretation that you're advancing has never been set forth either by this Commission or any court.

MR. DUNBAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Ms. Caswell, you stated in your opening remarks that the FCC, Congress, and at least the State of North Carolina --

MS. CASWELL: As well as this state have never --

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: North Carolina affirmatively, their Commission affirmatively rejected the notion of Fresh Look?

MS. CASWELL: Yes, they did, because they decided that the state statute didn't give them the

jurisdiction to do it, and they pointed to things similar to what I'm pointing to now. They said their Commission doesn't even approve these contracts. We don't approve them either. And their statute gave the companies the authority to do contracts, just as our statute gives us the authority to do those contracts. So that order was very similar to -- well, that situation there was very similar to the situation here.

Other states when they've rejected it have looked at both constitutional and statutory concerns.

North Carolina happened to dismiss it under the statute before even having to get into constitutional stuff. I think that was the case.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Have any states adopted a similar rule?

MS. CASWELL: I think that Ohio -- well, the CLECs have cited some of the states, but I think there are only two. Ohio is one of them. I think the rule was adopted probably in 1997 or thereabouts.

But we've got to realize that when we look at any of these rules, all of them are more reasonable than anything that has been proposed here. Ohio, for instance, I think is a 180-day Fresh Look window, and it does contain the contract repricing that we've

talked about. Everything, every rule I've seen at the federal and state level have included sorter windows, windows measured in terms of days, not years. And that's true of the FCC expanded interconnect order that Ms. Marek mentioned before. That was a 180-day window, it was for contracts three years or longer, and it included contract repricing.

The only other state I think they've mentioned is New Hampshire. I was not able to find the New Hampshire order. I can't speak to the rules, but I suspect from the way that their comments were worded that they're nowhere near as extensive as anything that's proposed here.

So again, we've got windows -- that's in the local exchange context. Those are the only two that have been cited. Those are the only two I'm aware of. You have had other contexts like the expanded interconnection. In some states like -- you know, they've cited settlement agreements where, you know, companies agree to like a 120-day window or something in an intraLATA market. As far as local exchange, they're not popular.

And even when they have been imposed in other contexts, there are no Fresh Look windows I've seen that approach two years. They're six months,

they're three months, they're four months. They're long contracts, and they always include repricing so that the LEC gets compensation appropriate to the term that the customer actually took.

You know, that's only fair, and that has been recognized by the FCC and other commissions, that if you do anything else, you're going to have a taking, and you're going to have unfairness to the LEC. I mean, the point of the rule shouldn't be that it's punitive. It should put the LEC back in the position it would have been in if the customer had originally taken the shorter contract.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: And when the FCC looked at the issue, it was in the context of the expanded interconnection.

MS. CASWELL: Expanded interconnection for special access. I think that was back in 1992. And then you had -- and I think Ms. Marek mentioned this as well. You had a state proceeding, intrastate expanded interconnect proceeding. And since the FCC had adopted a Fresh Look there, most states followed suit, and they did their own Fresh Look rules. I think did you the same thing, but again, I think you followed the FCC's guidelines there for the Fresh Look window for repricing. I would have to go back and

look at that, but my understanding is that most states did it because the FCC did it, and you couldn't very well have different rules in the two states.

Oh, I have the New Hampshire rule. It's a

on, I have the New Hampshire rule. It's a 180-day Fresh Look opportunity, so that's consistent with all of the other instances I've cited and the one other Fresh Look rule that I know of in the local exchange context.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Do you know if they were challenged at all on the constitutional grounds or the status of those rules?

MS. CASWELL: In Ohio or New Hampshire?
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Uh-huh.

MS. CASWELL: I do not know that. I would have to find it out.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Well, actually, when did those rules go into effect? Maybe we --

MS. CASWELL: New Hampshire was ordered by the PSC on December 8, 1997. I think Ohio was 1997 as well. I have it here somewhere. I don't want to hold you up. I can --

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Or maybe you can -MS. CASWELL: -- give it to you later.
COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: You can give it to

25 | us later.

1 MS. CASWELL: I think it was 1997 as well. 2 There's nothing been --3 MR. ROBINSON: July 17th. 4 MS. CASWELL: I'm sorry? 5 MR. ROBINSON: July 17th. 6 MS. CASWELL: July 17th, 1997? 7 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 8 MS. CASWELL: Okay. Thank you. 9 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: But, Ms. Caswell, 10 you're still saying, though, even if we did the 11 shorter time period and did the repricing stuff that 12 you suggested, that we would still have the constitutional problem? 13 14 MS. CASWELL: Yes, you very well might. Ι 15 think the constitutional analysis looks at 16 reasonableness. 17 COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Okay. 18 MS. CASWELL: And in that regard, you might 19 be a little better protected, but I don't know that 20 you get rid of all the constitutional issues. 21 would depend on the date, I think, that you proposed. 22 As you know, the Staff proposed a 1997 date initially, 23 and under that scheme, you might be a little better 24 off legally than proposing a 2000 date with no

evidence of no competition until that date.

COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: Thank you.

MR. ROMANO: If I may ask a few questions.

Mike Romano for KMC.

Ms. Caswell, are you aware of whether the Ohio Commission's 180-day window triggered immediately upon the rule's effective date?

MS. CASWELL: No. I think it depended on when -- let's see, an interconnection contract was probably executed, and maybe even if the competitor was taking something out of it. But even if you use that standard, it's going to be most of the big exchanges here, and, you know, it's not going to make much of a difference in practical terms. If we use that in Florida, it would still be, you know, better, because it would recognize that competition has been in at least the larger exchanges for quite some time.

MR. ROMANO: Okay. But that -- you're saying then that that would allow the Commission -- that sort of a 180-day window which would be measured by an interconnection agreement or a first call terminated, I think may have been the measure.

MS. CASWELL: Uh-huh.

MR. ROMANO: That would allow you to tell when any facilities-based competitor had started using an interconnection or completed a call, and thereby

tell when competition existed in an exchange? Is that what --

MS. CASWELL: No, I'm not saying it would tell when competition existed. I'm not sure I would agree with you on that. But I am saying that, you know, the Ohio measure, even if we used it here, I don't know if it would make much practical difference, because you would still have a trigger date that was somewhere, you know, certainly sooner than 2000 in most of the exchanges we're talking about where there are big contracts.

MR. ROMANO: I have one question for Mr. Robinson as well.

You've referenced I think 250 ALEC certifications and some amount of interconnection agreements that have been signed. Isn't the real measure of competition how many of those agreements are in fact operational and how many of those certificates people are actually providing service under?

MR. ROBINSON: Well, I don't believe so. I disagree. I think that just by having certification means that if you have a business plan and you are trying to acquire customers -- just as they pointed out earlier, you might be acquiring customers prior to

1	even having your plant in service or having a customer
2	gained. But the minute you get one, you will probably
3	operate, so, no. And of the 100 interconnection
4	agreements that GTE has entered into, 55 of them are
5	operational.
6	MR. ROMANO: Is that on facilities-based or
7	resale?
8	MR. ROBINSON: Facilities.
9	MR. ROMANO: All 55 of them. Okay. Thank
10	you.
11	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Ms. Kaufman, any
12	questions?
13	MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
14	Mr. Robinson, can you tell us, what is the
15	typical length of one of these contracts that GTE has
16	with a customer?
17	MR. ROBINSON: They vary. We start with
18	one. One year is considered long. Anything over one
19	year is considered long-term, and our average
20	generally is about three.
21	MS. KAUFMAN: So your average contract is
22	about three years?
23	MR. ROBINSON: Yes.
24	MS. KAUFMAN: One of the suggestions that
25	you made is pushing back the date of contract that

would come under the Fresh Look rule to February 1, 1 1996; is that right? 2 3 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 4 MS. KAUFMAN: So if that's the case, essentially there wouldn't be any GTE contracts that 5 6 would be eligible under the rule; correct? 7 MR. ROBINSON: Depending on when they make the fresh look available, if it was before or after 8 9 2000, that's true. MS. KAUFMAN: So I guess my point is that 10 11 if the Commission adopts your suggestion of moving 12 back the date, that would pretty much take care of any 13 GTE contracts that the rule would apply to, because 14 you said most of them are three years or shorter. MR. ROBINSON: 15 Yes. 16 MS. KAUFMAN: Thank you. 17 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Staff? 18 MS. BROWN: Just two questions for 19 Mr. Robinson. Well, maybe three. 20 Do you have your direct testimony with you? 21 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, I do. 22 MS. BROWN: Okay. If you would refer to 23 page 6, lines 12 through 14. And for the -- that's in 24 the first volume of Staff's composite exhibit.

You say in there that the number of new

CSAs provided annual increases from '94 to '95, but by '97 showed a 77% decrease from '94 levels.

MR. ROBINSON: Yes.

MS. BROWN: Do you see where you say that?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes.

MS. BROWN: We're concerned with the consistency of that statement with your responses to our Staff's data request, April 29, 1999. Do you have a copy of that with you?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes.

MS. BROWN: All right. Items 3 and 4 on there -- for the Commission's convenience, it's Tab 3 and page 4 -- are the matrices again showing outstanding contracts. And it appears from them that GTE has experienced a dramatic increase in both CSAs and tariffed term plans since 1997, and what appears to be a large increase in 1999. Do you agree with that?

MR. ROBINSON: No. I don't see a large amount of numbers of CSA type contracts starting in 1997.

MS. BROWN: Okay. All right. Maybe that's where the problem is coming. You're talking primarily CSAs?

MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Now, the other page

there is the eliqible tariffed term plans. And, yes, 1 2 they are increasing. MS. BROWN: Okay. So in your testimony you 3 were just talking about CSAs. 4 5 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Yes, ma'am. MS. BROWN: And in the matrix you're 6 7 dealing with both. MR. ROBINSON: Yes. 8 MS. BROWN: And it is the tariffed term 9 plans that have increased dramatically since '97? 10 11 MR. ROBINSON: That's correct. MS. BROWN: Okay. All right. 12 13 Just a second. You do see on your matrix that it appears 14 15 there are four contracts, new contracts that you've 16 entered into in 1999 for CSAs? 17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes. MS. BROWN: Which is double the amount from 18 19 1998. MR. ROBINSON: 20 Yes. 21 MS. BROWN: Okay. Thank you. 22 MR. ROMANO: Mr. Chairman, if I may, can I 23 ask one point of clarification, having looked at the 24 1998 competition report from the Commission?

One question.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA:

MR. ROMANO: Mr. Robinson, I'm looking at the 1998 competition report of this Commission. And I don't know if you've reviewed this at all, but Table 3-1 I don't believe indicates that there's any company currently providing service, at least as of the date of this chart, that is in GTE's service territory through a facilities-based method. Could you clarify the discrepancy?

MS. CASWELL: Could you tell me what this chart is? Because we haven't had time to look at it.

MR. ROMANO: Table 3-1 on pages 29 and 30 of the Competition in Telecommunications Markets in Florida, December 1998 report.

MR. ROBINSON: Well, I'm not sure of the characterization of the chart, but I know that ICI in Tampa is one of the competitors, and they are facilities-based.

MS. CASWELL: Yes, and also I was looking at it, and I see Reconex in Tampa. I see Telephone Company of Central Florida in Tampa. I see United States Telecom in Tampa. I see U.S. Telco in Tampa.

MR. ROMANO: But those are all resale, if I
-- or most of those are resale, at least. I see
those.

MS. CASWELL: ICI isn't resale or

facilities-based. 1 Does this chart distinguish between 2 facilities-based and resale? 3 MR. ROMANO: The third column, method. 4 5 MS. CASWELL: Oh, I see. Okay. I got it. MS. BROWN: Excuse me. If I might just 6 interject. If you have questions to ask about an 7 8 exhibit, could you -- I don't think anyone else has seen copies of what you're asking for, and it's --9 MR. ROMANO: It's the competition report 10 of the Florida Commission that BellSouth had asked 11 that we take official recognition of. 12 MS. BROWN: Yes, we've taken official 13 recognition of it, but we don't have -- no one has a 14 15 copy to look at. 16 MR. ROMANO: Okay. I apologize. 17 MR. DUNBAR: (Inaudible.) MS. CASWELL: (Inaudible.) 18 19 MR. ROMANO: We're just trying to clarify the distinction. 20 21 MR. DUNBAR: (Inaudible.) 22 MS. BROWN: Well, wait. 23 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: The court reporter can't 24 hear. Tell us exactly what it is that you're looking 25 for. What's the problem?

MS. CASWELL: If the clari -- maybe I can 1 cut this short. If the clarification is that there 2 are more resellers than facilities-based carriers, I 3 would say, yes, I agree. 4 The clarification is that MR. ROMANO: No. 5 he had referenced 55 facilities-based carriers 6 providing service in GTE's service territory in 7 This chart shows maybe two, one or two. And Florida. 8 that's the clarification I'm trying to --9 MS. CASWELL: What I thought he said was 55 10 interconnection agreements, probably interconnection 11 12 resale agreements. MR. ROMANO: Operative? Operative on a 13 facilities-based? 14 CHAIRMAN GARCIA: One at a time. 15 MR. ROMANO: Operative on a 16 facilities-based basis, there are 55 interconection 17 agreements in Florida right now for GTE? 18 MR. ROBINSON: They have been certified to 19 be facilities-based, yes, and we have interconnection 20 21 agreements with them. 22 MS. CASWELL: I think those are 23 interconnection and/or resale agreements. And I think 24 those 55 are operational.

MR. ROMANO: But they're interconnection

and/or resale. That's --1 MS. CASWELL: I think so. That's -- yes. 2 MR. ROMANO: I think that just -- thank 3 4 you. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: The discrepancy has been 5 cleared up. 6 7 MR. ROMANO: Thank you. CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Thank you. 8 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me indicate it 9 10 hasn't been cleared up for me. Are you saying in Florida there are 55 competitive local exchange 11 12 carriers? 13 MR. ROBINSON: No. I'm saying that GTE has entered into interconnection agreements with 110 14 15 competitive local exchange carriers. Fifty-five of 16 them are operational either through facilities-based 17 or resale. COMMISSIONER CLARK: How many of them --18 19 MR. ROBINSON: In GTE territory. 20 COMMISSIONER CLARK: How many of them are facilities-based carriers in GTE territory? 21 22 MR. ROBINSON: Well, I would have to look 23 through this list, but I agree -- I disagree with the listing as I look right now to Intermedia, for one. 24

So I don't know how accurate that chart would be, but

certainly a large number. And I don't know how accurate this chart is.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: How many does the chart show?

MR. ROBINSON: It shows -- including Intermedia, it shows them almost all as resale, although it does show some with interconnection.

MS. CASWELL: Commissioner Clark, if we could clarify, I think the table -- and we don't have the exhibit in front of us again. I think the table is only those who responded to the data request for the reports, so I don't know if it's the whole universe of carriers.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Give me a figure of how many facilities-based carriers are currently providing service in GTE's territory.

MR. ROBINSON: I don't have the exact number. I would say it's somewhere between zero and 55, or 1 and 55, because Intermedia is one for sure.

MS. CASWELL: Commissioner Clark, I think
ICI I know is facilities-based. I think we have
Teleport, TCG. I think Time Warner is
facilities-based. There are --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, let me clarify.

You have interconnection agreements with them. Do you

know that they are currently providing service? 1 MS. CASWELL: I believe they are. I'm not 2 the expert on this, but yes, I believe they are. 3 asked that question before we came, and the answer was 4 yes. I absolutely know that ICI has, because it has 5 been there for years, and we've been competing against 6 7 them. And I believe Time Warner says it provides service in Tampa, facilities-based service in Tampa, 8 in some of the materials here. And I know there are 9 other carriers doing that. 10 COMMISSIONER CLARK: But neither one of you 11 know how many facilities-based carriers are currently 12 providing service in GTE's territory? 13 MR. ROBINSON: Not exactly. I don't have 14 15 that information with me. I --MS. CASWELL: I would say between four and 16 17 ten. MR. DUNBAR: Yes. Commissioner, I --18 COMMISSIONER CLARK: That's a lot different 19 than zero and 55. 20 21 MR. DUNBAR: We would concur. We think it's about four. We are one of them, and we think 22 23 there are four. 24 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. 25 MS. BROWN: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one

more question? And I promise it won't be long.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Go ahead.

MS. BROWN: We were talking earlier when I was asking you some questions about the increase in your term discount plans in '97, and then we had a little disagreement about whether four CSAs in '99 was a significant increase. Can you explain what has been the cause of that increase, both for the term plans, tariffed term plans and the CSAs?

MR. ROBINSON: I think it's due to competition. The customers are making it known that they've had other offers, or we know they're going to have other offers, and therefore, that is a way to compete.

MS. BROWN: Okay. Thank you.

We have Sprint remaining.

MR. REHWINKEL: Mr. Chairman, Charles
Rehwinkel with Sprint. Before Mr. Poag starts with
the comments on behalf of Sprint, I would just like to
state that if the Commission feels that the resale
issues raised by the Florida Pay Telephone Association
are germane to this docket, I am prepared to address
those after Mr. Poag gives his comments. Otherwise,
we'll just limit our comments to what Mr. Poag has
filed.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Mr. Poag?

MR. POAG: Good morning. Ben Poag,
Director of Regulatory Affairs, Sprint Florida. My
comments today are on behalf of the Sprint
Corporation, and they reflect a compromise position
between our competitive local exchange company
operations and our incumbent local exchange company
operations.

Basically, Sprint supports the rules as proposed with a few modifications. We passed out earlier a copy of my testimony with the proposed modifications in legislative format attached to that. I would just like to briefly go through those modifications. I'll give you a chance to get the document if you don't have it.

I'm looking at the attachment to my comments, and I'm on page 1, line 16. This is just a clarification, in that Fresh Look is not in the definitions, and it just provides a little bit more explicit definition of what would be the application of the eligible contracts.

On page 2, beginning in the middle of line 2, this is an addition to clarify, in case it wasn't clear, that the termination liability limitation is only applicable to end user customers that are

subscribing to service from a competitive local exchange company to avoid a competitor (sic) trying to get out of a contract because they're moving or for some other reason.

On the same page 2, lines 10 and 11 is the same clarification I talked about on page 1.

On page 3, line 7, the compromise position of our competitive and incumbent local exchange operations is that the Fresh Look window be limited to one year instead of two years.

On page 5, line 2, this addition is to clarify the intent of the application of the rule. Under the prior section, it indicates that a customer could opt between paying the unrecovered non-recurring costs or paying monthly payments for the recurring rate which covers the non-recurring costs. We do not include a separate recurring rate for a non-recurring cost in our contracts. And if the customer had the option to select that, it would effectively negate any recovery at all. That should only be an option where the non-recurring cost is explicitly identified to recover -- I'm sorry, where there is a recurring rate element to recover an explicitly identified non-recurring cost.

And that last addition on page 5, beginning

on line 2 through 4, just clarifies the application of the preceding subparagraph (b).

That concludes my comments.

1.4

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Questions?

MS. CASWELL: I do have one. Mr. Poag, on page 3 of your testimony, you say that from a competitive entrant standpoint, you recognize that six months is adequate time for customers who want to change carriers or respond to competitive solicitations and take action to cancel contracts pursuant to this rule. And then further on you elaborate and say most likely candidates for Fresh Look would be targeted within the first few months of the window opening.

If that's true, and I agree that it is, why would you double that and propose a year for the Fresh Look window?

MR. POAG: Again, this was a compromise position between our competitive local exchange company operations and our local telephone operations.

MS. CASWELL: Okay. Thanks.

MR. GOGGIN: I have a question for you about your competitive local exchange company. It goes by the name of Sprint Metropolitan Networks, Inc.?

MR. POAG: Yes, it was. I think it may have changed recently.

MR. GOGGIN: In the 1996 competition report, the Commission reported that Sprint Metropolitan Networks was providing PBX trunks, rotary lines, B-1 lines, direct inward dialing, direct trunk interface, hunt groups, and dial tone services via DS-1 transport to business customers. Is that an accurate description of the services that were being provided by Sprint at that time, Sprint's competitive local exchange carrier?

MR. POAG: I would have to rely on the report as much as you do. I don't have the report, and I didn't provide that input.

MR. GOGGIN: Dial tone services versus DS-1 transport, does that -- in Orlando and Lake Mary is what the report indicates. Do you understand that to mean facilities-based service via transport from outside Sprint's territory to one of the switches within Sprint's LEC territory?

MR. POAG: Would you like me to speculate?

MR. GOGGIN: No, I don't want you to

speculate. I'm just asking.

On page 3 of your testimony you mentioned that Sprint supports the change in the proposed rule

from having eligibility cutoff being January 1, 1997, as originally proposed, to having a cutoff that begins whenever is rule is adopted. The justification for supporting this you say is that Sprint's average duration of contracts is three years, and if the eligibility cutoff were to begin three years back, there would not be much reason to have a rule.

Judging from the 1996 report, at least with respect to Orlando and Lake Mary, there seems to have been ALEC competition for BellSouth services as early as 1996. So it stands to reason that if the rule were adopted in 1999 and the average length of Sprint's contracts is three years, that there would be no contracts affected by the rule that had not been signed at the time that Sprint was competing with BellSouth in its territory. Does that make sense?

MR. POAG: That was a long question. I'm not sure what you're trying to say. I'm not clear.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: I forgot the premise of the question. Why don't you just ask --

MR. GOGGIN: Okay. I'm sorry. The premise of the question is, if the average duration of contracts is three years, then it's reasonable to assume that as of three years ago, there would be virtually no contracts -- there would be virtually no

contracts that would be affected by the rule that had been signed longer than three years ago.

MR. POAG: Correct.

MR. GOGGIN: And if the rule goes into affect, say, January 1 in the year 2000, the affected contracts would really be contracts entered into starting from approximately January 1, 1997; correct?

MR. POAG: Yes.

MR. GOGGIN: And Sprint Metropolitan

Networks apparently was competing with BellSouth in

its territory in Orlando and Lake Mary as early as

1996; isn't that correct?

MR. POAG: I'm not sure. I'm not sure of that. I do know that they -- you're going to force me to answer that earlier guestion.

Basically, as I understand their operation, to the best of my knowledge, they basically have a switch, and in terms of the transport, they do lease the transport. And this is in common with other -- I'll call them facilities-based, because they do have a switch. But they don't have what I'll call the last mile network out to all of the customers, so they do purchase or lease facilities either as unbundled elements or access from the local exchange companies to actually get to the customers.

MR. GOGGIN: I guess then -- it's a long question, and I apologize. But given this report regarding Sprint Metropolitan Networks and Time Warner's earlier statement that they were providing facilities-based local exchange service as early as February 1997, and your understanding that the rule would really affect contracts primarily signed after January 1, 1997, is there a reason to have the rule? Is there a justification for Fresh Look, at least with respect to Orlando?

MR. POAG: In my opinion, there is some justification for it, yes. And I think to state that you had some competition would -- that competition for the most part has been relatively limited. And as we mentioned before, with regard to Sprint Metropolitan Networks, it wasn't because they had, you know, widespread fiber optic facilities to all of the customers. They were in fact competing based on having to lease those types of facilities. So, yes, you had competition. Did you have competition throughout the area? I don't think so. And did they have facilities on a widespread basis? I don't think so.

Again, this is basically a compromise position of the company looking at both sides of the

business. And it's my personal opinion that this is a fair and reasonable approach to resolve this issue.

MR. GOGGIN: One question to clarify the amendments that you propose. One of the amendments that you propose is that only end users seeking early termination of otherwise eligible contracts with LECs in order to acquire services from or enter into a new contract with another local provider will be eligible.

We understand Sprint's intent in proposing this is to avoid having current ILEC customers who do not intend to switch services, but merely intend to stop taking services, to be able to use this rule to terminate the service. Is that the purpose for it?

MR. POAG: Yes.

MR. GOGGIN: It could also be construed as perhaps preventing an ILEC from competing for the business of that customer after they have received a termination notice. Would it be Sprint's intent to prohibit ILECs from competing for the business of a customer who sends a termination liability notice?

MR. POAG: No.

MR. GOGGIN: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Is there anything you want to add before we --

MS. BROWN: We just have a couple of little

concluding things.

Supra wanted me to mention that their witness had a personal emergency and was not able to be here today to participate. They are a participant in the case, and his testimony is included in our composite exhibit.

And then the only last thing that I have is, just to clarify, Chairman Johnson, Exhibit No. -- I'm sorry, Chairman Garcia, Exhibit No. 2, CNJ-1, is BellSouth's total CSAs affected. I would assume that that will be included in the record of this rule hearing.

And then the last thing is that post-hearing briefs are due on June 16th. And that's it.

MR. DUNBAR: Mr. Chairman, I have one final item too. I wonder if we could simply request that official notice be taken of this Commission's Order No. PSC-94-0284-FOF-TP, which was referred to in Ms. Marek's comments earlier this morning.

CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay. Very good. Thank you very much for --

MS. BROWN: Chairman Garcia, I need to mention that the SERC is due to appeal Staff on September 3rd, so that will be available at that

1	time
2	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: Okay.
3	MS. BROWN: for anyone if they want to
4	ask me for it.
5	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: The what?
6	MS. BROWN: The SERC, Statement of
7	Estimated Regulatory Costs.
8	CHAIRMAN GARCIA: One more term I'll never
9	be able to understand.
10	Very good. Thank you very much. I
11	appreciate your presentations. See you next time.
12	(Thereupon, the hearing concluded at
13	12:20 p.m.)
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1 2 STATE OF FLORIDA ) CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 3 4 COUNTY OF LEON 5 I, MARY ALLEN NEEL, RPR, 6 DO HEREBY CERTIFY that the hearing in Docket No. 7 980253-TX was heard by the Full Commission at the time 8 and place herein stated; it is further 9 10 CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed 11 under my direct supervision; and that this transcript, 12 13 consisting of 122 pages, constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings. 14 15 DATED this 24th day of May, 1999. 16 17 18 19 20 ALLEN 100 Salem Court Tallahassee, Florida 21 32301 (850) 878-2221 22 23 24 25

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