ORIGINAL

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Review of Florida Power Corporation's Earnings, Including Effects of Proposed Acquisition of Florida Power Corporation by Carolina Power & Light DOCKET NO. 000824-EI

Submitted for Filing: September 14, 2001

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. VANDER WEIDE

ON BEHALF OF FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION

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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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COST OF EQUITY

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. VANDER WEIDE COST OF EQUITY

- I. Introduction 1 Please state your name, title, and business address for the record. 2 Q 1 My name is James H. Vander Weide. I am Research Professor of A 1 3 Finance and Economics at the Fugua School of Business of Duke 4 University. I am also President of Financial Strategy Associates, a firm 5 that provides strategic and financial consulting services to clients in the 6 electric, gas, insurance, telecommunications, and water industries. My 7 business address is 3606 Stoneybrook Drive, Durham, North Carolina. 8 9 Would you please describe your educational background and prior Q 2 10 academic experience? 11 A 2 I graduated from Cornell University in 1966 with a Bachelor's Degree in 12 Economics. I then attended Northwestern University where I earned a 13 Ph.D. in Finance. In January 1972, I joined the faculty of the School of 14 15 Business at Duke University and was named Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, and then Professor. 16 17 Since joining the faculty I have taught courses in corporate finance, 18 19 investment management, and management of financial institutions. I have taught a graduate seminar on the theory of public utility pricing and 20 lectured in executive development seminars on the cost of capital, DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE 21
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financial analysis, capital budgeting, mergers and acquisitions, cash 1 management, short-run financial planning, and competitive strategy. 1 2 have also served as Program Director of several executive education 3 programs at the Fugua School of Business, including the Duke 4 Advanced Management Program, the Duke Executive Program in 5 Telecommunications, Competitive Strategies in Telecommunications, 6 and the Duke Program for Manager Development for managers from the 7 former Soviet Union. 8

9

I have conducted seminars and training sessions on financial analysis, 10 financial strategy, cost of capital, cash management, depreciation 11 12 policies, and short-run financial planning for a wide variety of U.S. and international companies, including ABB, Allstate, Ameritech, AT&T, Bell 13 Atlantic, BellSouth, Carolina Power & Light, Contel, Fisons, Glaxo 14 Wellcome, GTE, Lafarge, MidAmerican Energy, New Century Energies, 15 16 Norfolk Southern, Pacific Bell Telephone, Progress Energy, Inc, The 17 Rank Group, Siemens, Southern New England Telephone, TRW, and Wolseley Plc. 18

19

In addition to my teaching and executive education activities, I have
written research papers on such topics as portfolio management, the
cost of capital, capital budgeting, the effect of regulation on the
performance of public utilities, the economics of universal service

1		requirements, and cash management. My articles have been published
2		in American Economic Review, Financial Management, International
3		Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Finance, Journal of
4		Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Bank Research, Journal
5		of Accounting Research, Journal of Cash Management, Management
6		Science, The Journal of Portfolio Management, Atlantic Economic
7		Journal, Journal of Economics and Business, and Computers and
8		Operations Research. I have written a book titled Managing Corporate
9		Liquidity: an Introduction to Working Capital Management, and a
10		chapter for The Handbook of Modern Finance, "Financial Management
11		in the Short Run."
12		
12 13	Q 3	Have you previously testified on financial or economic issues?
	Q 3 A 3	Have you previously testified on financial or economic issues? Yes. As an expert on financial and economic theory, I have testified on
13		
13 14		Yes. As an expert on financial and economic theory, I have testified on
13 14 15		Yes. As an expert on financial and economic theory, I have testified on the cost of capital, competition, risk, incentive regulation, forward-looking
13 14 15 16		Yes. As an expert on financial and economic theory, I have testified on the cost of capital, competition, risk, incentive regulation, forward-looking economic cost, economic pricing guidelines, depreciation, accounting,
13 14 15 16 17		Yes. As an expert on financial and economic theory, I have testified on the cost of capital, competition, risk, incentive regulation, forward-looking economic cost, economic pricing guidelines, depreciation, accounting, valuation, and other financial and economic issues in some 300 cases
13 14 15 16 17 18		Yes. As an expert on financial and economic theory, I have testified on the cost of capital, competition, risk, incentive regulation, forward-looking economic cost, economic pricing guidelines, depreciation, accounting, valuation, and other financial and economic issues in some 300 cases before the U.S. Congress, the Canadian Radio-Television and
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13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20		Yes. As an expert on financial and economic theory, I have testified on the cost of capital, competition, risk, incentive regulation, forward-looking economic cost, economic pricing guidelines, depreciation, accounting, valuation, and other financial and economic issues in some 300 cases before the U.S. Congress, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the National Telecommunications and Information

1		
2	Q 4	What is the purpose of your testimony?
3	A 4	I have been asked by Florida Power Corporation ("Florida Power") to
4		prepare an independent appraisal of Florida Power's cost of equity, and
5		to recommend a rate of return on equity that is fair, that allows Florida
6		Power to attract capital on reasonable terms, and that allows Florida
7		Power to maintain its financial integrity.
8		
9	Q 5	What is the relationship between Florida Power and Progress
10		Energy, Inc. ("Progress Energy")?
11	A 5	Florida Power is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Florida Progress
12		Corporation, which is wholly owned by Progress Energy.
13		
14	Q 6	When was Progress Energy formed?
15	A 6	Progress Energy was formed on June 19, 2000, when Carolina Power &
16		Light Company reorganized itself into CP&L Energy. The new holding
17		company changed its name from CP&L Energy to Progress Energy on
18		December 4, 2000.
19		
20	Q 7	In addition to Florida Power, what are the major businesses of
21		Progress Energy?
22	A 7	In addition to Florida Power, Progress Energy's major businesses
23		include: (1) CP&L, a company engaged in the generation, transmission,

and distribution and sale of electricity in portions of North Carolina and 1 South Carolina; (2) NCNG, a company that transports, distributes, and 2 sells natural gas to customers in North Carolina; (3) Strategic Resource 3 Solutions, a company that provides software systems and services for 4 facility and energy management purposes to educational, governmental, 5 6 commercial, and industrial markets; (4) Progress Ventures, a company involved in the development and construction of gas-fired merchant 7 generation plants and synthetic fuel facilities; and (5) Progress Telecom, 8 a company that provides broadband capacity services, dark fiber, and 9 wireless services in the Southeastern United States. 10 11 12 Q 8 What effect does the relationship between Florida Power and Progress Energy have on your testimony? 13 A 8 14 Since Florida Power's stock is not publicly traded, I cannot estimate Florida Power's cost of equity directly from its stock price. Instead, I 15 16 estimate Florida Power's cost of equity from stock market data for a group of proxy companies. 17 18 Q 9 19 Please summarize your cost of equity approach and recommendation for Florida Power. 20 A 9 I calculate Florida Power's cost of equity using three traditional 21 approaches to cost of equity estimation: the Discounted Cash Flow 22 (DCF) Model, the ex ante risk premium approach, and the ex post risk 23

1		premium approach. These methodologies produce a cost of equity
2		equal to 13.30 percent, 12.46 percent, and 13.89 percent, respectively.
3		recommend a cost of equity for Florida Power of 13.2 percent.
4	11.	Economic and Legal Principles
5	Q 10	How do economists define the required rate of return, or cost of
6		capital, associated with particular investment decisions such as the
7		decision to invest in electric transmission and distribution
8		facilities?
9	A 10	Economists define the cost of capital as the return investors expect to
10		receive on alternative investments of comparable risk.
11		
12	Q 11	How does the cost of capital affect a firm's investment decisions?
13	A 11	The goal of a firm is to maximize the value of the firm. This goal can be
14		accomplished by accepting all investments in plant and equipment with
15		an expected rate of return greater than the cost of capital. Thus, a firm
16		should continue to invest in plant and equipment only so long as the
17		return on its investment is greater than or equal to its cost of capital.
18		
19	Q 12	How does the cost of capital affect investors' willingness to invest
20		in a company?
21	A 12	The cost of capital measures the return investors can expect on
22		investments of comparable risk. The cost of capital also measures the
23		investor's required rate of return on investment because rational

investors will not invest in a particular investment opportunity if the 1 expected return on that opportunity is less than the cost of capital. Thus, 2 the cost of capital is a hurdle rate for both investors and the firm. 3 4 Q 13 Do all investors have the same position in the firm? 5 No. Debt investors have a fixed claim on a firm's assets and income that 6 A 13 must be paid prior to any payment to the firm's equity investors. Since 7 the firm's equity investors have a residual claim on the firm's assets and 8 income, equity investments are riskier than debt investments. Thus, the 9 cost of equity exceeds the cost of debt. 10 11 Q 14 How do economists define the cost of equity? 12 13 A 14 Economists define the cost of equity as the return investors expect to receive on alternative equity investments of comparable risk. Since the 14 return on an equity investment of comparable risk is not a contractual 15 return, the cost of equity is more difficult to measure than the cost of 16 17 debt. There is agreement, however, as I have already noted, that the cost of equity is greater than the cost of debt. There is also agreement 18 among economists that the cost of equity, like the cost of debt, is both 19 20 forward looking and market based. 21 Q 15 Does the required rate of return on an investment vary with the risk 22 of that investment? 23

1	A 15	Yes. Since investors are averse to risk, they require a higher rate of
2		return on investments with greater risk.
3		
4	Q 16	Do economists and investors consider future industry changes
5		when they estimate the risk of a particular investment?
6	A 16	Yes. Economists and investors consider all the risks that a firm might
7		incur over the future life of the company.
8		
9	Q 17	Are these economic principles regarding the fair return for capital
10		recognized in any Supreme Court cases?
11	A 17	Yes. These economic principles, relating to the supply of and demand
12		for capital, are recognized in two United States Supreme Court cases:
13		(1) Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service
14		Comm'n.; and (2) Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co. In
15		the Bluefield Water Works case, the Court states:
		A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn a return upon the value of the property which it employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part of the country on investments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties, but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures. The returnshould be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility, and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit, and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties. [Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service Comm'n. 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923)].

The Court clearly recognizes here that: (1) a regulated firm cannot 1 remain financially sound unless the return it is allowed to earn on the 2 value of its property is at least equal to the cost of capital (the principle 3 relating to the demand for capital); and (2) a regulated firm will not be 4 able to attract capital if it does not offer investors an opportunity to earn 5 a return on their investment equal to the return they expect to earn on 6 other investments of the same risk (the principle relating to the supply of 7 capital). 8 9 10 In the Hope Natural Gas case, the Court reiterates the financial soundness and capital attraction principles of the *Bluefield* case: 11 From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock... By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract capital. [Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)] 12 Q 18 What practical difficulties arise when one attempts to apply the economic principles noted above to a regulated firm? 13 A 18 The application of these principles to the debt and preferred stock 14 components of a regulated firm's capital structure is straightforward. 15 Several problems arise, however, when the principles are applied to 16 common equity. These problems stem from the fact that the cash flows 17

to the equity investors, over any period of time, are not fixed by contract, 1 and thus are not known with certainty. To induce equity investors to part 2 with their money, a firm must offer them an expected return that is 3 commensurate with expected returns on equity investments of similar 4 risk. The need to measure expected returns makes the application of 5 the above principles difficult. These difficulties are especially 6 7 pronounced today for a firm like Florida Power, which is part of an industry that is undergoing dramatic structural change caused by 8 increased competition, uncertain regulation, and technological change. 9 10 How do you address these difficulties in your testimony? Q 19 11 A 19 I address these difficulties by employing the comparable company 12 approach to estimate Florida Power's cost of equity. 13 14 Q 20 What is the comparable company approach? 15 A 20 The comparable company approach estimates Florida Power's cost of 16 equity by identifying a group of companies of similar risk. The cost of 17 equity is then estimated for the companies in the proxy group. 18 111. **Business and Financial Risks in the Electric Energy Industry** 19 What are the primary factors that affect the business and financial 20 Q 21 21 risks of Florida Power, which in turn can affect its cost of capital? A 21 The business and financial risks of Florida Power are affected by a 22 number of economic factors, including: 23

1. High Operating Leverage. The electric energy business requires a 1 large commitment to fixed costs in relation to the operating margin 2 on sales, a situation known as high operating leverage. The 3 relatively high degree of fixed costs in the electric energy business 4 arises from the average electric energy company's large investment 5 in fixed generation, transmission, and distribution facilities. High 6 operating leverage causes the average electric energy company's 7 operating income to be highly sensitive to revenue fluctuations. 8

2. <u>Demand Uncertainty</u>. The business risk of electric energy 9 companies is increased by the high degree of demand uncertainty in 10 the industry. Demand uncertainty is caused by: (a) the strong 11 12 dependence of electric demand on the state of the economy and weather patterns; (b) the ability of customers to choose alternative 13 14 forms of energy, such as natural gas or oil; (c) the ability of some customers to locate facilities in the service areas of competitors; and 15 (d) the ability of some customers to produce their own electricity 16 under cogeneration or self-generation arrangements. 17

183. Peak Demand. The need to invest substantial sums in fixed plant is19further exacerbated by the peaking nature of electricity usage and20society's demand for a high degree of system reliability. The peak21demand for electricity is high relative to average sales in non-peak22periods. Peak demand is a particular problem for utilities like Florida23Power, which is generally a winter-peaking utility, with brief demand

- spikes that usually last only a few hours as cold fronts move through
 its service territory.
- 4. <u>Regulatory Uncertainty</u>. The business risk of the electric energy 3 business is increased by uncertainty concerning how electric 4 services will be priced and regulated. Electric companies are 5 currently experiencing an environment where services that were 6 once regulated are becoming fully competitive. In addition, investors 7 8 recognize that industry restructuring may include changes in franchise agreements. Changes in the industry have prompted 9 some municipalities to consider not renewing existing franchise 10 agreements, and to offer the opportunity for other providers to offer 11 electric service to retail customers. 12

14 Q 22 Have any of the above factors changed in recent years?

- 15 A 22 Yes. Electric utilities such as Florida Power have experienced
- 16 significantly greater demand and regulatory uncertainty in recent years
- as a direct result of increased competition and industry restructuring.
- 18

IV. Cost of Equity Estimation Methods

19Q 23What methods did you use to estimate the cost of common equity20capital for Florida Power?

A 23 I used three generally accepted methods for estimating Florida Power's
cost of common equity. These are the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), the
ex ante risk premium, and the ex post risk premium methods. The DCF

method assumes that the current market price of a firm's stock is equal 1 to the discounted value of all expected future cash flows. The ex ante 2 risk premium method assumes that an investor's current expectations 3 regarding the equity risk premium can be estimated from recent data on 4 the DCF expected rate of return on equity compared to the interest rate 5 on long-term Treasury bonds. The expost risk premium method 6 assumes that an investor's current expectations regarding the equity-7 8 debt return differential is equal to the historical record of comparable returns on stock and bond investments. The cost of equity under both 9 risk premium methods is then equal to the interest rate on bond 10 investments plus the risk premium. 11

- 12 V. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Approach
- 13 Q 24 Please describe the DCF Model.

A 24 The DCF Model is based on the assumption that investors value an 14 asset on the basis of the future cash flows they expect to receive from 15 owning the asset. Thus, investors value an investment in a bond 16 17 because they expect to receive a sequence of semi-annual coupon payments over the life of the bond and a terminal payment equal to the 18 bond's face value at the time the bond matures. Likewise, investors 19 value an investment in a firm's stock because they expect to receive a 20 sequence of dividend payments and, perhaps, expect to sell the stock at 21 a higher price sometime in the future. 22

23

A second fundamental principle of the DCF approach is that investors value a dollar received in the future less than a dollar received today. A future dollar is valued less than a current dollar because investors could invest a current dollar in an interest earning account and increase their wealth. This principle is called the time value of money.

Applying the two fundamental DCF principles noted above to an
investment in a bond leads to the conclusion that investors value their
investment in the bond on the basis of the present value of the bond's
future cash flows. Thus, the price of the bond should be equal to:

EQUATION 1

$$P_{B} = \frac{C}{(1+i)} + \frac{C}{(1+i)^{2}} + \dots + \frac{C+F}{(1+i)^{n}}$$

where:

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P_B = Bond price;
C = Cash value of the coupon payment (assumed for notational convenience to occur annually rather than semi-annually);
F = Face value of the bond;
i = The rate of interest the investor could earn by investing his money in an alternative bond of equal risk; and
n = The number of periods before the bond matures.
Applying these same principles to an investment in a firm's stock suggests that the price of the stock should be equal to:

EQUATION 2

$$P_s = \frac{D_1}{(1+k)} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k)^2} + \cdots + \frac{D_n + P_n}{(1+k)^n}$$

where:

	Ps	Ξ	Current price of the firm's stock;
	D ₁ , D ₂ D _n	=	Expected annual dividend per share on the firm's stock;
	Pn	=	Price per share of stock at the time the investor expects to sell the stock; and
	k	Π	Return the investor expects to earn on alternative investments of the same risk, i.e., the investor's required rate of return.
	Equation (2	2) is	frequently called the Annual Discounted Cash Flow
	Model of st	ocł	valuation. Assuming that dividends grow at a constant
	annual rate	e, g	, this equation can be solved for k , the cost of equity. The
	resulting co	ost	of equity equation is $k = D_1/P_s + g$, where k is the cost of
	equity, D_1 is	s th	e expected next period annual dividend, P_{s} is the current
	price of the	sto	ock, and g is the constant annual growth rate in earnings,
	dividends, a	anc	book value per share. The term D_1/P_s is called the
	dividend yie	əld	component of the Annual DCF Model, and the term g is
	called the g	jrov	vth component of the Annual DCF Model.
Q 25	Are you re	cor	nmending that the Annual DCF Model be used to
	estimate F	lori	da Power's cost of equity?
A 25	No. The D	CF	Model assumes that a company's stock price is equal to
	the present	dis	counted value of all expected future dividends. The

Annual DCF Model is only a correct expression for the present 1 discounted value of future dividends if dividends are paid annually at the 2 end of each year. Since the companies in my proxy group all pay 3 dividends quarterly, a Quarterly DCF Model must be used to estimate 4 the cost of equity for these firms. The Quarterly DCF Model differs from 5 the Annual DCF Model in that it expresses a company's price as the 6 present discounted value of a guarterly stream of dividend payments. A 7 complete analysis of the implications of the guarterly payment of 8 9 dividends on the DCF Model is provided in Appendix 1. For the reasons cited there, I employed the Quarterly DCF Model throughout my 10 calculations. 11 12 Q 26 Please describe the Quarterly DCF Model you used. 13 A 26 The Quarterly DCF Model I used is described on Schedule 1 and in 14 15 Appendix 1. The Quarterly DCF equation shows that the cost of equity is: the sum of the future expected dividend yield and the growth rate, 16 where the dividend in the dividend yield is the equivalent future value of 17 the four quarterly dividends at the end of the year, and the growth rate is 18 the expected growth in dividends or earnings per share. 19 20 Q 27 In Appendix 1, you demonstrate that the Quarterly DCF Model 21 22 provides the theoretically correct valuation of stocks when dividends are paid quarterly. Do investors, in practice, recognize 23

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the actual timing and magnitude of cash flows when they value stocks and other securities?

A 27 Yes. In valuing long-term government or corporate bonds, investors 3 recognize that interest is paid semi-annually. Thus, the price of a long-4 term government or corporate bond is simply the present value of the 5 semi-annual interest and principal payments on these bonds. Likewise, 6 in valuing mortgages, investors recognize that interest is paid monthly. 7 Thus, the value of a mortgage loan is simply the present value of the 8 9 monthly interest and principal payments on the loan. In valuing stock investments, stock investors correctly recognize that dividends are paid 10 quarterly. Thus, a firm's stock price is the present value of the stream of 11 12 quarterly dividends expected from owning the stock.

13

Q 28 When valuing bonds, mortgages, or stocks, would investors
 assume that cash flows are received only at the end of the year,
 when, in fact, the cash flows are received semi-annually, quarterly,
 or monthly?

A 28 No. Assuming that cash flows are received at the end of the year when
they are received semi-annually, quarterly, or monthly would lead
investors to make serious mistakes in valuing investment opportunities.
No rational investor would make the mistake of assuming that dividends
or other cash flows are paid annually when, in fact, they are paid more
frequently.

How did you estimate the growth component of the Quarterly DCF Q 29 1 Model? 2 I used the consensus analysts' estimates of future earnings per share A 29 3 (EPS) growth reported by I/B/E/S. 4 5 Q 30 What are the analysts' estimates of future EPS growth? 6 As part of their research, financial analysts working at Wall Street firms A 30 7 periodically estimate EPS growth for each firm they follow. The EPS 8 9 forecasts for each firm are then published. Investors who are contemplating purchasing or selling shares in individual companies 10 review the forecasts. 11 12 What is I/B/E/S? Q 31 13 A 31 I/B/E/S is a firm that reports analysts' EPS growth forecasts for a broad 14 15 group of companies. The forecasts are expressed in terms of a mean forecast and a standard deviation of forecast for each firm. Investors 16 use the mean forecast as a consensus estimate of future firm 17 performance. 18 19 Q 32 Why did you use the I/B/E/S growth estimates? 20 A 32 The I/B/E/S consensus growth rates: (1) are widely circulated in the 21 22 financial community, (2) include the projections of reputable financial analysts who develop estimates of future EPS growth, (3) are reported 23

on a timely basis to investors, and (4) are widely used by institutional 1 and other investors. 2 3 Why did you rely on analysts' projections of future EPS growth in Q 33 4 estimating the investors' expected growth rate rather than looking 5 at past historical growth rates? 6 I relied on analysts' projections of future EPS growth because there is A 33 7 considerable empirical evidence that investors use analysts' forecasts to 8 estimate future earnings growth. 9 10 Have you performed any studies concerning the use of analysts' Q 34 11 forecasts as an estimate of investors' expected growth rate, g? 12 A 34 Yes, I prepared a study in conjunction with Willard T. Carleton, Karl Eller 13 Professor of Finance at the University of Arizona, on why analysts' 14 forecasts are the best estimate of investors' expectation of future 15 long-term growth. This study is described in a paper entitled "Investor 16 17 Growth Expectations and Stock Prices: the Analysts versus Historical 18 Growth Extrapolation," published in the Spring 1988 edition of The Journal of Portfolio Management. 19 20 Please summarize the results of your study. 21 Q 35 A 35 First, we performed a correlation analysis to identify the historically 22 oriented growth rates which best described a firm's stock price. Then we 23

did a regression study comparing the historical growth rates with the 1 consensus analysts' forecasts. In every case, the regression equations 2 containing the average of analysts' forecasts statistically outperformed 3 the regression equations containing the historical growth estimates. 4 These results are consistent with those found by Cragg and Malkiel, the 5 early major research in this area. These results are also consistent with 6 the hypothesis that investors use analysts' forecasts, rather than 7 8 historically oriented growth calculations, in making buy and sell decisions. They provide overwhelming evidence that the analysts' 9 forecasts of future growth are superior to historically oriented growth 10 11 measures in predicting a firm's stock price. 12 What price did you use in your DCF Model? Q 36 13 14 A 36 I used a simple average of the monthly high and low stock prices for each firm for the three-month period ending July 2001. These high and 15 low stock prices were obtained from the Standard & Poor's Stock Guide, 16 17 a source generally available to and used by investors. 18 Why did you use the three-month average stock price in applying 19 Q 37 the DCF method? 20 A 37 I used the three-month average stock price in applying the DCF method 21 22 because stock prices fluctuate daily, while financial analysts' forecasts for a given company are generally changed less frequently, often on a 23

1		quarterly basis. Thus, to match the stock price with an earnings
2		forecast, it is appropriate to average stock prices over a three-month
3		period.
4		
5	Q 38	Did you include an allowance for flotation costs in your DCF
6		analysis?
7	A 38	Yes. I have included a five percent allowance for flotation costs in my
8		DCF calculations.
9		
10	Q 39	Please explain your inclusion of flotation costs.
11	A 39	All firms that have sold securities in the capital markets have incurred
12		some level of flotation costs, including underwriters' commissions, legal
13		fees, printing expense, etc. These costs are withheld from the proceeds
14		of the stock sale or are paid separately, and must be recovered over the
15		life of the equity issue. Costs vary depending upon the size of the issue,
16		the type of registration method used and other factors, but in general
17		these costs range between three and five percent of the proceeds from
18		the issue [see Lee, Inmoo, Scott Lochhead, Jay Ritter, and
19		Quanshui Zhao, "The Costs of Raising Capital," The Journal of Financial
20		Research, Vol. XIX No 1 (Spring 1996), 59-74, and Clifford W. Smith,
21		"Alternative Methods for Raising Capital," Journal of Financial
22		Economics 5 (1977) 273-307]. In addition to these costs, for large equity
23		issues (in relation to outstanding equity shares), there is likely to be a

decline in price associated with the sale of shares to the public. On 1 average, the decline due to market pressure has been estimated at two 2 to three percent [see Richard H. Pettway, "The Effects of New Equity 3 Sales Upon Utility Share Prices," Public Utilities Fortnightly, May 10, 4 1984, 35-39]. Thus, the total flotation cost, including both issuance 5 expense and market pressure, could range anywhere from five to 6 eight percent of the proceeds of an equity issue. I believe a combined 7 five percent allowance for flotation costs is a conservative estimate that 8 should be used in applying the DCF Model in this proceeding. 9

10

Q 40 Do you have any more recent evidence that five percent is a
 reasonable allowance for flotation costs in applying the DCF Model
 in this proceeding?

A 40 Yes. In August 2001, Progress Energy issued 12,650,000 shares of 14 common stock at an offering price of \$40 per share, for a total value of 15 16 \$506 million. The underwriting discount on this issue was \$1.40 per share, or \$17,710,000. In addition, Progress Energy incurred \$750,000 17 in direct expenses that were not included in the underwriting discount. 18 Thus, the percentage of issuance expenses to the total value of the 19 offering was 3.67 percent (\$18,460,000 total expense divided by 20 21 506,000,000 = 3.65 percent).

22

In addition to issuance expenses, Progress Energy's stock investors 1 also experienced a loss due to market pressure. The planned issuance 2 was announced after the market closed on August 6, 2001, when the 3 closing price of Progress Energy's stock was \$43.57. The stock was 4 issued on August 20, 2001, at a price of \$40.00. Thus, the stock price 5 declined by 8.19 percent from the date of announcement to the time of 6 sale. By comparison, the S&P Electric Index changed only minimally 7 over the same period, closing at 102.39 on August 6 and 102.20 on 8 August 20, a decline of 0.19 percent. Thus, the percent loss due to 9 market pressure was approximately eight percent. 10

- 11
- Q 41 Is a flotation cost adjustment only appropriate if a company issues
 stock during the last year?

A 41 14 As described in Appendix 2, a flotation cost adjustment is required whether or not a company issued new stock during the last year. 15 16 Previously incurred flotation costs have not been expensed in previous rate cases; rather, they are a permanent cost associated with past 17 issues of common stock. Just as an adjustment is made to the 18 embedded cost of debt to reflect previously incurred debt issuance costs 19 20 (regardless of whether additional bond issuances were made in the test year), so should an adjustment be made to the cost of equity regardless 21 of whether additional stock was issued during the last year. 22

1	Q 42	Does an allowance for recovery of flotation costs associated with
2		stock sales in prior years constitute retroactive rate-making?
3	A 42	No. An adjustment for flotation costs on equity is not meant to recover
4		any cost that is properly assigned to prior years. In fact, the adjustment
5		allows Florida Power to recover only the current carrying costs
6		associated with flotation expenses incurred at the time stock sales were
7		made. The original flotation costs themselves will never be recovered,
8		because the stock is assumed to have an infinite life.
9		
10	Q 43	What companies do you recommend as risk proxies for Florida
11		Power?
12	A 43	I recommend proxy companies from the Value Line electric and natural
13		gas distribution ("LDC") industry groups as risk proxies for Florida Power.
14		
15	Q 44	How are the Value Line electric companies similar in risk to Florida
16		Power?
17	A 44	The Value Line electric companies are similar in risk to Florida Power in
18		that they are high quality electric companies that are engaged in the
19		generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity.
20		
21	Q 45	How did you select your group of electric energy companies?
22	A 45	I selected all the companies in the Value Line electric company groups
23		having a Value Line Safety Rank of 1, 2, or 3. In addition, in order to

obtain reasonably reliable DCF results I selected only those companies 1 that: (1) paid dividends during every quarter of the last five years; (2) did 2 not decrease dividends during any quarter of the past five years; (3) had 3 at least three analysts included in the I/B/E/S consensus growth 4 forecast; and (4) have not announced mergers. The electric companies 5 in my DCF group are shown on Schedule 1. 6 7 Why did you eliminate companies that have either decreased or 8 Q 46 eliminated their dividend in the past five years? 9 The DCF Model requires the assumption that dividends will grow at a A 46 10 constant rate into the indefinite future. If a company has either 11 decreased or eliminated its dividend in recent years, an assumption that 12 the company's dividend will grow at the same rate into the indefinite 13 14 future is questionable. 15 Q 47 Why did you eliminate companies that have fewer than three 16 analysts included in the I/B/E/S consensus forecasts? 17 A 47 18 The DCF Model also requires a reliable estimate of a company's expected future growth. For most companies, the I/B/E/S consensus 19 growth forecast is the best available estimate of the growth term in the 20 DCF Model. However, the I/B/E/S estimate is less reliable if the I/B/E/S 21 22 consensus is based on the inputs of very few analysts. On the basis of

my professional judgment, I believe that at least three analysts'
 estimates is a reasonable minimum number.
 4 Q48 Why did you eliminate companies that have announced mergers
 that are not yet completed?

A 48 Because of the widespread merger activity in the electric utility industry, 6 stock prices have been bid up in anticipation of merger-related cost 7 savings and new market opportunities. Analysts' growth forecasts, on 8 the other hand, are necessarily related to companies as they currently 9 exist, and do not reflect the potential cost savings and new market 10 opportunities associated with mergers. The use of a stock price that 11 12 includes the value of potential mergers in conjunction with growth forecasts that do not include the growth enhancing prospects of potential 13 mergers produces DCF results that tend to understate an electric utility's 14 true cost of equity. 15

16

Q 49 Does the mismatch between stock prices and growth rates
 associated with merger candidates occur only for firms that have
 announced an intention to merge?

A 49 No. In an industry such as the electric utility industry where merger
activity is widespread, the stock prices of most companies in the industry
tend to be bid up in anticipation of potential merger announcements.
Thus, the DCF Model will tend to understate a company's true cost of

- equity in industries such as the electric utility industry, which are
 undergoing radical restructuring.
- 3
 - 4 Q 50 Did you eliminate potential merger candidates from your electric 5 energy company DCF analyses?
- A 50 No. I eliminated only those electric companies that have already made
 specific announcements of mergers. If I were to eliminate all companies
 that were potential merger candidates in the electric utility industry, there
 would be too few companies remaining for inclusion in my DCF analysis.
- 10
- 11 Q 51 Which companies were eliminated from the Value Line electric
- 12 group according to your criteria?
- A 51 The companies eliminated from the Value Line electric group because
 they had either decreased or eliminated their dividend, had fewer than
 three analysts in the I/B/E/S consensus growth forecast, had Safety
 Ranks of 4 or 5, or had announced mergers that are not yet completed,
 are shown on Schedule 2. The large number of companies eliminated is
 an indication of the dramatic changes and increased risk in the electric
 utility industry.
- 20
- 21 Q 52 In addition to a group of electric companies, you also used a proxy 22 group of Value Line LDCs. How are Value Line's LDCs similar in 23 risk to Florida Power?

A 52 The LDCs are a natural surrogate for the risks of investing in Florida 1 Power at this time. Like Florida Power, the LDCs: (1) employ a capital-2 intensive physical network that connects each customer to the source of 3 energy; (2) procure energy for their customers; (3) sell energy to 4 customers whose energy demand is primarily dependent on the state of 5 6 the economy and the weather; and (4) are regulated by public utility commissions that have traditionally viewed electric and natural gas 7 utilities as being comparable in risk. 8

9

10 Q 53 Do the Value Line LDCs meet the standards of the Hope and

Bluefield cases that they are comparable in risk to Florida Power?
A 53 Yes. The Hope and Bluefield standard states that a public utility should
be allowed to earn a return on its investment that is commensurate with
the returns investors are able to earn on investments having similar risk.
Since Florida Power faces risks that are at least as great as the risks
faced by Value Line's LDCs, the LDCs are a group of companies that
conservatively meet the standards of the Hope and Bluefield cases.

18

19 Q 54 How did you select your group of LDCs?

A 54 I selected all the companies in Value Line's group of natural gas
distribution companies that: (1) paid dividends during every quarter of
the last five years; (2) did not decrease dividends during any quarter of
the past five years; (3) had at least three analysts included in the I/B/E/S

		·
1		consensus growth forecast; and (4) have not announced a merger. In
2		addition, all of the LDCs included in my group have a Value Line Safety
3		Rank of 1, 2, or 3. The LDCs in my DCF group are shown on
4		Schedule 3.
5		
6	Q 55	Which companies were eliminated from the Value Line LDC group
7		according to your criteria?
8	A 55	Of the 19 LDCs in Value Line, Cascade was not included because they
9		have fewer than three analyst's growth forecasts; Southern Union was
10		not included because it pays no dividends. In addition, UGI was
11		eliminated because Value Line indicates that it has announced an
12		acquisition that has not been completed; I did not include Southwest Gas
13		because of the continuing legal controversy regarding its cancelled
14		merger with ONEOK; and I eliminated ONEOK because its DCF result
15		(20.89 percent) exceeded the mean result by more than two standard
16		deviations.
17		
18	Q 56	Please summarize the results of your application of the DCF
19		method to the Value Line electric energy and LDC companies.
20	A 56	As shown on Schedules 1 and 3, my application of the DCF method to
21		the Value Line electric energy companies produces an average result of
22		13.24 percent, and, for the LDCs, an average result of 13.36 percent.

29

Based on your DCF studies, what is your conclusion regarding Q 57 1 Florida Power's DCF-based cost of equity? 2 My applications of the DCF Model to the Value Line electric and natural A 57 3 gas groups produces an average DCF result of 13.24 percent and 4 13.36 percent, respectively. On the basis of these results, I concluded 5 that the DCF cost of equity is 13.3 percent. 6 7 VI. Risk Premium Approach 8 Please describe the Risk Premium approach to estimating Florida 9 Q 58 Power's cost of equity. 10 A 58 The Risk Premium approach is based on the principle that investors 11 expect to earn a return on an equity investment in Florida Power that 12 reflects a "premium" over and above the return they expect to earn on an 13 investment in a portfolio of Treasury or corporate bonds. This equity risk 14 premium compensates equity investors for the additional risk they bear 15 16 in making equity investments versus bond investments. 17 Q 59 How did you measure the required risk premium on an equity 18 19 investment in Florida Power? A 59 I used two methods to estimate the required risk premium on an equity 20 investment in Florida Power. The first is called the ex ante risk premium 21 method and the second is called the expost risk premium method. 22

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A. Ex Ante Risk Premium Approach

- 2 Q 60 Please describe your ex ante risk premium approach for measuring
 - the required risk premium on an equity investment in Florida
- 4 Power.

1

3

- 5 A 60 My ex ante risk premium method is based on a three-year study of the
- 6 DCF expected return on a proxy group of LDCs compared to the interest
- 7 rate on 20-year U. S. Treasury bonds. Specifically, for each of the last
- 8 36 months, I calculated the risk premium using the equation,

where:

RP _{FP}	=	the required risk premium on an equity investment in Florida Power.
DCFLDC	=	average DCF estimated cost of equity on a portfolio of natural gas distribution companies.
I _{20-yr} ⊤	=	the yield to maturity on an investment in 20-year Treasury bonds.

9 Q 61 What were the results of your ex ante risk premium study?

- 10 A 61 The results of my ex ante risk premium study are described in
- 11 Schedule 4. Over the last 36 months, the average DCF estimated cost
- 12 of equity on an investment in a portfolio of LDCs was equal to
- 13 12.62 percent, while the average yield to maturity on 20-year Treasury
- 14 bonds was 6 percent. Thus, the average estimated risk premium on an
- investment in Florida Power over the last 36 months was 6.62 percent.

2

Q 62 Does your 36-month time series of risk premiums on an equity

investment in Florida Power exhibit any trends?

A 62 Yes. The ex ante risk premiums shown in Schedule 4 are clearly 3 trending upwards. The higher risk premiums exhibited in Schedule 4 are 4 in line with the higher risks of investing in electric and natural gas 5 companies in recent years. If I were to recognize explicitly the upward 6 trend in the 36-month time series of risk premiums, my best estimate of 7 the future required risk premium would be 7.50 percent. However, to be 8 conservative, I have decided to use the average 6.62 percent risk 9 premium over the entire 36-month period as an estimate of the future 10 risk premium in my ex ante risk premium approach. 11

12

13 Q 63 What cost of equity do you obtain from your ex ante risk premium 14 approach?

A 63 To estimate the cost of equity using the ex ante risk premium approach,
one must add the estimated risk premium to the current yield to maturity
on 20-year Treasury bonds. During the three-month period April, May
and June 2001, the average yield to maturity on 20-year Treasury bonds
was 5.84 percent. Adding the estimated average risk premium of
6.62 percent to the 5.84 percent average yield to maturity on 20-year
Treasury bonds produces a cost of equity estimate of 12.46 percent.

B. <u>Ex Post Risk Premium Approach</u>

Q 64 Please describe your ex post risk premium approach for measuring
 the required risk premium on an equity investment in Florida
 Power.

I first performed a study of the comparable returns received by bond and 5 A 64 stock investors over the last 63 years. I estimated the returns on stock 6 and bond portfolios, using stock price and dividend yield data on the 7 S&P 500 and bond yield data on Moody's A-rated Utility Bonds. 8 (Moody's gives Florida Power's bonds an A rating.) My study consisted 9 of making an investment of one dollar in the S&P 500 and Moody's 10 A-rated Utility Bonds at the beginning of 1937, and reinvesting the 11 principal plus return each year to 2001. The return associated with each 12 stock portfolio is the sum of the annual dividend yield and capital gain (or 13 loss) which accrued to this portfolio during the year(s) in which it was 14 held. The return associated with the bond portfolio, on the other hand, is 15 16 the sum of the annual coupon yield and capital gain (or loss) which accrued to the bond portfolio during the year(s) in which it was held. The 17 resulting annual returns on the stock and bond portfolios purchased in 18 each year between 1937 and 2001 are shown on Schedule 5. The S&P 19 20 500 stock portfolio grew at a rate of 12.30 percent, while the Moody's A-rated utility bond portfolio grew at a rate of 6.01 percent per year. The 21 22 risk premium on the S&P 500 stock portfolio is 6.29 percent.

23

I also conducted a second study using stock data on the S&P Utilities
rather than the S&P 500. As shown on Schedule 6, the S&P Utility stock
portfolio grew at a rate of 11.15 percent per year. Thus, the return on
the S&P Utility stock portfolio exceeded the return on the Moody's
A-rated utility bond portfolio by 5.14 percent.

- 6

7 Q 65 Why did you analyze investors' experiences over such a long time
 8 frame?

A 65 Because day-to-day stock price movements can be somewhat random, it 9 10 is inappropriate to rely on short-run movements in stock prices in order to derive a reliable risk premium. Rather than buying and selling 11 frequently in anticipation of highly volatile price movements, most 12 13 investors employ a strategy of buying and holding a diversified portfolio 14 of stocks. This buy-and-hold strategy will allow an investor to achieve a 15 much more predictable long-run return on stock investments and at the 16 same time will minimize transaction costs. The situation is very similar to 17 the problem of predicting the results of coin tosses. I cannot predict with any reasonable degree of accuracy the result of a single, or even a few, 18 19 flips of a balanced coin; but I can predict with a good deal of confidence that approximately 50 heads will appear in 100 tosses of this coin. 20 21 Under these circumstances, it is most appropriate to estimate future experience from long-run evidence of investment performance. 22

1

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Q 66 Would your study provide a different risk premium if you started with a different time period?

Yes. The risk premium results do vary somewhat depending on the A 66 3 historical time period chosen. My policy was to go back as far in history 4 as I could get reliable data. Because the S&P 500 contains a significant 5 number of utility stocks, I thought it would be most meaningful to begin 6 after the passage and implementation of the Public Utility Holding 7 Company Act of 1935. This Act significantly changed the structure of the 8 public utility industry. Since the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 9 1935 was not implemented until the beginning of 1937, I felt that 10 numbers taken from before this date would not be comparable to those 11 taken after. 12

13

Q 67 Why was it necessary to examine the yield from debt investments in
 order to determine the investors' required rate of return on equity
 capital?

A 67 As previously explained, investors expect to earn a return on their equity
investment that exceeds currently available bond yields. This is because
the return on equity, being a residual return, is less certain than the yield
on bonds and investors must be compensated for this uncertainty.
Second, the investors' current expectations concerning the amount by
which the return on equity will exceed the bond yield will be strongly
influenced by historical differences in returns to bond and stock

1		investors. For these reasons, we can estimate investors' current
2		expected returns from an equity investment from knowledge of current
3		bond yields and past differences between returns on stocks and bonds.
4		
5	Q 68	Has there been any significant trend in the equity risk premium over
6		the 1937 to 2001 time period of your risk premium study?
7	A 68	No. Statisticians test for trends in data series by regressing the data
8		observations against time. I have performed such a time series
9		regression on my two data sets of historical risk premiums. As shown
10		below in Tables 1 and 2, there is no statistically significant trend in my
11		risk premium data. Indeed, the coefficient on the time variable is
12		insignificantly different from zero (if there were a trend, the coefficient on
13		the time variable should be significantly different from zero).

TABLE 1	
REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR RISK PREMIUM ON S&P 500	

	Intercept	Time	Adjusted R Square	F
Coefficient T Statistic	0.07 1.78	0.000 -0.268	-0.01	0.07

TABLE 2 REGRESSION OUTPUT FOR RISK PREMIUM ON S&P UTILITIES

	Intercept	Time	Adjusted R Square	F
Coefficient T Statistic	0.06 1.62	0.000 -0.22	-0.02	0.05

- Do you have any other evidence that there has been no significant Q 69 1 trend in risk premium results over time? 2 Yes. The Ibbotson Associates' 2001 Yearbook contains an analysis of A 69 3 "trends" in risk premium data. Ibbotson Associates uses correlation 4 analysis to determine if there is any pattern or "trend" in risk premiums 5 over time. They also conclude that there are no trends in risk premiums 6 over time. 7 8 What is the significance of the evidence that historical risk Q 70 9 premiums have no trend or other statistical pattern over time? 10 A 70 11 The significance of this evidence is that the average historical risk premium is a good estimate of the future expected risk premium. As 12 Ibbotson notes: 13 The significance of this evidence is that the realized equity risk premium next year will not be dependent on the realized equity risk premium from this year. That is, there is no discernable pattern in the realized equity risk premium---it is virtually impossible to forecast next year's realized risk premium based on the premium of the previous year. For example, if this year's difference between the riskless rate and the return on the stock market is higher than last year's, that does not imply that next year's will be higher than this year's. It is as likely to be higher as it is lower. The best estimate of the expected value of a variable that has behaved randomly in the past is the average (or arithmetic mean) of its past values. [Ibbotson Associates' Valuation Edition 2001 Yearbook, page 65.1 14 Q 71 You mention that Ibbotson Associates also provides risk premium data. How do the lbbotson Associates' risk premiums compare to 15 your risk premiums? 16
 - 37

Ibbotson Associates obtains a 7.8 percent risk premium on the S&P 500 A 71 1 versus long-term government bonds. Since the yield on long-term 2 government bonds is currently approximately 200 basis points less than 3 the yield on A-rated utility bonds, the Ibbotson Associates' data would 4 indicate an approximate 5.8 percent risk premium on the S&P 500 over 5 A-rated utility bonds. As shown on Schedules 5 and 6, my studies 6 produce a risk premium over A-rated utility bonds in the range of 7 5.14 percent to 6.29 percent. 8 9

Q 72 What conclusions do you draw from your ex post risk premium
 analyses about the required return on an equity investment in
 Florida Power?

A 72 My own studies, combined with my analysis of other studies, provide 13 14 strong evidence that investors today require an equity return of approximately 5.14 to 6.29 percentage points above the expected yield 15 on the long-term debt issues of Florida Power. For the risk premium 16 17 approach to be correctly applied to Florida Power, one must know the current bond yield on the long-term debt issues of Florida Power. It is 18 my opinion as a financial expert that the market yield on the long-term 19 debt issues of Florida Power is suggested by the average interest rate 20 for A-rated public utility long-term debt issues. 21

The average interest rate on Moody's seasoned A-rated utility bonds for the three months April through June 2001 has ranged from 7.85 percent

to 7.99 percent. On the basis of this information, I conclude that 1 investors would expect a long-term yield of approximately 7.93 percent 2 on the long-term debt issues of Florida Power. Adding a 5.14 to 3 6.29 percentage point risk premium to an expected yield of 7.93 percent 4 on the debt issues of Florida Power, I obtain an expected return on 5 equity in the range 13.1 to 14.2 percent, with a midpoint of 13.6 percent. 6 Adding a 25 basis-point allowance for flotation costs, I obtain an 7 estimate of 13.9 percent as the cost of equity for Florida Power using the 8 Ex Post Risk Premium method. 9

10

VII.

Fair Rate of Return on Equity

11 Q 73 Please summarize your findings concerning Florida Power's cost of 12 equity?

- 13 A 73 My DCF analysis suggests that Florida Power's cost of equity is
- 14 13.3 percent. My ex ante risk premium approach produces a cost of
- 15 equity estimate for Florida Power of 12.46 percent. From my ex post risk
- 16 premium approach, I find that the cost of equity is 13.9 percent. The
- average of these three approaches is 13.22 percent.
- 18
 - 19Q 74What is your recommendation as to a fair rate of return on common20equity for Florida Power?
 - A 74 I recommend that Florida Power be allowed to earn a fair rate of return
 on common equity equal to 13.2 percent.

23

- 1 Q 75 Does this conclude your testimony?
- 2 A 75 Yes, it does.

LIST OF SCHEDULES AND APPENDICES

- Schedule 1 Summary of Discounted Cash Flow Analysis for the Value Line Electric Energy Companies.
- Schedule 2 Companies not Included in Electric Company Discounted Cash Flow Analysis.
- Schedule 3 Summary of Discounted Cash Flow Analysis for the Value Line Natural Gas Distribution Companies.
- Schedule 4 Comparison of DCF Expected Return on an Equity Investment in Natural Gas Distribution Companies to the Interest Rate on 20-Year Treasury Bonds.
- Schedule 5 Comparative Returns on S&P 500 Stock Index and Moody's A-Rated Bonds 1937—2001
- Schedule 6 Comparative Returns on S&P Utility Stocks and Moody's A-Rated Bonds 1937—2001
- Appendix 1 Derivation of the Quarterly DCF Model
- Appendix 2 Adjusting for Flotation Costs in Determining a Public Utility's Allowed Rate of Return on Equity
- Appendix 3 Risk Premium Approach

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SCHEDULE 1 SUMMARY OF DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS FOR ELECTRIC ENERGY COMPANIES

Company	Quarterly Dividend	Average Price	I/B/E/S g	Quarterly DCF
Allegheny Energy	0.430	48.940		
ALLETE	0.268	23.347	8.42%	13.92%
Ameren Corp.	0.635	42.097	4.50%	11.41%
American Electric Power	0.600	47.310	5.85%	11.75%
Cinergy Corp.	0.450	33.530	5.71%	11.94%
Cleco Corp.	0.218	22.808	10.03%	14.63%
CMS Energy Corp.	0.365	28.478		
Dominion Resources	0.645	63.025	9.86%	14.85%
DPL Inc.	0.235	27.967	9.54%	13.61%
DQE	0.420	22.118	5.67%	14.45%
DTE	0.515	44.574	6.60%	12.01%
Duke Energy	0.275	42.335	11.66%	14.88%
FPL Group	0.560	58.643	6.75%	11.14%
Hawaiian Elec.	0.620	37.358	2.50%	9.92%
IDACORP Inc.	0.465	37.303	6.40%	12.23%
Kansas City Power & Lt.	0.415	25.080	5.67%	13.39%
MDU Resources	0.220	34.252	10.82%	13.97%
NiSource Inc.	0.290	28.412	9.36%	14.13%
NSTAR	0.515	41.908	6.80%	12.54%
Pinnacle West Capital	0.375	47.310	7.80%	11.48%
Progress Energy	0.530	42.810	6.79%	12.57%
Public Serv. Enterprise	0.540	47.582	6.47%	11.78%
Reliant Energy	0.375	38.553	7.76%	12.37%
Southern Co.	0.335	22.963	6.82%	13.71%
TECO Energy	0.345	30.798	7.99%	13.25%
TXU Corp.	0.600	46.895	8.21%	14.34%
UIL Holdings	0.720	47.498	2.33%	9.08%
Vectren Corp.	0.255	21.660	7.75%	13.28%
Xcel Energy Inc.	0.375	28.875	<u> </u>	12.74%
Market Weighted Average				13.24%

Notes:

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d1,d2,d3,d4

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Next four quarterly dividends, calculated by multiplying the last four quarterly dividends per Value Line by the factor (1 + g). Average of the monthly high and low stock prices during the three months ending June 2001

= per S&P Stock Guide.

=

- =
- Flotation costs expressed as a percent of gross proceeds. I/B/E/S forecast of future earnings growth June 2001. Cost of equity using the quarterly version of the DCF Model. =

$$k = \frac{d_1(1+k)^{.75} + d_2(1+k)^{.50} + d_3(1+k)^{.25} + d_4}{P_0(1-FC)} + g$$

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SCHEDULE 2 COMPANIES ELIMINATED FROM DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS

Zero or reduced dividends Fewer than 3 I/B/E/S estimates

Avista Conectiv **Constellation Energy** Edison International El Paso Electric Entergy Exelon Green Mountain Power Montana Power Niagara Mohawk **Northeast Utilities** PG&E **Potomac Electric** PPL Corp. SCANA Sempra Energy Sierra Pacific Resources Unisource Energy Western Resources Wisconsin Energy

Alliant Black Hills CH Energy Empire District El Paso Electric Green Mountain Power Niagara Mohawk Northwestern Corp. OGE Energy Otter Tail Power Puget Energy RGS Energy Unisource Energy WPS Resources

Mergers

Conectiv Consolidated Edison DTE Energy Empire District Energy East First Energy Niagara Mohawk Northwestern Corp Public Service New Mexico St. Joseph Light & Power WPS Resources Potomac Electric Northeast Utilities MCN (LDC) Utilicorp United RGS GPU (National Grid--British) (purchasing Montana Power's electric business) Western Resources Utilicorp United Wisc Fuel & Light

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SCHEDULE 3 SUMMARY OF DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS FOR THE VALUE LINE NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES

Company	Quarterly Dividend	Average Price	I/B/E/S g	Quarterly DCF
AGL Resources	0.270	23.223	7.16%	12.65%
Atmos Energy	0.290	22.987	7.57%	13.54%
Energen Corp.	0.170	30.793	11.00%	13.71%
KeySpan	0.445	36.742	11.39%	17.43%
Laclede	0.335	24.102	3.33%	9,59%
New Jersey Resources	0.440	43.848	6.38%	11.03%
NICOR Inc.	0.440	37.925	5.79%	11.01%
Northwest Nat. Gas	0.310	23.955	4.55%	10.47%
NUI	0.245	22.003	10.95%	16.46%
Peoples Energy	0.510	39.275	5.43%	11.40%
Piedmont Natural Gas	0.385	34.570	5.33%	10.32%
SEMCO Energy	0.210	14.537	6.45%	13.24%
South Jersey Industries	0.370	30.925	5.67%	11.17%
WGL Holding	0.315	27.602	4.43%	9.58%
Market Weighted Average				13.36%

Next four quarterly dividends, calculated by multiplying the last four quarterly

Average of the monthly high and low stock prices during the three months ending

dividends per Value Line by the factor (1 + g).

= I/B/E/S forecast of future earnings growth June 2001.

Flotation costs expressed as a percent of gross proceeds.

Cost of equity using the quarterly version of the DCF Model.

 $k = \frac{d_1(1+k)^{75} + d_2(1+k)^{50} + d_3(1+k)^{25} + d_4}{P_0(1-FC)} + g$

June 2001 per S&P Stock Guide.

Notes:

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SCHEDULE 4 COMPARISON OF DCF EXPECTED RETURN ON AN EQUITY INVESTMENT IN NATURAL GAS DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES TO THE INTEREST RATE ON 20-YEAR TREASURY BONDS.

		20-Year Treasury	
	DCF Result	Bond Yield	Risk Premium
June-98	10.90%	5.80%	5.10%
July	11.06%	5.78%	5.28%
August	11.69%	5.66%	6.03%
September	12.21%	5.38%	6.83%
October	12.31%	5.30%	7.01%
November	11.73%	5.48%	6.25%
December	11.49%	5.36%	6.13%
January-99	11.67%	5.45%	6.22%
February	12.14%	5.66%	6.48%
March	12.41%	5.87%	6.54%
April	12.43%	5.82%	6.61%
May	12.14%	6.08%	6.06%
June	12.05%	6.36%	5.69%
July	12.08%	6.28%	5.80%
August	12.05%	6.43%	5.62%
September	12.10%	6.50%	5.60%
October	12.60%	6.66%	5.94%
November	12.73%	6.48%	6.25%
December	13.13%	6.69%	6.44%
January-00	13.50%	6.86%	6.64%
February	13.95%	6.54%	7.419
March	13.81%	6.38%	7.43%
April	13.77%	6.18%	7.59%
May	13.50%	6.55%	6.95%
June	13.46%	6.28%	7.18%
July	13.47%	6.20%	7.279
August	13.19%	6.02%	7.179
September	12.90%	6.09%	6.819
October	13.03%	6.04%	6.99%
November	12.77%	5.98%	6.79%
December	12.59%	5.64%	6.95%
January-01	12.85%	5.65%	7.20%
February	12.95%	5.62%	7.33%
March	13.09%	5.49%	7.60%
April	12.59%	5.78%	6.81%
May	13.26%	5.92%	7.34%
June	13.32%	5,82%	7.50%
Average	12.62%	6.00%	6.62%

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SCHEDULE 5 COMPARATIVE RETURNS ON S&P 500 STOCK INDEX AND MOODY'S A-RATED BONDS 1937-2001

		Stock	<u> </u>	D	Decid
	Stock	Dividend	Stock	Bond	Bond
Year	Price	Yield	Return	Price	Return
2001	1,335.63	0.0116		56.40	
2000	1425.59	0.0118	-5.13%	52.60	14.82
1999	1248.77	0.0130	15.46%	63.03	-10.20%
1998	963.35	0.0162	31.25%	62.43	7.38%
1997	766.22	0.0195	27.68%	56.62	17.32%
1996	614.42	0.0231	27.02%	60.91	-0.48%
1995	465.25	0.0287	34.93%	50.22	29.26%
1994	472.99	0.0269	1.05%	60.01	-9.65%
1993	435.23	0.0288	11.56%	53.13	20.48%
1992	416.08	0.0290	7.50%	49.56	15.27%
1991	325.49	0.0382	31.65%	44.84	19.44%
1990	339.97	0.0341	-0.85%	45.60	7.11%
1989	285.41	0.0364	22.76%	43.06	15.18%
1988	250.48	0.0366	17.61%	40.10	17.36%
1987	264.51	0.0317	-2.13%	48.92	-9.84%
1986	208.19	0.0390	30.95%	39.98	32.36%
1985	171.61	0.0451	25.83%	32.57	35.05%
1984	166.39	0.0427	7.41%	31.49	16.12%
1983	144.27	0.0479	20.12%	29.41	20.65%
1982	117.28	0.0595	28.96%	24.48	36.48%
1981	132.97	0.0480	-7.00%	29.37	-3.01%
1980	110.87	0.0541	25.34%	34.69	-3.81%
1979	99.71	0.0533	16.52%	43.91	-11.89%
1978	90.25	0.0532	15.80%	49.09	-2.40%
1977	103.80	0.0399	-9.06%	50.95	4.20%
1976	96.86	0.0380	10.96%	43.91	25.13%
1975	72.56	0.0507	38.56%	41.76	14.75%
1974	96.11	0.0364	-20.86%	52.54	-12.91%
1973	118.40	0.0269	-16.14%	58.51	-3.37%
1972	103.30	0.0296	17.58%	56.47	10.69%
1971	93.49	0.0332	13.81%	53.93	12.13%
1970	90.31	0.0356	7.08%	50.46	14.81%
1969	102.00	0.0306	-8.40%	62.43	-12.76%
1968	95.04	0.0313	10.45%	66.97	-0.81%
1967	84.45	0.0351	16.05%	78.69	-9.81%
1966	93.32	0.0302	-6.48%	86.57	-4.48%
1965	86.12	0.0299	11.35%	91.40	-0.91%
1964	76.45	0.0305	15.70%	92.01	3.68%
1963	65.06	0.0331	20.82%	93.56	2.61%
1962	69.07	0.0297	-2.84%	89.60	8.89%
1961	59.72	0.0328	18.94%	89.74	4.29%
1960	58.03	0.0327	6.18%	84.36	11.13%
1959	55.62	0.0324	7.57%	91.55	-3.49%
1958	41.12	0.0448	39.74%	101.22	-5.60%
1957	45.43	0.0431	-5.18%	100.70	4.49%
1956	44.15	0.0424	7.14%	113.00	-7.35%

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SCHEDULE 5 (continued) COMPARATIVE RETURNS ON S&P 500 STOCK INDEX AND MOODY'S A-RATED BONDS 1937—2001

		Stock			
	Stock	Dividend	Stock	Bond	Bond
Year	Price	Yield	Return	Price	Return
1955	35.60	0.0438	28.40%	116.77	0.20%
1954	25.46	0.0569	45.52%	112.79	7.07%
1953	26.18	0.0545	2.70%	114.24	2.24%
1952	24.19	0.0582	14.05%	113.41	4.26%
1951	21.21	0.0634	20.39%	123.44	-4.89%
1950	16.88	0.0665	32.30%	125.08	1.89%
1949	15.36	0.0620	16.10%	119.82	7.72%
1948	14.83	0.0571	9.28%	118.50	4.49%
1947	15.21	0.0449	1.99%	126.02	-2.7 9 %
1946	18.02	0.0356	-12.03%	126.74	2.59%
1945	13.49	0.0460	38.18%	119.82	9.11%
1944	11.85	0.0495	18.79%	119.82	3.34%
1943	10.09	0.0554	22.98%	118.50	4.49%
1942	8.93	0.0788	20.87%	117.63	4.14%
1941	10.55	0.0638	-8.98%	116.34	4.55%
1940	12.30	0.0458	-9.65%	112.39	7.08%
1939	12.50	0.0349	1.89%	105.75	10.05%
1938	11.31	0.0784	18.36%	99.83	9.94%
1937	17.59	0.0434	-31.36%	103.18	0.63%
Return			12.30%		6.01%
Risk Premium			6.29%		

Note: See Appendix 3 for an explanation of how stock and bond returns are derived and the source of the data presented.

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SCHEDULE 6 COMPARATIVE RETURNS ON S&P UTILITY STOCK INDEX AND MOODY'S A-RATED BONDS 1937-2001

	Stock	Stock Dividend	Stock	Bond	Bond
Year	Price	Yield	Return	Price	Return
2001	307.70	0.0287		56.40	
2000	239.17	0.0413	32.78%	52.60	14.82
1999	253.52	0.0394	-1.72%	63.03	-10.20%
1998	228.61	0.0394	15.47%	62.43	7.38%
1997	201.14	0.0492	18.58%	56.62	17.32%
1996	201.14	0.0492	3.83%	60.91	-0.48%
1995	153.87	0.0454		50.22	-0.46%
1995			37.49%		
	168.70	0.0496	-3.83%	60.01	-9.65%
1993	159.79	0.0537	10.95%	53.13	20.48%
1992	149.70	0.0572	12.46%	49.56	15.27%
1991	138.38	0.0607	14.25%	44.84	19.44%
1990	146.04	0.0558	0.33%	45.60	7.11%
1989	114.37	0.0699	34.68%	43.06	15.18%
1988	106.13	0.0704	14.80%	40.10	17.36%
1987	120.09	0.0588	-5.74%	48.92	-9.84%
1986	92.06	0.0742	37.87%	39.98	32.36%
1985	75.83	0.086	30.00%	32.57	35.05%
1984	68.50	0.0925	19.95%	31.49	16.12%
1983	61.89	0.0948	20.16%	29.41	20.65%
1982	51.81	0.1074	30.20%	24.48	36.48%
1981	52.01	0.0978	9.40%	29.37	-3.01%
1980	50.26	0.0953	13.01%	34.69	-3.81%
1979	50.33	0.0893	8.79%	43.91	-11.89%
1978	52.40	0.0791	3.96%	49.09	-2.40%
1977	54.01	0.0714	4.16%	50.95	4.20%
1976	46.9 9	0.0776	22.70%	43.91	25.13%
1975	38.19	0.092	32.24%	41.76	14.75%
1974	48.60	0.0713	-14.29%	52.54	-12.91%
1973	60.01	0.0556	-13.45%	58.51	-3.37%
1972	60.1 9	0.0542	5.12%	56.47	10.69%
1971	63.43	0.0504	-0.07%	53.93	12.13%
1970	55.72	0.0561	19.45%	50.46	14.81%
1969	68.65	0.0445	-14.38%	62.43	-12.76%
1968	68.02	0.0435	5.28%	66.97	-0.81%
1967	70.63	0.0392	0.22%	78.69	-9.81%
1966	74.50	0.0347	-1.72%	86.57	-4.48%
1965	75.87	0.0315	1.34%	91.40	-0.91%
1964	67.26	0.0331	16.11%	92.01	3.68%
1963	63.35	0.033	9.47%	93.56	2.61%
1962	62.69	0.032	4.25%	89.60	8.89%
1961	52.73	0.0358	22.47%	89.74	4.29%
1960	44.50	0.0403	22.52%	84.36	11.13%
1959	43.96	0.0377	5.00%	91.55	-3.49%
1958	33.30	0.0377	36.88%	101.22	-5.60%
1950	32.32	0.0487	7.90%	100.70	4.49%
1956	31.55	0.0487	7.16%	113.00	-7.35%
1955	29.89	0.0472	10.16%	116.77	0.20%
1955	29.69	0.0481	22.37%	112.79	7.07%

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION SCHEDULE 6 (continued) COMPARATIVE RETURNS ON S&P UTILITY STOCK INDEX AND MOODY'S A-RATED BONDS 1937-2001

Year	Stock Price	Stock Dividend Yield	Stock Return	Bond Price	Bond Return
				114.24	2.24%
1953	24.41	0.0511	9.62%		
1952	22.22	0.055	15.36%	113.41	4.26%
1951	20.01	0.0606	17.10%	123.44	-4.89%
1950	20.20	0.0554	4.60%	125.08	1.89%
1949	16.54	0.057	27.83%	119.82	7.72%
1948	16.53	0.0535	5.41%	118.50	4.49%
1947	19.21	0.0354	-10.41%	126.02	-2.79%
1946	21.34	0.0298	-7.00%	126.74	2.59%
1945	13.91	0.0448	57.89%	119.82	9.11%
1944	12.10	0.0569	20.65%	119.82	3.34%
1943	9.22	0.0621	37.45%	118.50	4.49%
1942	8.54	0.094	17.36%	117.63	4.14%
1941	13.25	0.0717	-28.38%	116.34	4.55%
1940	16.97	0.054	-16.52%	112.39	7.08%
1939	16.05	0.0553	11.26%	105.75	10.05%
1938	14.30	0.073	19.54%	99.83	9.94%
1937	24.34	0.0432	-36.93%	103.18	0.63%
Return			11.15	· ·	6.01%
Risk Premium			5.14%		
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Note: See Appendix 3 for an explanation of how stock and bond returns are derived and the source of the data presented.

Appendix 1 James H. Vander Weide The Quarterly DCF Model

THE QUARTERLY DCF MODEL

The simple DCF Model assumes that a firm pays dividends only at the end of each year. Since firms in fact pay dividends quarterly and investors appreciate the time value of money, the annual version of the DCF Model generally underestimates the value investors are willing to place on the firm's expected future dividend stream. In this appendix, we review two alternative formulations of the DCF Model that allow for the quarterly payment of dividends.

When dividends are assumed to be paid annually, the DCF Model suggests that the current price of the firm's stock is given by the expression:

$$P_{o} = \frac{D_{1}}{(1+k)} + \frac{D_{2}}{(1+k)^{2}} + \dots + \frac{D_{n}+P_{n}}{(1+k)^{n}}$$
(1)

where

Po	=	current price per share of the firm's stock,
D ₁ , D ₂ ,,D _n	=	expected annual dividends per share on the firm's stock,
Pn	=	price per share of stock at the time investors expect to sell the stock, and
k	=	return investors expect to earn on alternative investments of the same risk, i.e., the investors' required rate of return.

Unfortunately, expression (1) is rather difficult to analyze, especially for the purpose of estimating k. Thus, most analysts make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, they assume that dividends are expected to grow at the constant rate g into the indefinite future. Second, they assume that the stock price at time n is simply the present value of all dividends expected in periods subsequent to n. Third, they assume that the investors' required rate of return, k, exceeds the expected dividend growth rate g. Under the above simplifying assumptions, a firm's stock price may be written as the following sum:

$$P_o = \frac{D_o(1+g)}{(1+k)} + \frac{D_o(1+g)^2}{(1+k)^2} + \frac{D_o(1+g)^3}{(1+k)^3} + \dots , \qquad (2)$$

where the three dots indicate that the sum continues indefinitely.

As we shall demonstrate shortly, this sum may be simplified to:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_0(1+g)}{(k-g)}$$

First, however, we need to review the very useful concept of a geometric progression. Geometric Progression

Consider the sequence of numbers 3, 6, 12, 24,..., where each number after the first is obtained by multiplying the preceding number by the factor 2. Obviously, this sequence of numbers may also be expressed as the sequence 3, 3×2 , 3×2^2 , 3×2^3 , etc. This sequence is an example of a geometric progression.

<u>Definition</u>: A geometric progression is a sequence in which each term after the first is obtained by multiplying some fixed number, called the common ratio, by the preceding term.

A general notation for geometric progressions is: a, the first term, r, the common ratio, and n, the number of terms. Using this notation, any geometric progression may be represented by the sequence:

In studying the DCF Model, we will find it useful to have an expression for the sum of n terms of a geometric progression. Call this sum S_n . Then

$$S_n = a + ar + ... + ar^{n-1}$$
. (3)

However, this expression can be simplified by multiplying both sides of equation (3) by r and then subtracting the new equation from the old. Thus,

$$rS_n = ar + ar^2 + ar^3 + ... + ar^n$$

and

 $S_n - rS_n = a - ar^n$

or

$$(1 - r) S_n = a (1 - r^n)$$

Solving for S_n , we obtain:

$$S_n = \frac{a(1-r^n)}{(1-r)}$$
 (4)

as a simple expression for the sum of n terms of a geometric progression. Furthermore, if |r| < 1, then S_n is finite, and as n approaches infinity, S_n approaches a \div (1-r). Thus, for a geometric progression with an infinite number of terms and |r| < 1, equation (4) becomes:

$$S = \frac{a}{1 - r} \qquad (5)$$

Application to DCF Model

Comparing equation (2) with equation (3), we see that the firm's stock price (under the DCF assumption) is the sum of an infinite geometric progression with the first term

$$a = \frac{D_o(1+g)}{(1+k)}$$

and common factor

$$r = \frac{(1+g)}{(1+k)}$$

Applying equation (5) for the sum of such a geometric progression, we obtain

$$S = a \bullet \frac{1}{(1-r)} = \frac{D_o(1+g)}{(1+k)} \bullet \frac{1}{1-\frac{1+g}{1+k}} = \frac{D_o(1+g)}{(1+k)} \bullet \frac{1+k}{k-g} = \frac{D_o(1+g)}{k-g}$$


as we suggested earlier.

Quarterly DCF Model

The Annual DCF Model assumes that dividends grow at an annual rate of g% per year (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

Annual DCF Model




Year

 $D_0 = 4d_0$

 $D_1 = D_0(1 + g)$

Figure 2



In the Quarterly DCF Model, it is natural to assume that quarterly dividend payments differ from the preceding quarterly dividend by the factor $(1 + g)^{.25}$, where g

is expressed in terms of percent per year and the decimal .25 indicates that the growth has only occurred for one quarter of the year. (See Figure 2.) Using this assumption, along with the assumption of constant growth and k > g, we obtain a new expression for the firm's stock price, which takes account of the quarterly payment of dividends. This expression is:

$$P_{o} = \frac{d_{o}(1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}}{(1+k)^{\frac{1}{4}}} + \frac{d_{o}(1+g)^{\frac{2}{4}}}{(1+k)^{\frac{2}{4}}} + \frac{d_{o}(1+g)^{\frac{3}{4}}}{(1+k)^{\frac{3}{4}}} + \dots$$
(6)

where d_0 is the last quarterly dividend payment, rather than the last annual dividend payment. (We use a lower case d to remind the reader that this is not the annual dividend.)

Although equation (6) looks formidable at first glance, it too can be greatly simplified using the formula [equation (4)] for the sum of an infinite geometric progression. As the reader can easily verify, equation (6) can be simplified to:

$$P_{0} = \frac{d_{0}(1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}}{(1+k)^{\frac{1}{4}} - (1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}}$$
(7)

Solving equation (7) for k, we obtain a DCF formula for estimating the cost of equity under the quarterly dividend assumption:

$$k = \left[\frac{d_0 (1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}}}{P_0} + (1+g)^{\frac{1}{4}} \right]^4 - 1 \quad (8)$$

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Appendix 1 James H. Vander Weide The Quarterly DCF Model


An Alternative Quarterly DCF Model

Although the constant growth Quarterly DCF Model [equation (8)] allows for the quarterly timing of dividend payments, it does require the assumption that the firm increases its dividend payments each quarter. Since this assumption is difficult for some analysts to accept, we now discuss a second Quarterly DCF Model that allows for constant quarterly dividend payments within each dividend year.

Assume then that the firm pays dividends quarterly and that each dividend payment is constant for four consecutive quarters. There are four cases to consider, with each case distinguished by varying assumptions about where we are evaluating the firm in relation to the time of its next dividend increase. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3


Quarterly DCF Model (Constant Dividend Version)



Year

 $d_1 = d_2 = d_3 = d_4 = d_0(1+g)$





Year


 $d_1 = d_0$


 $d_2 = d_3 = d_4 = d_0(1+g)$


- 8 -

Figure 3 (continued)









Year

 $d_1 = d_2 = d_3 = d_0$ $d_4 = d_0(1+g)$ If we assume that the investor invests the quarterly dividend in an alternative investment of the same risk, then the amount accumulated by the end of the year will in all cases be given by

$$D_{1}^{*} = d_{1} (1+k)^{3/4} + d_{2} (1+k)^{1/2} + d_{3} (1+k)^{1/4} + d_{4}$$

where d_1 , d_2 , d_3 and d_4 are the four quarterly dividends. Under these new assumptions, the firm's stock price may be expressed by an Annual DCF Model of the form (2), with the exception that

$$D_1^* = d_1 (1 + k)^{3/4} + d_2 (1 + k)^{1/2} + d_3 (1 + k)^{1/4} + d_4$$
 (9)

is used in place of $D_0(1+g)$. But, we already know that the Annual DCF Model may be reduced to

$$P_o = \frac{D_o(1+g)}{k-g}$$

Thus, under the assumptions of the second Quarterly DCF Model, the firm's cost of equity is given by

$$k = \frac{D_1^*}{P_0} + g (10)$$

with D_1^* given by (9).

Although equation (10) looks like the Annual DCF Model, there are at least two very important practical differences. First, since D_1^* is always greater than $D_0(1+g)$, the estimates of the cost of equity are always larger (and more accurate) in the Quarterly Model (10) than in the Annual Model. Second, since D_1^* depends on k through equation (9), the unknown "k" appears on both sides of (10), and an iterative procedure is required to solve for k.

ADJUSTING FOR FLOTATION COSTS IN DETERMINING A PUBLIC UTILITY'S ALLOWED RATE OF RETURN ON EQUITY

I. Introduction

Regulation of public utilities is guided by the principle that utility revenues should be sufficient to allow recovery of all prudently incurred expenses, including the cost of capital. As set forth in the 1944 *Hope Natural Gas* Case [*Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas* Co. 320 U. S. 591 (1944) at 603], the U. S. Supreme Court states:

From the investor or company point of view it is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business. These include service on the debt and dividends on the stock....By that standard the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks.

Since the flotation costs arising from the issuance of debt and equity securities are an integral component of capital costs, this standard requires that the company's revenues be sufficient to fully recover flotation costs.

Despite the widespread agreement that flotation costs should be recovered in the regulatory process, several issues still need to be resolved. These include:

- 1. How is the term "flotation costs" defined? Does it include only the outof-pocket costs associated with issuing securities (e. g., legal fees, printing costs, selling and underwriting expenses), or does it also include the reduction in a security's price that frequently accompanies flotation (i. e., market pressure)?
- 2. What should be the time pattern of cost recovery? Should a company be allowed to recover flotation costs immediately, or should flotation costs be recovered over the life of the issue?
- 3. For the purposes of regulatory accounting, should flotation costs be included as an expense? As an addition to rate base? Or as an additional element of a firm's allowed rate of return?
- 4. Do existing regulatory methods for flotation cost recovery allow a firm *full* recovery of flotation costs?

In this paper, I review the literature pertaining to the above issues and discuss my own views regarding how this literature applies to the cost of equity for a regulated firm.

II. Definition of Flotation Cost

The value of a firm is related to the future stream of net cash flows (revenues minus expenses measured on a cash basis) that can be derived from its assets. In the process of acquiring assets, a firm incurs certain expenses which reduce its value. Some of these expenses or costs are directly associated with revenue production in one period (e. g., wages, cost of goods sold), others are more properly associated with revenue production in many periods (e. g., the acquisition cost of plant and equipment). In either case, the word "cost" refers to any item that reduces the value of a firm.

If this concept is applied to the act of issuing new securities to finance asset purchases, many items are properly included in issuance or flotation costs. These include: (1) compensation received by investment bankers for underwriting services, (2) legal fees, (3) accounting fees, (4) engineering fees, (5) trustee's fees, (6) listing fees, (7) printing and engraving expenses, (8) SEC registration fees, (9) Federal Revenue Stamps, (10) state taxes, (11) warrants granted to underwriters as extra compensation, (12) postage expenses, (13) employees' time, (14) market pressure, and (15) the offer discount. The finance literature generally divides these flotation cost items into three categories, namely, underwriting expenses, issuer expenses, and price effects.

III. Magnitude of Flotation Costs

The finance literature contains several studies of the magnitude of the flotation costs associated with new debt and equity issues. These studies differ primarily with regard to the time period studied, the sample of companies included, and the source of data. The flotation cost studies generally agree, however, that for large issues, underwriting expenses represent approximately one and one-half percent of the proceeds of debt issues and three to five percent of the proceeds of seasoned equity issues. They also agree that issuer expenses represent approximately 0.5 percent of both debt and equity issues, and that the announcement of an equity issue reduces the company's stock price by at least two to three percent of the proceeds from the stock issue. Thus, total flotation costs represent approximately two percent¹ of the proceeds from debt issues, and five and one-half to eight and one-half percent of the proceeds of equity issues.

Lee *et. al.* [14] is an excellent example of the type of flotation cost studies found in the finance literature. The Lee study is a comprehensive recent study of the underwriting and issuer costs associated with debt and equity issues for both utilities and non-utilities. The results of the Lee *et. al.* study are reproduced in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 demonstrates that the total underwriting and issuer expenses for the

¹ The two percent flotation cost on debt only recognizes the cost of newly-issued debt. When interest rates decline, many companies exercise the call provisions on higher cost debt and reissue debt at lower rates. This process involves reacquisition costs that are not included in the academic studies. If reacquisition costs were included in the academic studies, debt flotation costs could increase significantly.

1,092 debt issues in their study averaged 2.24 percent of the proceeds of the issues, while the total underwriting and issuer costs for the 1,593 seasoned equity issues in their study averaged 7.11 percent of the proceeds of the new issue. Table 1 also demonstrates that the total underwriting and issuer costs of seasoned equity offerings, as a percent of proceeds, decline with the size of the issue. For issues above \$60 million, total underwriting and issuer costs amount to from three to five percent of the amount of the proceeds.

Table 2 reports the total underwriting and issuer expenses for 135 utility debt issues and 136 seasoned utility equity issues. Total underwriting and issuer expenses for utility bond offerings averaged 1.47 percent of the amount of the proceeds and for seasoned utility equity offerings averaged 4.92 percent of the amount of the proceeds. Again, there are some economies of scale associated with larger equity offerings. Total underwriting and issuer expenses for equity offerings in excess of 40 million dollars generally range from three to four percent of the proceeds.

The results of the Lee study for large equity issues are consistent with results of earlier studies by Bhagat and Frost [4], Mikkelson and Partch [17], and Smith [24]. Bhagat and Frost found that total underwriting and issuer expenses average approximately four and one-half percent of the amount of proceeds from negotiated utility offerings during the period 1973 to 1980, and approximately three and one-half percent of the amount of the proceeds from competitive utility offerings over the same period. Mikkelson and Partch found that total underwriting and issuer expenses average five and one-half percent of the proceeds from seasoned equity offerings over the 1972 to 1982 period. Smith found that total underwriting and issuer expenses for larger equity issues generally amount to four to five percent of the proceeds of the new issue.

The finance literature also contains numerous studies of the decline in price associated with sales of large blocks of stock to the public. These articles relate to the price impact of: (1) initial public offerings; (2) the sale of large blocks of stock from one investor to another; and (3) the issuance of seasoned equity issues to the general public. All of these studies generally support the notion that the announcement of the sale of large blocks of stock produces a decline in a company's share price. The decline in share price for initial public offerings; and the decline in share price for seasoned equity offerings; and the decline in share price for public utilities. A comprehensive study of the magnitude of the decline in share price associated specifically with the sale of new equity by public utilities is reported in Pettway [19], who found the market pressure effect for a sample of 368 public utility equity sales to be in the range of two to three percent. This decline in price is a real cost to the utility, because the proceeds to the utility depend on the stock price on the day of issue.

In addition to the price decline associated with the announcement of a new equity issue, the finance literature recognizes that there is also a price decline associated with the actual issuance of equity securities. In particular, underwriters typically sell seasoned new equity securities to investors at a price lower than the closing market

- 3 -

price on the day preceding the issue. The Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association of Securities Dealers require that underwriters not sell shares at a price above the offer price. Since the offer price represents a binding constraint to the underwriter, the underwriter tends to set the offer price slightly below the market price on the day of issue to compensate for the risk that the price received by the underwriter may go down, but can not increase. Smith provides evidence that the offer discount tends to be between 0.5 and 0.8 percent of the proceeds of an equity issue. I am not aware of any similar studies for debt issues.

In summary, the finance literature provides strong support for the conclusion that total underwriting and issuer expenses for public utility debt offerings represent approximately two percent of the amount of the proceeds, while total underwriting and issuer expenses for public utility equity offerings represent at least four to five percent of the amount of the proceeds. In addition, the finance literature supports the conclusion that the cost associated with the decline in stock price at the announcement date represents approximately two to three percent as a result of a large public utility equity issue.

IV. TIME PATTERN OF FLOTATION COST RECOVERY

Although flotation costs are incurred only at the time a firm issues new securities, there is no reason why an issuing firm ought to recognize the expense only in the current period. In fact, if assets purchased with the proceeds of a security issue produce revenues over many years, a sound argument can be made in favor of recognizing flotation expenses over a reasonably lengthy period of time. Such recognition is certainly consistent with the generally accepted accounting principle that the time pattern of expenses match the time pattern of revenues, and it is also consistent with the normal treatment of debt flotation expenses in both regulated and unregulated industries.

In the context of a regulated firm, it should be noted that there are many possible time patterns for the recovery of flotation expenses. However, if it is felt that flotation expenses are most appropriately recovered over a period of years, then it should be recognized that investors must also be compensated for the passage of time. That is to say, the value of an investor's capital will be reduced if the expenses are merely distributed over time, without any allowance for the time value of money.

V. ACCOUNTING FOR FLOTATION COST IN A REGULATORY SETTING

In a regulatory setting, a firm's revenue requirements are determined by the equation:

Revenue Requirement = Total Expenses + Allowed Rate of Return x Rate Base

Thus, there are three ways in which an issuing firm can account for and recover its flotation expenses: (1) treat flotation expenses as a current expense and recover them immediately; (2) include flotation expenses in rate base and recover them over

time; and (3) adjust the allowed rate of return upward and again recover flotation expenses over time. Before considering methods currently being used to recover flotation expenses in a regulatory setting, I shall briefly consider the advantages and disadvantages of these three basic recovery methods.

Expenses. Treating flotation costs as a current expense has several advantages. Because it allows for recovery at the time the expense occurs, it is not necessary to compute amortized balances over time and to debate which interest rate should be applied to these balances. A firm's stockholders are treated fairly, and so are the firm's customers, because they pay neither more nor less than the actual flotation expense. Since flotation costs are relatively small compared to the total revenue requirement, treatment as a current expense does not cause unusual rate hikes in the year of flotation, as would the introduction of a large generating plant in a state that does not allow Construction Work in Progress in rate base.

On the other hand, there are two major disadvantages of treating flotation costs as a current expense. First, since the asset purchased with the acquired funds will likely generate revenues for many years into the future, it seems unfair that current ratepayers should bear the full cost of issuing new securities, when future ratepayers share in the benefits. Second, this method requires an estimate of the underpricing effect on each security issue. Given the difficulties involved in measuring the extent of underpricing, it may be more accurate to estimate the average underpricing allowance for many securities than to estimate the exact figure for one security.

Rate Base. In an article in *Public Utilities Fortnightly*, Bierman and Hass [5] recommend that flotation costs be treated as an intangible asset that is included in a firm's rate base along with the assets acquired with the stock proceeds. This approach has many advantages. For ratepayers, it provides a better match between benefits and expenses: the future ratepayers who benefit from the financing costs contribute the revenues to recover these costs. For investors, if the allowed rate of return is equal to the investors' required rate of return, it is also theoretically fair since they are compensated for the opportunity cost of their investment (including both the time value of money and the investment risk).

Despite the compelling advantages of this method of cost recovery, there are several disadvantages that probably explain why it has not been used in practice. First, a firm will only recover the proper amount for flotation expenses if the rate base is multiplied by the appropriate cost of capital. To the extent that a commission under or over estimates the cost of capital, a firm will under or over recover its flotation expenses. Second, it is may be both legally and psychologically difficult for commissioners to include an intangible asset in a firm's rate base. According to established legal doctrine, assets are to be included in rate base only if they are "used and useful" in the public service. It is unclear whether intangible assets such as flotation expenses meet this criterion.

<u>Rate of Return</u>. The prevailing practice among state regulators is to treat flotation expenses as an additional element of a firm's cost of capital or allowed rate of

return. This method is similar to the second method above (treatment in rate base) in that some part of the initial flotation cost is amortized over time. However, it has a disadvantage not shared by the rate base method. If flotation cost is included in rate base, it is fairly easy to keep track of the flotation cost on each new equity issue and see how it is recovered over time. Using the rate of return method, it is not possible to track the flotation cost for specific issues because the flotation cost for a specific issue is never recorded. Thus, it is not clear to participants whether a current allowance is meant to recover (1) flotation costs actually incurred in a test period, (2) expected future flotation costs, or (3) past flotation costs. This confusion never arises in the treatment of debt flotation costs. Because the exact costs are recorded and explicitly amortized over time, participants recognize that current allowances for debt flotation costs are meant to recover some fraction of the flotation costs on all past debt issues.

VI. EXISTING REGULATORY METHODS

Although most state commissions prefer to let a regulated firm recover flotation expenses through an adjustment to the allowed rate of return, there is considerable controversy about the magnitude of the required adjustment. The following are some of the most frequently asked questions: (1) Should an adjustment to the allowed return be made every year, or should the adjustment be made only in those years in which new equity is raised? (2) Should an adjusted rate of return be applied to the entire rate base, or should it be applied only to that portion of the rate base financed with paid-in capital (as opposed to retained earnings)? (3) What is the appropriate formula for adjusting the rate of return?

This section reviews several methods of allowing for flotation cost recovery. Since the regulatory methods of allowing for recovery of debt flotation costs is well known and widely accepted, I will begin my discussion of flotation cost recovery procedures by describing the widely accepted procedure of allowing for debt flotation cost recovery.

Debt Flotation Costs

Regulators uniformly recognize that companies incur flotation costs when they issue debt securities. They typically allow recovery of debt flotation costs by making an adjustment to both the cost of debt and the rate base (see Brigham [6]). Assume that: (1) a regulated company issues \$100 million in bonds that mature in 10 years; (2) the interest rate on these bonds is seven percent; and (3) flotation costs represent four percent of the amount of the proceeds. Then the cost of debt for regulatory purposes will generally be calculated as follows:

- $E_t = total earnings in year t$
- D_t = total cash dividends at time t
- b = $(E_t D_t) \div E_t$ = retention rate, expressed as a fraction of earnings
- h = new equity issues, expressed as a fraction of earnings
- m = equity investment rate, expressed as a fraction of earnings, m = b + h < 1
 - = flotation costs, expressed as a fraction of the value of an issue.

Because of flotation costs, Arzac and Marcus assume that a firm must issue a greater amount of external equity each year than it actually needs. In terms of the above notation, a firm issues $hE_t + (1-f)$ to obtain hE_t in external equity funding. Thus, each year a firm loses:

Equation 3

$$L = \frac{hE_t}{1-f} - hE_t = \frac{f}{1-f} \times hE_t$$

due to flotation expenses. The present value, V, of all future flotation expenses is:

Equation 4

$$V = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{fhE_t}{(1-f)(1+k)^t} = \frac{fh}{1-f} \times \frac{rK_0}{k-mr}$$

To avoid diluting the value of the initial stockholder's equity, a regulatory authority needs to find the value of r, a firm's allowed return on equity base, that equates the value of equity net of flotation costs to the initial equity base ($S_f = K_0$). Since the value of equity net of flotation costs equals the value of equity in the absence of flotation costs minus the present value of flotation costs, a regulatory authority needs to find that value of *r* that solves the following equation:

$$S_f = S - L_s$$

This value is:

f

Equation 5

$$r = \frac{k}{1 - \frac{fh}{1 - f}}$$

To illustrate the Arzac-Marcus approach to adjusting the allowed return on equity for the effect of flotation costs, suppose that the cost of equity in the absence of flotation costs is 12 percent. Furthermore, assume that a firm obtains external equity financing each year equal to 10 percent of its earnings and that flotation expenses equal 5 percent of the value of each issue. Then, according to Arzac and Marcus, the allowed return on equity should be:

$$r = \frac{.12}{1 - \frac{(.05).(.1)}{.95}} = .1206 = 12.06\%$$

Summary. With respect to the three questions raised at the beginning of this section, it is evident that Arzac and Marcus believe the flotation cost adjustment should be applied each year, since continuous external equity financing is a fundamental assumption of their model. They also believe that the adjusted rate of return should be applied to the entire equity-financed portion of the rate base because their model is based on the assumption that the flotation cost adjustment mechanism will be applied to the entire equity financed portion of the rate base. Finally, Arzac and Marcus recommend a flotation cost adjustment formula, Equation (3), that implicitly excludes recovery of financing costs associated with financing in previous periods and includes only an allowance for the fraction of equity financing obtained from external sources.

Patterson. The Arzac-Marcus flotation cost adjustment formula is significantly different from the conventional approach (found in many introductory textbooks) which recommends the adjustment equation:

Equation 6

$$r = \frac{D_t}{P_{t-1}(1-f)} + g$$

where P_{t-1} is the stock price in the previous period and *g* is the expected dividend growth rate. Patterson [18] compares the Arzac-Marcus adjustment formula to the conventional approach and reaches the conclusion that the Arzac-Marcus formula effectively expenses issuance costs as they are incurred, while the conventional approach effectively amortizes them over an assumed infinite life of the equity issue. Thus, the conventional formula is similar to the formula for the recovery of debt flotation costs: it is not meant to compensate investors for the flotation costs of future issues, but instead is meant to compensate investors for the flotation costs of previous issues. Patterson argues that the conventional approach is more appropriate for rate making purposes because the plant purchased with external equity funds will yield benefits over many future periods.

Illustration. To illustrate the Patterson approach to flotation cost recovery, assume that a newly organized utility sells an initial issue of stock for \$100 per share, and that the utility plans to finance all new investments with retained earnings. Assume also that: (1) the initial dividend per share is six dollars; (2) the expected long-run dividend growth rate is six percent; (3) the flotation cost is five percent of the amount of the proceeds; and (4) the payout ratio is 51.28 percent. Then, the investor's required rate of return on equity is [k = (D/P) + g = 6 percent + 6 percent = 12

percent]; and the flotation-cost-adjusted cost of equity is [6 percent (1/.95) + 6 percent = 12.316 percent].

The effects of the Patterson adjustment formula on the utility's rate base, dividends, earnings, and stock price are shown in Table 3. We see that the Patterson formula allows earnings and dividends to grow at the expected six percent rate. We also see that the present value of expected future dividends, \$100, is just sufficient to induce investors to part with their money. If the present value of expected future dividends were less than \$100, investors would not have been willing to invest \$100 in the firm. Furthermore, the present value of future dividends will only equal \$100 if the firm is allowed to earn the 12.316 percent flotation-cost-adjusted cost of equity on its entire rate base.

Summary. Patterson's opinions on the three issues raised in this section are in stark contrast to those of Arzac and Marcus. He believes that: (1) a flotation cost adjustment should be applied in every year, regardless of whether a firm issues any new equity in each year; (2) a flotation cost adjustment should be applied to the entire equity-financed portion of the rate base, including that portion financed by retained earnings; and (3) the rate of return adjustment formula should allow a firm to recover an appropriate fraction of all previous flotation expenses.

VII. CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the literature and analyzed flotation cost issues, I conclude that:

Definition of Flotation Cost: A regulated firm should be allowed to recover both the total underwriting and issuance expenses associated with issuing securities and the cost of market pressure.

<u>Time Pattern of Flotation Cost Recovery</u>. Shareholders are indifferent between the alternatives of immediate recovery of flotation costs and recovery over time, as long as they are fairly compensated for the opportunity cost of their money. This opportunity cost must include both the time value of money and a risk premium for equity investments of this nature.

Regulatory Recovery of Flotation Costs. The Patterson approach to recovering flotation costs is the only rate-of-return-adjustment approach that meets the *Hope* case criterion that a regulated company's revenues must be sufficient to allow the company an opportunity to recover all prudently incurred expenses, including the cost of capital. The Patterson approach is also the only rate-of-return-adjustment approach that provides an incentive for investors to invest in the regulated company.

Implementation of a Flotation Cost Adjustment. As noted earlier, prevailing regulatory practice seems to be to allow the recovery of flotation costs through an adjustment to the required rate of return. My review of the literature on this subject indicates that there are at least two recommended methods of making this adjustment: the Patterson approach and the Arzac-Marcus approach. The Patterson approach assumes that a firm's flotation expenses on new equity issues are treated in the same manner as flotation expenses on new bond issues, i. e., they are amortized over future time periods. If this assumption is true (and I believe it is), then the flotation cost adjustment should be applied to a firm's entire equity base, including retained earnings. In practical terms, the Patterson approach produces an increase in a firm's cost of equity of approximately thirty basis points. The Arzac-Marcus approach assumes that flotation costs on new equity issues are recovered entirely in the year in which the securities are sold. Under the Arzac-Marcus assumption, a firm should not be allowed any adjustments for flotation costs associated with previous flotations. Instead, a firm should be allowed only an adjustment on future security sales as they occur. Under reasonable assumptions about the rate of new equity sales, this method produces an increase in the cost of equity of approximately six basis points. Since the Arzac-Marcus approach does not allow the company to recover the entire amount of its flotation cost, I recommend that this approach be rejected and the Patterson approach be accepted.

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Table 1

Direct Costs as a Percentage of Gross Proceeds for Equity (IPOs and SEOs) and Straight and Convertible Bonds Offered by Domestic Operating Companies 1990----1994²

	IPOs				SEOs				
	No.		Other	Total	No.		Other	Total	
Proceeds	of	Gross	Direct	Direct	of	Gross	Direct	Direct	
(\$ in millions)	lssues	Spreads	Expenses	Costs	Issues	Spreads	Expenses	Costs	
2-9.99	337	9.05%	7.91%	16.96%	167	7.72%	5.56%	13.28%	
10-19.99	389	7.24%	4.39%	11.63%	310	6.23%	2.49%	8.72%	
20-39.99	533	7.01%	2.69%	9.70%	425	5.60%	1.33%	6.93%	
40-59.99	215	6.96%	1.76%	8.72%	261	5.05%	0.82%	5.87%	
60-79.99	79	6.74%	1.46%	8.20%	143	4.57%	0.61%	5.18%	
80-99.99	51	6.47%	1.44%	7.91%	71	4.25%	0.48%	4.73%	
100-199.99	106	6.03%	1.03%	7.06%	152	3.85%	0.37%	4.22%	
200-499.99	47	5.67%	0.86%	6.53%	55	3.26%	0.21%	3.47%	
500 and up	10	5.21%	0.51%	5.72%	9	3.03%	0.12%	3.15%	
Total/Average	1,767	7.31%	3.69%	11.00%	1,593	5.44%	1.67%	7.11%	

Equities

Bonds

	Convertible Bonds				Straight Bonds			
	No.		Other	Total	No.		Other	Total
Proceeds	of	Gross	Direct	Direct	of	Gross	Direct	Direct
(\$ in millions)	Issues	Spreads	Expenses	Costs	Issues	Spreads	Expenses	Costs
2-9.99	4	6.07%	2.68%	8.75%	32	2.07%	2.32%	4.39%
10-19.99	14	5.48%	3.18%	8.66%	78	1.36%	1.40%	2.76%
20-39.99	18	4.16%	1.95%	6.11%	89	1.54%	0.88%	2.42%
40-59.99	28	3.26%	1.04%	4.30%	90	0.72%	0.60%	1.32%
60-79.99	47	2.64%	0.59%	3.23%	92	1.76%	0.58%	2.34%
80-99.99	13	2.43%	0.61%	3.04%	112	1.55%	0.61%	2.16%
100-199.99	57	2.34%	0.42%	2.76%	409	1.77%	0.54%	2.31%
200-499.99	27	1.99%	0.19%	2.18%	170	1.79%	0.40%	2.19%
500 and up	3	2.00%	0.09%	2.09%	20	1.39%	0.25%	1.64%
Total/Average	211	2.92%	0.87%	3.79%	1,092	1.62%	0.62%	2.24%

Notes:

Closed-end funds and unit offerings are excluded from the sample. Rights offerings for SEOs are also excluded. Bond offerings do not include securities backed by mortgages and issues by Federal agencies. Only firm commitment offerings and non-shelf-registered offerings are included.

Gross Spreads as a percentage of total proceeds, including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession. Other Direct Expenses as a percentage of total proceeds, including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession. Total Direct Costs as a percentage of total proceeds (total direct costs are the sum of gross spreads and other direct expenses).

² Inmoo Lee, Scott Lochhead, Jay Ritter, and Quanshui Zhao, "The Costs of Raising Capital," *Journal of Financial Research* Vol 19 No 1 (Spring 1996) pp. 59-74.

Appendix 2 James H. Vander Weide Adjusting for Flotation Costs

Table 2

Direct Costs of Raising Capital 1990—1994 Utility versus Non-Utility Companies³

Equities									
Non-Utilities	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	IPOs		SEOs					
				No.		Total			
Proceeds	No.			Of		Direct			
(\$ in millions)	of Issues	Gross Spreads	Total Direct Costs	Issues	Gross Spreads				
2-9.99	332	9.04%	16.97%	154		13.76%			
10-19.99	388	7.24%	11.64%	278		9.01%			
20-39.99	528	7.01%	9.70%	399		7.07%			
40-59.99	214	6.96%	8.71%	240		6.02%			
60-79.99	78	6.74%	8.21%	131	4.68%	5.31%			
80-99.99	47	6.46%	7.88%	60	4.35%	4.84%			
100-199.99	101	6.01%	7.01%	137	3.97%	4.36%			
200-499.99	44	5.65%	6.49%	50	3.27%	3.48%			
500 and up	10	5.21%	5.72%	8	3.12%	3.25%			
Total/Average	1,742	7.31%	11.01%	1,457	5.57%	7.32%			
Utilities Only									
2-9.99	5	9.40%	16.54%	13					
10-19.99	1	7.00%	8.77%	32	to the second				
20-39.99	5	7.00%	9.86%	26					
40-59.99	1	6.98%	11.55%	21	3.69%				
60-79.99	1	6.50%	7.55%	12	3.39%	3.72%			
80-99.99	4	6.57%	8.24%	11	3.68%				
100-199.99	5	6.45%	7.96%	15					
200-499.99	3	5.88%	7.00%	5					
500 and up	0			1	2.25%				
Total/Average	25	7.15%	10.14%	136	4.01%	4.92%			

Equities

³ Lee et al, op. cit.

Table 2 (continued) Direct Costs of Raising Capital 1990----1994 Utility versus Non-Utility Companies⁴

			Bonds				
Non-Utilities		Convertible Bo	nds	Straight Bonds			
Proceeds (\$ in millions)	No. of Issues	Gross Spreads	Total Direct Costs	No. of Issues	Gross Spreads	Total Direct Costs	
2-9.99	4	6.07%	8.75%	29	2.07%	4.53%	
10-19.99	12	5.54%	8.65%	47	1.70%	3.28%	
20-39.99	16	4.20%	6.23%	63	1.59%	2.52%	
40-59.99	28	3.26%	4.30%	76	0.73%	1.37%	
60-79.99	47	2.64%	3.23%	84	1.84%	2.44%	
80-99.99	12	2.54%	3.19%	104	1.61%	2.25%	
100-199.99	55	2.34%	2.77%	381	1.83%	2.38%	
200-499.99	26	1.97%	2.16%	154	1.87%	2.27%	
500 and up	3	2.00%	2.09%	19	1.28%	1.53%	
Total/Average	203	2.90%	3.75%	957	1.70%	2.34%	
Utilities Only	<u> </u>						
2-9.99	0			3	2.00%	3.28%	
10-19.99	2	5.13%	8.72%	31	0.86%	the second s	
20-39.99	2	3.88%	<u>5.18</u> %	26	<u>1.40%</u>	2.06%	
40-59.99	0			14	0.63%	1.10%	
60-79.99	0			8	0.87%	1.13%	
80-99.99	1	1.13%	1.34%	8	0.71%	0.98%	
100-199.99	2	2.50%	2.74%	28	1.06%	1.42%	
200-499.99	1	2.50%	2.65%	16	1.00%		
500 and up	0			1	3.50%		
Total/Average	8	3.33%	4.66%	135	1.04%	<u> </u>	

Bonds

Notes:

Total proceeds raised in the United States, excluding proceeds from the exercise of over allotment options. Gross spreads as a percentage of total proceeds (including management fee, underwriting fee, and selling concession). Other direct expenses as a percentage of total proceeds (including registration fee and printing, legal, and auditing costs).

Lee et al, op. cit.

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Not available because of missing data on other direct expenses.

		Earnings	Earnings		
	Rate	@	@		Amortization
Time Period	Base	12.32%	12.00%	Dividends	Initial FC
0	95.00				
1	100.70	11.70	11.40	6.00	0.3000
2	106.74	12.40	12.08	6.36	0.3180
3	113.15	13.15	12.81	6.74	0.3371
4	119.94	13.93	13.58	7.15	0.3573
5	127.13	14.77	14.39	7.57	0.3787
6	134.76	15.66	15.26	8.03	0.4015
7	142.84	16.60	16.17	8.51	0.4256
8	151.42	17.59	17.14	9.02	0.4511
9	160.50	18.65	18,17	9.56	0.4782
10	170.13	19.77	19.26	10.14	0.5068
11	180.34	20.95	20.42	10.75	0.5373
12	191.16	22.21	21.64	11.39	0.5695
13	202.63	23.54	22.94	12.07	0.6037
14	214.79	24,96	24,32	12.80	0.6399
15	227.67	26.45	25.77	13.57	0.6783
16	241.33	28.04	27.32	14.38	0.7190
17	255.81	29.72	28.96	15.24	0.7621
18	271.16	31.51	30,70	16.16	0.8078
19	287.43	33.40	32.54	17.13	0.8563
20	304.68	35.40	34.49	18.15	0.9077
21	322.96	37.52	36.56	19.24	0.9621
22	342.34	39.77	38.76	20.40	1.0199
23	362.88	42.16	41.08	21.62	1.0811
24	384.65	44.69	43.55	22.92	1.1459
25	407.73	47.37	46.16	24.29	1.2147
26	432.19	50.21	48.93	25.75	1.2876
27	458.12	53.23	51.86	27.30	1.3648
28	485.61	56.42	54.97	28.93	1.4467
29	514.75	59.81	58.27	30.67	1.5335
30	545.63	63.40	61.77	32.51	1.6255
Present Value@12%		195.00	190.00	100.00	5.00

Table 3Illustration of Patterson Approach to Flotation Cost Recovery

Risk Premium Approach

Source

Stock price and yield information is obtained from Standard & Poor's Security Price publication. Standard & Poor's derives the stock dividend yield by dividing the aggregate cash dividends (based on the latest known annual rate) by the aggregate market value of the stocks in the group. The bond price information is obtained by calculating the present value of a bond due in 30 years with a \$4.00 coupon and a yield to maturity of a particular year's indicated Moody's A-rated Utility bond yield. The values shown on Schedules 5 and 6 are the January values of the respective indices.

Calculation of Stock and Bond Returns

Sample calculation of "Stock Return" column:

 $Stock Return (2000) = \begin{bmatrix} Stock Price (2001) - Stock Price (2000) + Dividend (2000) \\ Stock Price (2000) \end{bmatrix}$

where Dividend (2000) = Stock Price (2000) x Stock Div. Yield (2000)

Sample calculation of "Bond Return" column:

Bond Return (2000) = $\left[\frac{\text{Bond Price (2001) - Bond Price (2000) + Interest (2000)}}{\text{Bond Price (2000)}}\right]$

where Interest = \$4.00.

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