BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Review of GridFlorida Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) Proposal.	DOCKET NO. 020233-EI ORDER NO. PSC-03-1006-FOF-EI ISSUED: September 8, 2003

The following Commissioners participated in the disposition of this matter:

LILA A. JABER, Chairman
J. TERRY DEASON
BRAULIO L. BAEZ
RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY

ORDER DENYING AND GRANTING MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION AND CLARIFYING ORDER NO. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI

BY THE COMMISSION:

BACKGROUND

In December 1999, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued Order No. 2000, which required all public utilities that own, operate, or control interstate transmission facilities to file by October 16, 2000, a proposal to participate in a regional transmission organization (RTO). In response to Order No. 2000, Florida Power Corporation, now known as Progress Energy Florida, Inc. (PEFI), Florida Power & Light Company (FPL), and Tampa Electric Company (TECO) (collectively, the Applicants or GridFlorida Companies) developed a Peninsular Florida RTO proposal referred to as GridFlorida (the Transco filing).

On October 3-5, 2001, we held an evidentiary hearing in Docket Nos. 000824-EI, 001148-EI, and 010577-EI to determine the prudence of the formation of and the participation in the proposed GridFlorida RTO by the Applicants. As a result of the hearing, we issued Order No. PSC-01-2489-FOF-EI on December 20, 2001 (Order No. PSC-01-2489-FOF-EI or December 20 Order). Based on the evidence in the record, we found that a Peninsular Florida RTO was more appropriate for Florida's utilities and ratepayers than a larger, regional RTO at this time. Further, as a policy matter, we noted

our support for the formation of an RTO to facilitate the development of a competitive wholesale energy market in Florida. We found, in part, that the Applicants were prudent in proactively forming GridFlorida. The Applicants were ordered to file a modified RTO proposal that conformed the GridFlorida proposal to the findings of the Order and used an independent system operator (ISO) structure in which each utility maintains ownership of its transmission facilities. The modified proposal was due 90 days following the issuance of the Order. A new generic docket, Docket No. 020233-EI, was opened to address the modified proposal.

The Applicants filed a modified proposal (compliance filing) on March 20, 2002. We held a workshop to discuss the compliance filing on May 29, 2002. Parties to this docket were provided the opportunity to file Pre-Workshop and Post-Workshop Comments and to participate in meetings and conference calls regarding the compliance filing. As a result of comments at the workshop, the GridFlorida Companies modified certain aspects of the compliance filing. These changes (modified compliance filing) were filed on June 21, 2002. The following persons intervened in this docket and provided comments: Florida Municipal Group (FMG), which is comprised of Lakeland Electric, Kissimmee Utility Authority, Gainesville Regional Utilities, and the City of Tallahassee, Florida; Florida Municipal Power Agency (FMPA); JEA; Mirant Americas Development, Inc., Duke Energy North America, LLC, Calpine Corporation, and Reliant Energy Power Generation, Inc. (Joint Commenters); Reedy Creek Improvement District (Reedy Creek); Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Seminole); Seminole Member Cooperatives (Seminole Members); Trans-Elect, Inc. (Trans-Elect); Florida Industrial Power Users Group (FIPUG); and Office of Public Counsel (OPC).

On September 3, 2002, we issued Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI (Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI or September 3 Order), which determined by final agency action GridFlorida's compliance with Order No. PSC-01-2489-FOF-EI, and directed the GridFlorida Companies to file petitions and testimony addressing market design no later than 30 days from our vote at the August 20, 2002, Agenda Conference. Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI also issued as proposed agency action (PAA) specific changes to the GridFlorida compliance filing. Several protests and requests for hearing were filed with respect to the PAA portions of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI.

Also at the August 20, 2002, Agenda Conference, we decided to conduct an expedited evidentiary hearing on the merits of a revised GridFlorida market design proposal which includes: (1) financial transmission rights for transmission capacity allocation; (2) unbalanced schedules with a voluntary day-ahead market; (3) market clearing prices for balancing energy and congestion management; and (4) sharing of gains on real-time energy sales. The GridFlorida Companies were directed to file a petition, testimony, and any other documentation deemed appropriate within 30 days of the Agenda vote. Accordingly, by Orders No. PSC-02-1177-PCO-EI and PSC-02-1251-PCO-EI, issued August 29, 2002, and September 11, 2002, respectively, the market design and protested PAA issues in this docket were scheduled for an expedited administrative hearing on October 31, 2002.

On September 13, 2002, a motion for reconsideration of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI was filed by the Seminole and Calpine Corporation (Seminole and Calpine). On September 18, 2002, respective motions for reconsideration were also filed by PEFI, FMG, Reedy Creek, and FMPA. In addition, on September 18, OPC filed a motion for reconsideration and stay of proceedings, simultaneously with a request for oral argument with respect to its request for reconsideration.

On September 20, 2002, the Applicants filed a response to Seminole and Calpine's motion. On September 23, 2002, OPC filed respective responses to FMPA and PEFI's motions. On September 25, 2002, TECO and FPL filed a joint response to PEFI and FMPA's respective motions; and the Applicants filed a response to OPC's motion for stay and reconsideration, and a response to the motions for reconsideration filed by FMG and Reedy Creek.

On October 3, 2002, OPC filed a notice of administrative appeal of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI to the Florida Supreme Court. By Order No. PSC-02-1475-PCO-EI, issued October 28, 2002, we abated the hearing pursuant to Rule 9.310(b)(2), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides that the timely filing of a notice of appeal shall automatically operate as a stay pending review when the state, any public officer in an official capacity, board, commission or other body seeks review. Order No. PSC-02-1475-PCO-EI noted that the outcome of the appeal may profoundly impact the design and import of the issues which can and should be

considered at hearing. In light of these concerns, we also abated ruling upon the motions for reconsideration at the October 15, 2002, Agenda Conference, pending disposition of OPC's appeal of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI.

On June 2, 2003, the Florida Supreme Court issued an order stating that it was opposed to "piecemeal review" of single orders, especially when, as in Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, the final and non-final issues are intertwined. Citizens v. Jaber, 847 So. 2d 975 (Fla. 2003) Therefore, OPC's case was dismissed without prejudice to any party to bring a challenge to Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI after all portions are final.

We note that on September 15, 2003, we will host a FERC Technical Conference concerning Florida's perspective on FERC's regional transmission organization (RTO) and standard market design (SMD) initiatives. This technical conference will provide this Commission, as well as Florida market participants and other interested persons, a forum to discuss FERC's wholesale power market design proposals in anticipation of final rules on SMD in the future.

We are vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter addressed herein through the provisions of Chapter 366, Florida Statutes, including, but not limited to, Sections 366.04, 366.05, and 366.06, Florida Statutes.

OPC'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Rule 9.020, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that a party who files a notice of appeal is deemed to have abandoned any pending postjudgment motion brought by that party, if the notice of appeal is filed before the filing of the signed, written order disposing of such motion. Thus, OPC's request for oral argument and reconsideration is deemed abandoned by the October 3, 2002 filing of its notice of appeal, which effectively constitutes disposition of OPC's request for oral argument and Motion for Reconsideration of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI.

FMG'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

FMG's Motion for Reconsideration

FMG's first point for reconsideration concerns our decision to convene a hearing on market design issues. Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI found certain GridFlorida market design proposals to be non-compliant with the December 20 Order, including proposals to adopt locational marginal pricing, financial transmission rights, market clearing prices, and unbalanced schedules. Nonetheless, we recognized that such proposals "may be of benefit to retail ratepayers" and initiated a hearing process to review the proposals further. FMG urges us to reconsider our decision to convene a hearing on these issues at this time.

FMG notes that on July 31, 2002, FERC issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) on Standard Electricity Market Design (SMD) in FERC Docket No. RM01-12-000. FERC has since modified the comment schedule for the NOPR, included dates for both initial and reply comments, and scheduled at least three technical conferences. The FMG members see no practical value in addressing the same issues, at the same time, in two parallel and interrelated proceedings. Instead, FMG urges us to defer the hearing at this time pending FERC's completion of the SMD rulemaking. FMG states that once a final SMD is available, we will have a model against which we can analyze GridFlorida's market design proposals. Because GridFlorida will ultimately be required to justify any deviations from the SMD that is adopted by FERC, deferring a hearing until after a final SMD is available will enable us to develop a more sustainable record for any SMD variations that are adopted.

For largely the same reasons, FMG argues that we should also reconsider our decision to accept GridFlorida's proposed bright-line, 69kV standard for determining which facilities a participating owner (PO) must turn over to the RTO for operational purposes. FMG contends that Order PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI accepted the bright-line standard on the sole basis that it was found to comply with the December 20 Order, did not violate federal law, and in any event was a matter for determination by the FERC. FMG further contends that the December 20 Order was "similarly brief," finding that the proposed bright-line standard was not contested, and that

there was no evidence in the record suggesting that the demarcation point should be something other than 69kV. FMG contends that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI and the December 20 Order fail to address the fundamental issue of whether it is appropriate for the RTO to assume operational control of facilities that distribute power locally where the owner of the facilities desires to retain that control.

FMG contends that FERC's proposed SMD does not reflect a bright-line test. Instead, it proposes to retain the seven-factor test adopted by Order No. 888 for demarcating transmission and distribution facilities on a functional basis. FMG notes that the NOPR requests comments on several issues, including whether regional variations on this issue should be accommodated and whether a bright-line test should be used "either in addition to or in lieu of the seven factor test." FMG argues that the bright-line standard approved by Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI is at odds with the approach taken by FERC's proposed SMD, is not mandated by anything FERC has done in the GridFlorida RTO proceeding in Docket No. RT01-67-000, and that the record supporting our acceptance of the bright-line standard is virtually non-existent.

FMG requests that we reconsider our decision to the extent that it accepted the bright-line, 69kV standard as a final order and defer resolution of this issue until after FERC has adopted an SMD. Alternatively, if we elect to proceed to hearing on market design issues, the FMG members request that the bright-line, 69kV issue be reserved for hearing as well, and that they be permitted to file testimony on the issue. Otherwise, FMG contends that no meaningful opportunity to do so before this Commission will have been provided, with the result being that the FMG members' rights to procedural due process before this Commission will have been abridged.

Applicants' Response

In their Response to FMG's Motion for Reconsideration, the Applicants state that:

> [t]he purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to identify a point of fact or law which was overlooked or which the Commission failed to consider in rendering its

> order. See Stewart Bonded Warehouse, Inc. v. Bevis, 294 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1974); Diamond Cab Co. v. King, 146 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1962); and Pingree v. Quaintance, 394 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A motion for reconsideration is not an appropriate vehicle to reargue matters that have already been considered by the Commission. Sherwood v. State, 111 So.2d 96 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1959) citing State ex. rel. Jaytex Realty Co. v. Green, 105 So.2d 817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). Nor should a motion for reconsideration be granted "based upon an arbitrary feeling that a mistake may have been made, but should be based upon specific factual matters set forth in the record and susceptible to review." Stewart Bonded Warehouse, 294 So.2d at 317.

In Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, we reiterated our determination in the December 20 Order that the GridFlorida Companies' use of a uniform demarcation point of 69kV for the identification of transmission facilities subject to GridFlorida planning and operations was appropriate. We held that:

> A uniform demarcation point is necessary to ensure equal access for all participating companies and to ensure that subsidies resulting from different demarcation points do not occur. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that the demarcation point should be something other than 69kV. In addition, this demarcation point has been consistently used by this Commission when determining appropriate cost allocations to distribution, transmission, and generation facilities.

Further, the December 20 Order was clear in its warning that our determinations reflected therein would not be relitigated. The Applicants contend that FMG's motion reargues matters that have already been considered by this Commission.

The Applicants note that the motion references FMG's repeated participation and comments on the 69kV issue during the workshop process. The fact that FMG disagrees with our determination provides no basis for reconsideration. Further, the Applicants contend that FMG had the opportunity to intervene and present testimony on this issue in the initial GridFlorida proceedings; however, they chose not to do so. Therefore, contrary to the

assertions in the motion, FMG's due process rights were not abridged; rather, they were simply not exercised.

Based on these arguments, the Applicants contend that FMG's request for reconsideration, as well as its alternative request to present testimony on this issue in the hearing scheduled in the instant docket, should be denied. The Applicants took no position on FMG's request for a postponement of the hearing on market design issues, pending completion of FERC's SMD rule development proceeding.

Denial of FMG'S Motion for Reconsideration

Our decision to convene a hearing on the GridFlorida market design issues was a procedural decision and well within our discretion. The hearing process should help explain and amplify the Applicants' proposal regarding market design, and will provide for additional input from substantially affected parties. While the pending FERC SMD NOPR does address related issues, it is unlikely to focus on regional, Florida-specific issues which can be explored more fully at a hearing before this Commission. Although FMG expresses a procedural preference to allow FERC to complete its rulemaking process, it fails to demonstrate that in convening a hearing on market design issues, we have committed an error of fact or law which warrants reconsideration.

We agree that FMG's motion reargues positions it has raised throughout the workshop process. FMG was afforded an opportunity to file testimony with respect to the bright-line, 69kV issue in the initial GridFlorida proceedings. FMG might also have filed for reconsideration or appeal from the December 20 Order, in which the 69kV issue was determined, but chose not to do so. Reargument of an issue is an inappropriate basis for reconsideration; further, no error of fact or law has been demonstrated. Therefore, FMG's request for reconsideration, as well as its alternative request to present testimony on this issue in the hearing scheduled in the instant docket, is denied.

REEDY CREEK'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Reedy Creek's Motion for Reconsideration

In Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, we found that the GridFlorida Applicants' proposed changes to the Participating Owners Management Agreement ("POMA") with respect to the demarcation point for transmission facilities were consistent with the December 20 Order requiring the adoption of an ISO structure for the GridFlorida RTO. Reedy Creek contends that such changes (1) were not required by the December 20 Order, and (2) ignore and are inconsistent with federal law.

In Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, we cited to our discussion in the December 20 Order of the demarcation point issue. In the December 20 Order, we noted the Applicants' explanation that (i) facilities of a rating of 69kV and above "historically" had been considered to be transmission facilities in Florida, (ii) stakeholders generally expressed the need for open access to "all 69kV and above transmission facilities in Florida," (iii) classification of radial facilities as distribution would make access "more complicated than it needs to be," and (iv) different demarcation points for each utility could result in "subsidies across utilities." We approved the Applicants' proposal in the December 20 Order, but ordered no specific changes to the POMA or other documentation on this issue.

In their March 20 compliance filing, the Applicants nonetheless modified the definition of "Controlled Facilities" in the POMA, purportedly to comply with our requirement that the Applicants propose an ISO structure. Reedy Creek argues that these modifications went far beyond simply deleting the "Transco" provisions in that definition. They also deleted any reference to "transmission" in the definition. As a result of this new definition, any facility in Florida rated at 69kV or higher, regardless of actual function, is deemed to be subject to the RTO's control.

In Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, we considered the FMG's comments at the May 29, 2002 Workshop, in particular FMG's "preference for the opportunity to demonstrate that some 69kV facilities are local distribution." The Order quotes FMG's remarks

regarding the status of the 69kV issue at FERC, stating that the FERC had not spoken to the matter and that the matter was on rehearing before FERC. We concluded that there was no reason to believe that our ruling in the December 20 Order was inconsistent with federal law because it was uncontested that the FERC has not directly addressed the question of 69kV as a bright line demarcation. Finally, we concluded that retaining the 69kV demarcation point as a bright line clearly complies with the December 20 Order, and that the changes to the POMA are consistent with the Order's requirement to adopt an ISO structure.

Reedy Creek further contends that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI is inconsistent with federal law, in that we failed to take into account the FERC approach to determining whether facilities are "transmission" or "local distribution." The FERC's approach is functional, rather than a bright line test, based upon the nominal voltage rating of the facility in question. While Reedy Creek acknowledges the GridFlorida Applicants' proposal to use a bright line test of 69kV remains pending before FERC, it contends that we "should not contravene federal law" by prematurely adopting a bright-line test that is contrary to FERC's approach.

Reedy Creek also contends that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI ignores, and is indeed contrary to, FERC's long-standing approach to determining whether particular facilities are "transmission" or "local distribution." Reedy Creek believes FERC has addressed this issue, and that its approach has been and is a functional one. See, e.g., Order No. 888, FERC Stats. & Regs., ¶ 31,036, at 31,980-81 (1996). Thus, if a particular facility serves a transmission function, then it is properly classified as "transmission;" in contrast, if a facility serves only local distribution purposes, then it properly should be classified as "local distribution," not "transmission." In distinguishing between "transmission" and "local distribution" facilities, the technical characteristics of the facilities also may be considered, but voltage level is but only one factor in that analysis. Reedy Creek contends that FERC has never relied simply and solely upon the capacity rating of a facility to determine if it is transmission or local distribution.

Reedy Creek contends that, more recently, FERC confirmed in its SMD NOPR FERC's preference for the use of a functional approach. In the SMD NOPR, FERC proposed using its seven-factor

test first adopted in Order No. 888 to determine the local distribution component of an unbundled retail sale. In the SMD NOPR, FERC also requested comment on whether, either in addition to or in lieu of the seven factor test, FERC should use a bright line voltage test (e.g., 69kV) to determine which facilities are placed under the control of the Independent Transmission Provider, and, if so, whether FERC should allow regional variation. While FERC has requested comments on the use of a 69kV bright-line test, Reedy Creek contends that the existing case law and FERC policies point toward use of a functional approach.

Reedy Creek's motion refers to the October 3-5, 2001 hearing before in Docket Nos. 000824-EI, et al., in which an Applicant witness testified that voltage level is but one factor that FERC considers and that FERC uses a functional approach to facility classification. Reedy Creek contends that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI overlooks this evidence. Reedy Creek further claims that there is no evidence in the record to support the claim that different demarcation points would complicate the provision of transmission service under an RTO. Thus, we can decide that the three IOUs' transfer to the RTO of operational control of their transmission facilities of 69kV and above is appropriate without upsetting FERC's test for other utilities.

Reedy Creek states that the December 20 Order never directed the Applicants to delete the reference to "transmission" from the definition of "Controlled Facilities" in the POMA. Nowhere in the December 20 Order do we indicate that we intended to treat as "transmission" local distribution facilities that happen to be rated at 69kV. Thus, Reedy Creek concludes that we erred in describing the changes proposed in the March 20 compliance filing as being a "response to our requirement that GridFlorida establish a transmission facilities demarcation at 69kV." While Reedy Creek urges that the 69kV demarcation point be replaced by a functional approach, it argues that at a bare minimum the POMA's definition of "Controlled Facilities" should be restored to its previous version so that it at least includes a reference to "transmission."

Reedy Creek contends that the fact that the 69kV issue is pending at FERC in Docket No. RT01-67 does not render FERC's approach moot or irrelevant. It argues that we should at a minimum recognize that the bright-line approach is inconsistent with FERC's

present approach to facility classification. Until FERC changes its policies, Reedy Creek believes that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI is inconsistent with federal law and should be modified accordingly.

Applicants' Response

The Applicants argue that, similarly to FMG, Reedy Creek reargues points addressed by Reedy Creek concerning the 69kV demarcation point issue in Pre-Workshop Comments, at the May 29, 2002 workshop, and its Post-Workshop Comments. In its motion, Reedy Creek specifically requests that we modify Order PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI on the 69kV issue to (1) allow Florida utilities the option of demonstrating that any particular facility serves a distribution function rather than a transmission function, regardless of nominal voltage levels; and (2) require the Applicants to reinsert the reference to "transmission" in Section 2.5 of the POMA.

Reedy Creek argues that FERC has applied a multi-factor functional test in determining whether a facility is a transmission or distribution facility. However, as acknowledged by Reedy Creek in its motion, and as indicated in Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, the question concerning the appropriateness of the use of 69kV as a bright line demarcation point remains pending before FERC. Accordingly, we correctly concluded in both the December 20 Order and Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI that the use of the 69kV voltage level as a bright line demarcation, without reference to the FERC's multi-factor test, is not inconsistent with federal law. The Applicants contend that Reedy Creek's attempt to relitigate our establishment of 69kV and above as a bright line demarcation point in the December 20 Order violates our admonition that we would not relitigate our determinations in the December 20 Order. The Applicants further contend that Reedy Creek's request that we modify Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI to allow the option of demonstrating that any particular facility serves a distribution function rather than a transmission function defeats the purpose of establishing a uniform demarcation point outlined in the December 20 Order.

The Applicants also contend that Reedy Creek's renewed opposition to the deletion of the word "transmission" from Section 2.5 of the POMA is similarly unavailing. The changes to the

language in Section 2.5 of the POMA, including the deletion of the word "transmission," are consistent with the underlying rationale in the December 20 Order that all facilities with a voltage level of 69kV and above be defined as Controlled Facilities under Section 2.5 of the POMA. Reedy Creek's Motion fails to provide a justifiable basis for reconsideration of our conclusion that the changes in the language in Section 2.5 are consistent with the adoption of an ISO structure.

Denial of Reedy Creek's Motion for Reconsideration

As stated previously, the standard of review for a motion for reconsideration is whether the motion identifies a point of fact or law which was overlooked or which we failed to consider in rendering our Order. In a motion for reconsideration, it is not appropriate to reargue matters that have already been considered. Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration should not be granted based upon an arbitrary feeling that a mistake may have been made, but should be based upon specific factual matters set forth in the record and susceptible to review.

Reedy Creek's argument that we approved the Applicants' proposal in the December 20 Order, but ordered no specific changes to the POMA or other documentation on this issue, is unpersuasive as a demonstration of error. Order No. PSC-01-2489-FOF-EI provides:

> If the GridFlorida Companies believe that certain terms should be included in the modified proposal, but those terms are inconsistent with the findings in this Order, the GridFlorida Companies may address the appropriateness of those terms in their proposal. However, the parties should note that this Commission will not relitigate the issues addressed in this Order.

Further, in Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, we found that the modifications made in the Applicant compliance filing were appropriate:

> In addressing the 69kV demarcation point issue, Reedy Creek questions whether the Applicants' proposal is required by our December 20 Order. Reedy Creek objects

> to the omission of the word "transmission" in the revised definition. In addition, Reedy Creek asserts, in its Pre-Workshop Comments, that the section is not consistent with applicable federal law because the FERC has never used "such a mechanistic approach; rather FERC uses a functional approach to determining the appropriate classification of a facility."
>
> In our December 20 Order, we noted that the GridFlorida Companies had considered that facilities 69kV and above have historically been considered to be transmission facilities. We also referenced that the GridFlorida Companies had discussed whether to classify radial facilities as distribution instead of transmission. We gave recognition to the GridFlorida Companies' conclusion that to do so would make access to transmission more complicated than it needs to be. Finally, we concluded that, among other things, a uniform demarcation point is necessary to ensure equal access for all participating companies.

The arguments raised in Reedy Creek's motion for reconsideration are the same as those it raised in the workshop process. Reedy Creek's motion consists largely of reargument of positions it supported throughout the workshop process, as well as to testimony which was given during the October 2001 hearing in the original RTO dockets. As such, it is in direct contravention to the December 20 Order's caution that the determinations reflected therein would not be relitigated. Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI also addresses the matters raised by Reedy Creek regarding FERC's treatment of the demarcation point, concluding that there is no reason to believe that our ruling in Order No. PSC-01-2489-FOF-EI is inconsistent with federal law. While Reedy Creek may disagree with that assessment, it has failed to demonstrate that we committed an error of fact or law in reaching our determination; accordingly, its motion for reconsideration is denied.

SEMINOLE AND CALPINE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Seminole and Calpine's Motion for Reconsideration

Seminole and Calpine jointly move for reconsideration on our decision to render the Attachment T cutoff issue, found at pages 51-54 of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, as proposed agency action (PAA). Seminole also seeks reconsideration as to setting the market design issues for hearing at this time, in light of the pending SMD NOPR proceeding before FERC.

Seminole and Calpine contend that, with one exception, we consistently ruled in Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI that our decisions as to whether changes proposed by the Applicants were consistent or inconsistent with its December 20 Order were final agency action. Items designated as PAA were either changes being made to the compliance filing or rate issues. However, with respect to the Attachment T cutoff issue, addressed at pages 51-54 of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, we issued our ruling as PAA that the Attachment T cutoff date was not in compliance with the December 20 Order.

Seminole and Calpine contend that in doing so, we acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and abused our discretion, since this ruling "violated the standard used to label all other issues as either 'final' or 'proposed'" without providing any basis or rationale. Because the Applicants intend to litigate this issue at hearing before this Commission, Seminole and Calpine argue that they will now have to commit additional resources to once again demonstrate that the Applicants are wrong in their attempt to use the December 20 Order as the basis for changing the Attachment T cut-off date from December 15, 2000, to a later date. Seminole and Calpine request that we reconsider Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI to correct this error.

Seminole raises a second point on reconsideration, with respect to our decision to set the market design issues for hearing. Seminole contends that the hearing should be deferred until after the conclusion of the FERC's SMD rulemaking proceeding.

Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI requires the Applicants to file petitions and testimony on a number of market design issues that

have not been previously addressed by the Applicants, to be heard at an expedited hearing in conjunction with any protested PAA issues. Seminole suggests that this course of action is not efficient and raises certain due process concerns. Seminole notes that the FERC is in the process of a rulemaking proceeding on market design, which involves issues of great complexity. Seminole contends that, given the impossibility in this proceeding as presently formulated of treating this subject with the depth it warrants and the attendant jurisdictional pitfalls, the better course of action is to defer a hearing until after the FERC acts in the SMD NOPR now pending before it. At that time, we would be in a better position to determine what aspects, if any, of the SMD are not a good fit for Florida. Seminole contends that trying to make that decision at this time is futile and a waste of all parties' and this Commission's resources.

FPL and TECO's Response

In their joint response, FPL and TECO note that the purpose of a petition for rehearing or reconsideration is to bring to the attention of the trier of fact some point which it overlooked or failed to consider when it rendered its order in the first instance. Motions for reconsideration are not intended as a procedure for rearguing the whole case merely because the losing party disagrees with the judgment or the order. FPL and TECO contend that both of the points raised in Seminole and Calpine's motion for reconsideration were carefully considered during the course of this proceeding, and that no error of fact or law has been committed.

With respect to the Attachment T date decision, FPL and TECO note that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI requires the applicants to change the proposed Attachment T cutoff date to be included in the GridFlorida proposal back to the original date contained in the GridFlorida filing in Docket Nos. 000824-EI, 0001148-EI, and 010577-EI.

The Applicants contend that the proposed change in the Attachment T cutoff date was in compliance with the December 20 Order; however, assuming arguendo that this change was not in compliance, FPL and TECO assert that they have the right to present a proposed change and to have that change considered by due process

of law. Due process includes a right to hearing on the proposed change. Further, where Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI requires other changes to be made in the GridFlorida proposal and those changes were challenged by an intervener, the changes were designated as PAA. Also, an opportunity for hearing should also be afforded where the Applicants propose a change which we propose to reject. For example, with regard to the Applicants requesting a change in market design from physical rights to financial rights, we are providing an opportunity for a hearing. Calpine and Seminole have not alleged that such action was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of agency discretion. Thus, FPL and TECO contend that the method for identifying PAA decisions is applied uniformly and fairly.

FPL and TECO state it is also important to note that our decision on this issue was procedural. We simply found that the change in the Attachment T cutoff date is not in compliance with Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI. We did not reach a final substantive decision on the appropriate Attachment T date; rather, we appropriately allowed the Applicants to seek a hearing on the merits of its proposed change. FPL and TECO contend that our determination to allow further hearing on an issue can hardly be considered to deny Calpine or Seminole due process of law. We are entitled to allow further illumination on an issue of critical importance to retail ratepayers, and Calpine and Seminole are afforded the opportunity to opine on the issue. We made our determination to allow further hearing after much discussion at the August 20, 2002 Agenda Conference. FPL and TECO conclude that there is a sound basis for the action taken with respect to this matter.

FPL and TECO take no position on Seminole's request for a postponement of the evidentiary hearing pending completion of FERC's SMD rule proceeding.

Denial of Seminole and Calpine's Motion for Reconsideration

Rule 25-22.060(1), Florida Administrative Code, provides that any party to a proceeding who is adversely affected by an order of this Commission may file a motion for reconsideration of that order. The rule also provides that we will not entertain a motion for reconsideration of a Notice of Proposed Agency Action issued

pursuant to Rule 25-22.029, Florida Administrative Code, regardless of the form of the Notice and regardless of whether or not the proposed action has become effective under Rule 25-22.029(6). The decision to render an issue as final or proposed agency action is largely a matter of procedural discretion, dependent upon whether a point of entry has been afforded to affected persons and whether additional investigation or analysis is required for us to render our decision. Seminole and Calpine's request with respect to the Attachment T cutoff date shall be denied on the basis that it requests reconsideration of an action issued as PAA.

Even were Seminole and Calpine's motion not in contravention of Rule 25-22.029, Florida Administrative Code, we find that the motion in its entirety shall be denied on the following grounds. As discussed previously, the standard of review for a motion for reconsideration is whether the motion identifies a point of fact or law which was overlooked or which we failed to consider in rendering our Order. Furthermore, a motion for reconsideration should not be granted based upon an arbitrary feeling that a mistake may have been made, but should be based upon specific factual matters set forth in the record and susceptible to review.

At the August 20, 2002 Agenda Conference, we found that sufficient uncertainty existed regarding the Attachment T cutoff date to warrant changing the nature of its decision from final agency action, as initially recommended by our staff, to PAA. As discussed above, the decision to do so is procedural in nature, and is well within our discretion. Seminole and Calpine contend that we acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and abused our discretion in issuing the Attachment T cutoff date as PAA. While this may be an appropriate standard for the appeal of an administrative order, it is not the standard for a motion for reconsideration. Our decision does not deprive Seminole and Calpine of due process; rather, due process is afforded to allow amplification and clarification of an important issue. Calpine and Seminole are thereby left in a no more advantaged or disadvantaged position than any other party to this proceeding.

Seminole and Calpine have failed to demonstrate that we made a mistake of fact or law in rendering our decision on the Attachment T cutoff date as PAA. Therefore, the portion of the motion for reconsideration pertaining to this issue is denied.

With respect to Seminole's request for reconsideration on setting the market design issues for hearing at this time, we reiterate that this is a procedural decision which is well within our discretion. Seminole's request to defer the hearing on market design pending completion of FERC's SMD rulemaking fails to raise any point of fact or law which was not discussed or considered prior to the issuance of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI. Besides concerns regarding the efficiency and expediency of setting the market design issues for hearing, Seminole offers no basis for deferring the evidentiary hearing contemplated by Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI. Having failed to demonstrate a mistake of fact or law, this portion of Seminole's request is also denied.

GRANTING FMPA'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OR RECONSIDERATION

FMPA's Motion for Clarification or Reconsideration

At issue in FMPA's motion for reconsideration or clarification is the in-service demarcation date that determines cost responsibility allocations for newer transmission facilities. Older facilities' costs are treated as if those facilities were useful only for loads in the zones where they are located, i.e., the statewide sharing of their costs is delayed until years 6 through 10 of GridFlorida operations. For newer facilities, it is recognized that they were completed with a view to GridFlorida operating them for statewide use, and their costs are therefore shared statewide as soon as GridFlorida begins operating. There is another demarcation date for defining new contracts, but FMPA's motion concerns the new facilities' demarcation date.

Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, at pages 51-54, begins by stating, "in their compliance filing, the Applicants modified language in Attachment T concerning the demarcation date for new facilities." FMPA contends that the Order proceeds to discuss that date change, and a related change to the date for defining new contracts, as if they represented a single date change. In fact, the Order accurately described the new contracts demarcation date as it stood before the Applicants' filing on compliance (that date was December 15, 2000, and located in OATT Attachment T in the Applicants' prior and still-pending FERC filings), but it did not accurately describe the pre-revision new facilities demarcation date (which was a date certain of January 1, 2001). The new

facilities' date was stated in several tariff locations other than Attachment T. In the compliance filing, that date was changed to a floating future date, defined as January 1 of the year during which GridFlorida begins operations.

Thus, FMPA contends that the Order treats the issue as if there were a single demarcation date, which was changed so as to alter the definition of both new facilities and new contracts. The Order proceeds to reject that date change in its entirety, and FMPA argues that this is most fairly read as rejecting both the new contracts date change and the new facilities date change. Furthermore, FMPA believes that our supporting reasoning is equally applicable to both changes.

FMPA indicates that additional error occurred during staff's oral comments at the August 20, 2002 Agenda Conference, in which staff stated that the interveners had not expressed any concern with respect to the change to the new facilities date. However, FMPA had indicated at pages 31-34 of its post-workshop comments, that the new facilities date was in fact problematic. FMPA contends that this factual error contributed to an unintentional but disparate treatment of the facilities and contract demarcation dates.

For the reasons stated above, FMPA concludes that disparate treatment of the new facilities and new contracts date changes are clear error. Given that we have addressed GridFlorida's rate structure, FMPA believes that both of the demarcation date changes should have been treated alike. The proposed delay in the new facilities demarcation date should have been rejected clearly, just as the proposed delay in the new contracts demarcation date was rejected. FMPA requests that we promptly clarify that that was our intent.

OPC's Response

In its response, OPC states that under the original Transco proposal for GridFlorida, all rates for transmission service, both wholesale and retail, were to be under FERC's jurisdiction. Even though the December 20 Order rejected the transco in favor of an ISO and insisted upon retaining its traditional ratemaking jurisdiction, OPC argues that the GridFlorida Applicants put forth

an alternative rate structure still designed to transfer jurisdiction to FERC. Under the revised proposal, all new transmission assets were to be subject to a FERC-approved system-wide rate, and all existing transmission facilities were to be subject to a FERC-approved zonal rate. The demarcation date for identifying new transmission assets would, OPC contends, only serve to distinguish between two categories of transmission assets, both of which would be removed from our jurisdiction in contravention of the December 20 Order.

In Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI at page 63, however, we directed that the GridFlorida filing be modified so that we retain our jurisdiction. OPC contends that a true compliance filing in response to Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI should not distinguish between new and existing transmission assets because we have the same retail jurisdiction over both. OPC concludes that the demarcation date for new transmission assets under the rejected rate structure proposal is irrelevant.

FPL and TECO's Response

FPL and TECO contend that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI approves, as final agency action, the demarcation date for defining new facilities as January 1 of the year GridFlorida begins commercial operation, and rejects by PAA the proposed demarcation date for determining new contracts (new contract date or the Attachment T cutoff date). On September 24, 2002, protests were filed by PEFI and by FPL and TECO with respect to this issue.

FPL and TECO contend that approval of the Applicants' proposal to change the new facilities date is sound on the merits, in that it ameliorates the impact of cost shifts among retail customers, and should not be reconsidered. FPL and TECO argue that it is likewise important that the new contract date should be set for January 1 of the year GridFlorida begins operation, as is requested in FPL and TECO's PAA protest.

FPL and TECO submit that FMPA's motion for reconsideration should be denied, because FMPA essentially contends that we did not know what we were doing in approving the new facilities date. FPL and TECO urge that we deny FMPA's motion to the extent that it seeks to reverse approval of the new facilities date as proposed in

the compliance filing and approved by Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI. However, in order to have a complete hearing on the merits of the appropriate demarcation dates, FPL and TECO suggest that it may be appropriate to set both the new facilities and the new contract dates for hearing and to thereafter approve both dates as proposed by the Applicants in their compliance filing.

Granting FMPA's Motion for Clarification or Reconsideration

As a preliminary matter, we note that OPC's filing is not so much a response to FMPA's motion than a supplemental argument for its own motion for reconsideration, which was abandoned when OPC filed its appeal. OPC contends that a true compliance filing in response to Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI should not distinguish between new and existing transmission assets because we have the same retail jurisdiction over both. OPC concludes that "the demarcation date for new transmission assets under the rejected rate structure proposal is irrelevant." OPC's response does not request that we take any affirmative action with respect to FMPA's motion, and we find that no further analysis is merited.

FPL and TECO contend that FMPA's motion for reconsideration should be denied, because FMPA essentially contends that we did not know what we were doing in approving the new facilities date. FPL and TECO also urge that we deny FMPA's motion to the extent that it seeks to reverse approval of the new facilities date as proposed in the compliance filing and approved by Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI as final agency action. However, FPL and TECO also concede that it may be appropriate to set both the new facilities and the new contract dates for hearing, in which case they would request approval of both dates as proposed in the compliance filing.

The transcription of the August 20, 2002, Agenda Conference, commencing at page 85, and again commencing at page 94, indicates that both our staff and this Commission were aware of the distinction between the new contract and new facilities demarcation dates. The transcript also indicates that our staff believed the new facilities date to be consistent with the December 20 Order. However, FMPA is correct that it had in fact identified the new facilities demarcation date as being problematic in its post-workshop comments. This was inadvertently not identified at the

Agenda Conference during the discussion regarding the new facilities and contract dates.

Furthermore, as discussed previously, the transcription of the August 20 Agenda Conference indicates an intent on our part to consign both demarcation dates as PAA so that both dates could be more fully addressed by the parties at hearing.

Section R of the Planning and Operations section of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI does not provide a clear indication as to whether the ruling that the Attachment T cutoff date (new contracts date) is also applied to the new facilities date. Furthermore, it appears that a mistake of fact may have occurred in the indication that no intervener had expressed concern with regard to the facilities date. Regardless of whether this apparent mistake would rise to the level of material error, we find that, in light of the apparent ambiguity and the comments at the August 20 Agenda Conference, FMPA's motion shall be granted. We hereby clarify that the new facilities demarcation date was intended to be issued as proposed agency action in Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, so that the date could be more fully discussed and examined at the administrative hearing to be scheduled in this docket.

PEFI'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

PEFI's Motion for Reconsideration

As discussed previously, at its August 20, 2002 Agenda Conference, we considered a number of compliance issues identified in our staff's recommendation. PEFI notes that our staff initially recommended that we deny the proposed change to the new contract date through final agency action, because staff believed the change was not necessary to comply with the December 20 Order and no additional language was required by the denial. However, after a lengthy discussion regarding the effect of re-establishing the contract date as originally proposed, including the effect on another demarcation date between existing and new transmission facilities (the facilities date), we found that sufficient uncertainty existed on the issue to warrant changing the nature of our decision from final agency action to PAA. This change was intended to provide an opportunity to hear the positions of the parties on the appropriate treatment of the contract date if a

hearing on the issue was requested, thereby allowing us to resolve the existing uncertainty and reach an informed decision.

On September 24, 2002, PEFI requested a hearing on this PAA decision. PEFI contends that its protest and supporting testimony will explain its position that, while PEFI agrees with the decision requiring the contract date to remain as originally proposed, we by not requiring that the facilities date also remain as originally proposed in order to maintain the important linkage between these two dates. PEFI believes it is clear from the Agenda Conference discussion that we intended to leave all aspects of our PAA decision open for consideration if a hearing is requested, including the issue of linkage between the contract date and the facilities date that is central to PEFI's position.

However, PEFI recognizes the possibility that an argument could be asserted that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI constitutes final agency approval of the revised facilities date. In the event such an argument were to be accepted, it would seriously compromise, if not completely preclude, PEFI's opportunity to present testimony asserting its position that the linkage between the facilities date and the contract date must be maintained by re-establishing both dates as originally proposed. PEFI believes that an argument to this effect would be without merit and contrary to our clear intent in reaching the PAA decision on the contract date. Nonetheless, out of an abundance of caution and in the interest of protecting PEFI's testimony from a challenge to its admissibility based on such an argument, PEFI has decided to seek reconsideration of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI to the extent it is deemed to constitute final agency approval of the revised Facilities Date.

PEFI submits that any conclusion that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI constitutes approval of the revised facilities date by final agency action is based on mistake, misunderstanding, or oversight in the application of the criteria used to identify those changes contained in the compliance filing that were not required by the December 20 Order. In its recommendation, our staff described the Applicants' contention that the original contract date and facilities date needed to be revised to bring them in closer proximity to GridFlorida's actual commencement of operations, since the original commencement date was significantly delayed. Our staff then discussed the reasons it found this contention to be

unpersuasive as a basis for finding that these revisions were necessary to comply with the December 20 Order. However, our staff concluded its analysis by recommending only that the revised contract date be found out of compliance with that Order; it was silent on the facilities date.

In response to our questions at the August 20, 2002, Agenda Conference, our staff explained why the facilities date was not explicitly discussed in the issue. While neither date revision was required to comply with the December 20 Order, our staff stated that the interveners had expressed a concern only about the change to the contract date. PEFI contends that this is a mistake; that noncompliance of the revised facilities date had in fact been raised. On pages 31 through 34 of its post-workshop comments filed on June 21, 2002, FMPA objected to the changes in both the contract and the facilities demarcation dates included in the March 20, 2002 compliance filing.

PEFI argues that had our staff been aware of FMPA's objection, it would have included the revised facilities date in its noncompliance recommendation given its stated rationale for including the revised contract date. By the same token, had our staff done so, PEFI believes that we would have approved staff's recommendation for the same reason it approved staff's recommendation on the revised contract date. PEFI concludes that if Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI should be deemed to constitute final approval of the revised facilities date, such approval would be based on a mistake of material fact and would not be sustainable on reconsideration.

Given the limited purpose of its motion for reconsideration and the possibility that it will become moot if a challenge to the admissibility of the Company's testimony based on this argument is not made, PEFI suggests that its motion be held in abeyance until the hearing. If such a challenge is not forthcoming at the time PEFI's testimony is offered into evidence, the motion will be withdrawn.

OPC's Response

In its response, OPC states that under the original transco proposal for GridFlorida, all rates for transmission service, both wholesale and retail, were to be under FERC's jurisdiction. Even though the December 20 Order rejected the transco in favor of an ISO and insisted upon retaining this Commission's traditional ratemaking jurisdiction, OPC argues that the GridFlorida Applicants put forth an alternative rate structure still designed to transfer jurisdiction to FERC. Under the revised proposal, all new transmission assets were to be subject to a FERC-approved system-wide rate, and all existing transmission facilities were to be subject to a FERC-approved zonal rate. The demarcation date for identifying new transmission assets would, OPC contends, only serve to distinguish between two categories of transmission assets, both of which would be removed from our jurisdiction in contravention of the December 20 Order.

In Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI at page 63, however, we directed that the GridFlorida filing be modified so that we retain our jurisdiction. OPC contends that a true compliance filing in response to Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI should not distinguish between new and existing transmission assets because we have the same retail jurisdiction over both. OPC concludes that the demarcation date for new transmission assets under the rejected rate structure proposal is irrelevant.

FPL and TECO's Response

FPL and TECO contend that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI approves, as final agency action, the demarcation date for defining new facilities as January 1 of the year GridFlorida begins commercial operation, and rejects by PAA the proposed demarcation date for determining new contracts (new contract date or the Attachment T cutoff date). On September 24, 2002, protests were filed by PEFI, FPL and TECO with respect to this issue.

FPL and TECO contend that approval of the Applicants' proposal to change the new facilities date is sound on the merits in that it ameliorates the impact of cost shifts among retail customers, and should not be reconsidered. FPL and TECO argue that it is likewise important that the new contract date should be set for January 1 of

the year GridFlorida begins operation, as is requested in FPL and TECO's PAA protest.

FPL and TECO urge that we deny PEFI's motion to the extent that it seeks to reverse the approval of the new facilities date as proposed in the compliance filing and approved by Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI. However, in order to have a complete hearing on the merits of the appropriate demarcation dates, FPL and TECO suggest that it may be appropriate to set both the new facilities and the new contract dates for hearing and to thereafter approve both dates as proposed by the Applicants in their compliance filing.

Granting PEFI's Motion for Reconsideration

As a preliminary matter, we note that OPC's filing is not so much a response to PEFI's motion than a supplemental argument for its own motion for reconsideration, which was abandoned when OPC filed its appeal. OPC contends that a true compliance filing in response to Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI should not distinguish between new and existing transmission assets because we have the same retail jurisdiction over both. OPC concludes that "the demarcation date for new transmission assets under the rejected rate structure proposal is irrelevant." OPC's response does not request that we take any affirmative action with respect to PEFI's motion, and we find that no further analysis is merited.

PEFI's motion for reconsideration is essentially a placeholder, by which PEFI seeks to reserve its ability to address both the new contract and new facilities dates as protested issues at the administrative hearing to be scheduled in this matter. Should Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI be deemed to constitute final approval of the revised facilities date, PEFI is concerned that it would be precluded from presenting testimony at hearing that the new contract date should remain as originally proposed, and that there is a linkage between the new contract and new facilities demarcation dates. Hence, PEFI suggests that its motion be held in abeyance until the hearing. If such a challenge is not forthcoming at the time PEFI's testimony is offered into evidence, the motion will be withdrawn.

FPL and TECO contend that the Applicants' proposal to change the new facilities date has in fact been approved by final agency

action and should not be reconsidered, and urge that we deny PEFI's motion to the extent that it seeks to reverse approval of the new facilities date as proposed in the compliance filing. However, no express ruling to that effect is clearly made in the Order. Furthermore, FPL and TECO concede that it may be appropriate to set both the new facilities and the new contract dates for hearing, in which case they would request approval of both dates as proposed in the compliance filing.

As noted previously, Section R of the Planning and Operations section of Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI does not provide a clear indication as to whether our ruling regarding the Attachment T cutoff date (new contracts date) is also applied to the new facilities date. Furthermore, it appears that a mistake of fact may have occurred in the indication that no intervener had expressed concern with regard to the facilities date. Regardless of whether this apparent mistake would rise to the level of material error, we find that, in light of the apparent ambiguity and the comments at the August 20 Agenda Conference, PEFI's motion shall be granted. We clarify herein that the new facilities demarcation date was intended to be issued as proposed agency action in Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI, so that the date could be more fully discussed and examined in this docket.

Based on the foregoing, it is

ORDERED by the Florida Public Service Commission that pursuant to Rule 9.020, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, Public Counsel's request for oral argument and reconsideration is deemed abandoned by the October 3, 2002 filing of its notice of appeal, which effectively constitutes disposition of Public Counsel's request. It is further

ORDERED that Florida Municipal Group's motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. It is further

ORDERED that Reedy Creek Improvement District's motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. It is further

ORDERED that Seminole Electric Cooperative and Calpine Corporation's motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. It is further

ORDERED that Florida Municipal Power Agency's motion is hereby granted, as set forth herein. It is further

ORDERED that Progress Energy Florida, Inc.'s motion for reconsideration is hereby granted, as set forth herein. It is further

ORDERED that Order No. PSC-02-1199-PAA-EI is hereby clarified in that the new facilities demarcation date was intended to be issued as proposed agency action, so that the date can be more fully discussed and examined in this docket. It is further

ORDERED that this docket shall remain open to permit final disposition of this matter.

By ORDER of the Florida Public Service Commission this 8th Day of September, 2003.

BLANCA S. BAYÓ, Director
Division of the Commission Clerk
and Administrative Services

(S E A L)

JSB

NOTICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

The Florida Public Service Commission is required by Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes, to notify parties of any administrative hearing or judicial review of Commission orders that is available under Sections 120.57 or 120.68, Florida Statutes, as well as the procedures and time limits that apply. This notice should not be construed to mean all requests for an administrative hearing or judicial review will be granted or result in the relief sought.

Any party adversely affected by the Commission's final action in this matter may request judicial review by the Florida Supreme Court in the case of an electric, gas or telephone utility or the First District Court of Appeal in the case of a water or wastewater utility by filing a notice of appeal with the Director, Division of the Commission Clerk and Administrative Services, 2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850, and filing a copy of the notice of appeal and the filing fee with the appropriate court. This filing must be completed within thirty (30) days after the issuance of this order, pursuant to Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The notice of appeal must be in the form specified in Rule 9.900(a), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.