1 2	FLORID	BEFORE THE DA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
3		DOCKET NO. 031020-WS
4	In the Matter (
5	PETITION FOR DECLARA	
6	BY FOREST UTILITIES	. INC. AND
7	JAMAICA BAY WEST ASS TO DETERMINE WHETHER OF SERVICE TERRITORS	Y PURSUANT TO
8	SECTION 367.045(2), NECESSARY TO PROVIDE	E BULK WASTEWATER
9	SERVICE TO JAMAICA E ENTITY.	BAY, AN EXEMPT
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14	PROCEEDINGS:	AGENDA CONFERENCE
15	I NOCEDINGS.	ITEM NO. 2
16	BEFORE:	CHAIRMAN LILA A. JABER COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON
17		COMMISSIONER BRAULIO L. BAEZ COMMISSIONER RUDOLPH "RUDY" BRADLEY
18		COMMISSIONER CHARLES M. DAVIDSON
19	DATE:	December 16, 2003
20	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center
21		Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida
22		Tallahassee, Florida
23	TRANSCRIBED FROM	TRICIA DIMARTE RES
24	TAPE BY:	TRICIA DeMARTE, RPR Official FPSC Reporter
25		(850) 413-6736 '
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FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

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PROCEEDINGS

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CHAIRMAN JABER: That takes us to Item 2. Commissioners, on Item 2 I need to mention that there is an Issue 1 that involves a petition to intervene. This item has also been noticed, however, as a -- parties may participate at the Commission's discretion.

Staff. let's start this item with a question to you. Help me procedurally on what to do next. If I understand your recommendation correctly, that regardless of how the Commission votes on the intervention, folks can still participate this morning.

MR. BELLAK: I think that's correct.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, I think we should start with that. Do you want to have participation on this item? Do you need participation on this item?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Madam Chairman. I think it would be helpful if we allow participation. I do notice that Issue 1 airs a question of intervention. Is it your intention to address that or just at this point just to address the question of participation?

CHAIRMAN JABER: Participation, because my thought was if you're inclined to have participation, then we need to hear on Issue 1. So I tend to agree with you. I want to have some participation. Okay. Great.

With that, Mr. Bellak, introduce the item.

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MR. BELLAK: Commissioners, this is a petition for a declaratory statement filed by Forest Utilities, which is seeking a statement that they do not have to extend their certificated area of service pursuant to Section 367.045 in order for them to provide bulk service or more precisely named service for resale to Jamaica Bay as long as they meet the requirement that the service interconnection is accomplished within their current service territory.

And the recommendation of the staff, briefly stated. is that wholly aside from their participation this morning at the agenda, the recommendation is that intervention be denied for failure to demonstrate standing or to meet the test in the Commission's formal intervention rule, and as to Issue 2, that the petition for declaratory statement be granted.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Bellak, it was fine for what you just said, but can you bring the microphone closer to you? I think we were having just a little bit of difficulty.

And let's see. Mr. Deterding, you're here representing --

MR. DETERDING: Yes, Madam Chair. Marty Deterding here representing Forest Utilities. I have with me Ken Plante representing Jamaica Bay.

CHAIRMAN JABER: And Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Madam Chairman. Schef Wright representing Lee County.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Let's start issue by issue, and Issue 1 involves Lee County's petition to intervene. So,

Mr. Wright, I'll let you start your argument and allow Forest

4 and Jamaica Bay to respond.

> MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Madam Chairman. I'll be as brief as I can. Commissioners. The issues here both with respect to Lee County's petition in standing to intervene and with regard to the substance of the requested declaratory statement are really all of the same piece: namely, whether the transaction proposed between Forest and Jamaica Bay, the provision of bulk wastewater service by Forest to Jamaica Bay, is or is not a jurisdictional transaction. If it's not a jurisdictional transaction under the statute, then Lee County is not entitled to the Commission's protection under 367.045(5)(a), and accordingly, you know, we would lack standing to intervene. If it's not jurisdictional, then no amendment to Forest's certificate of authorization would be required.

> Correspondingly, if it is a jurisdictional transaction, the opposite results would obtain. If it's a jurisdictional transaction, Lee County is entitled to the Commission's protection under 367.045(5)(a) which provides that the Commission may not grant an amendment to a certificate to extend service to an area where another utility is already ready, willing, and able to serve and where that utility has

not refused or neglected to provide service. I don't think there's any dispute as to the fact that Lee County is ready, willing, and able to serve. We are, in fact, serving Jamaica Bay at this time. And I don't think there's any dispute as regards to Lee County's having refused or neglected to provide service. We have never refused or neglected to provide service.

As explained in our pleadings, the plain language of Chapter 367 renders the proposed transaction a jurisdictional transaction. It can't be jurisdictional for one purpose, approving a rate for the service which Forest wants you all to do, and not for another; i.e., not for the purpose of extending -- or whether the service area extension amendment provisions of the statute applies. The exemption provisions of Section 367.022 are real clear. They say the following are not subject to the provisions of this chapter except as expressly provided. If the bulk service contemplated here is not subject to the provision of the chapter, it's not subject to the provision of the chapter. If it is, then it is. We assert, of course, that it is.

With regard to our standing and the Agrico test, we lay this out very clearly in our petition at Pages 9 and 10 where we said, within the meaning of Section 367.045(5)(a), Florida Statutes, Lee County Utilities' wastewater treatment system is "adequate to meet the reasonable needs of the

public," statutory requirement, including Jamaica Bay and all of Jamaica Bay's occupants, Lee County Utilities is fully able to "provide reasonably adequate service" to all those whom it serves, and Lee County Utilities has never refused or neglected to provide service to any potential customer within its service area. Accordingly, the Commission may not approve the extension of Forest's service area unless the transaction is determined to be nonjurisdictional. By the plain language of 367.022(12), Florida Statutes, the Forest-Jamaica Bay transaction would be jurisdictional, triggering all applicable Commission statutes. Lee County is accordingly entitled to the protection of that section. The cited statutes, .045(5)(a) and .022(12), provide the basis for the relief requested.

we cited to your statutes. We explained why we are entitled to intervene as a matter of right. We're substantially affected. We're providing service now. We have facilities in place to provide the service. Denying us the protection of the statute will substantially affect our interests, and it's potentially an immediate thing. You know, they contemplate canceling the contract that they have with us and switching service from Jamaica Bay -- Jamaica Bay service from Lee County to Forest. There's no question about the immediacy of the injury. The question is, are we within the statute? Under 367.045(5)(a), we're entitled to your protection because we are ready, willing, and able to serve.

We satisfy all the statutory requirements.

So the question is, is the service contemplated a jurisdictional transaction? We don't think it's arguable -- we don't think this is a close question. 367.022(12) enumerates specific exemptions. Those which are not exempt are jurisdictional. The specific exemptions that the statute enumerates are sale or resale to a governmental authority and sale or resale to a utility regulated pursuant to Chapter 367 by the Commission or by the County. Jamaica Bay West is not a governmental authority. Jamaica Bay West is not a utility subject to the Commission's regulation, subject to Chapter 367 at all. It's not subject to the Commission's regulation; it is not subject to Lee County's regulation.

The staff assert that there are no customers of Lee County at issue in the proposed transaction. We strongly disagree. Jamaica Bay West is the customer at issue. Indeed, Jamaica Bay West is the customer to whom we are already providing service; that Jamaica Bay West is a jurisdictional retail customer is first given away by the fact that Forest Utilities wants you-all to approve a tariff to provide the service. If it's not a jurisdictional transaction, it's not a jurisdictional transaction; no tariff is required. That's what the law says. 367.022 says the following enumerated species of entities and transactions are not subject to the provisions of the chapter except as expressly provided. And there's no

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express provision that says utilities can provide bulk service to species -- entities such as Jamaica Bay West under a tariff and not have to comply with the certificated service areas.

I think -- that's about what I have to say on the standing issue. I'd be happy to go ahead and conclude the rest of what I have to say with regard to the substantive issue in a declaratory statement or save it.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Let's hang on to it for a moment -- MR. WRIGHT: Sure.

CHAIRMAN JABER: -- and go to Forest and Jamaica Bay for a response on intervention.

MR. DETERDING: Thank you, Madam Chair.

Commissioners, Forest did not raise a concern in part because of the short time period between the filing of the documents by Lee County and the date of the staff recommendation. We did not raise the standing issue, but I do believe that the Commission staff's analysis of that issue is very well done and very thorough in analyzing that standing and concludes that the County does not have standing to participate in this declaratory statement matter. And I don't have anything further to offer.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Bellak, your recommendation statement says that we can either grant or deny, but when I got to Page 5 of the staff analysis, it seems as though you are recommending that the petition for intervention should be

denied. So my question to you is, if you are recommending that it should be denied, just walk us through what the legal rationale was as it relates to Agrico. I've read what you've said related to Tequesta and the Lee County Electric Co-op. I'm more interested in an analysis on whether Lee County has met the standard laid out in Agrico.

MR. BELLAK: Okay. To begin with, the recommendation that you had discretion to grant or deny only related to this proceeding for the purposes of parties may participate at the Commission's discretion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: But they can regardless -- well, we just established that.

MR. BELLAK: Right.

CHAIRMAN JABER: They could participate regardless.

MR. BELLAK: Right. If someone raised the technical issue that they weren't a party, the answer would be, well, in the past the Commission has granted not limited intervention but intervention for a limited purpose. So I would have made that point.

But as to the formal intervention, pursuant to the Commission's intervention rule, which depends on meeting this standard of being substantially affected, they can't be substantially affected. The reason for that is they're relying on Lee County versus Marks. The Lee County versus Marks case only related to applicants for service that had end use

facilities in a particular area.

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Now, the service that's being requested is bulk service, which is to say service for resale. Service for resale is not service to end use customers and is treated differently under the statutes, under the case law, and even in the Lee County versus Marks case.

Now, for the first time. I've heard the assertion that Jamaica Bay is a retail customer of Lee County. My understanding from everything that's been filed is that the service that's being requested -- the new class of service that Forest wishes to provide to Jamaica Bay is bulk service for resale. That's an entirely different situation. Lee County versus Marks is inapplicable to that. Therefore, the assertion on the part of Lee County under Agrico that they have a right to provide this service and that they may be injured in that right by what we do in this declaratory proceeding or that this is the kind of proceeding meant to protect that right, there's no right to provide service for resale. It doesn't exist under the statutes. And if that's the right they're asserting, then that right doesn't exist. That's prong one of Agrico, nonexistent. So they can't be injured by the lack of a right that doesn't exist. And second of all, this is not a proceeding which protects rights that don't exist.

So under Agrico they have no standing whatsoever if, in fact, what we're talking about is service for resale. And

everything that I've read and every discussion of this indicates that this is service for resale. And I think the most dramatic demonstration that I can give to the Commission of the difference is to look at Statute 366.03, which is an electric statute, but it's relevant because we're talking about a legal basis in Lee County versus Marks which is an electric case. And the first two sentences of 366.03 make the same point that we made in the recommendation, but they make it in a very dramatic fashion. The first sentence says, "Each public utility shall furnish to each person applying therefor reasonably sufficient, adequate, and efficient service." Now, the word "service" when not modified by any other description means end user, retail service.

The second sentence says, "No public utility shall be required to furnish electricity or gas for resale." So the parameter that's applicable to end use service is 180 degrees different, nonapplicable to service for resale. They couldn't be more different. And the attempt which is made here to assume that the same parameters of Chapter 367 apply whether it's end use service such as at issue in 367.045 or service for resale is simply a non-point. If you look at Section 367, they -- at Chapter 367, 367.045 sets out the parameter of service, meaning the first sentence in 366.03, service to end use customers.

On the other hand, the Legislature has given a

1	separate statute for service for resale, 367.123, and has
2	appointed the Commission as the sole authority that can require
3	any utility to provide service for resale. And if they're
4	correct, if Lee County is correct, they would read
5	367.123 right out of the book because suppose the Commission
6	decided that Forest should provide bulk service for resale to
7	Jamaica Bay. According to Lee County, if Lee County feels that
8	it wants to provide that kind of service to Jamaica Bay, then
9	whatever order the Commission issued would be nullified.
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioners, do you have
11	any other questions or a motion?
12	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question.
13	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason.
14	COMMISSIONER DEASON: This is for Mr. Wright.
15	Mr. Wright, is it your contention that Jamaica Bay is a retail
16	customer?
17	MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And how do you make that
19	conclusion?
20	MR. WRIGHT: They are a direct purchaser of service
21	from whomever. At this time they are a purchaser of service
22	from Lee County. And I make the conclusion based on the
23	statute that this is a jurisdictional transaction. There is no
24	exemption from the Commission's full panoply of regulatory

authority for this transaction. You just can't shoehorn it

into any of the specifically enumerated exemptions in 367.022.

If it were a governmental authority, we wouldn't be here, if

Jamaica Bay were a governmental authority. If Jamaica Bay were
a utility regulated pursuant to Chapter 367, we wouldn't be
here. If it were either of those species of entity, it would
not be subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.

The Legislature has been very clear about what is and is not exempt. It has said that with respect to the sale of wastewater service, bulk, resale, whatever, those transactions that are exempt are transactions where the sale is by a regulated entity to a governmental authority or transactions by a regulated utility to another Commission-regulated utility. Jamaica Bay West is neither. This is a jurisdictional transaction, this is retail service, regardless of what they do.

What you're doing is looking behind the meter to see what they do. You know, what's the difference between this and a 1400-unit motel? You know, that would be a jurisdictional transaction. You know, and again --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me interrupt.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Wright.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Excuse me.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Wright.

Commissioner Deason.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: What then is -- in your

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observation or your understanding, what then is Jamaica Bay? What is the entity?

MR. WRIGHT: Jamaica Bay is a 1400-unit mobile home park that buys bulk service, in our view of the statute, at retail from whomever, Lee County at the present time, Forest as they hope to, and then provides that service to the occupants of the mobile home park without specific compensation therefor. That fact, that they provide it to them included in their lot rent or however it's structured, is what exempts them from the Commission's regulation. That doesn't change the nature of the transaction as between Lee County and Jamaica Bay or as between Forest and Jamaica Bay.

You know, they've asked you to approve a tariff for it. You know, if it's a jurisdictional transaction, you know, they have to have a tariff, but, you know, we believe that the rest of the statute applies. If it's not, you know, then it's not.

> COMMISSIONER DEASON: I have a question.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Go ahead, and then Commissioner

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Bellak, how do you base your determination that this is a sale for resale? Is it based upon the fact that even if there's no compensation, direct compensation, it is somehow included within the lot rent and that constitutes a sale for resale?

MR. BELLAK: Well, my understanding is that the tariff that was sought by Forest was for bulk service. And the analysis that was done assumed that this was bulk service for resale because the service is going to be resold to the users of the service, which is the customers of Jamaica Bay. Now, if that's incorrect, then we may be talking about a new species of retail bulk service, and that may or may not be the case. But we're not -- for us, the argument about exemption is a strawman. We've never said that the transaction is exempt.

What we're saying is that under the facts of what was sought, which was bulk service, that all of the bulk service cases that have been reviewed that the Commission has approved have been bulk service for resale, but that's the assumption that's being made going in. If the Commission draws the conclusion that this is a retail sale, then that's a different issue. But we're not arguing exemption. I mean, I've been listening to ten minutes of conversations about exemption, but we're not taking the position that this is an exempt transaction. We're taking the position that based on the facts that we've been presented, it's a bulk service for resale tariff that was being sought after and was being granted.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think I heard Mr. Bellak answer my question. And my question is this. Is Forest providing retail service to end use

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customers, or did you say that's the determination that --

MR. BELLAK: My understanding is the answer is

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Okav.

MR. BELLAK: Which is the same thing in this Town of Jupiter versus Village of Tequesta. The assumption going in in Jupiter versus Teguesta was that the Village of Teguesta was not a retail customer of the Town of Jupiter. They were just getting bulk service at a point of delivery for the resale of that service to the end use customers in the Village of Teguesta. That's why the Court analyzed that differently than you would analyze a retail sale. And that's why we're -- the staff is relying on that case to demonstrate that they're wide of the mark. They don't seem to be taking on the actual issue that the Commission's analysis has presented. They're aiming at some strawman that we've never brought up. We never said that this was an exempt transaction. We said it was a sale of

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Therefore, the key determinant in whether a company needs a certificate or not is the answer to -- well, is that particular question.

MR. BELLAK: Right.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: Are they providing retail service to end use customers?

MR. BELLAK: Right. Bulk service for resale, the

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Commission deems the location of the service to be the point of interconnection. So, in other words, it's a different test than the test for locating end use consumer service. And in this case, the facts are that the interconnection will be within the certificated service area of Forest even though it's going to be used outside of that area.

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It's exactly like Jupiter versus Tequesta. Town of Jupiter versus Tequesta, the point of interconnection for the bulk service was within the Town of Jupiter. So the Judge said, well, there's no actual service to any end use customer in the Village of Tequesta, so we're going to hold that there's no dispute in the Village of Tequesta. There's no territorial dispute going on because it's not end use service. This is only bulk service for resale, and the interconnection point is within the Town of Jupiter. So the Court was satisfied that that's not the same kettle of fish as if would be the case if the Town of Jupiter were actually hooking up end use customers in the Village of Teguesta, sending those bills to those end use customers, making contact to those end use customers. None of that was happening. It was just service for resale at a delivery point. And that's the nature of all of these service for resale tariffs that the Commission has approved over a period of decades.

And, in fact, if you read the actual amended territorial agreement in Lee County versus Marks and its Order

1	850129, what the agreement provided for was that LCEC, the	
2	County, and FPL agree that neither supplier will attempt to	
3	serve or serve any applicant whose end use facilities are	
4	located within the service territory of the other. In other	
5	words, if their home or business were located. It doesn't say	
6	anything about interconnections between utilities that are	
7	going to resell bulk power or bulk service.	
8	CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Bellak, let me stop	
9	MR. BELLAK: That's not even included.	
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: Let me stop you there. Commissioner	
11	Bradley, you had follow-up questions or	
12	COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: I'm ready to make a motion.	
13	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay.	
14	MR. WRIGHT: Madam Chairman?	
15	CHAIRMAN JABER: Hang on one second.	
16	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: A question.	
17	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez, you had a	
18	question?	
19	Mr. Wright, I've seen your hand. Let me tell you, if	
20	there's no question posed to you, you've had your opportunity	
21	to speak.	
22	Commissioner Baez, you have a question?	
23	COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Mr. Bellak, help me clear up in	
24	my mind, do we I'm hearing in your explanation that there is	
25	some kind of presumption of resale; is that you're presuming	

that it's resale.

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MR. BELLAK: It looked exactly like the Village of Tequesta.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: Do we ever -- so anything that comes in, we say it's resale until proven -- I'm trying to order in my mind whether there is any analysis or any determination behind the meter.

MR. BELLAK: Well, let's say this. I would -- after working on this project, I would say that there is a fair need for more precision in the bulk service area, especially because the treatment of bulk service is so different from the treatment of plain service, end use service. And I sympathize with anyone, whether it's Mr. Wright or someone on the Commission panel or someone on the staff, that finds this area somewhat cryptic because of that. But what we can say is that I haven't seen anything which takes this set of facts and distinguishes it from the Village of Tequesta and the Town of Jupiter or any of the other Commission bulk service orders. And I think it's really the burden of the intervenor, the would-be intervenor to have done that. Instead, they focussed an awful lot of energy talking about exemption when the staff analysis never made that issue even back during the other docket. The staff was never arguing that at all. So they've had ample opportunity to come to grips with the difference between end use service and bulk service, but they've evaded

that and avoided it.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: A follow-up.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Baez.

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: If the circumstances were different and what we had was -- I guess the picture that I have in my mind is that, yes, there is some bulk sale going on. Now, what happens after the bulk sale? Where the water goes is of no concern to us, or at least it hasn't been proven that it should be of concern to us. I guess my question is, if the facts were different, if there were actual customers behind the bulk sale --

(Tape Ends, Side A; Tape Begins, Side B.)

COMMISSIONER BAEZ: There is no fact that we can point to that a sale is going on behind this bulk sale, I mean, is that true?

MR. BELLAK: Well, we can because the mobile home park is not like a farm that's trying to buy retail bulk service, let's say, and they're just going to buy a lot of service. And so they're buying bulk. I can imagine bulk service that's retail because a farm needs a lot of water, so they get some kind of different rate that's called bulk service, but that's not -- well, no one ever made an analysis that would indicate that there's anything here except the Village of Tequesta. You've got a lot of end users out there. And like the Village of Tequesta -- and they're all customers

of this mobile home park. And just like the Village of Tequesta, Jamaica Bay is a utility that serves those customers with wastewater service.

Now, it so happens that because it's self-service, they're exempt, but whatever service they're going to purchase, no matter who they purchase it for, it's not going to be service that's used by the owners of Jamaica Bay. It's going to be service -- it's going to go to the retail customers that are customers of the park. So it's just like the end users in the Village of Tequesta. The village is acting as a kind of utility, even though it's a municipality, and it's buying bulk service from a town, the Town of Jupiter, but it's for the purpose of reselling it to the residents of Tequesta. So --

CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Bradley, I'm going to come back to you for a motion, but let me make sure Commissioners have no other questions.

Commissioner Bradley. And, Commissioner, let me -- I understand we've probably gotten a little bit into Issue 2, but the only motion I'm asking for is on Issue 1, the intervention.

COMMISSIONER BRADLEY: My motion would be to deny Lee County's intervention.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. There is a motion to deny Lee County's petition to intervene. Is there a second? Is there a second?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'll second the motion.

CHAIRMAN JABER: There's a motion and a second. All those in favor say "aye."

(Unanimous affirmative vote.)

CHAIRMAN JABER: Opposed? Anyone opposed?

Okay. Motion carries unanimously.

Now, getting to Issue 2 though, Mr. Bellak, I think we have confirmed a couple of times now that just because we've denied the petition to intervene doesn't mean parties can't participate in -- interested persons can't participate in Issue 2. And I did let Mr. Wright know that there would be comments made for Issue 2. But, Forest, we'll let you go first since it's your petition.

MR. DETERDING: Thank you, Commissioners. I don't believe I need to go through the fact scenario, but I will point out one thing that I think was at least briefly touched upon in our previous discussion of the prior issue and that is a couple of points. First of all, Jamaica Bay is a utility. It is not an end user. It provides service to the residents of the mobile home park without specific compensation. If it were not for -- if you were to go along with the position of the County, that this was an end use retail customer, then there would be no purpose in the provision of the exemption within the statute related to systems such as this who provide service without specific compensation to the end use customer. So I wanted to make that point.

Second of all, Mr. Wright has raised the issue of the applicability of the Southlake case, wherein he points to the fact that that -- and relies upon the belief that the Southlake case is different in that it agrees with the position taken by the staff and by Forest based upon the fact that there is a bulk service arrangement to a governmental authority in that case and that that is the underlying reason for the Commission's decision. He fails to note, however, that that exemption did not occur until after that case. So his basis for claiming that that type of service, wastewater bulk service, to a governmental authority distinguishes that case is misplaced. There was no exemption for bulk resale wastewater at the time the Commission entered that decision.

Forest is simply trying to move forward with discussions with Jamaica Bay for the provision of bulk wastewater service to this exempt entity. We had made all those arrangements with Jamaica Bay and we're prepared to make the interconnect, but because of the need for immediate service and because of glitches in the permitting through DEP and the local building authority we were not able to complete that arrangement for bulk service. Those were in part the result of the County's taking the position that we had to have an extension of service territory. Therefore, this issue is ripe. We need a decision so that if we enter into such an arrangement, that we can move forward without those impediments

being put in front of us again. The building department's only basis for denying a building permit to Jamaica Bay was the failure to have an extension of service territory, which in the Commission's 25 years of processing similar bulk service arrangements it is never contended. And, in fact, all the rulings suggest exactly the opposite, though none dealed directly with the issue.

One other point I would like to make -- well, I think that basically is our position.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Jamaica Bay, do you have anything to add?

MR. PLANTE: Yes, Commissioners, I'd like to make one statement. Just as far as background, when we're talking -Lee County, when they've -- we've mentioned it's for settlement agreement with them that allows for a temporary agreement for their accepting wastewater that's already treated. It's reuse quality, but there is capacity, if necessary, and the plant goes down, they could take the untreated effluent and treat that. I think it's interesting to point out that Lee County Utilities is not physically treating this wastewater. It has a contract with the City of Ft. Myers. The pipe that was constructed goes to another pipe that goes to the City of Ft. Myers. And on the certificate that was required for all of the permits, it's the engineer with the City of Ft. Myers that signs off on it. So basically Lee County brokered the deal.

It is not their physical plant that purchased the ability from the City of Ft. Myers to process this. That's all.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Mr. Plante, I have just a factual question for you, something that wasn't real clear to me from the dec statement. The arrangement you want with Forest and the arrangement you have with Lee County currently is temporary for the purpose of you making improvements to your own facility and meeting all the DEP requirements; is that correct? Am I correct?

MR. PLANTE: That's in part correct, yes. The facility of Jamaica Bay is operating; it's functional. Last year they spent a couple hundred thousand dollars upgrading it. It's working. The problem is with the perc ponds. They're not percolating properly. They've overflowed in part because Lee County had a few days last summer with nine inches of rain. That's a lot of rain. Every inch of rain is an extra 80,000 gallons in one of these ponds.

What we sought was a manner is which to lower the levels of the ponds, clean them out, and see if they could be continued to be used. So the arrangement with Lee County is on a temporary basis to -- and it includes in there the ability to drain the ponds twice. DEP is urging Jamaica Bay to hook up permanently to Lee County. That is an option. However, the purpose of the declaratory statement and why we joined in was to make sure we had the other option also because this is reuse

quality water. Forest has reuse customers. In fact, it would 1 be supplied to them as opposed to just going into another 2 treatment plant if there's a way to use that water. So this is 3 a temporary -- as it clearly stated, could become permanent, 4 5 but it's a temporary way to just drain the ponds. CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. So really -- and, 6 7 Mr. Deterding, you can jump in here. The question you pose to us is one of law, which is, if Jamaica Bay temporarily or 8 9 permanently seeks to enter into an arrangement with Forest 10 Utilities, does that warrant an application for an amendment of 11 vour certificate? 12 MR. DETERDING: That's correct. CHAIRMAN JABER: That is solely the legal question. 13 14 MR. DETERDING: That is correct. Commissioner. 15 CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioners, do you have questions 16 at this point, or are we ready to move on to Mr. Wright? 17 Mr. Wright. 18 MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Madam Chairman. Again. 19 Commissioners, with regard to the request of the declaratory 20 statement, we oppose it. We believe that this is a 21 jurisdictional transaction, and accordingly, that all the 22 requirements of 367.045 must be complied with. 23 With regard to some of the specific comments made in

With regard to some of the specific comments made in the Commission staff's recommendation by Mr. Bellak and by Mr. Deterding and by -- I don't think I have any response to what

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Mr. Plante said, I would tell you the following: Mr. Bellak referred to all the cases. All the cases except one cited in all the paper here involved sales to specifically exempt entities, governmental authorities or the utilities. The one where it didn't was the St. Johns Service Company case that involved service to a homeowner's association across county lines. That was a cross county line case. It was a case that turned on the Commission's interpretation of 367.171, not with respect to 367.045, not with respect to 367.022. Tequesta turned on Chapter 180 and a contract between the Town of Jupiter and the Village of Tequesta as it incorporated Chapter 180. It was not a Chapter 367 case. None of these cases was ever challenged in any event.

Contrary to what Mr. Deterding asserts, that Jamaica Bay West is a utility, we would simply say they're not. They're not as a matter of law. By the operation of 367.022(5), they are not subject to the provisions of the chapter. The fact that they provide wastewater service as part of their services to their tenants does not make them a utility. What would make them a utility would be being a utility under some form of applicable law, whether Chapter 367 or a county ordinance; they are not such.

Mr. Deterding attempted to assert that there would be no purpose in the exemption of 367.022(5) if our position were to stand. That's not true. The purpose of 367.022(5), which

specifically exempts entities like Jamaica Bay West, mobile
home parks and other entities that provide compensation to
their occupants or their members without specific compensation
therefor, is to avoid the regulatory problems that would occur
if you tried to regulate transactions where there were no
specific charges for the service. I don't think that argument
holds water.

With regard to Mr. Deterding's reference to the Southlake case, I think the fact that the Legislature subsequently codified the provisions of 367.022(12) only supports our position. The Legislature has spoken on this. They have said what is jurisdictional and what is not jurisdictional.

And with regard to the point of interconnection matter, which is what brings the Lee County Co-op case by analogy only -- and I believe we were really clear on this. We didn't assert that it was binding precedent. We asserted that the binding requirements here are those of 367.045 and 367.022, but we bring Lee County Electric Co-op v. Marks into this case because it addresses the same public policy considerations, albeit in that case in the electric arena, as are addressed by 367.045 in the water and wastewater arena.

The purpose of these statutes is to avoid the unnecessary, unneeded, unwarranted duplication of facilities.

On the electric and gas side pursuant to Chapter 366, you have

the territorial dispute and territorial agreement statutes that provide for a resolution of such disputes. There is no such framework on the water and wastewater side. There's a very different regulatory framework on the water and wastewater side, and that framework is the framework of certificated service areas. And the Legislature has made it very clear that you have to have a certificated service area to provide service and the purpose is, very explicitly, you know, .045(5)(a), to avoid duplication where there's another utility that's ready, willing, able to serve and has never neglected or refused to provide service.

Forgive me, I've lost one tie on the track of my train of thought there. The analogy of Lee County is that you can't escape the otherwise applicable requirements of law by the artifice of putting the point of interconnection in another service area. Our position is very clear. This is a jurisdictional transaction; accordingly, it's subject to all aspects of the Commission's jurisdiction, rate regulation, and service area certification requirements alike. Accordingly, we believe you should deny the declaratory statement. Thanks for your time.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Thank you, Mr. Wright. Mr. Bellak, I'm going to pose a question to you. I just want a yes-or-no answer because I think we're all ready to vote this out, hopefully. I am looking at the very narrow question in

deciding this item, the very narrow question of, does Forest 1 2 have to seek an amendment to its certificate if it engages in a 3 permanent or temporary relationship with Jamaica Bay based on 4 the rationale that Jamaica Bay is wholly contained within Forest's certificated territory? My question to you is, is my 5 view of that very narrow question and the rationale I'm using 6 7 to get to the answer inappropriate to support your 8 recommendation? 9 MR. BELLAK: I don't understand the question. 10 facts of the case are --11 CHAIRMAN JABER: Well, Mr. Bellak, wait. Before you 12 go on, let me try to pose the question to you again.

MR. BELLAK: Okay.

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CHAIRMAN JABER: Set aside Lee County, Tequesta, and the cases you cite. I am wanting to answer the very limited question of, does Forest Utilities have to seek an amendment of their certificate if they engage in a temporary or permanent relationship with Jamaica Bay? And in answering that question, I have relied heavily on the fact represented by staff, which is Jamaica Bay is contained within Forest's certificated territory. Is that not true?

MR. BELLAK: That's not true.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Then I need you to explain.

MR. BELLAK: The interconnection is within the certificated -- the interconnection is within the certificated

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territory. And under those facts, as I understand them, they do not need an extension of their territory.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. And the interconnection. contrast that with what else there might be. Are you saying there are lines outside of Forest's territory that provide service?

MR. BELLAK: Not that Forest is going -- Jamaica Bay is going to construct that line.

CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Well. I need to understand the distinction you want me to fully appreciate. The interconnection happens on the Forest side. Service of water, the provision of water necessarily will have to be on the Jamaica side.

MR. BELLAK: No. because it's service for resale and that's deemed to be where the interconnection is located. Only for service for resale, not for end use service. And that's why in Chapter 367, despite .045 which sets out the parameters of end use service, there's a specific different statute for service for resale. It's two different ways of testing location.

And what their argument is, that the Commission doesn't have the discretion and hasn't had the discretion for 30 years to deem the point of service to be where the interconnection takes place, only in the instance of service for resale. And the short answer is the Commission does have

1	that discretion.		
2	CHAIRMAN JABER: Okay. Commissioners, do you have		
3	any other questions or a motion?		
4	Commissioner Baez. No? Okay.		
5	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I can make a motion.		
6	CHAIRMAN JABER: Commissioner Deason.		
7	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I move staff's recommendation		
8	on Issues 2 and 3.		
9	(Inaudible.)		
10	CHAIRMAN JABER: And a second. All those in favor		
11	say "aye."		
12	(Unanimous affirmative vote.)		
13	CHAIRMAN JABER: Issues 2 and 3, staff		
14	recommendation, are approved unanimously. Thank you. That		
15	takes us to Item 5.		
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	II		

1	STATE OF FLORIDA)
2	COUNTY OF LEON CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
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