BEFORE THE 1 FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 2 DOCKET NO. 060822-TL 3 In the Matter of: 4 PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM CARRIER-OF-LAST-RESORT (COLR) OBLIGATIONS PURSUANT 5 TO FLORIDA STATUTES 364.025(6)(D) FOR TWO PRIVATE SUBDIVISIONS IN NOCATEE DEVELOPMENT, 6 BY BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. 7 8 9 10 11 ELECTRONIC VERSIONS OF THIS TRANSCRIPT ARE 12 A CONVENIENCE COPY ONLY AND ARE NOT THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING, 13 THE .PDF VERSION INCLUDES PREFILED TESTIMONY. 14 15 16 PROCEEDINGS: AGENDA CONFERENCE 17 ITEM NO. 17 18 **BEFORE:** CHAIRMAN LISA POLAK EDGAR COMMISSIONER MATTHEW M. CARTER, II 19 COMMISSIONER KATRINA J. MCMURRIAN 20 DATE: Tuesday, March 13, 2007 21 PLACE: Betty Easley Conference Center 22 Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way 23 Tallahassee, Florida REPORTED BY: JANE FAUROT, RPR 24

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Official FPSC Reporter

(850) 413-6732

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1	PARTICIPATING:
2	TRACY HATCH, ESQUIRE, and JAMES MEZA III, ESQUIRE,
3	representing AT&T Florida.
4	FLOYD R. SELF, ESQUIRE, representing Nocatee
5	Development Company/SONOC Company LLC.
6	CHARLES REHWINKEL, representing Embarq
7	Communications, Inc.
8	MICHAEL COOKE, General Counsel, PAT WIGGINS, ESQUIRE
9	DALE BUYS, RICK MOSES and RAY KENNEDY, representing the Florida
10	Public Service Commission Staff.
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PROCEEDINGS

2 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: We are on Item 17.

MR. BUYS: Good morning, Commissioners. Dale Buys with the Commission staff.

Item 17 is staff's recommendation in Docket Number 060822, regarding BellSouth's, now they are AT&T's, petition for relief from its carrier of last resort obligations at the Riverwood and Coastal Oaks Subdivisions in the Nocatee development located in Duval and St. Johns Counties.

Upon review of the information provided thus far in this docket, staff believes AT&T has not made a prima facie case for good cause, and the Commission should deny AT&T's petition and not relieve AT&T from its COLR obligation at the identified properties.

Representatives from AT&T and Nocatee, I believe, are here this morning, and we are all prepared to discuss this matter.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you.

Mr. Meza.

MR. MEZA: Thank you, Madam Chair. Jim Meza again on behalf of AT&T Florida. Mr. Hatch will be providing BellSouth comments today.

MR. HATCH: Good morning, Commissioners. Tracy Hatch appearing on behalf of AT&T Florida. I think probably we ought to start out with we disagree with the ultimate conclusion of

staff's recommendation. We think they reached the ultimate wrong result. In reading the recommendation, what it essentially says is that we have not put on a sufficient amount of information for a prima facie case to justify good cause. But if I read the recommendation correctly, it appears from the way staff has structured it that there could never be a way in which a carrier could establish a prima facie case for uneconomic deployment. Essentially, what they have said is we didn't put forth any real examples, or any statistical data, or anything like that that would justify a good cause relief from COLR based on uneconomic deployment.

The nature of the COLR beast is that you can't do that -- the way the staff has structured it there would never be an occasion where you could actually do that. Each COLR application is based on the facts and circumstances of that particular instance. In this case you have got the Nocatee development. There is no way, unless you actually deploy the facilities, that you could give staff the kind of information they seem to be asking for in order to justify the fact that it is uneconomic deployment, in which case we have already deployed the facilities on an uneconomic basis and how are we going to recover our investment in those facilities. That is the fundamental quandary that we find ourselves in with the staff recommendation. There doesn't seem to be any way to get there from here.

Another point, too, that you have to consider and go back to the history of what COLR is and what COLR is not. If you go back, and the staff touches on the history of all of this briefly in its recommendation, talking about the concept of universal service, what it is, how it came about and why it is. But, essentially, it's what is generally referred to as part of a regulatory compact. If you go back before 1995 there was the phone company. If you go back to 1984 there is really the phone company, when there was essentially only one phone company in the United States. And the regulatory compact was that we would, or the phone company would give service to everybody under reasonable terms and conditions that wanted it within a geographic area, and as part of that deal you got to be the monopoly provider of telephone service. All of that changed in 1995.

Now, the legislation that essentially created competition or created the opportunity for competition in 1995 carried forth this COLR obligation, in which case we would provide, or the incumbent would be the COLR provider, and would provide service to those folks, reasonable terms and conditions, within its serving territory. But you have to understand COLR is the carrier of last resort. It is where there is no other alternative. Prior to 1995 that question never arose because there was only one alternative. I mean, that is just the nature of the beast. Post '95 there are

alternatives. COLR really exists as a concept only where there is no other alternative.

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Now, if you look at Nocatee, there is clearly another alternative, so you have to ask the question should COLR even exist under these circumstances? I mean, that's a fundamental question you have to ask yourself. It's clear from staff's recommendation that Nocatee will be providing phone service to those folks. And so, then, there is an alternative. One of the things that Nocatee says is that the statute intends that there be choice. No question, the 1995 statutes were designed to create choice. COLR is not a requirement that we be a choice. COLR is a requirement only where we are the only one that's available under reasonable terms and conditions. So, in a sense, we disagree with the staff's analysis as well as Nocatee's on that issue.

Now, one of the things that we do agree with, with respect to the staff's recommendation, and we would seek some clarification here, is that if -- and then they refer to we have other options under the Commission's rules in terms of CIAC, contributions in aid of construction, so that we have those tools available to us to essentially offset or at least mitigate the issue of uneconomic deployment.

We may be able to live with staff's recommendation, but we need to understand, first, who is able to invoke the COLR obligation from us? Is it Nocatee as a developer or is it

end users when they actually desire service? That's a question that is not answered. If it is the developer that can invoke this COLR obligation for us to deploy facilities, the staff suggests that is we can use the CIAC rule to recoup some of our investment in deploying those facilities. I think we probably can live with that. But the question then that we need at least clarification on from the Commission is if we go forward and Nocatee is able to invoke that COLR obligation for us to deploy facilities to provide voice only service, then, is Nocatee going to be responsible under the CIAC rule for paying us, under the CIAC rule, for the deployment of those facilities? That is the question. And if Nocatee says, I'm not going to pay you, then, we don't have an obligation to deploy those facilities.

One thing that you have to also consider here is the size and scope of the Nocatee development. It's not like we are denying subscribers phone service. At this point the only thing that's on the table is, essentially, we are declining to provide facilities to 3,000 homes that, at least as far as I know, don't have people in them at this point. The real question, of course, in any kind of economic deployment is how many customers are actually going to buy your service, that tells you whether it's going to be economic to deploy. We have absolutely no idea how many people are going to, essentially, subscribe to the service. We are limited in the Nocatee by

virtue of easement restrictions to providing voice-only services.

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Now, we are competing against the other alternative phone provider, which is going to be Comcast, and they can provide a whole range and host of services. Their economic equation is radically different from ours, because they, essentially, become the exclusive provider of video and data, and they can add on voice if somebody wants to buy it. By virtue of the easements from the developer, we are restricted to providing voice only, and so our economic equation in terms of recovery investment is radically different. The take rate required to economically deploy facilities has to be much higher in order to deploy those facilities.

One final comment with respect to the staff recommendation, this is sort of an afterthought, is that the staff suggests that the only way to really determine how to make these judgments on COLR petitions is through a generic. As I mentioned earlier, each of these cases, essentially, stand alone in its own right, and you have got statutory obligations to do them very quickly. The nature of these petitions are fact based and individual circumstances, and they do not lend themselves to any kind of a generic proceeding. We think that deferring anything -- well, I don't think you can defer it. I think the statute requires that you essentially act on the petitions that are before you. But the generic proceeding in

and of itself would not lend itself to this kind of a proceeding. We don't think that is the solution.

Thank you.

MR. SELF: Thank you, Madam Chairman, Commissioners. Floyd Self of the Messer, Caparello and Self law firm, appearing on behalf of Nocatee and all of the other entities involved in the development of the Nocatee community.

It seems to me, Commissioners, that there is really one question that you need to ask yourselves today, since this is a carrier of last resort waiver, and that is, is there any financial/legal access or other limitation on AT&T/BellSouth's ability to offer voice telephone service? And the answer to that question is no, there is absolutely no limitation on their ability. They are provided full access to install any facilities they want, but there is a limitation on their ability to provide voice telephone service only. And, really, that kind of goes to the last point that Mr. Hatch was talking about, when he was discussing the fact that if you are going to provide voice only the take rates have to be higher and all of that kind of stuff.

To me, it seems that the not economic to serve unless we can bundle in all of these other things is a very disturbing argument to make, because if it is uneconomic for BellSouth to -- and I apologize, I have been saying BellSouth for a long time. It's going to take a while. I'm sure Mr. Hatch has the

same problem.

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Anyway, if it is uneconomic for AT&T to serve a private gated community unless they can also provide video and data services or broadband services, then it seems that what BellSouth is really saying is that it is uneconomic to serve anyplace in the State of Florida. And I say that, because if you think about a community that perhaps the customers in that area don't take video and don't take broadband services, what is the economic incentive for a company like AT&T or any other incumbent LEC to serve or, importantly, to continue to serve in that area? Because if the argument is we can only serve if we can only bundle in all of these other things that are not regulated by this Commission, and which have nothing to do with the provision of telephone service, then I think that's a slippery slope, the result of which is you slide all the way down. Because I'm not sure if under that kind of analysis, if there is anyplace in the state of Florida that would be -- that would justify support for just voice-only telephone service.

And it seems that what AT&T is asking you to do is to make a leap of faith, and it is faith that they will fail and fail miserably, solely because they cannot offer the broadband and video services. And I find that at least partially ironic, because at the moment they really don't have a widespread deployed video service that they can offer at all. As you saw in the case background, Nocatee negotiated with them for a

considerable period of time to provide video as well as broadband services, and ultimately the business decision was made not to proceed with them because they could not offer the video service. So, I find it very disturbing to say that you have got to be able to bundle these things in. If that argument is true, then why not say, well, if we can't also offer, and pick any ridiculous thing that you want, toasters, cars, cell phone service. Again, I think that is an argument that doesn't stand up and which I think supports the staff argument that there is no prima facie case.

I think in the final analysis in order to grant a waiver -- I don't think this is an impossible question to answer. The statute sets forth four situations in which a carrier has been denied access, whether it is through physical access or effective economic access. And I think the good faith argument was thrown into the statute in order to give you the flexibility to address situations that amount to the same kind of denial of access. So I think if you had a situation where they, AT&T, was unable to access those customers, for example, perhaps Nocatee had entered into an arrangement with a cell phone company and we put towers on all of the residences, and we bundled in cell phone service into the purchase price for the houses or there was a homeowners association that had that kind of -- where that obligation existed, then I think you might, at least theoretically, have a good argument that there

is a good faith or -- excuse me, a good cause denial of access to that residence through that alternative provider. But I think given what you have now, the fundamental fact that they do have access to all of those residences, they can put in any facilities that they want, I think makes it very clear that under the statute that there is no prima facie case for good cause.

One other point that Mr. Hatch raised, and the staff recommendation touches upon this also, and that is this idea of potentially of the CIAC and that the tariffs or the Commission's rules provide a mechanism for the recovery of that. I don't know whether that's appropriate or not. I would only say at this point in time that to the extent that AT&T was going to invoke that, that it would be important that it must be applied fairly and nondiscriminatorily and that the facilities at issue needed to focus on voice telephone service.

For example, if AT&T said, well, it's going to cost \$2 million to build-out to serve this community, then I think we have to look at what are the facilities that they are including in that? Are they building in facilities that would also provide data and video, or are they talking about facilities that would be voice only? That's not an issue that needs to be resolved today, but if we get to that point downstream, I think that is important to look at.

And I'll be happy to answer any questions that you

may have.

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2 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Self.

Commissioners?

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I have some.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner McMurrian.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Let me see if I can get my thoughts together here, though. We've got a lot of information on this, definitely.

Mr. Self, I wanted to follow up with something you said when you were talking about the leap of faith and that you think that AT&T was making the argument that fails solely because they can't offer video and broadband. And I guess I understand it a little differently, so I just wanted to ask you about this. I understand that, and I believe that Mr. Hatch's argument touched on this, it is more about putting in the facilities to serve voice and then not knowing how many voice customers you're going to get. So it is more a recouping investment issue than it is just that they can't get broadband and video. They can't serve that because of the exclusive arrangement.

I mean, at least it seems to me that it's a combination of the two things. Maybe it's aggravated by the fact that they can't get the broadband and the video and that might help offset that recouping issue of the original investment for voice. But do you really see it as solely

because they can't offer video and broadband? Maybe we just have a difference of opinion.

MR. SELF: Well -- and I don't know whether it is semantics or not either. I'm just reading what the pleadings say and, you know, whether it is stated this way or it is my interpretation of it, what I'm seeing is it is uneconomic for us to be in there unless we can also offer the video and the broadband. And maybe there is more ambiguity today in a new development when you are deploying some kind of wired network for telephone, and potentially other services as well, as to whether or not you're going to still get effectively 100 percent penetration on that versus 20 years ago.

I mean, we have all seen the stories about, you know, college kids with cell phones and other people with cell phones and not even having traditional landline telephone service. I think if you buy into that argument that there is a question as to what's the take rate going to be; it's not going to be our traditional assumed virtually 100 percent penetration. Well, that is really true the other way, as well. Even though Comcast may be providing video and data services, there's no guarantees either that they are going to have a high level of penetration with respect to their voice telephone service.

I admit that question, you know, only time is going to tell how difficult it's going to be or what the circumstances are going to be for a carrier to know what the

I don't know. I think it's fair to assume that these are private gated communities. You know, if you want to make assumptions, you know, I think it is safe to assume that they are going to take video and broadband services. But I think it is -- my assumption is it is also very safe to assume that those types of customers are going to want traditional wired telephone service, not VoIP and all of the issues that it may have, not cellular with the issues that they may have. You know, they want reliable, affordable, guaranteed phone service. You know, I find it ironic that I'm arguing on their behalf, but, I mean, that's what they offer.

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COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I guess, Mr. Self -- and I guess I will go ahead and follow up with you on it. I guess what I'm struggling with is it seems to me there has to be some scenario that gets to good cause or else what's the purpose of it being there. And to me, when you look at the factors in this case, it seems like if you are not there you are getting awfully close. And I'm having trouble defining it for myself, but I guess I will just ask you. What do you think would constitute good cause, or do you think it's true what Mr. Hatch said, that under staff's reading of this there really is nothing to get you to the good cause.

MR. SELF: Well, I disagree with that. I think there are scenarios where you could potentially have good cause. And

like I said before, it has got to amount to an effective denial of access to the customers. One hypothetical may be they contract with a cellular company and somehow between the homeowners association or some other combination of things, you end up with a deal that cellular service is provided. There's base stations, cell phones. I don't know, I'm just sort of making this up as I'm going along. But I could see a scenario where that might be true.

There might be other types of business arrangements whereby you are effectively denying AT&T access to those customers, either through physical access or through some economic combination that involves voice telephone service. We certainly don't with the arrangement with Comcast have an economic denial of access to those customers in the present facts.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I guess this, perhaps, is best asked of staff. What do you see as the purpose of the COLR statute? I guess that would be -- I guess that would be for Patrick -- Mr. Wiggins, I'm sorry.

MR. WIGGINS: The COLR statute or the COLR waiver?

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Actually, I should probably say what is the purpose of COLR, the carrier of last resort concept, what is the purpose? And I know that we have gone through some of the history in the rec.

MR. WIGGINS: All right. First of all, it's the

carrier of last resort, not the carrier of only resort. Let's be clear, Mr. Hatch. The purpose of the carrier of last resort obligation under the revisions to the '95 version of Chapter 364 were to embrace in a new regulatory bargain the standard or historical common carrier obligation to provide services on a nondiscriminatory basis to all those who request your service within an area you are holding yourself out to provide it indiscriminately. That was a long sentence.

What is unique about telephone companies in Florida is they have a territorial description, just like they have a property description, which says this is your territory, and they say we are going to serve it. That means they build-out. That is what they do and that started back in 1911. Okay. So that has been there all along. And the common carrier obligation to provide that service when it's asked goes back to at least the eleventh century and probably back to Rome, so this is nothing new, okay.

It is true, I'm not just winging this one. So the purpose was to take that obligation that has been there all the time and try to make it breathe and be alive in a price capped, competitive evolving environment. So where we are left now is that as competition is intruding, we are having situations where previously it might have been uneconomic in a specific situation for the ILEC to serve, but where they might have some guarantee overall that they would be getting a fair rate of

return for their rates, where they know they are not going to get their money back. They are going to lose money. There is no back end on this.

So, the waiver, in looking at trying to balancing the guarantees that we have that any user can have access to a carrier of last resort, and that carriers have access to that user, and that we can maintain the integrity of the public switched network said, hey, you have got four situations where automatically the switch is on or off or it is black or white, these are them until 2009. Is it 2009 still? So 2009 and all bets are off. But until then these four conditions.

Then, we have gray areas. And the Legislature in its infinite wisdom says, PSC, you take care of the gray areas. All right. What is happening here is that the ILEC and the developers and the cable companies are saying, yeah, it's a gray area, but treat it like it is black or white. It really is not gray, they have not made their case; or it really is not gray, we have made our case. Follow? So they are trying to put us in an either/or position when there is no either/or here.

The truth is I think that Mr. Hatch was right in most everything he said, and I think Mr. Self is right in everything he says. So how is it you can be sitting here with two people being -- you know, two sides being essentially right? Well, that is why it is a gray area. Okay. So that is where we are.

getting at, it seems to me that the purpose of COLR overall is to provide a safety net for customers to have a phone. I mean, is that correct? It seems to me that that is what the notion is. And it seems to me that what the purpose of the COLR relief statute was, was to come in and say there are circumstances where we think that, essentially, we have taken care of that because there is some competitor that has come in and in some way or another locked out the traditional carrier of last resort, and that customers then do have another carrier. Granted that they don't have the same requirement under the statutes that a traditional provider has, but that essentially there is a provider of voice service.

MR. WIGGINS: Yes, ma'am. I think the interpretation you gave is a permissible one. I think it is reasonable in the evolving, but it is not what I see. I do not believe that the purpose of the COLR obligation is to give the individual user a safety net. I think the purpose of the COLR obligation is to ensure that we have universal service in a public switched network and facilities deployed to serve that public switched network.

The fact that it translates into an individual right of a consumer as a safety net is actually a function of it, but I don't see that as being the driving purpose. However, clearly, the existence of alternative access to the public

switched network through VoIP or others or cellular or whatever, is clearly a consideration you can take into account.

That is why this is a gray area. We are just going to use our best judgment as we move through this.

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MR. SELF: And, Commissioner McMurrian, if I may. I don't think it is the mere, the mere presence of an alternative provider that is dispositive of the issue. I mean, I read something the other day, there is like 220 million wireless customers in the country. Well, you know, it seems that virtually everybody over the age of 11 has a cell phone. The Legislature has to be aware of the fact that cellular is out there, that if you have a broadband connection there's multiple VoIP alternatives.

If it was the mere presence of an alternative carrier, then I think the statute would have been totally different. There would be no COLR obligation at all. And it may well be that come January 1st, 2009 that may well be the situation that you are in if the existing terminal date does, in fact, come to pass without another extension.

MR. WIGGINS: May I? This is a frame here that I would like to add, Madam Chair, if I could, which may be useful, particularly as we move forward with the other comments. You know, in our mission statement as a Commission, we say that part of our purpose is to remove regulatory barriers to the marketplace to help the marketplace work,

right? And we're looking -- what we are seeing here is the kind of impasse between developers and ILECs. For some reason, negotiations aren't working. Why is that? Well, because it is in an either/or position, that's why. You either come and put your facilities in, and, by the way, we want you to put your facilities in, but we may actually have an incentive to encourage people not to use them, okay. Versus the ILEC saying, not unless you pay everything we want, we're walking. And that may be a harsh way to portray the two sides.

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So what can we do to remove the regulatory barriers to promote competition, promote the marketplace? What I think staff's recommendation is, is that if you say in this moment as teed up, sorry, you haven't actually proved the COLR waiver yet. For one thing, you have not explored special constructions, negotiations with the CIAC and the like with the developer, with the middle ground, where you guys can negotiate as business people to come to a deal. You haven't explored that yet. Explore that first, and if you can't come to terms, then come back.

And what we are hoping is that with what we have with our statute and our statutory jurisdiction, which is voice, that this approach will help remove some of the obstacles to the developers and the ILECs getting what they need in the situation, certainty, information and the ability to evaluate whether they have a rational economic deal. So that is the

purpose of our recommendation.

MR. REHWINKEL: Madam Chairman, may I address you as an interested person, solely on the issue of the legislation?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Rehwinkel.

MR. REHWINKEL: My names is Charles Rehwinkel. I'm with Embarq, and I recognize that I have another docketed item, and I will stay away from any mention of anything in there, knowing the state of that docket.

But I wanted to address some comments that have been made about the meaning of this legislation, and I would offer, for whatever it is worth, for you to accept, ignore, disregard as you see fit, but I was involved in the development of a draft that was submitted in the legislative process. As a citizen we are entitled to do that and to participate and to take our representatives ideas for legislation, and we did that.

At the time this legislation was being developed, we were in a negotiating session with your staff, the staff of the sponsor, and representatives of other companies. And, yes, it is true that there are four scenarios that are laid out in the statute that deal with virtual or actual denial of access to the property. There was a fifth scenario proposed. It is very similar to some of the scenarios that you are seeing here today in this matter.

We were told that it would be preferable to not put a

fifth scenario in, but to bring language that's very similar to what is in the statute today to bring it to the Commission to have it have a hearing, and that the Commission would give a quick turn around on that. So, that's the language, that is how the statute came about. And I say that because it is not just a different flavor of one of these four denials of access to the property that you have heard advocated as a way to interpret the statute.

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If you look at the definition that's included in the statute, there is a definition of communications service, which means a voice service or a voice replacement service through the use of any technology. There is an express recognition by the legislature that there are other ways to serve properties. So I don't believe that there is -- this statute changes the paradigm as far as what the expectations are for service at the property.

If you look at the waiver language, the good cause shown language that has been discussed here today, and it says that a party may petition for good cause shown based on the facts and circumstances of provision of service to the multi-tenant business or residential property. There is a recognition that other types of service can be delivered at that property, and we believe that that means that the parties are entitled to bring these gray areas to you that don't have to necessarily deal with the denial of access to the property.

So I just wanted to make it clear that there is a recognition by the Legislature that things have changed, and that the way service is provided is a factor for you to take into consideration there. It is not just a matter about whether there is a denial of service.

And, finally, I would urge on the matter of a generic docket is to exercise a great deal of caution in that area. As a provider that will probably be bringing petitions to you in the future that involve millions of dollars of our precious and scarce capital resources, we think we are entitled under the law to have case-by-case decisions made at locations. And a generic docket has the danger of going for a year or two years. I have seen some generic dockets last ten years. And I'm not suggesting that that is what the staff has in mind, but generic dockets have no statutory time frames on them. They have no APA time frames on them. They can go a long time. I would hate for there to be a pending generic docket that sucked the life out of every petition that was brought under the statute.

And as to the CIAC issue as it relates to these petitions, the 90-day provision in the statute, I believe, is intended to recognize that the developer world marches on. The developer world doesn't sit around and decide whether we have got time to negotiate CIAC agreements with developers or not. There are times certain where you have to provide facilities in the ground, you have got to provide service on an economic

basis. So just having that option doesn't necessarily provide a silver bullet under the statute. We believe that the statute recognized that there is a 90-day time clock, because there was a need to get a yes or no, build/no build decision.

That's all I have to say. Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner McMurrian.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I guess I'll just follow up on what I said earlier about struggling without determining good cause, and I have had a lot of discussions with staff on this. And, frankly, I haven't -- it doesn't seem like anyone is able to say this is what we think constitutes good cause. And I guess the reason I struggle with it is because it seems like the circumstances we have here to me justifies good cause. And maybe it's just one of those things I have to disagree, but in this case you have a developer who has entered into an exclusive service arrangement for data and video, and I realize that that is not what the statute is about, it's about voice. But, as I said earlier, I think it contributes to the recoupment of investment to provide voice issue.

You have a service provider who's willing and able to also provide a voice replacement service; you have other voice replacement alternatives out there, such as wireless, like we have talked about; and at least you have some demonstration on behalf of the carrier to say that it is uneconomic.

Now, of course, we are not in a post-hearing

situation. We haven't gone through cross examination of BellSouth's testimony or AT&T Florida's testimony about whether or not the numbers they have provided hold up on the investment side and how they could recoup them. I understand that. But to me it seems like just at first blush, recognizing it is PAA, to me you are leading up to a situation where I think good cause has been shown.

MR. WIGGINS: Madam Chair, I want to answer two questions Mr. Hatch asked before they get too -- as I recall, you asked two questions. One is who has the right to invoke the COLR obligation, and I think staff's view has been consistently that's the customer, the end user. And, second, given that, who would be the one that would make the -- contribute the CIAC, and that would be the --

MR. HATCH: The developer.

MR. WIGGINS: The developer, yes. I was getting there. Fine. Thank you. He was so afraid I was going to say the customer.

Although ultimately it will be the customer, because sooner or later, you know, there is no free lunch, and that is why we're here. So that would be the developer. And from my perspective, at least, and although we have not discussed this with staff, is that for some reason if they won a lottery and got the same amount of money to contribute to defray the cost, it is the same thing. The issue is whether a contribution or

special construction that can be worked out on an economic commercial basis can, in fact, avoid rates for that development that are confiscatory. So -- but I thought Mr. Hatch wanted one of those questions answered, so. Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner McMurrian.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Thank you. I did have one other comment and Mr. Wiggins reminded me.

On the CIAC issue, I really do applaud staff for sort of thinking -- don't kill me for saying this, overquoted -- outside the box, and trying to spur the negotiations. And I think that that was -- I think that that was a great idea, and I'm not saying that that is not an idea that has merit in this case or others. I guess for me, whenever I read that this case didn't constitute good cause, to me then this case is going to become a precedent for other cases. And I just couldn't come up with what was really missing.

To me, the more I tried to come up with what my list of what constituted good cause, I could see a situation where you are going to find -- you are going to end up encouraging behavior that was going to end you right back up with the same question you had before, because then the developer may have reason to go about it a different way and make sure then that -- I just think that with the circumstances here, where you are locked out of data and video, and you have that provider that has contracted in that situation also providing

voice replacement service, and everyone agrees there are other voice replacement services out there, and a demonstration, again, realizing it has not gone through a hearing process, that there will be uneconomic or there will be harm to the entity that would be required to provide voice. I just think that you get there. But, again, I think that the -- I think that the CIAC issue is really a great idea and probably will move this thing along, at least from the perspective of the parties that may be polarized on one side of the issue.

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MR. SELF: Commissioner, if I may just for one brief moment. It seems to me that if your statement is correct, then you have created an unfair bargaining position. Because if what you say is true, then the only option that's available to a developer is to take service with the incumbent local company that is at least offering voice, video, and data services.

Because if you say that a developer that enters into an agreement for voice -- I'm sorry, for video and data with someone other than the incumbent local exchange company always constitutes good cause, then they're in a position where they can never do that.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I don't believe I said that.

I was saying that I think with all of those factors taken together, and I might have misspoken earlier when we were having an exchange. I didn't mean to say that any time that you had a voice replacement provider that that in itself

constitutes good cause. I think it's a combination of the things. And to me, I just think the circumstances here constitute good cause. But, no, I don't -- I'm not saying that any time there is an agreement with respect to data and video that that in itself constitutes good cause.

I think that it has to be with a combination that there are other providers out there, such as wireless, and I believe the statute mentions using any technology. And to me when you take the information we have in the statute, and it leads you to a certain sort of overall intent of where they were trying to go. And I think that, of course, they left the good cause there to give us some discretion to decide when we thought the circumstances met the good cause standard. And in my opinion I think they do in this case.

MR. SELF: Well, I'm just concerned that given the near ubiquitous nature of cellular and the fact that if you have broadband you then have multiple VoIP options, then it seems to me that if you have got a contract to provide even just broadband, then you're done.

MR. MEZA: Madam Chair, if I may respond.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Meza, just a moment.

Commissioner Carter, did you want to jump in or would you like to hear from the other end of the table first?

COMMISSIONER CARTER: I will wait for a moment.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. Mr. Meza.

MR. MEZA: Thank you, Madam Chair. Jim Meza on behalf of AT&T Florida. I just want to respond to Mr. Self's comments. And we need to keep in mind that, your know, the sympathy argument for the developer -- when you hear that argument, remember that they are the ones that have entered into this arrangement with an alternative provider for their own financial reasons. They have made a business decision which they are at liberty to do, that we are going to restrict consumers at this property that buy our -- that buy these homes to only getting data and video from a particular provider.

And so when he says in that situation and what you are saying is that is good cause because there is always going to be an alternative provider on the voice side, well, buyer beware, developer beware. When you are entering into these negotiations with cable providers that restrict our ability to provide services that we know consumers want, then that's the consequences of their action.

There should be an ability for us to provide all the services that all our consumers want. And when there is not, and it is uneconomic for us to spend \$1.6 million to deploy facilities when there is an alternative provider for all three services that consumers want, we should be relieved of our obligation.

Thank you.

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CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Just to staff. As I understand the perspective as presented for the reason to disregard the COLR requirement is AT&T is saying, one, is that the exclusive agreement for video and data by the developer and the cost of installing the infrastructure purely for voice.

MR. KENNEDY: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Therefore, that should give

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Therefore, that should give them good cause to ignore the carrier of last resort requirement.

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MR. KENNEDY: That's their position, yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Did I miss anything?

MR. KENNEDY: No, I don't think so.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Is there anything in the pleadings that would have precluded or anything in the process that would have precluded AT&T from saying here is a plethora of reasons why we should ignore the carrier of last resort requirement?

MR. KENNEDY: They can lay out anything they desire in their pleading, as I see it.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: And based upon what I have seen here, other than the fact that the developer has an exclusive agreement for video and data and the cost for installing the infrastructure for voice, what else did they present?

MR. KENNEDY: I missed the last part.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: What else did AT&T present?

I'm trying to find out in here what else is in here.

MR. KENNEDY: It is their cost and their fear of not recovering their cost.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Which is pretty much the cost issue.

MR. KENNEDY: Correct.

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COMMISSIONER CARTER: It is all part of the cost issue, isn't it?

MR. KENNEDY: Right. One thing that stood out in my mind was -- and it actually helped prompt us to add the CIAC in the recommendation -- was that, apparently -- I believe they said the developer was not willing to pay them to install their network, and the CIAC would help recoup some of those costs, is why we put that in there, and let them explore other avenues.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chairman, if you will bear with me momentarily. I'm trying to understand why if given the opportunity and given the requirement for the carrier of last resort, if I had an opportunity to show good cause on why this requirement should be waived, I would obviously give you the kitchen sink if it were me. I'm just saying just from a common sense standpoint I would give you everything. But I have only seen the fact that the developer has exclusive agreement for video and data and the cost for installing the infrastructure for voice.

1 MR. KENNEDY: Correct.

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COMMISSIONER CARTER: That is pretty much it, right?

MR. KENNEDY: Yes, sir.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: So based upon these two factors we should ignore the carrier of last resort, right?

MR. HATCH: Commissioner Carter, you are looking at me. I assume you want a response. Let me jump in.

I don't think that's an accurate characterization.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Okay. Show me in here where it's different.

MR. HATCH: If you are looking for an instance in the petition where there is a laundry list of all possible objections to this, it isn't in the petition, per se. Let me just jump in and say, I mean, even if you assume Mr. Wiggins is right, and we have to provide service to anybody in our territory that wants it, and even if you assume Mr. Self is right, and that everybody is entitled to a choice and we are the second choice regardless of whatever else is out there, the carrier of last resort obligation, which stems from the old universal service, has never in its entire history been open-ended. There has always been a cost limit.

Some guy that lives on an island two hundred miles offshore is not entitled to phone service if it is uneconomic to serve him. Because, understand, under the old regulatory compact the general body of ratepayers pay the price.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Show me in the document where 1 this is -- just lay it out for me. 2 MR. HATCH: In the discovery that we have produced to 3 the staff, we had provided a net present value analysis of the 4 economics for this development. And based on our analysis and 5 those economics it is uneconomic to serve. 6 COMMISSIONER CARTER: And based upon your analysis 7 for economics --8 That's correct. 9 MR. HATCH: COMMISSIONER CARTER: -- and based upon your reading 1.0 of the statute. 11 MR. HATCH: Yes. Our reading of the statute is that 12 we are here under the good cause standard, and for us the good 13 cause is it is not economic to provide it. We will never 14 recover our investment under the current -- the way it looks to 15 16 us. COMMISSIONER CARTER: It is uneconomical to provide 17 voice? 18 MR. HATCH: Yes. 19 COMMISSIONER CARTER: That's what you are saying? 20 MR. HATCH: In a sense, yes. We are restricted to 21 providing voice. We will accept that. But based on the 22 limitations on what we can deploy, what services we can provide 23 to recover the investment in the deployment of those 24

facilities, after a ten-year period we still have not recovered

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our investment, and that is based on some aggressive assumptions even in the data that we provided.

why --

For example, we assumed a 50 percent take rate, and that is probably fairly aggressive based on this scenario. But even based on our own analysis being fairly favorable to deployment, it just doesn't -- it's not going to make us any money.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: So, then, I guess you are saying that there shouldn't even be a COLR requirement under any circumstances --

MR. HATCH: We can debate --

COMMISSIONER CARTER: -- as it pertains to voice?

MR. HATCH: I mean, we can debate the philosophy of

COMMISSIONER CARTER: I'm just asking you. I'm asking you, based upon what you are saying is that for voice, then there shouldn't be any COLR requirement?

MR. HATCH: No, I'm not saying that at all. The statute actually creates a COLR requirement. You can fairly read it, just assuming that you can fairly read it to be limited solely to voice. Even if you say that, at some point you don't have to provide service if it becomes too expensive to provide. That has always been true historically.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chairman, I realize I have taken a lot more time than even I thought I would take on

this.

When you say it is uneconomical, in the process of displaying or proving that it is uneconomical, did you submit audited financials in your projections, or did you -- I mean, what kind of cost analysis did you go through on that? I'm trying -- I'm trying to find from the record here where this would show clearly that it would be uneconomical to provide voice service under the COLR requirement and the fact that the exclusive agreement with video and data amplifies that. I don't know how it falls into it, but those are the bases to show good cause to ignore the COLR requirement.

MR. HATCH: We had provided our cost information to the staff. It was filed, essentially, proprietary. The staff can certainly provide that to you. They can give you their reactions as to what the amount and quality of the data that we provided to you is.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: And they did that. They did that, and they still came up with this recommendation.

MR. HATCH: They dismissed it out of hand as projections and, essentially, speculative. The problem with that is, is in order to give you the actual physical economic information that you would like to demonstrate it, I would have to deploy the facilities first, figure out what the take rate is, wait ten years and then tell you that it was uneconomic, and that is what we're trying to avoid.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Or we can just take your guesstimation that it is uneconomic.

MR. HATCH: Yes, you could; and, certainly, we are asking you to do that.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Right. Well, I don't -- I would disagree with your characterization of how staff views the data that you presented to them. I disagree with you on that characterization. I think that they are sincere, and they looked at this data and gave it the worth that it deserves. I don't think they discussed it and gave it no -- to say it's willy-nilly, I don't think -- I would take issue with that characterization.

But I still get -- I'm back to where I started, and I'm still there with it. It seems to me the basis for good cause to ignore the COLR requirement centers upon, one, the developer has an exclusive agreement with another party to provide video and data; and, two, the cost, the estimate it costs of installing infrastructure for voice only. That's where I am. Am I missing something? Staff, did I miss something?

MR. KENNEDY: No, sir.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: Madam Chairman, could we have a moment, please. I think it's time for a break.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: I could use a stretch. Let's take about seven and come back at a quarter to.

1 We are on break.

2 (Recess.)

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CHAIRMAN EDGAR: We are going to get started again.

Thank you all.

And, Commissioner McMurrian, I think we left with you.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Thank you. I have a few more questions. And this one, I guess, I will direct to AT&T Florida, but I'm fine with other people responding to it, too. Similar to a question I think I asked before, but, essentially, could there be negative consequences on the remaining customers of your company if you are required to build-out in an area like this, and you actually don't get sort of a critical mass of customers signing up for your voice service?

MR. HATCH: I think the answer to that is clearly yes. At some point our customers have to pay the revenues that support the enterprise. To the extent that we enter into money-losing propositions, those customers support that loss ultimately, or it goes to our bottom line and the stockholders eat the loss. In a competitive market, essentially, that is how it works in any event. We don't have rate base regulation. We can't just file a rate case and go to the customers like a rate base regulated customer can.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Anyone else want to respond to that?

MR. SELF: Yes, I agree with the answer, if the

question is what is that critical mass. You know, I was just looking at the numbers. If you just accept the 1.6 million, if only a thousand of the 3,000 homes took the service, you're asked -- that means those thousand homes would have to, basically, pony up over time \$1,600. You know, over five years that is \$320. You know, I don't know what makes it work or doesn't work economically, but it seems that if you are getting 320 bucks a year from these customers, that's \$28 a month or \$24, something like that, that, you know, you are getting close, and that is just assuming a one-third penetration. But I don't know what the right numbers are for that.

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MR. MOSES: Commissioner McMurrian, may I speak to that, please? I think one thing that is getting lost in all of these discussions is that CIAC option that they have got available to them. If they can recover that expense up front by applying that option, all of this other discussion is moot. I mean, it is only going to have an effect of, I think my staff has told me, approximately \$200 per household. So with that minimum amount of money that the customers would have to ultimately contribute, the facilities are paid for, they are in there providing the services, now your customers have options. So why give them a waiver when their money is going to be given to them?

MR. SELF: And we did, Commissioner McMurrian, at some point in the negotiations. I don't know how much, but

there was an offer to fund some of this. I wasn't a party to the negotiations, but there was at least an offer to negotiate some reasonable amount. I think maybe the CIAC statute or rule may well give some context to that discussion.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I guess I would say to that,
Mr. Moses and Mr. Self, that I haven't forgotten about the
CIAC. And as I said earlier, I think it's a very good approach
to try to encourage parties to sort of come to some middle
ground, and perhaps these things won't be as contentious
anymore. Perhaps that is a good way to resolve this.

My concern is, as I read the rec, we are making a finding that good cause has not been established here, and I'm not comfortable doing that. I don't believe -- I can't really come up with a situation where you are going to have more factors that point you to the conclusion of good cause, and I think it is there for some reason.

I mean, the Legislature could have stopped with the four automatics and never put in a provision for good cause at all. And I realize that in one of the bills there was another automatic that was taken out. The good cause is there. And I think I have some obligation to try to determine, at least in my mind, whether I think this justifies good cause or not. And maybe we don't have to make an exact finding of whether this is good cause or not. That I don't know.

MR. MOSES: I think I could give you an example of

what possibly could be a good cause, something similar to like Dog Island where they may have to put a submarine cable across there, which is going to be excessively expensive. That alternative probably wouldn't be even viable for the CIAC, because it is going to be so expensive they couldn't -- the customers couldn't afford it.

In that instance we ended up putting a radio system out there, I think was what the ultimate resolution was. A situation like that, good cause may be shown, because the CIAC is such that it is not affordable for the customers to be expected to pay that. Another alternative would have to be done. We have had the same situation in South Florida for the Seminole tribe. There is an area down there that is being served by a radio system that is antiquated, needs to be changed out, but you couldn't get landlines in there. It's too expensive to do so. So there are some instances, I think, that good cause could be shown. We just don't believe this is one of them.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Well, let me follow up on that point. To me what you are suggesting is that there is some threshold amount of money that sets good cause. That if the investment were such that, and I don't know what that amount of money is, and I realize we're not in a hearing situation here, so you have numbers that BellSouth has put out, and we haven't litigated whether those numbers are valid or

not. And I think everyone would agree that there is a certain amount of guessing going on about this anyway, because this is such a new issue, it is a case of first impression for us. We don't have data about how many people have taken voice service in these kind of situations.

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So, you know, my frustration is I feel like I'm flying blind, other than the information that's in the statute. And in the statute you have the four automatics, which I think give you an idea of kind of where they were going. And I realize that they didn't create another automatic just because someone has locked them out on video and data. And, also, that they didn't make an automatic exemption just because there was some other voice provider. But I think when you start putting those things together with some kind of demonstration of economic harm --

MR. MOSES: And we understand the predicament that, unfortunately, we have placed you in, but that is another reason of that CIAC option in there is to try to mitigate the economic part of it. It also gives them the opportunity they can protest the PAA, they can come in and ask for a hearing, they can go and flesh out all of these areas that you are concerned with. We are just trying to convince you not to go the opposite direction and grant it and set a precedent when we haven't fleshed out all of those criteria.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Let me ask you another

question, if the Chairman is okay with it. The exclusive marketing arrangements that are mentioned on the top of Page 7, it says that Nocatee has entered into exclusive marketing arrangements for all three types of services, but they have entered into exclusive service arrangements for video and data, and we have been talking a lot about that.

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What exactly does it mean to have an exclusive marketing arrangement? What are other providers prevented from doing in that situation? And I'm trying to get my arms around what is the likelihood of AT&T Florida being chosen by a customer that comes in if they already have the video and broadband. And we have said how important -- repeatedly in our comp reports we have said how important that triple play is. People like to get one bill. I know there are certain factors with respect that VoIP that make it not equal to the others, but what exactly happens with an exclusive marketing arrangement?

MR. KENNEDY: The way I understand it one thing is the customers may not automatically have Comcast for video and broadband. It is not paid for in their dues, homeowners dues, so they have to buy it. I suspect some people may not buy broadband. You know, who knows. And that is another unknown. If they don't buy the broadband, they may not be able to buy the voice from Comcast. Who knows. But the marketing agreement, basically, in reviewing their agreement, which we

have a copy of, and most of it is unclassified. In the offices where they are promoting the homes there will be documentation on Comcast service, voice service, all services. In the closings they will present Comcast products to the people who are buying the homes. So on site Comcast's name will be very visible. BellSouth cannot hang their marketing materials on site. They do it through newspapers, direct mails, or however they do it. Phone calls, whatever. So exclusive marketing is Comcast will be visible for the voice.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I think that is where I'm going. Perhaps that is something that leads even to a factor, because I think it is going to affect -- I think it is a reasonable assumption to think that the exclusive marketing may affect the take rate if AT&T is required to come in, the take rate that they would be able to receive because they have to go through, presumably, tougher measures. Most of us don't answer the phone with an 800 number.

MR. KENNEDY: Right.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: But, anyway, I guess that's my concern with that.

But you raised something in your analysis that I was wanting to ask about, and I have probably lost my train of thought. I have. I was going to ask BellSouth or AT&T Florida -- it's going to take some time.

MR. HATCH: Don't feel bad, I do it all the time.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Something about the exclusive marketing arrangements. Why don't I do it this way. Why don't I let you respond to what you just heard the staff say, and maybe I will remember my point.

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MR. HATCH: As I understand an exclusive marketing arrangement, it is where the developer would market to home buyers the products with whom they have the exclusive arrangement, in this case Comcast. And as staff said, when they come and they shop and they buy, then the developer, in addition to selling them the house is also trying to sell them, you know, Comcast Internet, Comcast cable, that kind of stuff, and VoIP as well, probably, as part of their package.

It does not preclude anybody else from trying to sell to them, it's just that it puts the exclusive marketing arrangement or that provider in a preferred position, vis-a-vis, the developer in doing the initial sale of the property. In general, we don't have any objection to exclusive marketing arrangements. We think that we can compete on marketing as well as anybody.

But the difference and to be contrasted is what you also have here is the exclusive service agreement. And that exclusive service agreement takes the form of an easement that the developer, who is currently the property owner, imposes on the property. And it becomes a restriction that runs with that property, so that when that property is sold to a homeowner,

the homeowner -- the easement with that property then precludes us from providing anything other than voice services over the facilities that are installed.

MR. MEZA: If I may. I apologize for tag-teaming, but I just want to add something. And that is, if there was not an exclusive service arrangement for data and video here, and it was exclusive marketing for all three, we probably wouldn't have filed the petition.

MR. HATCH: Because it changes the economics.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Essentially, you are saying that you would just be competing on who could get to the customer fastest?

MR. MEZA: That's right, yes. The customer is a free agent. And we may be disadvantaged to some degree, but we will take on that risk. It's when we can only provide voice, but our competitor can provide all three, that is when we need relief.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: And I want to make sure I understand your position, too. Because of something that was said earlier, you are not saying that the one criteria, that you are locked out of, video and data, in itself justifies good cause, or are you? I want to make sure.

MR. HATCH: No, it is not just because we are locked out of voice and data -- I mean, video and data that constitutes the good cause.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: So if I understand correctly, I think what you are saying is you are locked out of video and data, that contributes to the impact of the concern that you won't recoup the initial investment to provide voice, because you also -- you don't have that other option to make revenue.

MR. HATCH: In a sense, yes. It becomes -- it's always an economic decision regardless. If we have the ability to market -- when we deploy facilities, if we can market multiple versions of services over those facilities, then it changes the economics. It makes the revenue recovery of our investment easier and faster. And to the extent that you peel away all the potential sources of revenue, then you reduce the economics, and that crossover point where it becomes profitable versus money losing gets pushed further and further in or further out, actually.

MR. SELF: And, Commissioner, my problem with that is if you can bundle nonregulated services then where do you stop? Today they tell you it's data and video, which they don't have any authority to even provide in one county or any technology that has been deployed. Where do you draw the line? What other nonregulated services can you bring into this mix to say, well, because we also can't do these other things, it's uneconomic to do it.

MR. WIGGINS: Madam Chair.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Wiggins.

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MR. WIGGINS: Let me see if I can make this very brief.

There are two factors that I don't think are being talked about enough here by the parties or any of us. One is the end user and the second is the public switched network. I think we would all agree that part of the Commission's charge is to promote this public switched network that we've cultivated for a hundred plus years, and not to see it vulcanized or unnecessarily truncated because of squabbles between developers and ILECs.

Secondly, ultimately I think we would all agree that where the technology is now, even though it may sound redundant, we would all prefer to have telecommunications facilities wired in a first class development in addition to having just cable. That would be in the public interest.

With that in mind, I think part of staff's recommendation is how do we promote that, and I have already touched on one way to do that is to allow them to discuss CIAC.

This brings us to the economic fairness issue. As

I've listened to your comments, Commissioner McMurrian, it

seems to me that weighing heavy on your mind is that why isn't

there good cause when the carrier of last resort can say, look,

they are not physically locking us out, but they have taken two

out of the three -- two out of the three triple play, and they

have given the developer an incentive not to have us really be that successful with the voice. I mean, why should we even go? It's hardly fair. And looking at it from that point of view that makes a lot of sense.

But looking at it from a regulator's point of view, with the public switched network still being an essential facility, there still being, as we know from rate rebalancing and hurricane, and all of that, it is still treated as a essential facility. The question we ask ourselves is, well, you have never been required not to have the opportunity to earn a reasonable return on your investment. You have never been denied that. And one of the mechanisms we use in water and wastewater, sometimes in electric and sometimes in telecom is negotiate a front-end contribution in aid of construction that will allow you to avoid that fundamental unfairness, and that is what we have suggested there. And I think until 2009, when the COLR thing goes away, that is where we are, and that is what our recommendation is, and that's why we think it is not unfair to them.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Mr. Wiggins baited me again.

MR. WIGGINS: I'm just trying to help.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: No, I appreciate that, and I don't think we have forgotten the end user. I mean, to be honest with you, if I had my way, we wouldn't have these agreements to start with. I would rather -- I would rather an

individual customer, whether they live in a multi-tenant situation or whether it's just down the road from me in a single family home, I would rather the customer have the option of picking between the two and let they duke it out. And I don't care who wins. I just think it is better for the customer that these guys are duking it out. And I'm concerned that ultimately there are going to be impacts on the other end users who may not be directly impacted in that situation, because it was an uneconomic decision for the carrier of last resort. And, frankly, I just don't know that that's fair. And I --

MR. WIGGINS: I didn't mean to suggest that you were.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: No, and I know. I wasn't

trying to be overly defensive, but I just wanted you to know

that from my perspective, that's how I feel about the issue.

But I don't get to decide that part. And, correctly, we don't

have jurisdiction over broadband and video, but it does play

into the economic impact on the carrier of last resort, which I

MR. WIGGINS: I just felt like I needed to state as forcefully as I could where we were coming from.

feel like I am charged to worry about.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I understand. And, again, I think that the CIAC is a good approach to try to address this.

Again, it goes back to making a finding that this is not good cause.

And, you know, something that kind of keeps bugging me, another issue that keeps bugging me is under these four automatic criteria, under the first one you have a situation where if they show the automatic -- that automatic criteria is met, you will have only one provider, and it will not be, at least in this situation, it would not be a traditional wireline carrier. And I think that because it contemplates that kind of scenario, I don't know that I can call that scenario bad. And it kind of goes back to the ultimate -- what I see as sort of the ultimate or the original purpose of COLR. To me, it is more of a safety net than making sure there is a competitive choice.

And I realize that's also part of our mandate is to worry about competition and to make sure there are alternatives. But to me, in this situation, you do have alternatives. They may not be entirely equal. I realize there are 911 considerations, and as discussed probably more later, alarm situations and things like that. But I don't know how equal they have to be to consider them a substitute.

So, again, I guess where I'm at, and maybe I should ask you the question. Do we have to make a finding -- and it sort of pains me to ask this, because I don't want to avoid the duty to make the call, but do we have to make a finding one way or the other about good cause?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Before you respond, let me jump in

because I was doing to ask, I think, a similar question and just slightly -- worded slightly differently, and maybe you can respond then to both at the same time.

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Does the staff -- if the staff recommendation were to be adopted, does that include a finding that -- hang on, let me think for a second. Does the staff recommendation include the finding that good cause does not exist?

MR. WIGGINS: I want to make sure that I'm on the same page with staff, but as I have understood our discussions, it's a finding that a prima facie case for good cause has not been made. It's not the same thing as saying it doesn't exist. I don't necessarily -- even though this may not be the most efficient process to contemplate, I don't see it as being with prejudice against filing again if some other development comes up.

Of course, I do understand that there are time lines and that might make it impractical. But the way I have approached it is based on what we have been shown today, we don't think that given the 90-day time frame with what we have that we can recommend a PAA that good cause has been found. It doesn't mean that it doesn't exist, it just means in this situation. So we see it as very limited. Am I on board with that?

MR. KENNEDY: Yes.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: And I guess, Commissioner McMurrian,

as I have been listening and thinking this through as we have had the discussion, my reading of this did not include a finding regarding good cause specifically. And I do note that it is a PAA. I fully recognize that there are, of course, the statutory time lines that we have, but also time lines that exist in the real world, and time does not stop, and I recognize that as well. But it is a PAA, and the way the statute is structured it is case-by-case individually, at this point in time anyway.

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And I guess where my struggle is, and not to put words in your mouth, but it seems to me that you are struggling perhaps with this being precedent-setting, and I don't know that I see it quite that way. As definitively, anyway. And I didn't mean to interrupt if you have further.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: No. I'll just respond to that. I mean, the way I did -- and, perhaps, I am reading it wrong, but the way I did read it was that we were making a finding that good cause has not been shown here. And I can't really agree with that, or I can't agree with that. I feel like that the circumstances with this case when you take them all into consideration together, it's not that they just have an exclusive agreement with data and video, it is not that there is just someone else out there, one or two or three, it is not any of those things alone. I think when you put them together I think it constitutes good cause.

But I do realize this is PAA, and I do realize that staff has made a very good attempt at coming up with something that might address some of the concerns that might essentially mandate that the carrier of last resort lose money. So, I will just add that. But I don't know that we have to say that the prima facie case for good cause has not been made here, but I guess that was my question. But if we have to say one way or the other, we think this is it or this is not it, I think this is it.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioners, further questions or discussion? I'm not sure we can take it much further, but I'm glad to allow the time if we need to. But as I said, we will take a lunch break at some point if we keep going because I'm hungry.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: May I ask one more question?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. Commissioner McMurrian for one additional question.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I will address this to our general counsel. And I have sort of hinted at this. Do we need to decide one way or the other if this case constitutes good cause? And I realize with what the Chairman said that it may not be precedent-setting, but I think still you say that we don't think they have made a case for good cause here. Do we even have to address that? I mean, I realize we have to say whether or not -- we have to respond to the petition, and we

have got a 90-day deadline for that, but is there any way -- is there any way around saying that the good cause hasn't been met here and still deciding on the petition?

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MR. COOKE: I think Mr. Wiggins explained it well.

I'm not sure I can add to that. I think what staff is saying,
as I understand it, is staff does not believe necessarily -it's not that good cause can't exist under these circumstances,
it's that a prima facie case, in staff's opinion, has not been
made under these specific circumstances with the information
that's available. And to the extent the information has been
tested, that good cause -- a prima facie case of good cause
exists.

I'm not sure I can think of a way around that, however. I don't know that I would view it as -- one of the problems is this is a new statute, and I think Mr. Wiggins also explained it well, that we are caught between parties who want to make this a cut and dried one way or the other type of approach, and we are trying to do this under a PAA. And as experience -- as we gain experience with these matters, particularly if there are hearings held, it doesn't mean that under these circumstances coming back in the future we might not come to a different conclusion, in my mind.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioner Carter.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: I was just going to pick up on where the general counsel was is basically I think staff is

saying that based upon the circumstances in this particular case, the -- on its face, on its face, a cause has not been shown to ignore the COLR requirement. And that's all it's saying is that -- I'm not saying that it can't be done, and I'm sure there are could be a case for good cause, but this is not it, not as it currently stands. And I agree with staff on this. I think they are right.

I think that on its face without more, you're setting the threshold far too low. I think the staff is correct on this one. Based upon the facts and circumstances as presented, you don't have a prima facie case for waiving the COLR requirement. That's it. That is the way I see it.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Commissioners, further questions?

Any questions?

Commissioner Carter, are you prepared to make a motion?

COMMISSIONER CARTER: (Inaudible. Microphone off.)
CHAIRMAN EDGAR: You're recognized.

COMMISSIONER CARTER: I will move staff's recommendation on this issue for this matter.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: I knew we were going to end up here.

The one thing that makes me more comfortable with this rec was the CIAC, and I mentioned that several times, ad nauseam, that I think that that will move the issue along. I

still have a lot of discomfort about saying there wasn't a prima facie case here, because I think I just disagree, and I think with the circumstances and with this being kind of a case of first impression, I think that reasonable minds can disagree on this. And, yes, I can second the motion and just -- I mean, everyone is, of course, well-versed on what my concerns are now. But I can see that moving this along and trying staff's approach of applying CIAC in these kind of situations may be a good answer.

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But as long as there is the understanding that we haven't once and for all made a case, and I realize what the actually rec statement says, that we haven't once and for all ruled that this isn't good cause, that given these circumstances in this rec that it doesn't constitute good cause.

So I can second the motion.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Commissioner McMurrian.

And I, too, am prepared to support the motion. So, with that, all in favor say aye.

(Unanimous affirmative vote.)

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Opposed? Show it adopted.

MR. HATCH: Madam Chair, may I ask for a clarification as to what's included within the Commission's decision with respect -- because as Commissioner McMurrian pointed out, the CIAC is part of the staff's recommendation.

And in terms of -- essentially, what you have done is deny the waiver of COLR, so we now have a COLR obligation in this instance. With respect to CIAC, are we allowed to delay deploying facilities in Nocatee in question until we come to agreement where is an ultimate decision on the CIAC issue?

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Mr. Wiggins.

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MR. WIGGINS: That is not ripe for determination. Sorry, buddy.

But the deal is this: We are going to write this order with as much clarification and as much guidance to bring as much certainty to the process as possible as reflected in the order. And I'm sure staff will remain open to all the stakeholders in this to try to be of use. But it is not teed up right now so that a specific -- failure of a specific CIAC negotiation invokes your COLR exemption. It is just not teed up that way, but we will do the very best we can with this incremental order to be as specific as we can to give the parties the guidance.

Clearly, we have sent a signal that if those negotiation fail or for some reason that there is an impasse that the ILEC is not precluded from revisiting this. We do also understand the time constraints. You know, I wish we could be more useful, but that's the nature of the process we are dealing with.

MR. SELF: And, Madam Chairman, if I can help. I 1 mean, I think Mr. Wiggins said it right. I mean, I appreciate 2 the fact that you all have taken so much time today to deal 3 with this issue. And I think there's multiple messages that 4 have been well received. And I think what needs to happen is 5 the parties need to talk. And if they can't resolve that, then 6 7 I'm sure you may inevitably see something, whether it is a COLR waiver, whether it's a CIAC dispute, I don't know. But I will 8 9 pledge that we will attempt in good faith to see if we can't 10 bring this in for a landing. 11 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Self. 12 Mr. Hatch. 13 That's fine, yes, ma'am. MR. HATCH: 14 CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Okay. Thank your for the question, 15

and for each of you. Okay.

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1	STATE OF FLORIDA)
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	COUNTY OF LEON)
4	
5	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Office of Hearing Reporter Services, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and
6	Administrative Services, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
7	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been
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9	proceedings.
10	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative
11	or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in
12	the action.
13	DATED THIS 20th day of March, 2007.
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16	Official FPSC Hearings Reporter FPSC Division of Commission Clerk and
17	Administrative Services
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