| 1 | D. O. | BEFORE THE | |
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| 2 | FLOR | IDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION | |
| 3 | | DOCKET NO. 070677-EQ | |
| 4 | | | |
| 5 | In the Matter of: | | |
| 6 | PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF NEGOTIATED RENEWABLE ENERGY CONTRACT WITH MANATEE | | |
| 7 | GREEN POWER, LLC, B | | |
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| 14 | PROCEEDINGS: | AGENDA CONFERENCE ITEM NO. 11 | |
| 15 | | | |
| 16 | BEFORE: | CHAIRMAN MATTHEW M. CARTER, II COMMISSIONER LISA POLAK EDGAR | |
| 17 | | COMMISSIONER KATRINA J. McMURRIAN COMMISSIONER NANCY ARGENZIANO | |
| 18 | | COMMISSIONER NATHAN A. SKOP | |
| | DATE: | Tuesday, January 29, 2008 | |
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| 21 | | Tallahassee, Florida | |
| 22 | REPORTED BY: | LINDA BOLES, RPR, CRR JANE FAUROT, RPR | |
| 23 | | Official FPSC Reporters | |
| 24 | | (850) 413-6734 and 413-6732 | |
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| 1 | PARTICIPATING: | | |
|----|---|--|--|
| 2 | BRYAN S. ANDERSON, representing Florida Power & | | |
| 3 | Light Company. | | |
| 4 | MICHAEL COOKE, GENERAL COUNSEL, JEAN HARTMAN, | | |
| 5 | ESQUIRE, and TOM BALLINGER, representing the Florida Public | | |
| 6 | Service Commission Staff. | | |
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PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN CARTER: We are now, Commissioners, moving to Item Number 11. Give staff a moment to get set up here, but we're moving to Item Number 11.

(Pause.)

Staff, you are recognized to present the issue.

MS. HARTMAN: On the agenda is Docket 070677-EQ regarding a petition for approval of negotiated renewable energy contract with Manatee Green Power, LLC, and Florida Power & Light.

There are three issues in the docket today for your consideration. Issue 1 is approval of the requested recovery for capacity and energy payments under the contract. Staff recommends approval of these payments for recovery.

Issue 2 is approval through the fuel clause for recovery for payments made under the contract for Green Attributes associated with the purchase of this energy. Staff recommends denial.

Issue 3 is closure of the docket, and staff recommends closure if no timely protest to the proposed agency action is filed within 21 days.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Okay. Remember to push the button.

I believe we have the parties here wishing to speak. You're recognized.

MR. ANDERSON: Good morning, Chairman Carter. My

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name is Bryan Anderson. I'm an attorney for Florida

Power & Light Company. I'm accompanied here today by

Tom Hartman, who is the Director for Business Management for
the regulatory assessment planning part of our company which
works on contracts like this.

We've all worked together a lot over the last year or so on how best to increase the amount of new renewable generation we have here in Florida, and what we have before us today is an important step which has consequences for this particular contract but also with respect to future development of considerable amounts of renewable generation in Florida. We are grateful with staff's concurrence with our view in Issue 1 that this contract complies with the avoided cost standards.

The point we wish to visit with you about here today is Issue 2, which involves the treatment of the purchase of renewable attributes. You'll note we don't say renewable energy credits and things like that because that's not really defined in Florida law yet. We mean renewable attributes in the broadest sense, which for this would involve the purchase of anything that might be defined under federal law, state law, including CO2 mitigation, all those different things.

The core point that we would like to leave with today is the idea that in order to move forward and to encourage the development of renewable generation, which we all want to do, we need to provide for -- the right regulatory treatment in

this case involves permitting the purchase of renewable energy credits and cost recovery for those renewable energy credits. You know, what we have before you here no doubt complies with PURPA, PSC, express intent of the Legislature to promote renewable energy.

The, one of the core ideas I'd like to touch on though is that it's been suggested in a staff recommendation that this contract would result in customers paying more than avoided cost. And to be very clear, I've had passed down to you some important FERC decisions on this point.

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which is the source of all our guidance here in the states as to what constitutes avoided cost, very clearly delineates what goes into consideration of avoided cost. And a good example is in the ELO3-133-000 order in front of you at Pages 5 and 6.

Paragraph 21 talks about the things that go into the mix:

Utility system cost data, availability of capacity or energy, relationship of the availability of energy. The point that FERC makes, and this is Paragraph 22 at Page 6, they say, "Significantly, what factor is not mentioned in the Commission's regulations is the environmental attributes of the QF selling to the utility." And then the last sentence of that same paragraph, "The avoided cost rates, in short, are not intended to compensate the QF for more than capacity and energy."

So the way to think about this in our view for this contract and as we look forward to other contracts is that there are analytically two transactions occurring in the same contract. One is for the capacity and energy not to exceed avoided costs. We're all in agreement here today that standard is met. The separate and distinct element is the purchase of renewable energy credits or the renewable attributes. And the question there is the classic utility question, which is is this a reasonable thing to do? Are the costs reasonable? And we submit to you that it is appropriate and timely for the State of Florida to recognize these types of costs to encourage utilities to purchase renewable attributes.

Think about the generation cases we've worked with recently where we always factor in now CO2 costs. CO2 cost regulations are on the horizon. They're not here yet but they're part of our daily planning. The suggestion in the staff recommendation is that it's too speculative to permit these purchases because there's no renewable portfolio standard yet in Florida. We suggest that over the 15-year horizon of this contract it's a reasonable thing to be purchasing renewable attributes in anticipation that the state will move in that direction. And, in addition, please take into consideration that even if the state does not do that, there is no likelihood of harm to customers through this purchase. The reason for this particular contract is we negotiated a good

price for these renewable attributes. They're already in the money. The market price is trending up a little bit. So, you know, worst case, if we never, ever needed these, they could, they could be sold up. It's also a fairly small amount over the 15-year term of the contract. It's about \$800,000 over the term.

But please think this through in relation to the 145 megawatts of new renewable capacity which was bid into our renewable RFP. The only way under existing Florida law that we see to come to you to seek approval of those contracts is with capacity and energy costs not exceeding avoided cost complying with the FERC regulation of the state rules, and then whatever pricing is necessary in relation to the renewable attributes that is negotiated in order to permit those facilities to be constructed and brought forward. And because those costs, of course, are not included in our rates in any way, that cost recovery in our view needs to be recognized.

So we ask the Commission today to please approve our petition as drafted and as requested, to permit the approval of renewable attributes, which staff agrees is a good idea, but to permit the cost recovery through the appropriate capacity or energy clause.

That's the end of our remarks. I'm happy to answer any questions. We also have your own rule handed out to you which we all worked on together, which expressly recognizes

| 1 | that renewable energy credits, tax credits are the property of | | |
|----|--|--|--|
| 2 | the renewable generating facility. And in our negotiations we | | |
| 3 | as utilities are not permitted to use our payments at full | | |
| 4 | avoided cost, again, recognizing the idea that this is | | |
| 5 | separate, distinct and additional. That's the end of our | | |
| 6 | remarks. Thank you. | | |
| 7 | CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you very kindly. | | |
| 8 | Commissioners, comments, questions? | | |
| 9 | Commissioner Skop, you're recognized. | | |
| 10 | Oh, I'm sorry. Commissioner McMurrian, you're | | |
| 11 | recognized. | | |
| 12 | COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Thank you. Were we going to | | |
| 13 | hear from staff first or | | |
| 14 | MR. BALLINGER: If you'd like, we can. | | |
| 15 | COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Chairman, if that's | | |
| 16 | CHAIRMAN CARTER: That's an excellent idea. That's | | |
| L7 | an excellent idea. | | |
| L8 | COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Thank you. | | |
| L9 | CHAIRMAN CARTER: Let's hear from staff. You're | | |
| 20 | recognized. | | |
| 21 | MR. BALLINGER: Tom Ballinger with Commission staff. | | |
| 22 | First of all, I believe I agree with Mr. Anderson that these | | |
| 23 | Green Attributes are separate and apart from avoided cost and | | |
| 24 | that's why staff showed it as two separate issues in the | | |

recommendation. We do treat them differently. However, I also

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agree with Mr. Anderson that they're undefined at this time, even acknowledge they're not a TREC. They are a Green Attribute of something yet to be defined in the future, if and when.

So with that lack of clarity of what they are, staff looked to them as another energy payment, and that's why we came up with the phrase "above avoided cost." It's basically an adder to the energy payment at this time because it's undefined of what else it could be.

Treating them as separate as we did, staff is again acknowledging that there is no market yet for Green Attributes or RECs in Florida. And we think that to approve FPL's recovery mechanism would be prejudging any discussion you may have in the future about RPS, of whether to include Green Attributes as part of an RPS structure or whether not to include them. They may not be necessary. So it is kind of a premature acknowledgment, if you will, or recovery of RECs.

Staff's recommendation was trying to incentivize the utility that if they are a good thing and they are needed to promote renewable generation, we would allow the utility to earn a profit on the RECs if they are sold either in state or out of state, whatever the case may be in the future. They are in a much better position to judge the Green Attribute market and can track it than the Commission may be or the ratepayers. We don't think it's appropriate right now to burden the

ratepayers with that risk. And that's kind of the, the summary, if you will, of our recommendation.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you, Mr. Ballinger.

Commissioners. Commissioner McMurrian.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Thank you. And this may be a little awkward because I don't have all this planned out.

I'm trying to react to a few things that Mr. Anderson said and a few things that Mr. Ballinger said, and perhaps I'll throw it out and see who's, who's best to answer it.

I guess, Mr. Anderson, with respect to what
Mr. Ballinger said about the attributes being undefined, is
there any way to give more certainty to what we're exactly
dealing with here with respect to Green Attributes?

MR. ANDERSON: There is considerable certainty in terms of how it is described within the terms of the contract before us today. The most significant point is that it is defined in such a way as to be the broadest bushel basket in which to capture any renewable attribute that could be used essentially at any time. But it is correct that Florida is not, you know, formally defined a TREC market or a TREC trading mechanism. I think the best analogy remains, for example, how we think about CO2. It's in our planning, it's in our costing all the time. It's prudent and reasonable to include this type of purchase at this time, particularly if we were to try to incent and develop new renewables.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Chairman, a follow-up with Mr. Ballinger.

I mean, even if there were a way to define that better, and I think, as Mr. Anderson said, without having that kind of a market in Florida at this time it would be hard to define it and I think they're trying to keep it broad, but even if there was a way to narrow it down, would that really resolve the concerns we have before us anyway? It's really just one of them; right?

MR. BALLINGER: Correct. It's why we used the phrase "above avoided cost" because I didn't know what else to call it. So I look at it as an additional energy payment since it is undefined. In my view even if it was defined we would still have the problem of there's not a market in Florida yet. The only market we have for any RECs of some sort is voluntary markets, which is why we refer to the order at the bottom of a declaratory statement where the Commission said that if you want to pay above avoided costs, an adder, if you will, to renewable energy, you can do so through voluntary contributions from ratepayers and not violate PURPA, but you may not obligate ratepayers to a payment above avoided cost. Staff sees this as an obligation to ratepayers paying above avoided costs because it's an undefined term. It's basically another energy component.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Chairman, I'm sorry. Thank

you.

So, Mr. Ballinger, you said that you agreed with him that they're separate. You think that it has to be factored in to the calculation for avoided costs though. You think that these Green Attributes have to be calculated in as a part of that in order to determine whether it meets avoided cost standard or not.

MR. BALLINGER: I think at this juncture it does because it's undefined. So in my mind it's another energy payment. We did treat it separately though recognizing that there is a voluntary market out there for Green Attributes or TRECs in other states and things of this nature. And, quite frankly, we didn't want to jeopardize the validity of this contract. By looking at it and including it totally of avoided cost, then it would be well above avoided cost and the Commission would be forced to deny it. I think that's why staff came up with the recommendation it did to say we recognize these as separate entities, they're undefined, we don't think it's appropriate for ratepayers to have this risk. Therefore, we're recommending that the utility retain ownership of these attributes and sell them where they may.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Mr. Chairman, I do have another for Mr. Anderson.

To the, to the point that Mr. Ballinger makes about the risk to the ratepayers and some of the discussion that we

had earlier with you, and you were saying that even if the market doesn't materialize and you can sell them and you think you'll be able to get at least the 325 per megawatt hour back, but what happens if you can't sell them back at 325? Is, is the company willing to take on that sort of risk if we were to somehow include these for cost recovery at this point? Is the company willing to say if it never materializes, and I'm not sure what point that would be, I'm not sure how far down the road we would be looking, but if that did materialize, is the company willing at that point to basically say we would be willing to take on the difference between 325 and perhaps you can only sell them for 310, for instance?

MR. ANDERSON: We'd suggest that would not be appropriate under utility regulation. We're purchasing something in good faith. We're seeking a prudence determination concerning its purchase. And if that purchase is prudent and reasonable, and we believe it is, then those costs should be recovered and that's not a risk of the type our company should bear.

May I make one brief comment though also? With respect to Mr. Ballinger's point about trying to define these costs, these renewable costs as part of avoided cost, I'd just like to caution the Commission and all of us here today, I think that would be inviting a very serious legal error. And the reason is, is that Section 292.304 of 18 C.F.R. is the

source of our definitions of what constitutes avoided cost and that's carried through, of course, in Florida regulations.

Those are set forth, for example, in the order denying rehearing that's before you there.

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ELO3-133-001 at Page 5, Paragraph 14, lists those items, the types of items that are expressly included in determining avoided cost. Avoided cost isn't what a utility makes it up to be, it isn't things that we can all decide should be lumped in there. It's a very specific formula. And, in fact, it was this formula which is exclusive of, does not include in any way renewable attributes which was the basis of the FERC's decision that we were talking about earlier that renewable attributes are separate and apart. They're not part of the avoided cost computation. And the significance of that is it would be incorrect to conclude that approving cost recovery would result in payment of higher than avoided costs. The simple reason being these are by definition not part of the avoided cost computation. This is a separate and distinct purchase of a renewable attribute which is actually defined at length in our contract at Paragraph D1 which I won't read to you now. But I just wanted to leave that point.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Commissioner McMurrian.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Well, I did, I did hope that we would get some response to that from our legal staff. And also I had another question for, for the technical staff, if

it's okay.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: You're recognized. You're recognized.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Essentially is there some way -- if we were to move forward with the staff recommendation as is, is there some way for FPL to possibly get recovery for these Green Attributes later? If everything does materialize, is there a way to in a sense go back and look at that down the road and say this, you know, this has materialized and now it seems to make sense and this would be a good thing for the ratepayer?

MR. COOKE: Commissioners, I don't, I can't think of a reason why if the market does materialize, if these issues become much more crystal clear as to what these attributes are and how they're defined, I can't think of a reason why this Commission probably on petition by FPL or on its own couldn't revisit this question in the future.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: And also, Chairman, the point about legal, we would be committing legal error essentially if we were to do --

MS. HARTMAN: My reading of the FERC opinions is that the opinions only speak to who owns the TRECs. And my understanding is that they decide, well, states can determine ownership. I don't, I don't have a broader reading of that.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I

just wanted to say, as you can see, I'm sort of struggling here. I don't -- this is not one where I read it and I had a clear answer in my mind. And we, staff and I had a long discussion yesterday about this. I see the points that Mr. Anderson is raising. I am concerned and I think we've had some of these related discussions before about there's so much uncertainty about what's going to happen and I know that's staff's point.

But I also feel like that this -- I don't want to miss an opportunity to essentially get these Green Attributes at a good price that might ultimately materialize very favorably for the ratepayer and I don't want to miss that opportunity and in a sense send a message that we don't want to encourage utilities to purchase these Green Attributes when they can this way. So I guess I'm just struggling here and I just wanted to voice that. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Okay. Commissioners, we'll recognize Commissioner Edgar, then Commissioner Skop.

Commissioner Edgar, you're recognized.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Going back to some of the discussion a few minutes ago, if I might. Just a general question to Mr. Anderson. Is the existing and future potential market for Green Attributes the same market as for TRECs or is it somewhat different?

MR. ANDERSON: It's somewhat different. Just think

this through with me for a moment, is in Florida we haven't defined attributes of a TREC. Therefore, for purposes of this contract, we define things much broader as to any renewable attribute of any description. It could be a carbon credit, it could be this or that. So the significance is, is that if this state establishes TRECs, the TREC component of this would be conveyed to FPL for the benefits of its customers under it. In addition, if under some federal arrangement or federal scheme there were CO2 credits of some type applicable to this, we would own those also.

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So this, this -- by -- we very specifically thought about how to do this in the best way for our customers. I think it's Green E -- or there's already a voluntary market in Florida for Green E Attributes. That's -- when we talk about this being kind of in the money already, that's what we're referring to. And I think the voluntary price for those is now about \$3.60 a megawatt hour. This contract price is about \$3.25. So the significant point is even in this market in Florida where we haven't even defined the attribute, where they haven't even become scarce because they're being acquired by an RPS, that narrow sliver of the voluntary right is already in excess of value of what we'd be paying here. So that's one of the reasons we think this would be a good deal on behalf of our customers.

And at the same time, to Commissioner McMurrian's

point, as we look forward to other contracts like this, we would, like you, like to see lots of additional renewable generation. Please recall under these contracts we earn nothing. It's a pure flow through to customers. Customers -- and we all get the environmental benefits, but the costs we earn nothing on. So all we would get if we were to take these ourselves for this or any other contract would be some undefined risk, which that's not how utilities provide service. We try to focus on what do our customers need, buy it, provide it and recover those costs in a way. We're not, we're not set up and we're not in the business of holding portfolios of things for possible future use for this contract or other contracts.

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COMMISSIONER EDGAR: May I follow up, Mr. Chairman?

CHAIRMAN CARTER: You're recognized.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you.

But, Mr. Anderson, earlier in your opening overview comments you pointed out that the amount that we are talking about is approximately \$800,000 over 15 years, and I think in your comments you made the point that that would be a very small amount of money to the customers. But yet I feel like I'm also hearing you say that FPL is strongly opposed to the accounting treatment recommended by staff because it would be too risky for the utility to take on, and those two statements are, are not in complete concert in my mind. Could you

elaborate?

MR. ANDERSON: It goes to the basic nature of a utility company, which we don't take positions in underlying assets as a trading company. We buy things to use to serve our customers, and then what we try to do is ensure that we recover those costs and only the costs. So the significant point is that while we think this is a, a good and reasonable transaction on behalf of our customers, we're literally not in the business of taking positions like this on our own account and we would not likely choose to do that.

It's also a significant point -- I recognize the \$800,000 over 15 years. But think about this for all other utilities in the state, for the 145 megawatts coming down the pike. What we're trying to do is ensure that interests are aligned correctly. We want renewables to be developed. This project will be five new megawatts and that's good. But you can see the chilling effect that it has for utilities if, if we're not, if we're put in the position of essentially having to take market risks on something we don't earn money on anyway and not recover those costs. So it's just, it's just not consistent with, with, with how utilities do business and how our company would wish to proceed.

CHAIRMAN EDGAR: Just a brief comment. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. A brief comment.

And thank you, Mr. Anderson, for your comments. I do

hear you and much of what you're saying resonates with me, but yet I have some discomfort that I am still grappling with.

I agree with what Commissioner McMurrian said and what Mr. Anderson said, that, you know, we are as a state and certainly as one Commissioner and probably as a Commission trying to put in place policies and actions to encourage the additional use of renewable energy in a manner that is deemed to be reliable and cost-effective. But -- so I don't want my statement to be construed as being opposed to that because I agree with that. But yet I just don't feel like I have enough clarity at this point to be able to recommend recovery through the fuel clause. And that to me is an additional step that if as a Commission we are going to recommend cost recovery through the fuel clause, I would like to have more, more of a real feel about what it is that we are doing. So that's kind of what I'm grappling with. And I know there are other questions, so thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you, Commissioner.

Commissioner Skop, you're recognized, sir.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have just a few observations with respect to the contract first and foremost. I wanted to commend FPL for adequately protecting its customers under the existing agreement specifically with respect to Section I, the completion performance security and the drawdown ability in

case the vendor does not perform, as well as Section M, FPL's right in the event of default to terminate with no termination fee, unlike some contracts that have substantial termination fees.

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With respect to Issue 2, which I think is the crux of the matter before us, I think there was a statement made that, some statements that have been made that I'd like to flesh out a little bit with a question to staff.

I do agree that the Green Attributes have not yet been defined and they may encompass a lot of things of substantial value to utilities in terms of market potential and meeting their needs on a forward-going basis. But I also note that there does appear to be a TREC in terms of an in-state TREC purchase mechanism already in place under an existing, one or more existing voluntary programs within the state. So with respect to that, I'd like to direct a question to Mr. Ballinger with respect to Footnote 7 on Page 8 of the staff recommendation. And if you could kind of speak to that a little bit in relation to the ruling under that order as well as the, the program that's mentioned.

MR. BALLINGER: Okay. That was a declaratory statement back in 2002 that FPL asked, and it was seeking from the Commission that if it had a voluntary program to collect money from customers, a Green Energy Program where customers voluntarily contributed, say, an extra \$5 a month in their bill

to go purchase renewable energy, would that violate PURPA if those additional payments went to a renewable generator? And the Commission's decision in that declaratory order was, no, they would not as long as they're voluntary; that if people wish to contribute to such causes, they may do that. The difference would come is if ratepayers were obligated to pay these premiums, if you will, for renewable energy. That could be a violation of PURPA. And that was the crux of that decision in that declaratory statement.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. And as a follow-up, Mr. Chair. With respect to the program mentioned in Footnote 7, that program is currently the subject of a separate docketed matter; is that correct?

MR. BALLINGER: I believe so. I believe the Green Energy Program that was being discussed by FPL transformed into the current Sunshine Energy Program.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: And that program purchases both in-state and out-of-state RECs; is that correct?

MR. BALLINGER: Correct.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. Fellow Commissioners, again, I think, I think my position on this is, is there may be a substantial market in the future. And I fully respect Commissioner McMurrian's concerns and also the argument that Mr. Anderson has projected; however, we're not exactly there yet, as I think Commissioner Edgar has properly recognized.

I do fully support staff's recommendation on Issue 2, 1 2 notwithstanding that there is also a separate and distinct basis over and above staff's recommendation that deals with a 3 separate docketed matter that would substantiate why this 5 request in its near term should not be approved because there's 6 already in effect an existing mechanism that could purchase 7 some, if not all, of the RECs and attributes in question. again, I am generally in support of staff's recommendation and 8 if we wish to move forward in the absence of different 9 10 questions -- if not, I'm prepared to make a motion.

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CHAIRMAN CARTER: Before we do that and before I recognize Commissioner McMurrian for a subsequent question,

Commissioner Argenziano, do you have any questions in reference to this issue, Issue 11? We're particularly talking about Issue Number 2 in that case.

COMMISSIONER ARGENZIANO: No, Mr. Chairman. I think my questions have been answered and my colleagues have asked very pertinent questions.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you. I know you're not feeling well, but I sure appreciate you, you know, fighting the good fight and being with us here.

COMMISSIONER ARGENZIANO: Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Commissioner McMurrian, you're recognized.

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COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Thank you.

MR. ANDERSON: Mr. Chairman, I'm sorry, but before
you --

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

MR. ANDERSON: May I have one last side remark,

please?

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CHAIRMAN CARTER: You seem real excited about it, so let's go ahead on.

MR. ANDERSON: I appreciate it. And we've all worked on these renewable issues. We're really trying to make this work. We feel this is a way. We would like though for the Commission to consider this, is that if you disagree with our position, we ask that you grant your staff the administrative authority to approve the contract without the purchase of Green Attributes should we be able to renegotiate the contract under otherwise similar terms. That would let us, you know, pay the avoided cost exactly as stated. We would not buy the renewable attributes at all. And, you know, Seimens has expressed the concern they'd like to get their project going, and that would save the time of renegotiating a contract in its entirety and resubmitting and restarting all the clocks. But we would ask that the Commission do that and we would then X out, if we can -- we'd have to negotiate this, any purchase of renewable attributes.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Let me do this before -Commissioner McMurrian, I know I told you I was going to

recognize you. Let me, let me recognize Mr. Cooke for just one moment here and kind of bring us around here.

MR. COOKE: I'm generally in favor of that. I think that we could do that administratively if it's very clear what it is that you are directing us to do. I think that there are provisions in the contract that would be specifically eliminated if that were the case. So there would be no delegation to us as staff to make a substantive decision. But in the alternative, if you approve it here in this forum to tell us that you agree that if the payments under that contract are negotiated out, that we could implement that administratively. I'm a little uncertain because we have to look at the contract and we would not want to get into making substantive decisions. Just a question of whether we could do it administratively or not.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Interesting. We'll just take that kind of under advisement for right now. But right now I want to go to Commissioner McMurrian, who's been very patient. You're recognized.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Thank you, Chairman. And actually my question, and I wanted to pose it to Mr. Anderson and to staff, in a way it was along those lines. And I've been trying to think about if there's some way for us to address this issue without necessarily addressing Issue 2. And I guess my concern is, is that this issue is bigger than this one

contract and this one issue before us. And I just wanted to throw out there is there some way -- and perhaps Mr. Anderson is saying that they would go back and talk to, talk to the other party about perhaps, you know, sort of taking this out of the contract and maybe that's definitely one way to do it.

I guess my question was is there some way for the Commission to sort of take up this issue about Green Attributes and recovery through a clause and that sort of thing on a more generic basis, even if we, even if we do need to go forward with this issue that's before us today? Because obviously the company has petitioned for it in this manner and I think we might have to make a decision on that. But would there be some way for us to take that issue up more broadly, because I do think it's bigger than what we have before us? And I'd like to hear from Mr. Anderson and from staff. I'm not sure what order is best, so.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Mr. Anderson.

MR. ANDERSON: Thank you, Commissioner McMurrian.

I'm sorry for interrupting you earlier. I just wanted to make sure that the point was in before the vote occurred.

Our thinking is kind of piece by piece here. We have this particular contract that we've worked to negotiate that potentially could be online this year, which is good. Our thought all along has been that a broader form solution will most likely be needed in relation to costs for recovery of

renewable attributes and this and that, you know, in a rulemaking or, or in the context of RPS or all the things we've talked about elsewhere.

Our thought very specifically for this contract was to try not to have to decide that, perhaps be very clear that in approving this the Commission is thinking of those things down the road. But the specific thing we thought would work for this particular contract would be the fuel clause recovery we talked about in which case it would be incorporated in the schedules beginning 2009 as a line item for your review and the like. And by the time that actually occurs -- let's think this through. This facility comes on late 2008, let's say. Let's say we begin making payments in 2009. There's already a considerable time buffer there in terms of when as a mechanical matter we start recovering costs.

And for the issue generally, as you've said, I suggest we'll have a lot more information down the road as to how this Commission wishes to proceed in relation to recovery of such costs generally if there's a special new rule, a special new clause. I can't prejudge that with you. I agree it's a, it's a large issue down the road. What we're trying to do here with this contract is move the ball forward in one small incremental way.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Mr. Ballinger.

MR. BALLINGER: Yes. I would suggest that this

should not be discussed in a vacuum of just cost recovery. This, I think this is a bigger part of an RPS development if and when you do that and it should be taken in that context in total. I'm not sure if there's additional workshops scheduled to look at RPS and things of that nature. But I would suggest that's where it should be discussed and not just a separate thing about cost recovery. I would caution you that I think to approve cost recovery before you develop an RPS would tie your hands when you go to develop an RPS because here you've already committed ratepayer funds to Green Attributes of some sort to apply to RPS. You may be faced with a decision that you don't need Green Attributes to make your RPS, yet you've already spent some money. So I think it's going to hamper your judgment or could hamper your judgment in the future, and I would suggest that you discuss this in the total context of RPS development.

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COMMISSIONER ARGENZIANO: Mr. Chair?

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Yes, ma'am. You're recognized, Commissioner Argenziano.

COMMISSIONER ARGENZIANO: I couldn't agree more with Mr. Ballinger. I think at this time it's purely speculative. The company is not willing to take the risk with their shareholders, I guess. I approve of what the company is trying to do, but I can't see putting that on the consumer at this time. We don't even know where the, where the Legislature is

going to turn out on this yet and I think it would be very dangerous.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Okay. Let me do this,

Commissioners. Let me just take about five minutes. The clock on the wall says 11:30. We'll get back in here at eleven -- is it 10:30? Oh. Maybe I shouldn't quit my day job. I was about to say, Mr. Anderson, welcome to the matrix. (Laughter.) But how about we come back at about 11:00 -- 10:35. All right?

Does that work for everybody? Commissioner Argenziano, can you hold on for a second? We're going to take about a five-minute -- 10:35.

COMMISSIONER ARGENZIANO: Yes, Mr. Chair.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: We're on recess.

(Recess.)

CHAIRMAN CARTER: If everyone will get in their places and all, we'll kind of bring ourselves back around here.

And I think just as we took a break Commissioner McMurrian had some questions; I think Commissioner Skop has some questions.

Commissioner Edgar, did you have any additional questions?

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to be just a touch clearer on the,

perhaps -- my words, not yours -- alternative suggestion that

Mr. Anderson gave to us shortly before the break. And you read

us some suggested language about giving some administrative

approval authority to staff.

Could you go over that again?

MR. ANDERSON: Of course.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you.

MR. ANDERSON: We would ask that if the Commission disagrees with our position on Issue 2, we would request that the Commission grant its staff the administrative authority to approve the contract without the purchase of green attributes, should the company be able to renegotiate the contract under otherwise similar terms.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Mr. Chairman, may I follow up?

CHAIRMAN CARTER: You're recognized.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you.

Mr. Anderson, am I correct that if that were to be the way we go, just for discussion purposes at this point, if that is the way that the Commission ultimately went, then that would not impact Issue 1 as it is laid out currently?

MR. ANDERSON: Just thinking this through, if the staff recommendation as a whole is adopted, then it would be FPL's choice to reject the contract in its entirety under the reg-out clause in the contract. So what this fall-back position that we have just talked about does, is it gives us the ability to try to preserve the purchase at the not-to-exceed-avoided-cost price, if we can negotiate that, and remove the green attributes. And that's not something we have

talked to the proposed seller about, but that would be something we would do, but we can't speak to what the result would be. Our strong preference, of course, is approval as proposed.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you. And I understand and I appreciate that position. But I also think that, therefore, the answer to my question is yes.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: And is there a timing? I mean, is that part of the reason that you would be looking for us to handle that in the next steps, if we went that direction administratively through staff rather than bring it back before the Commission, is that there are some timing constraints?

MR. ANDERSON: Yes, that is correct. There are timing constraints.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: All right. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you.

Commissioner Skop, you're recognized.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just a quick question or comment. I do, under the circumstances, tend to fully agree with Mr. Ballinger and Commissioner Argenziano's position on this matter. Certainly if, under the existing contract, there were an option or a right of refusal with respect to the attributes, certainly I think that that would be something of value in the future.

But, again, as Mr. Ballinger has appropriately, I think, pointed out, we are not in a RPS situation yet, and so it's somewhat analogous to putting the cart ahead of the horse.

But, again, I am somewhat open to supporting administrative review. My concern is just what the disposition would be. But, again, I think I could support staff and trust their judgment that they would move forward as long as, as Mr. Cooke has pointed out, there is not a substantive change that would need to come before the Commission. But, like I said, I just wanted to opine on that. And with that, I'm willing to move forward with what the Commission decides.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Commissioners, do we need to hear from Mr. Ballinger, or do you have further questions, or discussions? I'm looking at Mr. Cooke right now before we --

COMMISSIONER ARGENZIANO: Mr. Chair?

CHAIRMAN CARTER: You're recognized, Commissioner
Argenziano.

COMMISSIONER ARGENZIANO: If I could, I would like to hear -- I'd like to ask Mr. Ballinger, basically, to repeat his statements before. I need to hear them one more time to fully understand why he is opposed to the Issue 2 proposal.

MR. BALLINGER: I'll do my best, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER ARGENZIANO: Thank you.

MR. BALLINGER: I kind of did it on the fly the first time, so let's see if I can get it right the second time.

I think, basically, we summed it up is that is a bit premature. That we do not have an RPS in place, I think to -- as Mr. Anderson pointed out, FPL is not in the business of holding on to portfolios for possible future use, nor does staff think that ratepayers should be held on to portfolios for possible future use. I don't think they should bear that risk, especially when they are not in the position to understand the markets as well as the utility is.

Staff's recommendation has given the utility the opportunity to earn a return, if you will, on these attributes if they sell them in the open market and, at the same time, encourage renewable generation. I hope that sums up, again, what we said earlier. If not, I will try again.

COMMISSIONER ARGENZIANO: Yes, Mr. Ballinger, that's what I thought you said. And I guess I still feel the same way, Mr. Chair. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you, Commissioner Argenziano.

Commissioners? Commissioner Skop.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Commissioner Skop.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Just one quick follow up to staff. Mr. Ballinger, you would agree, would you not, that there is, notwithstanding the fact that this may be premature in light of not having the RPS in place, but should the need arise to purchase attributes from this project, which does have a substantial benefit to the

state, I clearly recognize that, but you would agree, would you not, there is an existing mechanism under an existing voluntary program to accomplish that?

MR. BALLINGER: Yes. And even if the existing program could not facilitate it, I think FPL is free to come up with a new voluntary program for in-state RECs to address it.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Don't give me a coronary.

MR. BALLINGER: No. I understand. But, I'm not certain that the existing program could cover it. There might be some problem, there may not be; but that does not prevent the utility from developing a voluntary program to cover these things.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you.

Commissioner Edgar.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Mr. Chairman, if the timing is correct, let me put this out, if I may. I think that I would make a motion in support of the staff recommendation on Issue 1 and Issue 3, and on Issue 2 to adopt the language that was suggested by Mr. Anderson such that we would give staff administrative authority to approve the contract without the green attributes portion.

COMMISSIONER SKOP: I'd be willing to second that.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you, Commissioners.

It has been moved and seconded. Any questions on

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

where we're going? I'm glad that staff was taking notes on that.

Commissioner McMurrian, you're recognized.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: It is not a question, it's

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: It is not a question, it's just a comment. I wanted to say I appreciate you all giving me the latitude to ask some questions to think some of this through. I am in agreement with the motion.

I'm just trying to, again, perhaps add some more certainty to this whole process. It seems like we are just not going to be able to get it at this time point, but I think that as long as we continue to look at these types of issues and make sure that we are thinking outside the box, to use that over-used phrase, then I'm comfortable with the staff rec, and the motion, actually the motion as Commissioner Edgar made.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: As we bring this in for a landing,

I think it just shows that we are willing and able to look at

opportunities for companies to step up and do innovative things

to assist in this process where we are headed, but also we want

to be cognizant of the ratepayers.

So, with that, Commissioners, all those in favor of the motion let it be known by the sign of aye.

(Unanimous affirmative vote.)

CHAIRMAN CARTER: All those opposed?

The motion passes.

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1 2 STATE OF FLORIDA 3 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTERS COUNTY OF LEON 4 5 WE, JANE FAUROT, RPR, and LINDA BOLES, RPR, CRR, Official Commission Reporters, do hereby certify that the 6 foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated. 7 IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that we stenographically 8 reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under our direct supervision; and that this 9 transcript constitutes a true transcription of our notes of said proceedings. 10 WE FURTHER CERTIFY that we are not a relative, 11 employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor are we a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorneys or 12 counsel connected with the action, nor are we financially interested in the action. 13 14 DATED THIS 5th DAY OF February, 2008. 15 16 JAME FAUROT, RPR LINDA BOLES, RPR, 17 FP&C Official Commission FPSC Official Commissi Reporter Reporter 18 (850) 413-6732 (850) 413-6734 19 20 21 22 23 24

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105 FERC ¶ 61,004 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Pat Wood, III, Chairman;
William L. Massey, and Nora Mead Brownell.

American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay Power Corporation, and Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Docket No. EL03-133-000

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR DECLARATORY ORDER

(Issued October 1, 2003)

- 1. On June 13, 2003, American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay Power Corporation, and Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. (Petitioners) filed a petition for declaratory order in which they seek an interpretation of the Commission's regulations implementing Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2000). See 18 C.F.R. Part 292 (2003).
- 2. Petitioners, through direct and indirect subsidiaries, own and operate waste-toenergy power plants across the United States that are certified as qualifying facilities
 (QFs). Petitioners seek Commission interpretation of its avoided cost rules under
 PURPA. Specifically, Petitioners seek an order declaring that avoided cost contracts
 entered into pursuant to PURPA, absent express provisions to the contrary, do not
 inherently convey to the purchasing utility any renewable energy credits or similar
 tradeable certificates (RECs). They contend that the power purchase price that the utility
 pays under such a contract compensates a QF only for the energy and capacity produced
 by that facility and not for any environmental attributes associated with the facility.
- 3. As discussed below, we grant Petitioners' petition for a declaratory order, to the extent that they ask the Commission to declare that contracts for the sale of QF capacity and energy entered into pursuant to PURPA do not convey RECs to the purchasing utility (absent express provision in a contract to the contrary). While a state may decide that a sale of power at wholesale automatically transfers ownership of the state-created RECs, that requirement must find its authority in state law, not PURPA.

Background

- 4. RECs have been created in recent years by State programs typically designed to promote increased reliance on renewable energy resources. These State programs typically are premised on promoting policy goals such as improved air and water quality, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, broader fuel diversity, enhanced energy security, and hedging against the price volatility of fossil fuels.
- 5. According to Petitioners, to date such programs have been adopted in 13 States. They require retail sellers of electricity to include in their resource portfolios a certain amount of electricity from renewable energy resources. This obligation can be satisfied by owning renewable energy facilities, by purchasing power from such facilities, or by purchasing tradable certificates, such as RECs, that correspond to a certain amount of renewable energy generated by a third party. Two states have implemented REC trading programs. Some ISOs are also developing markets for REC trading.
- 6. The development of these programs and trading markets for RECs has given rise to disputes between QFs and their purchasing utilities. These disputes have focused on the underlying PURPA purchase obligation; that is, whether the existence of a long-term contract entered into pursuant to a PURPA purchase obligation determines ownership of the RECs, though the long-term contract may be silent.
- 7. Petitioners argue that, absent express provisions to the contrary, contracts entered into pursuant to PURPA do not inherently convey RECs to the utility that purchases the QF's power at avoided cost. They argue that, under this Commission's regulations, avoided cost does not reflect or compensate for environmental externalities associated with QF generation. They also argue that, under Commission precedent, environmental attributes of generation are treated as unbundled from the sale of power. Finally, Petitioners argue that utility arguments in support of a finding that the RECs do convey to the utilities as part of the avoided cost sale depend upon a revisitation of the avoided cost determination made at the time of the purchase obligation. Petitioners argue that such a revisitation of the avoided cost determination should not be allowed.
- 8. Notice of Petitioners' filing was published in the Federal Register, 68 Fed. Reg. 38,321 (2003), with comments, protests, and interventions due on or before July 7, 2003.
- 9. Timely motions to intervene and comments in support of the Petitioners were filed by Minnesota Methane LLC; Miami-Dade County Department of Solid Waste Management; USA Biomass Power Producers Alliance; Independent Energy Producers of New Jersey; Independent Power Producers of New York, Inc.; County of Olmsted, Minnesota; Solid Waste Association of North America; Decker Energy International, Inc.; Sithe Energies, Inc.; Azure Mountain Power Company, Tannery Island Power Company; Hydro Power, Inc.; and Energy Enterprises, Inc.

- 10. These parties request the Commission to grant the Petitioners' petition for declaratory order. They primarily argue that, under existing rules, the avoided cost paid by the purchasing utility compensates the QF for the capacity and the energy generated; and that the sale of RECs, in contrast, compensates the QF for the facility's environmental attributes and rewards the risks associated with the investment in and the design and operation of a renewable energy resource plant. They argue that QF developers face risks in designing and constructing a plant that will be a viable long-term investment meeting rigorous environmental standards that include generating technologies that meet environmental and reliability standards and Commission policy. Therefore, RECs need to remain an incentive for QF developers. They largely agree that allowing QFs to trade the RECs associated with a renewable facility will facilitate the development of liquid and efficient markets for RECs, which will in turn create incentives for the development and use of renewable energy resources for the generation of power.
- 11. Timely motions to intervene, comments and protests in opposition were filed by purchasing utilities, including: Public Service Electric and Gas Company; PacifiCorp; Southern California Edison Company and Pacific Gas & Electric Company; Edison Electric Institute; Xcel Energy Services Inc.; Jersey Central Power & Light Company; Metropolitan Edison Company and Pennsylvania Electric Company (collectively, the FirstEnergy Companies); Ridgewood Renewable Power, LLC.; Central Maine Power Company; Northeast Utilities Service Company, on behalf of Connecticut Light and Power Company, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, and the United Illuminating Company; and Bangor Hydro–Electric Company.
- 12. The parties that oppose the petition for declaratory order request that the Commission either: (1) find that PURPA contracts, unless stated to the contrary, include the transfer of RECs; (2) decline to issue an order; or (3) defer the Petitioners' petition for declaratory order to the states. They largely contend that QFs are fairly compensated. They further argue that PURPA contracts that require a utility to purchase a QF's entire output are bundled contracts and include renewable attributes, which are not separable from the capacity and energy. Some argue that granting the Petitioners request would increase the returns to the QFs at the expense of utilities, other retail suppliers and their customers, and ultimately would discourage REC trading programs.
- 13. Central Maine Power Company (Central Maine) argues that the Petitioners' request is a matter of private contract interpretation and not suited for generic decision-making by the Commission. Central Maine believes that the grant of the declaratory order would directly affect its rights under each Power Purchase Agreement with a QF, by improperly determining Central Maine's contractual rights to tradable certificates.

- The following state commissions filed notices of intervention, comments or 14. protests: Maine Public Utilities Commission (Maine Commission), New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission (New Hampshire Commission), New York State Public Service Commission (New York Commission), and California Public Utilities Commission (California Commission). The state commissions generally argue that the implementation and interpretation of QF contract issues should be left to the states. They also argue the Petitioners' request interferes with state initiatives and request the Commission to deny the relief requested, as a matter of policy. The Maine Commission argues that RECs are an element of PURPA contracts and should be viewed as part of a bundled product transferred to the purchaser with the capacity and energy. They request the Commission determine that Maine utilities own the renewable attributes of power sold to them through QF contracts entered into prior to the date of electric restructuring in Maine. The New Hampshire Commission argues that the Petitioners' argument that PURPA contracts compensate QFs only for capacity and energy, not for any environmental attributes, is a fallacy.
- 15. Motions to intervene with no position were filed by New York State Electric & Gas Corporation; New England Power Pool; Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation; Constellation Power Source, Inc. and Constellation Power, Inc.; California Energy Commission; and CHI Energy, Inc.
- 16. Untimely motions to intervene in support of the petition were filed by Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Authority; Craven County Wood Energy; Electric Power Supply Association; California Biomass Energy Alliance, LLC.; City of Alexandria, Virginia; Florida Partnership for Affordable Competitive Energy; and Arlington County, Virginia, Department of Environmental Services. An untimely motion to intervene in opposition to the petition was filed by Atlantic City Electric Company. Untimely motions to intervene with no position were filed by Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission; and PPL EnergyPlus, LLC and PPL Electric Utilities Corporation.

Discussion

- 17. Pursuant to Rule 214 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.214 (2003), the notices of intervention and the timely, unopposed motions to intervene serve to make those who filed them parties to this proceeding. Furthermore, given their interest and the absence of undue prejudice or delay, we find good cause to grant the untimely motions to intervene.
- 18. We will grant Petitioners' request for declaratory order, to the extent that the petition asks that the Commission declare that the Commission's avoided cost regulations did not contemplate the existence of RECs and that the avoided cost rates for capacity and energy sold under contracts entered into pursuant to PURPA do not convey the RECs, in the absence of an express contractual provision.

- 19. Section 210(a) of PURPA requires the Commission to prescribe rules imposing on electric utilities the obligation to offer to purchase electric energy from QFs. Under Section 210(b) of PURPA, such purchases must be at rates that are: (1) just and reasonable to electric consumers and in the public interest; (2) not discriminatory against QFs; and (3) not in excess of the incremental cost to the electric utility of alternative electric energy. Section 210(d) of PURPA, in turn, defines "incremental cost of alternative electric energy" as "the cost to the electric utility of the electric energy which, but for the purchase from [the QF] such utility would generate or purchase from another source."
- 20. The Commission implemented the purchase obligation set forth in PURPA in Section 292.303 of its regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a) (2003), which provides:

Each electric utility shall purchase, in accordance with § 292.304, any energy and capacity which is made available from a qualifying facility . . .

Section 292.304, in turn, requires that rates for purchases shall: (1) be just and reasonable to the electric customer of the electric utility and in the public interest; and (2) not discriminate against qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(1) (2003). The regulation further provides that nothing in the regulation requires any electric utility to pay more than the avoided costs for purchases. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(2) (2003). "Avoided costs" is defined as "the incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the qualifying facility or qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or purchase from another source." 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2003).

- 21. Section 292.304 sets forth what factors are to be considered in determining avoided costs. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2003). The factors to be considered include:
 - (1) the utility's system cost data;
 - (2) the availability of capacity or energy from a QF during the system daily and season peak periods;
 - (3) the relationship of the availability of energy or capacity from the QF to the ability of the electric utility to avoid costs; and

¹ See, e.g., Connecticut Light and Power Company, 70 FERC ¶ 61,012 at 61,023, 61,028, reconsideration denied, 71 FERC ¶ 61,035 at 61,151 (1995), appeal dismissed, 117 F. 3d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

² See, e.g., id., 70 FERC at 61,023-24, 61,028-030, and 71 FERC at 61,151-53.

- (4) the costs or saving resulting from variations in line losses from those that would have existed in the absence of purchases from the QF.
- Significantly, what factor is <u>not</u> mentioned in the Commission's regulations is the environmental attributes of the QF selling to the utility. This is because avoided costs were intended to put the utility into the same position when purchasing QF capacity and energy as if the utility generated the energy itself or purchased the energy from another source. In this regard, the avoided cost that a utility pays a QF does not depend on the type of QF, <u>i.e.</u>, whether it is a fossil-fuel-cogeneration facility or a renewable-energy small power production facility. The avoided cost rates, in short, are not intended to compensate the QF for more than capacity and energy.
 - 23. As noted above, RECs are relatively recent creations of the States. Seven States have adopted Renewable Portfolio Standards that use unbundled RECs. What is relevant here is that the RECs are created by the States. They exist outside the confines of PURPA. PURPA thus does not address the ownership of RECs. And the contracts for sales of QF capacity and energy, entered into pursuant to PURPA, likewise do not control the ownership of the RECs (absent an express provision in the contract). States, in creating RECs, have the power to determine who owns the REC in the initial instance, and how they may be sold or traded; it is not an issue controlled by PURPA.
 - 24. We thus grant Petitioners' petition for a declaratory order, to the extent that they ask the Commission to declare that contracts for the sale of QF capacity and energy entered into pursuant to PURPA do not convey RECs to the purchasing utility (absent an express provision in a contract to the contrary). While a state may decide that a sale of power at wholesale automatically transfers ownership of the state-created RECs, that requirement must find its authority in state law, not PURPA.

The Commission orders:

The Commission hereby grants Petitioners' petition for declaratory order, as discussed in the body of this order.

By the Commission. Commissioner Brownell dissenting with a separate statement attached.

(SEAL)

Magalie R. Salas, Secretary.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay Power Corporation, and Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Docket No. EL03-133-000

(Issued October 1, 2003)

BROWNELL, Commissioner, dissenting:

1. The logic of this order escapes me. The order states, and I agree, that RECs are creations of the States, and that PURPA does not address the ownership of RECs. Given that, the logical conclusion ought to be that whether a particular contract conveys RECs is purely a matter of the particular state law creating the RECs. This order, however, grants the petition with the blanket declaration that PURPA avoided-cost contracts do not convey RECs to the purchasing utility unless they include an express provision doing so. I would have dismissed the petition and left the issue of ownership of RECs to be resolved in the appropriate state fora.

Nora Mead Brownell Commissioner

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107 FERC ¶ 61,016 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Before Commissioners: Pat Wood, III, Chairman;

Nora Mead Brownell, Joseph T. Kelliher,

and Suedeen G. Kelly.

American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay Power Corporation, and Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Docket No. EL03-133-001

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

(Issued April 15, 2004)

1. In this order, we deny rehearing of the Commission's October 1, 2003 Order in this proceeding, American Ref-Fuel Company, et al., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004 (2003) (October 1 Order). In the October 1 Order, the Commission interpreted the Commission's regulations implementing section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2000), see 18 C.F.R. Part 292 (2003), by declaring that contracts for the sale of qualifying facility (QF) capacity and energy entered into pursuant to PURPA do not convey renewable energy credits or similar tradeable certificates (RECs) to the purchasing utility (absent express provision in a contract to the contrary). The Commission further declared that while a State may decide that a sale of power at wholesale automatically transfers ownership of the State-created RECs, that requirement must find its authority in State law, not PURPA.

Background

- 2. RECs were created in recent years by State programs typically designed to promote increased reliance on renewable energy resources. These State programs typically are premised on promoting policy goals such as improved air and water quality, reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, broader fuel diversity, enhanced energy security, and hedging against the price volatility of fossil fuels.
- 3. According to the petition, such programs had been adopted in 13 states as of the date of the petition. The programs require retail sellers of electricity to include in their resource portfolios a certain amount of electricity from renewable energy resources. This

obligation can be satisfied by owning renewable energy facilities, by purchasing power from such facilities, or by purchasing tradeable certificates, such as RECs, that correspond to a certain amount of renewable energy generated by a third party. Two States have implemented REC trading programs. Some Independent System Operators and Regional Transmission Organizations are also developing markets for REC trading.

4. The development of these programs and trading markets for RECs has given rise to disputes between QFs and their purchasing utilities. These disputes have focused on the underlying PURPA purchase obligation; that is, whether the existence of a long-term contract entered into pursuant to a PURPA purchase obligation determines ownership of the RECs, though the long-term contract may be silent.

October 1 Order

- 5. On June 13, 2003, American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay Power Corporation, and Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. (Petitioners) filed a petition for declaratory order seeking an interpretation of the Commission's avoided costs rules under PURPA. Specifically, Petitioners sought an order declaring that avoided cost contracts entered into pursuant to PURPA, absent express provisions to the contrary, do not inherently convey to the purchasing utility any RECs. They argued that the power purchase price that the utility pays under such a contract compensates a QF only for the energy and capacity produced by that facility and not for any environmental attributes associated with the facility.
- 6. In the October 1 Order the Commission granted the petition for declaratory order:

to the extent that the petition asks that the Commission declare that the Commission's avoided cost regulations did not contemplate the existence of RECs and that the avoided cost rates for capacity and energy sold under contracts entered into pursuant to PURPA do not convey the RECs, in the absence of an express contractual provision.[1]

¹ October 1 Order at P 18, 24; <u>accord id</u>. at P 3. Our reference to an "express contractual provision" here and elsewhere in the October 1 Order seems to have been misunderstood. We did not mean to suggest that the parties to a PURPA contract, by contract, could undo the requirements of State law in this regard. All we intended by this language was to indicate that a PURPA contract did not inherently convey any RECs, and correspondingly that, assuming State law did not provide to the contrary, the QF by contract could separately convey the RECs.

The Commission continued that, while a State may decide that a sale of power at wholesale automatically transfers ownership of the State-created RECs, that requirement must find its authority in State law.²

Requests for Rehearing

- 7. Timely requests for rehearing were filed by the Maine Public Utilities Commission (Maine Commission); the Edison Electric Institute; Southern California Edison Company and Pacific Gas and Electric Company, jointly; Jersey Central Power & Light Company, Metropolitan Edison Company and Pennsylvania Electric Company (collectively, the FirstEnergy Companies); Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G); Northeast Utilities Service Company on behalf of Connecticut Light and Power Company, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, and Public Service Company of New Hampshire (collectively the NU Operating Companies) and United Illuminating Company; and Xcel Energy Services, Inc. All urge that the Commission should have either dismissed the petition for declaratory order, or, if it did not dismiss the petition, the Commission should have ruled that PURPA contracts are bundled total output contracts that include the renewable attributes and thus RECs convey with the electricity sold under the contracts.
- 8. Petitioners filed an answer to the requests for rehearing.

Discussion

- 9. Rule 713(d) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure provides that the Commission will not permit answer to requests for rehearing. 18 C.F.R. § 385.713 (d) (2003). We will accordingly reject Petitioners' answer to the requests for rehearing.
- 10. Nothing raised on rehearing warrants changing our decision in the October 1 Order and, accordingly, we will deny rehearing.
- 11. The entities seeking rehearing, other than the Maine Commission, are (or represent) utilities that purchase electricity from QFs. They argue the Commission should have dismissed the petition and left the issue of whether a contract conveys RECs to the appropriate State court.³ Alternatively, just as they argued in response to the

² Id. at P 24.

³ While those seeking rehearing argue that, once the Commission acknowledged that RECs are creatures of the States and exist outside the confines of PURPA, see id. at P 23-24, dismissal of the petition was the only action the Commission could take in this case, we do not agree. In this regard we note that those seeking rehearing also argue on (continued...)

original petition, all seek a ruling that avoided cost rates paid under PURPA pay not just for capacity and energy from a QF, but also any associated RECs. All oppose having this Commission rule that contracts for the sale of QF capacity and energy entered into pursuant to PURPA convey only the capacity and energy, and do not convey RECs, to the purchasing utility (absent express provision in the contracts to the contrary).

- 12. We disagree. As we stated in the October 1 Order, "States, in creating RECs, have the power to determine who owns the REC in the initial instance, and how they may be sold or traded; it is not an issue controlled by PURPA." However, PURPA does determine the rate which electric utilities must offer to purchase electric energy from QFs.
- 13. As we explained in the October 1 Order,⁵ section 210(a) of PURPA requires the Commission to prescribe rules imposing on electric utilities the obligation to offer to purchase electric energy from QFs.⁶ The Commission implemented the purchase obligation in PURPA in section 292.303 of its regulations, 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (2003), which provides:

Each electric utility shall purchase, in accordance with § 292.304, any energy and capacity which is made available from a qualifying facility . . .

Section 292.304, in turn, requires that rates for purchases shall: (1) be just and reasonable to the electric customer of the electric utility and in the public interest; and (2) not discriminate against qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(1) (2003). The regulation further provides that nothing

rehearing, as they did in response to the petition, that RECs automatically convey under PURPA avoided cost contracts to the power-purchasing utilities. They ask that the Commission affirmatively rule that, under PURPA, RECs are conveyed to the purchasing utilities. They, in essence, argue that the Commission may properly address the substance of the petition, as long as the Commission rules in their favor. They implicitly acknowledge that the Commission can properly rule on the substance of the petition, rather than dismiss it. Their quarrel is thus with how the Commission ruled on the substance of the petition.

⁴ <u>Id</u>. at P 23. Indeed, insofar as RECs are State-created, different States can treat RECs differently.

⁵ Id. at P 19-21.

⁶ In PURPA the QFs are referred to as qualifying small power production facilities and as qualifying cogeneration facilities.

in the regulation requires any electric utility to pay more than the avoided costs for purchases. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(2) (2003). "Avoided costs" is defined as "the incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the purchase from the qualifying facility or qualifying facilities, such utility would generate itself or purchase from another source." 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2003).

- 14. Section 292.304 sets forth what factors are to be considered in determining avoided costs. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(e) (2003). The factors to be considered include:
 - (1) the utility's system cost data;
 - (2) the availability of capacity or energy from a QF during the system daily and season peak periods;
 - (3) the relationship of the availability of energy or capacity from the QF to the ability of the electric utility to avoid costs; and
 - (4) the costs or saving resulting from variations in line losses from those that would have existed in the absence of purchases from the QF.
- 15. As the Commission stated in its October 1 Order, the factor that is not mentioned in the Commission's regulations is the environmental attributes of the QF selling to the utility. This is because, under PURPA and our implementing regulations, avoided costs were intended to put the utility in the same position when purchasing QF capacity and energy as if the utility either had generated the energy itself or purchased the energy from another source. In this regard, the avoided cost that a utility pays a QF does not depend on the type of QF, i.e., whether it is a fossil-fuel-fired cogeneration facility or a renewable-energy-fired small power production facility. As those seeking rehearing recognize, only renewable energy small power production facilities have renewable attributes, yet the energy from a cogeneration facility is priced the same as the energy from a small power production facility. Both are priced based on a purchasing utility's avoided costs. The Commission thus reasonably concluded that avoided cost rates are not intended to compensate the QF for more than capacity and energy.

⁷ <u>Id</u>. at P 22.

⁸ Id.

- 16. If avoided cost rates are not intended to compensate a QF for more than capacity and energy, it follows that other attributes associated with the facilities are separate from, and may be sold separately from, the capacity and energy. Indeed, states in creating RECs that are unbundled and tradeable have recognized this. The very fact that RECs may be unbundled and may be traded under State law indicates that the environmental attributes do not inherently convey pursuant to an avoided cost contract to the purchasing utility.
- 17. In sum, therefore, we will deny rehearing of our October 1 Order.

The Commission orders:

The requests for rehearing are hereby denied.

By the Commission.

(SEAL)

Magalie R. Salas, Secretary.

If the thermal output of a cogeneration QF is separately saleable, the renewable attributes of a small power production QF are similarly separate.

In this regard, we note that cogeneration facilities, to receive QF status, are required to produce both electricity and useful thermal output. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 796 (18)(A)(i)-(ii), (B) (2000); 18 C.F.R. §§ 292.202(c), 292.205 (2003). The thermal output that is a pre-requisite to a cogeneration facility's achieving QF status is saleable separately from the capacity and energy of the cogeneration facility. See, e.g., Liquid Carbonics Industries Corp. v. FERC, 29 F.3d 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (purchase of thermal output by unaffiliated thermal host establishes arm's-length market for thermal output); see also Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC, 205 F.3d 235, 237-38 (5th Cir. 2000); Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P., 63 FERC ¶ 61,320 at 63,157-59 (1993); Arroyo Energy Limited Partnership, 62 FERC ¶ 61,257 at 62,722-23, reh'g denied, 63 FERC ¶ 61,198 at 62,545-46 (1993); Electrodyne Corp., 32 FERC ¶ 61,102 at 61,277-79 (1985).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay Power Corporation, and Wheelabrator Technologies Inc. Docket No. EL03-133-001

(Issued April 15, 2004)

Nora Mead BROWNELL, Commissioner dissenting:

1. As I stated in my prior dissent, I believe that once the Commission acknowledged that RECs are creations of the States, the only logical course was to dismiss the petition and leave the issue of ownership of RECs to be resolved in the appropriate state fora. Therefore, I would have granted rehearing.

Nora Mead Brownell