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
J.R. Kelly
Public Counsel

STATE OF FLORIDA
OFFICE OF PUBLIC COUNSEL

c/o THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE
111 WEST MADISON ST.
ROOM 812
TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-1400
850-488-9330

EMAIL: OPC_WEBSITE@LEG.STATE.FL.US
WWW.FLORIDAOPC.GOV

MARCO RUBIO
Speaker of the House of
Representatives



October 13, 2008

Ms. Ann Cole, Commission Clerk
Office of Commission Clerk
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd.
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

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COMMISSION
CLERK

Re: Docket No. 080121-WS

Dear Ms. Cole:

Enclosed for filing, on behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida, are the original and 15 copies of the Direct Testimony of James A. Rothschild, Patricia W. Merchant, CPA, Earl Poucher, Andrew T. Woodcock, P.E., M.B.A. and Kimberly H. Dismukes (Public Version).

stl Please indicate the time and date of receipt on the enclosed duplicate of this letter and return it to our office.

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Sincerely,

Charlie Beck
Deputy Public Counsel

DOCUMENT NO. DATE

09679-08 10/13/08
FPSC - COMMISSION CLERK

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Application for increase in water and)
Wastewater rates in Alachua, Brevard,)
DeSoto, Highlands, Lake, Lee, Marion,)
Orange, Palm Beach, Pasco, Polk,)
Putnam, Seminole, Sumter, Volusia, and)
Washington Counties by Aqua Utilities)
Florida, Inc.)

Docket No. 080121-WS

Filed: October 13, 2008

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

JAMES A. ROTHSCHILD

On Behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida

Respectfully submitted,
J.R. Kelly
Public Counsel

Office of Public Counsel
c/o The Florida Legislature
111 West Madison Street
Room 812
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400

(850) 488-9330

Attorney for the citizens
Of the State of Florida

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Attorney for the citizens
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EXHIBIT JAR-2

Resume of James A. Rothschild

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DIRECT TESTIMONY
OF
JAMES A. ROTHSCHILD
On Behalf of the Office of Public Counsel
Before the
Florida Public Service Commission
Docket No. 080121-WS

I. STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS

Q. PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

A. My name is James A. Rothschild and my address is 115 Scarlet Oak Drive, Wilton, Connecticut 06897.

Q. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF YOUR TESTIMONY?

A. I am testifying on behalf of the Office of Public Counsel to provide my recommendations to the Commission regarding the determination of (1) the cost of capital; (2) the cost of equity; and (3) the appropriate capital structure for Aqua Utilities Florida, Inc. I also respond to Aqua Utilities Florida, Inc.'s witness Paul Anzaldo's prefiled direct testimony.

Q. WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?

A. I am a financial consultant specializing in utility regulation. I have experience in the regulation of electric, gas, telephone, sewer, and gas utilities throughout the United States and Nova Scotia, Canada.

1 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR UTILITY REGULATORY EXPERIENCE.**

2 A. I have been a consultant specializing in utility ratemaking since 1972. Initially, I
3 was employed by Touche Ross & Co. Touche Ross & Co. later merged to form
4 Deloitte Touche. I then provided similar consulting services while with J.
5 Rothschild Associates, Georgetown Consulting Group, and Rothschild Financial
6 Consulting. While associated with the above firms, I have worked for various
7 state utility commissions, attorneys general, and public advocates on regulatory
8 matters relating to regulatory and financial issues. These have included rate of
9 return, financial issues, and accounting issues. (See my resume at Exhibit JAR-
10 2).

11
12 **Q. WHAT IS YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND?**

13 A. I received an MBA in Banking and Finance from Case Western University (1971)
14 and a BS in Chemical Engineering from the University of Pittsburgh (1967).

15
16 **II. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS**

17 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR TESTIMONY**

18 A. I recommend an overall cost of capital of 7.05% for Aqua Utilities Florida
19 (“AUF”) based upon a cost of equity of 9.47%. This 9.47% cost of equity is only
20 applicable to the cost of capital computed based upon the actual capital structure
21 of Aqua America, Inc. which contains 44.03% common equity.

22
23 If the Company’s requested common equity ratio is used it would lower the cost f
24 equity to 8.75%. Despite this decrease in the cost of equity the overall cost of
25 capital would increase to 7.37% and balloon higher once taxes are considered

1 because this 62.31% common equity in the Company proposed capital structure
2 would be grossed up for income taxes. If my recommendation is adopted only
3 44.03% of the capital structure would be grossed up for income taxes.

4
5 The derivation of my recommended 9.47% cost of equity is summarized on my
6 Exhibit __ JAR-1, Schedule 2 and is based on a DCF result of between 9.28% and
7 9.71%. As part of my determination process I also considered my Risk
8 Premium/CAPM result of 8.68%.

9
10 I performed two sensitivity analyzes as a check on my primary recommendation.
11 In one of them I removed Equity Resources from the group of 10 gas companies
12 because it has substantial non-regulated activities related to energy production. If
13 Equity Resources is excluded from the DCF analysis, the indicated cost of equity
14 is between 9.79% and 9.81%. My second sensitivity analysis was to apply the
15 DCF method directly to the financial data of Aqua America, Inc. The DCF
16 indicated cost of equity for Aqua America Inc. alone is between 9.07% and
17 9.23%.

18
19 Aqua America Inc has requested a cost of equity of 10.25% for AUF, which is
20 based on the leverage formula in effect at the Commission's final vote with an
21 overall cost of capital of 8.10% for water and 8.02% for sewer. (See page 1 of 2
22 of Schedule of Requested Cost of Capital in Mr. Anzaldo's direct testimony.) On
23 page 2 of 2 of this schedule the overall cost of capital is 8.12% for water and
24 8.06% for sewer based upon 13 month average balance ending December 31,
25 2006. Rather than base his recommended capital structure on the actual capital

1 structure being used by Aqua America Inc., Mr. Anzaldo based his recommended
2 capital structure on the thirteen month average of AUF. (See page 2, line 23-24
3 and page 3, lines 1-2 of Mr. Anzaldo's direct testimony.) It would be
4 inappropriate to assign a higher level of common equity to the capital structure
5 AUF than it is actually using unless such an assignment could be shown to result
6 in a lower, not higher, revenue requirement. I will show later in this testimony
7 that much of what AUF has recorded as equity on its books was really provided
8 by debt that was issued by Aqua America, Inc. and was therefore acquired at a
9 cost rate considerably lower than the cost of equity.

11 **III. COST OF DEBT**

13 **Q. WHAT COST OF DEBT IS THE COMPANY REQUESTING?**

14 A. The Company has requested a 5.10% cost for long-term debt. According to the
15 Direct Testimony of Mr. Stephen Anzaldo and the Schedule of Requested Cost of
16 Capital, the Company is not requesting any short-term debt. This 5.10% cost of
17 long-term debt is reflective only of the cost of debt that was directly issued by
18 AUF but fails to include the impact on the cost of debt caused by debt issued on
19 AUF's behalf by its parent Aqua America, Inc. As explained elsewhere in this
20 testimony, the debt issued by Aqua America, Inc. that is financing part of AUF's
21 assets should not only be included in the true capital structure of AUF, but should
22 also be included in the embedded cost of debt computation. The 2nd quarter of
23 2008 10 Q of Aqua America, Inc. shows that of this parent issued short-term debt,
24 \$135 million was issued at a cost rate of 4.87%, and another \$207 million was
25 issued at cost rates between 5.00% and 5.99%. Since no specific breakdown by

1 interest rate of this \$207 million debt issuance is available in the 10 Q, I cannot
2 make an accurate revision to this 5.10% embedded cost rate. Therefore, for
3 purposes of preparing this testimony, I have used the 5.10% debt cost rate. Based
4 on the interest rate information that is available, it appears that the change to the
5 embedded cost of debt caused by including the parent issued debt would be
6 minimal. However, if the Company chooses to provide a more precise
7 computation of the embedded cost of debt that takes into account an allocation of
8 this parent issued debt, it could be more appropriate to use this revised cost of
9 debt computation.

10
11 **IV. CAPITAL STRUCTURE**

12 **Q. WHAT CAPITAL STRUCTURE HAVE YOU RECOMMENDED IN**
13 **THIS CASE?**

14 **A.** I recommend that the cost of capital for Aqua Utilities Florida be based
15 upon the actual fully arms-length capital structure selected by
16 management, i.e. the actual consolidated capital structure of Aqua
17 America, Inc. This capital structure contains 44.03% common equity,
18 0.00% preferred stock, 52.53% long-term debt and 3.43% short-term debt.
19 See Exhibit ___ JAR-1, Schedule 8. This actual Aqua America, Inc., capital
20 structure should be adjusted to reflect the Florida regulatory basis capital
21 structure. I arrived at this recommended capital structure based on the
22 actual capital structure being used by Aqua America Inc. on a

1 consolidated basis as of June 8, 2008, that I obtained from the Aqua
2 America Inc. Form 8-K, as of June 8, 2008.

3
4 **Q. HOW DOES YOUR RECOMMENDED CAPITAL STRUCTURE**
5 **COMPARE WITH THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE REQUESTED BY THE**
6 **COMPANY?**

7 A. Aqua Utilities Florida has requested a financial basis capital structure that
8 contains 62.31% common equity and has used that in its implementation
9 of the leverage formula. See page 4, line 4 of Mr. Anzaldo's direct
10 testimony.

11
12 **Q. WHY DOES AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA HAVE OVER 62%**
13 **COMMON EQUITY ON ITS BOOKS WHEN ON A CONSOLIDATED**
14 **BASIS AQUA UTILITIES, INC. HAS ONLY ABOUT 45% COMMON**
15 **EQUITY?**

16 A. What is happening can be seen by reviewing the financial statements of
17 Aqua Utilities, Inc. I examined the Aqua America Inc. Form 10-Q
18 quarterly report for the period ended June 30, 2008 that the Company
19 prepared pursuant to section 13 or 15 (d) of the securities exchange act of
20 1934. Of special interest is the information contained on pages 2 and 5 of
21 this report. Page 2 shows that the total debt of Aqua America, Inc. was

1 \$1,212,423,000. It is this number plus the \$7,002,000 current portion of
2 long-term debt that is exactly the same number I used for long-term debt
3 when computing Aqua America's actual capital structure. Page 5 of this
4 same report provides a breakdown of this \$1,212,423,000. It shows that of
5 this amount, only \$827,121,000 is "Long-term debt of subsidiaries
6 (substantially secured by utility plant)". In addition, the Company also
7 has "Notes payable to bank under revolving credit agreement, variable
8 rate, due May 2012" for \$50,000,000; "Unsecured notes payable" due
9 between 2010 and 2037 for a total of \$342,132,000 and Notes due in 2008
10 for \$172,000. These notes that total over \$392 million are debt financings
11 that the Company has issued, but are not reflected on the books of any of
12 Aqua America, Inc's subsidiaries.

13

14 **Q. IS THIS \$392 MILLION OF DEBT THAT HAS NOT BEEN REFLECTED**
15 **ON THE BOOKS OF THE REGULATED WATER UTILITY**
16 **SUBSIDIARIES OF AQUA AMERICA, INC. ACTUALLY FINANCING**
17 **THE REGULATED UTILITY OPERATIONS OF AQUA AMERICA,**
18 **INC?**

19 **A.** Yes. While no detailed breakdown of utility assets is provided in the
20 6/30/08 10 Q report, the 2007 10 K report Aqua America, Inc. does provide
21 a breakdown. The 12/31/07 balance sheet for Aqua America, Inc. shows

1 that the total "Net property, plant and equipment" Aqua America, Inc.
2 had at the time was \$2,792,794,000. Page 20 of this same 10K report
3 provides a detailed breakdown of this amount. It shows that all of this
4 property, plant, and equipment is allocated to the regulated water utility
5 subsidiaries of Aqua America, Inc., leaving nothing for unregulated
6 activities. Additionally, page 4 of the same 10K report shows that of the
7 total \$602,499,000 of revenues earned by Aqua America, Inc., \$589,743,000
8 or 97.9% of the total revenues of Aqua America, Inc., were earned by its
9 regulated subsidiaries.

10
11 **Q. IF THE DEBT ISSUED BY AQUA AMERICA, INC. IS ACTUALLY**
12 **FINANCING THE UTILITY ASSETS ON THE BOOKS OF THE**
13 **REGULATED SUBSIDIARIES, HOW WAS AQUA AMERICA, INC.**
14 **ABLE TO AVOID SHOWING THE \$392 MILLION OF DEBT ON THE**
15 **BOOKS OF ANY OF ITS REGULATED WATER SUBSIDIARIES?**

16 **A.** When Aqua America, Inc. issues debt at the parent level, it can take the
17 proceeds of that debt and invest it in its subsidiary companies. If it so
18 chooses, it can use the proceeds of the debt issuance to purchase common
19 stock of its subsidiaries rather than make a loan to its regulated
20 subsidiaries. This procedure has the advantage of making the regulated
21 subsidiaries appear to have more common equity than they actually do.

1 In the case of Aqua America, Inc. the amount of debt that is masquerading
2 as common equity on the books of the regulated entities totals \$392
3 million.

4

5 **Q. DOES THE COMMON EQUITY OF THE SUBSIDIARIES APPEAR AS**
6 **EQUITY ON THE CONSOLIDATED BOOKS OF AQUA AMERICA,**
7 **INC?**

8 A. No. Because equity that was purchased with debt.

9

10 **Q. HOW SHOULD THE COMMISSION DETERMINE THE CAPITAL**
11 **STRUCTURE TO USE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE OVERALL**
12 **COST OF CAPITAL APPLICABLE TO THE REGULATED WATER**
13 **OPERATIONS OF AUF?**

14 A. Especially in these times where the public has lost so much trust in the
15 financial industry, it is important to use the capital structure that fully
16 reflects the actual capital structure financing a utility unless such a capital
17 structure is shown to be more expensive than appropriate. Ideally the
18 Commission should use the capital structure that will balance safety and
19 economy. However, how to determine the capital structure that will
20 produce the lowest overall cost of capital is controversial. Therefore,
21 commissions frequently look to actual capital structures as an indicator of

1 what capital structures will produce the lowest overall cost of capital.
2 Utility rate regulation is a substitute for competition. Competition puts
3 continual pressure on companies to provide services desired by its
4 customers at the lowest price. To provide services at the lowest price,
5 competitive companies have to minimize all costs, including the cost of
6 capital. The cost of capital can be highly influenced by the capital
7 structure a company uses.

8
9 **It cannot be stressed strongly enough that the reported capital structure**
10 **of wholly owned subsidiaries such as AUF does not provide insight into**
11 **what capital structure management believes will produce the lowest**
12 **overall cost of capital.** I have explained earlier that the subsidiary capital
13 structures of the regulated water companies owned by Aqua America, Inc.
14 contain \$392 million of what is reported to be common equity that was
15 actually raised by its parent in the form of debt, not equity. Holding
16 companies with regulated subsidiaries have a special incentive to put
17 extra equity on the books of such regulated subsidiaries when the only
18 point to such excess equity is to rationalize a higher than appropriate
19 revenue requirement.

20

1 Please note that Standard & Poor's is specifically aware of the weakest
2 link in the chain of problems associated with a high reported common
3 equity ratio reported on the books of regulated subsidiaries when such
4 extra equity disappears at the consolidated level:

5 Utilities are often owned by companies that own other,
6 riskier businesses or that are saddled with an additional
7 layer of debt at the parent level. Corporate rating criteria
8 would rarely view the default risk of an unregulated
9 subsidiary as being substantially different from the credit
10 quality of the consolidated economic entity (which would
11 fully take into account parent-company obligations).

12 Regulated subsidiaries can be treated as exceptions to this
13 rule – if the specific regulators involved are expected to
14 create barriers that insulate a subsidiary from its parent.

15 Corporate Rating Criteria obtained from the Standard & Poor's

16

17 Myron J. Gordon, famous as the first person to use the DCF model in utility rate
18 proceedings, said the following regarding capital structure in his direct testimony
19 in an American Telephone and Telegraph case:

20 For a regulated company increasing the debt ratio is a heads-you-
21 win-tails-I-lose proposition. The consumers enjoy the benefits in
22 reduced revenue requirements of a high debt ratio, while the
23 management and stock-holders suffer the increased risk. The
24 consequence is that the management of a regulated company will
25 want the lowest possible debt ratio that it can persuade the
26 regulatory commission to accept, **and a commission that simply**

1 **accepts the debt ratio advocated by a utility subject to its**
2 **regulation is derelict in its responsibilities to consumers.**

3 *Re American Telephone and Telegraph Company. CC Docket No. 79-63, 1980*

4
5 **V. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW METHOD**

6
7 **Q. WHAT IS THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (DCF) METHOD?**

8 A. The DCF method is a mathematical formula that is used to value a stock and to
9 calculate the cost of equity. It recognizes that investors who buy a stock due so to
10 receive cash dividends and/or capital gains in the future, considering the time
11 value of money.

12
13 **Q. WHAT IS THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY?**

14 A. The time value of money is just another way of saying that money can earn
15 interest. The concept recognizes that because money can earn interest, a dollar
16 received today is worth more than a dollar received tomorrow, a dollar received
17 tomorrow is worth more than a dollar next year, and so on. For example, if an
18 investor puts \$100 in a bank account that offers a 3% annual compounded interest
19 rate, the investor will have \$103 a year later and \$106.09 in two years. If the only
20 investment opportunity is to put money in this bank offering a 3% interest rate
21 then that \$103 next year is worth \$100 today.

22
23 If a company offers an investor \$100 in ten years or \$80 today, the DCF method
24 helps answer the question of which amount the investor should take. If the only
25 investment opportunity for the investor is to put the money in a bank earning 3%

1 interest, it is known that \$100 in ten years is equivalent to \$74.40 today
2 $(\$100/(1.03)^{10})$. The DCF method guides the investor to the correct answer,
3 which is to take the \$80 because it is higher than the \$74.40.

4
5 In the above example the discounted cash flow (DCF) method discount rate was
6 3%.

7
8 **Q. IS THE DISCOUNT RATE HIGHER WHEN AN INVESTOR VALUES A**
9 **STOCK THAN WHEN INVESTING IN AN FDIC INSURED BANK**
10 **ACCOUNT?**

11 A. Yes. The FDIC insured bank account is virtually certain to pay the interest and
12 not default on the investor's deposit. On the other hand investing in stocks
13 involves risk because the quality of management, competitive surprises or overall
14 economic conditions all impact a company's ability to generate cash flow in the
15 future.

16
17 **Q. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DISCOUNT RATE**
18 **AND THE COST OF EQUITY?**

19 A. The discount rate investors' use when calculating the value of a stock is equal to
20 the cost of equity.

21
22 **Q. HOW ARE INVESTORS PAID THE COST OF EQUITY?**

23 A. In addition to receiving dividends the investor has the option to sell the stock.
24 The profit investors receive from selling stock is generally referred to as capital
25 gains.

1 **Q. WHAT ARE CAPITAL GAINS?**

2 A. A capital gain, or loss, is the difference between what an investor pays for a stock
3 and the final selling price. For example, if an investor pays \$20 for a stock this
4 year and sells it for \$21 in three years time, the capital gain is equal to \$21 - \$20
5 or \$1.

6
7 **Q. IS IT ACCEPTABLE TO ARRIVE AT A COST OF EQUITY FROM THE**
8 **DCF MODEL THAT COULD CAUSE THE STOCK PRICE OF A**
9 **COMPANY TO CHANGE?**

10 A. Yes. This principle is a key point of the City of Cleveland vs. Hope Natural Gas
11 U.S. Supreme Court decision. In this landmark case, the U.S Supreme Court said:

12 The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police power,
13 may reduce the value of property which is being regulated. But the
14 fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is
15 invalid. It does, however, indicate that "fair value" is the end
16 product of the process of rate-making not the starting point.... The
17 heart of the matter is upon "fair value" when the value of the going
18 enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be
19 anticipated.

20
21 **Q. WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BEHIND THE DCF METHOD?**

22 A. An investor parts with his or her money to receive dividends and then sells the
23 stock to someone else. The price the new owner is willing to pay for the stock is
24 related to the future flow of dividends and future selling price he or she expects to
25 receive. The value of a company is recognized to be the discounted value of all
26 future dividends continuing until the stock is sold, plus the value of the stock sale
27 proceeds when it is eventually sold.

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For example, if the cost of equity is 9% and the dividend is \$1 per share then that one-dollar dividend paid out next year is worth $\$1/(1+.09)$ or \$0.92 today. This means that the \$0.92 of the current stock price is accounted for by the dividend expected to be paid one year from today. In addition to receiving a dividend for next year an investor might also expect a dividend in the second year of owning the investment. If that dividend were also \$1 then in terms of today's value of that dividend in the second year that \$1 is now worth $\$1/ (1.09)^2 = \0.84 . If by the third year it's expected the dividend will jump to \$1.50 then the contribution to today's stock price from this \$1.50 is $\$1.50(1.09)^3 = \1.16 . This analysis continues year by year for as many years as the investor expects to own the stock.

This relationship can be generalized by the following mathematical equation:

$$P = \frac{D_1}{(1+k)} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k)^2} + \frac{D_3}{(1+k)^3} + \dots + \frac{(D_n + P_n)}{(1+k)^n}$$

- P = Current stock price
- D1 = Dividend paid out in the first year
- D2 = Dividend paid out in the second year
- D3 = Dividend paid out in the third year
- Dn = Dividend paid out in the nth year
- k = the opportunity cost of capital or the require return.
- Pn = the sale price of the stock

This complex version of the DCF equation can be used to solve for the cost of equity by estimating the dividend each year and what price the stock will be sold for and then having the computation solve for the cost of equity, k.

1 **Q. DOES THE POTENTIAL FOR A CHANGE IN THE FUTURE EXPECTED**
2 **RETURN ON BOOK EQUITY MAKE THE DCF MODEL CIRCULAR?**

3 A. No. It is not circular because the DCF computations are all taken from a point in
4 time before investor expectations change. Such an approach is therefore no more
5 circular than a ship captain who, by looking at his compass, determines that his
6 ship is sailing 10 degrees too far South, so he turns the ship to have the very same
7 compass turn back to the true course.

8
9 **Q. IS IT ALWAYS NECESSARY TO USE THIS COMPLEX FORM OF THE**
10 **DCF METHOD?**

11 A. No. If the best estimate for future growth in earnings, book value, dividends and
12 stock price is the same estimate then and only then does the complex formula
13 becomes mathematically identical to the answer obtained by the following
14 equation:

15

16 $k = D/P + g.$

17

18 **Q. WHAT IS THE SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE DCF METHOD?**

19 A. In the simplified version the cost of equity k is equal to the dividend yield plus
20 growth.

21 $k = D/P + g$

22 k = Cost of equity

23 D/P = Dividend Yield (D = dividend and P = stock price)

24 g = Growth in earnings, dividends, book value and stock price expected by
25 investors.

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In the mathematical duration of this simplified DCF model growth, $g = \text{Future Expected Return on Book Equity (ROE) X Retention Rate} + \text{SV}$. SV is the growth caused by the sale of new common stock at a price different from book value.

The retention rate is the percentage of earnings not paid out as a dividend. If a stock price is \$20 per share and the investor receives a \$1 dividend per year the dividend yield is 5% ($\$1/\20).

$$k = 5\% + g$$

If there was no growth then we could say that $k = 5\%$.

$$k = 5\% + 0\%$$

When a company generates earnings it chooses how much to pay out to stockholders and how much to re-invest in the company. In the above example the retention rate is zero and 100% of the earnings are paid out as a dividend.

Companies usually do not pay 100% of earnings as a dividend. The percentage of earnings not paid out as a dividend benefits investors because this portion is re-invested in the company. Whatever percentage of earnings that are re-invested in the company is called the retention rate. For example, if half the earnings are re-invested the retention rate is 50%. The retained earnings are re-invested in the

1 company because management presumably believes there are good investments
2 they can make with that money. The investors' expectation of the returns on this
3 re-invested money is the Return on Book Equity (ROE), not the cost of equity r.

4
5 As stated earlier, growth is equal to ROE X Retention Rate. For example if
6 investors expect an ROE of 8% and a 50% retention rate the growth is equal to
7 4% (50% X 8%).

8
9 **Q. IS IT ALWAYS APPROPRIATE TO USE THE SIMPLIFIED VERSION**
10 **OF THE DCF METHOD?**

11 A. No. In order to use the simplified version, our best estimate must be that the
12 following factors will grow at the same rate:

- 13 a) Earnings
- 14 b) Book Value
- 15 c) Dividends
- 16 d) Stock Price

17 If these are all expected to grow at the same rate, then growth (g) will be equal to
18 ROE X retention rate.

19
20 **Q. CAN YOU PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE WHERE IT IS NOT**
21 **APPROPRIATE TO USE THE SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE DCF**
22 **METHOD?**

23 A. Yes. If our best estimate is that earnings per share and stock price will grow at
24 6% per year while dividends per share will grow at 3% per year and book value

1 per share will grow at 4% per year then the simplified version of the DCF method
2 should not be used.

3

4 In Exhibit ___ JAR-1, Schedule 9, I have attached a Table 1 that reflects that the
5 dividend yield decreases from 5.30% in 2007 to 4.73% in 2011. In this case it is
6 not proper to use either the 5.30% or the 4.73% in the simplified formula. Taking
7 an average over any given time period is also improper because the dividend yield
8 keeps decreasing in the future. In the Table 1 shown on Schedule 9, return on
9 book equity increases from 10.19% in 2007 to 11.00% by 2011. It is unrealistic
10 to expect any company, let alone a regulated public utility, to have a return on
11 book equity that increases indefinitely.

12

13 **Q. PLEASE PROVIDE AN EXAMPLE OF A CONDITION WHERE IT IS**
14 **APPROPRIATE TO USE THE SIMPLIFIED VERSION OF THE DCF**
15 **METHOD.**

16 A. In Table 2 from Exhibit ___ JAR-1, Schedule 9, the growth rate is equal to 4% for
17 earnings per share, book value per share, stock price and dividend per share. The
18 4% is calculated by multiplying ROE X Retention Rate. The starting point of the
19 table shows earnings per share at \$1, book value per share is \$10, stock price is
20 \$11 and dividends per share is \$0.60. The retention rate r is equal to 40%. It was
21 calculated by taking \$1 (earnings per share) minus \$0.60 (dividends per share)
22 and then dividing by \$1 earnings per share. The ROE is equal to 10%, \$1
23 (earnings per share) divided by \$10 (book value per share). So, ROE X Retention
24 Rate is equal to 4% (40% retention rate X 10% ROE).

25

1 Table 2 on Schedule 9 shows that if earnings per share, book value per share,
2 stock price and dividends per share all grow at 4% then book value per share
3 grown at 4% is equal to earnings per share minus dividends per share plus the last
4 year's book value for every year.

5
6 All of the components must grow at a rate equal to ROE X Retention Rate. If any
7 of these components grow at a different rates, or anything other than ROE X
8 Retention Rate then problems such as permanently increasing or decreasing
9 dividend yield can occur, creating problems that ensure an inaccurate answer from
10 the DCF model.

11

12 **Q. IS IT ALWAYS NECESSARY TO REJECT THE CONSTANT GROWTH**
13 **FORM OF THE DCF METHOD FOR A COMPANY WITH ANY**
14 **FORECASTED NON-CONSTANT GROWTH FACTORS?**

15 A. No. It can be possible to still arrive at a reasonable estimate for the cost of equity
16 using the constant growth form of the DCF model so long as the inputs are treated
17 in a manner consistent with constant growth. For example, if the dividend rate
18 used to compute the dividend yield is used to determine the retention rate, then
19 the computation is the same as if dividends were to grow at the same rate as
20 earnings, dividends and book value.

21

22 **Q. IS THE APPROACH YOU HAVE DESCRIBED TO MAKE THE INPUTS**
23 **INTO THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF AN ABSOLUTELY PERFECT**
24 **SOLUTION?**

1 A. No. However, it is the most accurate way to fit a non-constant growth situation
2 into a constant growth DCF formula. It is considerably more accurate than
3 haphazard approaches such as adding a five-year earnings per share growth rate to
4 the current dividend yield. Being true to the mathematical demands of the
5 constant growth DCF model is an essential step to using it properly and therefore
6 maximizing its accuracy.

7

8 Note the self-correcting nature of the approach to the constant growth DCF that I
9 have described:

10

11 A) Suppose a company is expected to grow dividends less rapidly than
12 earnings simply because management plans to invest a larger portion of earnings
13 in the future. This change would lower the expected dividend yield and raise
14 future growth. The least accurate way to handle this situation would be to use the
15 higher expected growth without making a corresponding reduction to the dividend
16 yield. The approach I have used does not make that mistake, while a simplistic
17 approach of merely adding a five-year earnings per share growth rate to an
18 historical dividend yield does make that mistake.

19

20 B) Suppose a company is expected to undergo a temporary rapid increase
21 because the base period has a lower than sustainable earned return on book equity,
22 by equating the retention rate based not only on the actual dividend but on the
23 earnings rate that would have existed if the future expected earned return on
24 equity had been earned, the higher and more sustainable growth rate is computed.
25 However, unsustainable transitional growth derived from a time when return on

1 equity is changing substantially, i.e. earnings on book is non-constant. The
2 approach I have used remains correct, while a simplistic approach of merely
3 adding a five-year earnings per share growth rate to an historical dividend yield
4 would be invalid.

5
6 **Q. DOES THE CONSTANT FORM OF THE DCF MODEL ASSUME THAT**
7 **THE STOCK PRICE WILL BE EQUAL TO BOOK VALUE?**

8 A. No. Stock price and book value are modeled to grow at the same rate. If book
9 value and stock price grow at the same rate, the market-to-book ratio must be
10 expected in the DCF model to remain constant rather than gravitate to some
11 higher or lower value in the future.

12
13 **Q. IS THE ACCURACY OF THE ANSWER OBTAINED FROM THE DCF**
14 **MODEL INFLUENCED BY THE MARKET –TO-BOOK RATIO**
15 **PREVAILING AT THE TIME OF THE ANALYSIS?**

16 A. No. The accuracy of the DCF result is driven by the accuracy of future cash flow
17 estimates. There is no reason to believe the accuracy of a future cash flow
18 projection is inherently more or less difficult to make for a company with a
19 market-to-book ratio of 0.80, 1.0 or 2.0.

20
21 **Q. IF THE COST OF EQUITY COMPUTED BY THE DCF MODEL IS**
22 **DIFFERENT THAN THE RETURN ON EQUITY USED TO COMPUTE**
23 **GROWTH, DOES THIS CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS?**

24 A. No. The cost of equity is the return investors expect to receive on their
25 investment at market price, while the return on equity used to compute growth is

1 equal to the return investors expect a company will be able to earn on its book
2 value at the time the DCF computation was being made. Since market-to-book
3 ratios are rarely exactly equal to 1.0, the return on market price expected by
4 investors is rarely equal to the return on equity investors expect will be achieved
5 on book value.

6

7 **Q. COULD A COMMISSION'S COST OF EQUITY DECISION CHANGE**
8 **INVESTOR'S EXPECTATION FOR THE FUTURE RETURN ON BOOK**
9 **VALUE?**

10 A. Yes. However, it is highly unlikely that any one commission's decision could
11 have a material impact on the future expected return on equity for a comparative
12 group of utility companies. Nevertheless, if a commission's decision were to
13 change investors' expectation of future return on book equity, it could cause
14 numerous inputs in the DCF model to change. The stock price would change in
15 response to a higher or lower dividend rate and an increased or decreased
16 expected growth could cause investors to change their future expected return on
17 book equity.

18

19 **Q. HOW DID YOU OBTAIN THE GROUP OF COMPARATIVE**
20 **COMPANIES THATA YOU USED IN THIS CASE?**

21 A. I used the same companies that this Commission has selected for use in the
22 determination of the leverage formula. In reviewing this group of gas companies,
23 I was especially concerned that Equitable Resources was significantly different
24 than the rest of the group. It has a much higher market-to-book ratio, a
25 considerably higher future expected return on book equity, and its overall

1 business is indicated by Value Line to be oriented towards the production, storage
2 and drilling. In Value Line's September 12, 2008 issue it says, "Equitable
3 Resources has been performing well. Leading the way has been Equitable's
4 production unit," and "Drilling activity has yielded promising results."

5

6 **Q. HOW DID YOU CALCULATE THE DIVIDEND YIELD, D/P?**

7 A. I obtained the most recent quarterly dividend for each of the gas companies. For
8 each company I estimated their annual dividend payments by multiplying the
9 most recent quarterly dividend by 4.

10

11 From Yahoo Finance I obtained the monthly closing prices for all of the
12 comparative gas companies. For every company, I divided the annual dividend
13 payments by their closing stock price for the year ending 8/31/08 to get the
14 dividend yield per company. The dividend yields for these gas companies is
15 based on the year end stock price averaged 3.61% (See Exhibit ___ JAR-1,
16 Schedule 4, page 1).

17

18 I also calculated the average dividend yield for the year for the gas company
19 group by dividing the same dividend payment by the average of the high and low
20 monthly closing stock prices of the past 12 months to get dividend yields. The
21 average dividend yield computed on this basis was 3.70% (See Exhibit ___ JAR-
22 1, Schedule 4, page 1)

23

24 **Q. HOW DID YOU CALCULATE THE GROWTH (g) PORTION OF YOUR**
25 **DCF ANALYSIS?**

1 A. For each company I calculated growth component by solving for Future Expected
2 Return on Book Equity multiplied by Retention Rate. I then added an allowance
3 for growth caused by the sale of new common stock above book value.

4

5 **Q. HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE THE FUTURE RETURN ON BOOK**
6 **EQUITY EXPECTED BY INVESTORS?**

7 A. I estimated the future expected return on book equity by reviewing the return on
8 book equity published by Value Line, and considering that forecast in the context
9 of historic actual returns on equity.

10

11 **Q. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE RETENTION RATE?**

12 A. I calculated the dividend yield on book by multiplying the dividend yield on
13 market price by the market to book ratio. I multiplied this dividend yield on book
14 number by the future expected return on book equity to get the retention rate.

15 (See Exhibit ___ JAR-1, Schedule 3)

16

17 **Q. HOW DID YOU DETERMINE THE SALE OF NEW COMMON STOCK?**

18 A. I used the most current issue of Value Line to obtain the amount of stock
19 outstanding in 2007 and the number of shares forecasted to be outstanding in
20 2011-2013. I calculated the compound annual growth rate between 2007 and the
21 2011-2013 time frame for the comparative gas group. (See Exhibit ___ JAR-1,
22 Schedule 5.)

23

24 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR DCF RESULTS?**

1 A. The results of my DCF analysis can be seen on Exhibit ___ JAR-1, Schedule 2.
2 The average dividend yield for the comparative gas companies is 3.61% to 3.70%.
3 The average growth rate of these companies is between 5.83% and 6.31%. To
4 account for dividend growth for next year, 0.11 is added. The DCF method is
5 indicating a cost of equity of between 9.64% and 10.03%. (See Exhibit ___ JAR-
6 1, Schedule 3.)

7

8 VI. CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

9

10 Q. WHAT IS THE CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL (CAPM)?

11 A. The capital asset pricing model is a method for calculating the cost of equity for a
12 stock by adding a risk premium to a risk free rate. The risk premium appropriate
13 for a group of companies is proportional to the “beta” of that group.

14

$$15 \text{ COE} = R_f + B \times (R_m - R_f)$$

16

17 COE = Cost of equity

18 R_f = Risk free rate

19 B = Beta

20 R_m = the expected return on the market

21

22 Q. WHAT IS A RISK FREE RATE?

23 A. The risk free rate is theoretically a rate that investors receive for investing in a
24 security that has no chance of unexpected price fluctuations. Short-term U.S.
25 government treasury bills are often used to estimate this risk free rate because

1 their default risk is close to zero and because the time to maturity is so short that
2 unexpected price fluctuations from changes in the interest rates are minimal.

3

4 **Q. CAN THE RATE OF A LONGER TERM BOND YIELD LIKE A 20-YEAR**
5 **TREASURY BILL, ALSO BE USED AS A RISK FREE RATE?**

6 A. While a longer-term Treasury bond could be used in a risk premium analysis, a
7 20-year Treasury bond is not truly risk free because it is subject to interest rate
8 risk. For example, an investor buys a 20-year U.S. Treasury bond that is yielding
9 5% and then interest rates rise to 6% the price of a 20-year Treasury bond will
10 decrease, substantially. Therefore, if a 20-year Treasury bond is used in a CAPM
11 analysis, it should be used in a way that recognizes the non-risk-free nature of this
12 20-year U.S. Treasury bond.

13

14 **Q. WHAT IS A RISK PREMIUM?**

15 A. The risk premium is the return that investors demand to take on additional risk.
16 The risk premium can be the difference between any financial instrument in
17 different risk categories such as the difference between U.S. Treasury bonds,
18 corporate bonds, preferred stock or common stock.

19

20 **Q. WHY DO INVESTORS DEMAND A RISK PREMIUM TO INVEST IN**
21 **STOCKS?**

22 A. Investors prefer avoiding uncertainty. They will seek investments with
23 uncertainty if an opportunity is perceived to receive adequate compensation for
24 taking on the additional risk.

25

1 **Q. FOR WHAT TYPE OF RISK DO INVESTORS DEMAND**
2 **COMPENSATION?**

3 A. The only type of risk that investors demand compensation for is the risk that
4 cannot be eliminated through diversification. Investors buy stocks as part of a
5 diversified portfolio. The portfolio effect causes the diversifiable risks of each
6 company to cancel out – unexpected problems are offset by unexpected success.
7 After all of the diversifiable risks of all the companies in an investor’s portfolio
8 cancel out, then only non-diversifiable risk remains. Even a well-diversified
9 portfolio can be harmed by a worldwide recession or a sudden shortage of oil.

10

11 **Q. WHAT IS BETA?**

12 A. Beta is a measurement of the correlation between a given stock and the market as
13 a whole. A portfolio made up of companies with a beta that averages 1.0 tends to
14 have price swings that match the market in magnitude. A portfolio with an
15 average beta of 1.5 tends to move 1.5% for every 1% the market moves. A
16 portfolio with average beta of 0.8 tends to move 0.8% for every 1% the market
17 moves.

18

19 **Q. DO ALL COMPANIES REQUIRE THE SAME RISK PREMIUM?**

20 A. No. There are companies that are more sensitive than others to non-diversifiable
21 risks such as changes in the economy. A portfolio more heavily weighted with
22 companies that are especially impacted by the market will generally require a
23 higher risk premium than a low risk portfolio. For example, a portfolio heavily
24 weighted with stocks that sell luxury items may be harmed dramatically if
25 disposable income goes down because such products are the first to go in hard

1 times. Conversely, a portfolio heavily investing in companies that make a staple
2 products like utilities, corn flakes or soap is likely to be less susceptible to
3 changes in the economy, have more stable stock prices and therefore require a
4 lower risk premium.

5
6 **Q. HOW DID YOU APPLY THE CAPM?**

7 A. I compared the actual compounded annual returns earned by each of 10 groups of
8 companies from 1926-2007 with an average beta of each group. In this way, I
9 effectively examined the returns on ten different portfolios, each with a different
10 average beta. Graph 1 shows that on average from 1926-2007, companies with a
11 beta of 1.0 earned a compounded annual return of 10.40% for its equity investors.
12 The average beta for the comparative gas companies is 0.83, indicating that the
13 non-diversifiable risk for these gas companies is 83% of the average risk. The
14 least squared equation indicates that the earned return to stockholders who
15 invested in a portfolio with a beta of 0.83 earned a compounded annual return of
16 8.68% from 1926-2007.

17 The 10.40% compounded annual average historical actual return earned by
18 companies with a beta of 1.0 and a 9.42% historical actual return earned by
19 companies with 0.83 occurred over a time when the compound annual rate of
20 inflation averaged 3.0%. However, the current inflation expectation demanded by
21 investors is 2.26% (see Exhibit ___ JAR-1, Schedule 6, page 1), or 0.74% lower
22 than the inflation rate embedded in the historical actual return numbers.

23 Therefore, to make the historical returns consistent with investors' current
24 inflation expectations, the 9.42% should be reduced by 0.74%. This 9.42% return

1 adjusted for the current inflation expectation results in a 8.68% CAPM indicated
2 cost of equity for gas companies with a beta of 0.83.

3
4 **Q. ARE COMPOUNDED ANNUAL RETURNS THE SAME AS THE**
5 **GEOMETRIC MEAN?**

6 A. Yes

7
8 **Q. IS THE COMPOUND ANNUAL AVERAGE RETURN, OR GEOMETRIC**
9 **MEAN, A BETTER MEASURE OF ACTUAL HISTORICAL RETURNS**
10 **AND WHAT INVESTORS EXPECT TO EARN IN THE FUTURE THAN**
11 **THE ARITHMETIC MEAN?**

12 A. Yes. Page 24 of Stocks for the Long Run, Third Edition contains the following:

13 Investors can be expected to realize geometric returns only over
14 long periods of time. The average geometric return is always less
15 than the average arithmetic return except when all yearly returns
16 are exactly equal. The difference is related to the volatility of
17 yearly returns.

18
19 A simple example demonstrates the difference. If a portfolio falls
20 by 50 percent in the first year and then doubles (up 100 percent) in
21 the second year, “buy and hold” investors are back to where they
22 started, with a total return of zero. The compound or geometric
23 return r_G , defined earlier as $(1-.5)(1+1)-1$, accurately indicates the
24 zero total return of this investment over two years.

25
26 The average annual arithmetic return r_A is $+25\text{percent} = (-50$
27 $\text{percent} + 100\text{ percent})/2$. Over 2 years, this average return can be
28 turned into a compound or total return only by successfully
29 “timing” the market, specifically increasing the funds invested in

1 the second year and hoping for a recovery in stock prices. Had the
2 market dropped again in the second year, the strategy would have
3 been unsuccessful and would have resulted in lower total returns
4 than achieved by the buy-and-hold investor.
5

6 **Q. WHAT GROUP OF COMPANIES DID YOU USE IN YOUR CAPM**
7 **ANALYSIS?**

8 A. I relied on the Ibbotson Associates data from their 2008 Yearbook that includes
9 3,901 companies.
10

11 **Q. HOW DID YOU DIVIDE THESE COMPANIES INTO TEN**
12 **PORTFOLIOS?**

13 A. The only data available in the Ibbotson Associates report with the companies it
14 covers divided into separate portfolios are these ten groups that were divided by
15 size. Since these ten groups all had significantly different betas and because the
16 actual historical earned returns for these groups was also quantified, it was
17 possible to use these groups to show how beta related to the actual earned return
18 earned by each of these groups. It was acceptable to use the portfolios consisting
19 of different size companies in this analysis because:
20

21 1) By CAPM theory, size is a diversifiable risk and therefore does not impact
22 the cost of equity.

23 2) The results themselves confirm that size does not matter because the least
24 squares trend line projects to a credible risk-free rate. If size, in addition to beta,
25 did actually influence the cost of equity, then the projection of the data would be

1 substantially different than the cost rate expected for a zero risk security (i.e., a
2 security with a beta of zero.)

3

4 **Q. WHAT DID YOU USE FOR A RISK FREE RATE?**

5 A. The most accurate risk free rate to use with this analysis is the one that is defined
6 by the data itself. That way, the true historical actual relationship between beta
7 and the cost of equity is maintained.

8

9 **Q. WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMPOUNDED**
10 **ANNUAL EARNED RETURN AND BETA FOR THE GROUP OF**
11 **COMPANIES YOU SELECTED?**

12

13 A. The data points in the graph shown on Exhibit JAR-1, Schedule 6, are numbered
14 from highest to lowest beta, with number 1 being the group with the lowest beta
15 and number 10 being the group with the highest beta. A least squared line was
16 used to fit a line to the data points and the derived equation was used to calculate
17 the returns for a given beta. Historically a company with a beta of 1 has earned a
18 return of about 10.40%. A company with a beta equal to 0.83, the average beta of
19 the comparative gas companies, has earned approximately 9.42%.

20

21 **Q. DOES THE GRAPH OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BETA AND**
22 **RETURNS SHOWN ON SCHEDULE 6 HELP CONFIRM THE CAPM**
23 **THEORY?**

24 A. Yes. The equation of the least squares line is $Y = .059922 X + 0.0445$ so the line
25 indicates a y-intercept (or security with a zero beta) of 4.45%. Theoretically a

1 firm with a zero beta is a risk free security. The compound annual return actually
2 achieved by investors in U.S. Treasury Bills from 1926-2007 was 4.70%, or only
3 25 basis points higher than the result consistent with the actual return versus
4 actual beta data used in my CAPM analysis. This small difference is an excellent
5 confirmation of the integrity of the CAPM theory.

6

7 **Q. DO THESE HISTORICAL ACTUAL RETURNS FROM 1926-2007**
8 **AUTOMATICALLY EQUATE TO THE COST OF EQUITY?**

9 A. No. The cost of equity at any given risk level is directly influenced by investors'
10 expectations of future inflation rates, while the historical data is a product of the
11 inflation rates that existed in the past. The compounded annual rate of inflation
12 between 1926 and 2007, the time period from which that data used to construct
13 this graph was compiled, inflation averaged 3.0%. Currently however the bond
14 market shows that investor's inflation expectation is 2.26%. Since the returns
15 demanded by investors include an allowance for inflation, it is appropriate to
16 update the historical actual returns to be consistent with what investors currently
17 demand for inflation. Since inflation expectation is 0.74% lower than it was from
18 1926-2007, the cost of equity is appropriately estimated to be 0.49% lower at all
19 risk levels than it was on average from 1926 to 2007. The current cost of equity
20 for the gas group with a beta of 0.83 is 8.68%.

21

22 **Q. HOW DID YOU CALCULATE WHAT THE MARKET EXPECTS**
23 **INFLATION TO BE AS OF 8/31/08?**

24 A. I took the difference between 20-year US treasury bonds and the long-term
25 inflation indexed treasury bonds. The yield on the 30-year US Treasury bonds is

1 4.43% (www.bloomberg.com/markets/rates/index.html) and the yield on the
2 inflation-indexed bonds is 2.17%.
3 (www.bloomberg.com/markets/rates/index.html). Since the market is willing to
4 accept a 2.17% yield instead of a 4.43% yield in return for protection against
5 inflation, the market expects inflation to be 2.26% (4.43% - 2.17%).
6

7 **Q. DOES THEORY AND EMPIRICAL DATA SUPPORT YOUR FINDINGS?**

8 A. Yes. The CAPM theory says the relationship between the cost of capital and beta
9 is linear. In the financial textbook *Investments* (McGraw-Hill/Irwin 2005), by
10 Bodie, Kane and Marcus it states on page 290 that "...fairly priced' assets plot
11 exactly on the SML..." and, "...all securities must lie on the SML in market
12 equilibrium." As seen in Graph 1 on Schedule 6, page 3 of 4, the stock based
13 empirical data is consistent with the theory that higher betas correlate with higher
14 returns. The term Security Market Line (SML) is given to the expected return-
15 beta relationship.
16

17 If this historical actual earned return being is consistent with what investors'
18 expected and if the CAPM theory is correct, it is possible to estimate the risk-free
19 rate that existed on average over the 1926-2007 period by making a linear
20 projection of the historical stock returns. As shown on my graph #1, the stock
21 based empirical data results in a computed risk-free rate of 4.45% (note: Because
22 of the limitations the graph it appears 4.00% but the formula clearly shows the
23 intercept to be 4.45%). This is very close to the actual 4.6% compounded annual
24 return of U.S. Treasury Bills.
25

1 **Q. IS THE U.S. TREASURY BILL YIELD A GOOD ESTIMATE OF THE**
2 **RISK FREE RATE?**

3 A. On average for the long-term, it is. However spot distortions are common. The
4 current rate on the 90-day U.S. Treasury is 1.72% as of 8/31/08, and 0.92% as of
5 9/30/08. It is lower than the long-run average because Fed Chairman, Ben
6 Bernanke, has been reducing interest rates in an attempt to stimulate the economy.

7
8 **Q. HOW DOES YOUR CAPM RESULT COMPARE TO THE RESULTS**
9 **STATED IN IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES?**

10 A. On page 179 of "Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation" Ibbotson SBBI/Morningstar
11 2008 yearbook, the authors conclude:

12 The supply side model estimates that stocks will continue to
13 provide significant returns over the long run, averaging around
14 9.66% per year, assuming historical inflation rates. The equity risk
15 premium, based on the supply side earnings model, is calculated to
16 be 4.24% on a geometric basis and 6.23% on an arithmetic basis.

17
18 In the above statement, the 9.66% return expected by Ibbotson SBBI/Morningstar
19 is based on a stock of average risk. Based on historical inflation rates the
20 expected return I calculate for a company of average risk at 10.4% is higher than
21 the 9.66% concluded by Ibbotson SBBI/Morningstar. Considering that inflation
22 expectations are lower than the historical average and the group of 10 gas
23 companies has a lower risk than the company of average risk, my finding of a
24 8.68% CAPM cost of equity is consistent with both the historical data and the
25 SBBI/Morningstar's forecast.

1 **Q. IS THERE ANOTHER IMPORTANT VERIFICATION OF THE CAPM**
2 **CONCLUSION YOU HAVE RECOMMENDED?**

3 A. Yes. Page 12 of Stocks for the Long Run by Wharton Professor, Jeremy Siegel,
4 concludes that "... the real after-inflation, compound annual rate of return on
5 stocks...real return on stocks... averaged 6.9 percent per year since 1926." The
6 book also points out that this real after-inflation return on stocks has been
7 "...extraordinarily stable..., averaging 6.6 percent from 1871 through 1925..."
8 and the book mentions that the return since World War II was 7.1 percent.
9 Recognizing that the return data prior to 1926 contains many fewer companies
10 and is in a much less mature economy than the data since 1926, I will concentrate
11 on the inflation premium data after 1926 and will therefore conclude that the
12 equity premium in excess of inflation for the average common stock in the U.S. is
13 7.1%. Adding the current inflation expectation derived from the bond market of
14 2.26% results in a cost of equity estimate of 9.36% for a company of average risk.
15 This result is virtually identical to the 9.66% estimate made by Ibbotson
16 Associates, further confirming that my 10.4% CAPM estimate based on the
17 results for the average stock is conservatively high.

18

19 **VII. EVALUATION OF THE TESTIMONY OF MR. ANZALDO**

20

21 **Q. PLEASE EXPLAIN WHAT MR. ANZALDO RECOMENDS.**

22 A. Mr. Anzaldo, on page 4 of his direct testimony, has recommended that AUF be
23 allowed a return on equity of between 10.25% based on the leverage formula in
24 effect at the time of the Commission's final vote. On page 4, lines 17-21 Mr.
25 Anzaldo's direct testimony that approximately 60% common equity and 36% debt

1 is “appropriate for AUF.” And that AUF’s size and lack of growth dictate a higher
2 common equity ratio than a “typical water company.”

3

4 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. ANZALDO’S COST OF EQUITY**
5 **RECOMMENDATION?**

6 A. No. As explained earlier in my testimony I believe that the cost of equity for
7 AUF is 9.47% with a common equity ratio of 44.03%. If the Commission
8 chooses to use a higher than justifiable common equity ratio of 62.31% the cost of
9 equity would decrease to 8.75%. Such a low percentage of debt in the capital
10 structure would have significantly lower risk than the proxy group of 10 case
11 companies I used to calculate the cost of equity in my.

12

13 **Q. DO YOU AGREE WITH MR. ANZALDO’S CAPITAL STRUCTURE**
14 **RECOMMENDATION?**

15 A. No. Mr. Anzaldo See page 4 of Mr. Anzaldo’s direct testimony uses a 13-month
16 average basis for AUF. The parent, Aqua America Inc.’s operations are almost
17 100% regulated. Also, as explained earlier in this testimony, the books of Aqua
18 America, Inc. contain \$392 million of debt financing that has been used to finance
19 the equity of its regulated water utilities. Therefore, the cost of that portion of
20 what has been reported on the books of AUF has been obtained at a cost of debt
21 rate, not a cost of equity rate. As of June 8, 2008 Aqua America Inc. has a
22 common equity ratio of 44% and that is the ratio that should be used in this
23 proceeding.

24

25 **Q. PLEASE RESPOND TO MR. ANZALDO’ COMMENT ON THE SIZE OF**

1 **AUF HAVING AN INFLUENCE ON THE COMMON EQUITY RATIO.**

2 A. Mr. Anzaldo presented no evidence that capital structure is related to size. He did
3 not even claim that capital structure is somehow a function of size among the
4 various regulated water subsidiaries of Aqua America, Inc. AUF is part of the
5 Aqua America, Inc. system. Its effective capital structure and capital cost rates
6 are therefore a function of the overall system. If the savings from creating the
7 entire system were not passed on to Florida ratepayers, the effect would be for
8 Aqua America, Inc. to earn a considerably higher return on equity than was
9 intended by the Commission.

10
11 **VIII. CONCLUSION**

12
13 **Q. PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS CASE.**

14 A. The overall cost of capital that should be allowed to AUF in this proceeding is
15 7.05% (9.60% pre tax). See Exhibit ___ JAR-1, Schedule 1. This 7.05% overall
16 cost of capital is based upon a cost of equity of 9.47% with a 44.03% common
17 equity ratio. Alternately, if a higher common equity ratio were used, then the cost
18 of equity would be lower.

19 **Q. DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR TESTIMONY?**

20 A. Yes.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
DOCKET NO. 080121-WS


I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished
by U.S. Mail to the following parties on this 13th day of September, 2008.

Ralph Jaeger
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Blvd.
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850

Ms. Kimberly A. Joyce
Aqua Utilities Florida, Inc.
762 West Lancaster Avenue
Bryn Mawr, PA 19010-3402

Bruce May, Esq.
Gigi Rollini, Esq.
c/o Holland & Knight Law Firm
P.O. Drawer 810
Tallahassee, FL 32302-0810

Cecilia Bradley
Office of the Attorney General
The Capitol-PL101
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050



Charlie Beck
Deputy Public Counsel

OVERALL COST OF CAPITAL

Capital Structure and Cost Rates				
<i>Recommended Capital Structure</i>				
	<u>Ratios</u>	<u>Cost Rate</u>	<u>[E] Weighted Cost Rate</u>	<u>[F] Pre Tax Cost Rate</u>
Long-Term Debt	52.53% [A]	5.10% [B]	2.68%	2.68%
Short-Term Debt	3.43% [A]	5.90% [C]	0.20%	0.20%
Common Equity	44.03% [A]	9.47% [D]	4.17%	6.72%
	100.0%		7.05%	9.60%

Capital Structure and Cost Rates				
<i>Capital Structure Requested by the Company</i>				
	<u>Ratios</u>	<u>Cost Rate</u>	<u>[E] Weighted Cost Rate</u>	<u>[F] Pre Tax Cost Rate</u>
Long-Term Debt	37.69% [G]	5.10% [B]	1.92%	1.92%
Short-Term Debt	0.00%		0.00%	
Common Equity	62.31% [B]	8.75% [D]	5.45%	8.78%
	100.0%		7.37%	10.70%

Sources:

- [A] JAR-1 Schedule 8 (Figures from June 30, 2008)
- [B] Direct Testimony of Mr. Stephen Anzaldo, Page 4
- [C] Aqua America Inc. 10K (Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, page 40)
- [D] JAR-1 Schedule 2
- [E] Cost Rate x Ratio
- [F] 1.61 X Cost Rate.
- [G] 1 - Common Equity Ratio

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
COST OF EQUITY SUMMARY**

Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
Cost of Equity Summary
Schedule 2
Page 1 of 1

SIMPLIFIED, OR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF (D/P +g) RESULTS:	Average for Year ending 8/31/08	As of 8/31/2008
Based upon 10 Gas Companies Covered by Value Line (Same Companies used in Florida's Leverage Graph Calculation)	9.28% [A]	9.71% [A]
Based upon 9 Gas Companies (Same as 10 but excluding Equitable Resources)	9.79% [B]	9.81% [B]
Aqua America Inc.	9.23% [C]	9.07% [C]

Risk Premium

Capital Asset Pricing Model Based upon 10 Gas Companies Covered by Value Line (Same Companies used in Florida's Leverage Graph Calculation)	8.68% [D]
---	-----------

Recommended Equity Cost Rate Finding	9.25%
Indicated Cost of Equity	9.25% [E]

BASED ON RECOMMENDED CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Recommended Equity Cost Rate Finding	9.25%
Allowance for risk for Capital Structure with 44% Common Equity versus comparative group's 49.62%.	0.22% [E]
Indicated Cost of Equity	9.47%

BASED ON COMPANY REQUESTED CAPITAL STRUCTURE

Recommended Equity Cost Rate Finding	9.25%
Allowance for risk for Capital Structure with 62.31% Common Equity versus comparative group's 49.62%.	-0.50% [E]
Indicated Cost of Equity	8.75%

Sources:

- [A] JAR-1 SCHEDULE 3, Page 1
- [B] JAR-1 SCHEDULE 3, Page 2
- [C] JAR-1 SCHEDULE 3, Page 3
- [D] JAR-1 SCHEDULE 6, Page 1
- [E] Based on estimate of 0.04% change in cost of equity for each 1% change in common equity ratio. This is derived from an analysis of the relationship between the cost of equity and the percentage of common equity in the capital structure. The analysis was done by comparing the DCF indicated cost of equity to the percentage of common equity in the capital structure for all electric utilities covered by Value Line.

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (DCF) INDICATED COST OF EQUITY
TEN GAS COMPANIES USED IN FLORIDA LEVERAGE
GRAPH COMPUTATIONS**

Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ____ (JAR-1)
DCF cost of Equity
Schedule 3
Page 1 of 3

		Based on Monthly Midpoint Market Price For Year Ending 8/31/08	Based on Market Price As of 8/31/2008
1 Dividend Yield On Market Price	[B]	3.70%	3.61%
2 Retention Ratio:			
a) Market-to-book	[B]	2.39	2.25
b) Div. Yld on Book	[C]	8.86%	8.14%
c) Return on Equity	[A]	12.25%	12.25%
d) Retention Rate	[D]	27.63%	33.58%
3 Reinvestment Growth	[E]	3.39%	4.11%
4 New Financing Growth	[F]	2.09%	1.88%
5 Total Estimate of Investor Anticipated Growth	[G]	5.48%	5.99%
6 Increment to Dividend Yield for Growth to Next Year	[H]	0.10%	0.11%
7 Indicated Cost of Equity	[I]	9.28%	9.71%

Some of the Considerations for Determining Future Expected Return on Equity:

Sources:	Median	Mean	Source:
[A] Value Line Expectation	12.25%	13.00%	0
Return on Equity to Achieve Zacks' Growth	13.08%	13.45%	0
Earned Return on Equity in 2007	12.18%	12.40%	0
Earned Return on Equity in 2006	11.99%	14.59%	0
Earned Return on Equity in 2005	11.89%	13.44%	0
[B] JAR-1 SCHEDULE 4, Page 1			
[C] Line 1 x Line 2a			
[D] 1- Line 2b/Line 2c			
[E] Line 2c x Line 2d			
[F] S X V			
[M/B X (Ext. Fin Rate+1)/(M/B + Ext. Fin. Rate-1)			Ext. Fin. rate used = 1.50% [J]
[G] Line 3 + Line 4			
[H] Line 1 x one-half of line 5			
[I] Line 1 + Line 5 + Line 6			
[J] JAR-1 SCHEDULE 5			

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (DCF) INDICATED COST OF EQUITY
TEN GAS COMPANIES USED IN FLORIDA LEVERAGE
GRAPH COMPUTATIONS**

Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
DCF cost of Equity
Schedule 3
Page 2 of 3

LESS EQUITABLE RESOURCES

			Based on Monthly Midpoint Market Price For Year Ending 8/31/08	Based on Market Price As of 8/31/2008
1 Dividend Yield On Market Price	[B]		<u>3.95%</u>	<u>3.82%</u>
2 Retention Ratio:				
a) Market-to-book	[B]		1.85	1.89
b) Div. Yld on Book	[C]		7.30%	7.20%
c) Return on Equity	[A]		11.75%	11.75%
d) Retention Rate	[D]		<u>37.89%</u>	<u>38.73%</u>
3 Reinvestment Growth	[E]		4.45%	4.55%
4 New Financing Growth	[F]		<u>1.27%</u>	<u>1.33%</u>
5 Total Estimate of Investor Anticipated Growth	[G]		5.72%	5.88%
6 increment to Dividend Yield for Growth to Next Year	[H]		0.11%	0.11%
7 Indicated Cost of Equity	[I]		<u>9.79%</u>	<u>9.81%</u>

Some of the Considerations for Determining Future Expected Return on Equity:

Sources:	<u>Median</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Source:</u>
[A] Value Line Expectation	11.50%	12.17%	JAR SCHEDULE 4, Page 2
Return on Equity to Achieve Zacks' Growth	12.91%	6.82%	JAR SCHEDULE 4, Page 3
Earned Return on Equity in 2007	11.96%	11.80%	JAR SCHEDULE 4, Page 2
Earned Return on Equity in 2006	10.87%	12.37%	JAR SCHEDULE 4, Page 2
Earned Return on Equity in 2005	11.64%	11.10%	JAR SCHEDULE 4, Page 2
[B] JAR-1 SCHEDULE 4, Page 1			
[C] Line 1 x Line 2a			
[D] 1- Line 2b/Line 2c			
[E] Line 2c x Line 2d			
[F] S X V			
[G] $[M/B \times (Ext. Fin Rate + 1)] / (M/B + Ext. Fin. Rate - 1)$			Ext. Fin. rate used = 1.50% [J]
[H] Line 3 + Line 4			
[I] Line 1 x one-half of line 5			
[J] Line 1 + Line 5 + Line 6			
[K] JAR SCHEDULE 5			

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW (DCF) INDICATED COST OF EQUITY
TEN GAS COMPANIES USED IN FLORIDA LEVERAGE
GRAPH COMPUTATIONS**

**Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
DCF cost of Equity
Schedule 3
Page 3 of 3**

AQUA AMERICA INC. ONLY

		BASED ON MONTHLY MIDPOINT MARKET PRICE FOR Year Ending 8/31/08	BASED ON MARKET PRICE AS OF 8/31/2008
1 Dividend Yield On Market Price	[B]	<u>2.73%</u>	<u>2.53%</u>
2 Retention Ratio:			
a) Market-to-book	[B]	2.50	2.77
b) Div. Yld on Book	[C]	6.83%	7.00%
c) Return on Equity	[A]	<u>12.00%</u>	<u>12.00%</u>
d) Retention Rate	[D]	<u>43.08%</u>	<u>41.64%</u>
3 Reinvestment Growth	[E]	5.17%	5.00%
4 New Financing Growth	[F]	<u>1.24%</u>	<u>1.46%</u>
5 Total Estimate of Investor Anticipated Growth	[G]	6.41%	6.46%
6 Increment to Dividend Yield for Growth to Next Year	[H]	0.09%	0.08%
7 Indicated Cost of Equity	[I]	<u>9.23%</u>	<u>9.07%</u>

Some of the Considerations for Determining Future Expected Return on Equity:

Sources:	<u>Median</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Source:</u>
[A] Value Line Expectation	12.00%	12.00%	JAR-1 SCHEDULE 4, Page 2
Return on Equity to Achieve Zacks' Growth	12.65%	12.65%	JAR-1 SCHEDULE 4, Page 3
Earned Return on Equity in 2007	9.94%	9.94%	JAR-1 SCHEDULE 4, Page 2
Earned Return on Equity in 2006	10.56%	10.56%	JAR-1 SCHEDULE 4, Page 2
Earned Return on Equity in 2005	11.65%	11.65%	JAR-1 SCHEDULE 4, Page 2
[B] JAR-1 SCHEDULE 4, Page 1			
[C] Line 1 x Line 2a			
[D] 1- Line 2b/Line 2c			
[E] Line 2c x Line 2d			
[F] S X V			
[M/B X (Ext. Fin Rate+1)/(M/B + Ext. Fin. Rate-1)		Ext. Fin. rate used =	0.83% [J]
[G] Line 3 + Line 4			
[H] Line 1 x one-half of line 5			
[I] Line 1 + Line 5 + Line 6			
[J] JAR-1 SCHEDULE 5			

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
COMPARATIVE COMPANIES
SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA**

**Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
Comparative Companies
Schedule 4, page 1 of 3**

		[1] Book Per Sh. Dec. 04	[2] Book Per Sh. Dec. 05	[3] Book Per Sh. Dec. 06	[4] Book Per Sh. Dec. 07	[5] At 08/31/08	[6] Market Price High for Year	[7] Low for Year	[8] Market to Book At 08/31/08	[9] Avg. for Year	[10] Div. Rate [A]	[11] Dividend Yield At 8/31/2008	[12] Avg. for Year
VL Issue		[A]	[A]	[A]	[A]	[B]	[B]	[B]	[C]	[C]	[A]	[D]	[D]
TEN GAS COMPANIES USED IN FLORIDA LEVERAGE GRAPH COMPUTATIONS													
AGL	ATG	\$18.06	\$19.29	\$20.71	\$21.74	\$33.06	\$41.16	\$32.20	1.52	1.73	\$1.68	5.08%	4.58%
ATMOS Energy Corp.	ATO	\$18.05	\$19.90	\$20.16	\$22.01	\$27.54	\$29.63	\$25.00	1.25	1.30	\$1.30	4.72%	4.76%
Equitable Res.	EQT	\$7.17	\$2.96	\$7.78	\$8.98	\$49.91	\$76.14	\$46.79	5.56	7.33	\$0.88	1.76%	1.43%
Laclede Group	LG	\$16.96	\$17.31	\$18.85	\$19.79	\$44.93	\$47.98	\$30.60	2.27	2.03	\$1.50	3.34%	3.82%
Nicor, Inc.	GAS	\$16.99	\$18.36	\$19.43	\$20.58	\$45.89	\$46.84	\$32.35	2.23	1.98	\$1.86	4.05%	4.70%
N. W. National Gas	NWN	\$20.64	\$21.28	\$22.01	\$22.52	\$48.73	\$50.89	\$41.07	2.16	2.07	\$1.50	3.08%	3.26%
Piedmont National Gas	PNY	\$11.15	\$11.53	\$11.83	\$11.99	\$28.85	\$29.20	\$24.01	2.41	2.23	\$1.04	3.60%	3.91%
South Jersey Inds.	SJI	\$12.41	\$13.50	\$15.11	\$16.25	\$35.67	\$39.36	\$31.83	2.20	2.27	\$1.08	3.02%	3.03%
Southwest Gas	SWX	\$19.18	\$19.10	\$21.58	\$22.98	\$30.35	\$31.74	\$25.14	1.32	1.28	\$0.90	2.97%	3.16%
WGL Holdings	WGL	\$16.95	\$17.80	\$18.28	\$19.83	\$32.20	\$35.69	\$30.26	1.62	1.73	\$1.44	4.47%	4.37%
	AVERAGE	\$15.76	\$16.10	\$17.57	\$18.67	\$37.71	\$42.86	\$31.93	2.25	2.39	\$1.32	3.61%	3.70%
	MEDIAN								2.18	2.01		3.47%	3.86%
RESULT WITHOUT EQUITABLE RESOURCES													
	AVERAGE	\$16.71	\$17.56	\$18.66	\$19.74	\$36.36	\$39.17	\$30.27	1.89	1.85	\$1.37	3.82%	3.95%
	MEDIAN								2.16	1.98		3.60%	3.91%
AQUA AMERICA INC.													
		\$5.89	\$6.30	\$6.96	\$7.32	\$18.29	\$25.10	\$14.46	2.50	2.77	\$0.50	2.73%	2.53%

e= Estimated by Value Line

Sources:

- [A] Most current Value Line at time of prep. of schedule. Most current quarterly dividend rate X 4
- [B] Yahoo Finance – Historical Prices
- [C] Market price divided by book value
- [D] Dividend rate divided by market price

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
COMPARATIVE COMPANIES
SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA
EARNINGS PER SHARE AND RETURN ON EQUITY**

**Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ____ (JAR-1)
Comparative Companies
Schedule 4, page 2 of 3**

	[1] EPS 2005	[2] EPS 2006	[3] EPS 2007	[4] Return on Eq. 2006	[5] Return on Eq. 2007	[6] Value Line Future Exp. Return on Eq.	[7] Return on Equity 2005
	[A]	[A]	[A]	[B]	[B]	[A]	[B]
TEN GAS COMPANIES USED IN FLORIDA LEVERAGE GRAPH COMPUTATIONS							
AGL	\$2.48	\$2.72	\$2.72	13.60%	12.82%	14.00%	13.28%
ATMOS Energy Corp.	\$1.72	\$2.00	\$1.94	9.99%	9.20%	9.50%	9.06%
Equitable Res.	\$1.75	\$1.86	\$1.49	34.64%	17.78%	20.50%	34.55%
Laclede Group	\$1.90	\$2.37	\$2.31	13.11%	11.96%	11.50%	11.09%
Nicor, Inc.	\$2.27	\$2.87	\$2.99	15.19%	14.95%	14.00%	12.84%
N. W. National Gas	\$2.11	\$2.35	\$2.76	10.86%	12.40%	11.00%	10.07%
Piedmont National Gas	\$1.32	\$1.27	\$1.40	10.87%	11.75%	13.00%	11.64%
South Jersey Inds.	\$1.71	\$2.46	\$2.09	17.20%	13.33%	16.50%	13.20%
Southwest Gas	\$1.25	\$1.98	\$1.95	9.73%	8.75%	9.50%	6.53%
WGL Holdings	\$2.11	\$1.94	\$2.10	10.75%	11.02%	10.50%	12.14%
	\$1.86	\$2.18	\$2.18	14.59%	12.40%	13.00%	13.44%
				11.99%	12.18%	12.25%	11.89%
RESULT WITHOUT EQUITABLE RESOURCES							
Equitable Res.	\$1.87	\$2.22	\$2.25	12.37%	11.80%	12.17%	11.10%
				10.87%	11.96%	11.50%	11.64%
AQUA AMERICA INC.							
Aqua America Inc.	\$0.71	\$0.70	\$0.71	10.56%	9.94%	12.00%	11.65%

e= Estimated by Value Line

Source:

[A] Most current Value Line at time of prep. of schedule.

[B] Earnings Per Share divided by average book value. Book value shown on JAR-1, SCHEDULE 4, Page 1

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
COMPARATIVE COMPANIES
RETURN ON EQUITY IMPLIED IN
ZACKS PROJECTED GROWTH RATES**

**Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
Comparative Companies
Schedule 4, page 3 of 3**

		Dec. 07 Y/E <u>Book</u> [A]	Earnings <u>2007</u> [A]	Dividends [A]	Analyst 5 Year Growth Rate <u>10/</u> [B]	Y/E Book in 2011 at Zack's <u>Growth</u> [C]	Y/E Book in 2012 at Zack's <u>Growth</u> [C]	Earnings 2012 at Zack's <u>Growth</u> [C]	Return on Equity to achieve Analysts' <u>Growth</u> [C]	VALUE LINE BETA [A]
TEN GAS COMPANIES USED IN FLORIDA LEVERAGE GRAPH COMPUTATIONS										
AGL	ATG	\$21.74	\$2.72	\$1.68	4.80%	\$26.42	\$27.74	\$3.44	12.70%	0.85
ATMOS Energy Corp.	ATO	\$22.01	\$1.94	\$1.30	5.40%	\$24.93	\$25.77	\$2.52	9.95%	0.80
Equitable Res.	EQT	\$8.98	\$1.49	\$0.88	9.80%	\$12.08	\$13.05	\$2.38	18.92%	0.90
Laclede Group	LG	\$19.79	\$2.31	\$1.50	10.00%	\$23.93	\$25.23	\$3.72	15.14%	0.80
Nicor, Inc.	GAS	\$20.58	\$2.99	\$1.86	5.80%	\$25.79	\$27.29	\$3.96	14.93%	0.90
N. W. National Gas	NWN	\$22.52	\$2.76	\$1.50	6.50%	\$28.43	\$30.16	\$3.78	12.91%	0.75
Piedmont National Gas	PNY	\$11.99	\$1.40	\$1.04	5.60%	\$13.64	\$14.12	\$1.84	13.25%	0.80
South Jersey Inds.	SJI	\$16.25	\$2.09	\$1.08	7.80%	\$21.15	\$22.62	\$3.04	13.90%	0.80
Southwest Gas	SWX	\$22.98	\$1.95	\$0.90	8.00%	\$28.09	\$29.63	\$2.87	9.93%	0.80
WGL Holdings	WGL	\$19.83	\$2.10	\$1.44	7.50%	\$23.00	\$23.95	\$3.01	12.84%	0.85
		\$18.67	\$2.18	\$1.32	7.12% 7.00%	\$22.75	\$23.96	\$3.06	13.45% 13.08%	0.83 0.80
		\$19.74	\$2.25	\$1.37	6.82% 6.50%	\$23.93	\$25.17	\$3.13	12.84% 12.91%	0.82
Aqua America Inc.	ATG	\$7.32	\$0.71	\$0.50	8.70%	\$8.36	\$8.68	\$1.08	12.65%	0.95

[A] Must Current Value Line at time of prep of schedule

[B] Zacks.com, 5/29/08

[C] Projected return on equity is obtained by escalating both dividends and earnings per share by the stated growth rate, and adding earnings and subtracting dividends in each year to determine the book value.

AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
EXTERNAL FINANCING RATE
(Millions of Shares)

Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
External Financing Rate
Schedule 5
Page 1 of 1

**TEN GAS COMPANIES USED IN FLORIDA
LEVERAGE GRAPH COMPUTATION**

	Common Stock Outstanding		Compound Annual
	2007	2011-13	
AGL	76.40	80.00	0.93%
ATMOS Energy Corp.	89.33	115.00	5.18%
Equitable Res.	122.16	124.00	0.30%
Laclede Group	21.65	25.50	3.33%
Nicor, Inc.	45.90	45.00	-0.40%
N. W. National Gas	26.41	28.00	1.18%
Piedmont National Gas	73.23	72.00	-0.34%
South Jersey Inds.	29.61	33.00	2.19%
Southwest Gas	42.81	48.00	2.31%
WGL Holdings	49.45	50.00	0.22%
		Average	1.49%
		Median	1.05%
		Round to	1.50%
Less Equitable		Average	1.62%
		Median	1.18%
		Round to	1.50%
AQUA AMERICA INC. ONLY	Common Stock Outstanding		Compound Annual
	2007	2011-13	
Aqua America Inc.	133.40	139.00	0.83%

External financing rate adjusted for change in common equity ratio

Source: Most current Value Line at time of prep. of schedule.

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
BASED ON HISTORICAL ACTUAL
COMPOUND ANNUAL RETURNS**

**Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ____ (JAR-1)
CAPM Pricing Model
Schedule 6
Page 1 of 4**

1 Historical Actual Return - beta = 1	10.40% [A]
2 Historical Actual Return - beta = 0.83	9.42% [B]
3 Interest Rate on 30-Year Treasury Bonds	4.43% [C]
4 Interest Rate on Long-Term Inflation Indexed Treasury Bonds	<u>2.17%</u> [D]
5 Current Market Inflation Expectation	2.26% Line 3 minus Line 4
6 Historical Actual Inflation	3.00% [E]
7 Difference From Historical Actual Inflation	0.74%
8 Adjusted Returns For Current Market Inflation Expectation Beta = 1	9.66%

CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL

7 Indicated Cost of Equity for Portfolio of Companies with a beta of 0.83	8.68%
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Sources:

- [A] Ibbotson Associates 2008 Yearbook, page 295
- [B] JAR-1, Schedule 6, Page 2
- [C] US Treasury, as of 8/31/08
- [D] Federal Reserve Statistical Release
- [E] Ibbotson Associates 2008 Yearbook, page 331

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
 CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
 HISTORIC ACTUAL COMPOUND RETURNS
 and HISTORIC ACTUAL COMPOUND ANNUAL RETURNS ADJUSTED FOR
 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CURRENT AND HISTORICAL ACTUAL INFLATION RATE**

**Docket No. 080121-WS
 Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
 CAPM Pricing Model
 Schedule 6
 Page 2 of 4**


		GAS COMPANIES									
		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
[A]	Portfolio by Size Decile										
[A]	Beta	0.91%	1.03%	1.10%	1.12%	1.16%	1.18%	1.24%	1.30%	1.35%	1.41%
[B]	Historic Actual Compounded Annual Return	9.60%	10.90%	11.30%	11.10%	11.70%	11.70%	11.60%	11.80%	11.90%	13.60%
[C]	Reduced Compounded Annual Returns	8.86%	10.16%	10.56%	10.36%	10.96%	10.96%	10.86%	11.06%	11.16%	12.86%

[D]	Least Squared Line derived from compounded annual returns per decile				
	Beta	Slope	Y-Intercept		Return
	0.83	5.9922	4.45		9.42%
	See graph on JAR Schedule 6, page 5				

	Least Squared Line				
	Beta	Slope	Y-Intercept		Return
[E]	0.83	5.9922	3.71		8.68%
	See graph on JAR Schedule 6, page 4				

- [A] Ibbotson Associates 2008 Yearbook, page 142
- [B] Ibbotson Associates 2008 Yearbook, page 130
- [C] by 0.35% actual difference between 3.00% historical and 2.65% current expected long-term inflation rate.
- [D] Least Squared Line derived from Historical Actual Compounded Annual Return
- [E] Least Squared Line derived from Reduced Compounded Annual Return


Beta	0.91%	1.03%	1.10%	1.12%	1.16%	1.18%	1.24%	1.30%	1.35%	1.41%
Historic Actual Compounded Annual Return	9.60%	10.90%	11.30%	11.10%	11.70%	11.70%	11.60%	11.80%	11.90%	13.60%



**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
 CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL
 RETURNS VERSUS BETA
 COMPOUND ANNUAL RETURNS**

Docket No. 080121-WS
 Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
 CAPM Pricing Model
 Schedule 6
 Page 4 of 4

Beta	0.91%	1.03%	1.10%	1.12%	1.16%	1.18%	1.24%	1.30%	1.35%	1.41%
Reduced Compounded Annual Returns	8.86%	10.16%	10.56%	10.36%	10.96%	10.96%	10.86%	11.06%	11.16%	12.86%



AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL CAPITAL STRUCTURES OF OTHER UTILITIES

Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
Actual Capital Structures
Schedule 7
Page 1 of 1

	% Common Equity w/out Short Term Debt					Quantity						Percentage			
	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	(\$000,000s) Total Debt	LT Debt	ST Debt	Pfd Stock	Equity	Total Capital	LT Debt	ST Debt	Pfd Stock	Equity Ratio With ST Debt
	AGL	49.7%	46.0%	48.1%	49.8%	49.8%	\$2,150.0	\$1,637.0	\$513.0	\$0.0	\$1,624.0	\$3,774.0	43.4%	13.6%	0.0%
ATMOS Energy Corp. Equitable Res.*	49.8%	56.8%	42.3%	43.0%	48.0%	\$2,234.0	\$2,119.7	\$114.3	\$0.0	\$1,956.6	\$4,190.6	50.6%	2.7%	0.0%	46.7%
Laclede Group	49.4%	48.3%	51.8%	50.4%	54.6%	\$368.0	\$309.2	\$58.8	\$0.5	\$372.5	\$741.0	41.7%	7.9%	0.1%	50.3%
Nicor, Inc.	60.3%	60.1%	62.5%	63.7%	69.0%	\$516.5	\$373.5	\$143.0	\$0.6	\$832.7	\$1,349.8	27.7%	10.6%	0.0%	61.7%
N. W. National Gas	50.3%	54.0%	53.0%	53.7%	53.7%	\$584.7	\$512.0	\$72.7	\$0.0	\$593.8	\$1,178.5	43.4%	6.2%	0.0%	50.4%
Piedmont National Gas	57.8%	56.4%	58.6%	51.7%	51.6%	\$903.2	\$824.7	\$78.5	\$0.0	\$879.2	\$1,782.4	46.3%	4.4%	0.0%	49.3%
South Jersey Inds.	49.0%	51.0%	55.1%	55.3%	57.3%	\$447.2	\$332.8	\$114.4	\$0.0	\$446.6	\$893.8	37.2%	12.8%	0.0%	50.0%
Southwest Gas	34.0%	35.8%	36.2%	39.4%	41.9%	\$1,306.8	\$1,268.7	\$38.1	\$0.0	\$914.9	\$2,221.7	57.1%	1.7%	0.0%	41.2%
WGL Holdings	54.3%	57.2%	58.6%	61.5%	60.3%	\$695.8	\$600.5	\$95.3	\$28.2	\$954.9	\$1,678.9	35.8%	5.7%	1.7%	56.9%
Average	50.5%	51.7%	51.8%	52.1%	54.0%	\$10,460	\$9,232	\$1,228	\$29	\$9,675	\$20,164	43.64%	6.56%	0.18%	49.62%
											Median	43.41%	5.92%	0.00%	49.65%

Source: Most current Value Line at time of prep.

*Value Line does not provide a common equity ratio for Equitable Res
The amount of equity is directly from Value Line "Shr. Equity (\$mill)"

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
AQUA AMERICA CAPITAL STRUCTURE**

**Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
Aqua America Capital Structure
Schedule 8
Page 1 of 1**

AQUA <i>In thousands of dollars</i>	30-Jun-08		31-Dec-07		31-Dec-06	
Long Term Borrowings*	\$1,219,425	52.53%	\$1,238,980	54.53%	\$982,815	48.57%
Short-term borrowings	\$79,725	3.43%	\$56,918	2.50%	\$119,150	5.89%
Equity	<u>\$1,022,114</u>	<u>44.03%</u>	<u>\$976,298</u>	<u>42.97%</u>	<u>\$921,630</u>	<u>45.54%</u>
Total Capital	\$2,321,264		\$2,272,196		\$2,023,595	

*Includes \$7,002 of current portion of long-term debt

Source: Aqua America, Inc. 10Q for 2008 and 2007
Aqua America, Inc. 10K for 2006

**AQUA UTILITIES FLORIDA, INC.
DIVIDEND GROWTH RATE COMPARISON**

**Docket No. 080121-WS
Exhibit No. ___(JAR-1)
Dividend Growth Rates
Schedule 9
Page 1 of 1**

DIFFERENT GROWTH RATES	Value	Growth			
Earnings Per Share	\$ 1.00	6%			
Dividends Per Share	\$ 0.60	3%			
Book Value Per Share	\$ 10.00	4%			
Stock Price	\$ 11.00	6%			
Growth at 6% per share	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Earnings Per Share	\$ 1.06	\$ 1.12	\$ 1.19	\$ 1.26	\$ 1.34
Dividends Per Share	\$ 0.62	\$ 0.64	\$ 0.66	\$ 0.68	\$ 0.70
Book Value Per Share	\$ 10.40	\$ 10.82	\$ 11.25	\$ 11.70	\$ 12.17
Stock Price	\$ 11.66	\$ 12.36	\$ 13.10	\$ 13.89	\$ 14.72
Dividend Yield	5.30%	5.15%	5.00%	4.86%	4.73%
Market to Book Ratio	1.12	1.14	1.16	1.19	1.21
Return on Book Equity	10.19%	10.39%	10.59%	10.79%	11.00%
P/E Ratio	11.00	11.00	11.00	11.00	11.00

Growth at ROE X Retention Rate	Value	Growth			
Earnings Per Share	\$ 1.00	4%			
Book Value Per Share	\$ 10.00	4%			
Stock Price	\$ 11.00	4%			
Dividends Per Share	\$ 0.60	4%			
Growth at 6% per share	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Earnings Per Share	\$ 1.04	\$ 1.08	\$ 1.12	\$ 1.17	\$ 1.22
Book Value Per Share	\$ 10.40	\$ 10.82	\$ 11.25	\$ 11.70	\$ 12.17
Stock Price	\$ 11.44	\$ 11.90	\$ 12.37	\$ 12.87	\$ 13.38
Dividends Per Share	\$ 0.62	\$ 0.65	\$ 0.67	\$ 0.70	\$ 0.73
Dividend Yield	5.45%	5.45%	5.45%	5.45%	5.45%
Market to Book Ratio	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10
Return on Book Equity	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%
P/E Ratio	11.00	11.00	11.00	11.00	11.00
Book Value Per Share Calculated	\$ 10.40	\$ 10.82	\$ 11.25	\$ 11.70	\$ 12.17
Growth Rate					

RESUME OF JAMES A. ROTHSCHILD

UTILITY REGULATION EXPERIENCE

- Filed expert testimony on rate of return, accounting and/or financial issues with regard to electric, telephone, gas, water, health care and insurance rate setting matters in the following jurisdictions:

Alabama	Kentucky	Oklahoma
Arizona	Maryland	Oregon
Connecticut	Maine	Pennsylvania
Delaware	Massachusetts	Rhode Island
FERC	Minnesota	South Carolina
Florida	New Jersey	Vermont
Georgia	New York	Washington, DC
Illinois	Nova Scotia	Washington

OTHER BUSINESS EXPERIENCE

- Economic Analyst - Evaluated profitability of expansion and new venture proposals and provided financial support material for contract negotiations.
- Process Engineer - Responsible for process design and invented process improvements, which included a device that reduced a major water pollution problem.

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY

February 1985-Present	Rothschild Financial Consulting
May 1979-January 1985	Georgetown Consulting Group, Inc.
August 1976-May 1979	J. Rothschild Associates
May 1972-August 1976	Touche Ross & Company
June 1967-May 1972	Olin Corporation

EDUCATION

- Case Western Reserve University, MBA, Banking & Finance, 1971
- University of Pittsburgh, BS, Chemical Engineering, 1967