1	BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION			
2	1 10111	DI TOBBIC BBRVICE COL	DOCKET NO. 080308-TP	
3	In the Matter of:		DOCKET NO. 080308-1P	
4	COMPLAINT AGAINST MCI COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, INC. D/B/A VERIZON BUSINESS SERVICES FOR FAILURE TO PAY INTRASTATE ACCESS CHARGES PURSUANT TO EMBARO'S			
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6	TARIFFS, BY EMBARQ	FLORIDA, INC.	<i>,</i>	
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12	PROCEEDINGS:	ACTURAL CONTERPRINCE	20000	
13		AGENDA CONFERENCE ITEM NO. 2		
14	BEFORE:			
15		CHAIRMAN MATTHEW M. CARTER, II COMMISSIONER LISA POLAK EDGAR COMMISSIONER KATRINA J. McMURRIAN		
16		COMMISSIONER NANCY ARGENZIANO COMMISSIONER NATHAN A. SKOP		
17		COMMISSIONER NATHAN	A. SROP	
18	DATE:	Tuesday, October 28,	2008	
19	PLACE:	Betty Easley Confere	once Center	
20	THACE.	Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way	since center	
21		Tallahassee, Florida	ι	
22	REPORTED BY:	JANE FAUROT, RPR		
23		Official FPSC Reporter (850) 413-6732		
24				
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	FLOR	IDA PUBLIC SERVICE C	DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE MMISSION 10507 NOV 128	

1	PARTICIPATING:
2	SUSAN S. MASTERTON, ESQUIRE, representing Embarq
3	Florida, Inc.
4	DE O'ROARK, ESQUIRE, and KIM CASWELL, ESQUIRE,,
5	representing Verizon Business Services.
6	CHARLES MURPHY, ESQUIRE, representing the Commission
7	Staff.
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## 1 PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN CARTER: We are now on Item 2.

Staff, you're recognized.

MR. MURPHY: Commissioners, Charles Murphy on behalf of the Commission staff. Docket Number 080308 is a complaint by Embarq against Verizon for failure to pay intrastate access charges in accordance with Embarq's tariffs. Verizon has filed a motion to dismiss this complaint, and has asked for oral argument on the issue, and staff recommends that the oral argument be granted.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Commissioners, why don't we grant the parties five minutes each for oral arguments, and we will proceed from there.

With that, you're recognized.

MR. O'ROARK: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners. I'm De O'Roark with Verizon. With me this morning is Kim Caswell, who will be giving the oral argument for Verizon.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: You have five minutes. You're recognized.

MS. CASWELL: Thank you.

As to the non-VoIP part of the staff's recommendation, Verizon agrees that if Embarq can make out a good faith claim that Verizon is not paying intrastate access charges on intrastate non-VoIP traffic, the Commission can hear

that claim. The Commission can and should, however, decline to hear the claim because Embarq brought the same claim to federal court a day after Verizon filed its motion to dismiss here.

However, if you decide to go forward on Embarq's non-VoIP claim, you should require Embarq to amend its complaint or file a new one that clearly states the non-VoIP claim and only the non-VoIP claim and the relief Embarq seeks for it. As it stands now, the complaint does not clearly state a non-VoIP claim that is separate from Embarq's VoIP claim.

As to the VoIP part of the recommendation, the more controversial part, the question is whether you have jurisdiction to decide what compensation should apply to certain VoIP traffic. Staff recommends deferring a decision until it has gathered more information, but it doesn't say what kind of information it thinks it needs. It suggests, though, that some of it may be factual. To the extent staff is asking to do fact discovery on Embarq's VoIP claim before the Commission has even decided whether it has jurisdiction over that claim, that would be impermissible.

Subject matter jurisdiction is a legal issue, not a factual one. The only fact you need to know is on the face of Embarq's complaint. It's a complaint about VoIP. Embarq has alleged that certain VoIP traffic is intrastate and is asking you to apply intrastate access to that VoIP traffic instead of the interstate access Verizon is now paying.

Subject matter jurisdiction can be granted only by state statute. So the question is whether any Florida law gives you jurisdiction over Embarg's VoIP claim. There is no such law. On the contrary, Florida Statutes explicitly exempt VoIP from Commission jurisdiction. Section 364.011, entitled Exemption from Commission Jurisdiction, lists VoIP as, "Exempt from oversight by the Commission," except as specifically authorized by federal law or another provision in Chapter 364. Chapter 364.013 states that VoIP, "Shall be free of state regulation." Section 364.01 says that VoIP is, "Not regulated by the Florida Public Service Commission." Section 364.02, Subsection 13 states that the term service in Chapter 364 does not include VoIP, "For purposes of regulation by this Commission."

These statutes mean just what they say. The Commission has no jurisdiction over VoIP, it cannot regulate VoIP, and it has no oversight over VoIP. Embarq is asking you to regulate VoIP by finding that it's an intrastate telecommunication service and deciding what intercarrier compensation applies to that service. You have no jurisdiction to do that.

The Commission reads the statutes the same way

Verizon does. In fact, the Commission has repeatedly

recognized that its lack of VoIP jurisdiction means that it

cannot even force companies to answer questions about their

VoIP activities, let alone exercise any regulatory oversight over those activities.

The only exception to the jurisdictional bar is in Section 364.013. That section states that the Commission cannot regulate VoIP, but it recognizes that the Commission may arbitrate and enforce interconnection agreements under Sections 251 and 252 of the Federal Telecom Act. But there is no interconnection agreement involved here, so the exception does not apply.

Embarq is instead asking you to apply state law in its state access tariff to VoIP, and that tariff doesn't mention VoIP at all. In fact, Embarq could not file a state tariff that mentions VoIP because Section 364.013 states that a LEC's duties with respect to VoIP are federal and only federal in nature.

It makes no sense for Embarq to claim that you can order Verizon to pay intrastate access on VoIP under a tariff that doesn't even mention VoIP when Embarq could not revise the same tariff to actually state that intrastate access charges apply to VoIP.

In short, you can't pretend, as Embarq asks you to, that VoIP traffic is no different from traditional telephone traffic when the Legislature has so emphatically stated that it is not. The Commission has all the information it needs to decide today that it has no jurisdiction over Embarq's VoIP

claim, but if staff or the Commission has questions about

Verizon's legal arguments, Verizon would be happy to provide

additional briefing on those arguments once they are

identified.

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The Commission could also decline to decide the jurisdiction issue altogether. The Commission has recognized that VoIP traffic is interstate in nature and that its regulation belongs with the FCC, not the states. The issue of VoIP compensation is pending before the FCC brought there by Embarq itself as well as many others. The FCC plans to issue an order on intercarrier compensation in less than two weeks.

In addition, Embarq has filed a federal lawsuit claiming as it has here that its state tariffs require payment of intrastate access charges on VoIP. There's no reason for the Commission to waste its resources deciding the same issues that Embarq has brought in multiple forums.

I know I don't have time to rebut --

CHAIRMAN CARTER: No, you are six minutes already.

MS. CASWELL: Okay.

**CHAIRMAN CARTER:** Next party.

MS. CASWELL: Thank you.

MS. MASTERTON: Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners. Susan Masterton on behalf of Embarq.

I would like to thank you for the opportunity to provides Embarq's position regarding Verizon's motion to

dismiss. And first, I would like to address an issue that Verizon raised about the federal complaint that Embarq has filed. It does not include a complaint based on Embarq's Florida tariff for the issues that relate to the VoIP complaint, and so we have not raised these issues in the federal suit.

The federal suit is not based on federal law. It is based on diversity jurisdiction of the federal court for various other states, and the suit is -- and the state tariffs for other state actions, and so it does not cover this Florida complaint. This complaint was filed prior to the federal suit, and because there was already a complaint before the Florida Commission it was not included in that complaint.

Verizon has said that the Commission -- that the Florida Statutes clearly provide that the Commission doesn't have jurisdiction over VoIP, and Embarq respectfully disagrees. First, in regards to subject matter jurisdiction, the class action that this complaint addresses is intrastate access charges. The statutes clearly give the Commission jurisdiction to resolve complaints related to the payment of intrastate access charges. It's set forth in the statute when it exempts intrastate interchange companies from Commission jurisdiction. The statute explicitly continues to require the payment of intrastate access charges, and this Commission has exercised its jurisdiction over intrastate access charges in many prior

cases.

Now, Verizon has raised more in the nature of an affirmative defense that this traffic is VoIP and that's why they haven't paid the intrastate access charges that Verizon has assessed. Embarq thinks the Commission clearly has jurisdiction over that, and the statutes say that. And when they exempt VoIP from the definition of services, it explicitly says nothing herein shall affect the rights and obligations of any entity related to the payment of switched network access rates.

Verizon conveniently ignores that. But clearly, if you read all of the statutes together, the Commission has jurisdiction over disputes related to the payment of intrastate access charges, and they have jurisdiction over VoIP when it relates to the payment of intrastate access charges. So as far as subject matter jurisdiction, I think the Florida law makes it clear that the Commission has jurisdiction in this case.

Embarq believes that the Commission clearly has jurisdiction, but as the staff has said in their recommendation, it is not necessary for the Commission to resolve that issue at this time. We have argued that Verizon has failed to pay our access charges, and whether Verizon's traffic is VoIP, how much of the traffic is VoIP, and whether Verizon has erroneously characterized any non-VoIP intrastate traffic as VoIP are all factual issues that need to be

addressed as the evidence is developed in the case.

As the staff noted in their recommendation, factual issues and affirmative defenses cannot be considered when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Verizon also asks in the alternative that the complaint be delayed pending an anticipated FCC ruling. And I want to make it clear that the FCC has not, to date, usurped or preempted the Commission's jurisdiction to address VoIP. So far they have not ruled on what type of intercarrier compensation is due for VoIP, they have not said that it's interstate in nature, they have not said that intrastate access charges are not due on VoIP traffic.

In addition, they have not preempted the Commission's jurisdiction to decide those issues. So there is nothing in the federal law today that says that the Commission cannot rule on Embarq's complaint. Now, we all know that there is a possible pending decision from the FCC that may address this issue coming up, but there is no guarantee that it will and no one knows in what way it will address that. So there is no reason that the Commission needs to delay or dismiss the complaint at this time based on some possibility of FCC action.

It's very early in the process, and the parties and the Commission will have ample opportunity to address the effect of any FCC rulings on the issues raised in Embarq's complaint as the case proceeds forward through the normal

process. So, therefore, Embarq respectfully requests that you approve the staff recommendation, and that you deny Verizon's motion to dismiss or to delay the proceeding on Embarq's complaint. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you. Now we'll have staff to introduce the issue. We have heard from the parties and their oral argument.

Staff, you're recognized.

MR. MURPHY: Staff recommends that the Commission deny Verizon's motion to dismiss because Embarq's complaint states a cause of action that is within the Commission's jurisdiction and for which relief may be granted. The Commission does not have to reach a decision on its jurisdiction with respect to access charges related to VoIP at this time.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Commissioner Skop, you're recognized.

a quick question with respect to the, I guess, staff recommendation. And, again, I don't want to get into the merits, because I tend to agree with staff. But on Page 8 it discusses at the bottom of Page 8 that staff believes the Commission has jurisdiction to address the access charge dispute with Verizon over non-VoIP traffic pursuant to the statutory references, and then at the middle paragraph of Page

9 it recommends that the question of subject matter 1 jurisdiction be dealt with at a future time. 2 Would it be correct to say that we do have 3 jurisdiction on the non-VoIP, but that determination of the 4 subject matter jurisdiction for VoIP services could be 5 6 determined? Because I'm a little confused, and when you are 7 dealing with something --8 MR. MURPHY: I believe that that's correct, and I 9 believe that Verizon and Embarg would concur with that. 10 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. So it would be correct to say, then, on the sentence in Page 9, staff recommends that the 11 12 question of subject matter jurisdiction with respect to VoIP 13 services be dealt with at a future time? 14 MR. MURPHY: Yes, I don't believe that Verizon would 15 concur with that, but I think they would agree that we have it 16 over the non-VoIP and that the issue would be over the VoIP. 17 Thank you. COMMISSIONER SKOP: 18 CHAIRMAN CARTER: Thank you. Commissioners? 19 Commissioner McMurrian. 20 COMMISSIONER MCMURRIAN: This is for the staff. guess what I keep struggling with, and we talked about this a 21 22 good bit yesterday, is if a party brings a motion to dismiss 23 based on jurisdiction, shouldn't the Commission answer the

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

MR. MURPHY: Well, the motion to dismiss included --

jurisdictional question before we decide a motion to dismiss?

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the complaint included things that would not survive a motion to dismiss, so that was where the focus was. Staff hasn't caucused on this, but I believe the staff has jurisdiction or the Commission has jurisdiction over the VoIP access charges based on the language, the clear language in the statute that access must be charged, that it is a tariffed thing, that there is a dispute with respect to whether it's even VoIP traffic. It's not delivered to Embarq as VoIP traffic. But we thought that it would be better to brief that and to have that be an issue in whatever, however it's addressed going forward.

**COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN:** I guess if I can follow up on that, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: You're recognized.

COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: What would be the process for determining that? If we were to approve staff's recommendation today, what would be the process in determining jurisdiction? Would we be determining jurisdiction before we get into the factual aspects of the case, or would we be doing that concurrent with a hearing on the factual dispute?

MR. MURPHY: Well, I'm not even sure that staff believes that you would start with a hearing. You might go forward with a proposed agency action and try to work with the parties. But I think you would need to establish whether or not all of the traffic at issue is, in fact, VoIP. That would be an issue that appears to be in dispute.

1 Just saying that it's VoIP -- I mean, I don't know 2. how Embarq gets a remedy if someone just alleges that 3 everything is VoIP and you can't touch it. But once you have 4 an idea that there is, in fact, VoIP traffic involved, then I 5 think you would address the merits of the arguments and you 6 would have the parties brief it, or present some sort of 7 evidence on it, or legal argument. 8 **COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN:** I quess I do have one more. 9 CHAIRMAN CARTER: One itty-bitty one. 10 COMMISSIONER McMURRIAN: Right. Sorry, 11 Commissioners. 12 Since you mentioned about trying to determine whether 13 it is VoIP or non-VoIP, and I think you're saying that you need 14 to do discovery in order to determine that, what do you say to 15 Ms. Caswell's argument that you shouldn't even be doing 16 discovery if you don't have jurisdiction over VoIP? 17

MR. MURPHY: I would say it assumes a fact that's not in evidence.

MS. CASWELL: May I respond briefly?

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Briefly.

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MS. CASWELL: Okay. We have to remember there are two claims here and one is a non-VoIP claim, and we don't disagree that you have jurisdiction over non-VoIP services. So to the extent we want to go forward with that, aside from the fact that it's already in the federal complaint, we agree with

that. So jurisdiction will be decided before we go forward on
that.

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On the VoIP claim, we would vigorously oppose any kind of discovery or factual investigation before we go forward because it is, in fact, correct that we need to decide jurisdiction before we go forward on a claim.

So two separate issues. And I think what Charles is getting at is -- will be the investigation that goes to the first part of the issue whether traffic -- how much of the traffic is VoIP and how much of the traffic is non-VoIP.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: You're recognized.

MS. MASTERTON: Yes. I was just going to basically say, yes, the issue is that we are saying they owe us intrastate access charges. They are saying they don't owe it to us because it's VoIP. So I think that is a defense and a factual fact that is so far only asserted by Verizon, but has not been proven. And Embarq is disputing that it is, or that it is the type that isn't subject to access changes and asking -- and how much of it, if all of those have to be decided. And ultimately, I guess, the Commission might decide for the VoIP, any that is actually identified as VoIP we don't have jurisdiction. But I don't think you can do that on the front end because there is really no evidence other than Verizon's assertion that it is VoIP.

CHAIRMAN CARTER: Okay. Commissioner Edgar.

1	COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you. And Commissioner
2	McMurrian's questions went to some of this, but let me just ask
3	it again so I can maybe hear the answer again.
4	If the motion to dismiss is not granted today, which
5	I tend towards that at this moment anyway. If it is not
6	granted, then how will the issue of subject matter jurisdiction
7	come back before us?
8	MR. MURPHY: If it's a proposed agency action, it
9	would come before you as a recommendation that you would vote
10	on whether or not you had jurisdiction. If it goes to hearing
11	it would be briefed by the parties. We will be working if
12	we're going the proposed agency action route, we would be
13	working with the parties, and I assume that we would have them
14	brief it or whatever form they would like to provide their
15	legal analysis of it.
16	COMMISSIONER EDGAR: And then those proposed issues
17	would come before the prehearing officer, if, indeed, we went
18	to hearing.
19	MR. MURPHY: Yes, prehearing officer or yes, if
20	you went that route.
21	COMMISSIONER EDGAR: If we went that route. Thank
22	you.
23	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Commissioner Skop.
24	COMMISSIONER SKOP: Thank you, Mr. Chair.
25	I have a quick question again. I'm still trying to

struggle with, I guess, it may be the semantics of how things are presented and things that are being said, but I thought that I heard staff say in response that some elements of the Embarq claim would not survive a motion to dismiss.

Am I correct in what I thought I heard there?

MR. MURPHY: I may have said it backwards. That

there are things about the Embarq claim that Verizon could not prevail in a motion to dismiss. There is --

commissioner skop: That clarifies things. Because, again, to me, certainly the Commission has jurisdiction under the non-VoIP traffic, and in terms of the VoIP traffic that is still up in the air. But, I guess I have a question with respect to the subject matter jurisdiction on the VoIP services.

Now, I know that that is under the federal body of law for VoIP, but with respect to intercarrier compensation, I have a question in relation to Florida Statute 364.0213 where it provides, I guess pursuant to this staff recommendation on Page 7, in pertinent part, that nothing herein shall affect the rights and obligations of any entity related to the payment of switched network access rates or other intercarrier compensation, if any, related to Voice-over-Internet-Protocol services.

So would it be correct in staff's view that if we are dealing with intercarrier compensation on interstate VoIP

1 services that we, in fact, pursuant to that statute may, in 2 fact, have subject matter jurisdiction? 3 MR. MURPHY: You are saying on interstate? COMMISSIONER SKOP: 4 Yes. 5 MR. MURPHY: The focus of this had been that this 6 traffic is intrastate. 7 COMMISSIONER SKOP: Intrastate, that's what I'm 8 trying to --9 MR. MURPHY: I think that you would, but I think that 10 there could be more discussion on that clearly. There could be 11 more review of that. But it would appear that, yes, that this 12 is service for which a VoIP provider owes access charges. 13 Access charges are tariffed. Now, what we have heard this 14 morning is that there is nothing in the tariff to address VoIP. 15 That's a wrinkle that had not been on our radar screen. So I 16 don't know. It would take some more review. 17 **COMMISSIONER SKOP:** Okay. So I guess breaking this 18 down in simple terms with respect to the alleged complaint with 19 non-VoIP traffic we do have subject matter jurisdiction? Yes, sir. 20 MR. MURPHY: COMMISSIONER SKOP: Okay. And with respect to the 21 22 VoIP services, and intercarrier compensation on interstate 23 point-to-point termination of that traffic intrastate, we may 24 or may not, pending further discussion, actually have subject 25 matter jurisdiction.

1	MR. MURPHY: Yes, sir.
2	COMMISSIONER SKOP: Thank you.
3	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Anything further? The chair is now
4	open for a recommendation.
5	Commissioner Skop, you're recognized.
6	COMMISSIONER SKOP: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess
7	based on the discussion, unless there is any further comments,
8	I guess I would respectfully move to accept the staff
9	recommendation on Issues 1, 2, and 3.
10	COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Second.
11	CHAIRMAN CARTER: Moved and properly seconded.
12	Commissioners, any further debate? Hearing none, all
13	those in favor let be it known by the sign of aye.
14	(Simultaneous aye.)
15	CHAIRMAN CARTER: All those opposed, like sign? Show
16	it done. Thank you, staff.
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1	STATE OF FLORIDA )
2	: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
3	COUNTY OF LEON )
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5	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Hearing Reporter Services Section, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk, do hereby certify
6	that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.
7	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically
8	reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said
9	proceedings.
10	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative
11	or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in
12	the action.
13	DATED THIS 10th day of November, 2008.
14	Ca Sont
15	JANE FAUROT, RPR
16	Official FPSC Hearings Reporter (850) 413-6732
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