DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

1	TI OD TO	BEFORE THE
2	FLORIDA	A PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
3	In the Matter o	
4		Docket No. 100459-EI
5	PETITION FOR AU IMPLEMENT A DEN	MONSTRATION
6	TIME-OF-USE ANI	TING OF PROPOSED DINTERRUPTIBLE
7	FUEL RATES IN 7	
8	AND REQUEST FOR	EXPERIMENTAL BASIS R EXPEDITED TREATMENT, LIC UTILITIES COMPANY.
9		CONTRICTES COMPANY.
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15	PROCEEDINGS:	COMMISSION CONFERENCE AGENDA ITEM NO. 9
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17	COMMISSIONERS	CHAIRMAN ART GRAHAM
18	114110111111111111111111111111111111111	COMMISSIONER LISA POLAK EDGAR COMMISSIONER RONALD A. BRISÉ
19		COMMISSIONER EDUARDO E. BALBIS COMMISSIONER JULIE I. BROWN
20	DATE:	
21	DATE.	Tuesday, June 14, 2011
22	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center Room 148
23		4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida
24	REPORTED BY:	JANE FAUROT, RPR
25		Official FPSC Reporter (850) 413-6732

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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## PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Item Number 9.

MS. BENNETT: Good morning, Chairman and Commissioners.

Item 9 involves a tariff which you had approved previously this year. It was an experimental tariff for interruptible rates and time-of-use rates that FPUC, Florida Public Utilities, requested. The City of Marianna appeared at that proceeding and objected. This was a proposed agency action, and the City of Marianna has protested the proceeding on a timely basis.

The City of Marianna filed its petition,

Florida Public Utilities requested that that petition

be dismissed on several grounds. They also asked the

city of -- I mean, FPUC asked for oral argument on its

motion to dismiss.

Issue 1 is staff's recommendation on the request for oral argument. Staff recommends that you grant the parties five minutes per side oral argument. Issue 2 is the staff's recommendation on the motion to dismiss. Staff recommends that you deny the motion to dismiss.

I am available for discussion. It would be my recommendation that if you grant oral argument, FPUC

argue first and then the City of Marianna.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Mr. Wright, is this what you want to talk about?

MR. WRIGHT: No, sir. Actually I had thought that Item 10 was going to have discussion. But as I said earlier, we oppose the PAA amendment, and we will protest it. Other things equal, I would have advocated that you just set it for hearing on your own motion later this year without issuing a proposed agency action order. But, no, sir, I said what I needed to say, and I appreciate your indulgence on that.

I do want to speak on this, as well, of course, and very briefly on Item 11. But, no, it was Item 10 that I came up about before.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Okay.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Florida -- yes, ma'am.

MS. KEATING: Is the Commission granting oral argument? Would you like me to proceed? We would definitely like five minutes of oral argument if that is the Commission's pleasure.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Can you get it done in five minutes?

MS. KEATING: I can definitely do that in five minutes, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Can I get a motion?

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: I approve staff's recommendation on Issue 1, if you approve, and would ask five minutes per side.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: It has been moved and seconded. All in favor say aye.

(Vote taken.)

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Any opposed?

You're up.

MS. KEATING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners. I'm Beth Keating with the Gunster Law Firm here today on behalf of FPUC. Thank you for this opportunity to address you on our motion to dismiss, and I will definitely be mindful of the allotted time.

Commissioners, first, let me start by saying the company fully recognizes that the standard for a motion to dismiss is high, but in this instance we believe that it has been met. And at the outset let me be clear that if this proceeding moves to hearing, the company will definitely oppose the city's factual allegations. However, here we believe that their protest is simple legally insufficient and should be dismissed.

Really, Commissioners, our position as to why the protest should be dismissed comes down to a couple

of pretty simple arguments. In a nutshell, the company submits that the cost-based fair, just, and reasonable standard upon which the City relies does not apply to experimental and transitional rates that are filed pursuant to Section 366.075. Instead, the cost-based fair, just, and reasonable standard is found in the provisions of Chapter 366 that apply to your general rate-setting function.

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Now, clearly, when you are in the role of setting base rates for a utility's general body of ratepayers, that fair, just, and reasonable standard applies. However, Section 366.075, which applies to the time-of-use and interruptible service rates before you, does not include that same fair, just, and reasonable language.

Now, we believe that that is because the legislature intended this provision to serve a very, very different purpose, that being to provide the Commission with the flexibility to encourage utilities to come up with creative ideas and projects to encourage conservation and efficiency in furtherance of the conservation goals that are set forth in Chapter 366.

Other differences in the terminology used in the more traditional rate-setting provisions, as

compared to that experimental rate provision, highlight the legislature's intent. And, again, we think there are really some very definite reasons for the differences in that terminology. We believe these differences were by design. Because unlike the general ratemaking proceedings, Section 366.075 was implemented to provide the Commission with an avenue to approve experimental projects in a proceeding outside the context of your general ratemaking proceeding. And this interpretation of the statute is entirely consistent with other provisions in Chapter 366; namely, FEECA, which specifically encourages experimental rates, rate structures and programs designed to encourage energy efficiency and conservation.

Now, from a practical perspective, I have a little bit of a hard time figuring out how we would really go to hearing on some of the factual allegations that the City has put forth. For instance, the City alleges that these rates don't send appropriate pricing signals to consumers. But surely any testimony filed by either side before these rates have been in effect for some reasonable period of time would be entirely speculative and unreliable. I think this really just goes to show that the legislature intended that

experimental rates would be in effect for some period of time so that they could be tested.

Now, the City has also failed to identify an injury in fact which is of sufficient immediacy to set this matter for hearing. The gist of the City's argument is that it is eligible for cost-based fair, just, and reasonable time-of-use and interruptible service rates that it doesn't have access to. If you follow that argument to its logical conclusion, if the company were to just pull the time of use and interruptible service rates, the City would still be harmed because it would be eligible for rates that no longer exist. This argument simply makes no sense.

And it's even more untenable given the fact that the company was under no statutory obligation to file these rates in the first place.

Furthermore, the mere allegation that the rates are not cost-based, fair, just, and reasonable is not a statutory defined harm that 366.075 was designed to address. And taking that mere allegation, even taking it as true, which you have to do, it fails to identify any level of immediacy in the harm that the City will incur. Particularly given the fact that the City has access to other rates that this Commission has already determined are, in fact, fair, just, and

reasonable. The City does not have to take service under these experimental rates.

Our sense, frankly, Commissioners, is that the only immediate injury that the City contemplates it might incur arises in the context of proceedings not here but before the Circuit Court in Jackson County.

In that regard, Commissioners, we just ask that you not allow the city to misuse this limited regulatory proceeding to bootstrap its position in the civil court.

Thank you, Commissioners. We appreciate your time, and we'd be happy to answer any questions.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Thank you.

Mr. Wright, you have got 7-1/2 minutes.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let's see if I can keep it under that. I believe that I can.

In the first instance, Mr. Chairman and Commissioners, naturally we support the staff's recommendation, the recommendations on both Issue 2 and Issue 3. We think that the law is very clear as it applies to the standards for motions to dismiss, and we have -- in our opinion, we have quite clearly met those, that those facts were summarized very succinctly by the staff in their recommendation that we are a customer. You have issued an order, we have timely

protested or filed a petition for a formal proceeding regarding those. We're a customer, we're eligible to take service on five out of the six tariff schedules that are in effect. The only exception being the residential time-of-use rate. We are eligible for all four of the general service time-of-use rates, and we are eligible for service under the interruptible rate.

The rates -- our assertion as a factual matter that the rates are not cost-based and that they do not take -- that they do not send appropriate price signals are appropriate factual assertions, and I will go back to that in a minute. These facts, as recognized by your staff's analysis, demonstrate that we have standing. We are a customer, we are eligible for the rates, and that we have alleged an injury of sufficient immediacy to warrant a hearing pursuant to the Agrico test.

The tariff sheets are in effect and we are eligible for those. We assert that they are not cost-based and that they don't send appropriate price signals, and accordingly we have standing, we have asked you for relief that you have the statutory authority to grant. Either deny the rates as proposed by FPUC or modify them after you have a factual hearing. So I think that really covers the

straightforward analysis of the motion to dismiss standard.

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Now, to respond to a few things that Ms. Keating said. One, 366.075 does permit experimental rates. It specifically provides that they may be limited in geographic area and for time. It says they may be approved to promote energy conservation or energy efficiency. It does not exempt them from the other statutory criteria that rates must be fair, just, and reasonable. And in particular, with respect to these rates, I think that the suggestion that they are somehow exempt from a factual challenge as to whether they send appropriate price signals, you know, is completely misplaced. If you are going to have a tariff that putatively promotes energy conservation and energy efficiency, almost by definition it has to send appropriate price signals to encourage the behavior that is under consideration, conservation of energy, modification of usage patterns, being interruptible.

Our assertion is that as a matter of fact these rates do not do this. This is a fact that is squarely within the ambit of 366.075. Moreover, there is no exception for rate proposals under 366.075 that they don't have to be cost-based or don't have to otherwise be fair, just, and reasonable. To try to

freight that out of the analysis of an experimental rate, I think deprives you of the job that you are supposed to be doing.

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Regarding the suggestion that they were to pull the rates, that would be fine. If they pulled the rates and decided not to offer them, we would be left with the opportunity to come in and file for time-of-use rates just as any customer may petition the Commission to approve time-of-use rates, but what we have here is not that scenario. What we have here is a scenario where the company has filed proposed time-of-use and interruptible rates that we assert are not cost-based and not appropriately reflective of the value that usage modification or interruptibility would provide.

I said some things about this in February that I would stand by. We don't need to try the case today. These are factual matters to be discussed later. But regarding the assertion that we are somehow involved in this for the purpose of furthering our interest in the court case, that's simply not true. We believe we have a very good case in court, that case in the Circuit Court in Jackson County. That case is where it is. It is in its proper venue, and we will see how it comes out.

If, though, it doesn't come out the way we believe it will, the way we hope it will, we will still be faced with trying to mitigate what we are paying under the highest rates in the state of Florida by hopefully taking advantage of time-of-use and interruptible rate. And we are entitled here before the Florida Public Service Commission to try the factual issues relative to these rates.

That is really all I have to say, and I appreciate your time. Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Okay. Back to the board. We are on Issue Number 2.

Commissioner Edgar.

commissioner edgar: To our staff, recognizing that the tariff that was the subject of this is a pilot project, if this were to go to hearing, how would the Commission be able to determine price signals prospectively?

MS. BENNETT: I think I could guess on ways that the City of Marianna might present it. I would imagine that they would look to an expert witness to testify, to bring testimony on similar experimental projects from jurisdictions, or they might argue policy, what is a time-of-use and is there some policy behind time-of-use and interruptible service rates that

their expert might testify to. But it would be nothing in our experience for this case because it is experimental, and FPUC is correct on that.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: And to the City?

MR. WRIGHT: In the first instance -- Mr. Chairman, thank you. In the first instance,

Commissioner, it is the company's burden to prove that these rates are appropriate under whatever statutory criteria are to be applied. We think that an appropriate examination of the rates themselves as compared to the costs that the company incurs to provide the service is an appropriate analysis. There may be more. We don't believe that the rates accurately reflect either the cost to serve or the value of interruptibility to the company and its general body of customers, and those at a minimum are issues that we would address.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: I'd like to hear from the Company, too, especially on the point of cost of service.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Ms. Keating.

MS. KEATING: Thank you, Commissioner.

First off, certainly we have to support the rates that we filed under the statute that's pertinent to them, which is that they are experimental

transitional rates. So from our perspective, they
truly have to be in effect for some period of time for
us to be able to have the information to come back to
you to support whether in fact they do fulfill the
Legislature's intent, which is to encourage efficiency
when customers use power and to fulfill the general
goal of efficiency and conservation at FEECA.

So when it comes to providing testimony, another point that Staff raised with regard to putting on an expert witness about experience in other jurisdictions, it comes back to experiential testimony is really not going to get you anywhere in this situation because every jurisdiction is different, every rate filing is different, and in this instance in particular you've got a very different company before you by virtue of the fact that this company does not have generation. So cost of service though, to your point, Commissioner, would be this company's cost of service under its PPA with Gulf Power.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: I'd like to go back to Staff, if I may.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Sure. You've got the floor.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Ms. Bennett.

MS. BENNETT: I'm sorry. I was --

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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COMMISSIONER EDGAR: That's okay.

MS. BENNETT: Was there another question?

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: There wasn't. I just wasn't sure if you had anything else you wanted to share with me. And if not, then I will move to another question.

MS. BENNETT: One of the things that Ms. Brubaker -- Crawford was reminding me is that if you were not -- I mean, if you were to dismiss this and to concur with FPUC's argument, no experimental rate would ever be subject to hearing. It would always be at the conclusion of the experimental time period before you would evaluate those rates.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: If indeed they were approved to begin with.

MS. BENNETT: Correct.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: I feel like what I'm -and to our legal Staff, that we are hearing from FPUC that the standard to grant the motion to dismiss has been met, and that I'm hearing, to simplify, Mr. Wright, from the City is that, that we really don't have any discretion on this, so -- as to the motion to dismiss.

So my question to you is with the information that we have before us, from a legal standpoint does

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the Commission have discretion on this?

MS. BENNETT: Only if you make a determination that the petition was legally insufficient. Ms. Keating made a, a statement at the beginning of her argument that it's a very high standard.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Yes.

MS. BENNETT: And so you must make a determination that the petition filed by Marianna is legally insufficient to state a cause of action. And the statutes require, require us to allow them one bite at the apple. If we were to make that determination, they would be able to refile a petition and try again.

commissioner edgar: Ms. Keating, can you summarize for my benefit the, your argument as to why the standard, the high standard for a motion to dismiss is met in this instance?

MS. KEATING: Absolutely, Commissioners.

What it comes down to is that we think the City is applying the incorrect standard of review to these rates and they haven't even addressed the standard that is in fact applicable to these rates, which is that they are experimental transitional rates and that they are submitted in order to encourage conservation and efficiency. The City hasn't even discussed whether

these rates would encourage efficiency. The closest they've come is to say that these don't send appropriate price signals. They haven't elaborated any further on that point.

I submit that we have met the standard for a motion to dismiss because they have absolutely failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 366.075. And by the same token, they've failed to identify any injury that arises as a result of these experimental rates that they are not obligated to take service under.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. I believe that we have identified the injury. The injury is that the tariffs are in effect, it is immediate, and we are entitled to have whatever tariffs are in effect, if we are eligible for them, to be fair, just, and reasonable.

We assert that, that an appropriate standard even for experimental rates is that they be cost-based and value-based, or at least at a minimum that the Commission consider those criteria. You know, the company's argument seems to be let's put them into effect and see what customers do.

I'll tell you one of the better moments I had

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

in my career was about 20 years ago when another utility company was trying to promote exactly the same thing. They proposed we have these rates we want to propose and they're experimental, and a Commissioner said, "Well, what are they testing?" "Well, we just want to see what customers will do." And the response from the Commissioner was, "Not on the best day you ever had is this an experimental rate." You know, just put them into effect and see what they do is not an experiment.

We have asserted factually that these, that these do not send appropriate price signals. I think that states a cause of action -- I'm sure that states a cause of action in and of itself even if you were to accept, which we don't and we think is erroneous, the company's assertion that the sole criterion for approval of this rate, these rates is whether they would encourage efficiency and encourage conservation. Again, there is no exclusion in 366.075 from the other statutory criteria as to rates.

commissioner edgar: Why would the statute encourage pilot project -- why would the statute encourage pilot project demonstration, finite time period, time of use rates if indeed one of the purposes was to not see how they worked?

MR. WRIGHT: I think they would do it to see how they worked, but that's not the sole criterion. I think the -- I think -- we believe the appropriate analysis is on the front end, ab initio, look at the proposed rates and see whether they bear an appropriate relationship to the cost and value of conserving, modifying usage, or promoting efficiency if it were an efficiency type proposal. That is a completely appropriate front-end analysis of any proposed experimental rate. These are just let's put them into effect and see what they do.

We assert that the rates as proposed are not cost-based and don't reflect the value. If you're going to have an experiment, you ought to at least analyze whether there is a legitimate cost basis and an appropriate value basis for the proposal before you test it to see what it will do.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Ms. Keating, and then I'm done, Mr. Chairman.

MS. KEATING: Well, I think pretty obviously we would dispute the City's contention that we've just offered these rates to put them into effect and see what they do. The company has provided a substantial amount of data to support the intent behind these rates, what they are designed to do, even the cost that

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they're based upon. So I submit, Commissioners, that the City's contentions simply are a red herring, if I might say, and don't rise to a level of maintaining their protest.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Commissioners, I'm, I am struggling a little bit with seeing the injury in this instance, but I look forward to any other questions or discussion. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Commissioner Balbis.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

A question for Staff. I remember in February when we approved these time of use rates, that at the time the agreement with FPUC and Gulf Power was not executed. The revision to it with the elimination of the ratcheting provision, which I believe we just approved in Item 10, and a lot of the decision that was based at that time was, was looking at the changes which again we approved in Item 10. Did Staff review in that, you know, from an administrative standpoint, not to bring up Item 10, but did the agreement that was approved in Item 10, was that consistent with what was expected at the time we approved the time of use rates?

MS. BENNETT: Yes, it was.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. And then again with -- you know, fortunately with the detailed review

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of when we went through that item in February, you know, again, I agree with Commissioner Edgar on I'm struggling to find an injury when it is a, an optional If they are not appropriate and cost-based, program. you know -- I recall that the time of use rates that we did approve, and any of the legal Staff can stop me if I'm not supposed to talk about what happened in February, but that, you know, it was a struggle with the agreement with Gulf Power to develop those, but they were, you know, it was a very thought-out approach to develop them on an experimental basis. And the fact that it is optional, again, I'm struggling to find the injury here on that, although recognizing that the standards are very high. I just, I'm failing to see That's the only comment I have.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Was that a motion?

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: No.

(Laughter.)

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: My lights, none of them are on.

Commissioner Brisé.

COMMISSIONER BRISÉ: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

And I -- in listening to the other

Commissioners and seeing that they reflect some of the same thoughts that I'm, and struggles that I'm having

at this point, I'm going to read a portion of the statute here.

366.075, "The Commission is authorized,"
Section 2, "The Commission is authorized to approve the geographic area used in testing experimental rates, and shall specify in the order setting those rates the area affected. The Commission may extend the period designated for the test if it determines that further testing is necessary to fully evaluate the effectiveness of the experimental rates."

Considering that we looked at this issue in February and we are now in the beginning of June, and, and it's not required for everyone to be on it, I think that it's only fair to allow it to run its course at least initially. So I, I think I'm at -- if I understand my other Commissioners' perspective, I think we are getting to the same place that there probably isn't enough injury or injury at this juncture to -- I think I'll leave it at that for now.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: So you're saying you're moving to dismiss the City's petition?

COMMISSIONER BRISÉ: Yes. I think that that is the direction that I'm moving to.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: That's been moved and second.

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Commissioner Brown.

MR. BROWN: I was just going to clarify, we are rejecting Staff's recommendation and, and moving -and dismissing the, the petition for formal hearing, and I just wanted that clear for the record.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Commissioner Edgar.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you. A question to Staff on that. If the motion as I understand it were to prevail, then my understanding is that we would be granting the motion to dismiss on the basis of a lack of standing, on the basis of a lack of sufficient injury to meet that criteria for standing. And I guess what I'm -- that is my understanding of the motion, so let me turn this way first, Ms. Bennett.

Commissioner, not to try to, to manipulate or change or -- but that is my understanding of what I heard you express, and so I guess I would just like to confirm if I'm understanding correctly.

COMMISSIONER BRISÉ: Well, I'm not the maker of the motion, so I'll allow the maker of the motion to

COMMISSIONER BROWN: Technically I just clarified, but, but that, that is the intent, yes.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Okay. Ms. Bennett, I think that does it. Do you concur?

1 MS. BENNETT: I do. I would note that that 2 would be without prejudice; is that correct? COMMISSIONER EDGAR: That would be my 3 4 preference, if indeed the majority concurs. COMMISSIONER BROWN: Certainly. COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Then thank you for that 7 clarification, and with that I would support the motion. CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Ms. Bennett, did you get 9 that motion? 10 11 MS. BENNETT: I did. 12 CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: It's been moved and 13 seconded. 14 Commissioner Balbis. 15 COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Thank you. I have a question for Staff. What would be 16 17 the next point where we would evaluate the effectiveness of these experimental rates and --18 19 MS. BENNETT: There is a possibility that you 20 will see a new petition filed by the City. If you don't, it would be -- the rates are in effect for four 21 22 years, I believe. Is that correct, Elizabeth? Four 23 years. And at the conclusion of those four years you 24 would see an evaluation from Staff on those rates. And 25 also, and also they are filing annual reports, so we

1 would see one at the end of the first year.

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COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. No further questions.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: All in favor, say aye.

(Affirmative vote.)

Any opposed? By your action, you approve the dismissal of the petition, petition on Issue Number 2.

MR. KISER: Mr. Chairman. Curt.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Oh.

MR. KISER: I just want to provide a little anecdotal information and I didn't want it to weigh in on what the Commission was going to do.

I was very, very much involved in the early '70s when the first energy crisis hit in '73, '74 with time of day pricing. I was in my first couple of years of the Legislature, and I pushed very, very hard for that issue to come about, hoping it would help address some of the energy issues and also to help some folks with the rising utility bills.

And a year or so after I began pushing real hard on that, at that time Florida Power instituted a pilot project in my community, close to my community in Dunedin where they put a number of customers on time of day rates. I think that may have been the first time that was ever used in Florida. And it went on for, I

think, some 12 months or 18 months. And unfortunately what happened was that the high utility bills, gas prices, all of those things that were associated with that first energy crisis, those things kind of started to go away, so some of the impetus for using more time of day prices started to go out the window.

Secondarily, the, most of the IOUs in the state at that time were not really in favor of time of day pricing. They preferred controlling the use of energy by them, by controlling, you know, basically rolling blackouts, interruptible service, things like that. They preferred that and didn't like the time of day use because what some of the early experiments and to some extent what the City of Dunedin experiment was about, it showed that when things did get real hot or real cold, you know, people went ahead and turned up the thermostat or turned it down, whatever the case may be, and they claimed that wasn't as reliable as letting them have that authority.

So as a result, it wasn't really until about 1980 when this statute was passed, and again I was still in the Legislature and still very much supportive of time of day rates, and that's kind of how that whole issue started to bubble up. And, and the companies have continued to use, you know, their, their

management issues to help control the flow of energy and hoping to hold down on the use of peaking units at various times.

But time of day use, it's, like I say, it's been around since -- quite some time now. That's about 35 years ago that all that happened. And in my opinion, frankly, there hasn't been enough experimentation on it to try to see whether or not it would be helpful.

And secondarily, the other problem is it just didn't get enough publicity. Most people just didn't realize and weren't enough energy conscious. But it just seems like once those gasoline prices and utility prices start to go up, then people seem to get more interested. But then once the pressure drops, some of that interest likewise goes out the window. And I just wanted to add that as some additional information for y'all to tuck away.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Thank you, Mr. Kiser.

Issue Number 3, I guess someone has got to make the recommendation to close the docket.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: So moved.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: It's been moved and seconded to close the docket. Any further discussion? Seeing none, all in favor, say aye.

1	(Affirmative vote.)
2	Any opposed? By your action, you have, you have
3	approved to close the docket.
4	(Agenda item concluded.)
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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1	STATE OF FLORIDA ) : CERTIFICATE OF REPORTERS		
2	COUNTY OF LEON )		
3			
4	WE, JANE FAUROT, RPR, and LINDA BOLES, CRR, RPR, Official Commission Reporters, do hereby certify		
5	that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.		
6	IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that we		
7	stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under our direct		
8	supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of our notes of said proceedings.		
9	WE FURTHER CERTIFY that we are not a		
10	relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor are we a relative or employee of any of		
11 12	the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with the action, nor are we financially interested in the action.		
13	DATED THIS 17th day of June, 2011.		
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