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1	BEFORE THE	
2	FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION	
3	In the Matter of:	
4		DOCKET NO. 130223-EI
5	PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF OPTIONAL NON-STANDARD METER RIDER, BY FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY.	
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12	PROCEEDINGS:	COMMISSION CONFERENCE AGENDA
13	11.00	ITEM NO. 11
14	COMMISSIONERS PARTICIPATING:	CHAIRMAN ART GRAHAM
15		COMMISSIONER LISA POLAK EDGAR COMMISSIONER RONALD A. BRISÉ
16		COMMISSIONER EDUARDO E. BALBIS COMMISSIONER JULIE I. BROWN
17	DATE:	Friday, May 9, 2014
18	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center
19		Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way
20		Tallahassee, Florida
21	REPORTED BY:	JANE FAUROT, RPR Official FPSC Reporter
22		(850) 413-6732
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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

PROCEEDINGS

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: We have one item left,

which is Item Number 11.

Staff, please.

MS. BROWNLESS: Yes, sir. Item Number 11 is in Docket 130223, which is FPL's smart meter docket. This staff recommendation involves motions for reconsideration filed by two groups of FPL customers, the Ahn and Martin protesters, of Procedural Orders Number PSC-140145 and 140146 issued by the Prehearing Officer. These orders denied the protesters' requests that issues regarding the health, safety, and privacy of smart meters be included in the final hearing on FPL's proposed non-standard meter tariff currently scheduled for hearing on September 23rd and 24th of 2014.

Having found no issue of law or fact that the Prehearing Officer overlooked or failed to consider in rendering her orders, staff recommends that Orders

Numbers PSC-140145 and 140146 be upheld and that the Ahn and Martin motions for reconsideration be denied.

The protesters have also requested oral argument on their motions to which FPL has objected. The decision to grant or deny oral argument is solely within the Commission's discretion. Should the

Commission decide to hear oral argument, staff
recommends that it be limited to ten minutes per side.

And here with us today, Commissioners, is Ms. Martin and

Mr. Rubin.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Commissioner Edgar.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As our staff has described to us, and as I know you are aware, what is before us is a request for reconsideration on two orders that I issued in this docket as Prehearing Officer. Those orders granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss both the Martin and the Ahn petitions.

I do want you to know that this is something I spent a lot of time with both our technical and legal staff going over before I issued these orders. I also am not surprised that there is a request for reconsideration before us. I truly felt like no matter what I did that probably that next step in the process would come forward, and that's absolutely fine. That is the process.

So, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we do grant oral argument, whatever amount of time you would like to give, and then after that I may have another comment or question.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Okay. Well, there's a

motion to grant oral argument. Is there a second?

COMMISSIONER BRISÉ: Second.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: It has been moved and seconded. I guess hearing nothing else other than staff's recommendation, I don't have a problem with granting ten minutes each side. So let's do that. Let's start with -- is it Ms. Martin?

MS. MARTIN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Ms. Martin, you have ten minutes.

MS. MARTIN: Yes. My name is Marilynne

Martin. I am the qualified representative and also a

petitioner for the Martin petitioners. We have

20 people on our petition. And I want to thank you for
this time to give oral argument.

The order we are asking you to reconsider limits the scope and jurisdiction of this proceeding to be held in September to issues of cost and cost allocation only. It denies all issues of health, safety, and privacy, as well as other issues such as the standard meter designation to be heard.

The denial comes with two parts. One, a lack of jurisdiction by the Commission, and the second being the concerns regarding the deployment should have been raised in the 2008 rate case. And I'd like to focus

today on facts that I think that were overlooked as far as law and facts, and that has to do with the petitioners right to proper notice and due process as well as some of the Commission powers that exist under the current statutes.

A fundamental requirement of due process is proper notice and adequate notice. Notice is knowledge of facts which would naturally lead an honest and prudent person to make an inquiry. We assert that proper notice was not given to the petitioners in the 2008 rate case where the smart meters were approved. The public was not told that the meters would be mandatory, nor was the public told that an active wireless neighborhood area network was to be constructed and operated through these meters on their home.

We understand that both the Commission and its staff as well as the utilities received about six to ten years of training on the smart grid and smart meters.

So when FPL said at the service hearings introducing smart meters, that had significant meaning to you. But is it reasonable to expect the public to have knowledge; that is, for them to know they must be mandatory, because in order to work properly through a wireless mesh network.

The fact is that no mention was made of

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wireless nor mandatory and there doesn't appear to be any news reported prior to the order on that also. So we ask you how John Q. Public had notice to dispute this action at the time. The fact is that the petitioners received notice after that proceeding had concluded. I went and got the deployment letters, and they brought the issues to the service hearings being conducted in the 2012 rate case.

The notice of that hearing for 2012 said that the purpose was to take testimony from the public on the quality and the adequacy of FPL's service and other matters relating to the rate case. We ask you if it is true that this March 2010 order made the smart meter the standard meter, and it was mandatory, and all should have known it, then why did the Commissioners shut down the proper and legal testimony coming before them at that time? Why didn't FPL and the Commissioner give notice to the people at that time? Why wasn't the public told in the 2012 service hearings that this was standard service and they were to be charged or needed to take it as a mandatory meter? Why was appropriate and legal testimony denied and a separate track set up with separate comment cards to be handled under separate proceedings?

At the Melbourne service meetings, Ms. Bulger

(phonetic), a customer, came forth and asked a very simple question, and she said, "Can these meters shut your electric off via an office without an employee coming?" She was not given an answer. So it appears people are confused as to what this equipment can and cannot do two years after, but you're asking us to have known to dispute it.

So did the public receive their due process rights in the smart meter workshop that was set up, the separate track that was set up? And we say no. The public did not have the equal opportunity to present their facts, respond to staff questions, refute the facts, recommendations? The public's request for presentations at that workshop were denied. There was also no notice provided after you had your Internal Affairs meeting on the briefing report, and no notice came out after that meeting to tell us how to protest that recommendation. No notice of rulemaking was even set up.

So the petitioners assert the fact that they were denied their due process rights to be heard. In addition, since such meetings and decisions were unreasonably delayed until February 29th, 2013, the petitioners were further denied their due process rights to protest the 2012 rate case settlement which was

issued on January 14th where the period has closed.

A comprehensive investigation into important consumer issues did not occur on September 20th, 2012, as promised, nor was due process allowed. There was no notice of how to dispute those finding. And until FPL filed this non-standard meter tariff today, in August, the public had no avenue to appeal the recommendations made in that briefing report. So we contend this is the place for all disputes to finally be heard.

Administrative Procedures Act 120.57(e)(1) says an agency or administrative law judge may not base agency action that determines the substantial interest of a party on an unadopted rule. We ask you to consider whether the smart meter workshop briefing report, the recommendation that the utilities decide for themselves to offer an internal meter, and, if so, must present a cost-based tariff, is that an unadopted rule?

And also, you know, we have Order Number 18893 which basically transferred the ownership of meter enclosures to us, and the order simply states for a meter. This equipment is not a meter. So the petitioners believe their due process rights of law have been denied.

So the order that you are opining on today suggests also that the Commission has the power to

mandate a product to be placed directly on the home of the customer, but the Commission has absolutely no jurisdiction over the safety of that product, and we respectfully disagree. The fact is that this Commission has broad powers and also responsibility for public safety. A smart meter is now part of your distribution facilities. It wasn't prior, okay, the analog wasn't, but this is. If you want to shut off service to somebody five houses away from me, you have to bounce that signal through my home. It is definitely part of distribution facilities, and you definitely have responsibility for that.

The Commission in this order has overlooked Section 366.05, which give it power to prescribe standards of quality and to require replacements when necessary to promote the convenience and welfare of the public. In addition, Section 366.06 gives it powers that whenever the Commission finds, upon request made, that practices of any public utility are unjust, unjustly discriminatory, or in violation of law that public hearings be held. Many of my petitioners avoid all sources of wireless. It makes them ill. They have doctors notes telling them to do so.

You were suggesting they have to accept as standard service a product directly on their homes that

they have been instructed to avoid and is known to make them ill, and that their only remedy is to sue, for which the disabled cannot afford.

This approved fee also places an undue burden on the poor. We say choice of meter. I certainly, in my financial situation, have a choice. But if you are living on a fixed income, that's no choice at all, and you have gotten comment letters on that. So we ask you to relook at our petition. We ask you to put the tariff order -- that's what we ask, we ask you to kind of put that order on hold, hold the proper hearings so we can have due process. Then based on those hearings, then we can make a proper decision on a non-standard tariff meter and what needs to be included in there. But it is time for the public, and petitioners very much request, respectfully, that our rights under the law to be heard be heard, and these are not frivolous issues.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Thank you, Ms. Martin.

Mr. Rubin.

MR. RUBIN: Thank you, Chairman. Ken Rubin for FPL.

Good afternoon, Commissioners. First of all, FPL fully supports the staff recommendation on this matter. As Commissioner Edgar indicated on April 1st of

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this year, as the Prehearing Officer, Commissioner Edgar entered two orders granting in part and denying in part FPL's motions to dismiss the two petitions, really two separate challenges to the Commission's January 14th order that approved FPL's revised opt-out tariff.

Each of the two orders that Commissioner Edgar entered as the Prehearing Officer completely and thoroughly addressed the positions of the parties point-by-point, and concluded by dismissing all claims aside from the cost basis and the allocation of the cost of the opt-out tariff. The orders that Commissioner Edgar entered as the Prehearing Officer, which are being challenged, also completely addressed all of the points that are now raised in the two motions for reconsideration that are pending today before the Commission. The Ahn petitioners who are represented by Attorney Jones, who I assumed would be here by telephone, but I now assume is not participating today, and by Ms. Martin as the qualified representative of the remaining petitioners, have failed in all material respects to meet the heavy burden that's required for reconsideration of a Commission order.

I'd like to at least briefly address that legal requirement. First, what is required for a valid motion for reconsideration. A legally sufficient motion

for reconsideration must do two things. First, the motion must identify a point of fact or a point of law that the Prehearing Officer overlooked or failed to consider in rendering the orders. And, secondly, they must explain how consideration of the allegedly overlooked fact or law would have led the Prehearing Officer to a different decision.

The two motions for reconsideration before the Commission today do neither of those two things. So to be clear, the issue really that is being considered by the Commission today is whether the petitioners have sufficiently satisfied the threshold legal requirements necessary for reconsideration of the two orders. In other words, have they shown, have they pointed out a point of law or fact that Commissioner Edgar overlooked in entering the two orders, and have they shown or explained how consideration of the points of law or fact would mandate a different result, and they simply have not met those burdens.

In response to the two motions for reconsideration, FPL cited the well-established case law that Florida courts and this Commission have followed for years that lay out those requirements. Staff agrees that those cases accurately outline the standard. And, in fact, Ms. Martin in her motion and Attorney Jones in

his motion agree that that is the appropriate standard.

As staff has noted in its recommendation, neither one of these two motions satisfy that legal requirement.

In its recommendation, staff has very carefully outlined the issues that petitioners claim were overlooked along with the support showing that quite to the contrary, each and every one of those issues was, in fact, directly addressed in the orders that were entered by Commissioner Edgar that are now under attack. Because staff has addressed these issues in detail, I won't go into them in any more detail now.

I know that Ms. Martin in her remarks has addressed some substantive issues that go well beyond what the Commission should be considering here today, but in your staff's recommendation the recommendation goes point-by-point and identifies where the two motions fail to meet those standards point-by-point.

Commissioners, the orders entered by the Prehearing Officer in this case very carefully, very analytically, and very clearly addressed the issues which the petitioners now claim were overlooked or not considered. In point of fact, the two arguments really -- I'm sorry, the two motions are really nothing more than reargument, and the law is clear that it's not appropriate to use a motion for reconsideration as a

vehicle to either reargue matters or to express 1 disagreement with the Commission's decision. 2 Notwithstanding that law, that's precisely what these

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two motions before the Commission today do.

To conclude, FPL urges the Commission to deny the two motions for reconsideration for the reasons expressed in our written response to the motions and for the reasons addressed by staff in the April 24th recommendation. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Rubin.

Commissioner Edgar.

COMMISSIONER EDGAR: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Very briefly, I would like to say very much and hopefully clearly on the record that I do agree with Ms. Martin very strongly on two points, and maybe others as well, but two that I want to point out right now. And that is I do believe that concerns of consumers should be heard and considered, and I also adamantly state that I don't believe the concerns expressed in this docket are frivolous. They are not frivolous. However, what was before me as Prehearing Officer was the scope of our jurisdiction as pertains to the tariff before us and relevant case law.

Although I am the one that signed these orders, they are orders of the Commission. And as such it is very important to me that they be correct, that they be right, and that each of my colleagues have available to each of you as you make a decision on the motions before us the opportunity to question the representatives of the parties and our staff. If an err of fact or law was made, or if any of you believes that it was, then please note that it was completely inadvertent and it should be corrected.

Again, I spent a lot of time with our staff preparing these orders and trying to best address the issues that were before us and most appropriately. But I am glad for any discussion, and would also just add that I very specifically made these orders longer than they often are so that the benefit of the rationale and analysis would be in the document for all to consider.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Thank you, Commissioner

Edgar. And I want to thank you for agreeing to be

Prehearing Officer on this. I knew that it was going

to take all your vast legal talents and organizational

skills and patience and everything else involved in

that, but I do want to thank you for stepping up to the

plate and taking this task on.

Commissioners, any questions or concerns?

Commissioner Balbis.

1 COMMISSIONER BALBIS: I don't --

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: I'm sorry, Brisé.

(Laughter.)

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COMMISSIONER BRISÉ: My brother from another mother.

(Laughter.)

I think at the appropriate time we'll make a motion, but when I reviewed the orders, I didn't find any error of fact or law. And I recognize that there is a lot of conversation around these issues, which is appropriate, but pertaining to what our responsibilities are and what the orders deal with, I think there is no error of fact or law that I could find in them. So when appropriate, I'll make a motion.

CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Commissioner Balbis.

COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Now I do have a comment. I just have a question for staff on this.

And I, too, went through both of the orders and I thought that they adequately addressed the issues, but I have a question on your recommendation for Issue 2.

On the Ahn motion, and you designated as their Issue 1, on the AMI meter does not meet the definition of a meter in the rule, et cetera. And you pointed out correctly that Commissioner Edgar's order where it talked about that the deployment of the AMI meters was

deployment covers that definition, as well, correct? 2 MS. BROWNLESS: I'm sorry, I don't understand 3 your question. 4 COMMISSIONER BALBIS: The Ahn motion states 5 that an AMI meter does not meet the definition of, 6 7 quote, meter in Rule 25-6.003, and then it goes on. MS. BROWNLESS: Yes. 8 9 COMMISSIONER BALBIS: All of those issues 10 were litigated in the prior rate case, the 2009 rate case that came out in the 2010 order, correct? 11 12 MS. BROWNLESS: My understanding is that 13 there was a thorough discussion in the rate case, and I want to share with you that I was not at the Commission 14 15 at that time and I didn't litigate that rate case, but my understanding is that all of the issues associated 16 17 with the AMI deployment program and what the meters would do and not do was discussed at the previous rate 18 19 case. 20 COMMISSIONER BALBIS: Okay. Thank you. CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Commissioner Brown. 21 22 COMMISSIONER BROWN: Thank you. 23 And, you know, as a lawyer I have a great appreciation for, when I read orders that are very well 24 25 analyzed and thorough, and I read both of them and

thoroughly litigated in the prior rate case, the

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thought they were extremely thorough and analytical, as 1 well as the staff recommendation. And, you know, I 2 agree with everything that everyone has said. I think 3 the standard of review for a motion for reconsideration 4 is quite high. I couldn't find an error of fact or law. 5 I think, though, some of the arguments that the 6 7 petitioners did raise may be more appropriate for other venues, as the Prehearing Officer alluded to in the 8 9 orders. So with that, I would be supportive of a 10 motion. CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: Commissioner Brisé. 11 COMMISSIONER BRISÉ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 12 I move staff recommendation. 13 CHAIRMAN GRAHAM: It has been moved and 14 15 seconded, staff recommendation on Item Number 11. Any further discussion? 16 17 Seeing none, all in favor say aye. (Vote taken.) 18 19 **CHAIRMAN GRAHAM:** Any opposed? 20 By your action you have approved staff recommendation on Item Number 11. 21 22 Okay. That concludes our agenda conference today. We are going to have IA here in this room and 23 that will start in the next three to five minutes. 24

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: CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

COUNTY OF LEON)

STATE OF FLORIDA

I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, Chief, Hearing Reporter Services Section, FPSC Division of Commission Clerk, do hereby certify that the foregoing proceeding was heard at the time and place herein stated.

IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that I stenographically reported the said proceedings; that the same has been transcribed under my direct supervision; and that this transcript constitutes a true transcription of my notes of said proceedings.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any of the parties' attorney or counsel connected with the action, nor am I financially interested in the action.

DATED THIS 16th day of May, 2014.

JANE FAUROT, RPR
Official FPSC Hearings Reporter
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FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION