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## Criteria | Corporates | Utilities: Assessing U.S. Utility Regulatory Environments

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**(Editor's Note:** This article was originally published on Nov. 7, 2007. We're republishing this article following our periodic review completed on Nov. 15, 2011. For our latest comments on regulated utility subsidiaries, please see "[Methodology: Differentiating The Issuer Credit Ratings Of A Regulated Utility Subsidiary And Its Parent](#)," published March 11, 2010, on RatingsDirect.)

The assessment of regulatory risk is perhaps the most important factor in Standard & Poor's Ratings Services' analysis of a U.S. regulated, investor-owned utility's business risk. Each of the other four factors we examine—markets, operations, competitiveness, and management—can affect the quality of the regulation a utility experiences, but we believe the fundamental regulatory environment in the jurisdictions in which a utility operates often influences credit quality the most. In our credit analysis, we evaluate regulatory risk on a company-specific basis. A utility management's skill in managing regulatory risk can in many cases overcome a difficult regulatory environment. Conversely, other companies can experience greater regulatory risk even with supportive regulatory regimes if management fails to devote the necessary time and resources to the important task of managing regulatory risk. Operating in a state with a regulatory structure that is conducive to maintaining credit quality will improve the chances for a utility to successfully negotiate the regulatory maze.

This commentary discusses our views on what constitutes a favorable regulatory climate. We then use those factors to create assessments of the regulatory environments in states that regulate the electric and gas utilities that we rate. (See the table at the end of this article.) Our intention is to provide a common base for our own analysis of regulatory risk and to better communicate to investors, issuers, and regulators how various elements of regulation can affect credit quality. The exercise is also expected to enhance our ability to evaluate management by highlighting instances where our opinion of a company's regulatory risk diverges significantly from the fundamental quality of the regulatory jurisdictions where it operates.

The assessments of relevant jurisdictions are based on quantitative and qualitative factors. Importantly, we make our assessments from a credit perspective. We plan to update them annually or when significant events occur that have an important impact on the regulatory climate in a particular jurisdiction. The new regulatory assessment information augments the methodology applied to regulated utilities today.

Our introduction of these regulatory assessments coincides with what we view as the increasing influence of regulatory matters on the rated utilities' risk profiles and greater credit market awareness of the importance of understanding the regulatory process. Our goal in explaining our views on regulatory practices and policies and their effect on Standard & Poor's analysis of the credit quality of utilities is to provide additional transparency to the market.

### Background

State utility regulation is almost as old as credit ratings. Standard & Poor's predecessor, Standard Statistics Bureau, was formed in 1906, and the first state utility commissions, as we know them today, appeared in 1907. Regulation has always been a factor in Standard & Poor's analysis of utility ratings, but its importance to our analysis has shifted with industry trends over time.

Before the 1970s, regulators presided for the most part over stable or decreasing rates as economic growth, rising consumption, and economies of scale drove costs down. The advent of inflation, rising and volatile fuel costs, and nuclear power missteps led to higher rates and, in our view, greater regulatory influence on credit quality during the 1980s. Restructuring in the natural gas and then the electric industries marked the 1990s and the first years of the new millennium, and the importance of regulatory issues in our analysis again started to subside. In our view, we are now in another era of increasing and unstable costs and some semblance of a return to traditional utility regulation. Consequently, the quality of regulation is at the forefront of our analysis of utility creditworthiness.

We have historically focused on regulatory risk on a company-specific basis. Nothing in what follows will change that approach. Utility commissions regulate diverse industries and adopt different approaches to different types of businesses. Treatment of utilities within the same industry can vary significantly in the same jurisdiction. The quality of the regulation experienced by a company is often the product of the company's management and business strategy as much as its regulators. The regulatory climate assessments only serve as a baseline of our opinion on the fundamental attitude of a jurisdiction toward the credit quality of the utilities in that state, and they are the starting point for Standard & Poor's analysis of the regulatory risk of each rated utility. Our goal is to achieve greater consistency and continuity in utility ratings.

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### Assessing Regulatory Jurisdictions

We assess jurisdictions on one basic attribute—the fundamental approach to controlling utility rates—and then in three major categories. The resulting assessments are based primarily on various measures of regulatory risk that are discussed briefly below. With respect to

5 of 5

qualitative factors, we look for long-term, historical characteristics of the jurisdiction, as well as transient regulatory and political developments.

The foundation of our opinion of the regulation in a jurisdiction is the degree to which competitive market forces are allowed to influence rates. In order of credit-friendliness, a state will rely either on full cost-based regulation for all components of the utility bill, market-based mechanisms for generation, and (more rarely) retail markets, or a hybrid of the two to control the amount charged and the terms on which that service is offered. It may surprise some to learn that we consider a hybrid setup, which in most cases exists because the transition to some sort of competition has stalled, to harbor more risk for bondholders than a system that is committed to letting market prices set a major part of the customer's bill.

The risk inherent in the market-based model is straightforward: the price for electricity can be more volatile when based on a market than when it is based on embedded costs, and regulators are apt to resist full and timely recovery when changes in generation costs are abrupt and substantial (and perhaps misunderstood). The risks in a hybrid or transitional model are less apparent, but, in our opinion, potentially more significant. First, we consider the uncertainty of the timing of reaching the end state--and what that end state will look like--to be a negative factor from a credit perspective. Second, in some cases, the hybrid model may result in a "lower-of-cost-or-market" approach that allows generation rates to reflect one or the other at different times depending on which one suits ratepayers best. A utility and its bondholders may then face a prolonged period of potential exposure to market risk (the downside) with little or no opportunity to participate in the benefits of competition (the upside of greater returns).

After identifying the fundamental regulatory paradigm, our analysis turns to factors that influence the utility's business risk climate in the jurisdiction. The factors fall into three broad categories: ratemaking, political environment, and financial stability. Broadly speaking, the ratemaking and financial stability factors influence our assessments more than the paradigm and political factors.

### Ratemaking Practices And Procedures

The main, and often the most contentious, task of a regulator is to set the rates a utility may charge its customers. We analyze specific rate decisions as part of the surveillance of each utility. Our regulatory assessments focus on the jurisdiction's overall approach to setting rates and the process it uses to conduct and manage base rate filings. Practices pertaining to separate tariff clauses for large expense items are examined in the third category of the analysis (see below). In this part of the assessment, we concentrate on whether established base rates fairly reflect the cost structure of a utility and allow management an opportunity to earn a compensatory return that provides bondholders with a financial cushion that promotes credit quality.

Notably, the analysis does not revolve around "authorized" returns, but rather on actual earned returns. We note the many examples of utilities with healthy authorized returns that, we believe, have no meaningful expectation of actually earning that return because of rate case lag, expense disallowances, etc. Although, in general, the absolute level of financial returns is less important to our analysis than how that return is earned, we recognize that, all else being equal, higher earned returns translate into better credit metrics and a more comfortable equity cushion for bondholders. A regulatory approach that allows utilities the opportunity to consistently earn a reasonable return is a positive factor in our view of credit quality.

The rates of return and capital structures used to generate the revenue requirement in rate proceedings may not be the primary focus of the assessment, but those and other decisions made in the ratemaking process are still noted. We consider those decisions to be potential signals from regulators on their attitude toward credit quality. We believe that the capital structure in particular is a handy and direct indication from the regulator as to whether or not creditworthiness is an important consideration in its deliberations when setting rates. Obviously, any pronouncements from a regulator that explicitly address credit ratings or ratemaking practices that incorporate credit-minded adjustments (e.g., the use of double-leveraged capital structures or off-balance-sheet debt-like obligations) are considered in the Standard & Poor's assessment.

We analyze the issue of "regulatory lag" in a comprehensive manner and not just as a matter of the efficiency of the regulator in completing rate cases. As part of this analysis, we evaluate the timeliness of rate decisions, coupled with an evaluation of the test year. In addition, we take into account the timing of interim rates, and other practices that affect the appropriateness of rates periodically established by the regulator. We do not view the issue of regulatory lag as an intermittent concern, consequential only during times of acute inflation or rising capital spending, but as a consistent part of our credit analysis. Accordingly, in our regulatory assessments we focus on whether the regulator efficiently prosecutes rate requests and bases its decisions with respect to rate setting on the most current information.

In our view, the prevalence of rate case settlements is not necessarily an important credit consideration. Although the common assumption among market participants seems to be that a settlement must be in the best interest of a utility, we believe this assumption disregards the possibility that management will sometimes make decisions based on its effect on earnings at the expense of cash flow considerations. This does not mean we dismiss the ability of stipulations to reach a fair resolution of difficult matters that help regulators issue timely and constructive rate decisions. It just means that frequent settlements do not, in our view, directly lead to a conclusion that the regulatory environment in a state enhances credit quality.

An important policy-related issue outside of individual rate cases that falls under this part of the assessment is the regulatory oversight of large capital projects with long lead times that carry out-sized risks to a utility and its bondholders. In our opinion, practices such as legislative or regulatory recognition of the need for pre-approval of such endeavors, periodic reviews that substantively involve the regulator in the progress of the project, and rolling prudence determinations during construction can reduce the general level of risk associated with a utility committing substantial capital well in advance of the rate proceeding that results in the project being placed into rate base. Before committing to such projects, a resource-procurement process that uses objective guidelines to evaluate competing proposals to meet load obligations and keeps the regulator informed and involved in the decisions can, in our view, help to reduce the risk of subsequent disallowances. If the jurisdiction has an Integrated Resource Plan or similar mechanism that includes the participation of many parties and is used to definitively establish the need for new generation, we consider credit risk to be further diminished.

Hide

5 of 5

One more factor that we examine in this part of the analysis is whether a jurisdiction employs nontraditional ratemaking practices. Examples of what we may view to be potentially credit-enhancing regulatory mechanisms include weather normalization and incentive ratemaking. We believe that the beneficial effect on credit quality of a tariff clause that smooths out cash flows that can vary with outside influences like weather is self evident. The benefits of incentives incorporated into the regulatory regime may be less clear. Well-designed incentives can be at least credit neutral. A moderate amount of incentives can be credit supportive. We generally view incentive provisions (whether tied to cost control, reliability, or operational performance) as being beneficial for credit quality if they are linked to fair and objective benchmarks. Incentives that lack some or all of those features, such as a plain, long-term rate freeze, can be, in our opinion, detrimental to credit quality.

**Political Insulation**

The role of politics in utility regulation is often misunderstood. In most jurisdictions, legislatures created regulatory commissions and invested them with the power to set and enforce utility rates and service standards. Regardless of how a regulatory commission is statutorily organized, its function is to set and regulate rates and service standards with due regard not only for the interests of those who advance the capital needed to provide safe and reliable utility service but for other constituents as well. In this regard, bondholders should recognize that the setting of utility rates invariably reflects political as well as economic factors. Therefore, the potential for political considerations to affect utility regulation can be a key determinant when we assess a regulatory jurisdiction.

A primary factor in this part of our assessment is the method of selecting utility commissioners. In some jurisdictions, the governors appoint regulatory commissioners. In others, the same voters who pay utility bills directly elect commissioners. The regulatory risk associated with that model can sometimes be managed, but there is an inherent level of risk in elected regulatory bodies that we reflect in the assessment. Standard & Poor's also analyzes the track record of the involvement of the executive branch or the legislature in utility matters, and the relative visibility of utility issues in the political arena.

The ability of a regulator to deliver sound, fair, and timely rate decisions and set prudent regulatory policies that assist utility managers in managing business and financial risk can be affected by the overall atmosphere that it operates in. The tone can be set by the governor or legislature, the history and tradition of independence accorded to the regulatory body, and the behavior of important constituent groups that intervene in utility proceedings.

**Cash Flow Support And Stability**

The final set of factors in our assessment of regulatory environments is arguably the most important. The phrase "cash is king" can be overused, but it does highlight an essential part of the credit analysis. A regulatory jurisdiction that recognizes the significance of cash flow in its decision making is one that will appeal to bondholders. Generating cash is a function of the actions of utility management, but the regulator can supply (or withhold) the tools that can affect the company's essential ability to actually realize the intended level of cash flow.

The most prominent factor in this part of the analysis is the application of separate tariff provisions for major expenses such as fuel and purchased power. The timely adjustment of rates in response to changing commodity prices and other expenses that are largely out of the control of utility management is a key component of a credit-enhancing regulatory jurisdiction. We analyze the quality of special tariff mechanisms to determine their effectiveness in producing the cash flow stability they are designed to achieve. The frequency of rate adjustments, the ability to quickly react to unusual market volatility, and the control of opportunities to engage in hindsight disallowances of costs could affect the analysis almost as much as whether the tariff provisions exist at all. The record of disallowances plays a part in the regulatory assessment.

The commission's policies and oversight covering hedging activities may also be a factor in this part of the review if a utility has sought regulatory approval. For utilities that attempt to manage commodity risks, we look for a clearly-stated hedging policy and a track record of activity that conforms to that policy. The responsibility for communicating the policy and demonstrating the prudence of the hedging activity rests with the utility, but the initial response to a hedging program and the history of the regulator's treatment of the results of the program could influence our assessment.

Regulators can employ other ratemaking techniques that promote stable cash flows. We consider a commission's decisions on rate design in assessing its attitude on credit quality. For example, we take into account the relative size of the typical monthly customer charge, a decoupling mechanism that severs the direct relationship between revenues and customer usage, or other rate design features that bolster credit quality.

Especially during upswings in the capital expenditure cycle, such as we are experiencing now, a jurisdiction's willingness to support large capital projects with cash during the construction phase is an important aspect of our analysis. This is especially true for ventures with big budgets and long lead times, such as baseload coal-fired or nuclear power plants and high-voltage transmission lines that are susceptible to construction delays. Allowance of a cash return on construction work-in-progress or similar ratemaking methods historically were considered extraordinary measures for use in unusual circumstances, but in today's environment of rising construction costs and possible inflationary pressures, cash flow support could be crucial in maintaining credit quality through the spending program.

**Jurisdictional Assessments**

The table below shows Standard & Poor's assessments of regulatory jurisdictions. The category titles are designed to communicate one other important point regarding utility regulation and its effect on ratings. All categories are denoted as "credit-supportive". To one degree or another, all U.S. utility regulation sustains credit quality when compared with the rest of corporate ratings at Standard & Poor's. The presence of regulators, no matter where in the spectrum of our assessments, reduces business risk and generally supports all U.S. utility ratings.

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**Regulatory Jurisdictions For Utilities Among U.S. States**

Most credit supportive More credit supportive Credit supportive Less credit supportive Least credit supportive

5 of 5

Alabama	Arkansas	Louisiana	Arizona
California	Colorado	Maine	Delaware
Florida	Connecticut	Missouri	Dist. of Columbia
Georgia	Hawaii	Montana	Illinois
Indiana	Idaho	New York	Maryland
Iowa	Kansas	Oklahoma	New Mexico
South Carolina	Kentucky	Rhode Island	
Wisconsin	Massachusetts	Texas	
	Michigan	Utah	
	Minnesota	Vermont	
	Mississippi	Washington	
	Nevada	West Virginia	
	New Hampshire	Wyoming	
	New Jersey		
	North Carolina		
	North Dakota		
	Ohio		
	Oregon		
	Pennsylvania		
	South Dakota		
	Virginia		

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5 of 5