

**BEFORE THE FLORIDA
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION**

**DOCKET NO. 04D206-EI
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY**

**IN RE: FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY'S
PETITION TO DETERMINE NEED FOR
TURKEY POINT UNIT 5
ELECTRICAL POWER PLANT**

DIRECT TESTIMONY & EXHIBIT OF:

WILLIAM A. AVERA

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FPSC-COMMISSION CLERK

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5 **March 8, 2004**

6
7 **I. INTRODUCTION**

8
9 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

10 A. William E. Avera, 3907 Red River, Austin, Texas, 78751.

11
12 **Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?**

13 A. I am a principal in Financial Concepts and Applications, Inc. (FINCAP), a
14 firm engaged in financial, economic, and policy consulting to business and
15 government.

16
17 **Q. Describe your educational background, professional qualifications, and
18 prior experience.**

19 A. I received a B.A. degree with a major in economics from Emory University.
20 After serving in the United States Navy, I entered the doctoral program in
21 economics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Upon receiving
22 my Ph.D., I joined the faculty at the University of North Carolina and taught
23 finance in the Graduate School of Business. I subsequently accepted a
24 position at the University of Texas at Austin where I taught courses in

1 financial management and investment analysis. I then went to work for
2 International Paper Company in New York City as Manager of Financial
3 Education, a position in which I had responsibility for all corporate education
4 programs in finance, accounting, and economics.

5
6 In 1977, I joined the staff of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT)
7 as Director of the Economic Research Division. During my tenure at the
8 PUCT, I managed a division responsible for financial analysis, cost allocation
9 and rate design, economic and financial research, and data processing
10 systems, and I testified in cases on a variety of financial and economic issues.
11 Since leaving the PUCT, I have been engaged as a consultant. I have
12 participated in a wide range of assignments involving utility-related matters
13 on behalf of utilities, industrial customers, municipalities, and regulatory
14 commissions. I have previously testified before the Federal Energy
15 Regulatory Commission (FERC), the Federal Communications Commission
16 (FCC), the Surface Transportation Board (and its predecessor, the Interstate
17 Commerce Commission), the Canadian Radio-Television and
18 Telecommunications Commission, and regulatory agencies, courts, and
19 legislative committees in 30 states, including the Florida Public Service
20 Commission (the Commission or FPSC).

21
22 I was appointed by the PUCT to the Synchronous Interconnection Committee
23 to advise the Texas Legislature on the costs and benefits of connecting Texas

1 to the national electric transmission grid. Currently, I serve as an outside
2 director of the Georgia System Operations Corporation, the system operator
3 for electric cooperatives in Georgia.

4
5 I have served as Lecturer in the Finance Department at the University of Texas
6 at Austin and taught in the evening graduate program at St. Edward's
7 University for twenty years. In addition, I have lectured on economic and
8 regulatory topics in programs sponsored by universities and industry groups. I
9 have taught in hundreds of educational programs for financial analysts in
10 programs sponsored by the Association for Investment Management and
11 Research, the Financial Analysts Review, and local financial analysts
12 societies. These programs have been presented in Asia, Europe, and North
13 America, including the Financial Analysts Seminar at Northwestern
14 University. I hold the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA[®]) designation and
15 have served as Vice President for Membership of the Financial Management
16 Association. I also have served on the Board of Directors of the North
17 Carolina Society of Financial Analysts. I was elected Vice Chairman of the
18 National Association of Regulatory Commissioners (NARUC) Subcommittee
19 on Economics and appointed to NARUC's Technical Subcommittee on the
20 National Energy Act. I also have served as an officer of various other
21 professional organizations and societies. A resume containing the details of
22 my experience and qualifications is attached as Document WEA-1.

1 **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?**

2 A. As a result of its resource planning process, Florida Power & Light Company
3 (FPL or the Company) has identified the need for additional firm capacity in
4 the amount of approximately 1,066 megawatts (MW) in 2007 to meet its
5 targeted reserve margin. FPL selected from among a number of self-build
6 options a capacity addition at its Turkey Point plant as its next planned
7 generating unit (NPGU) to meet that need. FPL subsequently issued its 2003
8 Request for Proposals (RFP) to solicit competitive power supply alternatives
9 to compare to its NPGU and identify the option for new resources that best
10 serves the needs of FPL's customers. In connection with the final economic
11 evaluation of individual proposals, the RFP provides for an equity adjustment
12 to recognize the impact of purchased power contracts on FPL's financial
13 position for obligations of more than three years.

14
15 The purpose of my testimony is to explain the impact that power purchase
16 contracts have on FPL's financial leverage and present to the FPSC the
17 method FPL is proposing to account for these impacts in the economic
18 evaluation of capacity alternatives under the RFP.

19
20 **Q. Are you sponsoring an exhibit in this case?**

21 A. Yes. It consists of Document No. WEA-1, Resume of William E. Avera.

1 **Q. Please summarize the basis for your conclusions concerning the issues on**
2 **which you are testifying in this hearing.**

3 A. As is common and generally accepted in my field of expertise, I have accessed
4 and used information from a variety of sources. I am familiar with the
5 organization, finances, and operations of FPL through my participation in
6 prior proceedings before the FPSC, including the Martin/Manatee need case
7 (Docket No. 020262-EI) and the FPSC's last review of FPL's rates (Docket
8 No. 001148-EI). I also reviewed information relating specifically to my
9 opinions in this proceeding, including bond rating agency reports, prior
10 regulatory proceedings and orders, and articles in the trade press. These
11 sources, coupled with my experience in the fields of finance and utility
12 regulation, have given me a working knowledge of FPL and are the basis for
13 my conclusions.

14
15 **Q. What are your conclusions regarding the impact of purchased power**
16 **contracts on FPL's financial position?**

17 A. Investors regard purchased power contracts as off-balance-sheet obligations
18 that increase the financial leverage of the purchaser. To maintain bond ratings
19 and financial flexibility, utilities must offset the debt equivalent of purchased
20 power obligations by increasing the equity component of the capital structure
21 from what it would otherwise be. The impact of imputed debt from purchased
22 power obligations has been recognized in past orders of the Commission and
23 bond rating agency reports. Considering the cost of additional equity that is

1 required to offset the debt equivalent of purchased power commitments is
2 consistent with FPSC orders and the treatment afforded these obligations by
3 the major rating agencies. FPL's equity adjustment calculation, which
4 considers both the costs of the debt equivalent imposed by purchased power
5 contracts and the potential offset provided by other mitigating factors,
6 reasonably accomplishes this adjustment.

7
8 **II. BACKGROUND**

9
10 **Q. How do these long-term purchased power commitments impact FPL's**
11 **financial leverage?**

12 **A.** While purchased power resource strategies do not involve direct capital
13 investment, they nonetheless have financial implications that must be
14 considered to allow for a meaningful comparison between supply alternatives.
15 When a utility enters a contract for firm, long-term purchased power, the
16 associated fixed cost components imply additional financial risks because the
17 fixed charges associated with purchased power contracts are akin to those
18 associated with other financial obligations, such as long-term debt. FPL's
19 existing power purchase agreements, along with any proposals submitted in
20 response to its RFP, obligate the Company to make certain capacity and
21 minimum contractual payments. As a result, these commitments are
22 equivalent to an off-balance sheet liability, and incorporating the debt

1 equivalent of obligations under purchased power contracts would have the
2 effect of increasing financial leverage.

3
4 **Q. Have these attributes of purchased power been recognized by the
5 financial community?**

6 A. Yes. The implications of purchased power commitments for a utility's
7 financial risks have been repeatedly cited by major bond rating agencies. As
8 early as 1990, Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) recognized the financial
9 risk imposed by the off-balance-sheet liabilities associated with purchased
10 power and the resulting erosion of the utility's financial flexibility (*Electric
11 Utility Week*, October 8, 1990). Similarly, Standard & Poor's Corporation
12 (S&P) observed in a 1992 ratings report for FPL that "a utility incurs certain
13 risks when entering into a long-term contract with fixed-cost capacity
14 component" (*CreditWeek*, April 6, 1992). As S&P observed in "Buy Versus
15 Build Debate Revisited" (*CreditWeek*, May 24, 1993):

16
17 When a utility enters into a long-term purchased power
18 contract with a fixed-cost component, it takes on financial risk.
19 Heavy fixed charges reduce a utility's financial flexibility and
20 long-term contractual arrangements represent – at least in part
21 – off balance sheet debt equivalents. (pp. 1-2)

22
23 More recently, in reviewing its evaluation of the credit implications of

1 purchased power, S&P reaffirmed its position that such agreements are “debt-
2 like in nature” and that the increased financial risk must be considered in
3 evaluating a utility’s credit risks (“Buy Versus Build’: Debt Aspects of
4 Purchased-Power Agreements”, *Utilities & Perspectives*, May 12, 2003).

5
6 Because the capacity and minimum contractual payment obligations under
7 power purchase agreements are analogous to those associated with traditional
8 debt financing, investors consider these commitments in evaluating FPL's
9 financial risks. Accordingly, incorporating the debt equivalent of FPL's
10 obligations under its purchased power contracts in the Company’s capital
11 structure would have the effect of increasing its financial leverage.

12
13 **Q. What implications do relatively greater amounts of purchased power
14 have for a utility's financial flexibility?**

15 **A.** Because investors perceive additional financial risks with obligations under
16 purchased power contracts, as reliance on these sources increases, the utility
17 must offset the associated debt equivalent by incorporating a higher equity
18 component in the capital structure to neutralize the effect on leverage. As
19 S&P has recognized, because of purchased power, it has been necessary for
20 FPL to maintain a relatively greater proportion of equity capital in order to
21 maintain its credit standing. In a December 3, 1998 report in *RatingsDirect*,
22 S&P noted that:

23

1 Florida Power & Light has a sizeable amount of fixed payment
2 purchased-power contracts, a portion of which is imputed by
3 Standard & Poor's as an off-balance-sheet obligation, and has
4 maintained a higher amount of equity capital on the balance
5 sheet to counter this off-balance-sheet debt obligation. (p. 2)

6
7 More recently, S&P noted that it “includes about \$1.3 billion as a debt
8 equivalent” because of FPL’s purchased power obligations (*Research: FPL*
9 *Group, Inc.*, Oct. 21, 2003). Absent financial policies that recognize the
10 leverage implicit in purchased power contracts, the associated investment
11 risks would place downward pressure on utilities' creditworthiness and debt
12 ratings and the greater leverage implied by a lower common equity ratio
13 would increase investors' required rate of return for both debt and equity
14 securities.

15
16 Apart from the immediate impact the debt-equivalent portion of purchased
17 power costs has on the utility's financial risk, heavy fixed charges also reduce
18 ongoing financial flexibility, and the utility may face other uncertainties, such
19 as potential replacement power costs in the event of supply disruption.
20 Moreover, investors' focus on the financial ramifications and other
21 uncertainties of purchased power is magnified as the utility's reliance on
22 purchased power increases. The 1,066 MW increase in purchased power
23 contemplated under FPL's RFP would constitute a greater than 40 percent

1 increase in the Company's firm purchased power capacity, which totaled
2 approximately 2,400 MW for 2002 (*2003 Request for Proposals (RFP)*,
3 Attachment 1).
4

5 **Q. Is it appropriate to consider these financial implications in an economic**
6 **evaluation of power supply alternatives?**

7 A. Yes. To conduct a meaningful economic comparison between buying power
8 and self-build options, it is necessary to recognize the financial risks
9 associated with power purchase contracts. Otherwise, the analyses will not
10 reflect the true cost of entering into purchased power agreements and any
11 comparison of the economics between alternative proposals will be flawed.
12 S&P noted that "(u)tilities need to take these 'financial externalities' into
13 account so that buy and build options are evaluated on a level playing field"
14 (*CreditWeek*, May 24, 1993) and emphasized the importance of reflecting the
15 financial realities associated with purchased power commitments in any
16 economic analyses of competitive options (*CreditWeek*, November 1991).
17 S&P recently confirmed that an evaluation of the financial risks associated
18 with purchased power commitments is necessary "to allow for more
19 meaningful comparisons with utilities that build generation" (*Utilities &*
20 *Perspectives*, May 12, 2003).
21

1 **Q. What other indications confirm the need to properly consider the**
2 **financial impacts of purchased power commitments?**

3 A. Investors are aware of the impact that purchased power can have on a utility's
4 investment risks. As S&P observed in 1993 (*CreditWeek*, May 24, 1993), the
5 financial impact of purchased power directly influences credit standing and
6 financial flexibility:

7
8 Over the past few years, several ratings have been lowered due
9 to purchased power obligations. In other cases, S&P did not
10 raise ratings. Still others are lower than they might otherwise
11 be owing to purchased power liabilities.

12
13 In the wake of recent turmoil in the electric power industry, bond rating
14 agencies and investors are continuing to scrutinize debt levels. For those
15 firms with higher leverage, this intense focus can lead not only to ratings
16 downgrades, but also to reduced access to capital and increased borrowing
17 costs. The Wall Street Journal reported (“Rating Agencies Crack Down on
18 Utilities”, p. C1, December 19, 2001) that even firms with stock prices at
19 recent lows may be forced to issue new common equity in adverse markets
20 and quoted a credit analyst with Fitch, Inc.:

21
22 “(B)anks are fearful to put more money into the sector” and it
23 is making credit analysts nervous as well. The smart

1 companies, he says, are the ones that voluntarily “get their
2 balance sheets in line” and then “let the market know they're in
3 charge of their destiny ... since the market clearly has the
4 heebie-jeebies.”

5

6 The article went on to note the crucial role that financial flexibility plays in
7 ensuring that the utility has the wherewithal to meet the needs of customers,
8 especially during times of stress:

9

10 All the belt tightening spells bad news for the continued
11 development of the nation's energy infrastructure. Companies
12 that can borrow more money and stretch their dollars, quite
13 simply, can build more plants and equipment. Companies that
14 are increasingly dependent on equity financing – particularly in
15 a bear market – can do less.

16

17 **Q. Has the FPSC previously recognized the impact that purchased power**
18 **contracts have on the utility’s finances?**

19 A. Yes. Rule 25-22.081(7), F.A.C., relating to the contents of a petition for
20 determination of need, specifically requires utilities to address the cost impact
21 of purchases on their capital structure:

22

23 If the generation addition is the result of a purchased power
24 agreement between an investor-owned utility and a nonutility

1 generator, the petition shall include a discussion of the
2 potential for increases or decreases in the utility's cost of
3 capital, the effect of the seller's financing arrangements on the
4 utility's system reliability, any competitive advantage the
5 financing arrangements may give the seller and the seller's fuel
6 supply adequacy.

7
8 In past decisions, the FPSC has acknowledged that an equity adjustment is
9 appropriate to address the capital structure impact associated with purchase
10 alternatives. For example, in connection with Florida Power Corporation's
11 petition for approval to construct the Hines Unit 2 power plant, the FPSC
12 recognized an adjustment for the debt equivalent of purchased power options,
13 noting in Order No. PSC-01-0029-FOF-EI (January 5, 2001) that:

14
15 We find that for long-term debt, we should allow some
16 consideration of imputed debt. Imputed debt is an actual
17 consideration by bond rating agencies. We note that we have
18 allowed limited consideration of imputed debt in past cases.

19
20 Similarly, in Docket No. 990249-EG, Standard Offer Contract for Florida
21 Power & Light Company, the FPSC concluded that "(w)e find it is appropriate
22 to include an equity adjustment when determining FPL's proposed standard
23 offer contract payments" (*Order No. PSC-99-1713-TRF-EG*, September 2,

1 1999). While the Commission chose not to address the broader policy issue of
2 who should bear the incremental cost of additional equity to compensate for
3 purchased power contracts, the FPSC recognized (*Ibid.* at p. 7-8) that:

4
5 Buying power increases the utility's fixed charges, which, in
6 turn, can reduce financial flexibility. Standard & Poor's (S&P)
7 notes that, "regardless of whether a utility buys or builds,
8 adding capacity means incurring risk." ... In including this
9 equity adjustment, FPL is reflecting the cost, in the form of less
10 financial flexibility, that is imposed on electric utilities with
11 purchased power contracts.

12
13 Moreover, the FPSC continues to recognize the financial leverage implicit in
14 purchased power contracts in the approach used for surveillance reporting
15 requirements. The current Revenue Sharing Agreement in effect for FPL
16 included in Order No. PSC-02-0501-AS-EI, April 11, 2002, incorporates by
17 reference the following provision from the Stipulation and Settlement
18 approved by the Commission in 1999 (*Order No. PSC-99-0519-AS-EI*, March
19 17, 1999):

20
21 (FPL's) adjusted equity ratio equals common equity divided by
22 the sum of common equity, preferred equity, debt and off-
23 balance sheet obligations. The amount used for off-balance

1 sheet obligations will be calculated per the Standard & Poor's
2 methodology as used in its August 1998 credit report.

3
4 Similarly, in a recent memorandum regarding FPL's proposed standard offer
5 contract (*Memorandum*, Docket No. 031093-EQ, Feb. 5, 2004), the FPSC's
6 Division of Economic Regulation concluded that "staff believes it is
7 appropriate for FPL to make an equity adjustment as proposed in the
8 determination of capacity payments in its Standard Offer Contract." Staff
9 affirmed FPL's calculations based on S&P's current methodology, with the
10 FPSC subsequently confirming at its February 17, 2004 Agenda Conference
11 that it would be appropriate for the Company to make an equity adjustment.

12
13 **Q. Does the Commission's decision in the Martin/Manatee need case (Docket**
14 **No. 020262-EI) also support consideration of the equity adjustment in**
15 **this case?**

16 **A.** Yes. While the FPSC declined to recognize the application of an equity
17 adjustment in evaluating alternatives to self-build options in FPL's last need
18 case, the Commission expressly confirmed that "consideration of an equity
19 adjustment is appropriate" (*Order No. PSC-02-1743-FOF-EI*).

20
21 **Q. What is your understanding of why the Commission declined to adopt**
22 **FPL's proposed equity adjustment in the Martin/Manatee proceeding?**

23 **A.** The Commission determined there was not sufficient evidence concerning the

1 potential impact of other factors associated with purchased power that might
2 serve to mitigate a portion of the additional financial costs imposed by the
3 debt equivalent of long-term supply contracts. Thus, while the FPSC
4 expressed “particular concern” regarding the need to examine the presence *or*
5 *absence* of mitigating factors, the Commission recommended that a case-by-
6 case examination of the entire circumstances surrounding the equity
7 adjustment be considered in subsequent proceedings (*Id.*).

8
9 **Q. Does FPL’s proposed equity adjustment specifically account for other**
10 **factors that might mitigate the financial costs associated with entering**
11 **into purchased power contracts?**

12 A. Yes. The equity adjustment mechanism proposed by FPL (RFP, Appendix C)
13 specifically captures the impact of mitigating factors in two ways. First, “the
14 presence or amount of other factors which financial rating agencies may take
15 into account in mitigation of the equity adjustment” (*Order No. PSC-02-1743-*
16 *FOF-El*) are already incorporated into S&P’s methodology. As explained in
17 greater detail subsequently, calculation of the debt equivalent associated with
18 purchase power obligations depends in part on an assigned “risk factor”,
19 which reflects the rating agency’s overall assessment of the risks that a utility
20 assumes when purchasing power under contract. While the most significant
21 attribute in establishing this risk factor is the risk of recovering the costs of
22 purchased power, S&P’s review encompasses “a qualitative analysis of
23 market, operating, and regulatory risks” (CreditWeek, May 24, 1993). S&P

1 noted that its current assessment “takes several variables into consideration,
 2 including the economics of the power and regulatory treatment” (*Utilities &*
 3 *Perspectives*, May 12, 2003). Examples of these qualitative economic and
 4 regulatory factors were identified in S&P’s 1993 publication and are displayed
 5 in the following table:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Risk Factor</u>
<i>Market</i>	Need for Power
	Economics
<i>Operating</i>	Performance Standards
	Reliability
	Dispatchability
	Control Over Maintenance
	Flexibility and Diversity
<i>Regulatory</i>	Preauthorized
	Regulatory Recovery Mechanism
	Regulatory Out Clause

18 Thus, in establishing its overall risk factor, S&P has already considered a host
 19 of “qualitative risk mitigators” (*CreditWeek*, May 24, 1993) that serve to offset
 20 the financial costs of purchased power contracts and these offsetting factors
 21 are incorporated into FPL’s equity adjustment.

22
 23 Second, FPL’s application of the equity adjustment specifically includes
 24 provisions to quantify the potential offsetting impact of two mitigating factors
 25 – completion security and performance security. As detailed in Appendix C to
 26 the RFP, FPL’s equity adjustment incorporates offsetting credits to the
 27 financial costs of purchased power contracts. These credits are designed to
 28 account for quantifiable differences between the delivery and performance
 29 risks of purchased power versus self-build options. Thus, in addition to the

1 mitigation already built into the risk factor used to quantify the equity
2 adjustment, FPL has included specific, quantitative adjustments to capture two
3 broad categories of potential mitigation.

4
5 **Q. Does the equity adjustment somehow depend on the assumption that**
6 **entering into a purchased power agreement would lead to a change in**
7 **bond ratings?**

8 A. No. A utility's credit ratings are established based on a plethora of qualitative
9 and quantitative factors. While investors clearly recognize that the debt
10 equivalent of purchased power obligations has a quantifiable impact on
11 financial risks and reduces a utility's financial flexibility, the incremental
12 investment risk may not rise to the level necessary to prompt a revision to the
13 utility's bond ratings. Indeed, because FPL's financial policies have explicitly
14 recognized the leverage implicit in purchased power contracts, it would come
15 as no surprise that some increment of additional purchased power could be
16 accommodated without immediate negative actions on the part of bond rating
17 agencies.

18
19 Regardless of whether additional purchased power triggers a change in bond
20 ratings, every additional obligation increases the Company's leverage.
21 Recognizing the equity adjustment is necessary, not to measure the potential
22 change in bond ratings, but simply to account for quantifiable cost differences
23 between power supply alternatives. The incremental costs that are associated

1 with additional financial leverage arising from purchased power contracts are
2 one such difference that has been recognized by the investment community
3 and the FPSC.
4

5 **III. EQUITY ADJUSTMENT**

6
7 **Q. Please describe the methodology used by S&P to reflect the financial**
8 **impact of purchased power obligations.**

9 A. While other rating agencies have expressed similar concerns regarding the
10 financial impacts of purchased power commitments, S&P is largely unique in
11 having a defined quantitative analysis to account for the additional risks
12 associated with these contractual commitments. This methodology begins by
13 quantifying the potential off-balance sheet obligation attributable to long-term
14 power purchase contracts. The first step in this process involves calculating
15 the net present value of the remaining capacity payments over the life of the
16 agreement, determined using a discount rate of 10 percent.

17
18 Next, S&P evaluates the characteristics of a utility's purchased power
19 contracts, placing each agreement on a risk spectrum according to the degree
20 to which payments under the contract resemble the fixed obligations of
21 traditional debt instruments, such as long-term bonds. Within the S&P
22 analytical framework, this difference in the relative debt characteristics of
23 purchased power obligations is accommodated using a risk spectrum ranging
24 from 0 to 100 percent. This risk factor represents the proportion of the

1 obligations' net present value to be considered off-balance sheet debt. For
2 example, if S&P determines that the risk factor for a specific purchased power
3 contract is 50 percent, S&P considers 50 percent of the net present value of
4 the related capacity payments as a debt equivalent and adds this to reported
5 obligations.

6
7 As noted earlier, in determining the risk factor S&P considers a variety of
8 qualitative factors related to the purchased power contract. Previously,
9 contracts that were relatively more firm in terms of their delivery and payment
10 obligations were generally considered more debt-like than others. However,
11 in a May 12, 2003, report (“Buy Versus Build’: Debt Aspects of Purchased-
12 Power Agreements,” *Utilities & Perspectives*), S&P explained that it had
13 revised its approach to recognize significant structural changes in the electric
14 power industry. Rather than evaluating the likelihood of payment under
15 purchased power contracts, S&P has revised its assessment to place particular
16 emphasis on the method under which the utility recovers of purchased power
17 costs. For example, assuming adequate regulatory treatment, S&P now
18 assigns a 50 percent risk factor where payments under long-term purchased
19 power commitments are included in a utility’s base rates. S&P concluded
20 (*Utilities & Perspectives*, May 12, 2003) that a risk factor as low as 30 percent
21 could be justified for utilities with supportive regulation that recover
22 purchased power costs via a fuel adjustment clause (FAC), as opposed to base
23 rates:

1 For utilities in supportive regulatory jurisdictions with a
2 precedent for timely and full cost recovery of fuel and
3 purchased power costs, a risk factor of as low as 30% could be
4 used.

5
6 **Q. Please describe the method FPL has proposed to reflect the greater**
7 **financial leverage associated with purchased power in its economic**
8 **evaluation under the RFP.**

9 **A.** Consistent with the fact that investors view some portion of a utility's capacity
10 payment obligations as the equivalent of debt on the balance sheet, FPL's
11 quantitative analyses reflect an equity adjustment to incorporate the additional
12 costs associated with the greater equity that would be required to rebalance its
13 capital structure.

14
15 For each year under the proposal, the cumulative net present value of the
16 remaining annual demand charges was calculated using the same 10 percent
17 discount rate utilized by S&P. To arrive at the debt equivalent portion of these
18 demand charges in each year, this cumulative net present value is multiplied
19 by a risk factor of 30 percent. This corresponds to the lowest factor specified
20 by S&P for an integrated utility that recovers purchased power costs through a
21 FAC and is identical to the risk factor applied to FPL by S&P in its own
22 analysis (*Research: FPL Group, Inc.*, Oct. 21, 2003). To offset the greater
23 financial leverage associated with this obligation, FPL must replace a portion

1 of this off-balance-sheet debt with equity, calculated as the product of the debt
2 equivalent and a 55 percent equity ratio. The incremental cost associated with
3 this rebalancing is then computed by multiplying the amount of capital
4 implicitly shifted from debt to equity by the difference between the pre-tax
5 cost of the two capital sources. Thus, the equity adjustment represents the
6 incremental costs in each year that would be required to hold FPL's financial
7 leverage constant in the face of the higher off-balance-sheet liabilities
8 attributable to the purchased power proposals. These annual costs are then
9 converted to a present value using the weighted average after-tax cost of debt
10 and equity capital. A detailed illustration of the method described above is
11 contained in Appendix C to the RFP.

12
13 Finally, as indicated earlier, FPL's equity adjustment also includes specific
14 provisions to offset the costs required to rebalance the Company's capital
15 structure by mitigation offered through the completion and performance
16 security. These factors, which are designed to accommodate measurable
17 differences in delivery and performance risk between purchased power and
18 self-build options, are in addition to qualitative factors considered by S&P in
19 its evaluation of the risk factor used to determine the debt equivalent of
20 purchased power obligations.

1 **Q. Is the methodology underlying the equity adjustment proposed by FPL**
2 **consistent with the S&P approach adopted in prior FPSC proceedings?**

3 A. Yes. The equity adjustment calculation employed by FPL is directly
4 analogous to the methodology used by S&P in its analyses of FPL's credit
5 standing. S&P's focus remains primarily on balance sheet adjustments
6 designed to recognize the credit implications of heightened financial risks
7 associated with purchased power, while FPL's adjustment quantifies the
8 implicit costs of rebalancing between debt and equity to offset these risks.
9 The methodology used by FPL to measure the off-balance-sheet obligation
10 associated with purchase power obligations is identical to S&P's approach.
11 Further, but for the additional consideration of specific mitigating factors,
12 FPL's proposed equity adjustment methodology is the same as that approved
13 by the FPSC in Order Nos. PSC-01-0029-FOF-EI and PSC-99-1713-TRF-EG
14 discussed earlier.

15
16 **Q. What capital structure and component costs of debt and equity are**
17 **incorporated in FPL's proposed calculation of the equity adjustment?**

18 A. FPL's equity adjustment is developed based on the assumption that the capital
19 structure is rebalanced to maintain a 55 percent equity ratio after reflecting the
20 impact of imputed debt from off-balance sheet obligations (adjusted equity
21 ratio). In computing the associated costs implicit in this rebalancing, the
22 equity adjustment assumes a rate of return on common equity of 11.0 percent
23 and an incremental debt cost of 6.4 percent.

1 **Q. Do you believe these assumptions are reasonable for purposes of an**
2 **economic evaluation of purchased power alternatives?**

3 A. Yes. The 55 percent adjusted common equity ratio incorporated in calculating
4 the equity adjustment is consistent with FPL's current and historical adjusted
5 capital structure. Further, the current Revenue Sharing Agreement arising
6 from the stipulation in Docket No. 001148-EI retained the adjusted capital
7 structure for surveillance reporting requirements specified under the terms of
8 the prior agreement that expired in April 2002. This prior agreement also
9 embodied a 55.83 percent surveillance cap on the adjusted common equity
10 ratio.

11
12 With respect to the component costs of debt and equity, a 6.4 percent
13 incremental cost of debt is generally consistent with the current yields on
14 public utility bonds. Meanwhile, under the terms of the current Revenue
15 Sharing Agreement, FPL no longer has a benchmark authorized return on
16 equity range for the purpose of addressing earnings levels. Nevertheless, the
17 11.0 percent cost of equity is the return specified in the order approving the
18 current Revenue Sharing Agreement "to be used for all other purposes"
19 (*Order No. PSC-02-0501-AS-EI*).

20
21 **Q. Does FPL's evaluation properly account for the impact of its self-build**
22 **options on the Company's finances?**

23 A. Yes. The cost of financing FPL's self-build options is incorporated into the

1 Company's evaluation through the capital structure and component costs of
2 financing, just as FPL has proposed to evaluate purchased power alternatives.
3 FPL assumes the same capital structure of 55 percent equity / 45 percent long-
4 term debt – and the same component costs of debt and equity – in evaluating
5 its self-build options. Because FPL uses identical assumptions to capture the
6 financing impact of its self-build options, the Company's evaluation is neutral
7 between self-build and purchased power alternatives.
8

9 **Q. Does the equity adjustment incorporate any provision to reflect the**
10 **relative credit quality of the individual counterparties?**

11 A. No. The terms of FPL's RFP explicitly contemplate that counterparties will
12 maintain an investment grade bond rating or an equivalent guarantee for new
13 construction proposals. In addition, the relative strength of the proposer is
14 considered in determining the type of credit support to be provided (*i.e.*, cash,
15 letter of credit, or guarantee). Accordingly, in conducting the analyses used to
16 quantify the equity adjustment, no modifications were made to incorporate
17 project sponsor risk differences. Nonetheless, the financial wherewithal of the
18 counterparty may impact the risks faced by FPL, especially in extreme
19 instances. As S&P observed (*CreditWeek*, November 1991):
20

21 (H)ighly leveraged NUGs [non-utility generators] are
22 inherently less creditworthy than less leveraged NUGs. And
23 their financial health may affect their reliability.

1 The risk spectrum used to calculate the equity adjustment reflects the relative
2 debt characteristics of the off-balance sheet liability associated with a
3 purchased power contract. As such, it is distinct from any assessment of the
4 financial viability of a specific counterparty or that entity's ability to actually
5 meet the provisions of the agreement.

6

7 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony in this case?**

8 **A. Yes, it does.**

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Summary of Qualifications

Ph.D. in economics and finance; Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA[®]) designation; extensive expert witness testimony before courts, alternative dispute resolution panels, regulatory agencies and legislative committees; lectured in executive education programs around the world on ethics, investment analysis, and regulation; undergraduate and graduate teaching in business and economics; appointed to leadership positions in government, industry, academia, and the military.

Employment

Principal,
FINCAP, Inc.
(Sep. 1979 to present)

Financial, economic and policy consulting to business and government. Perform business and public policy research, cost/benefit analyses and financial modeling, valuation of businesses (over 100 entities valued), estimation of damages, statistical and industry studies. Provide strategy advice and educational services in public and private sectors, and serve as expert witness before regulatory agencies, legislative committees, arbitration panels, and courts.

*Director, Economic Research
Division,*
Public Utility Commission of Texas
(Dec. 1977 to Aug. 1979)

Responsible for research and testimony preparation on rate of return, rate structure, and econometric analysis dealing with energy, telecommunications, water and sewer utilities. Testified in major rate cases and appeared before legislative committees and served as Chief Economist for agency. Administered state and federal grant funds. Communicated frequently with political leaders and representatives from consumer groups, media, and investment community.

Manager, Financial Education,
International Paper Company
New York City
(Feb. 1977 to Nov. 1977)

Directed corporate education programs in accounting, finance, and economics. Developed course materials, recruited and trained instructors, liaison within the company and with academic institutions. Prepared operating budget and designed financial controls for corporate professional development program.

Lecturer in Finance,
The University of Texas at Austin
(Sep. 1979 to May 1981)
Assistant Professor of Finance,
(Sep. 1975 to May 1977)

Taught graduate and undergraduate courses in financial management and investment theory. Conducted research in business and public policy. Named Outstanding Graduate Business Professor and received various administrative appointments.

Assistant Professor of Business,
University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill
(Sep. 1972 to Jul. 1975)

Taught in BBA, MBA, and Ph.D. programs. Created project course in finance, Financial Management for Women, and participated in developing Small Business Management sequence. Organized the North Carolina Institute for Investment Research, a group of financial institutions that supported academic research. Faculty advisor to the Media Board, which funds student publications and broadcast stations.

Education

Ph.D., Economics and Finance,
University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill
(Jan. 1969 to Aug. 1972)

Elective courses included financial management, public finance, monetary theory, and econometrics. Awarded the Stonier Fellowship by the American Bankers' Association and University Teaching Fellowship. Taught statistics, macroeconomics, and microeconomics.

Dissertation: *The Geometric Mean Strategy as a Theory of Multiperiod Portfolio Choice*

B.A., Economics,
Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia
(Sep. 1961 to Jun. 1965)

Active in extracurricular activities, president of the Barkley Forum (debate team), Emory Religious Association, and Delta Tau Delta chapter. Individual awards and team championships at national collegiate debate tournaments.

Professional Associations

Received Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) designation in 1977; Vice President for Membership, Financial Management Association; President, Austin Chapter of Planning Executives Institute; Board of Directors, North Carolina Society of Financial Analysts; Candidate Curriculum Committee, Association for Investment Management and Research; Executive Committee of Southern Finance Association; Vice Chair, Staff Subcommittee on Economics and National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC); Appointed to NARUC Technical Subcommittee on the National Energy Act.

Teaching in Executive Education Programs

University-Sponsored Programs: Central Michigan University, Duke University, Louisiana State University, National Defense University, National University of Singapore, Texas A&M University, University of Kansas, University of North Carolina, University of Texas.

Business and Government-Sponsored Programs: Advanced Seminar on Earnings Regulation, American Public Welfare Association, Association for Investment Management and Research, Congressional Fellows Program, Cost of Capital Workshop, Electricity Consumers Resource Council, Financial Analysts Association of Indonesia, Financial Analysts Review, Financial Analysts Seminar at Northwestern University, Governor's Executive Development Program of Texas, Louisiana Association of Business and Industry, National Association of Purchasing Management, National Association of Tire Dealers, Planning Executives Institute, School of Banking of the South, State of Wisconsin Investment Board, Stock Exchange of Thailand, Texas Association of State Sponsored Computer Centers, Texas Bankers' Association, Texas Bar Association, Texas Savings and Loan League, Texas Society of CPAs, Tokyo Association of Foreign Banks, Union Bank of Switzerland, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Navy, U.S. Veterans Administration, in addition to Texas state agencies and major corporations.

Presented papers for Mills B. Lane Lecture Series at the University of Georgia and Heubner Lectures at the University of Pennsylvania. Taught graduate courses in finance and economics in evening program at St. Edward's University in Austin from January 1979 through 1998.

Expert Witness Testimony

Testified in nearly 200 cases before regulatory agencies addressing cost of capital, rate design, and other economic and financial issues.

Federal Agencies: Federal Communications Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Surface Transportation Board, Interstate Commerce Commission, and the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission.

State Regulatory Agencies: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.

Testified in over 30 cases before federal and state courts, arbitration panels, and alternative dispute tribunals (over 60 depositions given) regarding damages, valuation, antitrust liability, fiduciary duties, and other economic and financial issues.

Board Positions and Other Professional Activities

Audit Committee and Outside Director, Georgia System Operations Corporation (electric system operator for member-owned electric cooperatives in Georgia); Chairman, Board of Print Depot, Inc. and FINCAP, Inc.; Co-chair, Synchronous Interconnection Committee, appointed by Governor George Bush and Public Utility Commission of Texas; Operator of AAA Ranch, a certified organic producer of agricultural products; Appointed to Organic Livestock Advisory Committee by Texas Agricultural Commissioner Susan Combs; Appointed by Texas Railroad Commissioners to study group for *The UP/SP Merger: An Assessment of the Impacts on the State of Texas*; Appointed by

Hawaii Public Utilities Commission to team reviewing affiliate relationships of Hawaiian Electric Industries; Chairman, Energy Task Force, Greater Austin-San Antonio Corridor Council; Consultant to Public Utility Commission of Texas on cogeneration policy and other matters; Consultant to Public Service Commission of New Mexico on cogeneration policy; Evaluator of Energy Research Grant Proposals for Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board.

Community Activities

Board Member, Sustainable Food Center; Chair, Board of Deacons, Finance Committee, and Elder, Central Presbyterian Church of Austin; Founding Member, Orange-Chatham County (N.C.) Legal Aid Screening Committee.

Military

Captain, U.S. Naval Reserve (retired after 28 years service); Commanding Officer, Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) Engineering Support Unit; Officer-in-charge of SWIFT patrol boat in Vietnam; Enlisted service as weather analyst (advanced to second class petty officer).

Bibliography

Monographs

- Ethics and the Investment Professional* (video, workbook, and instructor's guide) and *Ethics Challenge Today* (video), Association for Investment Management and Research (1995)
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- "Usefulness of Current Values to Investors and Creditors," *Research Study on Current-Value Accounting Measurements and Utility*, George M. Scott, ed., Touche Ross Foundation (1978)
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- "Some Thoughts on the Rate of Return to Public Utility Companies," with Bruce H. Fairchild in *Proceedings of the NARUC Biennial Regulatory Information Conference* (1978)
- "A New Capital Budgeting Measure: The Integration of Time, Liquidity, and Uncertainty," with David Cordell in *Proceedings of the Southwestern Finance Association* (1977)
- "Usefulness of Current Values to Investors and Creditors," in *Inflation Accounting/Indexing and Stock Behavior* (1977)
- "Consumer Expectations and the Economy," *Texas Business Review* (Nov. 1976)
- "Portfolio Performance Evaluation and Long-run Capital Growth," with Henry A. Latané in *Proceedings of the Eastern Finance Association* (1973)
- Book reviews in *Journal of Finance* and *Financial Review*. Abstracts for *CFA Digest*. Articles in *Carolina Financial Times*.

Selected Papers and Presentations

- "The Who, What, When, How, and Why of Ethics", San Antonio Financial Analysts Society (Jan. 16, 2002). Similar presentation given to the Austin Society of Financial Analysts (Jan. 17, 2002)
- "Ethics for Financial Analysts," Sponsored by Canadian Council of Financial Analysts: delivered in Calgary, Edmonton, Regina, and Winnipeg, June 1997. Similar presentations given to Austin Society of Financial Analysts (Mar. 1994), San Antonio Society of Financial Analysts (Nov. 1985), and St. Louis Society of Financial Analysts (Feb. 1986)
- "Cost of Capital for Multi-Divisional Corporations," Financial Management Association, New Orleans, Louisiana (Oct. 1996)
- "Ethics and the Treasury Function," Government Treasurers Organization of Texas, Corpus Christi, Texas (Jun. 1996)
- "A Cooperative Future," Iowa Association of Electric Cooperatives, Des Moines (December 1995). Similar presentations given to National G & T Conference, Irving, Texas (June 1995), Kentucky Association of Electric Cooperatives Annual Meeting, Louisville (Nov. 1994), Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware Association of Electric Cooperatives Annual Meeting, Richmond (July 1994), and Carolina Electric Cooperatives Annual Meeting, Raleigh (Mar. 1994)
- "Information Superhighway Warnings: Speed Bumps on Wall Street and Detours from the Economy," Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants Natural Gas, Telecommunications and Electric Industries Conference, Austin (Apr. 1995)
- "Economic/Wall Street Outlook," Carolinas Council of the Institute of Management Accountants, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina (May 1994). Similar presentation given to Bell Operating Company Accounting Witness Conference, Santa Fe, New Mexico (Apr. 1993)

- "Regulatory Developments in Telecommunications," Regional Holding Company Financial and Accounting Conference, San Antonio (Sep. 1993)
- "Estimating the Cost of Capital During the 1990s: Issues and Directions," The National Society of Rate of Return Analysts, Washington, D.C. (May 1992)
- "Making Utility Regulation Work at the Public Utility Commission of Texas," Center for Legal and Regulatory Studies, University of Texas, Austin (June 1991)
- "Can Regulation Compete for the Hearts and Minds of Industrial Customers," Emerging Issues of Competition in the Electric Utility Industry Conference, Austin (May 1988)
- "The Role of Utilities in Fostering New Energy Technologies," Emerging Energy Technologies in Texas Conference, Austin (Mar. 1988)
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- "Public Utility Commissions and the Nuclear Plant Contractor," Construction Litigation Superconference, Laguna Beach, California (Dec. 1986)
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- "Multi-period Wealth Distributions and Portfolio Theory," Southern Finance Association, Houston (Nov. 1973)
- "Growth Rates, Expected Returns, and Variance in Portfolio Selection and Performance Evaluation," with Henry A. Latané, Econometric Society, Oslo, Norway (Aug. 1973)