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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

)

In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Power & Light Company.

) DOCKET NO. 20250011-EI

Direct Testimony and Exhibits of

Christopher C. Walters

On behalf of

Federal Executive Agencies

June 9, 2025



Project 11813

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Petition for rate increase) DOCKET NO.
by Florida Power & Light) 20250011-EI
Company.)
Company.)

STATE OF MISSOURI

COUNTY OF ST. LOUIS

SS

)

Affidavit of Christopher C. Walters

Christopher C. Walters, being first duly sworn, on his oath states:

1. My name is Christopher C. Walters. I am a consultant with Brubaker & Associates, Inc., having its principal place of business at 16690 Swingley Ridge Road, Suite 140, Chesterfield, Missouri 63017. We have been retained by the Federal Executive Agencies in this proceeding on their behalf.

2. Attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes are my direct testimony and exhibits which were prepared in written form for introduction into evidence in the Florida Public Service Commission Docket No. 20250011-EI.

3. I hereby swear and affirm that the testimony and exhibits are true and correct and that they show the matters and things that they purport to show.

Christopher C. Walters

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of June, 2025.



BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

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In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Power & Light Company.) DOCKET NO.) 20250011-EI

Table of Contents to theDirect Testimony of Christopher C. Walters

<u>Page</u>

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
II.	SUMMARY	2
111.	 INDUSTRY TRENDS AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT	3 . 10 . 18 . 22
IV.	 RATE OF RETURN A. Capital Structure B. Cost of Debt C. Cost of Equity D. Investment Risk Assessment of the Company E. Development of Proxy Group F. DCF Model G. Sustainable Growth DCF H. Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model I. Risk Premium Model J. Capital Asset Pricing Model K. Return on Equity Summary 	24 26 26 29 31 33 37 38 44 49 60
V.	REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF MR. COYNE'S TESTIMONY. A. Summary of Rebuttal B. Flotation Costs C. Mr. Coyne's DCF Analyses D. Mr. Coyne's CAPM Analysis E. Mr. Coyne's Risk Premium Analysis F. Mr. Coyne's Expected Earnings Analysis G. Mr. Coyne's Assertion that FPL is Riskier than the Proxy Group pendix A – Qualifications of Christopher C. Walters	. 62 . 62 . 66 . 67 . 68 . 73 . 76 . 78

- Exhibit CCW-1: Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)
- Exhibit CCW-2: Proxy Group
- Exhibit CCW-3: Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates
- Exhibit CCW-4: Constant Growth DCF Model (Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates)
- Exhibit CCW-5: Payout Ratios
- Exhibit CCW-6: Sustainable Growth Rate
- Exhibit CCW-7: Constant Growth DCF Model (Sustainable Growth Rate)
- Exhibit CCW-8: Multi-Stage DCF Model
- Exhibit CCW-9: Common Stock Market/Book Ratio
- Exhibit CCW-10: Equity Risk Premium Treasury Bond
- Exhibit CCW-11: Equity Risk Premium Utility Bond
- Exhibit CCW-12: Bond Yield Spreads
- Exhibit CCW-13: 3 and 6 Month Treasury and Utility Bond Yields
- Exhibit CCW-14: Beta
- Exhibit CCW-15: CAPM Return

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In re: Petition for rate increase by) DOCKET NO. 20250011-EI Florida Power & Light Company.

Direct Testimony of Christopher C. Walters

1		I. INTRODUCTION
2	Q	PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
3	А	Christopher C. Walters. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road,
4		Suite 140, Chesterfield, MO 63017.
5	Q	WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?
6	А	I am a consultant in the field of public utility regulation and a Principal with the firm of
7		Brubaker & Associates, Inc. ("BAI"), energy, economic and regulatory consultants.
8	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE.
9	А	This information is included in Appendix A to this testimony.
10	Q	ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU APPEARING IN THIS PROCEEDING?
11	А	I am appearing in this proceeding on behalf of the Federal Executive Agencies ("FEA").
12	Q	WHAT IS THE SUBJECT MATTER OF YOUR TESTIMONY?
13	А	My testimony addresses Florida Power & Light Company's ("FPL" or "Company")
14		current market cost of equity and capital structure.
15		To the extent my testimony does not address any particular issue does not
16		indicate tacit agreement with the Company's or another party's position on that issue.
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II. SUMMARY

2 Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE REST OF YOUR TESTIMONY.

A In Section III of my testimony, I review and analyze the regulated utility industry's access to capital, credit rating trends, and outlooks, as well as the overall trend in the authorized return on equity ("ROE") for utilities throughout the country. I conclude that the trend in authorized ROEs for utilities has declined over the last several years and has remained below 10.0% in more recent history. I also review the impact that the Federal Reserve's ("the Fed") monetary policy actions have had on the cost of capital.

9 In Section IV of my testimony, I address the Company's proposed capital 10 structure, cost of debt, outline how a fair ROE should be established, provide an 11 overview of the market's perception of the Company's investment risk, and present 12 the analyses I relied on to estimate an appropriate ROE for FPL. Based on the results 13 of several cost of equity estimation methods performed on publicly traded utility 14 companies, I estimate the current fair market ROE to fall within the range of 9.00% to 15 10.00%. Based on my assessment of the Company's overall risk profile and the 16 results of the analytical methods, I recommend FPL be awarded an ROE of 9.50%, 17 which is the mid-point of my overall estimated range. In acknowledgment of the 18 Company's significantly higher equity ratio, a more reasonable range applicable to the 19 Company would be the lower-half of my overall recommended range (i.e., 9.00% 20 to 9.50%).

In Section V of my testimony, I respond to the Company's witness Mr. Coyne's estimate of the current market cost of equity for FPL. Mr. Coyne recommends the Company be authorized an ROE of 11.90%, which is the average of his analytical results adjusted for flotation costs. I demonstrate that his ROE recommendation is excessive and should be rejected.

Ш. INDUSTRY TRENDS AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 1

2 A. Regulated Utility Industry Authorized ROEs Access to Capital, and Credit Strength

3 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE OBSERVABLE EVIDENCE ON TRENDS IN 4 AUTHORIZED ROES FOR ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITIES.

5 А Authorized ROEs for both electric and gas utilities have declined over the last 6 10 years, as illustrated in Figure CCW-1 below, and have been below 10.0% for about 7 the last nine years.



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1 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORIZED ROES FOR

2 ELECTRIC UTILITIES FOR THE LAST FEW YEARS.

- 3 A The distribution of authorized returns, annually, since 2016 is summarized in Table
- 4 CCW-1 below.

		TABLE C	CW-1				
<u>Distribution of Authorized ROEs</u> (All Electric Utilities)*							
<u>Year</u> (1)	<u>Average</u> (2)	<u>Median</u> (3)	Share of Decisions $\leq 9.5\%$ (4)	Share of Decisions $\leq 9.7\%$ (5)	Share of Decisions <u>≤ 10.0%</u> (6)		
2016	9.60%	9.60%	41%	53%	94%		
2017^{1}	9.68%	9.60%	40%	67%	81%		
2018^{2}	9.56%	9.58%	45%	61%	100%		
2019	9.65%	9.65%	36%	58%	88%		
2020^{3}	9.39%	9.48%	64%	79%	98%		
2021	9.39%	9.50%	57%	80%	97%		
2022	9.58%	9.53%	50%	59%	79%		
2023	9.66%	9.60%	38%	65%	90%		
2024	9.78%	9.78%	24%	37%	85%		
2025	9.70%	9.75%	33%	40%	93%		
Average	9.60%	9.61%	43%	60%	91%		
Median	9.62%	9.60%	41%	60%	91%		

Source and Notes:

S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025.

¹Includes authorized base ROE of 9.4% for Nevada Power Company, which excludes incentives associated with the Lenzie facility.

²Includes authorized base ROE of 9.6% for Interstate Power & Light Co., which excludes allowed ROE for generating facilities subject to special ratemaking principles.

³Includes authorized base ROE of 9.8% for Interstate Power & Light Co., which excludes allowed ROE for generating facilities subject to special ratemaking principles. *Excludes Limited Issue Rider Cases.

The distribution shows that the majority of authorized ROEs since 2016 have
 been below 9.7%, with many being below 9.5%.

Q HOW HAS THE AUTHORIZED COMMON EQUITY RATIO FLUCTUATED OVER THE SAME TIME PERIOD FOR UTILITIES?

5 А In general, the utility industry's common equity ratio has not deviated much from the 6 range of 50.0% to 52.0%. As shown in Table CCW-2, I have provided the authorized 7 common equity ratios for utilities around the country, excluding the reported common equity ratios for Arkansas, Florida, Indiana, and Michigan. For my overall market 8 9 analysis, I have excluded the reported authorized common equity ratios for these 10 states because these jurisdictions include sources of capital outside of 11 investor-supplied capital such as accumulated deferred income taxes. As such, the 12 reported common equity ratios in these states would result in a downward bias in the 13 reported permanent common equity ratios authorized for ratemaking purposes within 14 my trend analysis.

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Year (1) Average (2) Median (3) 2016 49.70% 49.99% 2017 50.02% 49.85% 2018 50.60% 50.23% 2019 51.55% 51.37% 2020 50.93% 51.17% 2021 51.01% 52.00% 2022 51.57% 51.92% 2023 51.59% 52.27% 2024 51.01% 52.10% 2025 50.30% 51.56% Average 50.83% 51.25% Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: 1 S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. • Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. because they include non-investor capital.		y Ratios	d in Authorized Equi	<u>Tren</u>
Year (1)Average (2)Median (3)201649.70%49.99% 2017201750.02%49.85% 2018201850.60%50.23% 2019201951.55%51.37% 2020202050.93%51.17% 2021202151.01%52.00% 2022202251.57%51.92% 		ectric ¹	E	
(1)(2)(3)201649.70%49.99%201750.02%49.85%201850.60%50.23%201951.55%51.37%202050.93%51.17%202151.01%52.00%202251.57%51.92%202351.59%52.27%202451.07%52.10%202550.30%51.56%Average50.83%51.25%Median50.97%51.46%Source and Notes:1S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025.Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital.HAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS AUTHORIZED ROES?Yes. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the indust	dian	Median	Average	Year
2016 49.70% 49.99% 2017 50.02% 49.85% 2018 50.60% 50.23% 2019 51.55% 51.37% 2020 50.93% 51.17% 2021 51.01% 52.00% 2022 51.57% 51.92% 2023 51.59% 52.27% 2024 51.07% 52.10% 2025 50.30% 51.56% Average 50.83% 51.25% Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: 1 S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. - Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. 50.46%	3)	(3)	(2)	(1)
2017 50.02% 49.85% 2018 50.60% 50.23% 2019 51.55% 51.37% 2020 50.93% 51.17% 2021 51.01% 52.00% 2022 51.57% 51.92% 2023 51.59% 52.27% 2024 51.07% 52.10% 2025 50.30% 51.56% Average 50.83% 51.25% Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: 1 S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. - Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. 50.83%	99%	49.99%	49.70%	2016
201850.60%50.23%201951.55%51.37%202050.93%51.17%202151.01%52.00%202251.57%51.92%202351.59%52.27%202451.07%52.10%202550.30%51.56%Average50.83%51.25%Median50.97%51.46%Source and Notes:1S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025.Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital.HAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS AUTHORIZED ROES?Yes. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the indust	35%	49.85%	50.02%	2017
201951.55%51.37%202050.93%51.17%202151.01%52.00%202251.57%51.92%202351.59%52.27%202451.07%52.10%202550.30%51.56%Average50.83%51.25%Median50.97%51.46%Source and Notes:1S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025.Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital.HAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS AUTHORIZED ROES?Yes. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the indust	23%	50.23%	50.60%	2018
202050.93%51.17%202151.01%52.00%202251.57%51.92%202351.59%52.27%202451.07%52.10%202550.30%51.56%Average50.83%51.25%Median50.97%51.46%Source and Notes:1S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025.Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital.IAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS AUTHORIZED ROES?Yes. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the industion	37%	51.37%	51.55%	2019
2021 51.01% 52.00% 2022 51.57% 51.92% 2023 51.59% 52.27% 2024 51.07% 52.10% 2025 50.30% 51.56% Average 50.83% 51.25% Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: 1 S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. - Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. HAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS NUTHORIZED ROES? Yes. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the industriphical statements of the industriphical	17%	51.17%	50.93%	2020
2022 51.57% 51.92% 2023 51.59% 52.27% 2024 51.07% 52.10% 2025 50.30% 51.56% Average 50.83% 51.25% Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: 1 S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. - Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. because they include non-investor capital.	00%	52.00%	51.01%	2021
2023 51.59% 52.27% 2024 51.07% 52.10% 2025 50.30% 51.56% Average 50.83% 51.25% Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: ¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. MAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS NUTHORIZED ROES? Yes. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the industion	92%	51.92%	51.57%	2022
2024 51.07% 52.10% 2025 50.30% 51.56% Average 50.83% 51.25% Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: 1 S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. - Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. HAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT ATINGS DURING PERIODS AUTHORIZED ROES? Yes. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the industrian the state of the state of the state of the industrian the state of the	27%	52.27%	51.59%	2023
2025 50.30% 51.56% Average 50.83% 51.25% Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: 1 S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. - Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. because they include non-investor capital. HAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS AUTHORIZED ROES? 'es. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the industrian the state of	10%	52.10%	51.07%	2024
Average 50.83% 51.25% Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: 1 S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. - Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. MAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS AUTHORIZED ROES? Test. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the industry	56%	51.56%	50.30%	2025
Median 50.97% 51.46% Source and Notes: 1 S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. - Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. HAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE RELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS AUTHORIZED ROES? Yes. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the industry	25%	51.25%	50.83%	Average
Source and Notes: ¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, data through May 16, 2025. - Excludes Arkansas, Florida, Indiana and Michigan because they include non-investor capital. NAVE REGULATED UTILITY COMPANIES BEEN ABLE ELATIVELY STRONG CREDIT RATINGS DURING PERIODS AUTHORIZED ROES? es. As shown below in Table CCW-3, the credit ratings of the industr	46%	51.46%	50.97%	Median
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							S&P I <u>Electri</u>	Ratings b ic Utility S	y Catego Subsidiari	ry es							
Description	<u>2009</u>	<u>2010</u>	<u>2011</u>	<u>2012</u>	<u>2013</u>	<u>2014</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>2016</u>	<u>2017</u>	<u>2018</u>	<u>2019</u>	<u>2020</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2022</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2024</u>	<u>2025</u>
or higher	12%	12%	12%	11%	13%	13%	13%	10%	10%	8%	14%	14%	10%	10%	12%	9%	7%
-	18%	20%	19%	22%	26%	26%	34%	43%	52%	54%	54%	53%	37%	37%	37%	33%	35%
BBB+	23%	24%	28%	28%	25%	28%	24%	32%	21%	22%	18%	19%	35%	36%	36%	45%	41%
IRR.	36% 0%	26% 16%	24% 15%	22% 17%	26% 11%	23% 11%	18%	4% 11%	/% 11%	13%	12%	3% 1%	16%	16%	15%	12%	13%
Selow BBB-	2%	2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	10%	1%	1%	1%	2%	3%
Fotal	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100
CA Ye Ex	PIT/ es. l	AL E ž Regu liture	XPEI lator	N DIT y Re port,	URE esear <i>RR</i>	PRO ch A A F	DGR Assoc	AMS ciate: cial	5? s' ("F <i>Focu</i>	RRA" vs, a) Oc divi	tober sion	22, of 3	2024 S&P	1 Uti <i>Glol</i>	lity C ba <i>l I</i>	Cap Mai
Int	ellige	ence,	mad	e se	veral	rele	vant	com	ment	s abo	out ut	ility iı	nvest	ment	s gei	neral	ly:1
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		\$	196.	5 bill	ion a	and §	\$197	billi	on, r	espe	ctivel	y. S	Spend	ding	in th	ese	
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		р	rojec	ts c	ontin	ue to	o sol	lidify	arou	ind f	edera	al an	d sta	te le	gisla	tion	
		s	uppc	orting	infra	astruc	cture	inve	estme	ent.							
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			nunup	ne u	ivers	are	expe	ected	l to e	levat	e util	ity ca	pital	expe	nditu	ires	

equipment is already pushing utilities to make considerable

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA Financial Focus: "Utility capital expenditures update," October 22, 2024.

investments in infrastructure. Meanwhile, the renewable energy
portfolio standards for multiple states continue to ramp up, with the
plans specifying large expansions of low-carbon energy generation
capacity. Amplifying these factors are federal infrastructure
investment plans, including the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022,
which aim to convert the US power generation network to a majority
of zero-carbon sources by 2035.

- 8 Forecast aggregate utility investments in 2025, 2026 and 2027 are 9 expected to reach new records of \$192 billion, \$196.5 billion and 10 \$197 billion, respectively. The increases are being driven in large 11 part by federal legislation enacted in 2021 and 2022, supporting 12 infrastructure investment and state-level energy transition plans 13 and incentives, as well as robust growth in demand from 14 datacenters, as the explosion in implementation of AI and cloud 15 computing continues.
 - Utilities have multiple opportunities to finance and support energy investments through mechanisms available within the Inflation Reduction Act and the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021. These pieces of legislation provide billions of dollars for power infrastructure investments, financial incentives for nuclear power plants and funding for battery storage technology, among other provisions.

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As shown in Figure CCW-2, capital expenditures for the regulated electric and natural gas delivery utilities have increased considerably over the period 2023 1

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into 2024, and the forecasted capital expenditures remain elevated through the end



of 2026.

4 As demonstrated in Figure CCW-2, and in the comments made by RRA S&P Global Market Intelligence, capital investments for the utility industry continue to stay 5 6 at elevated levels, and these capital expenditures are expected to fuel utilities' profit 7 growth into the foreseeable future. This is clear evidence that these capital 8 investments are enhancing shareholder value and are attracting both equity and debt 9 capital to the utility industry in a manner that allows for funding these elevated capital 10 investments. While capital markets embrace these profit-driven capital investments, 11 regulatory commissions also must be careful to maintain reasonable prices and tariff 12 terms and conditions to protect customers' needs for reliable utility service at 13 reasonable rates. If this is not done, utility rates will expand beyond the ability of 14 customers to pay, resulting in revenue constraints for utilities, which will impact their 15 financial integrity.

1 Q IS THERE EVIDENCE OF ROBUST VALUATIONS OF REGULATED UTILITY 2 EQUITY SECURITIES?

3 А Yes. Strong valuations demonstrate that utilities can issue securities at favorable 4 prices and price multiples, signaling their ability to access equity capital on reasonable 5 terms and at a relatively low cost. As shown on Exhibit CCW-1, the historical valuation 6 of utilities followed by The Value Line Investment Survey ("Value Line"), based on a 7 Price-to-Earnings ("P/E") ratio, Price-to-Cash Flow ratio, and Market Price-to-Book 8 value ratio, indicates utility security valuations today are very strong and robust relative 9 to the last several years. These strong valuations of utility stocks indicate that utilities 10 have access to equity capital under reasonable terms and at lower costs.

Q WHAT CONCLUSION DO YOU DRAW FROM THIS OBSERVABLE MARKET DATA IN FORMING YOUR RECOMMENDED ROE AND OVERALL RATE OF RETURN ("ROR")?

A Generally, authorized ROEs, credit standing, and access to capital have been quite robust for utilities over the last several years, even throughout the duration of the global pandemic. It is critical that the Florida Public Service Commission ("Commission") ensure that utility rates are increased no more than necessary to provide fair compensation and maintain financial integrity.

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20 B. Impact of Monetary Policy

Q ARE THE FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE'S ("FOMC") ACTIONS KNOWN TO THE MARKET PARTICIPANTS, AND IS IT REASONABLE TO BELIEVE THEY ARE REFLECTED IN THE MARKET'S VALUATION OF BOTH DEBT AND EQUITY SECURITIES?

A Yes, to both questions. The Fed has been transparent about its efforts to support the economy to achieve maximum employment, and to manage long-term inflation to

1	around a 2% level. The Fed has implemented procedures to support the economy's
2	efforts to achieve these policy objectives. Specifically, the Fed had previously lowered
3	the Federal Overnight Rate for securities and had engaged in a Quantitative Easing
4	program where the Fed was buying, monthly, Treasury and mortgage-backed
5	securities in order to moderate the demand in the marketplaces and support the
6	economy. Currently, the Fed is reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and
7	agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities. Such monetary policy actions
8	include raising the target federal funds rate and allowing maturing bonds to roll off its
9	balance sheet.
10	A visualization of the market's reaction to the Fed's actions on the federal funds
11	rate is shown in Figure CCW-3.
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As shown in Figure CCW-3 above, the rise in the federal funds rate has far outpaced the rise in Utility and Treasury yields while the spread of Utility bonds over Treasury bond yields have declined, and are now below their long-term average. When the yield spread of Utility bonds over Treasury bonds is declining and below average, it generally indicates that the market currently perceives lower relative risk in utilities. Narrower spreads mean investors are demanding less additional yield to hold Utility bonds compared to risk-free Treasuries. This suggests stronger confidence in

the financial stability and creditworthiness of utilities. Narrow spreads generally reflect
 a view that utilities are less risky investments right now relative to the long-term,
 whether due to favorable regulation, stable earnings outlooks, or improved credit
 fundamentals.

HAS THE FED MADE RECENT COMMENTS CONCERNING MONETARY POLICY

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- AND THE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON INTEREST RATES?
- 7 A Yes. On March 19, 2025, the FOMC released the following statement:

8 Although swings in net exports have affected the data, recent indicators
9 suggest that economic activity has continued to expand at a solid pace.
10 The unemployment rate has stabilized at a low level in recent months,
11 and labor market conditions remain solid. Inflation remains somewhat
12 elevated.

13The Committee seeks to achieve maximum employment and inflation14at the rate of 2 percent over the longer run. Uncertainty about the15economic outlook has increased further. The Committee is attentive to16the risks to both sides of its dual mandate and judges that the risks of17higher unemployment and higher inflation have risen.

In support of its goals, the Committee decided to maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent. In considering the extent and timing of additional adjustments to the target range for the federal funds rate, the Committee will carefully assess incoming data, the evolving outlook, and the balance of risks. The Committee will continue reducing its holdings of Treasury securities and agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities. The Committee is strongly committed to supporting maximum employment and returning
 inflation to its 2 percent objective.

3 In assessing the appropriate stance of monetary policy, the Committee 4 will continue to monitor the implications of incoming information for the 5 economic outlook. The Committee would be prepared to adjust the 6 stance of monetary policy as appropriate if risks emerge that could 7 impede the attainment of the Committee's goals. The Committee's 8 assessments will take into account a wide range of information, 9 including readings on labor market conditions, inflation pressures and 10 inflation expectations, and financial and international developments.²

11

12 The Federal Reserve's May 7, 2025, FOMC statement indicates that economic 13 activity continues to expand at a solid pace, with labor market conditions remaining 14 strong and inflation somewhat elevated. However, the Committee noted increased 15 uncertainty about the economic outlook, citing heightened risks of both higher 16 unemployment and higher inflation. To support its dual mandate of maximum 17 employment and 2% inflation, the Fed maintained the federal funds rate target range 18 at 4.25% to 4.5%. The Committee also decided to continue reducing its holdings of 19 Treasury securities and agency debt and mortgage-backed securities, with Treasury 20 redemptions capped at \$5 billion per month and agency securities at \$35 billion per 21 month. The Fed emphasized its commitment to monitoring incoming data and is 22 prepared to adjust monetary policy as appropriate to achieve its goals.

- 23
- 24

² Federal Reserve Board - Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement, May 7, 2025.

1 Q WHAT DO INDEPENDENT ECONOMISTS' OUTLOOKS FOR FUTURE INTEREST

2 RATES AND INFLATION LEVELS INDICATE?

3 А Independent economists, surveyed by Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, expect 4 long-term bond yields to remain relatively flat to marginally increase over the near 5 term, while maintaining levels that are still relatively low by historical levels. For 6 example, independent projections show that the consensus is the federal funds rate 7 will decrease while long-term interest rates, as measured by the 30-year Treasury 8 bond, are expected to remain relatively flat. Inflation, as measured through the Gross 9 Domestic Product ("GDP") price index, is expected to be a mix of marginal increases 10 and decreases over the near to intermediate term. This indicates that levels of inflation 11 are expected to be relatively flat over that period. The consensus projections for the 12 next several quarters are provided in Table CCW-4.

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				TABLE	CCW-4	4					
			Blue	Chip Fi	nancial l	Forecast	s				
<u>Projected</u>	l Fe de ra	I Funds 1	Rate, 30	-Year T	re as ury	Bond Yi	elds, an	d GDP F	Price Inc	le x	
Publication Date	1Q <u>2024</u>	2Q <u>2024</u>	3Q <u>2024</u>	4Q <u>2024</u>	1Q <u>2025</u>	2Q <u>2025</u>	3Q <u>2025</u>	4Q <u>2025</u>	1Q <u>2026</u>	2Q <u>2026</u>	3Q <u>2026</u>
T-Bond, 30 yr.											
Jun-24	4.3	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.3	4.3				
Jul-24		4.6	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.2			
Aug-24		4.6	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3			
Sep-24		4.6	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1			
Oct-24			4.2	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.0		
Nov-24			4.2	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2		
Dec-24			4.2	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4		
Jan-25				4.5	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.4	
Feb-25				4.5	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	
Mar-25				4.5	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.6	
Apr-25					4.7	4.6	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5
May-25					4.7	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.4
GDP Price Index											
Jun-24	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2				
Jul-24		2.8	2.3	2.3	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.1			
Aug-24		2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1			
Sep-24		2.5	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.1			
Oct-24			2.2	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1		
Nov-24			1.8	2.1	2.2	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.2		
Dec-24			1.8	2.2	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.3	2.3		
Jan-25				2.2	2.3	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.6	2.1	
Feb-25				2.2	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.1	
Mar-25				2.4	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.2	
Apr-25					2.7	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.5	2.1	2.2
May-25					3.7	3.4	3.2	2.9	2.6	2.3	2.3
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A start Virla in D 11	rorecasi	is, June .	2024 mro	ugn may	2023.						

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3 Q WHAT IS THE OUTLOOK FOR LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES, AND WHY DOES

- 4 IT MATTER?
- 5 A The outlook for long-term interest rates in the intermediate to long-term is also 6 impacted by the current Fed actions and the expectation that eventually the Fed's
- 7 monetary actions will return to more normal levels.
- 8 Long-term interest rate projections are illustrated in Table CCW-5:

<u>Description</u>	<u>Actual</u>	Near-Term <u>Projected*</u>	5- to 10-Year <u>Projected</u>
<u>2020</u>			
Q1	1.88%	2.57%	
Q2	1.38%	1.90%	3.0% - 3.8%
Q3	1.36%	1.87%	
Q4	1.62%	1.97%	2.8% - 3.6%
<u>2021</u>			
Q1	2.07%	2.23%	
Q2	2.26%	2.77%	3.5% - 3.9%
Q3	1.93%	2.63%	
Q4	1.95%	2.70%	3.4% - 3.8%
<u>2022</u>			
Q1	2.25%	2.87%	
Q2	3.04%	3.47%	3.8% - 3.9%
Q3	3.26%	3.63%	
Q4	3.90%	3.87%	3.9% - 4.0%
<u>2023</u>			
Q1	3.74%	3.77%	
Q2	3.80%	3.70%	3.8% - 3.9%
Q3	4.24%	3.83%	
Q4	4.58%	4.17%	4.1% - 4.2%
<u>2024</u>			
Q1	4.33%	4.03%	
Q2	4.57%	4.17%	4.3% - 4.4%
Q3	4.22%	4.20%	
Q4	4.50%	4.20%	4.3% - 4.2%

1

As outlined in Table CCW-5, the outlook for interest rates has moderated more recently relative to 2020 and part of 2021. For example, when actual interest rates were in the range of 1.4% to 2.1%, the near-term projections for 30-year Treasury yields ranged from 1.9% to 2.8% in 2020-2021, while the projections five to ten years out were in the range of 2.8% to 3.9%. Most recently, actual interest rates were approximately 4.5%, with near and intermediate projections in the range of 4.2%

- to 4.3%. While interest rates were expected to increase drastically from their actual
 levels in the 2020-2021 period, those same projections are now flat to declining, which
 indicates the cost of long-term capital might be near its peak.
- 4

5 C. Market Sentiments and Utility Industry Outlook

6 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CREDIT RATING OUTLOOK FOR REGULATED 7 UTILITIES.

A All credit rating agencies see rate affordability as an important consideration in
assessing utility credit, including Standard & Poor's ("S&P") and Moody's Investors
Service ("Moody's") as discussed below.

11 In its 2025 Outlook,³ S&P reports that North American regulated utilities face 12 continued credit pressure due to elevated capital spending, persistent cash flow 13 deficits (exceeding \$100 billion), and increasing physical risks such as wildfires and 14 extreme weather. In 2024, downgrades again outpaced upgrades, a five-year trend 15 driven by high capex, rising wildfire risk, and uneven regulatory outcomes. Despite 16 ongoing investment in the energy transition and data center growth (which may 17 modestly lift electricity sales by ~1% annually), financial metrics are deteriorating due 18 to underwhelming common equity issuance and high leverage. Hybrid security 19 issuance hit a record \$26 billion in 2024 and is expected to continue helping credit 20 Regulatory frameworks remain broadly credit supportive, though S&P support. 21 downgraded its view of Connecticut due to inconsistent returns and rising lag. 22 Customer bill affordability remains a key consideration, especially as capacity prices 23 rise and new infrastructure costs must be equitably allocated. Wildfire risk-24 particularly litigation and insurance constraints—is becoming a systemic credit

³ S&P Global Credit Ratings, "Industry Credit Outlook 2025 – North America Regulated Utilities", January 14, 2025.

concern, now affecting nearly all regions. S&P made several specific observations
 about affordability in the context of regulated utilities' credit quality:

- Electric bills as a share of household income: S&P noted that the
 average electric customer bill is about 2% of U.S. median
 household income, which it characterizes as "good value" relative
 to other typical household expenses. Preserving this affordability is
 critical to maintaining the industry's credit quality, as it underpins
 public and regulatory support.
- 9 2. Risk from cost shifts due to data centers: S&P cautioned that if 10 utilities assign a significant portion of new infrastructure costs 11 related to data center growth to existing residential customers, it 12 could lead to higher customer bills. This would, in turn, pressure 13 regulators to limit future rate case increases, potentially impairing 14 utilities' ability to recover costs or earn authorized returns.
- 153. Capacity price increases: S&P warned that higher PJM capacity16prices—which are directly passed on to customers—could result in17greater customer dissatisfaction. This could prompt regulators to18limit increases in other parts of the customer bill, indirectly19constraining utilities' ability to maintain financial performance and20manage regulatory risk.
- 21

In sum, S&P views affordability as a cornerstone issue for the sector:
sustained rate increases or cost shifts that threaten affordability could erode regulatory
support, triggering credit risk.

In a recent industry report, Moody's explained that the regulated electric and
 gas utilities' outlook remains "Negative" largely due to increased pricing pressures on

customers. Moody's stated that it changed its outlook from "Positive" to "Negative"
 due to the following:

3 We have revised our outlook on the US regulated utilities sector to 4 negative from stable. We changed the outlook because of increasingly 5 challenging business and financial conditions stemming from higher 6 natural gas prices, inflation and rising interest rates. These 7 developments raise residential customer affordability issues, 8 increasing the level of uncertainty with regard to the timely recovery of 9 costs for fuel and purchased power, as well as for rate cases more broadly.4 10

11

Also, in a report published in January of 2024, S&P specifically mentioned
 commodity price volatility, in combination with significant increases in capital
 investments, driving utility rate increases which may strain affordability concerns.⁵

Finally, Fitch opined that the regulated electric and gas utilities' outlook is deteriorating due to elevated capex that put pressure on credit metrics. Fitch also notes the bill affordability concerns for ratepayers, and regulators' ability to balance the rate requests with increasing customer bills.

19 Specifically, Fitch states:

20 Fitch Ratings' deteriorating outlook for the North American Utilities,

- 21 Power & Gas sector reflects continuing macroeconomic headwinds and
- 22 elevated capex that are putting pressure on credit metrics in the

⁴ *Moody's Investors Service Outlook*: "Regulated Electric and Gas Utilities – US 2023 outlook negative due to higher natural gas prices, inflation and rising interest rates," November 10, 2022 at page 1. (Emphasis Added).

⁵ S&P Global Ratings: "Industry Credit Outlook 2024: North America Regulated Utilities," January 9, 2024 at page 8.

Docket No. 20250011-EI Direct Testimony of Christopher C. Walters Page 21 of 81

1 high-cost funding environment. Bill affordability concerns for 2 ratepayers continue to persist despite the pull back in natural gas prices 3 and inflationary pressures. Fitch expects utility capex to grow by double 4 digits in 2024, underpinned by investments needed to make the electric 5 infrastructure more resilient against extreme weather events and to 6 accommodate renewable generation, including distributed sources. 7 Rate case outcomes are key to watch as regulators balance more rate requests with increases in customer bills. Authorized ROEs could 8 9 prove to be sticky despite an increase in cost of capital. Higher 10 weather-normalized retail electricity sales, driven by datacenter growth 11 and onshoring of manufacturing activities, and tax transferability 12 provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act could somewhat offset 13 headwinds to utilities. Ongoing management actions to sell assets and 14 issue equity, in some cases, is supportive of parent companies' ratings. 15 Within Fitch's coverage, 90% of ratings hold Stable Rating Outlooks. 16 We expect limited rating movement in 2024. The number of upgrades 17 in 2023 so far exceeds the number of downgrades, and is driven by 18 positive rating actions on several parent holding companies and their 19 regulated subsidiaries.6

20

As outlined by Moody's, S&P, and Fitch above, credit analysts are focusing on rate affordability as an important factor needed to support strong credit standing. Customers must be able to afford to pay their utility bills in order for utilities to maintain their financial integrity and strong investment grade credit standing. For this reason,

⁶ *FitchRatings.* "North American Utilities, Power & Gas Outlook 2024," December 6, 2023 at page 1. (Emphasis Added).

this Commission should carefully assess the reasonableness of cost of service in this
 proceeding, including an appropriate overall ROR necessitated by a reasonably
 cost-effective balanced ratemaking capital structure, and a ROE that represents fair
 compensation but also maintains competitive, just, and reasonable rates.

5

6 D. Additional Remarks

Q IN LIGHT OF HIGHER LEVELS OF INFLATION, EXPECTATIONS OF HIGHER INTEREST RATES, AND GEOPOLITICAL EVENTS AROUND THE WORLD, HOW HAS THE MARKET PERCEIVED UTILITIES AS INVESTMENT OPTIONS?

10 А Since the beginning of the second half of 2021, the natural gas utility sector has 11 significantly outperformed the S&P 500, with a total return of 69.30% compared to the 12 market's total return of 25.00%. Similarly, the electric utility sector has also outperformed the market with a total return of 37.56% over the same time period. This 13 14 is presented in Figure CCW-4. It is important to note that the S&P 500's strong 15 performance in 2023 and early 2024 was largely driven by a small group of "mega-cap" 16 companies known as the Magnificent 7. The Magnificent 7's stocks were among the 17 most valuable companies in the S&P 500 index and rallied significantly over this time. 18 Those seven stocks accounted for a majority of the S&P 500's returns even though 19 there were 493 other companies in the index. This is because the S&P 500 is a market 20 capitalization-weighted index, meaning companies with larger market capitalizations 21 have a greater impact on the index's overall performance. This is explained in the 22 S&P Dow Jones Indices report "U.S. Equity Market Attributes April 2024," stating that: 23 Year-to-date, the S&P 500 remained up 5.57% (with 10 of the 24 11 sectors up; Real Estate was down 9.86%), as breadth declined but 25 remained positive (302 up and 199 down, compared to last March's 369 and 134 YTD, respectively). The Magnificent 7 as a group still 26

Docket No. 20250011-EI Direct Testimony of Christopher C. Walters Page 23 of 81

 1
 dominated, accounting for 51% of the index return (which included

 2
 Apple's 11.5% YTD decline and Tesla's 26.2% YTD decline), as

 3
 NVIDIA (up 74.5% YTD) represented 41% of the S&P 500's YTD gain.⁷

 4
 5

 5
 Generally, the utility sector has been able to deliver positive and relatively

 6
 stable returns during a period of elevated inflation, rising interest rates, and uncertainty

 7
 because of geopolitical events around the world.



Figure CCW-4

⁷ <u>https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/commentary/market-attributes-us-equities-202404.pdf</u>. (Emphasis Added).

1		IV. RATE OF RETURN
2	Q	PLEASE GENERALLY DESCRIBE WHAT IS MEANT BY THE OVERALL ROR AS
3		IT RELATES TO RATEMAKING FOR REGULATED UTILITIES.
4	А	The overall ROR in utility ratemaking represents the weighted average cost of capital
5		a utility is allowed to earn on its rate base. It combines the cost of debt and the
6		authorized ROE, weighted by the utility's capital structure.
7		
8	<u>A.</u>	Capital Structure
9	Q	WHAT IS THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE?
10	А	FPL's proposed capital structure is summarized in Table CCW-6:
11		

Table CCW-6	3
Investor-Supplied Cap	<u>pital Structure</u>
Description	<u>Weight</u>
Long-term Debt Short-term Debt Common Equity Total	38.71% 1.69% <u>59.60%</u> 100.00% ⁸
*Total may not add due to rounding	

12

13 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED CAPITAL

- 14 STRUCTURE?
- 15 A Yes. As I will discuss, FPL's proposed equity ratio of 59.60% is relatively higher than
- 16 the equity ratio for the proxy group used to estimate the cost of equity for FPL. As

⁸ See, Direct Testimony of James Coyne, pages 62-63.

shown on Exhibit CCW-2, the proxy group has an average common equity ratio of
38.4% (including short-term debt) and 42.6% (excluding short-term debt). Either an
adjustment to the capital structure or a reduction in the authorized ROE could be
warranted given FPL's stronger financial position relative to the proxy group used to
assess the Company's cost of equity.

6 Q ARE YOU AWARE OF OTHER REGULATORY COMMISSIONS RECOGNIZING 7 THE NEED TO ALIGN THE COST OF EQUITY WITH THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE?

- 8 A Yes. In a recent Order, the Arkansas Public Service Commission imputed the capital 9 structure of Southwestern Electric Power Company ("SWEPCO") to be more in-line 10 with the comparable companies used to estimate the cost of equity.⁹ The adjustment 11 was to recognize that there must be *congruence* between the cost of equity and the 12 capital structure. Specifically, the Order states as follows:
- Consistent with our ruling in Order No. 10 of Docket No. 06-101-U, the Commission holds that there should be congruence between the estimated cost of equity and the debt-to-equity ratio, whereby a lower DTE ratio decreases financial risk and decreases the cost of equity. The evidence of record supports imputing the average capital structure of companies with comparable risk to SWEPCO for the purposes of determining SWEPCO's overall cost of capital.¹⁰

As I described above, the Company's proxy group here has an average common equity ratio of 38.4% (including short-term debt) and 42.6% (excluding short-term debt) as calculated by *S&P Global Market Intelligence* and *Value Line*, respectively. The Company's proposed equity ratio of 59.60% exceeds that of the proxy group's comparable average equity ratio of 38.4% (including short-term debt).

⁹ APSC Docket No. 21-170-U, Doc. No. 323, May 23, 2022, Order No. 14. ¹⁰ *Id.* at 25.

1	Q	ARE YOU RECOMMENDING AN ADJUSTMENT TO THE COMPANY'S CAPITAL
2		STRUCTURE?

- A Not at this time. I note that the Company's proposed equity ratio of 59.60% exceeds the proxy group's average equity ratio of 42.6% as well as the industry averages and medians reported above in Table CCW-2. While I am not making an explicit adjustment to the Company's proposed capital structure, I will take its relative position into consideration in my overall recommendation.
- 8

9 B. Cost of Debt

10 Q WHAT COST OF DEBT IS THE COMPANY PROPOSING?

11 A The Company is proposing an embedded cost of long-term debt of 4.69%.

12 Q ARE YOU TAKING ISSUE WITH THE COMPANY'S PROPOSED COST OF DEBT?
13 A No, I am not.

14

15 <u>C. Cost of Equity</u>

16 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT IS MEANT BY A "UTILITY'S COST OF COMMON 17 EQUITY."

18 А A utility's cost of common equity is the expected return that investors require on an 19 investment in the utility. Investors expect to earn their required return from receiving 20 dividends and through stock price appreciation. This rate is designed to ensure the 21 utility can attract investment, maintain financial stability, and provide reliable service 22 while balancing the interests of shareholders and ratepayers. Regulatory 23 commissions set the ROE based on market conditions and the utility's specific risk 24 profile.

- 25
- 26

1 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING A REGULATED 2 UTILITY'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY.

3 А In general, determining a fair cost of common equity for a regulated utility has been 4 framed by two hallmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"): 5 Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 6 679 (1923) and Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). 7 In these decisions, the Supreme Court found that just compensation depends on many 8 circumstances and must be determined by fair and enlightened judgments based on 9 relevant facts. The Supreme Court also found that a utility is entitled to such rates as 10 would permit it to earn a return on a property devoted to the convenience of the public 11 that is generally consistent with the same returns available in other investments of 12 corresponding risk. The Supreme Court continued that the utility has "no constitutional 13 rights to profits" such as those "realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures,"¹¹ and defined the ratepayer/investor balance as follows: 14 15 The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the 16 financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under 17 efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its

18 <u>credit</u> and <u>enable it to raise the money</u> necessary for the proper

19 discharge of its public duties.¹²

20

As such, a fair ROR is based on the expectation that the utility's costs reflect efficient and economical management, and the return will support its credit standing and access to capital, but the return will not be in excess of this level. Utility rates that are consistent with these standards will be just and reasonable, and compensation to

¹¹ *Bluefield*, 262 U.S. at pages 692-693.

¹² *Id.* at 693 (Emphasis Added).

the utility will be fair and support financial integrity and credit-standing, under economic
 management of the utility.

Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE PROCESS YOU HAVE USED TO ESTIMATE THE 4 COMPANY'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY.

5 А First, I assess the market's perspective of FPL's risk. Then, I developed a proxy group 6 of publicly traded utility companies that have similar risks and characteristics to FPL 7 and compared potential differences in risks. I then perform several models based on 8 financial theory to estimate FPL's cost of common equity. These models are: (1) a 9 constant growth Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF") model using consensus analysts' 10 growth rate projections; (2) a constant growth DCF model using sustainable growth 11 rate estimates; (3) a multi-stage growth DCF model; (4) a Risk Premium method, and; 12 (5) a Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM").

13 Q WHY MUST THE COST OF EQUITY BE ESTIMATED RATHER THAN DIRECTLY 14 OBSERVED?

15 A The cost of equity cannot be directly observed because equity investors do not receive 16 fixed, contractual payments like debt holders do. Instead, they are compensated 17 through uncertain and variable returns in the form of dividends and capital 18 appreciation. These returns depend on a range of unpredictable factors, including 19 company performance, market conditions, and investor sentiment. As such, the cost 20 of equity represents an investor's required ROR, which must be estimated using 21 financial models rather than measured directly from observable market transactions.

22 Q WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO APPLY MULTIPLE METHODS TO ESTIMATE THE 23 COST OF EQUITY?

A Because the cost of equity is an estimate based on forward-looking expectations and
 assumptions, no single model can definitively or universally capture the "true" cost.
 Each model, such as the DCF model, the CAPM, and the Risk Premium approach,

has its own theoretical foundation, strengths, and limitations. These models rely on
different assumptions and input variables such as projected growth rates or equity risk
premiums which can vary in reliability. Using multiple models provides a more
comprehensive and balanced view, helps identify outlier results, and increases
confidence that the final estimate reasonably reflects investor expectations under
current market conditions.

7 Q DOES THE USE OF MULTIPLE METHODS IMPROVE THE ACCURACY OF THE 8 ESTIMATE?

9 A Yes. Employing multiple methods helps to cross-check and validate the results,
10 mitigate the impact of any one model's limitations or potentially flawed assumptions,
11 and reduce reliance on any single uncertain input. By considering results from
12 different perspectives, a more informed and credible estimate can be made. This
13 approach is consistent with both sound financial practice and regulatory expectations
14 for fair and reasonable return determinations.

15

16

D. Investment Risk Assessment of the Company

17 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE MARKET'S ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPANY'S 18 INVESTMENT RISK.

19AThe market's assessment of a company's investment risk is generally described by20credit rating analysts' reports. The current credit ratings for FPL is A from S&P and21A1 from Moody's.¹³ The Company's outlook from S&P and Moody's is considered22"stable". In its September 2024 report covering FPL, S&P stated as follows:23Despite Hurricane Milton's severity, we expect FPL will manage any

24 infrastructure damage and rely on existing regulatory mechanisms to

¹³ S&P Capital IQ, accessed on May 9, 2025.

recover restoration costs without weakening credit quality. We expect
FPL will manage its liquidity position because it has a separate
\$1.5 billion storm credit facility with numerous banks. We also expect
the utility will seek recovery through a rate surcharge, and we assess
the regulatory construct as very supportive of consistently approving
storm restoration cost recovery. We will continue to monitor Hurricane
Milton's damages and FPL's storm restoration efforts.

8 Company Description

9 FPL is a wholly owned electric utility of NextEra Energy Inc. (NEE) and 10 is regulated by the Florida Power Service Commission. FPL has 11 generating capacity of approximately 34,925 megawatts (MW) and 12 serves more than 5.9 million customers throughout Florida. As of 13 Dec. 31, 2023, the company's generating capacity consist of natural 14 gas (73%), solar (14%), nuclear (11%), and coal (2%).

15 Outlook

16 S&P Global Ratings' stable outlook on FPL is consistent with its stable 17 outlook on parent NEE and its expectation that FPL's stand-alone 18 financial measures will not materially weaken. Under our base-case 19 scenario, we expect FPL's funds from operations (FFO) to debt will 20 remain in the middle of the range for its financial risk profile category at 21 31%-33%.

22 Downside scenario.

23 We could lower ratings on FPL if we downgrade NEE or if FPL's 24 stand-alone financial measures materially weaken, such that FFO to 25 debt is consistently below 19%.

1	Upside s	cenario.

We could raise our rating on FPL by one notch if we upgrade NEE and
FPL's financial measures continue to reflect the middle of the range for
its financial risk profile category, reflecting FFO to debt consistently
above 25%.¹⁴

6

7 FPL's financial From outlook is robust. with expected Funds 8 Operations ("FFO") to debt in the 31%-33% range over the near-term, supported by 9 an equity-rich capital structure with an equity ratio of approximately 60% and effective 10 management of regulatory risk. Florida's constructive regulatory framework, including 11 forecast test years, multiyear rate settlements, and timely cost-recovery mechanisms, 12 have enabled FPL to mitigate risks such as storm-related costs and regulatory lag. 13 The stable outlook and A rating from S&P, aligned with its parent NextEra Energy Inc., 14 is reflective of FPL's financial and operational resilience, further underpinned by its low 15 leverage.

16

17 <u>E. Development of Proxy Group</u>

18 Q PLEASE BRIEFLY DESCRIBE WHY A PROXY GROUP IS NEEDED IN
 19 ESTIMATING THE COST OF EQUITY.

A There are a few reasons why a proxy group is needed to estimate the cost of equity. As an initial matter, to be consistent with the *Hope* and *Bluefield* standards, as described above, the allowed return should be commensurate with returns on investments in other forms of comparable risk. A proxy group of similarly situated

¹⁴ S&P Capital IQ RatingsDirect, "Full Analysis: Florida Power & Light Co.," August 16, 2024.

companies of comparable risk is needed to assess the Company's proposal under this
 standard.

Even if FPL were a publicly traded company whose securities could be used to estimate its cost of equity, there exists the potential for certain errors and biases which would make the reliance on a single estimate undesirable and potentially less accurate. A proxy group of comparable risk companies adds reliability to the estimates by mitigating the potential for bias that may be introduced by measurement errors of model inputs.

9 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOU IDENTIFIED A PROXY UTILITY GROUP THAT
 10 COULD BE USED TO ESTIMATE THE COMPANY'S CURRENT MARKET COST
 11 OF EQUITY.

12 A I started with the same utility company proxy group relied on by FPL witness 13 Mr. Coyne.¹⁵ I then reviewed each company to see if there were any significant factors 14 that would potentially impact the overall risk level. Such factors would include 15 significant merger and/or acquisition activity, credit ratings upgrades/downgrades, or 16 dividend cuts. I also reviewed to make sure they were covered by an analyst in the 17 *Value Line Investment Survey*. Based on my review, I found that Mr. Coyne's initial 18 proxy group was sufficient.

19QHOW DOES THE INVESTMENT RISK OF THE COMPANY COMPARE TO THAT OF

20

THE PROXY GROUP?

A As shown on my Exhibit CCW-2, the proxy group has average credit ratings of BBB+ and Baa2 from S&P and Moody's, respectively. The proxy group's average rating of BBB+ from S&P is two notches lower than FPL's rating of A from S&P. The proxy

¹⁵ See, Section V-Proxy Group Selection, Direct Testimony of James Coyne.
group's average rating of Baa2 from Moody's is four notches lower than FPL's rating
 of A1 from Moody's.

As shown on the same exhibit, the proxy group has an average common equity ratio of 38.4% (including short-term debt) and 42.6% (excluding short-term debt) as calculated by *S&P Global Market Intelligence* and *Value Line*, respectively. FPL's requested common equity ratio of 59.60% significantly exceeds the proxy group's equity ratio as described above.

8 The Company's credit ratings are comparable to the proxy group, while its 9 requested equity ratio of 59.60% exceeds the proxy group's equity ratio.

10

11 F. DCF Model

12 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DCF MODEL.

13 A The DCF model posits that a stock price equals the sum of the present value of

14 expected future cash flows discounted at the investor's required ROR or cost of capital.

15 This model is expressed mathematically as follows:

16 $P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+K)^1} + \frac{D_2}{(1+K)^2} \dots \frac{D_{\infty}}{(1+K)^{\infty}}$

D_∞____ (Equation 1)

- 18 P_0 = Current stock price
- 19 D = Dividends in periods 1 ∞
- 20 K = Investor's required return
- 21 This model can be rearranged in order to estimate the discount rate or 22 investor-required return, known as "K." If it is reasonable to assume that earnings and 23 dividends will grow at a constant rate, then Equation 1 can be rearranged as follows:
- 24 K = D_1/P_0 + G (Equation 2)
- 25 K = Investor's required return
- 26 D_1 = Dividend in first year
- 27 P_0 = Current stock price
- 28 G = Expected constant dividend growth rate
- 29 Equation 2 is referred to as the annual "constant growth" DCF model.

1 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INPUTS TO YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL.

A As shown in Equation 2 above, the DCF model requires a current stock price, the
 expected dividend, and the expected growth rate in dividends.

4 Q WHAT STOCK PRICE HAVE YOU RELIED ON IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH 5 DCF MODEL?

A I relied on the average of the weekly high and low stock prices of the utilities in the
proxy group over a 13-week period ending on May 9, 2025. An average stock price is
less susceptible to market price variations than a price at a single point in time.
Therefore, an average stock price is less susceptible to aberrant market price
movements, which may not reflect the stock's long-term value.

11 Q WHAT DIVIDEND DID YOU USE IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?

12 A I used each proxy company's most recently paid quarterly dividend as reported in 13 Value Line.¹⁶ This dividend was annualized (multiplied by 4) and adjusted for next 14 year's growth to produce the D_1 factor for use in Equation 2 above. In other words, I 15 calculate D_1 by multiplying the annualized dividend (D_0) by (1+G).

16 Q WHAT DIVIDEND GROWTH RATES HAVE YOU USED IN YOUR CONSTANT 17 GROWTH DCF MODEL?

- A There are several methods that can be used to estimate the expected growth in dividends. However, regardless of the method, for purposes of determining the market-required return on common equity, one must attempt to estimate investors' expectations about what the dividend, or earnings growth rate, will be, and not what an individual investor or analyst may use to make individual investment decisions.
- 23
- 24

¹⁶ The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

As predictors of future returns, securities analysts' growth estimates have been shown to be more accurate than growth rates derived from historical data.¹⁷ That is, assuming the market generally makes rational investment decisions, analysts' growth projections are more likely to influence investors' decisions, which are captured in observable stock prices, than growth rates derived only from historical data.

For my constant growth DCF analysis, I have relied on a consensus, or mean,
of professional securities analysts' earnings growth estimates as a proxy for investors'
dividend growth rate expectations. I used the average of analysts' growth rate
estimates from three sources: Zacks, S&P Capital IQ Market Intelligence ("MI"), and
Institutional Brokers' Estimate System ("I/B/E/S") from LSEG Workspace. All such
projections were available on May 9, 2025, and all were reported online.¹⁸

12 Each growth rate projection is based on a survey of independent securities 13 analysts. There is no clear evidence whether a particular analyst is most influential on 14 general market investors. Therefore, a single analyst's projection does not predict 15 investor outlooks as reliably as does a consensus of market analysts' projections. The 16 consensus of estimates is a simple arithmetic average, or mean, of surveyed analysts' 17 earnings growth forecasts. A simple average of the growth forecasts gives equal 18 weight to all surveyed analysts' projections. Therefore, a simple average, or arithmetic 19 mean, of analysts' forecasts is a good proxy for investor expectations.

The growth rates I used in my DCF analysis are shown in Exhibit CCW-3. The average growth rate for my proxy group is 6.60% and a median growth rate of 6.63%.

22

¹⁷ See, e.g., David Gordon, Myron Gordon, and Lawrence Gould, Choice Among Methods of Estimating Share Yield, The Journal of Portfolio Management, Spring 1989.
¹⁸ www.zacks.com; LSEG Workspace; https://www.capitalig.spglobal.com/.

1 Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?

A As shown in Exhibit CCW-4, page 1, the average and median constant growth DCF
returns for my proxy group for the 13-week analysis are 10.43% and 10.18%,
respectively.

5 Q

ARE THERE LIMITATIONS OF THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?

6 A Yes. The constant growth DCF analysis for my proxy group is based on a group 7 average long-term growth rate of 6.60%. The three- to five-year growth rates are 8 approximately 59% higher than the long-term projected GDP growth rate of 4.14%, 9 described below. As I explain in detail below, a utility's growth rate cannot exceed the 10 growth rate of the economy in which it provides services in perpetuity, which is the 11 time period assumed by the DCF model.

12 Q HOW DID YOU IDENTIFY THE LONG-TERM PROJECTED GDP GROWTH RATE?

Although there may be short-term peaks, the long-term sustainable growth rate for a 13 А 14 utility stock cannot exceed the growth rate of the economy in which it sells its goods 15 and services. The long-term maximum sustainable growth rate for a utility investment 16 is limited by the projected long-term GDP growth rate, as that reflects the projected 17 long-term growth rate of the economy. The consensus projection for U.S. GDP, as 18 published by Blue Chip Economic Indicators, is an annual growth rate of approximately 19 4.14% over the next 10 years. In my opinion, this is a reasonable proxy of long-term 20 growth.

Later in this testimony, I discuss academic and investment-practitioner support for using the projected long-term GDP growth outlook as a maximum long-term growth rate projection. Using the long-term GDP growth rate as a conservative projection for the maximum growth rate is logical and is generally consistent with academic and practitioner accepted practices.

26

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1 <u>G. Sustainable Growth DCF</u>

2 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT THE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH DCF METHOD IS AND 3 HOW YOU ESTIMATED A SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATE FOR YOUR 4 SUSTAINABLE GROWTH DCF MODEL.

5 A The sustainable growth rate, also referred to as the internal growth rate, is determined 6 by the proportion of the utility's earnings that is retained and reinvested in its plant and 7 equipment. These reinvested earnings enhance the earnings base, also known as the 8 rate base. The earnings grow as the plant, funded by the reinvested earnings, is put 9 into operation, allowing the utility to receive its authorized return on the additional rate 10 base investment.

11 The internal growth approach is linked to the percentage of earnings retained 12 within a company, as opposed to being paid out as dividends. The earnings retention 13 ratio is calculated as 1 minus the dividend payout ratio. As the payout ratio decreases, 14 the retention ratio increases, leading to stronger growth as a company funds more 15 investments using retained earnings.

16 The payout ratios of the proxy group are shown in my Exhibit CCW-5. These 17 dividend-payout ratios and earnings-retention ratios then can be used to develop a 18 long-term growth rate driven by earnings retention.

19 The data used to estimate the long-term sustainable growth rate is based on 20 the Company's current market-to-book ratio and on *Value Line*'s three- to five-year 21 projections of earnings, dividends, earned returns on book equity, and stock 22 issuances.

As shown in Exhibit CCW-6, the average and median sustainable growth rates for the proxy group using this internal growth rate model are 5.47% and 5.71%, respectively.

1 Q WHAT IS THE DCF ESTIMATE USING THESE SUSTAINABLE GROWTH RATES?

- 2 A A DCF estimate based on these sustainable growth rates is developed in Exhibit CCW-
- 7. As shown there, and using the same formula in Equation 2 above, a sustainable
 growth DCF analysis produces proxy group average and median DCF results for the
 13-week period of 9.27% and 9.13%, respectively.
- 6
- 7

H. Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model

8 Q HAVE YOU CONDUCTED ANY OTHER DCF STUDIES?

9 Α Yes. As previously noted, the DCF model is intended to represent the present value 10 of an endless series of future cash flows. Nevertheless, the initial constant growth 11 DCF that I created is based on analyst growth-rate projections, providing a plausible 12 representation of rational investment expectations over the next three-to-five years. 13 The limitation of this constant growth DCF model is that it cannot reflect a reasonable 14 expectation of a shift in growth from a high or low short-term rate to a rate that aligns 15 more with long-term sustainable growth. To accommodate changing growth 16 expectations, I conducted a multi-stage DCF analysis that reflects growth rate change 17 over time.

18

Q WHY DO YOU BELIEVE GROWTH RATES CAN CHANGE OVER TIME?

19 А The growth rate projections by analysts for the next three-to-five years are subject to 20 change as the outlook for utility earnings-growth evolves. Utility companies 21 experience fluctuations in their investment cycles. When these companies are 22 undertaking substantial investments, the growth of their rate base accelerates, leading 23 to an increase in earnings growth. However, once a major construction cycle reaches 24 completion or plateaus, the growth in the utility rate base slows down, and its earnings 25 growth rate declines from an abnormally high three-to-five-year rate to a lower, 26 sustainable growth rate.

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As construction cycles become longer in duration, even with an aggressive construction plan, the growth rate of the utility will naturally slow due to a decrease in rate base growth as the utility has limited human and capital resources to expand its construction activities. Therefore, the three-to-five-year growth rate projection should be viewed as a long-term sustainable growth rate, but not without considering the current market conditions, industry trends, and determining whether the three-to-five-year growth outlook is feasible and sustainable.

8 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR MULTI-STAGE DCF MODEL.

9 A The multi-stage DCF model reflects the possibility of non-constant growth for a 10 company over time. The multi-stage DCF model reflects three growth periods: (1) a 11 short-term growth period consisting of the first five years; (2) a transition period, 12 consisting of the next five years (6 through 10); and (3) a long-term growth period 13 starting in year 11 and extending into perpetuity.

For the short-term growth period, I relied on the consensus of analysts' growth projections described above in relationship to my constant growth DCF model. For the transition period, the growth rates were reduced or increased by an equal factor reflecting the difference between the analysts' growth rates and the long-term sustainable growth rate. For the long-term growth period, I assumed each company's growth would converge to the maximum sustainable long-term growth rate.

20 Q WHY IS THE GDP GROWTH PROJECTION A REASONABLE PROXY FOR THE

21

MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE?

A As discussed above, utilities cannot indefinitely sustain a growth rate that exceeds the growth rate of the economy in which they sell services. A utility's earnings and dividend growth is created by increased utility investment in its rate base. Examples of what can drive such investment are: service area economic growth, system reliability upgrades, or state and federal green energy initiatives. As such, nominal

1		GDP growth is a reasonable upper limit for utility sales growth, rate base growth, and
2		earnings growth in the long-run. Therefore, the U.S. GDP nominal growth rate is a
3		conservative proxy for the highest sustainable long-term growth rate of a utility.
4	Q	IS THERE RESEARCH THAT SUPPORTS YOUR POSITION THAT, OVER THE
5		LONG-TERM, A COMPANY'S EARNINGS AND DIVIDENDS CANNOT GROW AT
6		A RATE GREATER THAN THE RATE OF GROWTH OF THE U.S. GDP?
7	А	Yes. This concept is supported in published analyst literature and academic work.
8		Specifically, in a textbook titled Fundamentals of Financial Management, published by
9		Eugene Brigham and Joel F. Houston, the authors state as follows:
10		The constant growth model is most appropriate for mature companies
11		with a stable history of growth and stable future expectations. Expected
12		growth rates vary somewhat among companies, but dividends for
13		mature firms are often expected to grow in the future at about the same
14		rate as nominal gross domestic product (real GDP plus inflation). ¹⁹
15		
16		The use of the economic growth rate is also supported by investment
17		practitioners as outlined as follows:
18		Estimating Growth Rates
19		One of the advantages of a three-stage discounted cash flow model is
20		that it fits with life cycle theories in regards to company growth. In these
21		theories, companies are assumed to have a life cycle with varying
22		growth characteristics. Typically, the potential for extraordinary growth

¹⁹ *Fundamentals of Financial Management*, Eugene F. Brigham and Joel F. Houston, Eleventh Edition 2007, Thomson South-Western, a Division of Thomson Corporation at page 298 (Emphasis Added).

in the near term eases over time and eventually growth slows to a more
 stable level.

4 Another approach to estimating long-term growth rates is to focus on 5 estimating the overall economic growth rate. Again, this is the 6 approach used in the Ibbotson Cost of Capital Yearbook. To obtain the 7 economic growth rate, a forecast is made of the growth rate's 8 component parts. Expected growth can be broken into two main parts: 9 expected inflation and expected real growth. By analyzing these 10 components separately, it is easier to see the factors that drive 11 growth.20

12

3

13 Q HOW DID YOU DETERMINE A LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE THAT REFLECTS
 14 THE CURRENT CONSENSUS OF INDEPENDENT MARKET PARTICIPANTS?

15 A I relied on the consensus of long-term GDP growth projections by independent 16 economists. Blue Chip Economic Indicators publishes the consensus for GDP growth 17 projections twice a year. These projections reflect current outlooks for GDP and are 18 likely to be influential on investors' expectations of future growth outlooks. The 19 consensus of projected GDP growth is about 4.14% over the next 10 years.²¹

20 Q DO YOU CONSIDER OTHER SOURCES OF PROJECTED LONG-TERM GDP 21 GROWTH?

- A Yes, and these alternative sources corroborate the consensus analysts' projections I
 relied on. Several projections are shown in Table CCW-7.
- 24

²⁰ Morningstar, Inc., Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook at pages 51 and 52.

²¹ Blue Chip Economic Indicators, March 10, 2025, at page 14.

T	ABLE CCW-7			
G	GDP Forecasts			
Source	Projected <u>Period</u>	Real <u>GDP</u>	<u>Inflation</u>	Nominal <u>GDP</u>
Blue Chip Economic Indicators	¹ 5-10 Yrs	1.9%	2.2%	4.1%
EIA - Annual Energy Outlook ²	26 Yrs	1.8%	2.1%	3.9%
Congressional Budget Office ³	30 Yrs	1.6%	2.0%	3.7%
Moody's Analytics ⁴	31 Yrs	2.0%	2.1%	4.1%
Social Security Administration ⁵	76 Yrs	1.6%	2.4%	4.0%
Economist Intelligence Unit ⁶	31 Yrs	1.6%	2.3%	3.9%
 Sources: ¹Blue Chip Economic Indicators, March 10, 2025 at 14. ²U.S. EnergyInformation Administration (EIA), Annual Energy Outlook 2025, April 15, 2025. ³Congressional Budget Office, Long-Term Budget Outlook, March 27, 2025. ⁴Moody's Analytics Forecast, last updated January 13, 2025. ⁵Social Security Administration, "2024 OASDI Trustees Report," Table VI.G6. May 6, 2024. ⁶S&P MI, Economist Intelligence Unit, downloaded on March 4, 2025. 				
As shown in the table above, % to 2.0% and 2.0% to 2.4%, re	, the real GDP	and the	inflation fall	l in the rang
r_{1} are of 3.8% to 4.3%. Therefore the		P arowth	projections	made by th
	a of 1 1/0% ac		projections	mate of mo
ticipants' expectations for long-te	rm GDP growth	1. The re	al GDP an	a nominal G
wth projections made by these ir	ndependent so	urces su	pport my u	se of 4.14%

a reasonable estimate of market participants' expectations for long-term GDP growth.

1 Q WHAT STOCK PRICE, DIVIDEND, AND GROWTH RATES DID YOU USE IN YOUR 2 MULTI-STAGE DCF ANALYSIS?

3 А I relied on the same 13-week average stock prices and the most recent quarterly 4 dividend payment data discussed above. For the first stage, I used the consensus of 5 analysts' growth rate projections discussed above in my constant growth DCF model. 6 The first stage covers the first five years, consistent with the time horizon of the 7 securities analysts' growth rate projections. The second stage, or transition stage, 8 begins in year 6 and extends through year 10. The second stage growth transitions 9 the growth rate from the first stage to the third stage using a straight linear trend. For 10 the third stage, or long-term sustainable growth stage, starting in year 11, I used a 11 4.14% long-term sustainable growth rate based on the consensus of economists' 12 long-term projected nominal GDP growth rate.

13 Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR MULTI-STAGE DCF MODEL?

A As shown in Exhibit CCW-8, the average and median DCF ROEs for my proxy group
using the 13-week average stock price are 8.51% and 8.31%, respectively.

16 Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS FROM YOUR DCF ANALYSES.

- 17 А The DCF results are summarized in Table CCW-8. As described above, the results of 18 the constant growth DCF using analysts' growth rates assume an average long-term 19 growth rate of 6.60%, which is approximately 59% higher than the long-term projected 20 GDP growth rate of 4.14%. This is an unsustainable assumption, and likely leads to 21 an overstatement in the cost of equity for a low risk regulated utility. As such, it is my 22 opinion that primary weight should be given to the sustainable growth and multi-stage 23 models of the DCF while minimal weight should be given to the constant growth DCF 24 model based on three-to-five year analyst growth rates.
- 25
- 26

Proxy Gr	oup
<u>Mean</u>	<u>Median</u>
10.43%	10.18%
9.27%	9.13%
8.51%	8.31%
	<u>Proxy Gr</u> <u>Mean</u> 10.43% 9.27% 8.51%

2

1

3 I. Risk Premium Model

4 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR BOND YIELD PLUS RISK PREMIUM MODEL.

5 A This model is based on the principle that investors require a higher return to assume 6 greater risk. Common equity investments have greater risk than bonds because bonds 7 have more security of payment in bankruptcy proceedings than common equity and 8 the coupon payments on bonds represent contractual obligations. In contrast, 9 companies are not required to pay dividends or guarantee returns on common equity 10 investments. Therefore, common equity securities are riskier than bond securities.

11 This risk premium model is based on two estimates of an equity risk premium. 12 First, I quantify the difference between regulatory commission-authorized returns on 13 common equity and contemporary U.S. Treasury bonds. The difference between the 14 authorized return on common equity and the Treasury bond yield is the risk premium. 15 I estimated the risk premium on an annual basis for each year since January 1986. 16 The authorized ROEs were based on regulatory commission-authorized returns for 1 2 utility companies. Authorized returns are typically based on expert witnesses' estimates of the investor-required return at the time of the proceeding.

3 The second equity risk premium estimate is based on the difference between 4 regulatory commission-authorized returns on common equity and contemporary 5 "A" rated utility bond yields by Moody's. I selected the period beginning in 1986 6 because public utility stocks consistently traded at a premium to book value during that 7 period. This is illustrated in Exhibit CCW-9, which shows the market-to-book ratio 8 since 1986 for the utility industry was consistently above a multiple of 1.0x. Over this 9 period, an analyst can infer that authorized ROEs were sufficient to support market 10 prices that at least exceeded book value. This is an indication that 11 commission-authorized returns on common equity supported a utility's ability to issue 12 additional common stock without diluting existing shares. It further demonstrates that 13 utilities were able to access equity markets without a detrimental impact on current 14 shareholders.

Based on this analysis, as shown in Exhibit CCW-10, the average indicated equity risk premium over U.S. Treasury bond yields has been 5.69%. Since the risk premium can vary depending upon market conditions and changing investor risk perceptions, I believe using an estimated range of risk premiums provides the best method to measure the current return on common equity for a risk premium methodology.

In addition, I assessed the five-year and ten-year rolling average risk premiums over the study period to gauge the variability over time. These rolling average risk premiums mitigate the impact of anomalous market conditions and skewed risk premiums over an entire business cycle. As shown on my Exhibit CCW-10, the five-year rolling average risk premium over Treasury bonds ranged from 4.25% to 7.09%, while the ten-year rolling average risk premium ranged from 4.38% to 6.91%.

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1 As shown on my Exhibit CCW-11, the average indicated equity risk premium 2 over contemporary "A" rated Moody's utility bond yields was 4.34%. The five-year and 3 ten-year rolling average risk premiums ranged from 2.88% to 5.91% and 3.20% to 4 5.74%, respectively.

5 Q WHY IS THE TIME PERIOD USED TO DERIVE THESE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM 6 ESTIMATES APPROPRIATE TO FORM ACCURATE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT 7 CONTEMPORARY MARKET CONDITIONS?

8 А Contemporary market conditions can change dramatically during the period that rates 9 determined in this proceeding will be in effect. A relatively long period of time where 10 stock valuations reflect premiums to book value indicates that the authorized ROEs 11 and the corresponding equity risk premiums were supportive of investors' return 12 expectations and provided utilities access to the equity markets under reasonable 13 terms and conditions. Further, this period is long enough to smooth abnormal market 14 movement that might distort equity risk premiums. While market conditions and risk 15 premiums do vary over time, this historical period is a reasonable period to estimate 16 contemporary risk premiums.

17 Q PLEASE EXPLAIN OTHER MARKET EVIDENCE YOU RELIED ON IN 18 DETERMINING AN APPROPRIATE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM.

- A The equity risk premium should reflect the market's perception of risk in the utility industry today. I have gauged investor perceptions in utility risk today in Exhibit CCW-12, where I show the yield-spread between utility bonds and Treasury bonds since 1980. As shown in this schedule, the average utility bond yield-spreads over Treasury bonds for "A" and "Baa" rated utility bonds for this historical period are 1.47% and 1.88%, respectively.
- A current three-month average "A" rated utility bond yield of 5.79% when compared to the current Treasury bond yield of 4.66%, as shown in Exhibit CCW-13,

page 1, implies a yield-spread of 1.13%. This current utility bond yield-spread is lower
than the long-term average-spread for "A" rated utility bonds of 1.47%. The
three-month average yield on "Baa" rated utility bonds is 5.97%. This indicates a
current spread for the "Baa" rated utility bond yield of 1.31%, which is lower than the
long-term average of 1.88%.

Q WHAT DOES THE CURRENT TREND IN UTILITY BOND SPREADS RELATIVE TO
 TREASURY BONDS INDICATE ABOUT THE MARKET'S PERCEPTION OF
 UTILITY RISK?

9 A The decline in the yield spread of utility bonds over Treasury bonds, to levels below
10 historical averages, indicates that the market currently views utilities as relatively
11 low-risk investments. Investors are demanding less additional yield to hold utility
12 bonds, reflecting strong confidence in utilities' financial stability and creditworthiness
13 under current market conditions.

14QHOW IS THE DECLINE IN UTILITY BOND SPREADS RELEVANT TO15ESTABLISHING A FAIR ROE FOR UTILITIES?

16 A The narrowing of utility bond spreads demonstrates that investors require less 17 compensation for utility credit risk today than they have historically. Because the cost 18 of equity must reflect prevailing market conditions, lower perceived risk implies a lower 19 investor-required ROE. A high ROE would overcompensate utilities and burden 20 customers unnecessarily, given that the market clearly prices utilities as safer 21 investments than in the past. This information supports a below-average equity risk 22 premium.

Q WHY SHOULD REGULATORS CONSIDER UTILITY BOND SPREADS WHEN SETTING AN AUTHORIZED ROE?

A Bond spreads provide an objective, real-time market measure of risk that regulators
should consider when setting the allowed ROE. If the bond market, which represents

large, sophisticated investors, views utilities as low-risk, it follows that equity investors
 also perceive lower risk and require a correspondingly lower return. Ignoring this
 evidence could result in rates that are not just and reasonable for customers.

4 Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS BASED ON YOUR RISK PREMIUM ANALYSES?

5 A I give primary consideration to the Risk Premium results using Treasury bonds and 6 A-rated utility bonds. My recommendation also takes the results of adding the 7 Baa-rated utility bond yield to the equity risk premium over A-rated utility bonds into 8 consideration.

9 Considering the current and projected economic environment, current 10 yield-spreads and equity risk premiums, as well as current levels of interest rates and 11 interest rate projections, I believe an equity risk premium between the average and 12 most recent two-year average equity risk premiums are warranted. As such, I believe 13 an equity risk premium over Treasury yields in the range of 5.47% and 5.69% is 14 appropriate. The midpoint of this risk premium range is 5.58%. Adding this risk 15 premium to the most recent consensus projected Treasury yield of 4.40% produces a 16 ROE of 9.98%.

17 Applying a similar methodology as described above, the most recent two-year 18 average equity risk premium over A-rated utility bonds is 4.18%, while the long-term 19 average risk premium 4.34%. The midpoint of this risk premium range is 4.26%. The 20 A-rated utility bond yield has averaged 5.79% over the three-month period through 21 April 2025 while the Baa-rated utility bond yield has averaged 5.97% over the same 22 period. Adding the indicated equity risk premium of 4.26% to the three-month average 23 A-rated utility bond yield of 5.79% produces an estimated cost of equity of 10.05%. 24 Adding the same equity risk premium to the three-month average Baa-rated utility 25 bond yield of 5.97% produces an estimated cost of equity of 10.23%.

The A-rated utility bond yield has averaged 5.73% over the six-month period
ending April 2025 while the Baa-rated utility bond yield has averaged 5.92% over the
same period. Adding the indicated equity risk premium of 4.34% to the six-month
average A-rated utility bond yield of 5.73% produces an estimated cost of equity
of 9.99%. Adding the same equity risk premium to the six-month average Baa-rated
utility bond yield of 5.92% produces an estimated cost of equity of 10.17%.
The results of my risk premium analyses are summarized in Table CCW-9.

Table CCW-9 Summary of Risk Premium Results Description Results Projected Treasury Yield 9.98% 3-Month Average Yields A-Rated Utility Bond 10.05% Baa-Rated Utility Bond 10.23% 6-Month Average Yields A-Rated Utility Bond 9.99% 10.17% Baa-Rated Utility Bond

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10 J. Capital Asset Pricing Model

11 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CAPM.

12 A The CAPM method of analysis is based upon the theory that the market-required ROR

13 for a security is equal to the risk-free rate, plus a risk premium associated with the

14 specific security. This relationship between risk and return can be expressed

15 mathematically as follows:

1		$R_i = R_f + B_i \times (R_m - R_f)$ where:
2 3 4 5		 R_i = Required return for stock i R_f = Risk-free rate R_m = Expected return for the market portfolio B_i = Beta - Measure of the risk for stock
6		The term "beta" in the equation represents the stock-specific risk that cannot
7		be reduced through diversification. In a well-diversified portfolio, specific risks related
8		to individual stocks can be reduced by balancing the portfolio with securities that offset
9		the impact of firm-specific factors, such as business cycle, competition, product mix,
10		and production limitations.
11		Non-diversifiable risks, on the other hand, are related to market conditions and
12		are referred to as systematic risks. These risks cannot be reduced through
13		diversification and are considered market risks. Conversely, non-systematic risks,
14		also known as business risks, can be reduced through diversification.
15		According to the CAPM, the market does not compensate investors for taking
16		on risks that can be diversified away. Thus, investors are only compensated for taking
17		on systematic, or non-diversifiable, risks. Beta is a measure of these systematic risks.
18	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INPUTS TO YOUR CAPM.
19	А	The CAPM requires an estimate of the market risk-free rate, the stock's beta, and the
20		Market Risk Premium ("MRP"). The MRP is the difference between the expected
21		market return and the risk-free rate.
22	Q	WHAT DID YOU USE AS AN ESTIMATE OF THE MARKET RISK-FREE RATE?
23	А	As previously noted, Blue Chip Financial Forecasts' projected 30-year Treasury bond
24		yield is 4.40%. ²² The current 30-year Treasury bond yield is 4.66%, as shown in
25		Exhibit CCW-13 at page 1. I used Blue Chip Financial Forecasts' projected 30-year
26		Treasury bond yield of 4.40% for my CAPM analysis.

²² Blue Chip Financial Forecast May 1, 2025.

1 Q WHAT BETA DID YOU USE IN YOUR ANALYSIS?

A As shown in Exhibit CCW-14, the current proxy group average and median *Value Line* beta estimates are 0.85 and 0.85, respectively. In my experience, these beta estimates are abnormally high and are unlikely to be sustained over the long-term. As such, I have also reviewed the historical average of the proxy group's *Value Line* betas. The historical average *Value Line* beta since 2014 is 0.79 and has ranged from 0.55 to 0.95. Prior to the recent pandemic, the high end of this range was 0.74.

8 In addition to Value Line, I have also included adjusted beta estimates as 9 provided by Market Intelligence's Beta Generator Model. This model relied on a 10 five-year period on a weekly basis ending May 9, 2025. The average and median 11 Market Intelligence betas are 0.46 and 0.46, respectively. Market Intelligence betas, 12 as calculated using its Beta Generator Model, are adjusted using the Vasicek method 13 and calculated using the S&P 500 as the proxy for the investable market. This is in 14 stark contrast with the Value Line beta estimates that are adjusted using a constant 15 weighting of 67%/35% to the raw beta/market beta and use the New York Stock 16 Exchange ("NYSE") as the proxy for the investable market. Because I rely on the 17 S&P 500 to estimate the expected return on the investable market, it makes sense to 18 rely on beta estimates that are calculated using the S&P 500 as the benchmark for the 19 market. Further, as S&P explains:

The Vasicek Method is a superior alternative to the Bloomberg Beta adjustment. The Bloomberg adjustment is not appropriate for a vast number of situations, as it assigns constant weighting regardless of the standard error in the raw beta estimation (Bloomberg Beta = 1/3*market beta + 2/3*Raw Beta). Given the statistical fact that a larger sample size yields a smaller error, the Vasicek method more appropriately adjusts the raw beta via weights determined by the variance of the

1	individual security versus the variance of a larger sample of comparable
2	companies. The weights are designed to bring the raw beta closer to
3	whichever beta estimation has the smallest error. This is a feature the
4	Bloomberg beta cannot replicate. ²³

Notably, while S&P makes reference to the Bloomberg method of applying
2/3 and 1/3 weights to the raw beta and market beta, respectively, the comparison still
applies to *Value Line's* methodology of applying 67% and 35% weights. Both methods
are forms of the Blume adjustment.²⁴ While the weights are slightly different between
the Bloomberg and *Value Line* methods, they are similar and apply a constant weight
without any regard to accuracy. As such, S&P's criticisms apply to both Bloomberg
betas and *Value Line* betas.

Because current beta estimates are based on the most recent five years of historical stock returns and volatility, they are being heavily impacted by the market fallout in early 2020 as the global pandemic set in and the market reacted, with this S&P 500 falling more than 40%. For this reason, it is not reasonable to assume current beta estimates, particularly Blume-adjusted betas such as those published by *Value Line*, are reflective of investor expectations at this time.

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²³ S&P Market Intelligence, Beta Generator Model.

²⁴ The Blume adjustment is a tool used to refine a beta measurement in finance. In general, beta attempts to explain how much a particular investment's price moves compared to the overall market. But beta is often based on historical data, which may not be an accurate method for predicting the future. The Blume adjustment tries to address this by considering the idea that, in the long run, most investments tend to become more similar in their riskiness to the overall market (represented by a beta of 1).

1QIS THERE AN EXPLANATION FOR WHY THE VASICEK-ADJUSTED BETAS2FROM S&P ARE SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN THE VALUE LINE BETAS IN3YOUR ANALYSIS?

4 А The Vasicek-adjusted betas, which average 0.46 for the proxy group, are significantly 5 lower than the Value Line betas, which average 0.85, due to differences in how each 6 method corrects for estimation error. The Vasicek method adjusts each company's 7 raw beta toward a lower industry-specific mean when the underlying data is less 8 reliable. This is especially relevant for utilities, which typically have stable earnings, 9 limited volatility, and weaker correlations with overall market returns. As a result, the 10 Vasicek method often pulls utility betas closer to a range of 0.4 to 0.6. In contrast, 11 Value Line's method adjusts toward the broader market average of 1.0, which inflates 12 the final estimate relative to Vasicek. In the current environment, utility stocks have 13 exhibited particularly low volatility and reduced market sensitivity, making the Vasicek 14 adjustment more pronounced. Both approaches use five years of weekly returns, but 15 they differ in how they respond to the statistical quality of the input data. The lower 16 Vasicek betas reflect utilities' defensive and low-risk investment profile more 17 conservatively.

18QYOU MENTION THAT THE CURRENT 5-YEAR VALUE LINE BETA ESTIMATES19MIGHT NOT BE REFLECTIVE OF INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS, AND20POTENTIALLY OVERSTATE THE COST OF EQUITY. DO YOU HAVE EVIDENCE21TO SUPPORT THAT HYPOTHESIS?

A Yes. As mentioned above, *Value Line's* beta estimates calculated over a 5-year
 historical price period will include the unprecedented volatility and market prices
 caused by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020. It is unreasonable to
 assume that those prices and resulting volatility resemble investor expectations going
 forward. Prior to the market fallout from the pandemic, utility beta estimates were at

several year lows. Subsequent to the period of peak volatility from the pandemic, utility
 betas have actually declined back toward their normalized levels. This is
 demonstrated in Table CCW-10. In this table, I present the raw unadjusted beta
 estimates for *Value Line's* reported 5-year period as well as a 3-year period ending
 May 9, 2025. I then apply the Blume adjustment using the same weighting applied by
 *Value Line.*²⁵

5-Year Value Line Beta ¹ 3-Year Beta ³				
Proxy Group	Unadjusted ²	Reported	Unadjusted	Adjusted
Alliant Energy Corporation	0.90	0.95	0.63	0.77
Ameren Corporation	0.82	0.90	0.54	0.71
American Electric Power Company, Inc.	0.75	0.85	0.43	0.64
Duke Energy Corporation	0.52	0.70	0.40	0.62
Edison International	0.82	0.90	0.76	0.86
Entergy Corporation	0.97	1.00	0.62	0.76
Evergy, Inc.	0.90	0.95	0.54	0.71
IDACORP, Inc.	0.60	0.75	0.45	0.65
NextEra Energy, Inc.	0.82	0.90	0.69	0.81
NorthWestern Corporation	0.67	0.80	0.50	0.68
OGE Energy Corp.	1.04	1.05	0.67	0.80
Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	0.67	0.80	0.55	0.72
Portland General Electric Company	0.67	0.80	0.54	0.71
PPL Corporation	0.82	0.90	0.60	0.75
Southern Company	0.60	0.75	0.40	0.61
TXNM Energy	0.52	0.70	0.42	0.63
Xcel Energy Inc.	0.60	0.75	0.48	0.67
Average	0.75	0.85	0.54	0.71
Median	0.75	0.85	0.54	0.71
Source:				
¹ The Value Line Investment Survey, Mar	ch 7, April 18, and M	lay 9, 2025.		
² Estimated the unadjusted beta by removin	g Value Line's Blume	adjustment me	thodology:	
(Linadiusted Beta - 0.35) / 0.67	-	-		

 $^{^{25}}$ The Value Line method to calculate adjusted betas is as follows: B_{acjusted} = 0.35 + 0.67 x B_{\text{unacjusted}}

- 1 This data clearly demonstrates that systematic market risk has subsided for 2 regulated utilities after controlling for the impacts of the global pandemic with average 3 and median beta estimates of 0.72 and 0.73, respectively.
- 4

Q HOW DID YOU DERIVE YOUR MRP ESTIMATES?

5 А My MRP estimates are derived using two general approaches: a risk premium 6 approach and a DCF approach. I also consider the normalized MRP of 5.50% with 7 the normalized risk-free rate of 4.70% as recommended by Kroll, formerly known as Duff & Phelps.²⁶ Based on this methodology and utilizing a "normalized" risk-free rate 8 9 of 4.70%, Kroll concludes that the current expected, or forward-looking, MRP is 5.50%, implying an expected return on the market of 10.20%.²⁷ 10

11 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR MRP ESTIMATE DERIVED USING THE RISK 12 PREMIUM METHODOLOGY.

- 13 А The forward-looking risk premium-based estimate was derived by estimating the expected return on the market (as represented by the S&P 500) and subtracting the 14 15 risk-free rate from this estimate. I estimated the expected return on the S&P 500 by 16 adding an expected inflation rate to the long-term historical arithmetic-average real 17 return on the market. The real return on the market represents the achieved return 18 above the rate of inflation.
- Morningstar Direct calculates the historical arithmetic-average real-market 19 return over the period 1926 to 2023 to be 9.02%.²⁸ A current consensus for projected 20

²⁶ Kroll, and its predecessor Duff & Phelps, is a provider of economic, financial, and valuation data that is often relied on by finance professionals and cited in ROR testimony.

²⁷ Kroll, Kroll Recommended U.S. Equity Risk Premium and Corresponding Risk-Free Rates to be Used in Computing Cost of Capital: January 2008 - Present (Apr. 15, 2025). The current 20-year yield of 4.70% exceeds the "normalized" yield of 3.5%. In accordance with Kroll's prescribed method, the greater of the two shall be used under the normalized Kroll methodology, i.e., 4.70%.

²⁸ Morningstar Direct, data through 2023.

inflation is 2.40%.²⁹ Using these estimates, the expected market return is 11.64%.³⁰
The MRP then is the difference between the 11.64% expected market return and the
projected risk-free rate of 4.40%, or 7.20%.

4 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR MRP ESTIMATES DERIVED USING THE DCF 5 METHODOLOGY.

6 А I employed two versions of the constant growth DCF model to develop estimates of 7 the MRP. I first employed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's ("FERC") 8 method of estimating the expected return on the market that was established in its 9 Opinion No. 569-A. FERC's method for estimating the expected return on the market 10 is to perform a constant growth DCF analysis on each of the dividend-paying 11 companies of the S&P 500 index. The growth rate component is based on the average 12 of the growth projections excluding companies with growth rates that were negative or 13 greater than 20%.³¹ The weighted average growth rate for the remaining companies is 10.30%. After reflecting the FERC prescribed method of adjusting the dividend yield 14 15 by (1 + 0.5g), the weighted average expected dividend vield is 1.79%. Thus, the 16 DCF-derived expected return on the market is the sum of those two components, 17 or 12.09%. The MRP then is the expected market return of 12.09%, less the projected 18 risk-free rate of 4.40%, or approximately 7.70%.

19 My second DCF-based MRP estimate was derived by performing the same 20 DCF analysis described above, except I used all companies in the S&P 500 index 21 rather than just the dividend-paying companies. The weighted average growth rate 22 for these companies is 10.90%. After reflecting the FERC-prescribed method of 23 adjusting the dividend yield by (1 + 0.5g), the weighted average expected dividend

²⁹ Blue Chip Financial Forecast May 1, 2025.

 $^{^{30}}$ [(1 + 9.02%) * (1 + 2.40%) - 1] * 100.

³¹ Opinion No. 569-A, at page 210.

1 yield is 1.58%. Thus, the DCF-derived expected return on the market is the sum of

2 those two components, or 12.48%. The MRP then is the expected market return of

3 12.48% less the projected risk-free rate of 4.40%, or approximately 8.10%.

4 The average expected market return based on the DCF model is 12.29% and 5 the average MRP based on the two DCF estimates is 7.90%.

6 Q HOW DO YOUR EXPECTED MARKET RETURNS COMPARE TO CURRENT 7 EXPECTATIONS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS?

- 8 A As shown in Table CCW-11 below, my average expected market return of 11.38%³²
- 9 exceeds long-term market expectations of several financial institutions.

TABLE CCW-11				
Long-Term Expected Return on the Market				
Term	Expected Return Large Cap <u>Equities</u>			
10 Years	6.70%			
10 - 15 Years	6.70%			
10 Years	2.8% - 4.8%			
10 Years	3.92%			
10 Years	5.0% - 6.3%			
10 Years	3.00%			
20 Years	5.70%			
10 Years	6.00%			
Sources: ¹ BlackRock Investment Institute, Capital market assumptions, May 22, 2025. ² JP Morgan Chase, Long-Term Capital Market Assumptions, 2025 Report. ³ Vanguard economic and market outlook for 2025: Beyond the Landing. ⁴ Research Affiliates, Asset Allocation Interactive. Retrieved 4/30/2025. ⁵ 2025 Invesco Capital Market Update. ⁶ Goldman Sachs, Updating our long-term return forecast for US equities to incorporate the current high level of market concentration, October 18, 2024. ⁷ Fidelity, Capital market assumptions				
	d Return on the Ma <u>Term</u> 10 Years 10 - 15 Years 10 Years 10 Years 10 Years 10 Years 20 Years 10			

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 32 11.38% = (10.20% + 12.29% + **11.64%**) / 3.

When compared to the expected market returns of financial institutions above,
 my average expected market return of 11.38% is greater than all of them. For these
 reasons, my expected market returns, and the associated MRPs, should be
 considered reasonable, if not high-end estimates.

5 Q HOW DO YOUR ESTIMATED MRPS COMPARE TO THAT ESTIMATED BY 6 KROLL?

A On its Cost of Capital portal, Kroll's MRP falls somewhere in the range of 5.50%
to 7.17%. My MRP estimates are in the range of 5.50% to 7.90%.

9 Q HOW DOES KROLL MEASURE A MRP?

10 A Kroll's range is based on several methodologies. First, Kroll estimated a MRP of 11 7.17% based on the difference between the total market return on common stocks 12 (S&P 500) less the income return on 20-year Treasury bond investments over the 13 1926-2023 period.³³

Second, Kroll used the Ibbotson & Chen supply-side model which produced a MRP estimate of 6.22%.³⁴ Kroll explains that the historical MRP based on the S&P 500 was influenced by an abnormal expansion of P/E ratios relative to earnings and dividend growth. To control for the volatility of extraordinary events and their impacts on P/E ratios, Kroll takes into consideration the three-year average P/E ratio as the current P/E ratio. Therefore, Kroll adjusted this MRP estimate to normalize the growth in the P/E ratio to be more in line with the growth in dividends and earnings.

Finally, Kroll developed its own recommended equity, or MRP, by employing an analysis that takes into consideration a wide range of economic information, multiple risk premium estimation methodologies, and the current state of the economy by observing measures such as the level of stock indices and corporate spreads as

³⁴ Id.

³³ Kroll Cost of Capital Navigator.

1		indicators of perceived risk. Based on this methodology, and utilizing a "normalized"
2		risk-free rate of 4.70%, Kroll concludes that the current expected, or forward-looking,
3		MRP is 5.50%, implying an expected return on the market of 10.20%. ³⁵
4	Q	WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?
5	А	As shown in Exhibit CCW-15, I have provided the results of twelve different
6		applications of the CAPM. The first three results presented are based on the proxy
7		group's current average Value Line beta of 0.85. The results of the CAPM based on
8		these inputs range from 9.38% to 11.12%.
9		The next set of three results presented are based on the proxy group's
10		historical Value Line beta of 0.79. The results of the CAPM based on these inputs
11		range from 9.04% to 10.63%.
12		The third set of results presented are based on the proxy group's current S&P
13		Global Market Intelligence beta of 0.46. The results of the CAPM based on these
14		inputs range from 7.24% to 8.04%.
15		The final set of results presented are based on the proxy group's three-year
16		beta estimate of 0.72. The results of the CAPM based on these inputs range from
17		8.66% to 10.09%.
18		My CAPM results are summarized in Table CCW-12.
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³⁵ Kroll, Kroll Increases U.S. Normalized Risk-Free Rate from 3.0% to 3.5%, but Spot 20-Year U.S. Treasury Yield Preferred When Higher (Jun. 16, 2022).

	T	Table CCW-12		
	CAPM	Results Summary	<u>.</u>	
Description	Current <u>VL Beta</u>	Historical <u>VL Beta</u>	Current <u>S&P Beta</u>	3-Year <u>Beta</u>
Kroll Method	9.38%	9.04%	7.24%	8.66%
RP Method	10.52%	10.08%	7.71%	9.58%
FERC DCF Method	<u>11.12%</u>	<u>10.63%</u>	<u>8.04%</u>	<u>10.09%</u>
Average	10.34%	9.92%	7.66%	9.44%

3 K. Return on Equity Summary

Q BASED ON THE RESULTS OF YOUR RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY ANALYSIS
 DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHAT RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY DO YOU
 RECOMMEND FOR THE COMPANY?

7 A The results of my analyses are summarized in Figure CCW-5. In this figure, I present
8 the various measures of central tendency (i.e., the mean and median results) for each
9 of my analytical models.



Figure CCW-5

2 Based on my analyses of the various methodologies described above, I 3 estimate the Company's current market ROE to be in the reasonable range of 9.00% 4 to 10.00%. My recommended range accounts for the unsustainable growth rates 5 assumed in the constant growth DCF model and the irrational assumption that Value 6 Line's current beta estimates are reflective of current investor expectations. As 7 described above, the results of the constant growth DCF using analysts' growth rates 8 assume an average long-term growth rate of 6.60%, which is approximately 59% 9 higher than the long-term projected GDP growth rate of 4.14%. This is an 10 unsustainable assumption, and likely leads to an overstatement in the cost of equity 11 for a low risk regulated utility. As such, it is my opinion that more weight should be 12 given to the sustainable growth and multi-stage models of the DCF. Based on my 13 assessment of FPL's overall risk profile and the results of these analytical methods, I 14 would recommend that this Commission authorize FPL a ROE of 9.50%, which is the

midpoint of the range produced by these models. In acknowledgment of the
Company's significantly higher equity ratio relative to the proxy group, a more
reasonable range applicable to the Company would be the lower-half of my overall
recommended range. As such, should the Commission authorize FPL its requested
equity ratio of 59.60%, an ROE in the lower half of my range (i.e., 9.00% to 9.50%)
would be warranted.

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V. REVIEW AND CRITIQUE OF MR. COYNE'S TESTIMONY

9 A. Summary of Rebuttal

10 Q WHAT ROE IS THE COMPANY REQUESTING?

11 In his Direct Testimony, Mr. Coyne recommends a ROE of 11.90% for FPL.³⁶ His А 12 recommendation is based on the average of his analytical results, producing a base 13 ROE of 11.83%, adjusted upward by 9 basis points for flotation costs, which he then rounds down to 11.90%.³⁷ Mr. Coyne's analyses yield a range of results from four 14 15 models: the Constant Growth DCF model (10.28%), the CAPM (15.65%), the Risk 16 Premium analysis (10.51%), and the Expected Earnings analysis (10.91%).³⁸ After 17 reviewing Mr. Coyne's analyses and making reasonable adjustments, as discussed 18 below, I will demonstrate that a more reasonable ROE of 9.50% or less is more aligned with current market conditions, FPL's relative risk, as well as regulatory precedents. 19

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³⁶ Direct Testimony of James Coyne, page 61.

³⁷ Id.

³⁸ *Id.* at page 9, Figure 1.

1	Q	PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW MR. COYNE DEVELOPED HIS MARKET COST OF
2		EQUITY FOR FPL.
3	А	Mr. Coyne used a DCF model, a CAPM, a Risk Premium analysis, and an Expected
4		Earnings analysis to support his ROE estimate for FPL. Mr. Coyne employed these
5		models to a proxy group of six publicly traded natural gas utility companies.
6		His estimated ROE results for FPL are shown in Table CCW-14.
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TABLE CCW-14				
Summary of Mr. Coyne's Return on Equity Estimates				
Description	Coyne <u>Results</u>			
<u>Constant Growth DCF³⁹</u> Mean-Low Growth (5.30%) Mean Growth (6.50%) Mean-High Growth (7.50%)	8.94%-9.22% 10.16%-10.45% 11.18%-11.47%			
<u>CAPM⁴⁰</u> Current Risk-Free Rate Projected Risk-Free Rate	15.37%-15.95% 15.34%-15.93%			
<u>Risk Premium⁴¹</u> 30-Day Average Yield Short-term Projected Yield Long-term Projected Yield	10.57% 10.53% 10.45% ⁴²			
Expected Earnings: Median/Mean	10.91%/10.27% ⁴³			
Base ROE	11.83%44			
Flotation Costs	0.09% ⁴⁵			
Recommended Return on Equity	11.90% ⁴⁶			
Note: Mr. Coyne's recommended ROE of 11.90% is rounded down from 11.92% after his flotation cost adjustment				

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With reasonable adjustments described in detail below, Mr. Coyne's analyses

would support my recommended return of equity for FPL of 9.50%.

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³⁹ Direct Testimony of James Coyne, page 36, Figure 11.
 ⁴⁰ *Id.* at page 39, Figure 13.

⁴¹ *Id.* at page 42, Figure 15. ⁴² *Id.* at Exhibit JMC-6, page 4.

⁴³ *Id.* at page 43.

⁴⁴ Id.

⁴⁵ *Id.* at page 61

⁴⁶ Id.

1 Q DO YOU HAVE ANY INITIAL COMMENTS OR OBSERVATIONS YOU WOULD 2 LIKE TO MAKE REGARDING MR. COYNE'S RECOMMENDATIONS?

A Yes. Mr. Coyne's recommended ROE of 11.90% and proposed common equity ratio of 59.60% for FPL overstates the cost of capital for a low-risk, rate-regulated electric tutility, resulting in a ROR that is among the highest in the United States. These recommendations exceed reasonable benchmarks and risk violating the Hope and Bluefield standards, which require rates to be just and reasonable for both investors and ratepayers.

9 FPL's credit ratings of A (S&P) and A1 (Moody's), as shown in my Exhibit 10 CCW-2, are two and four notches higher than the proxy group's average ratings of 11 BBB+ and Baa2, respectively, reflecting a lower risk profile. The S&P Global Ratings 12 report dated August 16, 2024, further supports FPL's low risk, projecting FFO to debt 13 at 31%-33% and debt to EBITDA⁴⁷ at 2.5x-3x through 2026.

Further, Mr. Coyne's proposed ROE implies an equity risk premium of 7.21% over FPL's embedded cost of debt of 4.69%. This significantly exceeds the average equity risk premium for electric utilities with A-rated bonds, which has ranged from 3.95% (year-to-date 2025) to 4.24% (2024) based on authorized ROEs.

Additionally, FPL's requested equity ratio of 59.60% is substantially higher than the proxy group's average of 38.4% (including short-term debt) or 42.6% (excluding short-term debt), increasing the weighted average cost of capital and potentially inflating customer rates beyond what is necessary to attract capital. These recommendations, if adopted, would impose excessive costs on ratepayers, failing to balance investor and consumer interests as required by Hope and Bluefield.

⁴⁷ Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization ("EBITDA").

1 <u>B. Flotation Costs</u>

2 Q DID MR. COYNE INCLUDE A FLOTATION COST ADJUSTMENT IN HIS 3 RECOMMENDED RETURN FOR FPL?

A Coyne includes a 9 basis point adjustment for flotation costs, increasing his base ROE
from 11.83% to 11.92%, which he rounds to 11.90%.⁴⁸ He asserts that flotation costs,
associated with issuing new equity, justify this adjustment regardless of whether FPL
plans to issue additional shares.⁴⁹

8 Q WHY IS MR. COYNE'S FLOTATION COST ADJUSTMENT FLAWED?

9 А Mr. Coyne's flotation cost adjustment is not based on FPL's actual and verifiable 10 flotation expenses. Instead, he derives the adjustment from generic cost information 11 for his proxy group.⁵⁰ Without evidence of FPL's specific flotation costs, there is no 12 basis to verify the reasonableness or appropriateness of the 9 basis point adjustment. 13 Furthermore, flotation costs, if incurred, are more appropriately recovered as an 14 expense through the cost of service rather than as an ROE adjustment. This approach 15 ensures that only prudently incurred costs are allocated fairly across FPL's operations. 16 avoiding an unnecessary increase in the ROE that burdens ratepayers.

Further, should flotation costs be allowed to be recovered, I believe it is more appropriate to recover them as an expense through cost of service rather than an increase to the ROE. This would allow for FPL's reasonably incurred flotation costs to be allocated in a fair manner to its various operations.

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⁴⁸ Direct Testimony of James Coyne, page 61.

⁴⁹ *Id.* at pages 60-61.

⁵⁰ Exhibit JMC-10, page 2.

1 <u>C. Mr. Coyne's DCF Analyses</u>

2 Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE HOW MR. COYNE APPLIED THE CONSTANT GROWTH 3 DCF MODEL.

A Mr. Coyne applied the Constant Growth DCF model using average stock prices over
 30, 90, and 180 trading days, annualized dividend per share data, and
 company-specific earnings growth forecasts for his 15 proxy group companies⁵¹. He
 considers the results of each proxy company's low, mean, and high growth rates.⁵²

8 Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF MR. COYNE'S CONSTANT GROWTH DCF

9 ANALYSIS?

- 10 A The results of Mr. Coyne's analysis, summarized in his Exhibit JMC-4, are as follows:
- 30-day average: Mean Low 8.94%, Mean 10.16%, Mean High 11.18%;
- 90-day average: Mean Low 8.99%, Mean 10.22%, Mean High 11.24%; and
- 13 180-day average: Mean Low 9.22%, Mean 10.45%, Mean High 11.47%.⁵³

14 Q ARE THE CONSTANT GROWTH DCF RESULTS PRODUCED BY MR. COYNE

15 **REASONABLE?**

16 No. His DCF results are overstated primarily due to the fact that his growth rates are А 17 substantially higher than the projected long-term growth rate of the United States 18 economy. Specifically, Mr. Coyne's constant growth DCF model is based on growth 19 rates of 5.30% (low-growth) to 7.50% (high-growth). These growth rates exceed the projected long-term GDP growth rate of 4.14%, meaning even his lowest average 20 21 growth rate scenario produces excessive results. As I discuss in greater detail below 22 and in my Direct Testimony, growth rates that exceed the growth rate of GDP in the 23 country in which the utility provides goods and services cannot be sustained.

⁵¹ Exhibit JMC-3, page 1.

⁵² Direct Testimony of James Coyne, page 36, Figure 11.

⁵³ Id.

1 Therefore, his DCF model results should be considered high-end return estimates. 2 Given the fact that Mr. Coyne's lowest and highest average growth scenarios 5.30% 3 and 7.50%, which exceed the consensus long-term projected growth rate of the U.S. 4 economy by 116 to 336 basis points, respectively, they should be given little weight. 5 Because of the economic infirmities with his assumed proxy company growth rate that 6 exceeds the expected growth of the U.S. economy in perpetuity, Mr. Coyne should 7 have considered the results of a multi-stage DCF. As shown on my Exhibit CCW-8, 8 the results of a multi-stage DCF model are in the range of 8.31% to 8.51%.

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D. Mr. Coyne's CAPM Analysis

11 Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE MR. COYNE'S CAPM ANALYSIS.

12 А Mr. Coyne's CAPM analysis used the Blue Chip forecast yield on 30-year Treasury 13 bonds of 4.30%⁵⁴ as the risk-free rate, and also considered the 30-day average yield on 30-year Treasury bonds of 4.56% as of December 31, 2024. He used Beta 14 15 coefficients from both Bloomberg and Value Line, calculated over five years of weekly 16 data. For the MRP, Mr. Coyne began by calculating a DCF-derived expected return 17 on the market using growth rates from Value Line, Bloomberg, and S&P Earnings & 18 Estimates. The DCF-derived return estimates range from 15.50% to 17.44%, and 19 average 16.68%. Mr. Coyne then subtracted his current and projected risk-free rates 20 of 4.56% and 4.30%, respectively, from his average expected market return of 16.68%. 21 This produced average MRPs of 12.11% (current risk free rate) and 12.38% (projected 22 risk-free rate).

⁵⁴ Mr. Coyne's Exhibit JMC-5.2 page 3 indicates that he relied on a projected yield for the 2026-2030 period, while his Exhibit JMC-5.2 page 4 indicates that he relied on a projected yield for the 2023-2027 period.
1 The results of Mr. Coyne's CAPM analysis are summarized in his 2 Exhibit JMC-5.2. His CAPM results range from 15.37% to 15.95% using his current 3 risk-free rate. Using his projected risk-free rate, his CAPM results ranged from 15.34% 4 to 15.93%.

5

Q WHAT ARE YOUR CONCERNS WITH MR. COYNE'S CAPM ANALYSIS?

6 А I have several concerns with Mr. Coyne's CAPM analysis. First, his lowest CAPM 7 result of 15.34% is so far removed from the rest of his analytical methods as well as 8 what has been authorized to other regulated utilities, it cannot be seriously considered 9 as a reasonable estimate. For example, 15.34% is 562 basis points higher than the 10 year-to-date average authorized ROE of 9.72% and 556 basis points higher than the 11 2024 average authorized ROE of 9.78% for electric utilities. Even without taking issue 12 with the rest of Mr. Coyne's additional analytical methods, his next highest result of 13 11.47% (high growth DCF result) is nearly 400 basis points lower than his lowest 14 CAPM result. Notably, Mr. Coyne appears to not rely on his high-growth DCF scenario 15 based on the results presented in his Exhibit JMC-2. Second, Mr. Covne's sole 16 reliance on 5-year Betas overstate the CAPM. Third, the assumed growth rates in his 17 DCF-derived market return estimates are excessive. Fourth, Mr. Coyne's MRPs of 18 12.11%-12.38% exceed MRPs supported by empirical research. Finally, Mr. Coyne 19 failed to consider other sources of the MRP as he has typically done in the past.

20 Q WHY DO YOU BELIEVE MR. COYNE'S 5-YEAR BETA ESTIMATES OVERSTATE 21 THE CAPM?

A The Beta coefficients he references rely on five years of prices and volatility, which
 include the market fallout induced by the onset of the global pandemic in early 2020.
 This period of extraordinary market volatility skews the Beta upwards, reflecting
 short-term market disruptions rather than a long-term change in the perceived risk of
 gas utilities. As discussed earlier in my testimony, prior to the market fallout from the

pandemic, utility Betas were at historically low levels. Therefore, Betas using five
years of prices do not reasonably reflect investor expectations, as the prices and
volatility from early 2020 will be included in the data through early 2025. This inclusion
distorts the Beta calculation, making it less representative of the true, long-term market
risk of utilities.

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Q

PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY YOU BELIEVE THE ASSUMED GROWTH RATES IN HIS DCF-DERIVED MARKET RETURN ESTIMATES ARE EXCESSIVE?

А 8 Mr. Coyne's DCF-derived expected market returns of 17.08%, 17.44%, and 15.50% 9 assume weighted average growth rates of 15.70%, 16.05%, and 14.09%, respectively.⁵⁵ As discussed above with respect to my own DCF model, the DCF 10 11 model requires a long-term sustainable growth rate. Mr. Coyne's average market 12 growth rates of 14.09-16.05% are far too high to be a rational outlook for sustainable 13 long-term market growth. His lowest growth rate of 14.09% is approximately 3.4x the 14 growth rate of the U.S. GDP long-term growth outlook of 4.14%. Notably, his highest 15 assumed growth rate of 16.05% is approximately 3.9x the growth rate of the U.S. GDP 16 long-term growth outlook of 4.14%. Mr. Coyne's market growth rates are irrational and 17 unsustainable for perpetuity, which is the assumed period of the DCF model.

In fact, in the Chartered Financial Analyst ("CFA") curriculum textbooks, the
CFA Institute notes as follows with regard to earnings growth rates for the companies
within the composite indices (i.e., S&P 500):

Earnings growth for the overall national economy can differ from the growth of earnings per share in a country's equity market composites. This is due to the presence of new businesses that are not yet included in the equity indices and are typically growing at a faster rate than the

⁵⁵ Exhibit JMC-5.1.

1 mature companies that make up the composites. <u>Thus, the earnings</u>

2 growth rate of companies making up the composites should be

3

lower than the earnings growth rate for the overall economy.56

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5 Mr. Coyne's DCF-derived expected return on the market is irrational, 6 excessive, and should be rejected.

Q PLEASE EXPLAIN WHY YOU BELIEVE MR. COYNE'S MRPS OF 12.11%-12.38%⁵⁷ 8 EXCEED MRPS SUPPORTED BY EMPIRICAL RESEARCH.

9 A These MRP estimates exceed the high end of the empirical evidence by as much

10 as 54.8%. For example, Dr. Morin notes in his book, <u>Modern Regulatory Finance</u>, that

11 several studies of the MRP have concluded that a MRP in the range of 5.0% to 8.0%

12 is a reasonable estimate for the United States.⁵⁸ For example, the Duarte and Rosa

13 study that Dr. Morin cites concludes that the historical mean is "guite difficult to improve

14 upon when considering out-of-sample performance measures."⁵⁹ Dr. Morin also notes

15 that a survey of professional practices showed that 71% of textbooks/tradebooks used

16 a historical average as the MRP, and 60% of financial advisors used a MRP in the

17 range of 7.0% to 7.4% (similar to a long-term arithmetic average MRP).⁶⁰

Based on this empirical research, it is clear Mr. Coyne's MRPs of 12.11% to
12.38% are excessive and overstate the cost of equity.

⁶⁰ <u>Id.</u>, at 190, n. 35.

⁵⁶ CFA Program Curriculum, 2014 Level II Vol.1, "Ethical and Professional Standards, Quantitative Methods, and Economics", Paul Kutasovic, Reading 15 – Economic Growth and the Investment Decision, p. 609, footnote 5 (Emphasis Added).

⁵⁷ Direct Testimony of James Coyne, page 39.

⁵⁸ Dr. Morin references studies by Duarte & Rosa; Professors Ross, Westerfield, and Jordan; Mahera; and Brealey, Myers, and Allen. Roger A. Morin, <u>Modern Regulatory Finance</u>, 190-192 (PUR Books LLC 2021). Dr. Morin notes in his textbook that there is a "slight preference" for the upper end of the range (i.e., 8%) during tumultuous times in capital markets with examples being the 2008-2009 credit crisis and the 2020 pandemic.

⁵⁹ <u>See</u> Roger A. Morin, <u>Modern Regulatory Finance</u>, 191 (PUR Books LLC 2021) (citing the Duarte and Rosa study).

1QPLEASE EXPLAIN WHY YOU BELIEVE MR. COYNE FAILED TO CONSIDER2OTHER SOURCES OF THE MRP AS HE HAS TYPICALLY DONE IN THE PAST.

- A Mr. Coyne has previously incorporated the long-term average MRP into his CAPM
 analysis but has excluded it in his CAPM here for unexplained reasons. For example,
 last year Mr. Coyne explains as follows:
- 6

7

- Q What Market Risk Premium did you use in your CAPM analysis?
- A I calculated a forward-looking MRP using the Constant 8 Growth DCF model to estimate the total market return for the 9 10 S&P 500 Index, using projected earnings growth rates and 11 dividend yields. As of February 29, 2024, the projected total 12 market return is 14.21%, as shown in Exhibit JMC-5.1. I then 13 calculated the forward-looking MRP by subtracting the 14 risk-free rate (based on the five-year forecast of the 30-year 15 Treasury bond of 4.10%) from the total market return. The 16 forward-looking MRP is 10.11%. I also utilized the historical 17 MRP from Kroll of 7.17%, which is based on the difference 18 between the return on large company stocks less the 19 income-only return on government bonds from 1926-2022, in 20 combination with the current 30-year Treasury bond yield 21 of 4.37%.61
- 22
- 23 Mr. Coyne should have considered alternative sources of the MRP rather than
 24 his sole reliance on the DCF model. Doing so would be consistent with his testimony

⁶¹ Before The North Carolina Utilities Commission, Docket No. G-9, Sub 837, Direct Testimony of James M. Coyne, April 1, 2024 at page 30.

where he explains "[t]hese factors emphasize the importance of considering the results
of multiple models, and the use of both current and forecasted bond yields, as I have
with my analysis."⁶² Mr. Coyne's choosing to omit from consideration other sources of
the MRP is in direct contradiction with his own testimony here and against his practice
as recently as last year. By doing so, Mr. Coyne has biased his results and overstated
the cost of equity for FPL.

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8 E. Mr. Coyne's Risk Premium Analysis

9 Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE MR. COYNE'S RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS AND ITS 10 INPUTS.

11 А As shown on his Exhibit JMC-6, Mr. Coyne estimates an ROE estimate based on the 12 premise that equity risk premiums are inversely related to interest rates, meaning as 13 interest rates go up the equity risk premium should decrease, and conversely, as 14 interest rates go down, the equity risk premium should increase. Calculating the equity 15 risk premium as the authorized ROE less the contemporaneous 30-year Treasury 16 yield, he estimates the average equity risk premium for electric utilities to be approximately 6.02% over the period 1992 through 2024.63 He performs a linear 17 18 regression using the 30-year Treasury yield as the independent variable (x-axis) and the risk premium as the dependent variable (y-axis).64 This model produces a 19 20 regression formula, which he applies by inputting his current, near-term projected, and 21 long-term projected 30-year Treasury bond yield of 4.56%, 4.48%, and 4.30%, 22 respectively. The resulting expected equity risk premium based on these inputs is 23 6.01%, 6.05%, and 6.15%, respectively.⁶⁵ He then adds these estimated risk

- ⁶⁴ Id.
- ⁶⁵ Id.

⁶² Direct Testimony of James Coyne, page 27.

⁶³ Id.

premiums to the corresponding Treasury yields, producing cost of equity estimate in
 the range of 10.45% to 10.57%.⁶⁶

3 Q IS MR. COYNE'S RISK PREMIUM METHODOLOGY REASONABLE?

4 А No. As an initial matter, even though his analysis is predicated on the authorized 5 ROEs for electric utilities as the starting point, two of his three Risk Premium model 6 results exceed the highest ROE awarded to any electric utility since 2024. For 7 example, the two highest estimates based on his Risk Premium model (10.53% and 8 10.57%) exceed the single highest authorized ROE of 10.50% observed since 2024. 9 Notably, the one observed ROE of 10.50% is the only instance where an authorized 10 ROE exceeds his lowest Risk Premium model estimate of 10.45%. In other words, 11 despite his Risk Premium model being predicated on authorized ROEs, all three of his 12 Risk Premium model estimates are higher than 56 of the 57 authorized ROEs for 13 electric utilities since 2024. Notably, two of his model results are higher than all 14 57 observations.

15 Notwithstanding that observation, my main concern with Mr. Covne's Risk 16 Premium analysis is that his estimated equity risk premium is significantly overstated 17 and inconsistent with his own hypothesis. For example, based on the data presented 18 in my Direct Testimony, the average equity risk premium in 2023 and 2024 is 5.51% 19 and 5.30%, respectively. This recent average is between 39 and 60 basis points less 20 than the equity risk premium of 5.90% estimated by Mr. Coyne. In a report issued last 21 year, RRA (a division of S&P Global) discussed the equity risk premium, as measured 22 by the authorized ROE spread over bond yields as follows:

However, with the uptick in interest rates since 2020, the spread has
begun to narrow, falling to around 550 basis points in 2023. With the

myriad factors putting upward pressure on customer bills, <u>the spread</u>
 <u>may continue to narrow as regulators may become more reluctant to</u>
 <u>raise authorized returns.⁶⁷</u>

5 As indicated by the data, the average Treasury yield in 2023 and 2024 was 6 4.09% and 4.40%, respectively. The average equity risk premium over Treasury yields 7 over those two years were 5.51% and 5.30%, respectively. Mr. Coyne assumed a 30-year Treasury yield of 4.30% to 4.56%. To be consistent with Mr. Coyne's inverse 8 9 relationship hypothesis, the equity risk premium should be consistent with the equity 10 risk premiums in the range of 5.30% to 5.51% since interest rates assumed by 11 Mr. Coyne are relatively consistent with the interest rates realized over 2023 and 2024. 12 However, Mr. Coyne's estimated equity risk premiums of 6.01%-6.15%, representing 13 an increase of up to 85 basis points relative to the 2023 and 2024 equity risk premiums. 14 Notably, the year-to-date average authorized ROE for vertically integrated electric 15 utilities is 9.76%, a decline from 9.84% in 2024.

16 Importantly, it is a clear indication that Mr. Coyne's Risk Premium method is 17 unreliable given his model produces an ROE estimate that significantly exceeds the 18 recent ROEs awarded to other regulated utilities. Further, given Mr. Coyne's estimates 19 of the equity risk premium are inconsistent with the inverse relationship he asserts is 20 present, Mr. Coyne's Risk Premium analysis should be given little weight.

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⁶⁷ RRA, Major energy rate case decisions in the U.S. January-December 2023 Quarterly update on decided rate cases, February 6, 2024. (Emphasis Added).

1 F. Mr. Coyne's Expected Earnings Analysis

2 Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE MR. COYNE'S EXPECTED EARNINGS ANALYSIS, 3 INCLUDING ITS INPUTS.

A Mr. Coyne's Expected Earnings analysis estimates the ROE based on projected
 returns on book equity for proxy companies, using Value Line's projections for
 2027-2029.⁶⁸ He argues this approach reflects the opportunity cost of investing in FPL
 by comparing expected returns of risk-comparable companies. The average result is
 10.91% while the median result is 10.27%.⁶⁹

9 Q WHAT ARE YOUR CONCERNS WITH MR. COYNE'S EXPECTED EARNINGS 10 ANALYSIS?

An expected earnings analysis does not measure the return an investor requires in order to make an investment. In other words, the accounting measure of the earned ROE does not measure the opportunity cost of capital. Rather, it measures the earned return on book equity that companies have experienced in the past or are projected to achieve in the future. The returns investors require in order to assume the risk of an investment are measured from prevailing stock market prices.

17 In addition, FERC has recently found that the Expected Earnings model does
18 not satisfy the requirements of *Hope*. In part, FERC states as follows:

As a result, the expected return on a utility's book value does not reflect "returns on investments in other enterprises" because book value does not reflect the value of any investment that is available to an investor in the market, outside of the unlikely situation in which market value and book value are exactly equal. Accordingly, we find that relying on

 ⁶⁸ Direct Testimony of James Coyne, page 43.
 ⁶⁹ *Id*.

1 the Expected Earnings model would not satisfy the requirements of 2 Hope. 3 The return on book value is also not indicative of what return an 4 investor requires to invest in the utility's equity or what return an 5 investor receives on the equity investment, because those returns are 6 determined with respect to the current market price that an investor 7 must pay in order to invest in the equity.⁷⁰ 8 9 Later in the same Opinion, FERC observes that Expected Earnings model 10 does not identify investments of comparable risk. It states as follows: 11 Moreover, we find that the record demonstrates that the Expected 12 Earnings model does not identify investments of comparable risk and 13 which alternatives will have a higher expected return as MISO TOs' 14 witness Mr. McKenzie indicates.^[footnote omitted] In particular, because the 15 Expected Earnings model measures returns on book value, without 16 consideration of what market price an investor would have to pay to 17 invest in the relevant company, it does not accurately measure the investor's expected returns on its investment.71 18 19 20 Additionally, the historical and projected earned ROE for these holding

20 Additionally, the historical and projected earned ROE for these holding 21 companies can be significantly influenced by the financial performance of 22 nonregulated operations. For these reasons, Mr. Coyne's expected earnings analysis 23 should be disregarded.

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⁷⁰ Opinion No. 569, 169 FERC ¶ 61,129 at p. 201-202.

⁷¹ *Id*. at p. 205.

1 <u>G. Mr. Coyne's Assertion that FPL is Riskier than the Proxy Group</u>

2 Q PLEASE EXPLAIN HOW MR. COYNE VIEWS THE COMPANY'S RISK RELATIVE 3 TO HIS PROXY GROUP.

4 А In his testimony, Mr. Coyne asserts that FPL faces above-average risk compared to 5 the proxy group due to several factors.⁷² He highlights FPL's significant capital 6 expenditure program, which requires substantial investment and increases financial 7 Additionally, FPL's ownership of nuclear generation assets introduces risk. 8 operational and regulatory complexities that elevate risk. Mr. Coyne also points to 9 severe weather risks, particularly hurricanes, which pose a threat to FPL's 10 infrastructure and financial stability due to its Florida location. Regulatory risks are 11 noted, as FPL operates in a jurisdiction with complex regulatory oversight. Lastly, the 12 multi-year rate plan introduces uncertainty, as it locks in rates over an extended period, 13 potentially misaligning with changing economic conditions.

14 Q DO YOU AGREE WITH HIS ASSESSMENT THAT THE COMPANY IS OF HIGHER 15 RISK THAN THE PROXY GROUP?

16 А No. FPL's credit ratings of A from S&P and A1 from Moody's are significantly stronger 17 than the proxy group's average ratings of BBB+ and Baa2, respectively, as shown in 18 my Exhibit CCW-2. These ratings, which are two and four notches higher than the 19 proxy group's, reflect a comprehensive evaluation of FPL's risk profile, including its 20 capital expenditure program, nuclear generation ownership, severe weather exposure, 21 regulatory environment, and multi-year rate plan. Credit rating agencies view 22 multi-year rate plans as credit positive due to their predictability and stability. 23 Furthermore, FPL's requested common equity ratio of 59.60% is substantially higher 24 than the proxy group's average equity ratio of 38.4% (including short-term debt) and

⁷² Direct Testimony of James Coyne, p. 7 & 56.

1		42.6% (excluding short-term debt), as calculated by S&P Global Market Intelligence
2		and Value Line. This higher equity ratio indicates a less leveraged capital structure,
3		further reducing FPL's financial risk compared to the proxy group. Therefore, FPL's
4		superior credit ratings and stronger capital structure demonstrate that it is of lower risk
5		than the proxy group, contrary to Mr. Coyne's assertion.
6	Q	DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?
7	А	Yes, it does.
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APPENDIX A – Qualifications of Christopher C. Walters

- 2 Q PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.
- A Christopher C. Walters. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road,
 Suite 140, Chesterfield, MO 63017.
- 5 Q PLEASE STATE YOUR OCCUPATION.
- A I am a consultant in the field of public utility regulation and a Principal with the firm of
 Brubaker & Associates, Inc. ("BAI"), energy, economic and regulatory consultants.

8 Q PLEASE STATE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFESSIONAL

9

EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE.

- A I received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Business Economics and Finance from
 Southern Illinois University Edwardsville. I have also received a Master of Business
 Administration Degree from Lindenwood University.
- 13 As a Principal at BAI, I perform detailed technical analyses and research to 14 support regulatory projects including expert testimony covering various regulatory 15 issues. Since my career at BAI began in 2011, I have held the positions of Analyst, 16 Associate Consultant, Consultant, Senior Consultant, and Associate. Throughout my 17 tenure, I have been involved with several regulated projects for electric, natural gas 18 and water and wastewater utilities, as well as competitive procurement of electric 19 power and gas supply. My regulatory project work includes estimating the cost of 20 equity capital, capital structure evaluations, assessing financial integrity, merger and 21 acquisition related issues, risk management related issues, depreciation rate studies, 22 and other revenue requirement issues.
- BAI was formed in April 1995. BAI and its predecessor firm have participated
 in more than 700 regulatory proceedings in 40 states and Canada.

BAI provides consulting services in the economic, technical, accounting, and financial aspects of public utility rates and in the acquisition of utility and energy services through RFPs and negotiations, in both regulated and unregulated markets. Our clients include large industrial and institutional customers, some utilities and, on occasion, state regulatory agencies. We also prepare special studies and reports, forecasts, surveys and siting studies, and present seminars on utility-related issues.

In general, we are engaged in energy and regulatory consulting, economic
analysis and contract negotiation. In addition to our main office in St. Louis, the firm
also has branch offices in Corpus Christi, Texas; Louisville, Kentucky and
Phoenix, Arizona.

11 Q HAVE YOU EVER TESTIFIED BEFORE A REGULATORY BODY?

A Yes. I have sponsored testimony before state regulatory commissions including:
 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
 Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
 Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
 Carolina, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. In addition, I have also sponsored testimony
 before the City Council of New Orleans and an affidavit before the FERC.

18 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATIONS OR 19 ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH YOU BELONG.

A I earned the Chartered Financial Analyst ("CFA") designation from the CFA Institute. The CFA charter was awarded after successfully completing three examinations which covered the subject areas of financial accounting and reporting analysis, corporate finance, economics, fixed income and equity valuation, derivatives, alternative investments, risk management, and professional and ethical conduct. I am a member of the CFA Institute and the CFA Society of St. Louis.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

		Price to Earnings (P/E) Ratio ¹											
		23-Year								3-Year	Averages		
Line	Company	<u>Average</u>	<u>2024 ²</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2022</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2020</u>	2017-2019	<u>2014-2016</u>	<u>2011-2013</u>	<u>2008-2010</u>	2005-2007	2002-2004
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1	ALLETE	18.24	18.80	16.80	18.10	20.60	18.30	23.30	16.97	16.40	15.33	16.42	25.21
2	Alliant Energy	17.11	20.10	16.40	21.40	21.20	21.20	20.30	19.00	14.77	13.27	14.84	15.54
3	Ameren Corp.	16.89	20.30	15.50	21.50	21.40	22.20	20.33	17.50	13.93	11.07	17.83	15.19
4	American Electric Power	15.35	18.40	15.90	21.10	17.10	19.60	19.57	15.63	13.40	12.17	14.30	11.92
5	Avangrid, Inc.	23.69	N/A	16.30	19.60	23.20	23.60	25.50	27.00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	18.23	16.20	14.60	20.00	20.20	21.20	20.97	17.90	16.00	13.03	21.91	19.18
7	Black Hills	17.45	13.90	14.20	18.10	17.70	17.00	19.17	19.13	22.13	14.00	16.01	15.20
8	CenterPoint Energy	17.00	19.80	20.40	18.70	26.10	15.90	24.80	19.00	16.03	12.30	14.77	9.83
9	CMS Energy Corp.	18.44	20.50	18.60	22.90	23.60	23.30	21.97	18.83	15.00	12.33	20.53	12.39
10	Consol. Edison	16.27	19.70	17.70	20.30	17.20	19.00	18.87	16.77	15.07	12.70	14.80	15.26
11	Dominion Resources	18.23	15.80	18.30	18.70	19.50	22.60	19.30	22.13	18.47	13.60	20.49	14.12
12	DTE Energy	16.81	18.90	16.90	22.40	30.00	16.30	18.63	17.33	15.43	12.50	16.51	13.67
13	Duke Energy	17.29	19.00	16.50	19.60	18.90	17.10	18.20	19.13	16.23	14.43	16.10	N/A
14	Edison Int'l	16.75	9.70	14.30	40.60	29.70	34.90	16.95	15.23	11.40	10.80	13.58	17.45
15	El Paso Electric	17.68	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	24.32	17.79	14.32	11.14	19.63	21.10
16	Entergy Corp.	14.93	25.80	20.60	21.10	15.00	15.30	15.10	12.10	11.17	13.40	16.62	13.46
17	Eversource Energy	18.01	12.40	13.10	20.90	22.20	23.70	20.10	18.23	17.40	13.03	21.84	16.73
18	Evergy, Inc.	19.20	17.30	14.80	19.90	16.20	21.70	22.25	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
19	Exelon Corp.	14.52	17.50	15.40	19.90	16.60	12.40	13.80	13.70	14.60	13.50	16.70	11.74
20	FirstEnergy Corp.	15.26	16.80	14.40	17.00	14.10	15.70	14.03	12.83	18.87	13.43	15.30	16.52
21	Fortis Inc.	19.24	18.80	17.00	21.10	21.20	20.60	17.70	21.30	19.63	17.37	19.39	N/A
22	Great Plains Energy	15.52	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	17.94	15.28	16.23	16.20	11.97
23	Hawaiian Elec.	17.36	11.20	6.00	18.50	18.20	21.50	20.30	16.63	16.37	20.53	19.30	15.47
24	Hydro One Limited ³	18.66	25.20	20.50	19.60	18.70	9.20	19.25	18.10	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
25	IDACORP, Inc.	17.25	19.60	18.10	21.00	20.80	19.90	21.13	16.67	12.43	11.97	16.66	20.29
26	MGE Energy	20.35	26.00	21.10	24.70	25.50	26.40	27.63	20.80	16.67	14.77	17.76	17.16
27	NextEra Energy, Inc.	18.72	17.90	19.80	27.80	31.30	28.90	24.40	18.30	14.17	12.90	16.81	15.05
28	NorthWestern Corp	16.88	16.00	13.70	17.30	17.40	18.60	18.17	17.27	15.07	12.77	21.58	N/A
29	OGE Energy	15.49	17.70	17.00	17.20	14.30	16.20	17.93	17.90	15.77	12.17	14.14	13.36
30	Otter Tail Corp.	20.31	12.90	14.30	9.50	12.30	18.30	22.60	19.07	30.10	30.65	17.25	17.04
31	Pinnacle West Capital	16.01	18.70	15.80	17.10	14.10	16.70	18.83	16.87	14.73	14.13	15.94	14.73
32	TXNM Energy	18.26	17.80	14.20	17.40	19.90	19.60	20.67	19.93	15.20	16.05	22.85	14.94
33	Portland General	16.56	13.70	14.30	18.20	17.70	16.60	20.23	17.37	14.43	14.23	17.63	N/A
34	PPL Corp.	16.39	19.70	16.20	20.00	54.10	13.90	14.07	13.60	11.40	18.40	15.51	11.39
35	Public Serv. Enterprise	14.76	20.20	18.80	18.50	16.80	15.70	16.97	14.00	12.23	11.33	17.02	11.61
36	SCANA Corp.	13.96	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	14.46	15.05	14.30	12.41	14.94	12.93
37	Sempra Energy	15.43	13.00	15.00	16.80	15.40	17.50	22.40	22.00	15.47	11.50	12.43	8.60
38	Southern Co.	16.48	21.10	18.60	19.60	18.40	17.90	16.07	16.53	16.33	14.83	16.04	14.72
39	Vectren Corp.	17.05	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	23.54	19.03	17.17	14.93	16.45	15.51
40	WEC Energy Group	17.50	19.00	16.50	21.90	22.30	24.90	21.03	19.63	15.50	14.03	15.64	13.47
41	Westar Energy	15.58	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	23.40	18.47	14.08	14.96	13.69	14.08
42	Xcel Energy Inc.	17.88	18.10	15.30	22.20	22.50	23.90	20.47	16.80	14.67	13.50	15.62	22.02
43	Average	17.06	17.99	16.29	20.28	20.85	19.66	19.97	17.79	15.68	14.15	16.95	15.11
44	Median	16.30	18.55	16.30	19.90	19.50	19.00	20.23	17.90	15.20	13.43	16.45	14.94

Sources: The current year P/E ratio is based on the forward P/E (price over expected earnings per share). All historical year P/E ratios are based on annual average share price over achieved earnings per share.

¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021.

Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

Market Price to Cash Flow (MP/CF) Ratio ¹													
		23-Year								3-Year	Averages		
Line	Company	Average	2024 ²	2023	2022	2021	2020	2017-2019	2014-2016	2011-2013	2008-2010	2005-2007	2002-2004
	<u></u>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1	ALLETE	9.12	8.03	6.69	7.56	8.61	8.14	10.83	8.19	8.41	8.61	10.97	11.46
2	Alliant Energy	8.31	9.74	9.43	10.43	10.31	10.66	11.22	9.31	7.41	6.77	7.01	5.16
3	Ameren Corp.	7.42	7.76	8.05	9.54	9.03	9.63	8.59	7.09	5.70	4.94	8.28	7.65
4	American Electric Power	6.77	7.70	7.68	8.67	7.57	8.41	8.72	7.22	5.99	5.32	6.15	5.13
5	Avangrid, Inc.	9.53	N/A	7.12	8.69	11.19	9.39	9.83	9.93	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	6.94	6.34	6.73	9.39	8.03	7.80	8.94	7.23	6.50	4.99	6.49	6.28
7	Black Hills	7.90	7.58	7.76	8.92	8.84	8.56	9.56	8.73	7.30	7.22	7.37	6.50
8	CenterPoint Energy	5.67	7.79	7.75	8.01	7.95	5.94	7.48	5.99	5.70	4.35	4.60	2.83
9	CMS Energy Corp.	6.60	8.53	8.28	9.43	9.27	9.87	9.00	7.72	6.04	3.85	4.67	3.04
10	Consol. Edison	8.24	8.34	8.26	8.70	7.26	8.35	9.28	8.42	8.08	7.00	8.52	8.28
11	Dominion Resources	9.86	9.08	9.24	9.35	11.15	14.59	11.92	11.90	10.08	7.79	8.85	7.24
12	DTE Energy	6.80	7.72	7.27	7.96	10.62	7.85	9.09	7.86	5.92	4.39	5.49	5.61
13	Duke Energy	7.60	7.47	7.17	7.75	7.89	8.06	7.82	8.21	8.07	6.37	7.16	N/A
14	Edison Int'l	6.02	6.04	5.67	6.83	7.14	7.57	9.25	6.12	4.76	4.56	6 16	4.21
15	El Paso Electric	5.93	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	8.99	6.75	5.71	4.41	6.45	4.31
16	Entergy Corp	5.83	7.85	4.62	7 15	5.61	5 78	5.21	4 1 1	4.06	6 10	8.38	6.51
17	Eversource Energy	7.60	6.51	10.39	9.39	11 41	12.53	10.33	10.13	8.12	4 57	5.25	3.13
18	Everay Inc	745	6.96	6 74	8.66	7.41	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
19	Exelon Corp	6.05	6.06	6.41	7.69	5.08	4 44	4.93	4.86	5 34	6.91	8.82	5.66
20	EirstEnergy Corp	6.92	7.47	7 90	8.93	6.60	0.23	8.23	5.98	6.97	5.66	7 15	5.00
21	Fortis Inc	8.45	8.00	8 34	9.10	9.57	9.50	8.56	9.00	8.13	7 25	8.54	N/A
22	Great Plains Energy	6.89	N/A	0.0 4 Ν/Δ	N/A	N/A	N/A	14.62	7.25	5.85	5.75	7 17	5.86
23	Hawaijan Elec	7 70	2 16	5 70	7.95	8.23	8 60	8 95	8.11	7.98	7.95	8.24	6.02
24	Hydro Ope Limited3	11.65	15.81	14.82	14.51	13 75	7 31	11 10	8.51	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
25	IDACORP. Inc	9.05	10.78	11.04	12/2	11.8/	11 38	12.01	9.64	7 16	631	7.83	731
26	MGE Eporav	11 75	13.26	12.31	13.63	N/A	1/ 00	15.08	13.20	10.48	8.62	10.08	0.78
27	NextEra Energy Inc	0.20	11.20	10.80	15.00	20.40	15.48	11.57	8 38	7.05	6.26	7.42	6.15
28	NorthWestern Corp	7.87	7 33	8.01	8.65	8.83	8.88	8.08	8.88	6.78	5.47	8 30	8.13
20		7.07	P 14	7 79	8.36	7.64	0.00	10.16	0.00	9.25	6.14	7 37	5.01
29	Ottor Tail Corp	0.25	8.01	8.02	7 70	9.61	0.00	11.70	9.04	0.23	0.14	8.70	8.40
31	Binnacla West Capital	5.25	6.11	6.02	5.10	6.10	9.99 7.40	8.04	3.23	9.02 6.33	5.24	5.79	5.30
22		6.20	6.06	6.97	5.15	7.94	7.43	7.62	7.20	6.33	4.30 5.40	9.60	5.50
32	Partland Caparal	6.00	5.00	6.56	0.95	6.49	6.70	7.03	6.45	5.74	4.52	5.00	0.03
24		7.02	0.05	7 92	0.00	12 74	7.46	0.22	0.45	5.55	4.52	9.02	5.72
25	Pril Colp. Dublic Sent Enternrise	7.93	9.90	1.00	10.52	11.74	0.00	0.37	7.24	6.14	6.40	0.02	5.75
30	SCANA Corp	0.12	11.70 N/A	9.00	10.55 N/A	11.3Z	0.22	0.90	1.24	0.20	6.90	0.90	0.75
27	Scana Corp.	7.09	N/A	0 02	0.75	12 22	10.40	10.20	0.40	7.21	0.20	0.55	0.00
20	Sempra Energy	0.01	9.70	0.93	9.75	13.23	0.40	7 70	10.55	7.59	0.00	7.00	4.07
30	Southern Co.	0.30	9.59	0.04	9.05	0.72	0.34	1.10	0.49	0.42	7.00	0.50	0.10
39	Vectren Corp.	7.00	N/A	IN/A	IN/A	IN/A	IN/A	10.52	0.00	0.14	5.91	0.99	1.20
40	WEC Energy Group	9.25	9.53	10.12	11.81	11.99	13.07	11.58	11.37	9.08	7.53	7.17	0.10
41	westar Energy	6.91	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	10.87	9.28	6.87	5.97	0.50	4.57
42	Acei Energy Inc.	7.06	1.13	7.96	8.62	9.19	10.07	8.61	80.1	0.78	5.80	5.89	5.01
43	Average	7.70	8.29	8.19	9.15	9.40	9.21	9.55	8.24	6.99	6.22	7.37	6.18
44	Wedian	1.57	7.82	7.90	8.70	8.78	8.48	9.00	8.19	6.87	6.14	1.37	5.97

Sources:

The current year P/E ratio is based on the forward P/E (price over expected earnings per share). All historical year P/E ratios are based on annual average share price over achieved earnings per share.

¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021.

Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Note:

^a Based on the average of the high and low price and the projected Cash Flow per share.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

						Market	Price to B	ook Value (MP	/BV) Ratio ¹			
		20-Year								3-Year Averag	es	
Line	Company	Average	2024 ²	2023	2022	2021	2020	2017-2019	2014-2016	2011-2013	2008-2010	2005-2007
	<u> </u>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
1	ALLETE	1.53	1.19	1.19	1.24	1.43	1.39	1.83	1.44	1.40	1.33	2.07
2	Alliant Energy	1.82	2.03	1.92	2.25	2.26	2.30	2.29	1.96	1.58	1.23	1.51
3	Ameren Corp.	1.61	1.90	2.00	2.15	2.13	2.21	2.04	1.53	1.12	0.95	1.64
4	American Electric Power	1.65	1.78	1.73	1.99	1.87	2.09	1.97	1.64	1.31	1.27	1.66
5	Avangrid, Inc.	0.90	N/A	0.71	0.89	1.01	0.97	0.99	0.78	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	1.32	1.11	1.19	1.33	1.42	1.37	1.72	1.42	1.22	1.04	1.24
7	Black Hills	1.49	1.15	1.28	1.54	1.52	1.55	1.87	1.77	1.32	1.04	1.56
8	CenterPoint Energy	2.25	1.78	1.86	1.99	1.74	1.90	2.33	2.48	2.05	2.07	2.98
9	CMS Energy Corp.	2.19	2.38	2.33	2.71	2.69	3.24	3.01	2.47	1.88	1.27	1.52
10	Consol. Edison	1.43	1.53	1.48	1.55	1.34	1.44	1.57	1.45	1.41	1.15	1.49
11	Dominion Resources	2.50	1.71	1.68	2.34	2.37	2.72	2.51	3.35	2.73	2.08	2.42
12	DTE Energy	1.67	2.10	1.97	2.41	2.82	1.80	1.99	1.70	1.35	1.05	1.35
13	Duke Energy	1.30	1.67	1.49	1.63	1.58	1.47	1.40	1.31	1.14	0.99	1.15
14	Edison Int'l	1.72	2.10	1.86	2.08	1.67	1.62	1.98	1.78	1.45	1.22	1.93
15	El Paso Electric	1.56	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.91	1.56	1.57	1.16	1.72
16	Entergy Corp.	1.74	1.81	1.45	1.81	1.75	1.93	1.84	1.47	1.29	1.91	2.18
17	Eversource Energy	1.55	1.48	1.71	1.86	2.00	2.11	1.80	1.55	1.39	1.25	1.29
18	Everay, Inc.	1.41	1.29	1.33	1.52	1.50	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
19	Exelon Corp	2.04	1.39	1.52	1.88	1.37	1.20	1.31	1.21	1.53	3.01	4 09
20	EirstEnergy Corp	2.05	1.86	2.08	2.37	2 33	2.81	3.20	1.56	1.35	1.81	1.93
21	Fortis Inc.	1.47	1.37	1.43	1.56	1.48	1.47	1.35	1.31	1.55	1.45	1.79
22	Great Plains Energy	1 21	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.33	1.13	0.97	0.93	1.77
23	Hawaiian Elec	1.65	1.50	1 24	1 94	1.81	1.82	1.85	1.10	1.57	1 40	1.78
24	Hydro One Limited3	1.58	2.12	1.89	1.83	1.64	1 44	1.00	1 34	N/A	Ν/Δ	N/A
25		1.50	1.68	1.00	1.00	1.88	1.84	2.00	1.54	1 23	1.05	1 28
26	MGE Energy	2.17	2.50	2 35	2.47	N/A	2.54	2.00	2.26	1.01	1.60	1.20
27	NextEra Energy Inc	2.17	2.00	2.00	4.07	1 27	3.58	2.70	2.20	1.31	1.00	2.02
28	NorthWestern Corp	1.42	1 1 1	1 18	1.07	1/3	1 45	1.62	1.61	1.44	1.75	1.52
20		1.42	1.11	1.10	1.2.5	1.45	1.40	1.88	1.01	2.03	1.13	1.02
30	Otter Tail Corp	1.01	2.18	2.55	2 30	2 33	2.04	2.48	1.86	1.63	1.35	1.80
31	Pinnacla West Capital	1.34	1 42	1 42	1.31	1.45	1.63	1.85	1.56	1.00	1.03	1.01
32	TXNM Energy	1.42	1.42	1.75	1.81	1.86	1.00	1.00	1.36	0.96	0.64	1.20
33	Portland General	1.36	1.45	1.75	1.01	1.55	1.57	1.30	1.50	1 17	0.04	1.30
34		1.50	1.20	1.37	1.30	1.50	1.63	2.02	2.11	1.17	2 30	2.66
25	Public Sony Enterprise	1.57	2.25	1.40	2.22	2.11	1.00	1.92	2.11	1.50	2.00	2.00
36	SCANA Corp	1.50	2.55 N/A	N/A	2.52	2.11	N/A	1.65	1.01	1.44	1.32	2.00
37	Somera Energy	1.31	1.74	1.65	1.84	1.64	1.8/	2.17	2.12	1.44	1.52	1.00
20	Sempla Energy	2.15	2.69	2.24	2.52	2.20	2.20	2.17	2.12	2.06	1.42	2.27
20	Vectron Corp	1 92	2.00	2.04 N/A	2.55	2.55	Z.20	2.05	2.01	2.00	1.09	4.77
40	WEG Energy Group	2.07	0.07	0.0E	0.EZ	2.64	0.04	2.75	2.10	1.04	1.40	1.77
40	Wester Energy Gloup	2.07	Z.Z/	2.30 N/A	Z.37	2.0 I N/A	2.04 N/A	2.27	2.00	2.02	1.04	1.70
41	Vestal Energy	1.37	1 77	N/A	1W/A	1WA	1N/A	1.94	1.00	1.27	1.04	1.55
42	Acer Energy Inc.	1.75	1.77	2.00	2.22	2.21	2.40	2.12	1.70	1.47	1.27	1.44
43	Average	1.73	1.78	1.73	1.95	1.91	1.94	1.98	1.72	1.52	1.41	1.81
44	wealan	1./1	1.73	1./1	1.88	1./4	1.84	1.94	1.61	1.45	1.27	1.72

Sources:

The current year P/E ratio is based on the forward P/E (price over expected earnings per share). All historical year P/E ratios are based on annual average share price over achieved earnings per share.

¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021.

Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Notes:

^b Based on the average of the high and low price and the projected Book Value per share.

Docket No. 20250011-EI **Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)** Exhibit CCW-1, Page 4 of 16

Florida Power & Light Company

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

		Dividend Yield ¹ 19-Year 3-Year Averages										
Line	Compony	19-Year	2024 2/8	2022	2022	2024	2019 2020	2015 2017	3-Year Average	2000 2011	2006 2009	
Line	company	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
		1050		1.070/		0.000/	0.00%	0.50%		E 400	0.740	
2	ALLETE Allight Energy	4.05%	4 03%	4 07%	4 4/%	3 88%	3 29%	3 50%	4 10%	5 13%	371%	
ŝ	Ameren Corn	4 07%	3 29%	3 13%	2 74%	2 74%	2 74%	3 53%	4 53%	5 67%	5 34%	
4	American Electric Power	3 97%	3 96%	4 02%	3 4 1%	3 61%	3 33%	3 58%	4 21%	5 12%	3 89%	
5	Avengrid, Inc	3 89%	N∕A	487%	3 94%	3 53%	3 57%	4 03%	N/A	N/A	N/A	
6	Avista Corp	3 93%	5 29%	4 85%	4 26%	3 94%	3 48%	3 50%	4 35%	4 60%	2 86%	
7	Black Hills	3 77%	4 53%	4 15%	3 44%	3 50%	3 16%	3 05%	3 47%	5 20%	3 80%	
8	CenterPoint Energy	4 08%	277%	2 71%	2 46%	2 77%	3 82%	4 85%	3 85%	5 31%	4 42%	
10	Consol Educan	3 20%	3 2 3 %	3 31%	2 92%	2 92%	211%	3 07%	3 84%	4 07%	1 93%	
11	Domining Resources	4 24 76	5 06%	5 18%	3 6694	3 38%	3 00% 4 60%	378%	4 23%	J 20%	3 56%	
12	DTE Energy	3.96%	3 55%	3 67%	3 17%	3 06%	3 33%	3 34%	3 86%	5 24%	4 82%	
13	Duke Energy	4 56%	3 92%	4 28%	3 98%	4 02%	4 35%	4 25%	4 46%	5 72%	4 80%	
14	Edison Int'l	3 4 1%	4 17%	4 47%	4 45%	4 39%	3 95%	2 84%	2 82%	3 66%	2 49%	
15	El Paso Electric	2 74%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2 55%	2 79%	2 98%	2 11%	N/A	
16	Entergy Corp	4 01%	3 62%	4 36%	3 70%	3 84%	3 83%	4 54%	4 81%	4 34%	2 71%	
17	Eversource Energy	3 34%	4 /2%	3 89%	3 09%	2 85%	2 92%	3 23%	34/%	3 67%	3 04%	
10	Everyy, Inc.	3 76%	4 00%	2 6 7 %	3 90%	3 39%	2 40%	2 7 1 %	4 70%	4 72%	2 70%	
20	ErstEnergy Corn	4 30%	4 23%	4 24%	3 71%	4 39%	4 28%	4 39%	4 47%	5 36%	3 24%	
21	Fortis Inc	3 73%	4 16%	4 09%	3 82%	3 77%	3 78%	3 75%	3 79%	3 86%	3 19%	
22	Great Plains Energy	4 52%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3 66%	3 84%	4 55%	6 02%	
23	Hawaiian Elec	440%	N/A	4 09%	3 59%	3 44%	3 32%	3 90%	4 73%	5 81%	4 92%	
24	Hydro One Limited	2 81%	2 11%	2 34%	2 50%	2 53%	3 22%	2 99%	N/A	N/A	N/A	
24	IDACORP, Inc	3 16%	3 24%	3 18%	2 86%	2 89%	2 67%	2 80%	3 20%	3 66%	3 63%	
25	MGE Energy	2 95%	2.06%	2 25%	2 15%	N/A	2 07%	2 32%	2 98%	3 99%	4 21%	
20	Nextera Energy, Inc	Z 90% A 19%	2 94%	Z 00% A 79%	Z 1176 A 5196	4 00%	2 40%	2 90%	3 32%	5 06%	A 27%	
28	OGE Energy	3.86%	4 30%	4 63%	4 30%	4 81%	4.06%	3.66%	2.68%	3 90%	4 10%	
29	Otter Tail Corp	3 75%	2 15%	2 33%	2 44%	2 81%	3 04%	3 77%	4 49%	5 54%	3 67%	
30	Pinnacle West Capital	4 50%	4 42%	4 51%	4 90%	4 44%	3 60%	3 50%	4 46%	5 67%	5 19%	
31	TXNM Energy	3 18%	3 70%	3 27%	3 04%	2 09%	2 68%	271%	2 91%	4 01%	3 81%	
32	Portland General	373%	4 45%	4 20%	3 63%	3 62%	3 19%	3 08%	3 71%	4 98%	3 39%	
33	PPL Corp Builde Corp	4 42%	3 40%	3 53%	3 23%	5 83%	5 56%	4 35%	4 /8%	4 91%	3 06%	
34	SCANA Corp.	3717e 43795	3 10% N/A	3 03% N/A	5 5/76 N/A	5 31% NIA	3 44% N/A	374%	4 20%	4 20%	3 10%	
36	Semma Energy	3.00%	3.06%	3 27%	2 00%	3 30%	3 11%	2.85%	3 12%	3 32%	2 39%	
37	Southern Co	4 52%	3 57%	4 13%	3 82%	4 17%	4 68%	4 61%	4 53%	5 10%	4 49%	
38	Vectren Corp	4 38%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3 23%	4 20%	5 48%	4 61%	
39	WEC Energy Group	3 09%	3 75%	3 57%	3 08%	3 00%	2 96%	3 38%	3 38%	3 16%	2 24%	
40	Wester Energy	4 37%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	3 21%	4 24%	5 48%	4 55%	
41	Xcel Energy Inc	3 68%	3 64%	3 28%	2 90%	2 81%	2 86%	3 37%	3 86%	4 63%	4 39%	
42	Average	3.82%	3.76%	3.82%	3.40%	3.49%	3.41%	3.51%	3.90%	4.65%	3.83%	
43	Median	3 69%	3 70%	3 89%	3 41%	3 47%	3 33%	3 50%	3 86%	4 87%	3 80%	
44	20-Yr Treasury Yields ³	3 32%	4 50%	4 25%	3 30%	1 98%	2 26%	2 47%	2 91%	3 92%	4 75%	
45	20-Yr TIPS ³	1 12%	2.06%	1 73%	0.64%	-0 43%	041%	0 73%	0.61%	171%	2 28%	
46	Implied Inflation ^a	2 17%	2 39%	2 48%	2 64%	2 42%	1 84%	1 73%	2 29%	2 17%	2 42%	
47	Real Dividend Yield [®]	1.61%	1.34%	1.30%	0.74%	1.04%	1.55%	1.75%	1.57%	2.42%	1.38%	
	A Detect HWW											
40	A-Rated Utility		E E 40/	E EE0/	4 749	2 408	2 60%	4.049/	4 308/	E E49/	6 008/	
48	Nominal A Rated Yield	4.74%	0.04%	0.00%	4./4%	3.10%	3.69%	4.01%	4.29%	0.01%	0.22%	
49	Real A Rated field	2.02%	3.08%	2.99%	2.05%	0.67%	1.82%	Z.Z4 %	1.90%	3.21%	3.12%	
	Baa-Rated Utility	_										
50	Nominal "Baa" Rated Yield	5.24%	5.76%	6.85%	5.05%	3.36%	4.10%	4.69%	4.87%	6.20%	6.63%	
51	Real "Baa" Rated Yield	3.00%	3.29%	3.29%	2.35%	0.91%	2.22%	2.91%	2.52%	3.94%	4.11%	
	Spreads (A-Rated Utility Bond - Stock)											
52	Nominal Spread	0.92%	1.78%	1.73%	1.34%	-0.38%	0.28%	0.50%	0.40%	0.87%	2.39%	
53	Real Spread*	0.90%	1.73%	1.69%	1.31%	-0.38%	0.27%	0.49%	0.39%	0.85%	2.33%	
	Spreads (Baa-Rated Utility Bond - Stock)	_										
54	Nominal Spread [®]	1.41%	2.00%	2.03%	1.65%	-0.13%	0.69%	1.18%	0.97%	1.55%	2.80%	
55	Real Spread®	1.38%	1.95%	1.98%	1.61%	-0.13%	0.67%	1.16%	0.95%	1.51%	2.73%	
	Spreads (Treasury Bond - Stock)	_										
56	Nominal	-0.51%	0.74%	0.44%	-0.10%	-1.51%	-1.15%	-1.04%	-0.98%	-0.73%	0.92%	
57	Real®	-0.50%	0.72%	0.43%	-0.10%	-1.47%	-1.13%	-1.02%	-0.96%	-0.71%	0.90%	

Trends in Dividend Yield and "A" Rated Utility Bond Yield



🛶 Average Nom. Dwidend Yield 🛑 Nom. "A" Rated Utility Bond Yield 🛶 Real "A" Rated Yield 🛶 Real Dividend Yield 🚽

- Bission the everage of the high and low price that the price lead of the price lead of the everage rest where provided in the everage rest where a first even of the everage rest where everag

Sources

 * Data for years 2019 and prior ware refraived from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021

 Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was refraived from Value Line Investment Survey

 * The Value Line Investment Survey.

 * St. Lous Federal Reserve Economic Research, Intel //research stlousfed org

 * Margarit Bond Record, through December 31, 2024

 Notes

 * Based on the average of the high and low price and the projected Dividends Declared per share, published in the Value Line Investment Survey

 * Line Af = /1, Line Affei // Sine Af

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

							Dividend per Sl	hare ¹			
		19-Year						3	-Year Average	es	
Line	Company	Average	2024 ²	2023	2022	2021	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	ALLETE	2.09	2.82	2.71	2.60	2.52	2.35	2.08	1.90	1.77	1.60
2	Alliant Energy	1.16	1.92	1.81	1.71	1.61	1.43	1.18	0.95	0.80	0.64
3	Ameren Corp.	1.99	2.68	2.52	2.36	2.20	1.92	1.72	1.60	1.55	2.54
4	American Electric Power	2.30	3.57	3.37	3.17	3.00	2.69	2.27	1.95	1.73	1.57
5	Avangrid, Inc.	1.75	N/A	1.76	1.76	1.76	1.75	1.73	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	1.28	1.90	1.84	1.76	1.69	1.55	1.37	1.22	0.97	0.62
7	Black Hills	1.79	2.60	2.50	2.41	2.29	2.05	1.70	1.52	1.44	1.36
8	CenterPoint Energy	0.85	0.81	0.77	0.72	0.66	0.96	1.12	0.86	0.78	0.67
9	CMS Energy Corp.	1.20	2.06	1.95	1.84	1.74	1.53	1.24	1.02	0.67	0.28
10	Consol. Edison	2.70	3.32	3.24	3.16	3.10	2.96	2.68	2.47	2.38	2.32
11	Dominion Resources	2.43	2.67	2.67	2.67	2.52	3.49	2.81	2.25	1.85	1.47
12	DTE Energy	3.00	4.15	3.88	3.54	3.88	3.85	3.09	2.57	2.21	2.11
13	Duke Energy	3.37	4.14	4.06	3.98	3.90	3.74	3.36	3.09	2.90	2.64
14	Edison Int'l	1.93	3.17	2.99	2.84	2.69	2.49	1.98	1.39	1.27	1.17
15	El Paso Electric	1.11	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.42	1.24	1.04	0.66	N/A
16	Entergy Corp.	1.72	2.30	2.17	2.05	1.93	1.83	1.71	1.66	1.59	1.29
17	Eversource Energy	1 69	2.86	2 70	2 55	2 41	2 14	1.78	1 45	1.03	0.78
18	Everav Inc	2 40	2.60	2.48	2.33	2 18	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
19	Exelon Corp.	1.61	1.52	1.44	1.35	1.53	1.45	1.27	1.60	2.10	1.84
20	FirstEnergy Corp	1 77	1 70	1.60	1.56	1.56	1.64	1 44	1 76	2 20	2.03
21	Fortis Inc	1.51	2.39	2 29	2 17	2.08	1.86	1.54	1 25	1 11	0.83
22	Great Plains Energy	1 11	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.05	0.89	0.83	1.66
23	Hawaiian Elec	1 25	N/A	1.08	1 40	1.36	1.28	1 24	1 24	1 24	1 24
24	Hydro One Limited	0.77	0.90	0.86	0.86	0.75	0.74	0.69	N/A	N/A	N/A
25		2.02	3.35	3.20	3.04	2.88	2.56	2.08	1.57	1.20	1.20
26	MGE Energy	1 21	1 76	1.67	1.59	N/A	1.38	1 21	1.07	0.99	0.94
27	NextEra Energy Inc.	0.96	2.06	1.87	1 70	1.54	1.00	0.87	0.66	0.51	0.41
28	NorthWestern Corp	1.88	2.60	2.56	2.52	2.48	2.30	2.01	1.53	1 38	1.28
29	OGE Energy	1 13	1.68	1.66	1.64	1.63	1 49	1 16	0.87	0.74	0.68
30	Otter Tail Corn	1.34	1.87	1.00	1.65	1.56	1.10	1.10	1 20	1 19	1 17
31	Pinnacle West Canital	2 65	3.55	3 49	3.42	3.36	3.05	2.57	2 41	2 10	2.08
32	TXNM Energy	0.92	1.57	1 49	1 4 1	0.98	1 17	0.89	0.67	0.50	0.79
33	Portland General	1.30	1.98	1.88	1 79	1 70	1.51	1 26	1 10	1.03	0.86
34	PPI Corp	1.38	1.03	0.95	0.88	1.66	1.65	1.53	1 47	1 39	1 22
35	Public Serv Enterprise	1.66	2 40	2.28	2 16	2.04	1.88	1.60	1 45	1.00	1.22
36	SCANA Corn	2.00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.31	2 04	1.00	1.76
37	Sempra Energy	2.68	2.48	2.38	4.58	4 40	3.88	3.04	2.52	1.68	1.70
38	Southern Co	2.00	2.46	2.00	2 70	2.62	2.46	2.23	2.02	1.80	1.60
39	Vectren Corp	1 42	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.62	1 43	1.37	1 27
40	WEC Energy Group	1.75	3.34	3.12	2 91	2 71	2.37	1 93	1 40	0.84	0.50
41	Westar Energy	1.30	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.52	1.36	1 24	1.07
42	Xcel Energy Inc	1 37	2 10	2.08	1 95	1.83	1.62	1 36	1 13	1.00	0.91
74	Noor Energy mo.	1.07	2.10	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.02	1.00	1.10	1.00	0.01
43	Average	1.74	2.42	2.27	2.24	2.19	2.03	1.73	1.53	1.37	1.29
44	Industry Average Growth	3.95%	6.91%	1.35%	2.21%	2.43%	5.38%	5.18%	3.52%	1.68%	5.43%

Sources:

¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021.

Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

						E	arnings per Sh	are ¹			
		19-Year						3	-Year Average	s	
Line	Company	Average	<u>2024²</u>	2023	2022	2021	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	ALLETE	3.01	3.10	4.30	3.38	3.23	3.35	3.22	2.70	2.24	2.89
2	Alliant Energy	1.86	2.69	2.78	2.73	2.63	2.33	1.78	1.64	1.23	1.22
3	Ameren Corp.	3.07	4.59	4.37	4.14	3.84	3.39	2.61	2.30	2.67	2.84
4	American Electric Power	3.77	5.61	5.24	5.09	4.96	4.13	3.81	3.17	2.90	2.90
5	Avangrid, Inc.	1.88	N/A	2.09	2.32	1.97	2.02	1.50	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	1.85	2.29	2.24	2.12	2.10	2.31	2.00	1.67	1.65	1.18
7	Black Hills	2.77	3.91	3.91	3.97	3.74	3.58	2.95	2.49	1.66	1.69
8	CenterPoint Energy	1.25	1.58	1.37	1.59	0.94	1.17	1.22	1.34	1.12	1.27
9	CMS Energy Corp.	1.91	3.33	3.01	2.84	2.58	2.45	2.01	1.64	1.24	0.84
10	Consol. Edison	3.99	5.38	5.04	4.55	4.74	4.19	4.03	3.80	3.39	3.26
11	Dominion Resources	2.85	2.77	1.99	4.11	3.19	2.42	3.39	2.96	2.76	2.52
12	DTE Energy	4.68	6.77	6.76	5.52	4.10	6.52	5.00	4.25	3.55	2.61
13	Duke Energy	4.19	5.90	5.56	5.27	4.93	4.37	4.01	3.94	3.85	3.12
14	Edison Int'l	3.32	4.91	4.76	1.60	2.00	1.48	4.20	4.22	3.27	3.43
15	El Paso Electric	2.02	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.07	2.28	2.24	2.02	1.54
16	Entergy Corp.	3.15	2.45	5.55	2.69	3.44	3.18	2.98	2.79	3.42	2.86
17	Eversource Energy	2.79	4.57	4.34	4.09	3.54	3.42	2.94	2.32	2.08	1.42
18	Evergy, Inc.	3.52	3.80	3.17	3.26	3.83	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
19	Exelon Corp.	2.82	2.45	2.38	2.26	1.74	2.56	2.37	2.11	3.97	3.88
20	FirstEnergy Corp.	2.58	2.63	2.56	2.41	2.69	1.67	2.28	1.98	2.82	4.14
21	Fortis Inc.	2.10	3.28	3.10	2.78	2.61	2.60	2.22	1.55	1.62	1.39
22	Great Plains Energy	1.33	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.97	1.51	1.27	1.54
23	Hawaiian Elec.	2.09	10.42	1.81	2.20	2.25	1.88	1.81	1.64	1.19	1.17
24	Hydro One Limited	1.52	1.92	1.81	1.75	1.61	1.47	1.23	N/A	N/A	N/A
25	IDACORP, Inc.	3.82	5.50	5.14	5.11	4.85	4.60	4.01	3.62	2.98	2.13
26	MGE Energy	2.19	3.45	3.25	3.07	N/A	2.51	2.15	2.11	1.63	1.49
27	NextEra Energy, Inc.	1.65	3.43	3.17	2.90	1.81	1.90	1.53	1.25	1.13	0.88
28	NorthWestern Corp	2.73	3.27	3.22	3.29	3.60	3.33	3.21	2.57	2.23	1.51
29	OGE Energy	1.82	2.19	2.07	2.25	2.36	2.15	1.77	1.90	1.52	1.26
30	Otter Tail Corp.	2.47	7.17	7.00	6.78	4.23	2.19	1.67	1.32	0.51	1.52
31	Pinnacle West Capital	3.85	5.24	4.41	4.26	5.47	4.73	4.10	3.58	2.78	2.75
32	TXNM Energy	1.64	2.74	2.82	2.69	2.27	2.03	1.74	1.39	0.84	0.86
33	Portland General	2.08	3.14	2.38	2.74	2.72	2.16	2.16	1.94	1.64	1.62
34	PPL Corp.	2.12	1.68	1.60	1.41	0.53	2.33	2.42	2.46	2.03	2.46
35	Public Serv. Enterprise	2.99	3.68	3.48	3.47	2.55	3.42	2.98	2.63	3.09	2.45
36	SCANA Corp.	3.30	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	4.06	3.44	2.93	2.76
37	Sempra Energy	4.95	4.65	4.61	9.21	4.01	6.01	4.70	4.40	4.42	4.31
38	Southern Co.	2.90	4.06	3.64	3.61	3.42	3.14	2.96	2.71	2.41	2.21
39	Vectren Corp.	1.94	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.51	1.87	1.72	1.63
40	WEC Energy Group	2.88	4.89	4.63	4.46	4.11	3.57	2.81	2.48	1.90	1.42
41	Westar Energy	1.96	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.26	2.26	1.62	1.68
42	Xcel Energy Inc.	2.22	3.50	3.35	3.17	2.96	2.63	2.20	1.93	1.59	1.39
43	Average	2.71	3.97	3.59	3.49	3.10	2.95	2.68	2.47	2.23	2.10
44	Industry Average Growth	3.93%	10.53%	2.96%	12.60%	1.28%	3.44%	2.66%	3.36%	3.58%	2.13%

Sources: ¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021.

Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

				Cash Fl	ow / Capita	al Spending	g ¹	
								3 - 5 yr ²
Line	Company	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025 ²	Projection
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
1	ALLETE	0.74x	0.80x	2.26x	1.42x	2.21x	1.36x	1.39x
2	Alliant Energy	0.82x	0.97x	0.94x	0.95x	0.97x	1.04x	1.27x
3	Ameren Corp.	0.51x	0.59x	0.72x	0.74x	0.84x	0.88x	0.98x
4	American Electric Power	0.74x	0.69x	0.73x	0.72x	0.82x	0.87x	1.11x
5	Avista Corp.	0.85x	0.87x	0.83x	0.78x	0.84x	0.95x	0.77x
6	Black Hills	0.72x	0.76x	0.85x	0.82x	0.68x	0.67x	0.73x
7	CenterPoint Energy	0.88x	0.62x	0.62x	0.57x	0.55x	0.52x	0.53x
8	CMS Energy Corp.	0.82x	0.77x	0.78x	0.92x	0.80x	0.61x	0.95x
9	Consol. Edison	0.82x	0.89x	0.83x	0.72x	0.84x	0.88x	0.99x
10	Dominion Resources	1.00x	0.89x	0.74x	0.63x	0.51x	0.53x	0.70x
11	DTE Energy	0.67x	0.70x	0.75x	0.82x	0.87x	0.90x	1.01x
12	Duke Energy	0.86x	0.93x	0.81x	0.79x	0.77x	0.92x	1.01x
13	Edison Int'l	0.67x	0.74x	0.67x	0.75x	0.82x	0.85x	0.90x
14	El Paso Electric	1.00x	0.83x	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
15	Entergy Corp.	0.81x	1.05x	0.98x	0.85x	0.81x	0.73x	0.75x
16	Eversource Energy	0.95x	0.74x	0.72x	0.86x	0.76x	0.74x	0.80x
17	Evergy, Inc.	1.06x	0.96x	0.94x	0.86x	0.86x	0.92x	1.01x
18	Exelon Corp.	1.30x	1.32x	0.96x	0.99x	0.80x	0.83x	0.93x
19	FirstEnergy Corp.	0.96x	0.91x	0.86x	0.80x	0.82x	0.64x	0.71x
20	Fortis Inc.	0.60x	0.74x	0.75x	0.82x	0.85x	0.89x	0.98x
21	Hawaiian Elec.	1.10x	1.42x	1.30x	1.51x	1.20x	1.29x	1.40x
22	Hydro One Electric	1.21x	0.67x	0.72x	0.63x	0.60x	0.63x	0.63x
23	IDACORP, Inc.	1.25x	1.16x	0.83x	0.63x	0.56x	0.56x	0.55x
24	MGE Energy	0.73x	0.87x	N/A	1.26x	1.10x	0.95x	1.10x
25	NextEra Energy, Inc.	0.58x	0.69x	0.54x	0.59x	0.59x	0.60x	0.69x
26	NorthWestern Corp	0.98x	0.82x	0.66x	0.75x	0.87x	0.86x	0.98x
27	OGE Energy	1.43x	1.13x	0.99x	0.97x	0.99x	1.06x	1.28x
28	Otter Tail Corp.	0.45x	1.42x	1.45x	1.08x	1.46x	1.47x	1.09x
29	Pinnacle West Capital	0.98x	0.85x	0.78x	0.95x	0.74x	0.77x	0.93x
30	TXNM Energy	0.59x	0.51x	0.63x	0.63x	0.53x	0.52x	0.56x
31	Portland General	0.75x	0.97x	1.01x	0.58x	0.62x	0.71x	0.87x
32	PPL Corp.	1.06x	1.12x	1.35x	0.98x	0.97x	1.00x	1.06x
33	Public Serv. Enterprise	1.00x	1.05x	0.82x	0.87x	0.90x	0.90x	0.97x
34	Sempra Energy	0.92x	0.78x	0.92x	0.96x	0.63x	0.59x	0.69x
35	Southern Co.	1.01x	0.93x	0.97x	0.97x	0.90x	0.97x	1.15x
36	WEC Energy Group	0.70x	0.75x	0.87x	0.92x	1.01x	1.09x	1.35x
37	Xcel Energy Inc.	0.99x	0.86x	0.80x	0.92x	0.65x	0.61x	0.90x
38	Average	0.88x	0.89x	0.90x	0.86x	0.85x	0.84x	0.94x
39	Median	0.86x	0.86x	0.83x	0.84x	0.82x	0.86x	0.96x

Source:

¹ Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Notes:

Based on the projected Cash Flow per share and Capital Spending per share.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

						Percent	Dividends to E	Book Value ¹			
		18-Year						3	-Year Average	es	
Line	Company	Average	2024 ^{2/a}	2023	2022	2021	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	ALLETE	5.88%	5.51%	5.56%	5.52%	5.56%	5.47%	5.40%	5.83%	6.44%	6.73%
2	Alliant Energy	6.42%	7.04%	6.84%	6.84%	6.73%	6.75%	6.99%	6.43%	6.10%	5.25%
3	Ameren Corp.	6.04%	6.26%	6.26%	5.88%	5.84%	5.82%	5.88%	5.87%	4.74%	7.85%
4	American Electric Power	6.38%	7.05%	6.95%	6.80%	6.74%	6.75%	6.25%	5.94%	6.03%	6.28%
5	Avangrid, Inc.	3.15%	N/A	3.46%	3.51%	3.57%	3.57%	2.36%	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	5.11%	5.87%	5.78%	5.65%	5.61%	5.47%	5.38%	5.49%	4.91%	3.49%
7	Black Hills	5.32%	5.19%	5.30%	5.32%	5.32%	5.32%	5.63%	5.18%	5.18%	5.35%
8	CenterPoint Energy	9.08%	4.95%	5.03%	4.90%	4.82%	7.96%	12.50%	8.41%	9.87%	12.21%
9	CMS Energy Corp.	6.76%	7.69%	7.84%	7.89%	7.87%	8.58%	8.25%	7.96%	5.78%	1.81%
10	Consol, Edison	5.94%	5.24%	5.29%	5.42%	5.48%	5.50%	5.70%	5.91%	6.30%	7.04%
11	Dominion Resources	10.08%	8 66%	8 69%	8 54%	8 00%	11 14%	11.88%	11.63%	9 35%	8 52%
12	DTE Energy	6.32%	7 43%	7 25%	7 64%	8 64%	6.38%	6.08%	5 72%	5.56%	5.99%
13	Duke Energy	5.53%	6.54%	6.37%	647%	6.34%	6 18%	5 73%	5.32%	5 73%	3.52%
14	Edison Int'l	5.82%	8 76%	8.30%	9.24%	7.36%	7.09%	5 53%	4 48%	4.06%	4 46%
15	El Paso Electric	2 94%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.04%	4 64%	4.57%	1 16%	0.00%
16	Entergy Corp	6.69%	6 55%	6 32%	6 68%	6 72%	7 21%	7 31%	6 17%	6.65%	6.27%
17	Eversource Epergy	5 19%	6.97%	6.66%	5 74%	5.69%	5.57%	5.27%	4 77%	4 76%	1 14%
18	Everage Inc.	5.62%	5 90%	5 00%	5 57%	5.03%	5 32%	N/A	4.7770 N/A	4.70%	4.1470 N/A
10	Evelop Corp	6.05%	5.50%	5.50%	5.57 %	4 26%	1 45%	1 2004	6 10%	10.20%	11 70%
20	Exelon Corp.	0.95%	J.07 %	0.0970	0.4270	4.30 %	4.4070	4.3970	0.19% 5 70%	7 540/	7 209/
20	FirstEnergy Corp.	0.74%	7.07% 5.70%	0.01%	0.70%	TU.20%	12.40% 5 470/	10.46%	5.79%	7.34%	7.20%
21	Creat Plaine Energy	5.44%	5.72%	0.04%	5.95%	5.59%	5.17 %	4.99%	3.54%	0.74%	0.01%
22	Great Plains Energy	5.31%	N/A	IN/A			IN/A	4.42%	3.95%	3.92%	0.94%
23	Hawallan Elec.	7.09%	N/A	5.07%	0.90%	0.22%	0.10%	0.02%	7.33%	1.00%	0.47%
24	Hydro One Limited	2.29%	4.47%	4.42%	4.57%	4.13%	4.57%	4.07%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
25	IDACORP, Inc.	4.74%	5.43%	5.57%	5.48%	5.45%	5.23%	4.86%	4.23%	3.87%	4.49%
26	MGE Energy	6.07%	5.33%	5.30%	5.32%	N/A	5.47%	5.74%	6.02%	6.55%	7.29%
27	NextEra Energy, Inc.	6.79%	8.46%	8.08%	8.61%	8.13%	6.78%	6.51%	6.40%	5.98%	6.24%
28	NorthWestern Corp	5.81%	5.58%	5.63%	5.65%	5.73%	5.74%	5.77%	5.56%	6.07%	6.09%
29	OGE Energy	6.88%	7.35%	7.49%	7.47%	8.04%	7.65%	6.53%	5.70%	6.28%	7.32%
30	Otter Tail Corp.	6.91%	4.69%	5.95%	5.61%	6.54%	7.18%	7.43%	8.06%	6.88%	6.59%
31	Pinnacle West Capital	6.21%	6.26%	6.41%	6.40%	6.43%	6.31%	5.96%	6.37%	6.21%	6.00%
32	TXNM Energy	4.11%	5.50%	5.72%	5.52%	3.88%	5.31%	4.23%	3.17%	2.68%	3.74%
33	Portland General	4.94%	5.71%	5.73%	5.75%	5.61%	5.26%	4.79%	4.66%	4.87%	4.12%
34	PPL Corp.	8.34%	5.40%	5.03%	4.66%	8.89%	9.81%	10.27%	7.57%	8.40%	8.78%
35	Public Serv. Enterprise	6.99%	7.42%	7.34%	7.82%	7.12%	6.26%	6.20%	6.36%	7.20%	8.36%
36	SCANA Corp.	6.44%	N/A	N/A	N/A		N/A	6.04%	6.15%	6.61%	6.98%
37	Sempra Energy	5.33%	5.32%	5.41%	5.49%	5.56%	6.31%	6.08%	5.67%	4.37%	4.09%
38	Southern Co.	9.56%	9.58%	9.65%	9.67%	9.96%	9.65%	9.34%	9.36%	9.38%	9.88%
39	Vectren Corp.	7.71%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	7.61%	7.54%	7.78%	7.90%
40	WEC Energy Group	6.53%	8.54%	8.38%	7.92%	7.83%	7.37%	6.76%	7.44%	5.13%	3.76%
41	Westar Energy	5.71%	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.68%	5.69%	5.82%	5.65%
42	Xcel Energy Inc.	6.20%	6.44%	6.55%	6.43%	6.38%	6.38%	6.26%	5.87%	5.99%	6.16%
43	Average	6.25%	6.47%	6.37%	6.41%	6.44%	6.54%	6.39%	6.01%	5.95%	6.10%
44	Median	6.06%	6.26%	5.95%	5.88%	6.28%	6.22%	5.96%	5.87%	6.01%	6.20%

Sources:

¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021. Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

^a Based on the projected 2024 Dividend Declared per share and Book Value per share, published in The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

						Divid	ends to Earnin	gs Ratio ¹			
		18-Year						3	-Year Average	es	
Line	Company	Average	2024 ^{2/a}	2023	2022	2021	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	ALLETE	0.70	0.91	0.63	0.77	0.78	0.70	0.65	0.70	0.80	0.56
2	Alliant Energy	0.62	0.71	0.65	0.63	0.61	0.61	0.67	0.58	0.66	0.53
3	Ameren Corp.	0.66	0.58	0.58	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.66	0.70	0.58	0.90
4	American Electric Power	0.61	0.64	0.64	0.62	0.60	0.65	0.60	0.62	0.60	0.54
5	Avangrid, Inc.	0.88	N/A	0.84	0.76	0.89	0.87	0.95	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	0.69	0.83	0.82	0.83	0.80	0.70	0.69	0.74	0.59	0.57
7	Black Hills	1.04	0.66	0.64	0.61	0.61	0.57	0.58	0.62	0.98	2.96
8	CenterPoint Energy	0.71	0.51	0.56	0.45	0.70	0.93	0.94	0.65	0.70	0.53
9	CMS Energy Corp.	0.58	0.62	0.65	0.65	0.67	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.54	0.30
10	Consol. Edison	0.68	0.62	0.64	0.69	0.65	0.71	0.67	0.65	0.70	0.71
11	Dominion Resources	0.89	0.96	1.34	0.65	0.79	1.53	0.83	0.76	0.67	0.59
12	DTE Energy	0.66	0.61	0.57	0.64	0.95	0.59	0.62	0.61	0.62	0.81
13	Duke Energy	0.80	0.70	0.73	0.76	0.79	0.86	0.84	0.79	0.76	0.80
14	Edison Int'l	0.48	0.65	0.63	1.78	1.35	0.06	0.47	0.33	0.39	0.34
15	El Paso Electric	0.50	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.68	0.54	0.46	0.27	N/A
16	Entergy Corp.	0.56	0.94	0.39	0.76	0.56	0.58	0.58	0.60	0.47	0.45
17	Eversource Energy	0.60	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.68	0.63	0.61	0.63	0.49	0.61
18	Everay, Inc.	0.69	0.68	0.78	0.71	0.57	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
19	Exelon Corp.	0.60	0.62	0.61	0.60	0.88	0.58	0.55	0.77	0.53	0.47
20	FirstEnergy Corp	0.78	0.65	0.63	0.65	0.58	1.01	0.64	1 09	0.84	0.49
21	Fortis Inc	0.72	0.73	0.74	0.78	0.80	0.71	0.71	0.81	0.68	0.60
22	Great Plains Energy	- 0.82	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	- 5.65	0.59	0.67	1 12
23	Hawaiian Elec	0.82	N/A	0.60	0.64	0.60	0.68	0.71	0.75	1.08	1.07
24	Hydro One Limited	0.92	0.47	0.48	0.01	0.00	1.87	0.57	N/A	N/A	N/A
25		0.52	0.61	0.40	0.40	0.59	0.56	0.52	0.43	0.41	0.57
26	MGE Epergy	0.56	0.51	0.51	0.52	N/A	0.55	0.56	0.40	0.41	0.63
27	NextEra Energy Inc	0.56	0.60	0.59	0.52	0.85	0.66	0.50	0.53	0.45	0.00
28	NorthWestern Corp	0.00	0.80	0.80	0.00	0.60	0.60	0.63	0.60	0.40	0.86
20		0.70	0.00	0.00	0.73	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.50
20	Ottor Tail Corp	0.01	0.77	0.00	0.75	0.03	0.70	0.00	0.43	2.48	0.84
31	Pinnacle West Capital	0.30	0.20	0.20	0.24	0.57	0.64	0.73	0.55	0.77	0.78
32	TYNM Energy	0.70	0.00	0.73	0.00	0.01	0.58	0.03	0.07	0.63	2.40
22	Partland Ganaral	0.04	0.57	0.00	0.52	0.43	0.50	0.51	0.40	0.03	2.40
24	PDL Corp	0.03	0.05	0.79	0.00	2 12	0.72	0.50	0.57	0.03	0.50
25	PPE Corp. Bublic Sony Enterprise	0.77	0.01	0.09	0.02	0.10	0.72	0.04	0.00	0.11	0.50
26	SCANA Corp	0.50	0.05	0.00 N/A	0.0Z	0.00	0.50	0.55	0.55	0.44	0.50
30	SCANA Corp.	0.61	N/A	N/A	N/A	1 10	N/A	0.57	0.59	0.05	0.64
37	Sempra Energy	0.54	0.53	0.52	0.50	0.77	0.05	0.05	0.57	0.30	0.29
20	Vectron Corr	0.75	0.70 N/A	U.70	U.75 N/A	0.77	U.70	0.75	0.74	0.75	0.72
39	Vectren Corp.	0.75	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.05	0.77	0.60	0.78
40	Wester Energy Group	0.57	U.00	U.07	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.44	0.35
41	Vestar Energy	0.00	N/A	N/A	IN/A	N/A	N/A	0.07	0.60	0.76	0.00
42	Acel Energy Inc.	0.62	0.63	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.62	0.58	0.63	0.66
43	Average	0.66	0.66	0.66	0.67	0.77	0.72	0.49	0.64	0.68	0.73
44	Median	0.63	0.64	0.63	0.64	0.68	0.66	0.63	0.61	0.63	0.59

Sources:

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 2 The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Note:

^b Based on the projected 2024 Dividends Declared per share and Earnings per share,

published in The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

						Cash Flov	v to Capital Sp	ending Ratio ¹			
		18-Year						3	-Year Average	es	
Line	Company	Average	2024 ^{2/a}	2023	2022	2021	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	ALLETE	0.94	1.30	1.76	2.12	0.55	0.80	1.37	0.54	0.60	0.78
2	Alliant Energy	0.79	0.65	0.74	0.91	0.95	N/A	0.65	0.83	0.65	0.96
3	Ameren Corp.	0.86	0.83	0.78	0.71	0.62	0.74	0.75	0.91	1.16	0.95
4	American Electric Power	0.86	0.84	0.79	0.81	0.81	0.75	0.79	0.95	1.15	0.74
5	Avangrid, Inc.	0.71	N/A	0.66	0.79	0.56	0.68	0.77	N/A	N/A	N/A
6	Avista Corp.	0.89	0.85	0.88	0.73	0.88	0.86	0.79	0.82	1.02	1.02
7	Black Hills	0.68	0.68	0.95	0.86	0.61	0.67	0.84	0.72	0.47	0.55
8	CenterPoint Energy	0.96	0.66	0.53	0.52	0.73	0.85	1.09	1.25	1.00	1.07
9	CMS Energy Corp.	0.86	0.74	0.85	0.82	0.78	0.78	0.84	0.79	1.05	0.91
10	Consol. Edison	0.83	0.84	0.84	0.88	0.83	0.84	0.72	0.92	0.88	0.75
11	Dominion Resources	0.75	0.41	0.46	0.86	0.73	0.91	0.70	0.71	0.80	0.81
12	DTE Energy	0.97	0.87	0.85	0.86	0.74	0.80	0.90	0.97	1.37	1.03
13	Duke Energy	0.89	0.89	0.81	0.87	0.85	0.82	0.88	1.05	0.81	0.93
14	Edison Int'l	0.75	0.85	0.83	0.62	0.55	0.52	0.88	0.79	0.67	0.91
15	El Paso Electric	0.87	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.83	0.86	0.86	0.77	0.90	0.96
16	Entergy Corp.	0.95	0.72	1.03	0.62	0.74	0.76	0.97	1.03	1.14	1.07
17	Eversource Energy	0.83	0.76	0.54	0.89	0.80	0.80	0.86	0.96	0.94	0.70
18	Everay, Inc.	0.90	0.88	0.90	0.78	1.03	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
19	Exelon Corp	1 18	0.81	0.82	0.84	1.00	1 12	0.88	0.99	1.50	1 77
20	FirstEnergy Corp	0.99	0.77	0.82	0.98	0.83	0.80	0.96	0.77	1 20	1 42
21	Fortis Inc	0.00	0.88	0.93	0.89	0.65	0.68	0.72	0.70	0.66	0.62
22	Great Plains Energy	0.79	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.00	N/A	0.95	0.85	0.80	0.56
23	Hawaijan Elec	1 22	2.99	1 14	1.56	1 27	1.07	1.05	0.98	1 19	1.09
24	Hydro One Limited	0.89	0.60	0.63	0.72	1.21	0.96	0.97	N/A	N/A	N/A
25		1.06	0.51	0.75	1.00	1.33	1 40	1 21	1.26	0.87	0.79
26	MGE Energy	1.08	1.02	0.98	1.00	0.82	0.82	1 4 1	1.10	1 42	0.75
27	NextEra Energy Inc.	0.60	0.52	0.50	0.55	0.58	0.60	0.62	0.61	0.63	0.64
28	NorthWestern Corp	0.00	0.79	0.00	0.00	0.84	1.07	1 11	0.01	0.89	1.26
20		0.00	1.02	1.03	0.70	1 24	1.07	1.00	0.84	0.61	0.74
30	Otter Tail Corp	1.02	1.02	1.00	2 13	0.48	0.92	0.89	0.74	0.01	0.82
31	Pinnacle West Canital	0.93	0.70	0.73	0.89	0.40	1.00	0.83	0.74	0.04	1.04
32	TXNM Energy	0.50	0.70	0.55	0.00	0.72	0.77	0.66	0.33	0.30	0.58
33	Portland General	0.81	0.65	0.51	0.86	0.72	0.93	0.00	0.78	0.83	0.76
34	PPL Corp	0.01	0.00	1.06	1.05	0.70	0.94	0.84	0.78	1.08	1 18
35	Public Serv Enterprise	1.00	0.90	0.02	1.00	1 13	0.94	0.68	0.70	1.00	1.10
36	SCANA Corp	0.86	N/A	0.32 N/Δ	N/A	1.10	N/A	0.78	0.84	0.83	0.98
37	Sempra Energy	0.00	0.59	0.61	0.02	0.77	0.81	0.68	0.04	0.00	0.90
20	Sempra Energy	0.79	0.09	0.01	0.92	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.77	0.00	0.90
20	Vectren Corn	1.00	0.5 4 Ν/Δ	0.00 N/Δ	0.57 N/Δ	0.53	0.50 N/A	0.00	1.06	1 11	0.93
39	WEC Energy Group	0.02	1.01	0.05	1.00	0.07	0.02	1.00	1.00	0.06	0.93
40 /14	Wester Energy Group	0.90	1.01 N/A	0.90 N/A	1.09 N/A	0.97	0.95 N/A	1.03	0.70	0.90	0.02
41	Yestar Energy	0.72	0.66	0.75	0.02	0.66	0.74	0.00	0.70	0.70	0.01
42	Adel Energy Inc.	0.75	0.00	0.75	0.93	0.00	0.74	0.75	0.00	0.03	0.79
43	Average	0.89	0.87	0.85	0.93	0.84	0.86	0.88	0.88	0.94	0.91
44	Median	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.87	0.81	0.83	0.86	0.84	0.89	0.91

Sources:

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 2 The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Notes:

^c Based on the projected Cash Flow per share and Capital Spending per share

published in The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Natural Gas Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

						Price	to Earnings (P.	/E) Ratio ¹			
		19-Year						3	-Year Average	s	
Line	<u>Company</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>2024 ²</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2022</u>	<u>2021</u>	2018-2020	<u>2015-2017</u>	<u>2012-2014</u>	<u>2009-2011</u>	2006-2008
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	Atmos Energy	17.54	19.80	16.80	19.30	18.80	22.40	20.10	15.97	13.37	14.34
2	Chesapeake Utilities	19.59	23.30	21.60	25.80	25.60	23.07	23.07	16.03	13.53	16.25
3	New Jersey Resources	17.02	14.80	14.90	17.00	17.50	19.20	20.10	14.83	15.57	16.68
4	NiSource Inc.	22.03	21.30	16.90	19.60	18.00	19.77	41.63	19.83	16.33	16.69
5	Northwest Nat. Gas	20.26	14.10	15.40	19.60	19.50	27.50	25.30	20.40	17.07	16.88
6	ONE Gas Inc.	20.51	16.90	16.00	19.90	18.90	23.37	22.00	17.80	N/A	N/A
7	Southwest Gas	17.95	19.70	23.00	NMF	14.30	19.57	21.07	16.23	13.97	17.85
8	Spire Inc.	18.32	18.20	14.50	17.50	13.60	30.20	18.63	18.53	13.37	14.03
9	UGI Corp.	15.05	10.50	8.40	14.10	13.90	18.33	19.27	15.87	12.07	14.12
10	Average	18.52	17.62	16.39	19.10	17.79	22.60	23.46	17.28	14.41	15.85
11	Median	17.80	18.20	16.00	19.45	18.00	22.40	21.07	16.23	13.75	16.46

					N	larket Price	e to Cash Flow	(MP/CF) Ratio	1		
		19-Year						3	-Year Average	s	
Line	Company	Average	2024 ²	2023	2022	<u>2021</u>	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)
12	Atmos Energy	9.46	11.93	11.27	11.87	10.99	12.83	10.88	7.85	6.26	6.76
13	Chesapeake Utilities	10.91	14.53	15.77	14.21	14.20	12.91	12.00	8.28	7.73	8.62
14	New Jersey Resources	11.83	9.95	11.22	11.55	11.56	12.84	13.37	10.84	11.79	11.31
15	NiSource Inc.	7.86	8.13	7.13	8.13	7.89	8.52	10.35	9.03	5.32	6.14
16	Northwest Nat. Gas	11.91	7.26	7.56	8.76	8.57	11.66	26.92	8.98	8.76	8.37
17	ONE Gas Inc.	9.98	7.01	7.73	9.91	9.32	11.82	10.73	8.16	N/A	N/A
18	Southwest Gas	7.27	7.88	7.35	19.83	6.87	8.43	7.69	5.95	4.78	5.20
19	Spire Inc.	9.47	7.29	7.53	8.34	7.55	11.63	9.73	11.53	8.26	8.62
20	UGI Corp.	7.70	4.67	5.84	7.20	9.56	9.78	9.19	6.78	6.42	7.50
21	Average	9.50	8.74	9.04	11.09	9.61	11.16	12.32	8.60	7.42	7.82
22	Median	8.37	7.88	7.56	9.91	9.32	11.66	10.73	8.28	7.07	7.94

		Market Price to Book Value (MP/BV) Ratio ¹											
		19-Year						3	-Year Average	es			
<u>Line</u>	Company	<u>Average</u>	<u>2024 ²</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2022</u>	<u>2021</u>	2018-2020	<u>2015-2017</u>	<u>2012-2014</u>	<u>2009-2011</u>	<u>2006-2008</u>		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(21)	(22)	(23)	(24)	(25)		
23	Atmos Energy	1.59	1.68	1.55	1.65	1.59	2.03	2.00	1.41	1.18	1.31		
24	Chesapeake Utilities	2.06	1.94	1.93	2.69	2.77	2.49	2.32	1.87	1.46	1.78		
25	New Jersey Resources	2.26	2.06	2.32	2.35	2.26	2.43	2.50	2.17	2.19	2.03		
26	NiSource Inc.	1.54	1.42	1.14	2.15	1.86	1.99	1.92	1.63	0.92	1.10		
27	Northwest Nat. Gas	1.78	1.08	1.29	1.51	1.45	2.23	1.99	1.62	1.73	1.90		
28	ONE Gas Inc.	1.63	1.32	1.43	1.73	1.57	2.01	1.61	1.07	N/A	N/A		
29	Southwest Gas	1.53	1.33	1.28	1.62	1.32	1.70	1.93	1.60	1.21	1.38		
30	Spire Inc.	1.53	1.25	1.29	1.43	1.47	1.69	1.57	1.40	1.51	1.69		
31	UGI Corp.	1.94	1.30	1.59	1.39	1.64	2.36	2.44	1.70	1.65	2.13		
32	Average	1.76	1.49	1.53	1.83	1.77	2.10	2.03	1.61	1.48	1.66		
33	Median	1.67	1.33	1.43	1.65	1.59	2.03	1.99	1.62	1.49	1.73		

Sources:

The current year P/E ratio is based on the forward P/E (price over expected earnings per share). All historical year P/E ratios are based on annual average share price over achieved earnings per share.

¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021.

Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, February 21, 2025.

Notes:

^a Based on the average of the high and low price for year and the projected Cash Flow per share, published in The Value Line Investment Survey.

^b Based on the average of the high and low price for the year and the projected Book Value per share, published in The Value Line Investment Survey.

Natural Gas Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

							Dividend Yiel	d1			
		18-Year						3	-Year Average	s	
Line	Company	Average	2024 ^{2/a}	2023	2022	2021	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	Atmos Energy	3.30%	2.45%	2.62%	2.46%	2.63%	2.17%	2.51%	3.59%	4.74%	4.53%
2	Chesapeake Utilities	2.62%	2.12%	2.08%	1.61%	1.50%	1.77%	1.93%	2.85%	3.79%	3.83%
3	New Jersey Resources	3.25%	3.75%	3.29%	3.25%	3.50%	2.86%	2.90%	3.53%	3.49%	3.19%
4	NiSource Inc.	3.92%	3.34%	3.85%	3.33%	3.60%	3.12%	3.03%	3.28%	5.94%	4.73%
5	Northwest Nat. Gas	3.69%	4.93%	4.40%	3.86%	3.90%	3.06%	3.43%	4.06%	3.73%	3.37%
6	ONE Gas Inc.	2.82%	3.87%	3.72%	3.08%	3.21%	2.47%	2.47%	2.28%	N/A	N/A
7	Southwest Gas	3.03%	3.60%	4.07%	3.20%	3.65%	2.87%	2.65%	2.72%	3.32%	2.78%
8	Spire Inc.	3.86%	4.65%	4.44%	3.89%	3.79%	3.15%	3.24%	3.95%	4.31%	4.24%
9	UGI Corp.	3.15%	5.82%	4.64%	3.61%	3.25%	2.60%	2.29%	3.10%	3.34%	2.83%
10	Average	3.34%	3.84%	3.68%	3.14%	3.23%	2.67%	2.72%	3.26%	4.08%	3.69%
11	Median	3.42%	3.75%	3.85%	3.25%	3.50%	2.86%	2.65%	3.28%	3.76%	3.60%
12	20-Yr Treasury Yields ³	3.32%	4.50%	4.25%	3.30%	1.98%	2.26%	2.47%	2.91%	3.92%	4.75%
13	20-Yr TIPS ³	1.12%	2.06%	1.73%	0.64%	-0.43%	0.41%	0.73%	0.61%	1.71%	2.28%
14	Implied Inflation ^b	2.17%	2.39%	2.48%	2.64%	2.42%	1.84%	1.73%	2.29%	2.17%	2.42%
15	Real Dividend Yield ^c	1.14%	1.41%	1.17%	0.49%	0.79%	0.82%	0.97%	0.95%	1.87%	1.24%
	Utility										
16	Nominal "A" Rated Yield ⁴	4.74%	5.54%	5.55%	4.74%	3.10%	3.69%	4.01%	4.29%	5.51%	6.22%
17	Real "A" Rated Yield	2.52%	3.08%	2.99%	2.05%	0.67%	1.82%	2.24%	1.96%	3.27%	3.72%
	Spreads (Utility Bond - Stock)										
18	Nominal ^d	1.41%	1.70%	1.87%	1.60%	-0.12%	1.02%	1.30%	1.03%	1.43%	2.54%
19	Real ^e	1.38%	1.67%	1.82%	1.56%	-0.12%	1.00%	1.28%	1.01%	1.40%	2.48%
	Spreads (Treasury Bond - Stock)										
20	Nominal	-0.02%	0.66%	0.57%	0.16%	-1.25%	-0.42%	-0.24%	-0.35%	-0.16%	1.07%
21	Real ^g	-0.02%	0.65%	0.56%	0.15%	-1.22%	-0.41%	-0.24%	-0.34%	-0.16%	1.04%



Sources:

¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021. Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

- ² The Value Line Investment Survey, February 21, 2025. ³ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org.
- ⁴ Mergent Bond Record, through December 31, 2024. Notes:
- ^a Based on the average of the high and low price for the year and the projected Dividends Declared per share published in the Value Line Investment Survey.
- ^b Line 16 = (1 + Line 14) / (1 + Line 15) 1.

- Line 17 = (1 + Line 12)/(1 + Line 16) 1. The spread being measured here is the nominal A-rated utility bond yield over the average nominal utility dividend yield; (Line 18 Line 12).
- e The spread being measured here is the real A-rated utility bond yield over the average real utility dividend yield; Line 19 Line 17)
- ¹ The spread being measured here is the nominal 20-Year Treasury yield over the average nominal utility divided yield; Line 14 Line 12).
 ⁹ The spread being measured here is the real 20-Year TIPS yield over the average real utility dividend yield; Line 15 Line 17)

Natural Gas Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

		Dividend per Share ¹											
		19-Year						3	-Year Average	es		2018	2017
<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>2024 ²</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2022</u>	<u>2021</u>	2018-2020	<u>2015-2017</u>	<u>2012-2014</u>	<u>2009-2011</u>	2006-2008	CAGR	CAGR
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
1	Atmos Energy	1.84	3.22	2.96	2.72	2.50	2.11	1.68	1.42	1.34	1.28	2.08%	2.15%
2	Chesapeake Utilities	1.30	2.46	2.25	2.03	1.84	1.54	1.19	1.01	0.87	0.79	2.89%	3.02%
3	New Jersey Resources	0.98	1.71	1.56	1.45	1.36	1.19	0.98	0.81	0.67	0.51	3.97%	4.59%
4	NiSource Inc.	0.89	1.06	1.00	0.94	0.88	0.81	0.72	0.98	0.92	0.92	-0.82%	-1.69%
5	Northwest Nat. Gas	1.78	1.95	1.94	1.93	1.92	1.90	1.87	1.82	1.68	1.45	1.36%	1.68%
6	ONE Gas Inc.	1.92	2.64	2.60	2.48	2.32	2.00	1.43	0.84	N/A	N/A	3.58%	4.30%
7	Southwest Gas	1.65	2.48	2.48	2.48	2.38	2.18	1.80	1.32	1.00	0.86	4.48%	5.35%
8	Spire Inc.	2.02	3.02	2.88	2.74	2.60	2.37	1.97	1.71	1.57	1.45	2.20%	2.34%
9	UGI Corp.	0.92	1.52	1.47	1.41	1.35	1.16	0.93	0.75	0.60	0.48	3.80%	4.41%
10	Average	1.44	2.23	2.13	2.02	1.91	1.70	1.40	1.18	1.08	0.97	2.62%	2.91%
11	Industry Average Growth	4.94%	4.81%	5.28%	6.01%	5.54%	6.64%	6.41%	3.16%	4.06%	3.28%		

Sources:

¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021. Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, February 21, 2025.

Natural Gas Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

Earnings per Share ¹											
		19-Year				_		3	-Year Average	es	
<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>2024 ²</u>	<u>2023</u>	<u>2022</u>	<u>2021</u>	<u>2018-2020</u>	<u>2015-2017</u>	<u>2012-2014</u>	<u>2009-2011</u>	<u>2006-2008</u>
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	Atmos Energy	3.51	6.83	6.10	5.60	5.12	4.36	3.36	2.52	2.13	1.98
2	Chesapeake Utilities	2.88	5.05	4.73	4.97	4.70	3.79	2.74	2.24	1.72	1.28
3	New Jersey Resources	1.78	2.95	2.70	2.50	2.16	2.25	1.71	1.60	1.24	1.02
4	NiSource Inc.	1.23	1.75	1.60	1.47	1.35	1.31	0.67	1.54	0.98	1.21
5	Northwest Nat. Gas	2.17	2.30	2.59	2.54	2.50	2.27	0.71	2.21	2.65	2.56
6	ONE Gas Inc.	3.30	3.85	4.14	4.08	3.85	3.48	2.64	2.07	N/A	N/A
7	Southwest Gas	2.86	2.80	2.13	3.10	3.80	3.92	3.24	2.99	2.21	1.77
8	Spire Inc.	3.09	4.19	3.85	3.95	4.96	3.10	3.28	2.39	2.74	2.44
9	UGI Corp.	2.03	3.06	2.84	2.90	2.96	2.56	2.12	1.56	1.51	1.20
10	Average	2.47	3.64	3.41	3.46	3.49	3.00	2.27	2.12	1.90	1.68
11	Industry Average Growth	5.20%	6.84%	-1.38%	-0.92%	18.27%	14.40%	-2.65%	5.77%	3.58%	3.74%

Sources:

² The Value Line Investment Survey, February 21, 2025.

¹ Data for years 2019 and prior were retrieved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021. Data for the years 2020 - 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Surveys.

Natural Gas Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

				Ca	ish Flow / (Capital Spe	ending'		
<u>Line</u>	Company	<u>2019</u> (1)	<u>2020</u> (2)	<u>2021</u> (3)	<u>2022</u> (4)	<u>2023</u> (5)	<u>2024</u> (6)	<u>2025²</u> (7)	3 - 5 yr ² <u>Projection</u> (8)
1	Atmos Energy	0.53x	0.53x	0.53x	0.54x	0.54x	0.55x	0.51x	0.64x
2	Chesapeake Utilities	0.66x	0.64x	0.82x	1.23x	0.84x	0.61x	0.60x	0.68x
3	New Jersey Resources	1.41x	0.65x	0.72x	0.59x	0.68x	1.03x	0.89x	0.93x
4	NiSource Inc.	0.66x	0.65x	0.69x	0.55x	0.43x	0.54x	0.73x	0.76x
5	Northwest Nat. Gas	0.77x	0.75x	0.61x	0.60x	0.68x	0.63x	0.68x	0.65x
6	ONE Gas Inc.	0.78x	0.88x	0.86x	0.74x	0.83x	0.81x	0.89x	1.22x
7	Southwest Gas	0.62x	0.53x	0.61x	0.31x	0.84x	0.76x	0.79x	0.82x
8	Spire Inc.	0.65x	0.65x	0.70x	0.80x	0.71x	0.64x	0.68x	0.85x
9	UGI Corp.	1.33x	1.54x	1.66x	1.42x	1.33x	1.24x	1.47x	1.49x
10	Average	0.82x	0.76x	0.80x	0.75x	0.76x	0.76x	0.81x	0.89x
11	Median	0.66x	0.65x	0.70x	0.60x	0.71x	0.64x	0.73x	0.82x

Sources:

¹ The Value Line Investment Survey, various report dates.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, February 21, 2025.

Notes:

Based on the projected Cash Flow per share and Capital Spending per share.

Docket No. 20250011-EI **Electric Utilities (Valuation Metrics)** Exhibit CCW-1, Page 16 of 16

Florida Power & Light Company

Natural Gas Utilities (Valuation Metrics)

						Percent	Dividends to E	look Value ¹			
		19-Year						3	-Year Average	s	
Line	Company	Average	2024 24	2023	2022	2021	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
_		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Almos Contras	4.040	4.4400	4.040	4.070	4 4007	4.00%	4.070	E 000	E E 00/	E 0400
2	Checkness e libilitier	4.94 % 5.04%	4.1176	4.04%	4.07%	4.19%	4.30%	4.97 %	5.00%	5.50%	G 770
2	Manu Jos av Des autors	7 0791	7 7 9 9/	7 5 5 6 7	7 5 2 97	7 0 397	6 779/	7 3197	7 6 497	7 6 9 9 /	C AEOT
4	Misource Inc	5.55%	A 74%	A 40%	7 15%	6 60%	6 20%	5.81%	5 23%	5 22%	5 11%
5	Northwest blat. Gas	6 20%	5 2495	5 60%	5 93%	5 66%	6.91%	6 70%	6 59%	G 49%	6 37%
š	ONE Gas Inc.	45395	5 10%	5 3 2 9 1	5 3 1 %	5.00%	4 64%	3 6 2 %	2 4 4 9	N/O A	5UA
7	Southwest Gas	4.52%	A 80%	5 20%	5 17%	4 80%	4.85%	5.07%	4 35%	3 9 3 %	3 76%
é	Soire Inc	5.86%	5.83%	5 73%	5.58%	5.56%	5 31%	5.07%	5 52%	6.46%	7 16%
ă	LIGI Com	5 78%	7 56%	7 35%	5.02%	5 34%	5.07%	5 55%	5 19%	5 51%	6.03%
	ooroorp.	0.70%	1.00 %	1.00%	0.02 %	0.04 10	0.02.4	0.00 %	0.15%	0.01%	0.0014
10	Average	5.60%	5.48%	5.49%	5.57%	5.48%	5.51%	5.42%	5.25%	5.78%	5.95%
11	Median	5.32%	5.10%	5.32%	5.31%	5.34%	5.31%	5.07%	5.23%	5.52%	6.20%
						Divid	ends to Earning	gs Ratio 1			
		19-Year						1	-Year Average	IS	
Line	Company	<u>Average</u>	2024 24	2023	2022	2021	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
12	atmos Enerau	0.55	0.47	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.49	0.50	0.57	0.63	0.65
13	Chesaneake Utildes	0.00	0.49	0.49	0.40	0.39	0.41	0.00	0.45	0.00	0.62
14	New Jersey Resources	0.55	0.58	0.58	0.59	0.63	0.54	0.58	0.52	0.54	0.53
15	NiSource Inc	0.80	0.61	0.63	0.64	0.65	0.62	1.25	0.64	0.95	0.77
16	Northwest Mat. Gas.	0.66	0.85	0.75	0.76	0.77	0.84	0.29	0.83	0.50	0.57
17	ONE Gas Inc	0.57	0.69	0.63	0.61	0.60	0.57	0.54	0.41	N/A	N/A
18	Southwest Gas	0.58	0.89	1.16	0.80	0.63	0.56	0.56	0.44	0.46	0.50
19	Soire Inc.	0.69	0.72	0.75	0.69	0.52	0.97	0.60	0.73	0.58	0.59
20	UGI Corp.	0.45	0.50	0.52	0.49	0.46	D.46	0.44	0.49	0.40	0.40
		0.00		0.00		0.57		0.52	0.57	0.55	0.50
21	Average	0.59	0.64	0.00	0.61	0.5/	0.61	0.50	0.57	0.59	0.55
22	metalan	0.00	0.01	0.63	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.00
		19-Year				Cash Flow	v to Capital Spe	inding Ratio	-Year Average	s	
Line	Company	Average	2024 24	90.93	20.22	20.21	2018-2020	2015-2017	2012-2014	2009-2011	2006-2008
	<u>company</u>	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
23	Atmos Energy	0.64	0.58	0.53	0.54	0.58	0.53	0.60	0.60	0.74	0.86
24	Chesapeake Utilities	0.76	0.61	0.81	1.23	0.81	0.60	0.51	0.72	1.12	0.70
25	New Jersey Resources	1.18	0.87	0.82	0.59	0.62	0.69	0.66	1.58	1.60	1.97
26	NiSource Inc.	0.74	0.74	0.61	0.55	0.68	0.62	0.51	0.59	0.97	1.14
27	Hornwest Nat. Gas	0.88	0.56	0.67	0.60	0.68	0.69	0.76	1.05	0.97	1.30
28	UNE Gas Inc.	0.83	0.81	0.77	0.74	0.86	0.85	0.88	0.79	Η/A	N/A
29	Southwest Gas	0.81	U.74	U.68	U.31	U.86	U.59	u.78	U.98	1.16	U.78
30	Spire Inc.	1.01	0.60	0.69	U.80	U.75	0.54	0.87	0.90	1.69	1.45
31	UGI Corp.	1.45	1.52	1.18	1.42	1.32	1.48	1.37	1.46	1.39	1.68
32	Average	0.94	0.78	0.75	0.75	0.80	0.73	0.77	0.96	1.20	1.23
33	Median	0.84	0.74	0.69	0.60	0.75	0.62	0.76	0.90	1.14	1.22

 Sources:

 1 Cuta for years 2015 and pror verse refereved from the Value Line Investment Survey Investment Analyzer Software, downloaded on June 18, 2021.

 Cuta for the years 2020- 2024 was retrieved from Value Line Investment Survey.

 3 The Value Line Investment Survey, Feturary 21, 2025.

 4 State Line Investment Survey, Feturary 21, 2025.

 Months

 4 State Line Investment Survey, Feturary 21, 2025.

 Months

 4 State Line Investment Survey.

 * Based on the projected Dividends Declared per share and Early specifies of the published in The Value Line Investment Survey.

 * Based on the projected Dividends Declared per share and Early specifies (and the Investment Survey).

 * Based on the projected Dividends Declared per share and Early specifies (and the Investment Survey).

Proxy Group

		Credit	Ratings ¹	Common Equity Ratios			
<u>Line</u>	Company	<u>S&P</u>	Moody's	<u>MI¹</u>	Value Line ²		
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		
1	Alliant Energy Corporation	BBB+	Baa2	39.7%	45.2%		
2	Ameren Corporation	BBB+	Baa1	39.0%	43.8%		
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	BBB+	Baa2	36.9%	42.0%		
4	Duke Energy Corporation	BBB+	Baa2	35.9%	38.8%		
5	Edison International	BBB	Baa2	25.1%	28.7%		
6	Entergy Corporation	BBB+	Baa2	33.7%	38.6%		
7	Evergy, Inc.	BBB+	Baa2	41.1%	48.0%		
8	IDACORP, Inc.	BBB	Baa2	52.0%	51.2%		
9	OGE Energy Corp.	BBB+	Baa1	45.5%	49.6%		
10	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	BBB+	Baa2	37.7%	45.0%		
11	Portland General Electric Company	BBB+	A3	42.5%	44.2%		
12	PPL Corporation	A-	Baa1	45.6%	48.8%		
13	Southern Company	A-	Baa1	32.3%	37.6%		
14	TXNM Energy	BBB	Baa3	30.1%	35.6%		
15	Xcel Energy Inc.	BBB+	Baa1	39.2%	41.4%		
16	Average	BBB+	Baa2	38.4%	42.6%		
17	Median			39.0%	43.8%		
18	Florida Power & Light ^{3,4}	А	A1		59.60%		

Sources:

Note: If credit rating/common equity ratio unavailable for utility, subsidiary data used.

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on May 9, 2025.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

³ S&P Capital IQ.

⁴ Direct Testimony of James M. Coyne, page 62.

Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates

					Average of Growth
Line	Company	Zacks ¹	<u>S&P²</u>	I/B/E/S ³	Rates
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1	Alliant Energy Corporation	6.73%	6.71%	6.45%	6.63%
2	Ameren Corporation	6.95%	6.95%	6.80%	6.90%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	6.43%	6.80%	6.37%	6.53%
4	Duke Energy Corporation	6.33%	6.38%	6.55%	6.42%
5	Edison International	7.01%	8.57%	9.97%	8.52%
6	Entergy Corporation	9.46%	9.12%	9.63%	9.40%
7	Evergy, Inc.	5.70%	5.62%	6.00%	5.77%
8	IDACORP, Inc.	8.47%	8.17%	6.80%	7.81%
9	OGE Energy Corp.	6.32%	6.53%	5.60%	6.15%
10	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	2.12%	4.83%	2.20%	3.05%
11	Portland General Electric Company	3.44%	4.82%	3.57%	3.94%
12	PPL Corporation	7.46%	7.40%	7.60%	7.49%
13	Southern Company	6.55%	6.26%	7.60%	6.80%
14	TXNM Energy	2.98%	7.69%	6.10%	5.59%
15	Xcel Energy Inc.	7.52%	7.84%	8.40%	7.92%
16	Average	6.23%	6.91%	6.64%	6.60%
17	Median	6.55%	6.80%	6.55%	6.63%

Sources:

¹ Zacks, http://www.zacks.com/, downloaded on May 9, 2025.

² S&P Global Market Intelligence, https://platform.mi.spglobal.com, downloaded on May 9, 2025.

³ LSEG Workspace, https://www.lseg.com/en/data-analytics/products/workspace, downloaded on May 9, 2025.

Constant Growth DCF Model (Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates)

<u>Line</u>	Company	13-Week AVG <u>Stock Price¹</u> (1)	Analysts' <u>Growth²</u> (2)	Annualized <u>Dividend³</u> (3)	Adjusted <u>Yield</u> (4)	Constant <u>Growth DCF</u> (5)
1	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$62.05	6.63%	\$1.92	3.30%	9.93%
2	Ameren Corporation	\$98.44	6.90%	\$2.84	3.08%	9.98%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$105.19	6.53%	\$3.72	3.77%	10.30%
4	Duke Energy Corporation	\$118.31	6.42%	\$4.18	3.76%	10.18%
5	Edison International	\$55.41	8.52%	\$3.31	6.48%	15.00%
6	Entergy Corporation	\$83.28	9.40%	\$2.40	3.15%	12.56%
7	Evergy, Inc.	\$67.32	5.77%	\$2.67	4.20%	9.97%
8	IDACORP, Inc.	\$115.26	7.81%	\$3.44	3.22%	11.03%
9	OGE Energy Corp.	\$44.62	6.15%	\$1.69	4.01%	10.16%
10	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$92.28	3.05%	\$3.58	4.00%	7.05%
11	Portland General Electric Company	\$43.12	3.94%	\$2.00	4.82%	8.76%
12	PPL Corporation	\$34.99	7.49%	\$1.09	3.35%	10.84%
13	Southern Company	\$89.60	6.80%	\$2.96	3.53%	10.33%
14	TXNM Energy	\$52.02	5.59%	\$1.63	3.31%	8.90%
15	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$69.58	7.92%	\$2.28	3.54%	11.46%
16	Average	\$75.43	6.60%	\$2.65	3.83%	10.43%
17	Median	\$69.58	6.63%	\$2.67	3.54%	10.18%

Sources:

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on May 9, 2025.

² Exhibit CCW-3

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Payout Ratios

		Dividend	s Per Share	Earnings	Per Share	Payout Ratio		
<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	2023	Projected	<u>2023</u>	Projected	2023	Projected	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
1	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$1.81	\$2.43	\$2.78	\$4.25	65.11%	57.18%	
2	Ameren Corporation	\$2.52	\$3.57	\$4.37	\$6.50	57.67%	54.92%	
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$3.37	\$4.31	\$5.24	\$7.50	64.31%	57.47%	
4	Duke Energy Corporation	\$4.06	\$5.00	\$5.56	\$8.00	73.02%	62.50%	
5	Edison International	\$2.99	\$4.25	\$4.76	\$7.00	62.82%	60.71%	
6	Entergy Corporation	\$2.17	\$3.00	\$5.55	\$4.20	39.10%	71.43%	
7	Evergy, Inc.	\$2.48	\$3.25	\$3.17	\$5.00	78.23%	65.00%	
8	IDACORP, Inc.	\$3.20	\$4.20	\$5.14	\$7.10	62.26%	59.15%	
9	OGE Energy Corp.	\$1.66	\$1.79	\$2.07	\$2.95	80.19%	60.68%	
10	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$3.49	\$3.85	\$4.41	\$6.25	79.14%	61.60%	
11	Portland General Electric Company	\$1.88	\$2.60	\$2.38	\$4.00	78.99%	65.00%	
12	PPL Corporation	\$0.95	\$1.40	\$1.60	\$2.40	59.38%	58.33%	
13	Southern Company	\$2.78	\$3.10	\$3.64	\$5.60	76.37%	55.36%	
14	TXNM Energy	\$1.49	\$2.00	\$2.82	\$3.65	52.84%	54.79%	
15	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$2.08	\$3.00	\$3.35	\$5.00	62.09%	60.00%	
16	Average	\$2.46	\$3.18	\$3.79	\$5.29	66.10%	60.28%	

Source:

The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Sustainable Growth Rate

		3 to 5 Year Projections										Sustainable
		Dividends	Earnings	Book Value	Book Value		Adjustment	Adjusted	Payout	Retention	Internal	Growth
<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Per Share</u> (1)	<u>Per Share</u> (2)	<u>Per Share</u> (3)	<u>Growth</u> (4)	<u>ROE</u> (5)	<u>Factor</u> (6)	<u>ROE</u> (7)	<u>Ratio</u> (8)	<u>Rate</u> (9)	<u>Growth Rate</u> (10)	<u>Rate</u> (11)
1	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$2.43	\$4.25	\$31.90	3.17%	13.32%	1.02	13.53%	57.18%	42.82%	5.79%	5.87%
2	Ameren Corporation	\$3.57	\$6.50	\$52.65	4.57%	12.35%	1.02	12.62%	54.92%	45.08%	5.69%	7.27%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$4.31	\$7.50	\$60.90	3.88%	12.32%	1.02	12.55%	57.47%	42.53%	5.34%	6.20%
4	Duke Energy Corporation	\$5.00	\$8.00	\$76.50	3.80%	10.46%	1.02	10.65%	62.50%	37.50%	3.99%	4.18%
5	Edison International	\$4.25	\$7.00	\$50.00	5.62%	14.00%	1.03	14.38%	60.71%	39.29%	5.65%	5.91%
6	Entergy Corporation	\$3.00	\$4.20	\$43.45	3.99%	9.67%	1.02	9.86%	71.43%	28.57%	2.82%	4.67%
7	Evergy, Inc.	\$3.25	\$5.00	\$47.50	2.05%	10.53%	1.01	10.63%	65.00%	35.00%	3.72%	3.73%
8	IDACORP, Inc.	\$4.20	\$7.10	\$74.00	4.31%	9.59%	1.02	9.80%	59.15%	40.85%	4.00%	5.71%
9	OGE Energy Corp.	\$1.79	\$2.95	\$26.25	2.86%	11.24%	1.01	11.40%	60.68%	39.32%	4.48%	4.48%
10	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$3.85	\$6.25	\$70.00	4.27%	8.93%	1.02	9.12%	61.60%	38.40%	3.50%	4.63%
11	Portland General Electric Company	\$2.60	\$4.00	\$42.25	4.30%	9.47%	1.02	9.67%	65.00%	35.00%	3.38%	4.29%
12	PPL Corporation	\$1.40	\$2.40	\$23.45	3.66%	10.23%	1.02	10.42%	58.33%	41.67%	4.34%	4.36%
13	Southern Company	\$3.10	\$5.60	\$32.25	1.89%	17.36%	1.01	17.53%	55.36%	44.64%	7.82%	8.75%
14	TXNM Energy	\$2.00	\$3.65	\$33.00	4.03%	11.06%	1.02	11.28%	54.79%	45.21%	5.10%	5.96%
15	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$3.00	\$5.00	\$43.70	5.47%	11.44%	1.03	11.75%	60.00%	40.00%	4.70%	6.09%
16 17	Average Median	\$3.18	\$5.29	\$47.19	3.86%	11.46%	1.02	11.68%	60.28%	39.72%	4.69%	5.47% 5.71%

Sources and Notes:

Cols. (1), (2) and (3): The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025. Col. (4): [Col. (3) / Page 2 Col. (2)] ^ (1/number of years projected) - 1. Col. (5): Col. (2) / Col. (3). Col. (6): [2 * (1 + Col. (4))] / (2 + Col. (4)). Col. (6): [2 * (1 + Col. (4))] / (2 + Col. (4)). Col. (7): Col. (6) * Col. (5). Col. (9): 1 - Col. (8). Col. (10): Col. (9) * Col. (7). Col. (11): Col. (10) + Page 2 Col. (9).

Sustainable Growth Rate

		13-Week	<u>2023</u> Book Value	Market to Book	Common Shares Outstanding (in Millions) ²					
		Average								
<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Stock Price¹</u> (1)	<u>Per Share²</u> (2)	<u>Ratio</u> (3)	<u>2023</u> (4)	<u>3-5 Years</u> (5)	<u>Growth</u> (6)	<u>S Factor³</u> (7)	<u>V Factor⁴</u> (8)	<u>S * V</u> (9)
1	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$62.05	\$26.46	2.34	256.10	257.00	0.06%	0.14%	57.35%	0.08%
2	Ameren Corporation	\$98.44	\$40.26	2.45	267.00	285.00	1.09%	2.67%	59.10%	1.58%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$105.19	\$48.46	2.17	526.18	550.00	0.74%	1.61%	53.93%	0.87%
4	Duke Energy Corporation	\$118.31	\$61.15	1.93	771.00	780.00	0.19%	0.37%	48.31%	0.18%
5	Edison International	\$55.41	\$36.02	1.54	383.93	395.00	0.47%	0.73%	34.99%	0.26%
6	Entergy Corporation	\$83.28	\$34.35	2.42	425.70	460.00	1.30%	3.15%	58.75%	1.85%
7	Evergy, Inc.	\$67.32	\$42.06	1.60	229.73	230.00	0.02%	0.03%	37.52%	0.01%
8	IDACORP, Inc.	\$115.26	\$57.44	2.01	50.62	56.00	1.70%	3.41%	50.16%	1.71%
9	OGE Energy Corp.	\$44.62	\$22.17	2.01	200.30	200.20	- 0.01%	- 0.02%	50.32%	- 0.01%
10	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$92.28	\$54.47	1.69	113.42	125.00	1.63%	2.77%	40.98%	1.13%
11	Portland General Electric Company	\$43.12	\$32.81	1.31	101.16	120.00	2.89%	3.79%	23.92%	0.91%
12	PPL Corporation	\$34.99	\$18.90	1.85	737.13	738.00	0.02%	0.04%	45.99%	0.02%
13	Southern Company	\$89.60	\$28.82	3.11	1,091.00	1,120.00	0.44%	1.36%	67.83%	0.92%
14	TXNM Energy	\$52.02	\$26.04	2.00	90.20	95.00	0.87%	1.73%	49.94%	0.87%
15	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$69.58	\$31.74	2.19	554.94	595.00	1.17%	2.56%	54.38%	1.39%
	Average	\$75.43	\$37.41	2.04	386.56	400.41	0.84%	1.62%	48.90 %	0.78%

Sources and Notes:

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on May 9, 2025.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

³ Expected Growth in the Number of Shares, Column (3) * Column (6).

⁴ Expected Profit of Stock Investment, [1 - 1 / Column (3)].

Constant Growth DCF Model (Sustainable Growth Rate)

		13-Week AVG	Sustainable	Annualized	Adjusted	Constant	
<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	Stock Price	<u>Growth</u> ²	<u>Dividend</u> °	<u>Yield</u>	<u>Growth DCF</u>	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
1	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$62.05	5.87%	\$1.92	3.28%	9.15%	
2	Ameren Corporation	\$98.44	7.27%	\$2.84	3.09%	10.36%	
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$105.19	6.20%	\$3.72	3.76%	9.96%	
4	Duke Energy Corporation	\$118.31	4.18%	\$4.18	3.68%	7.86%	
5	Edison International	\$55.41	5.91%	\$3.31	6.33%	12.23%	
6	Entergy Corporation	\$83.28	4.67%	\$2.40	3.02%	7.68%	
7	Evergy, Inc.	\$67.32	3.73%	\$2.67	4.11%	7.85%	
8	IDACORP, Inc.	\$115.26	5.71%	\$3.44	3.15%	8.87%	
9	OGE Energy Corp.	\$44.62	4.48%	\$1.69	3.95%	8.43%	
10	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$92.28	4.63%	\$3.58	4.06%	8.69%	
11	Portland General Electric Company	\$43.12	4.29%	\$2.00	4.84%	9.13%	
12	PPL Corporation	\$34.99	4.36%	\$1.09	3.26%	7.61%	
13	Southern Company	\$89.60	8.75%	\$2.96	3.59%	12.34%	
14	TXNM Energy	\$52.02	5.96%	\$1.63	3.32%	9.28%	
15	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$69.58	6.09%	\$2.28	3.48%	9.57%	
16	Average	\$75.43	5.47%	\$2.65	3.79%	9.27%	
17	Median					9.13%	

Sources:

² Exhibit CCW-6, page 1.

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on May 9, 2025.

³ The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.
Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model

		13-Week AVG	Annualized	First Stage	Second Stage Growth					Third Stage	Multi-Stage
<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	Company Stock Price ¹ Dividend ²		Growth ³	Year 6	<u>Year 7</u>	Year 8	Year 9	<u>Year 10</u>	_ Growth ⁴	Growth DCF
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$62.05	\$1.92	6.63%	6.22%	5.80%	5.39%	4.97%	4.56%	4.14%	7.91%
2	Ameren Corporation	\$98.44	\$2.84	6.90%	6.44%	5.98%	5.52%	5.06%	4.60%	4.14%	7.72%
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$105.19	\$3.72	6.53%	6.13%	5.73%	5.34%	4.94%	4.54%	4.14%	8.42%
4	Duke Energy Corporation	\$118.31	\$4.18	6.42%	6.04%	5.66%	5.28%	4.90%	4.52%	4.14%	8.38%
5	Edison International	\$55.41	\$3.31	8.52%	7.79%	7.06%	6.33%	5.60%	4.87%	4.14%	12.11%
6	Entergy Corporation	\$83.28	\$2.40	9.40%	8.53%	7.65%	6.77%	5.89%	5.02%	4.14%	8.31%
7	Evergy, Inc.	\$67.32	\$2.67	5.77%	5.50%	5.23%	4.96%	4.68%	4.41%	4.14%	8.71%
8	IDACORP, Inc.	\$115.26	\$3.44	7.81%	7.20%	6.59%	5.98%	5.36%	4.75%	4.14%	8.06%
9	OGE Energy Corp.	\$44.62	\$1.69	6.15%	5.82%	5.48%	5.15%	4.81%	4.48%	4.14%	8.60%
10	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$92.28	\$3.58	3.05%	3.23%	3.41%	3.59%	3.78%	3.96%	4.14%	7.90%
11	Portland General Electric Company	\$43.12	\$2.00	3.94%	3.98%	4.01%	4.04%	4.07%	4.11%	4.14%	8.91%
12	PPL Corporation	\$34.99	\$1.09	7.49%	6.93%	6.37%	5.81%	5.26%	4.70%	4.14%	8.15%
13	Southern Company	\$89.60	\$2.96	6.80%	6.36%	5.91%	5.47%	5.03%	4.58%	4.14%	8.21%
14	TXNM Energy	\$52.02	\$1.63	5.59%	5.35%	5.11%	4.87%	4.62%	4.38%	4.14%	7.72%
15	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$69.58	\$2.28	7.92%	7.29%	6.66%	6.03%	5.40%	4.77%	4.14%	8.46%
16	Average	\$75.43	\$2.65	6.60%	6.19%	5.78%	5.37%	4.96%	4.55%	4.14%	8.51%
17	Median										8 31%

Sources:

² The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

³ Exhibit CCW-3

⁴ Blue Chip Economic Indicators, March 10, 2025, at page 14.

¹ S&P Global Market Intelligence, Downloaded on May 9, 2025.

Docket No. 20250011-EI Common Stock Market/Book Ratio Exhibit CCW-9, Page 1 of 1

Florida Power & Light Company

Common Stock Market/Book Ratio



Source:

1980 - 2000: Mergent Public Utility Manual.

2001 - 2015: AUS Utility Reports, multiple dates.

2016 - 2023: Value Line Investment Survey, multiple dates.

* Value Line Investment Survey Reports February 21, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

Equity Risk Premium - Treasury Bond

<u>Line</u>	<u>Year</u>	Authorized Electric <u>Returns¹</u> (1)	30 yr. Treasury <u>Bond Yield²</u> (2)	Indicated Risk <u>Premium</u> (3)	Rolling 5 - Year <u>Average</u> (4)	Rolling 10 - Year <u>Average</u> (5)
1	1986	13.93%	7.80%	6.13%		
2	1987	12.99%	8.58%	4.41%		
3	1988	12.79%	8.96%	3.83%		
4	1989	12.97%	8.45%	4.52%		
5	1990	12.70%	8.61%	4.09%	4.60%	
6	1991	12.55%	8.14%	4.41%	4.25%	
7	1992	12.09%	7.67%	4.42%	4.26%	
8	1993	11.41%	6.60%	4.81%	4.45%	
9	1994	11.34%	7.37%	3.97%	4.34%	
10	1995	11.55%	6.88%	4.67%	4.46%	4.53%
11	1996	11.39%	6.70%	4.69%	4.51%	4.38%
12	1997	11.40%	6.61%	4.79%	4.59%	4.42%
13	1998	11.66%	5.58%	6.08%	4.84%	4.65%
14	1999	10.77%	5.87%	4.90%	5.03%	4.68%
15	2000	11.43%	5.94%	5.49%	5.19%	4.82%
16	2001	11.09%	5.49%	5.60%	5.37%	4.94%
17	2002	11.16%	5.43%	5.73%	5.56%	5.07%
18	2003	10.97%	4.96%	6.01%	5.55%	5.19%
19	2004	10.75%	5.05%	5.70%	5.71%	5.37%
20	2005	10.54%	4.65%	5.89%	5.79%	5.49%
21	2006	10.34%	4.87%	5.47%	5.76%	5.57%
22	2007	10.31%	4.83%	5.48%	5.71%	5.64%
23	2008	10.37%	4.28%	6.09%	5.73%	5.64%
24	2009	10.52%	4.07%	6.45%	5.88%	5.79%
20	2010	10.29%	4.23%	6.04%	5.91%	5.65%
20	2011	10.19%	3.91%	0.20%	6.07%	5.91%
21	2012	0.02%	2.92%	7.10% 6.270/	6.45%	6.00%
20	2013	9.02%	3 34%	6.42%	6.44%	6.16%
20	2014	9.60%	2.84%	6.76%	6.58%	6.24%
31	2016	9.60%	2.64%	7.00%	6.73%	6.40%
32	2010	9.68%	2.00 %	6.78%	6.66%	6.53%
33	2018	9.56%	3 11%	645%	6.68%	6.56%
34	2019	9.65%	2.58%	7.07%	6.81%	6.63%
35	2020	9.39%	1.56%	7.83%	7.02%	6.80%
36	2021	9.39%	2.05%	7.34%	7.09%	6.91%
37	2022	9.58%	3.12%	6.46%	7.03%	6.85%
38	2023	9.66%	4.09%	5.57%	6.85%	6.77%
39	2024	9.78%	4.41%	5.37%	6.51%	6.66%
40	2025 ³	9.72%	4.71%	5.01%	5.95%	6.49%
41 42	Average Minimum	10.82%	5.13%	5.69%	5.74% 4 25%	5.78% 4 38%
43	Maximum				7.09%	4.00 % 6.91%

Sources:

¹ Regulatory Research Associates, Inc., Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, Jan. 1997 p. 5, and Jan. 2011 p. 3. S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, January - March, 2025, April 25, 2025 at page 3. 2006 - 2024 Authorized Returns exclude limited issue rider cases.

² St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/.

The yields from 2002 to 2005 represent the 20-Year Treasury yields obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank.

³Data represents January - March, 2025.

Equity Risk Premium - Utility Bond

<u>Line</u>	<u>Year</u>	Authorized Electric <u>Returns¹</u> (1)	Average "A" Rated Utility <u>Bond Yield²</u> (2)	Indicated Risk <u>Premium</u> (3)	Rolling 5 - Year <u>Average</u> (4)	Rolling 10 - Year <u>Average</u> (5)
1	1986	13.93%	9.58%	4.35%		
2	1987	12.99%	10.10%	2.89%		
3	1988	12.79%	10.49%	2.30%		
4	1989	12.97%	9.77%	3.20%		
5	1990	12.70%	9.86%	2.84%	3.12%	
6	1991	12.55%	9.36%	3.19%	2.88%	
7	1992	12.09%	8.69%	3.40%	2.99%	
8	1993	11.41%	7.59%	3.82%	3.29%	
9	1994	11.34%	8.31%	3.03%	3.26%	
10	1995	11.55%	7.89%	3.66%	3.42%	3.27%
11	1996	11.39%	7.75%	3.64%	3.51%	3.20%
12	1997	11.40%	7.60%	3.80%	3.59%	3.29%
13	1998	11.66%	7.04%	4.62%	3.75%	3.52%
14	1999	10.77%	7.62%	3.15%	3.77%	3.52%
15	2000	11.43%	8.24%	3.19%	3.68%	3.55%
16	2001	11.09%	7.76%	3.33%	3.62%	3.56%
17	2002	11.16%	7.37%	3.79%	3.61%	3.60%
18	2003	10.97%	6.58%	4.39%	3.57%	3.66%
19	2004	10.75%	6.16%	4.59%	3.86%	3.82%
20	2005	10.54%	5.65%	4.89%	4.20%	3.94%
21	2006	10.34%	6.07%	4.27%	4.39%	4.00%
22	2007	10.31%	6.07%	4.24%	4.48%	4.04%
23	2008	10.37%	6.53%	3.84%	4.37%	3.97%
24	2009	10.52%	6.04%	4.48%	4.34%	4.10%
25	2010	10.29%	5.46%	4.83%	4.33%	4.26%
26	2011	10.19%	5.04%	5.15%	4.51%	4.45%
27	2012	10.02%	4.13%	5.89%	4.84%	4.66%
28	2013	9.82%	4.48%	5.34%	5.14%	4.75%
29	2014	9.76%	4.28%	5.48%	5.34%	4.84%
30	2015	9.60%	4.12%	5.48%	5.47%	4.90%
31	2016	9.60%	3.93%	5.66%	5.57%	5.04%
32	2017	9.68%	4.00%	5.68%	5.53%	5.18%
33	2018	9.56%	4.25%	5.31%	5.52%	5.33%
34	2019	9.65%	3.77%	5.88%	5.60%	5.47%
35	2020	9.39%	3.02%	6.37%	5.78%	5.62%
36	2021	9.39%	3.11%	6.28%	5.91%	5.74%
37	2022	9.58%	4.72%	4.86%	5.74%	5.64%
38	2023	9.66%	5.54%	4.12%	5.50%	5.51%
39	2024	9.78%	5.54%	4.24%	5.17%	5.39%
40	2025 °	9.72%	5.77%	3.95%	4.69%	5.24%
41	Average	10.82%	6.48%	4.34%	4.40%	4.42%
42	Minimum				2.88%	3.20%
43	Maximum				5.91%	5.74%

Sources:

¹ Regulatory Research Associates, Inc., Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, Jan. 1997 p. 5, and Jan. 2011 p. 3. S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, January - March, 2025, April 25, 2025 et page 2

April 25, 2025 at page 3. 2006 - 2024 Authorized Returns exclude limited issue rider cases.

² The utility bond yields for the period 1980-2005 were obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http The utility bond yields from 2006-2025 were obtained from the Mergent Bond Record.

³ Data represents January - March, 2025.

Bond Yield Spreads

				Public Utility Bond			Corporate Bond			Utility to Corporate		
		T-Bond			A-T-Bond	Baa-T-Bond			Aaa-T-Bond	Baa-T-Bond	Baa	A-Aaa
<u>Line</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Yield¹</u> (1)	<u>A</u> ² (2)	<u>Baa²</u> (3)	<u>Spread</u> (4)	<u>Spread</u> (5)	<u>Aaa³</u> (6)	<u>Baa³</u> (7)	<u>Spread</u> (8)	Spread (9)	<u>Spread</u> (10)	<u>Spread</u> (11)
1	1980	11.30%	13.34%	13.95%	2.04%	2.65%	11.94%	13.67%	0.64%	2.37%	0.28%	1.40%
2	1981	13.44%	15.95%	16.60%	2.51%	3.16%	14.17%	16.04%	0.73%	2.60%	0.56%	1.78%
3	1982	12.76%	15.86%	16.45%	3.10%	3.69%	13.79%	16.11%	1.03%	3.35%	0.34%	2.07%
4	1983	11.18%	13.66%	14.20%	2.48%	3.02%	12.04%	13.55%	0.86%	2.38%	0.65%	1.62%
5	1984	12.39%	14.03%	14.53%	1.64%	2.14%	12.71%	14.19%	0.32%	1.80%	0.34%	1.32%
6	1985	10.79%	12.47%	12.96%	1.68%	2.17%	11.37%	12.72%	0.58%	1.93%	0.24%	1.10%
7	1986	7.80%	9.58%	10.00%	1.78%	2.20%	9.02%	10.39%	1.22%	2.59%	-0.39%	0.56%
8	1987	8.58%	10.10%	10.53%	1.52%	1.95%	9.38%	10.58%	0.80%	2.00%	-0.05%	0.72%
9	1988	8.96%	10.49%	11.00%	1.53%	2.04%	9.71%	10.83%	0.75%	1.87%	0.17%	0.78%
10	1989	8.45%	9.77%	9.97%	1.32%	1.52%	9.26%	10.18%	0.81%	1.73%	-0.21%	0.51%
11	1990	8.61%	9.86%	10.06%	1.25%	1.45%	9.32%	10.36%	0.71%	1.75%	-0.30%	0.54%
12	1991	8.14%	9.36%	9.00%	1.22%	1.41%	8.11%	9.80%	0.63%	1.67%	-0.25%	0.59%
13	1992	1.61%	8.69%	8.80%	1.02%	1.19%	8.14%	8.98%	0.47%	1.31%	-0.12%	0.00%
14	1993	7.270/	7.09%	1.9170	0.99%	1.31%	7.22%	1.93%	0.62%	1.3370	-0.02%	0.37%
16	1994	6.88%	7 80%	0.03% 8.20%	0.94%	1.2070	7.90%	0.02% 8 20%	0.39%	1.2370	0.01%	0.33%
17	1995	6.70%	7.05%	8 17%	1.01%	1.417%	7 37%	8.05%	0.71%	1.32%	0.09%	0.38%
18	1997	6.61%	7.60%	7.95%	0.99%	1 34%	7 26%	7.86%	0.66%	1.00%	0.09%	0.34%
19	1998	5.58%	7.04%	7 26%	1 46%	1.68%	6.53%	7 22%	0.95%	1.64%	0.04%	0.51%
20	1999	5.87%	7 62%	7.88%	1 75%	2.01%	7 04%	7.87%	1 18%	2.01%	0.01%	0.58%
21	2000	5.94%	8 24%	8 36%	2.30%	2 42%	7 62%	8 36%	1.68%	2 42%	-0.01%	0.62%
22	2001	5.49%	7.76%	8.03%	2.27%	2.54%	7.08%	7.95%	1.59%	2.45%	0.08%	0.68%
23	2002	5.43%	7.37%	8.02%	1.94%	2.59%	6.49%	7.80%	1.06%	2.37%	0.22%	0.88%
24	2003	4.96%	6.58%	6.84%	1.62%	1.89%	5.67%	6.77%	0.71%	1.81%	0.08%	0.91%
25	2004	5.05%	6.16%	6.40%	1.11%	1.35%	5.63%	6.39%	0.58%	1.35%	0.00%	0.53%
26	2005	4.65%	5.65%	5.93%	1.00%	1.28%	5.24%	6.06%	0.59%	1.42%	-0.14%	0.41%
27	2006	4.87%	6.07%	6.32%	1.20%	1.44%	5.58%	6.48%	0.71%	1.61%	-0.16%	0.48%
28	2007	4.83%	6.07%	6.33%	1.24%	1.50%	5,56%	6.48%	0.72%	1.65%	-0.15%	0.52%
29	2008	4.28%	6.53%	7.25%	2.25%	2.97%	5.63%	7.45%	1.35%	3.17%	-0.20%	0.90%
30	2009	4 07%	6.04%	7.06%	1 97%	2 99%	5 31%	7 30%	1 24%	3 23%	-0.24%	0.73%
31	2010	4 25%	5 46%	5 96%	1 21%	171%	4 94%	6 04%	0.69%	1 79%	-0.08%	0.52%
32	2011	3.91%	5.04%	5.57%	1 13%	1.66%	4 64%	5.66%	0.73%	1.75%	-0.10%	0.40%
33	2011	2.92%	1 13%	1.86%	1.10%	1.00%	3.67%	1 94%	0.75%	2.01%	-0.08%	0.46%
24	2012	2.52%	1 1 20%	4 08%	1.21%	1.53%	1 2404	5 10%	0.70%	1 65%	0.12%	0.40%
25	2013	2 2 4 0 /0	4.4070	4.00%	0.04%	1.0470	4.24/0	1 050/	0.75%	1.53%	-0.1270	0.24%
20	2014	3.34 %	4.2070	4.00% 5.02%	1 2704	1.40%	2 000/	4.00%	1.05%	2 160/	-0.03%	0.1270
30	2015	2.04%	4.12%	5.03%	1.27%	2.19%	3.09%	5.00%	1.05%	2.10%	0.03%	0.23%
37	2016	2.60%	3.93%	4.00%	1.34%	2.00%	3.01%	4.1270	1.07%	2.1270	-0.04%	0.27%
38	2017	2.90%	4.00%	4.38%	1.10%	1.48%	3.74%	4.44%	0.85%	1.55%	-0.06%	0.26%
39	2018	3.11%	4.25%	4.67%	1.14%	1.56%	3.93%	4.80%	0.82%	1.69%	-0.13%	0.32%
40	2019	2.58%	3.77%	4.19%	1.19%	1.61%	3.39%	4.38%	0.81%	1.79%	-0.18%	0.38%
41	2020	1.56%	3.02%	3.39%	1.45%	1.83%	2.48%	3.60%	0.91%	2.04%	-0.21%	0.54%
42	2021	2.05%	3.11%	3.36%	1.06%	1.31%	2.71%	3.40%	0.66%	1.35%	-0.04%	0.40%
43	2022	3.12%	4.72%	5.03%	1.61%	1.91%	4.09%	5.08%	0.97%	1.97%	-0.05%	0.64%
44	2023	4.09%	5.54%	5.84%	1.45%	1.75%	4.84%	5.85%	0.75%	1.76%	-0.01%	0.70%
45	2024	4.41%	5.54%	5.76%	1.14%	1.36%	5.04%	5.75%	0.64%	1.35%	0.01%	0.50%
46	2025 4	4.71%	5.77%	5.95%	1.06%	1.24%	5.36%	5.98%	0.65%	1.27%	-0.02%	0.42%
47	Average	6.02%	7.49%	7.91%	1.47%	1.88%	6.85%	7.91%	0.83%	1.89%	0.00%	0.64%

Yield Spreads Treasury Vs. Corporate & Treasury Vs. Utility



Sources:

 Sources:
¹ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/.
² The utility yields for the period 1980-2000 were obtained from Mergent Public Utility Manual, Mergent Weekly News Reports, 2003. The utility yields for the period 2001-2024 were obtained from the Mergent Bond Record.
³ The corporate yields for the period 1980-2005 were obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/. The corporate yields from 2006-2025 were obtained from the Mergent Bond Record.

⁴ Data represents January - March, 2025.

3 and 6 Month Treasury and Utility Bond Yields

<u>Line</u>	<u>Date</u>	Treasury <u>Bond Yield¹</u> (1)	"A" Rated Utility <u>Bond Yield²</u> (2)	"Baa" Rated Utility <u>Bond Yield²</u> (3)
1	April-25	4.71%	5.91%	6.11%
2	March-25	4.60%	5.72%	5.91%
3	February-25	4.68%	5.73%	5.90%
4	January-25	4.85%	5.87%	6.05%
5	December-24	4.58%	5.58%	5.77%
6	November-24	4.54%	5.55%	5.75%
7	3-Month Average	4.66%	5.79%	5.97%
8	Spread To Treasury		1.13%	1.31%
9	6-Month Average	4.66%	5.73%	5.92%
10	Spread To Treasury		1.07%	1.26%

Sources:

¹ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org.

² Mergent Bond Record.

Trends in Bond Yields



Sources:

Mergent Bond Record.

www.moodys.com, Bond Yields and Key Indicators.

St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/

Yield Spread Between Utility Bonds and 30-Year Treasury Bonds



Sources:

Mergent Bond Record.

www.moodys.com, Bond Yields and Key Indicators.

St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, http://research.stlouisfed.org/

OBD Clabel

Florida Power & Light Company

<u>Beta</u>

<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Beta¹</u>	Historical <u>Beta²</u>	Market Intelligence Beta ³	Methodolgy Beta ⁴
1	Alliant Energy Corporation	0.95	0.78	0.46	0.78
2	Ameren Corporation	0.90	0.75	0.47	0.73
3	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	0.85	0.70	0.42	0.65
4	Duke Energy Corporation	0.70	0.71	0.38	0.63
5	Edison International	0.90	0.79	0.53	0.86
6	Entergy Corporation	1.00	0.79	0.51	0.78
7	Evergy, Inc.	0.95	0.95	0.44	0.73
8	IDACORP, Inc.	0.75	0.75	0.44	0.66
9	OGE Energy Corp.	1.05	0.96	0.54	0.81
10	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	0.80	0.77	0.49	0.73
11	Portland General Electric Company	0.80	0.78	0.46	0.72
12	PPL Corporation	0.90	0.88	0.51	0.77
13	Southern Company	0.75	0.72	0.45	0.63
14	TXNM Energy	0.70	0.82	0.36	0.63
15	Xcel Energy Inc.	0.75	0.69	0.44	0.69
16	Average	0.85	0.79	0.46	0.72
17	Median	0.85	0.78	0.46	0.73

Source:

¹ The Value Line Investment Survey, March 7, April 18, and May 9, 2025.

² Value Line Software Analyzer.

³ S&P Global Market Intelligence, betas for the period 5/09/2020 - 5/09/2025.

⁴ S&P Global Market Intelligence, betas for the period 5/09/2022 - 5/09/2025.

CAPM Return

<u>Line</u>	<u>Description</u>	Kroll Normalized <u>MRP</u> (1)	Risk Premium Derived <u>MRP</u> (2)	Average FERC S&P 500 DCF Derived <u>MRP</u> (3)
	Current Beta			
1	Risk-Free Rate ^{1,2}	4.70%	4.40%	4.40%
2	Market Risk Premium	5.50%	7.20%	7.90%
3	Beta ⁷	0.85	0.85	0.85
4	САРМ	9.38%	10.52%	11.12%
	Historical Beta			
5	Risk-Free Rate ^{1,2}	4.70%	4.40%	4.40%
6	Market Risk Premium ^{1,3}	5.50%	7.20%	7.90%
7	Beta ⁷	0.79	0.79	0.79
8	САРМ	9.04%	10.08%	10.63%
	Current S&P Global Market Intel	ligence Beta		
9	Risk-Free Rate ^{1,2}	4.70%	4.40%	4.40%
10	Market Risk Premium ^{1,3}	5.50%	7.20%	7.90%
11	Beta ⁷	0.46	0.46	0.46
12	САРМ	7.24%	7.71%	8.04%
	<u>3-Year S&P Global Market Intelli</u>	gence Beta Adjusted	Using VL Methodolog	<u>av</u>
13	Risk-Free Rate ^{1,2}	4.70%	4.40%	4.40%
14	Market Risk Premium ^{1,3}	5.50%	7.20%	7.90%
15	Beta ⁴	0.72	0.72	0.72
16	CAPM	8.66%	9.58%	10.09%

Sources:

¹ Kroll Cost of Capital Navigator.
² Blue Chip Financial Forecast May 1, 2025.

³ Exhibit CCW-15, page 2

⁴ Exhibit CCW-14.

Development of the Market Risk Premium

<u>Line</u>	Description	<u>MRP</u>
Risk	Premium Based Method:	
1	Lg. Co. Stock Real Market Return	9.02% ¹
2	Projected Consumer Price Index	<u>2.40%</u> ²
3	Expected Market Return	11.64%
4	Risk-Free Rate	<u>4.40%</u> ²
5	Market Risk Premium	7.20%
<u>FERC</u>	S&P 500 (Dividend Companies) 1-Step DCF Based Method:	
6	S&P 500 Growth	10.30% ³
7	Index Dividend Yield	1.70% ³
8	Adjusted Yield	<u>1.79%</u>
9	Expected Market Return	12.09%
10	Risk-Free Rate	<u>4.40%</u> ²
11	Market Risk Premium	7.70%
FERC	S&P 500 (All Companies) 1-Step DCF Based Method:	
12	Short-Term S&P 500 Growth	10.90% 4
13	Index Dividend Yield	1.50% 4
14	Adjusted Yield	<u>1.58%</u>
15	Expected Market Return	12.48%
16	Risk-Free Rate	4.40% ²
17	Market Risk Premium	8.10%
18	Average DCF Based MRP	7.90%
	Sources & Note:	
	¹ Morningstar Direct.	

- ² Blue Chip Financial Forecast May 1, 2025.
- ³ S&P 500 1-Step DCF through May 9, 2025 for Dividend Paying Companies.
- ⁴ S&P 500 1-Step DCF through May 9, 2025 for all Companies.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Docket Nos. 20250011-EI

CUI

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished

by electronic mail this 9th day of June, 2025, to the following:

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