

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In Re: Petition of Intermedia  
Communications of Florida, Inc.  
for expanded interconnection for  
AAVs within LEC central offices

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JONATHAN E. CANIS  
ON BEHALF OF INTERMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS OF FLORIDA, INC.

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1 allowed rate of return of the Bell Operating Companies, and establishing the  
2 FCC's rules governing the allocation of joint common costs between regulated  
3 and unregulated LEC businesses telecommunications practice at Swidler &  
4 Berlin.

5 Q. Please describe your telecommunications practice at Swidler & Berlin.

6 A. At Swidler & Berlin, I represent a number of clients, including IXCs, large users  
7 of telecommunications services and alternative access vendors ("AAVs") --  
8 otherwise known as competitive access providers ("CAPs") -- in proceedings  
9 before the FCC and numerous state regulatory commissions. My  
10 responsibilities include participation in a broad range of policy-oriented  
11 rulemaking proceedings, assisting clients in various business transactions and  
12 negotiations, and monitoring -- and when appropriate opposing -- LEC and/or  
13 IXC tariffed service rates.

14 My specific experience regarding collocation issues includes the  
15 following: I was lead counsel for an AAV client in the New York Public Service  
16 Commission ("NYPSC") proceeding that established the first LEC-tariffed  
17 collocation arrangement in the country. That involvement included the drafting  
18 of pleadings in the NYPSC's rulemaking proceeding, as well as protracted  
19 negotiations with representatives of New York Telephone to establish the  
20 terms and conditions of its collocation tariffs and related contracts. Currently  
21 four LECs in the United States have tariffed physical collocation arrangements  
22 for intrastate services: New York Telephone, New England Telephone, Centel

1 of Illinois and Bell of Pennsylvania. I negotiated each of these four collocation  
2 tariffs on behalf of an AAV client. I have also participated actively in the  
3 proceedings concerning the virtual collocation tariffs that have been filed by  
4 Illinois Bell and Bell of Pennsylvania. On behalf of various AAV clients,  
5 including the Association for Local Telecommunications Services - the national  
6 AAV trade association -- I have participated -- and continue to participate --  
7 extensively in the FCC's collocation proceeding.

8 Q. Have you been involved in any other proceedings in which states have  
9 considered the FCC's Expanded Interconnection Order?

10 A. I have represented competitive access providers in proceedings in Ohio,  
11 Pennsylvania, Delaware, West Virginia, Indiana and North Carolina. In Ohio, I  
12 continue to represent a coalition of five AAVs -- Cablevision Lightpath,  
13 Fibernet, MetroComm, Metropolitan Fiber Systems, and Ohio Linx in  
14 collocation-related proceedings. For Indiana I testified on collocation issues  
15 on behalf of City Signal and Indiana Digital Access.

16 Q. On whose behalf are you testifying today?

17 A. I am testifying on behalf of Intermedia Communications of Florida, Inc., to  
18 which I will hereafter refer to Intermedia. Intermedia currently provides  
19 competitive access services in Florida, as authorized by this Commission.

20 Q. What is the purpose of your testimony?

21 A. The purpose of my testimony is to describe the functions served by  
22 collocation, the similarities and differences between physical collocation and

1 virtual collocation and to describe the collocation debate and its resolution in  
2 other states and at the Federal Communications Commission. I will also  
3 demonstrate the positive economic impact that could result from the adoption  
4 of a physical collocation policy like that contained in the FCC's Expanded  
5 Interconnection Order.

6 Q. Please describe the policy goal which resulted in the FCC's consideration and  
7 adoption of the Expanded Interconnection Order.

8 A. The FCC and those states that have considered issues of enhanced  
9 interconnection to LEC networks have all been motivated by the same policy  
10 goal -- the promotion of effective competition for local telecommunications  
11 services. These regulatory initiatives have been spurred by the recent  
12 development of the competitive access services industry.

13 In the mid-1980s, the declining cost of fiber optic cable and  
14 technological innovation in microwave-based and fiber-based transmission  
15 equipment made it possible for a small group of entrepreneurial companies to  
16 compete directly with LECs for the provision of local access services. These  
17 companies established fiber or microwave networks that typically serve large  
18 business, institutional and governmental customers in metropolitan markets  
19 across the country. The AAVs, such as Intermedia, provide three general  
20 types of telecommunications links: (1) direct links from one customer  
21 premises to another; (2) links between a customer premises and an IXC point  
22 of presence ("POP"), to provide the originating or terminating tail of an

1 interstate or intrastate, interexchange, service; and (3) links between IXC  
2 POPs, to hand off traffic from one IXC to another, or to offer a single IXC the  
3 ability to aggregate or reroute its traffic without expanding its network.

4 AAV services typically involve high-capacity digital facilities for the  
5 transmission of data and voice traffic, and run the gamut from low-capacity  
6 data lines used for credit card verification to Fiber Distributed Data Interface  
7 service, which connects local area networks at 100 Mbps. Moreover, AAV  
8 services provide the highest operating standards available, and include state-  
9 of-the-art features such as full circuit redundancy, which protects against  
10 catastrophic service outages, and guarantees uninterrupted service 99.999%  
11 of the time. AAVs have pioneered the development of such services and  
12 network configurations, and LECs have only recently begun to follow suit.  
13 Because AAV's offer protection against service outages, many customers  
14 require "vendor diversity" for critical communications services; i.e., they  
15 purchase redundant services from both LECs and AAVs.

16 The AAV industry has grown substantially over the past several years,  
17 and now includes over 40 different companies operating in over 60  
18 metropolitan areas across the country. Nevertheless, the provision of  
19 competitive access services remains a nascent industry -- nationwide, AAV  
20 gross revenues represent less than 1% of the market for access services,  
21 which remains dominated by LECs.

1           The factor that most significantly inhibits AAV growth is the limited reach  
2 of their networks -- currently, AAVs are forced to serve a niche market of  
3 customers physically connected to their networks. As a method of expanding  
4 the reach of AAV services, several states (starting with New York), and the  
5 FCC have mandated or approved expanded interconnection arrangements,  
6 through which AAVs may cost-effectively connect their traffic to the LECs'  
7 networks, thereby gaining the ability to provide service to any customer  
8 located on the ubiquitous LEC network.

9 Q.   What benefits have the FCC and other commissions identified with the  
10 expansion of local telecommunications competition?

11 A.   The state public utility commissions and the FCC have identified a wide range  
12 of public interest benefits that will accrue from the increased competition for  
13 local services that collocation will stimulate. These benefits include more rapid  
14 deployment of new technology, system redundancy and increased protection  
15 against disastrous service outages, increased service innovation and greater  
16 customer choice, and price competition that will reduce the cost of  
17 telecommunications services to all customers. The importance of these  
18 benefits cannot be underestimated to communication dependent businesses.  
19 For example, information intensive businesses and health-care and educational  
20 institutions are and will continue in the future to be dependent upon a modern  
21 telecommunications infrastructure.

1           **Indeed, Intermedia has already demonstrated that competition brings**  
2           **substantial public interest benefits: Intermedia introduced redundant fiber ring**  
3           **network architecture to Florida, which has only recently been copied by LECs.**  
4           **Intermedia's entry into Florida markets has also resulted in the introduction of**  
5           **new services, superior service quality, and lower service rates for**  
6           **telecommunications users. For Intermedia -- or any competitive service**  
7           **provider -- to succeed, it must offer potential customers competitive pricing,**  
8           **superior quality, and responsive, user-friendly service. Intermedia has grown**  
9           **to date because it offers business users in Florida these three elements.**  
10          **Departure from a physical collocation standard will severely limit Intermedia's**  
11          **ability to provide favorable pricing, high quality and ease of administration to**  
12          **its customers. Regulation which artificially inhibits or restricts carriers from**  
13          **employing the type and quality of service technology that is available in other**  
14          **jurisdictions can only harm communications users in Florida. The Commission**  
15          **must not inadvertently establish a regulatory scheme which will inhibit multiple**  
16          **vendors from providing the greatest variety of competitive services possible to**  
17          **end users. In order for Florida to maintain an innovative, state-of-the-art**  
18          **communications infrastructure, it is crucial that all networks be**  
19          **interconnectable to each other on a mutually equitable and efficient basis.**  
20          **These objectives cannot be achieved through virtual collocation, because such**  
21          **arrangements are not the operational, economic or technical equivalent of**  
22          **physical collocation.**



1           Full and effective competition for local telecommunications will not  
2           develop in the midst of substantial regulatory uncertainty or inefficiency. Yet  
3           uncertainty and inefficiency would result if the Commission were to adopt a  
4           policy favoring virtual collocation, or giving the LEC discretion to select the  
5           form of collocation it will provide. Such a decision would yield uncertainty  
6           because, as discussed later in this testimony, virtual collocation greatly  
7           increases the risk of litigation over cost and discrimination issues. A virtual  
8           collocation or "LEC choice" policy would also be highly inefficient because it  
9           would be inconsistent with the physical collocation policy that governs  
10          interstate revisions, and would require AAVs and other collocators to build  
11          unnecessary and duplicative collocation arrangements, and to artificially  
12          segregate their interstate and intrastate traffic.

13                 States that fail to guarantee effective interconnection and invite costly  
14          litigation over collocation terms and conditions -- as a virtual collocation policy  
15          will do -- risk driving some of the most innovative and progressive forces in  
16          telecommunications out of the market. AAVs, which pioneered the  
17          deployment of "disaster-proof" fiber ring technology, would likely enter or  
18          expand their networks in states with less burdensome regulatory  
19          environments; other parties that are now considering entry into the local  
20          services markets -- such as interexchange carriers and cable operators --  
21          would look to invest in areas with greater competitive opportunity and  
22          regulatory certainty; large telecommunications-intensive businesses would look

1 to other states where competition has been more effective in reducing the  
2 rates for telecommunications services and increasing service options.

3 Q. Please describe briefly what collocation actually entails.

4 A. Through collocation, equipment necessary to terminate an interconnector's  
5 traffic is placed within the LEC central office ("CO"). This equipment typically  
6 includes: (1) optical line terminating multiplexers ("OLTMs") which terminate a  
7 fiber optic transmission and convert it from an optical to an electrical signal  
8 that may be processed by the LECs' switches; (2) other multiplexers, which  
9 typically include "3-1 multiplexers" which break down a single DS3 (45 Mbps)  
10 transmission into 28 individual DS1 (1.544 Mbps) circuits, and "1-0  
11 multiplexers" which break DS1 transmissions down into 24 voice-grade (64  
12 kbps or less) circuits; and (3) digital access and cross-connect systems  
13 ("DACs"), which reconfigure voice grade channels within a DS1 transmission,  
14 and are used to "groom" traffic (to route traffic over existing facilities in the  
15 most efficient manner possible). To terminate the interconnector's traffic within  
16 the CO, the interconnector brings its fiber optic cable up to a manhole near  
17 the central office, or mounts a microwave receiver on the CO roof. From  
18 those points, LEC personnel bring connecting cable into the CO, where it is  
19 attached to the collocated terminating equipment. Finally, individual circuits  
20 derived from the interconnector's equipment are cross-connected to LEC  
21 services to complete the transmission on the LEC network. The

- 1 interconnector monitors and controls the traffic between its network and the  
2 equipment collocated in the LEC CO.
- 3 Q. Do these functions differ for virtual vs. physical collocation?
- 4 A. No. The functions described above are identical under either physical or  
5 virtual collocation arrangements.
- 6 Q. How do these forms of collocation differ?
- 7 A. The two forms of collocation differ in two respects. First, under physical  
8 collocation, the interconnector's personnel are given access to the LEC CO in  
9 order to install and maintain the collocated equipment, while under virtual  
10 collocation, the interconnector personnel are excluded from the CO and the  
11 interconnector's equipment is installed, repaired and maintained by LEC  
12 personnel. Second, under physical collocation, the LEC typically sets aside a  
13 portion of unused CO space for interconnectors, and provides each  
14 interconnector with its own space (usually an area 10 feet square and 8-10  
15 feet high) in which to place its equipment. Under virtual collocation, the LEC  
16 may also take this approach, or it may dedicate individual equipment bays  
17 near its main or intermediate distribution frames to an interconnector's use.
- 18 Q. Where was collocation first ordered?
- 19 A. The New York Public Service Commission ("NYPSC") issued an order adopting  
20 a collocation policy on May 16, 1989.
- 21 Q. What influenced the NYPSC in adopting this policy?
- 22

- 1 A. The NYPSC's initial and subsequent orders that established collocation as a  
2 means of stimulating competition for local telecommunications services were  
3 heavily influenced by the New York City Mayor's Office and representatives of  
4 communications-intensive industries in New York. The primary concern of  
5 these parties was to ensure that the New York metropolitan area retained a  
6 state-of-the-art telecommunications infrastructure in order to prevent  
7 communications-dependant industries such as stock brokerages and financial  
8 service institutions from relocating in neighboring states.
- 9 Q. Did the NYPSC mandate physical collocation?
- 10 A. No. The NYPSC stated that the interconnection must be technically and  
11 economically comparable to actual collocation and the terms must be  
12 reasonable," and ordered New York Telephone ("NYT") to negotiate  
13 reasonable terms and conditions with parties seeking collocation. The NYPSC  
14 later extended this requirement to all other LECs operating in New York.
- 15 Q. What was NYT's response to that order?
- 16 A. NYT responded to the NYPSC order by filing its first collocation tariff, called  
17 the Optical Transport Interconnection Service ("OTIS"), which provided for  
18 virtual collocation.
- 19 Q. Was that tariff implemented?
- 20 A. Partially. The filing immediately was challenged by potential interconnectors,  
21 which argued that the service failed to meet the "comparability" standards  
22 established by the NYPSC. The NYPSC allowed the OTIS tariff to take effect,

1 but required that representatives of NYT and the interconnectors form a Task  
2 Force to negotiate a resolution to the interconnectors' complaints. As  
3 discussed below, the New York Telephone virtual collocation tariff was  
4 withdrawn within a year.

5 Q. What were the results of the NYPSC mandated negotiations?

6 A. The Task Force convened a series of formal meetings and informal  
7 communications that stretched from June 1990 to January 1991. The Task  
8 Force was chaired by a member of the NYPSC staff, who acted as an arbiter.  
9 The negotiations were successful in eliminating many of the remaining  
10 differences among the parties. NYT gradually modified its position on many of  
11 the substantive economic comparability issues. In November, 1990, it formally  
12 announced its intention to allow for physical collocation of competing carriers  
13 within its central office buildings.

14 NYT's "OTIS II" physical collocation tariff finally took effect in May, 1991  
15 -- two years after the NYPSC mandated collocation. From that two-year  
16 period of formal complaints, task forces and informal negotiations, physical  
17 collocation emerged as the only standard that satisfied the interconnectors'  
18 needs and the NYPSC's comparability and reasonableness standards.  
19 Significantly, NYT in its Comments to the FCC in the Expanded Interconnector  
20 Proceeding stated that it found that "[w]hile virtual collocation arrangements  
21 may be appropriate for some LECs, the NTCs [NYNEX Telephone  
22 Companies] have found that physical collocation provides a more suitable

1 solution to the needs of the NTCs and their customers.\* Confirming this is the  
2 fact that NYNEX has not opposed the mandatory physical collocation  
3 provision in the FCC's Collocation Order.

4 Q. What is the status of collocation in New York?

5 A. At least two AAVs currently are providing intrastate services over collocation  
6 arrangements in at least 14 NYT COs. Rochester Telephone became the  
7 second LEC in New York to file a collocation tariff. The Rochester tariff also  
8 provides for physical collocation, and took effect on October 1, 1991.

9 Q. Have other states considered collocation tariffs?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Please describe collocation tariffs in states other than New York.

12 A. Central office collocation arrangements have only been tariffed in three states  
13 outside of New York. In Massachusetts, New England Telephone adopted an  
14 OTIS tariff that largely mirrors that established by New York Telephone. The  
15 New England collocation service, like OTIS II, provides physical collocation,  
16 and took effect on August 14, 1991. At present at least two AAVs are  
17 providing intrastate service over collocation arrangements in eight New  
18 England Telephone central offices in the Boston metropolitan area.

19 In Illinois, Centel filed a tariff providing for physical collocation on May 8,  
20 1992. The Centel service, called the Centel Facility Interconnect Service  
21 ("CFIS"), establishes straightforward and non-burdensome security practices  
22 that permit AAV personnel access to the Centel COs to install and maintain

1 their equipment. Although CFIS has only been offered for a few months, three  
2 different interconnectors have already obtained collocation in at least one  
3 Centel CO.

4 In contrast to the collocation tariffs established in New York and  
5 Massachusetts, and by Centel in Illinois, Illinois Bell filed an intrastate tariff  
6 providing virtual collocation in Illinois. The Illinois Bell Tariff establishes an  
7 Optical Interconnection Service, and took effect on April 7, 1991. Although the  
8 Illinois Bell tariff has been available for twenty months, I am aware of only one  
9 AAV currently providing service over virtual collocation arrangements in three  
10 Illinois Bell COs.

11 Bell of Pennsylvania has recently filed a trial collocation tariff with a  
12 limited duration of one year. Filed to settle a AAV complaint, the collocation  
13 service provides both physical and virtual collocation in different central offices.  
14 The tariff took effect on November 30, 1992.

15 Both New Jersey Bell and Pacific Bell have established a single virtual  
16 collocation arrangement apiece as customer-specific contracts. These  
17 arrangements are each limited to a single customer and a single business  
18 application, and are not generally available to the public.

19 In addition, a number of other states have completed proceedings  
20 requiring either virtual or physical collocation for intrastate service. To date,  
21 no LEC has filed collocation tariffs pursuant to those proceedings.

22 Q. Please briefly describe the FCC's Expanded Interconnection proceeding.

1 A. The FCC's Expanded Interconnection order is the culmination of a process  
2 that began in 1989. Initiated in response to a 1989 AAV petition for  
3 rulemaking, the FCC's proceeding involved two separate notices of proposed  
4 rulemaking, and produced thousands of pages of comments, data and  
5 affidavits filed by nearly 70 parties. These comments included hundreds of  
6 pages devoted to the relative merits of physical versus virtual collocation  
7 submitted by interested parties. The FCC released its final orders concerning  
8 collocation standards on June 9, 1993, and required LECs to provide physical  
9 collocation in most instances.

10 Q. Can a virtual collocation arrangement provide the operational, economic and  
11 technical equivalent of physical collocation?

12 A. No. Under a physical collocation arrangement, the AAV has unfettered  
13 discretion in deciding how and when equipment will be deployed and, most  
14 importantly, in setting performance standards for its services and for its  
15 personnel. These decisions define the type and quality of the service an AAV  
16 provides. In contrast, under virtual collocation, AAVs will be denied the ability  
17 to control some of the most fundamental aspects of their business.

18 This problem reflects a fundamental and unavoidable flaw in virtual  
19 collocation: virtual collocation insinuates the LEC between an AAV and the  
20 service the AAV provides. In effect, virtual collocation perpetuates the  
21 bottleneck that has resulted in LEC domination of the local exchange market.  
22 To date, AAVs have crafted an attractive competitive alternative to LEC



1 services by deploying innovative new technologies, increasing service  
2 reliability, and offering greater responsiveness to customer needs. Under  
3 physical collocation, AAVs will retain the ability to offer these competitive  
4 alternatives to a vastly increased number of customers. Under virtual  
5 collocation, however, the LEC's own performance standards will become the  
6 de facto standards for AAV services. Customers located on the LEC network  
7 will have to accept LEC provisioning and repair intervals, even though the AAV  
8 industry has evolved in part because end users demanded higher operating  
9 standards and quicker installation times. Equally important, virtual collocation  
10 will impose highly inefficient conditions on collocators, including training costs,  
11 equipment carrying costs, and overtime charges, and litigation costs that  
12 simply are not incurred in a physical collocation environment. These  
13 inefficiencies will needlessly inflate AAV service rates, masking AAV operational  
14 economies, and denying the end user the ability to make economically rational  
15 and efficient choices.

16 Q. Are there additional costs associated with virtual collocation arrangements?

17 A. Yes. In addition to these operating and economic inefficiencies, virtual  
18 collocation invariably will lead to excessive levels of litigation, unnecessarily  
19 burdening the resources of both the Commission and the industry. Because  
20 the LEC is a competitor of collocated AAVs, it has a vested interest in seeing  
21 that AAV efficiency and service standards do not exceed its own. Because,  
22 under virtual collocation, the LEC is interposed between the AAV and its

1 equipment located within the central office, the LEC has the ability (and  
2 incentive) to act on this interest by failing to provide AAVs with timely and  
3 competent installation, repair and maintenance of collocated equipment.

4 Virtual collocation is therefore the telecommunications equivalent of placing the  
5 fox in charge of the henhouse, and invariably will engender charges of sabo-  
6 tage, price gouging and discrimination by AAVs against LECs, requiring  
7 stringent Commission oversight of LEC responses to AAV service requests.

8 Q. Is virtual collocation the operational equivalent of physical collocation?

9 A. One of an AAV's strongest selling points is its ability to respond to a  
10 customer's unique needs, and to offer the type of individualized service and  
11 timely performance that LECs cannot (or do not) provide. For example, most  
12 LECs require two weeks or more to install a new DS1 or DS3 service to a cus-  
13 tomer. AAV on average "turns up" new service to customers on its existing  
14 network in a matter of several days. Moreover, in response to customer  
15 emergencies, it is not unusual for an AAV to install a new DS1 or DS3 service  
16 overnight.

17 Under virtual collocation, an AAV's ability to provide this extraordinary  
18 level of service would be eliminated. Because AAV personnel would not have  
19 access to the AAV's terminating equipment within the LEC central office, the  
20 AAV would have to rely on the LEC to provide LEC personnel to make the  
21 necessary additions to, or modifications of, the AAV's interconnected facilities  
22 in order to turn up the requested service. Because the LECs do not provide

1           their own customers with the level of responsiveness available from AAVs,  
2           they cannot install and repair AAV equipment in the time required to maintain  
3           AAV standards. Indeed, even if LECs were capable of providing AAVs with  
4           the superior level of service standards demanded by AAV customers, they  
5           would have to discriminate against their other customers to do so. No LEC  
6           has stated its willingness to comply such standards under a virtual collocation  
7           arrangement. As a result, the quality of service that competitive AAVs may  
8           provide via virtually collocated facilities will unquestionably be diminished.

9                     Under virtual collocation, AAVs are constrained in their ability to  
10           upgrade, modify, or expand their networks. In a physical collocation  
11           environment, an AAV may install new equipment, or remove old equipment, as  
12           it deems appropriate. Under virtual collocation, such network changes must  
13           be scheduled with LEC personnel, who ultimately determine when such  
14           changes may take place. Similarly, physical collocation arrangements provide  
15           a significant advantage to AAV technicians by giving them direct access for  
16           testing and monitoring of the AAV's services.

17    Q.    Are there concerns other than timing which affect the operational equivalence  
18           of virtual and physical collocation?

19    A.    Yes. For example, under physical collocation, all of an AAV's equipment is  
20           located in one 10x10 foot space, which provides adequate room for both initial  
21           deployment of an AAV's facilities and for subsequent expansion of its  
22           equipment. In contrast, under virtual collocation there is no guaranty that all

1        AAV equipment will be installed in the same place. If a LEC disperses AAV  
2        equipment racks throughout its central office, the AAV may be denied the  
3        opportunity to expand or modify equipment efficiently, or may be required to  
4        bear the expense of cabling and repeaters that would be unnecessary if they  
5        were able to expand their operations within a centralized operating area.

6                Even after initial installation, when and if the equipment requires  
7        servicing, the limited number of LEC personnel familiar with the equipment will  
8        undoubtedly lead to further delays. The fact that these few individuals may  
9        have had no hands-on experience with the equipment, except for a training  
10       course weeks or months earlier, would most likely adversely affect the quality  
11       and promptness of service efforts. It is doubtful that LEC employees, no  
12       matter how skilled, will be as capable at servicing unfamiliar equipment as  
13       would be the AAV's own employees who deal with that equipment on a daily  
14       basis. This is especially true in instances in which multiple AAVs are  
15       collocated; LEC personnel cannot reasonably be expected to remain current  
16       on the technical intricacies of all of the equipment a number of different AAVs  
17       will choose to use based upon their different networks. Indeed, this is exactly  
18       what New York Telephone experienced in negotiating its OTIS II tariff.

19               During the course of these negotiations, it became apparent that virtual  
20       collocation as it was evolving in New York presented extremely complex  
21       operational and administrative problems. Although the interconnector could  
22       select the equipment functionality and remotely monitor and control that

1 equipment, ownership as well as the responsibility to purchase, install, and  
2 maintain equipment remained with NYT. Since interconnectors could choose  
3 equipment with which NYT's personnel were not familiar, and seek to impose  
4 repair and maintenance standards different from those NYT imposed on itself,  
5 NYT concluded that physical collocation, whereby the interconnector would  
6 provision its own service, and own, install, and maintain the equipment, was a  
7 better option for all concerned parties in New York.

8 Related arguments were raised before the FCC in its Expanded  
9 Interconnection proceeding. In that proceeding, Metropolitan Fiber Systems,  
10 Inc. ("MFS") argued that, based upon information obtained from Pacific Bell  
11 and Illinois Bell, the cost of training LEC personnel to operate interconnector-  
12 specified equipment could be estimated at approximately \$60,000 to \$70,000  
13 per wire center initially, plus an additional \$40,000 per year per wire center for  
14 yearly refresher courses. These estimates were based on training eight LEC  
15 employees (two per shift, plus two additional to assure coverage during  
16 vacations, illnesses, etc.) at each wire center. MFS also estimated that these  
17 training expenses would have to be incurred again any time the interconnector  
18 chose to add a new brand or model of equipment to its network.

19 Ameritech responded to the MFS argument by indicating that it would  
20 provide its personnel with only minimal training and thus could not reasonably  
21 be able to ensure that its personnel would be entirely familiar with AAV-

1 designated equipment. Ameritech further stated that trouble conditions might  
2 require the AAV's personnel to assist LEC personnel in performing tests.

3 Thus, in the event of a serious problem, Ameritech will allow AAV  
4 personnel to enter the central office and work on its terminating equipment.

5 Notwithstanding the question of what constitutes a "serious" problem  
6 and who makes the decision that a "serious" problem is imminent, as a  
7 practical matter, if AAV personnel can enter the central office and work on  
8 AAV-designated equipment when a "serious" problem arises without  
9 jeopardizing the LEC network, there is absolutely no reason why AAV  
10 personnel should not be able to enter the central office for regular (preventive)  
11 maintenance. Indeed, failure to allow AAV personnel to work regularly in the  
12 central office will ensure confusion in the event of an extraordinary problem  
13 and will limit the AAV's ability to respond to an emergency. This results in  
14 total overall degradation of the standards AAVs can maintain.

15 In addition to these concerns, other disputes are inevitable. One  
16 obvious example relates to provisioning intervals. In the event that an AAV  
17 determines that the LEC is not installing, maintaining or repairing its equipment  
18 in a timely manner, how would the dispute be resolved? Will the Commission  
19 be forced to hold an evidentiary hearing every time an AAV believes that a  
20 LEC is providing it with inadequate service? Will the AAV or the LEC have to  
21 provide customer-specific information to prove the speed with which they turn  
22 up service? Clearly the two competitors are not in a position to act as judge

1 and jury in such disputes. Rather, the Commission would be called upon to  
2 adjudicate these disputes on an ad hoc basis, and such litigation would place  
3 an enormous burden on the resources of the Commission and the AAVs.  
4 Such costly and burdensome litigation would be wholly obviated if physical  
5 collocation is adopted as the norm.

6 Q. Is virtual collocation the economic equivalent of physical collocation?

7 A. No. The operational problems discussed earlier raise the related problem of  
8 determining who should bear the economic costs associated with virtual  
9 collocation. First, as noted, if an AAV desires to use a particular brand or  
10 model of equipment that the LEC does not routinely use in its own network, it  
11 will be necessary for the LEC to train some of its personnel to operate and  
12 maintain that equipment. Regardless of who bears the cost of such training,  
13 inevitably there will be other operational costs that the AAV -- and ultimately  
14 the end user -- will have to bear. For example, the installation of the  
15 equipment could be delayed by weeks or months, until the LEC completes the  
16 training of the requisite number of employees without disrupting its other  
17 operations.

18 Moreover, such a training requirement would be highly inefficient, and  
19 would impose grossly excessive costs on collocating AAVs. In contrast to  
20 AAVs' efficient use of manpower, a LEC could require training for its personnel  
21 in every office in which an AAV is collocated, and presumably would need  
22 trained staff available on the morning, afternoon and evening shifts. Clearly, if

1       a single AAV collocates in several LEC central offices, it will be required to  
2       train a significant number of LEC personnel in order to have a qualified  
3       maintenance and repair staff available 24 hours a day. This is not only an  
4       enormous waste of time and money, it also unreasonably inflates the AAV's  
5       service rates, rendering the AAV less able to compete. It also provides a  
6       benefit to the LEC, who will acquire personnel with additional skills and  
7       training, at no expense.

8               Who should bear the cost of this training? In order to introduce new  
9       technology, the AAV will already have borne the costs of educating its  
10      employees about the new technology, thus it would be unfair and  
11      unreasonable for the AAV to also have to bear additional costs associated with  
12      educating LEC employees. This is especially true when the LEC will be able to  
13      utilize that training for its own purposes as well. On the other hand, with  
14      multiple interconnectors the LEC may incur training costs which ultimately  
15      prove unrelated to any service competitively provided by the LEC. It would be  
16      unreasonable to force the LEC (and ultimately its ratapayers) to incur such  
17      costs, which are not useful in the provision of LEC services.

18             Moreover, with regard to the installation, repair and maintenance of  
19      AAV-designated equipment, what specific labor costs should the AAV or the  
20      LEC be obligated to bear? LECs traditionally incur higher labor costs than do  
21      interconnectors. Thus, LECs will seek to impose their tariffed labor rates,  
22      which are based upon a calculation which includes actual labor cost as well as



1 overhead and rate of return. If LEC rates apply, the LEC labor involved in  
2 installing and maintaining AAV equipment will become a profit-making  
3 enterprise for the LEC. Obviously, this is not the economic equivalent of  
4 physical collocation and provides the LEC with a disincentive for providing the  
5 AAV with efficient service.

6 Another example relates to overtime. As a growth industry AAVs have,  
7 of necessity, been required to arrange employment agreements which are  
8 structured to avoid or reduce overtime costs to the maximum possible extent.  
9 In contrast, LECs have no incentive to minimize the use of overtime in  
10 attending to AAV equipment. As before, the competitive relationship between  
11 LECs and AAVs raises difficult administrative questions that invariably will  
12 result in needless litigation. It is abundantly clear that there is no reasonable  
13 method for resolving the inevitable disputes which will arise between LECs and  
14 AAVs, absent the Commission's micromanagement of the collocation  
15 relationship. For example, regardless of what general labor and overtime rate  
16 applies, who decides in a particular circumstances whether the LEC was  
17 justified in charging an AAV for overtime work which could reasonably have  
18 been conducted during regular business hours? If in a particular instance,  
19 there is limited labor available, and overtime expenses must be incurred, it is  
20 only reasonable to expect that the LEC will seek to impose all overtime  
21 expenses on its competitor rather than splitting the overtime labor between  
22 LEC and AAV projects. When is that a reasonable (or unreasonable) practice?

1 From the LEC's perspective, it would be reasonable to charge the AAV for all  
2 such expenses, because absent the AAV the LEC would not incur the charge.  
3 On the other hand, from the AAV's perspective, it cannot be held responsible  
4 for the extraordinary costs that result from a shortage of LEC labor.

5 Another example relates to the need for redundant training. In the  
6 event of LEC employee turnover, who pays the cost of training new LEC  
7 employees? Under what conditions is turnover reasonable or unreasonable?  
8 These are questions that the LEC, as a monopoly provider, has never had to  
9 answer. Moreover, how do the parties prove their contentions? Will the  
10 Commission review LEC and AAV operating practices to determine their  
11 reasonableness? It seems obvious that the Commission does not have the  
12 resources to apply to this type of conflict.

13 A more specific problem relates to spare parts. Under Illinois Bell's  
14 Optical Interconnection Service tariff, for example, the interconnector is  
15 required to pay Illinois Bell a recurring monthly charge for maintaining spare  
16 parts for the interconnector-designated equipment. Not only does this  
17 eliminate the AAV's ability to achieve lower equipment cost by procuring its  
18 own spare equipment directly, but over time the monthly rental rates paid by  
19 the AAV will exceed the actual cost of the spare parts, thereby unreasonably  
20 and unnecessarily inflating the AAV's cost for collocation. Moreover, where an  
21 AAV interconnects with multiple LECs, multiple spare part recurring costs will  
22 be imposed on the AAV. This is clearly inefficient, because in the absence of

1 virtual collocation the AAV would be able to maintain a centralized -- and  
2 limited -- supply of spare parts. This is the equivalent of requiring a trucking  
3 firm to maintain a separate supply of spare parts in each county it serves.

4 As this discussion well illustrates, the problem with virtual collocation is  
5 not simply that the LEC has the incentive to provide AAVs with unreasonable  
6 service; virtual collocation raises unsolvable, structural problems arising from  
7 the fact that the LECs are not equipped economically to install and maintain  
8 the AAV network. Virtual collocation invariably imposes any LEC's  
9 inefficiencies on the collocated AAVs.

10 This is precisely the reason that the FCC mandated physical collocation  
11 but gave the parties the option of negotiating virtual collocation. Only when  
12 the AAV has the ability to utilize physical collocation does the LEC have the  
13 necessary incentive to negotiate a virtual collocation agreement which may be  
14 economically equivalent to physical collocation and will not present the need  
15 for extensive regulatory involvement.

16 Q. Is virtual collocation the technical equivalent of physical collocation?

17 A. No. Under virtual collocation the AAV is not free to exercise reasonable  
18 technical control over its own network, nor is it free to update its network in  
19 response to technological developments. For example, under virtual  
20 collocation the AAV has no opportunity to supervise the LEC's maintenance  
21 and repair activities, and therefore is entirely at its competitor's mercy for the  
22 quality of its service. Indeed, because of this inability to maintain and

1 supervise its own equipment, it is possible for an AAV's network to be  
2 degraded as a result of faulty or incompetent installation, maintenance or  
3 repair by LEC personnel, without the AAV becoming aware of such operating  
4 practices until a serious problem arises.

5 Indeed, even if LECs provide their normal quality of service in  
6 maintaining and operating AAV facilities, they would degrade the quality of  
7 AAV service considerably. For example, AAVs typically provide uninterrupted  
8 service 99.99% of the time. The LECs' generally fail to meet this standard, as  
9 illustrated by Southern Bell's direct direct high capacity service, which provides  
10 an error-free rate of only 98.75%. For industries critically dependant on  
11 uninterrupted communications, such a difference is considerable. In fact, on  
12 an annual basis, a 98.75% service rate could mean total service disruptions  
13 amounting to a full 4.56 days.

14 Another serious concern relates to the dissemination of proprietary  
15 information. As noted, under virtual collocation, the AAV is forced to coordi-  
16 nate with the LEC every time it desires to upgrade or replace equipment on its  
17 network. This inhibits technical innovation, because an AAV cannot introduce  
18 new equipment into its network without first disclosing it to its principal  
19 competitor -- the LEC. Moreover, the AAV must also give the LEC the  
20 opportunity (and possibly pay the LEC) to train LEC personnel on that  
21 equipment. In other words, under virtual collocation when an AAV desires to  
22 upgrade its network, the AAV must first inform its principal competitor, pay that

1 competitor to train its own personnel to work on that equipment, and wait until  
2 the training has been accomplished. This will clearly inhibit introduction of new  
3 technology by the AAV. Clearly this process is far more time consuming and  
4 costly than replacing or upgrading equipment under physical collocation, in  
5 which case the AAV would simply obtain the equipment it prefers and install  
6 that equipment in its secure, partitioned portion of the central office. In  
7 addition, because virtual collocation would make it unduly burdensome for an  
8 AAV to replace equipment, even when no special innovation is involved, AAVs  
9 likely will be slower than otherwise to reconfigure their networks.

10 Q. What concerns have LECs raised in connection with physical collocation?

11 A. In opposing physical collocation before the FCC and elsewhere LECs raised  
12 the specter that under physical collocation network integrity will suffer and that  
13 they would have insufficient control over interconnector personnel.

14 Q. Have these concerns ever been expressed before?

15 A. Yes. These are the identical "concerns" which were raised a decade ago by  
16 AT&T in an attempt to prevent MCI and other interexchange carriers from  
17 interconnecting with its interstate network, and were later found meritless in  
18 the Execunet decisions, which allowed MCI to compete directly against AT&T.  
19 Before that, these arguments were raised in an attempt to prevent customers  
20 from connecting independently-manufactured customer premises equipment to  
21 the Bell network. Similarly, these arguments were ultimately dismissed in the  
22 Carterfone decision, which established the right of independent manufacturers

1 of customer premises equipment to interconnect their equipment with the Bell  
2 Atlantic network. As has been demonstrated by practical experience over the  
3 last twenty years and as demonstrated below, these allegations are baseless.

4 Q. Will physical collocation compromise the security of LEC central offices?

5 A. No. The Commission should not presume that only LEC employees have  
6 access to LEC central offices and wire centers. As a normal business practice,  
7 LECs regularly provide central office access to outside contractors, who are  
8 issued photo IDs and are permitted free and regular access to the most  
9 sensitive of central office equipment. There is no demonstrable reason why  
10 AAV personnel should not be afforded similar access based upon similar  
11 security conditions. Indeed, this is the conclusion drawn by New York  
12 Telephone, and is incorporated into its Collocation License Agreement. I have  
13 attached to my testimony excerpts of various collocation license agreements  
14 which freely address this concern. Thus, for example, in New York, the AAV is  
15 responsible for supplying NYT with a list of employees and approved vendors.  
16 NYT issues such personnel color-coded photo identification cards which  
17 permit access to the partitioned collocation space. It is as simple as that.

18 Moreover, a LEC truly concerned about control over AAV personnel is  
19 free to take the additional step of designating separate secured  
20 interconnection areas which do not permit AAV personnel access to common  
21 areas. This would reasonably serve the dual purpose of protecting the LEC  
22 from any imagined security problems while still permitting physical collocation.

1       **As the FCC has stated, the cost of preparing the secured area could be**  
2       **charged to the interconnectors. It is my understanding that Illinois Bell is**  
3       **beginning to do this now in anticipation of interstate collocation, by**  
4       **designating for AAV use an elevator that is programmed to open only on the**  
5       **floor in which AAV equipment is collocated.**

6   **Q.    Have the LEC's raised other concerns about physical collocation?**

7   **A.    Yes. As a general matter the LECs have raised an assortment of concerns**  
8       **that allegedly arise under physical collocation. For instance, LECs have raised**  
9       **the specter that, under physical collocation, strikes by AAV employees would**  
10       **interfere with LEC operations. This is an unrealistic concern, because most**  
11       **LECs are heavily unionized and most AAVs are not; in fact LEC strikes pose a**  
12       **far greater threat to collocated AAVs. This is evidenced by the fact that NYT's**  
13       **collocation license agreement ("CLA") has a provision designed to protect**  
14       **AAVs in the event of the a NYT strike, which provides that in the event of work**  
15       **stoppages NYT will provide AAVs with access to a separate entrance where**  
16       **possible.**

17               **LECs have also argued that under physical collocation they will be**  
18       **unable to exclude undesirables from central offices (undesirables being**  
19       **defined as personnel who have violated central office safety codes in the**  
20       **past), and that they will be unable to enforce fire codes and other operational**  
21       **standards on AAV personnel. These fears are unfounded and simply illogical -**  
22       **- AAV employees will adhere to the same conduct and safety codes that**

1 subcontractors adhere to, and LECs will maintain the same control over their  
2 central offices that they maintained before physical collocation.

3 Lastly, LECs have evidenced concern that under physical collocation  
4 LEC personnel will be required to restrict their communications in common  
5 areas to protect the confidentiality of proprietary information from their AAV  
6 competitors. LECs have every right to be concerned over their personnel  
7 discussing trade secrets in public areas, but this concern should exist  
8 regardless of whether collocation is offered in a given central office. Any  
9 subcontractor that currently performs work for a LEC -- and has ready access  
10 to the LEC central office -- could obtain employment with a competitor. Thus,  
11 this theoretical concern over unintentional disclosure of sensitive information  
12 exists with any non-LEC employees, and is not confined to AAV personnel.  
13 And again, considerable IXC and AAV experience with collocation has not  
14 identified this issue as a legitimate concern. Moreover, the LECs ignore the  
15 other side of this equation: as demonstrated above, under virtual collocation  
16 AAVs not only have to advise the LEC of the new equipment they intend to  
17 install, they also have to pay to have LEC personnel trained in the use of that  
18 equipment. Thus, virtual collocation requires the actual disclosure of AAV  
19 proprietary information to LECs, which should outweigh any LEC hypothetical  
20 concerns. Finally, if LECs build secured interconnector areas, as Illinois Bell  
21 appears to be doing, this alleged concern is eliminated.



1           LEC concerns over AAV personnel in central offices are extreme,  
2           illogical, speculative, and overstated. These concerns were raised at length  
3           before the FCC, which found them unsupported and unconvincing.

4   **Q.**   Will physical collocation threaten network integrity?

5   **A.**   No. In marked contrast to the hypothetical concerns raised over the last  
6           several years by LECs who have no experience with physical collocation,  
7           actual experience in New York and Massachusetts reveals that alleged  
8           concerns over network security under physical collocation are baseless and  
9           that physical collocation presents no threat to LEC network integrity.

10           In the first place it should be obvious that any disruption of the LEC  
11           network (or the AAV network) as a result of AAV activities would likely destroy  
12           the reputation -- and thus economic viability -- of the AAV. Thus, in order to  
13           protect the integrity of both AAV and LEC networks, AAVs routinely follow the  
14           same established technical equipment standards followed by the LEC.  
15           Moreover, AAVs are not adverse to following the installation and operating  
16           standards mandated by a particular LEC for a particular central office,  
17           provided that the LEC adheres to such standards itself.

18           Indeed, this has been the case in New York and Massachusetts. For  
19           example, the New York Telephone Collocation License Agreement requires  
20           AAVs to follow not only the Bellcore equipment standards, but also particular  
21           NYNEX and NYT installation and operating standards. For example, not only  
22           must all interconnector entrance facilities and splices comply with "Bellcore

1           Generic Specification For Optical Fiber and Optical Fiber Cable" but all  
2           interconnector equipment must be on NYT's list of approved products or  
3           comply with the "Bellcore Network Equipment Building System Generic  
4           Equipment Requirement." In addition, all interconnectors must comply with  
5           NYNEX "Information Standards For Central Office Installation And Removal  
6           Procedures," and "NYT's Central office engineering, environmental and  
7           transmission standards as they relate to fire, safety, health and environmental  
8           safeguards, or interference with NYT's service or facilities." Likewise, AAVs in  
9           Florida would voluntarily comply with the equipment or installation standards  
10          and operation manuals established and followed by the Florida LECs.

11                 These same network integrity arguments were debated at length before  
12          the FCC, and the FCC concluded that they were groundless. In the Expanded  
13          Interconnection Order the FCC concluded that collocation of AAV-designated  
14          equipment would not harm the local network or diminish its reliability since the  
15          FCC would require interconnectors to comply with all network integrity and  
16          operational safeguards being developed by the FCC's "Network Reliability  
17          Council." Further, the FCC found that "[i]n the unlikely event" AAV operating  
18          practices "represented a significant and demonstrable technical threat to the  
19          LEC network... the LEC would be allowed to proscribe for use of such...  
20          practices." Despite this cautionary warning the FCC concluded that they  
21          expected such problems to be "rare." Id.

- 1 Q. Will the FCC's order prevent a LEC from using its central office space for its  
2 own interstate or intrastate services.
- 3 A. No. The FCC specifically provided in its order that a LEC may obtain a waiver  
4 from the physical collocation requirement if it demonstrates that there is  
5 inadequate space for physical collocation in a particular central office in which  
6 interconnection has been requested. The FCC expressly recognized that a  
7 LEC's need for central office space to provide interstate or intrastate services  
8 in the future would constitute a legitimate basis for obtaining a waiver.
- 9 Q. How will this affect LEC's future space needs?
- 10 A. To the extent those needs are presently known and planned for, the FCC  
11 order again specifically provides for a waiver. With respect to future planning,  
12 a LEC must simply consider interconnection needs in planning additional  
13 space, just as it is required to consider needs for other services in its  
14 construction planning.
- 15 Q. Will physical collocation prevent a LEC from closing down or consolidating  
16 central offices?
- 17 A. No. All of the LEC physical collocation tariffs and contracts currently in effect  
18 include language that expressly reserves the LEC's right to terminate a  
19 physical collocation arrangement if it requires the space for any reason --  
20 including closing down or consolidating its central offices. The FCC's order  
21 would not disrupt such provisions.

1 Q. Based on your understanding of the FCC's order, the comparability of physical  
2 and virtual collocation and the benefits to be derived from collocation, what  
3 policy do you recommend the Commission adopt?

4 A. For the reasons discussed above, I urge the Commission to require Florida  
5 LECs to provide physical collocation for interconnectors.

6 Q: Should the Commission require all Florida LECs to provide physical  
7 collocation?

8 A: I recommend that the Commission require only Tier 1 LECs to offer collocation  
9 as a tariffed, generally available service. Other LECs may control central  
10 offices that are critically important to competitors, however. The Commission  
11 should therefore review requests for collocation in non-Tier 1 LEC central  
12 offices on a case-by-case basis. If AAVs or other potential collocators have a  
13 bona fide interest in collocating in such central offices, and if the LEC has the  
14 technical capability to accommodate collocation, the Commission should  
15 approve it. Such ad hoc adjudication of collocation in non-Tier 1 LEC central  
16 offices would extend the benefits of increased competition to smaller LECs.

17 Q: For which central offices must the LECs tariff physical interconnection?

18 A: In the federal collocation proceedings, the FCC forged a compromise that  
19 limited the number of COs in which interconnection had to be tariffed, thereby  
20 minimizing the need for LECs to establish CO-specific rates. Under the initial  
21 FCC plan, LECs were required to tariff each CO for physical collocation, even  
22 if there was little likelihood that collocation would be requested in a particular

1 office. The LECs opposed this approach, stating that they would be required  
2 to survey and establish rates for COs for which no demand for collocation was  
3 likely. In response, the FCC announced a compromise position, under which  
4 a LEC initially would tariff only the top 10% of the COs in its service area.  
5 These tarified COs would be the ones at which collocators likely will seek to  
6 collocate.

7 Recognizing, however, that potential collocators might wish to collocate  
8 at some offices other than the ones initially tarified, the Commission  
9 established a period within which potential collocators could request the  
10 tariffing of additional COs. Under this compromise position, the LECs need  
11 not tariff offices where there is unlikely to be an immediate need for  
12 collocation; however, upon request, collocators can achieve expanded  
13 interconnection in any CO where they foresee competitive opportunity. This  
14 accommodation of competing interests is quite rational, and I recommend that  
15 the Commission adopt the same approach.

16 Q: Should collocators allow LECs and other parties to interconnect with their  
17 networks?

18 A: Intermedia is willing to provide reciprocal interconnection arrangements for  
19 LECs or other parties, upon similar terms and conditions as those established  
20 by the LECs.

21 Q: Should the Commission require all special access and private line providers to  
22 file tariffs?

1 A: The Commission appropriately requires LECs to tariff their services since these  
2 carriers have both the ability and incentive to cross-subsidize their competitive  
3 services with their noncompetitive services. For competitive access providers,  
4 on the other hand, whose services are priced according to the dictates of the  
5 market, a tariffing requirement is superfluous. These providers have no  
6 captive customer base from which they can exact monopoly profits.  
7 Furthermore, as recognized by the Commission in its Alternative Access  
8 Vendor Order, No. 24877, AAV customers are generally sophisticated users  
9 who do not need expansive Commission protection. Thus, the Commission  
10 declined in its AAV Order to require tariffing by AAVs. The considerations that  
11 informed that decision still hold true today.

12 Q: Do the LECs need additional pricing flexibility to be able to compete under  
13 expanded interconnection?

14 A: No. The Commission already has granted LECs substantial pricing flexibility --  
15 allowing them to offer contract serving arrangements and individual case basis  
16 pricing, under which the LECs may price their services at nearly any level they  
17 desire, so long as they meet the LECs' average variable costs. This degree of  
18 flexibility allows the LECs to meet the competitive challenge posed by AAVs,  
19 but imposes certain limits on that flexibility to help ensure that LECs do not  
20 unfairly cross-subsidize their competitive services.

21

- 1 Q. What is the relation of the FCC's Expanded Interconnection Order to this  
2 Florida proceeding?
- 3 A. The FCC order only deals with interconnection for interstate services. Every  
4 state is free to determine a collocation policy for intrastate services. State  
5 regulators are free to establish mandatory collocation policies for intrastate  
6 traffic within their states, or to prohibit collocation for intrastate services  
7 altogether. As a practical matter, however, once a physical collocation  
8 arrangement is established for interstate services, it would not be efficient to  
9 establish a conflicting collocation standard for intrastate services. Because the  
10 FCC has required Tier 1 LECs in Florida to provide physical collocation in  
11 most cases for interstate services, I believe that it is not desirable from a  
12 public policy perspective to establish an inconsistent standard for collocation  
13 for intrastate services.
- 14 Q. If Florida adopts a physical collocation standard, does this mean that a virtual  
15 collocation agreement is never permissible?
- 16 A. No. If the Commission adopts the FCC standard, virtual collocation  
17 arrangements would be authorized when either there is insufficient space for  
18 physical collocation or the LEC and AAV voluntarily agree that a virtual  
19 collocation arrangement is best. Although the FCC believed that physical  
20 collocation was necessary to right the competitive imbalance created by the  
21 LEC's control of its central offices, its Order expressly allows for virtual  
22 collocation arrangements in these two instances.

1 Q: It is, then, your opinion that a physical collocation standard would offer  
2 significant procompetitive benefits to the citizens of Florida?

3 A: The interests of the Florida public will best be served by a Commission policy  
4 that promotes competition for local services to the fullest extent possible. The  
5 LECs' interest is diametrically opposed to this public interest: they have every  
6 incentive to impede expanded interconnection while they hurriedly seek to  
7 upgrade their existing networks with technology developed by the AAVs --  
8 technology that, significantly, the LECs long ignored.

9 Intermedia pioneered the use of fiber ring networks in Florida,  
10 inaugurating the first such network in Orlando in 1988. GTE, however, just  
11 announced plans to install fiber-optic networks, costing \$240 million, in parts  
12 of Florida, among other places, which duplicate the architecture of the network  
13 deployed by Intermedia 5 years ago. The import of the LECs' sudden  
14 conversion is clear: they sense the inevitability of expanded interconnection  
15 and thus seek, through regulatory and legislative delay, to hold the AAVs at  
16 bay while they solidify control over their captive customers, a task made easier  
17 by the massive resources they can devote to updating their networks.

18 Once GTE deploys these fiber rings, it will enjoy unrestricted  
19 interconnection and access to its own monopoly network. In addition, its  
20 sales force will have unrestricted access to customer information and be able  
21 to resell GTE's monopoly services. This is clearly an unfair advantage in  
22 providing what is also clearly a competitive service.



1           In addition, however, to LEC attempts to delay the advent of expanded  
2           interconnection while they play catch up with the AAVs, the LECs have also  
3           urged, as a second defense, adoption of a collocation standard that poses the  
4           least threat to their entrenched interests: a virtual collocation standard. Not  
5           surprisingly, this collocation standard is also the one least likely to promote  
6           effective competition in the intrastate market. The ability of AAVs to compete  
7           effectively for local services is contingent upon their ability to gain expanded  
8           interconnection within the central offices owned and controlled by the LECs.  
9           Under a virtual collocation standard, however, the LECs have the every  
10          incentive to use their strong bargaining position to impose excessive rates and  
11          burdensome and restrictive terms and conditions on any collocation  
12          arrangement they establish. Under such circumstances, little or no  
13          procompetitive benefit is realized.

14                 Furthermore, the LECs' ability and incentive to provide ineffective virtual  
15          collocation to AAVs cannot be overcome by Commission mandate -- the  
16          amount of litigation and regulatory micromanagement that would be required  
17          would exhaust the resources of both the Commission and the AAVs. As I  
18          have testified, the considerable experience gained with collocation in other  
19          states, and the voluminous record compiled in the FCC's collocation  
20          proceeding fully demonstrate that only a mandatory physical collocation  
21          standard can place interconnectors on competitively equal footing with the

1           **LECs. As a result, I urge the Commission to adopt the mandatory physical**  
2           **collocation standard embraced by the FCC.**

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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

**Docket No. 921074-TP**

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished by United States Mail this 24th day of June, 1993, to the following.

Charles Murphy  
Division of Legal Services  
Florida Public Service Commission  
101 East Gaines Street  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0850

Thomas R. Parker  
Kimberly Caswell  
GTE Florida Incorporated  
P. O. Box 110, FLTC0007  
Tampa, Florida 33601

C. Dean Kurtz  
Central Telephone Company  
of Florida  
Post Office Box 2214  
Tallahassee, Florida 32316

Peter M. Dunbar  
David L. Swafford  
Haben, Culpepper, Dunbar  
& French, P.A.  
Post Office Box 10095  
Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Michael W. Tye  
AT&T Communications  
106 East College Avenue  
Suite 1410  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Daniel V. Gregory  
Quincy Telephone Company  
Post Office Box 189  
Quincy, Florida 32351

Charles Beck  
Office of Public Counsel  
111 West Madison, Suite 812  
Claude Pepper Building  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1400

Harris R. Anthony  
J. Phillip Carver  
c/o Marshall M. Criser, III  
150 South Monroe St., Ste. 400  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Lee L. Willis  
Ausley, McMullen, McGehee,  
& Carothers & Proctor  
Post Office Box 391  
Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Paul Jones  
Time Warner Cable  
Corporate Headquarters  
300 First Stamford Place  
Stamford, CT 06902-6732

Harriet Eudy  
ALLTEL Florida, Inc.  
Post Office Box 550  
Live Oak, Florida 32060

David B. Erwin  
Young, van Assenderp, Varandoe  
& Benton, P.A.  
Post Office Box 1833  
Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Jeff McGehee  
Southland Telephone Company  
Post Office Box 37  
Atmore, Alabama 36504

John A. Carroll, Jr.  
Northeast Florida Telephone  
Post Office Box 485  
MacClenny, Florida 32063-0485

F. Ben Poag  
United Telephone Company  
of Florida  
P.O. Box 154000  
Altamonte Spings, Florida 32716

Charles Dennis  
Indiantown Telephone System,  
Inc.  
Post Office Box 277  
Indiantown, Florida 34956


Jodie L. Donovan  
Regulatory Counsel  
Teleport Communications Group,  
Inc.  
1 Teleport Drive, Suite 301  
Staten Island, New York 10311

Carolyn Mason  
Department of Management Serv.  
Division of Communications  
Koger Executive Center  
Building #110  
Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Beverly Manard  
c/o Richard Fletcher  
GTE Florida Incorporated  
106 E. College Ave, #1440  
Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1740

Rachel Rothstein  
c/o Wiley Law Firm  
Interexchange Access Coalition  
1776 K Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20006

Floyd Self  
Messer Law Firm  
P.O. Box 1876  
Tallahassee, Florida 32302

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Patrick K. Wiggins