IN RE: Determination of appropriate cost allocation and regulatory treatment of total revenues associated with wholesale sales to Florida Municipal Power Agency and City of Lakeland by Tampa Electric Company.

DOCKET NO. 970171-EU

ORIGINAL



BEFORE:

CHAIRMAN JULIA A. JOHNSON COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK COMMISSIONER DIANE K. KIESLING COMMISSIONER JOE GARCIA

PROCEEDING:

AGENDA CONFERENCE

ITEM NUMBER:

8

DATE:

September 23, 1997

PLACE:

4075 Esplanade Way, Room 148 Tallahassee, Florida

BUREAU OF REPORTING RECEIVED 10-3-97

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Appearances:

Lee L. Willis, Esquire, and Gordon L. Gillette representing TECO
Jack Shreve, Esquire and Roger Howe, Esquire representing OPC.
John McWhirter, Esquire, representing FIPUG

.

(Please see Agenda for Commission Conference for staff recommendations. Recommendation were not typed due to time constraints.)

PROCEEDINGS 1 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Item 8. 2 COMMISSION STAFF: Commissioners, Item 8 is the 3 TECO wholesale docket. It was deferred from the August 5th agenda conference at the Commissioners' 5 request to hear oral argument on the subject of the stipulation entered into by the parties in Docket 960409. I have discussed the presentations with the 9 parties and would recommend that they be limited to 10 10 to 15 minutes. However, it's up to the Commissioners 11 how long they wish to hear oral argument. 12 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I'm sorry, limited to what? 13 COMMISSION STAFF: Ten to 15 minutes. 14 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Okay. 15 COMMISSION STAFF: And I would also remind the 16 parties that the oral argument is limited to solely 17 the issues surrounding the stipulation. This is not 18 an opportunity to reopen the docket and the facts that 19 were before this Commission in June. 20 The Commissioners have voted on Issue 9. Issue 8 21 does not require a vote, and after oral argument we 22 would then be addressing Issues 1 through 7. 23 So with that, I will turn it over to the Chairman 24 or the parties. 25

1	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Commissioners, there
2	has been a recommendation that we limit the oral
3	argument. Is there a motion to that effect?
4	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. I think that what we
5	are requesting oral argument on is a fairly narrow
6	subject matter. And I think that ten minutes is
7	perhaps more than enough time, and ask the parties to
8	keep it shorter if they could.
9	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay.
10	MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, I'm Lee Willis
11	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is it per party or per side?
12	COMMISSION STAFF: If I may suggest, I envisioned
13	it being per party, not per individual within the
14	party. In other words, if there are multiple
15	attorneys, I would not suggest that the issue would
16	require 20 minutes or 30 minutes, ten minutes for two
17	or three attorneys.
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: The question I think is ten
19	minutes for Public Counsel and then another ten
20	minutes for FIPUG?
21	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes.
22	COMMISSIONER CLARK: That is the question. And
23	how many for TECO?
24	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Ten.
25	COMMISSION STAFF: Ten.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: 1 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Willis. 2 MR. WILLIS: Commissioners, I'm Lee Willis. 3 Together with me is Gordon L. Gillette, who is the Vice President of Regulatory of TECO Energy who will 5 present our argument. 6 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. 7 MR. GILLETTE: Good afternoon, Commissioners. 8 is regrettable that we are before the Commission to 9 determine the proper interpretation of certain 10 language in our stipulation. Language on which the 11 parties in good faith disagree. Tampa Electric and 12 the other parties worked very hard to achieve the 13 stipulation, and we are all justifiably proud of the 14 agreement. 15 Tampa Electric and I personally have the utmost 16 respect for Mr. Shreve, the Office of Public Counsel, 17 as well as for the Florida Industrial Power Users 18 Group and its representatives. Tampa Electric would 19 certainly never advocate nor condone any attempt to 20 violate or undercut this important agreement. 21 We have worked hard to open lines of 22 communication and to understand the points of view 23 expressed by these representatives of Tampa Electric's 24 customers in the matter at issue. 25

while Tampa Electric remains dedicated to finding some amicable way of reconciling our views and those of OPC and FIPUG with regard to the regulatory treatment of our wholesale sales to the City of Lakeland and the Florida Municipal Power Agency, it is our strong and earnest belief that your approval of the regulatory treatment which we proposed in this proceeding would in no way violate either the letter or the spirit of the stipulation.

I respectfully suggest that we should be clear in specifying what is not at issue. The stipulation provision at issue covers only capital and O&M, or so-called non-fuel revenues. The word fuel was specifically included in early drafts of Paragraph 5(f), but was intentionally excluded at the urging of the other parties.

The issue was resolved in this Commission's March 11th, 1997 fuel adjustment order by establishing the following principle. And I quote, "A utility shall credit average system fuel revenues through the fuel adjustment clause unless it demonstrates on a case-by-case basis that each new sale does, in fact, provide overall benefits to the retail ratepayers."

Commissioners, Tampa Electric has shown without contradiction in this proceeding that these sales will

provide economic benefits in excess of incremental costs. Regardless of how you may interpret the stipulation with respect to the non-fuel revenues, the Commission's March 11th, 1997 order governs the appropriate treatment of the fuel revenues from these sales.

OPC and FIPUG contend that the stipulation requires all long-term firm wholesale sales to be separated at system average cost. They conclude, therefore, that the language in Paragraph 5(f) of the stipulation is an absolute bar to this Commission's acceptance of a regulatory treatment which we have proposed in the proceeding of these sales, for these sales.

respective opinions on the matter. The language at issue, we believe that the language at issue does not mandate that all long-term sales be separated at average cost. Paragraph 5(f) of the stipulation reads, and I quote, "The separation procedure to be used to separate capital and O&M was approved in the company's last rate case. Docket Number 920324 shall continue to be used to separate any current and future wholesale sales from the retail jurisdiction."

All that Provision 5(f) of the stipulation

requires is the following: If -- and I emphasize only if the decision is made to separate a future wholesale sale, then the capital and O&M costs for the sales are to separated using the methodology adopted in Tampa Electric's 1992 rate case.

We know for certain that this clause was never interpreted as applying to all future wholesale sales, since wholesale sales under the broker system, short term sales, Schedule J sales, as well as some Schedule D sales have never been separated, but have been flowed through the fuel clause.

In fact, the only sales other than full requirement sales that have ever been separated under the methodology established in the last rate case were the long-term sales out of the Big Bend units.

It is not a matter of accident that the language in question falls far short of the requirement to separate the FMPA and Lakeland sales at system average cost as OPC and FIPUG suggest. It was Tampa Electric who proposed the language, and our intention was to address a specific concern. That concern was the regulatory treatment of the Big Bend sales.

Let me explain. As the level of Big Bend sales changed subsequent to our 1992 rate case, we began to adjust the separation factors originally calculated in

proportion to the current level of such sales. In this way the revenue requirement responsibility would not be imputed to nonexistent sales as the level of sales changed through time.

In the June 1994 fuel adjustment hearing, questions were raised by the parties and staff with regard to the appropriateness of proportionately adjusting the separation factors. A related issue with the Big Bend sales was raised in the 1996 fuel adjustment hearing with OPC's contention that the amount of fuel costs that should be credited to the retail fuel clause for the Big Bend sales should reflect the system average fuel cost instead of the fuel revenues actually received under the contracts.

During the discussions which led to the Polk stipulation, Tampa Electric was focused, among other things, on maintaining the existing regulatory treatment for the Big Bend sales. Our concern was fueled by the unrelenting challenge of the parties to the regulatory treatment of these sales.

To that end, Tampa Electric included the language at issue today in the initial drafts that were exchanged with OPC and FIPUG with the intention of accomplishing two things. First, we intended to settle the fuel adjustment issued raised by OPC on the

fuel treatment associated with the Big Bend sales. Second, we intended to ensure the proportional adjustment of separation factors depending on the level, on the megawatt level of sales being made from the Big Bend station.

As I noted earlier, Tampa Electric agreed during negotiations to modify Paragraph 5(f) and delete the reference to fuel. Tampa Electric never attributed the meaning to the language in question that has only recently been suggested by OPC and FIPUG. If we believed that the stipulation required the FMPA and Lakeland sales to be separated at system average cost, we would never have made these sales.

Another important point I would like to make is that OPC, FIPUG, and staff through their actions subsequent to the execution of the stipulation evidenced an understanding and intent similar to Tampa Electric with regard to the language at issue.

Tampa Electric met seven times with the various parties to discuss the company's proposals and try to reach agreement on the treatment of the FMPA and Lakeland sales before the matter was docketed.

In these meetings, Tampa Electric discussed a number of regulatory treatments, none of which involved separation at average cost. Neither OPC,

1	FIPUG, nor staff asserted or even suggested in any of
2	these meetings their current contention that the
3	stipulation requires the FMPA and Lakeland sales be
4	separated.
5	The question of the proper regulatory
6	treatment
7	MR. SHREVE: I just want to make clear, is it the
8	settlement negotiations he's talking about?
9	MR. GILLETTE: These were our discussions
10	MR. SHREVE: Are these settlement negotiations
11	you're talking about?
12	MR. GILLETTE: No, sir. These were our
13	discussions that were held in October through
14	February.
15	MR. SHREVE: In an effort to settle the issues.
16	MR. GILLETTE: Well, we were talking about how to
17	treat the FMPA and Lakeland sales.
18	MR. SHREVE: Then I would assume all settlement
19	negotiations in this docket and other issues are open
20	for comment.
21	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You can continue.
22	MR. GILLETTE: The question of the proper
23	regulatory treatment of the FMPA and Lakeland
24	wholesale sales was raised formally in the fuel
25	adjustment docket in February of 1997. The issue was

deferred to this docket.

Several meetings were held after February 1997 for the express purpose of defining the issues to be addressed in the proceeding. Not once during any of these meetings or in subsequent testimony did staff, OPC, or FIPUG even mention the stipulation as a factor in determining the appropriate regulatory treatment of these sales.

We believe that in all fairness the parties' behavior strongly suggests that they did not regard the stipulation as requiring the FMPA and Lakeland sales to be separated.

If a party or staff viewed separation as the only result under the stipulation, that point should have been raised by introducing a separate issue relating to the stipulation in this proceeding.

As we have stated on the record, a requirement that we separate the FMPA and Lakeland sales would result in a guaranteed loss to our shareholders with no corresponding benefit. The market dictated that the maximum overall benefits of these transactions was an estimated \$10 million on a net present value basis. The actual retail customer benefit from these sales must reflect economic reality. Separation of these sales at system average cost would result in a

theoretical reduction in resale revenues requirements of \$71.1 million, which is much greater than the \$10 million benefit.

If these sales were separated, our duty to our shareholders would leave us with no choice but to mitigate the loss resulting from such separation by selling or otherwise withdrawing from these discretionary transactions. A requirement that we separate future wholesale sales would also be an absolute disincentive for Tampa Electric to engage in wholesale sales other than economy sales.

Tampa Electric would be out of the long-term wholesale market and the resulting loss in benefits to retail ratepayers would be substantial. Clearly, the result would serve no interest other than that of unregulated power marketers. These marketers would in turn capture 100 percent of the benefits which they would export out-of-state.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You have about a minute left.

MR. GILLETTE: Okay. Just a few more comments.

The Commission is confronted today with a stipulation provision which the parties interpret differently. Tampa Electric feels that its interpretation of this stipulation is consistent with the intent and actions of the parties and should be

adopted by the Commission. However, we understand the 1 depth of concern shared by FIPUG and OPC on this 2 3 issue. We also understand that it is not in the best interest of Tampa Electric or its customers to 5 unnecessarily undercut the confidence of our partners, 6 FIPUG and OPC. Therefore, we respectfully suggest 7 that the Commission do the following: Flow through 8 the revenues from the sales to cover the costs in the 9 appropriate clauses, offsetting variable O&M through 10 base rates and flow through 100 percent of the 11 benefits from these sales through the fuel clause as 12 they occur in a manner which does not create 13 below-the-line exposure for Tampa Electric. 14 Clearly, this is not anyone's first choice, but 15 we believe it is a fair outcome for all concerned. As 16 OPC noted in its brief on Page 7, Footnote Number 1, 17 and I paraphrase, "Full separation can be achieved by 18 flowing back 100 percent of non-fuel revenues." 19 Flow through treatment will provide retail 20 customers with the full economic benefit of these 21 sales on a realtime basis. 22

Thank you, Commissioners, for your patience and attention.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. FIPUG.

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2	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is that the first time you
3	have heard that offer? John, I'm over here.
4	MR. McWHIRTER: I heard the offer, yes.
5	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is that the first time?
6	MR. McWHIRTER: Yes.
7	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.
8	MR. McWHIRTER: It has improved from the last
9	offer.
10	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I want to make sure I
11	caught all that was offered at the last of Mr.
12	Gillette's statement.
13	Could you go over that again, please.
14	MR. GILLETTE: Certainly. What we would do,
15	Commissioner, is credit the fuel clause with the
16	incremental costs of making fuel costs of making
17	the sales, credit the environmental cost recovery
18	clause with the incremental SO2 costs associated with
19	making the sales, cover our variable O&M costs through
20	above-the-line operating revenues, and then the
21	remaining revenues from the sales, which we term the
22	benefits, would be all flowed through the fuel clause.
23	MR. MCWHIRTER: As I understand that, the O&M
24	costs are around 4 million of the 9 million, so I
25	presume approximately 5 million would flow through as

MR. McWHIRTER: Madam Chairman, this is a ...

opposed to the 2 million that was offered earlier? 1 MR. GILLETTE: Well, the benefits of the sales 2 are about 10.2 million. And variable O&M is about 4 3 million based on the numbers that are in the record of this proceeding. 5 MR. McWHIRTER: So it's 6.2 as opposed to --6 MR. GILLETTE: No, sir. If you look at fuel, SO2 7 allowances, those costs, and then look at the revenues 8 above that, we are looking at \$14.8 million. 9 There is about \$4 million in variable O&M, and 10 there is \$10.2 million in remaining benefits. 11 MR. McWHIRTER: And 10 million would flow through 12 the fuel clause? 13 MR. GILLETTE: That's correct. 14 MR. McWHIRTER: Madam Chairman, this is a banner 15 occasion for me. I have been appearing before this 16 Commission for 25 years, and this the first time I 17 have ever had an opportunity to testify. And it's a 18 pleasure. 19 And this is what I thought I would do. 20 listened very carefully to the tape of your last 21 agenda discussion to the questions you asked. And in 22 order to be precise and short, and I will try to keep 23 it under ten minutes, I thought I would address each 24 question that was raised.

The first question raised by Mr. Deason was whether or not the stipulation is dispositive of the entire case. At that same time he said that he does not want to disturb the sanctity of any stipulation, and he wants to let people have the knowledge that when they enter into bonafide agreements that the Commission approves that it will uphold them.

The answer to that question, whether the stipulation is dispositive of the case is, yes, it is. The second question is why wasn't it raised as an issue? Commissioner Clark echoed the same question, and she said she didn't know whether it required testimony on the subject or whether it could be handled in briefs. Possibly some testimony would be required. The reason it wasn't raised as an issue was it's not a question, it's an answer to two questions that were, in fact, raised.

These are Issues Number 2 and Issue Number 5, and tangentially Issue Number 8. Those questions were how do we treat the -- well, to be precise, let me -- I don't have them right here before me, but, essentially it is how do we treat the non-fuel revenues in this case. And our response is that you treat them the way Tampa Electric Company agreed to treat them in the stipulation that was approved by the Commission.

Commissioner Deason said then that he was -- he thought that the stipulation clause 5(f) was ambiguous in that it was -- he didn't say it was ambiguous, he said it was subject to two interpretations. One is the interpretation that was given to it by the staff, which was that the stipulation is, in fact, dispositive of the case.

The second interpretation was that this section means that if there is a determination that there is to be a separation, then this would be the procedure that would be used to effectuate the separation would be handled as per the case in 1993.

I would respectfully suggest to you that the case in 1993, historically speaking, was an outgrowth of a number of things that happened. In 1984 Tampa Electric came in with Big Bend Number 4, a major unit, and there was some estimate that it had between 28 and 40 percent reserve margin. It had too much reserve margin. At that point in time, there was a ·· we requested it not be put in rate base.

The Commission framed a settlement philosophy in the case, and said we will put it in the rate base. The first two years the excess revenue required is covered by the agreement with Florida Power & Light, but after that we will direct Tampa Electric Company

to sell the excess power in the wholesale market and it attributed \$37 million to Tampa Electric for wholesale sales.

Nothing happened again until 1992, when Tampa Electric came back before this Commission. And in 1992, Tampa Electric said it needed to be incentivized to make off-system sales. It had several different kinds of contracts, but the preeminent contract under consideration in that case was Schedule D contracts with FMPA and New Smyrna Beach and others by which Tampa Electric had committed five years of capacity to these municipalities.

The Commission staff argued that those commitments were superior or at least in parity with the firm customers of the utility system and, therefore, based on previous Commission policy, they should be separated. And that is what the Commission did. At that time Tampa Electric suggested that it keep 60 percent of the revenue, or 40 percent of the revenue and flow 60 percent back to the customers through the fuel clause.

There was another issue addressed on Page 85 of the '92 order, and that had to do with what to do with all other sales that are not separated. All those other sales fall into categories in which there are as-available sales, emergency sales, or they are sales on the economy broker. The ones on the economy broker are taken care of with the 20 percent commission that Tampa Electric gets.

And as to all of the other sales, essentially the Commission ruled in that case that those were nonseparated and, therefore, 100 percent of the revenue should flow back to the customers in the fashion provided in the order. And that's essentially the offer that has been made today by Mr. Gillette.

I would suggest to you most respectfully that the negotiating process was -- it was lengthy, there was give and take. And in this negotiating process, the issue was should Tampa Electric give back 100 percent of its overearnings in '95 and '96. We agreed to less than 100 percent of the earnings. We agreed that 40 percent of the overearnings could be retained by Tampa Electric.

We argued about what to do with Port Manatee, since that site appeared not to any more be valuable to ratepayers for future plant site. And Tampa Electric conceded on that point and left Port Manatee out.

But what Tampa Electric really wanted in the case was to have the Polk plant in the rate base, and we

agreed to that. And it was told to you early on that the value of that to Tampa Electric, that ruling, was about \$100 million in revenue per annum as a result of the cost impact of that plant in rate base.

We asked for a quid pro quo to that. And the quid pro quo was that all of the other wholesale sales be separated as they had been done in the last case where you dealt with it in detail. And that's essentially how the stipulation came down.

And we think that the Commission should honor it. We think Tampa Electric addressed the issue in the case. Mr. Ramil testified that this proceeding was in keeping with the stipulation, but then he failed to prove that it was in keeping.

In fact, he pointed out, as they have indicated today, that the customers will be relieved of a \$71 million obligation to support a plant that is now dedicated exclusively to wholesale sales. And we think that is an appropriate thing.

If the wholesale customers has a first call on it, if interruptible customers will be interrupted before -- native customers who are paying their fair share of the costs are interrupted so that these wholesale sales can be made, if firm customers can be interrupted, there is some dispute in that, Ms.

Brannock (phonetic) said they could, Mr. Ramil -- no, 1 I guess Mr. Ramil said they could, Ms. Brannock 2 equivocated on the issue and said they were at parity. 3 But if the regular customers come behind these 4 wholesale sales, who should have the obligation to 5 carry the basic cost? It should be on the people that 6 have first call on that plant. 7 So the final question you made was what was 8 agreed to and what does it mean, and I have just 9 answered that question before stating the question, 10 and I yield to Public Counsel. 11 Well, there was one question. Is there a desire 12 to separate? On the part of FIPUG, there was a desire 13 to separate. 14 MR. HOWE: Commissioners, I'm Roger Howe with the 15 Public Counsel's Office. With me is Mr. Shreve, the 16 Public Counsel. 17 I'm afraid I have to deviate a little bit from 18 what I planned on presenting because of a comment that 19 Mr. Gillette made, and that was a statement that -- I 20 tried to write it down. He said the company showed 21 benefits without contradiction. We contradict and 22 dispute that claim completely. 23 Before this company entered into these sales, the 24 customers were getting \$3-1/2 million over the time 25

period covered by these sales of economy sales, the 80 percent share that flowed to customers. That was lost to the customers. So we think you need to look at this case first on the facts and then hopefully I can address that quickly and we will get on to the stipulation itself.

Without entering into this transaction at all, or these transactions of FMPA and Lakeland, the customers would have \$3-1/2 million more of a flowback of their 80 percent share of economy sales. Those were taken away when they entered into the FMPA sale. In their place, the company offered 2.4 million, of which they were guaranteed 2. It's a bad deal for the customers.

The second point on the facts. Under the Commission's March 11th ...

COMMISSION STAFF: Chairman Johnson, I'm sorry, I just have to remind the parties, and Roger's argument is excellent, but we must limit ourselves to the stipulation. If we don't, we have got some serious due process problems with this. I apologize, and do what you will.

MR. HOWE: I'm sorry, I have to say the staff attorney should have interjected that when Mr. Gillette said that without contradiction the company showed benefits. I can't let that ride. That is

before you now.

The second point I was going to make on the facts was under the Commission's March 11th, 1997 order, if the company didn't offer any proposal at all, you would use weighted average inventory cost for all wholesale sales, all new wholesale sales, which would reduce the customers' fuel adjustment charges.

The company has substituted an incremental fuel cost which increases the fuel charges, I believe, by more than the \$2 million they are offering. Before we ever get to the stipulation, the company's proposal is less than the increased charges the proposal would impose on the customers.

Now, let's get to the procedure. Commissioners, we received an order establishing procedure in this docket that required that the issues be identified before the company filed its testimony. I think that gave rise to much of the confusion.

Now, the important part, the stipulation. The important thing for the Commission to consider here is what does the Commission think it approved in the order approving the stipulation? Commissioners, at Page 4 of Order Number PSC-96-1300, the Commission says the stipulation continues to use the separation procedure adopted in the company's last rate case to

separate any current and future wholesale sales from the retail jurisdiction. That was your understanding.

Commissioners, I should tell you that on
September 25th when we signed that stipulation
everybody understood that it applied to all current
and future wholesale sales. Your staff, however,
recognized that to be true and recognized the problem
with it.

Your staff recognized that if that were applied consistently to all future sales, in a situation in which the company was to enter into new wholesale sales out of the Polk unit, priced at the incremental cost of fuel out of Polk, which would be low, they would be allowed to use the system average cost to separate the rate base component.

But Polk is significantly more expensive than the system average. So at staff's behest we entered into an amended stipulation that provided that if there were a wholesale sale made at the incremental cost of Polk, the Commission would be allowed to determine the separation methodology to apply. All other sales, current and future, would be separated in the same manner used in the company's last rate case.

Commissioners, I want you to face this, if you would, please, from the case the company put forward.

At the hearing, Mr. Ramil testified on the issue. And the only argument that the company made about how this stipulation could be viewed, and here is the question, in the September 25th, 1996 stipulation between Tampa Electric, Office of Public Counsel, and FIPUG, reference is made to the regulatory treatment of existing and future wholesale sales.

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What is the impact of this reference on the treatment of the FMPA and Lakeland agreements? Commissioners, I'm reading from transcript Pages 44 to 45. And Mr. Ramil answered, "Upon filing of the September 25th, 1997 -- " an incorrect reference --"stipulation, the Commission staff pointed out that it believed that a sale from the Polk Power Station might warrant different treatment than the treatment afforded other sales in the stipulation. Consequently, an amendment to the stipulation was negotiated and approved by the Commission which provided that the Commission would review the treatment of any wholesale sale from the Polk Power Station. Like a potential sale from the Polk Power Station, the FMPA and Lakeland sales are different sales and, therefore, require review for appropriate regulatory treatment."

The company's position was to try to bootstrap to

the exception we stipulated to for the Polk Power Station. It clearly does not apply. This case, this hearing, this docket has nothing to do with sales made at the incremental cost out of the Polk unit.

The stipulation is clear, the Commission's order approving the stipulation is clear. Any and all wholesale sales other than those priced at the incremental cost of Polk must be separated in the same manner used in the last rate case.

I will yield whatever time I have remaining for Mr. Shreve.

MR. SHREVE: I will be very brief. We have negotiated a lot of settlements, and we haven't had this problem before. All we want is the plain language of the settlement that was agreed to. That language is reinforced by the fact that we put in a staff-requested exception for the Polk unit, not for others. That makes the case more than anything else.

I hope to continue working on settlements. Mr. Gillette drafted the language he is talking about according to their President. He neglected to tell you what the impact -- and this came out in settlement negotiations, so even at this point even though I think he has gone further than normally we would when we have agreements on discussing settlement

negotiations, I'm not going to reveal the amount to you, I'm sure you would be interested in it.

In this settlement one of the prime negotiating factors in this was that down the line there are going to be refunds to the customers based on their retail earnings. He neglected to tell you what this change that they are asking for and how that would impact that refund because of the impact on their retail revenues. All we want is the settlement, the plain language of the settlement, and what was agreed to by both parties and drafted by TECO. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Commissioners.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, I have a question. I will ask Mr. Howe. I think early on in TECO's argument they made the point that the stipulation only addresses what I refer to as rate base type costs; capital costs, O&M, non-fuel. Do you agree with that characterization?

In other words, there is an issue in this proceeding concerning the treatment in the fuel clause of -- in fact, I think it's what triggered the entire investigation, was whether we use average embedded or we use incremental.

And I think as I understand what Mr. Gillette was saying is that under any interpretation of the

stipulation that does not affect -- that is still an open issue. Do you agree with that?

MR. HOWE: I do not agree that it is an open issue. And the reason I do not agree is the Commission's order states that in the absence of a utility's ability to demonstrate overall benefits, average fuel costs must be used.

So, the order says use average fuel costs unless benefits can be shown. I would suggest that that has to mean that you can use something other than average fuel costs only by showing benefits in another area, which limits you to the rate base area which Tampa Electric negotiated away. So, the fuel issue --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You are indicating to me during your argument that there are benefits by separating. Primarily there are going to be perhaps additional refunds under the stipulation by separating. Obviously you think that separation is more advantageous to customers than the requested treatment by TECO.

MR. HOWE: Intuitively, I feel that. Actually, I don't know. And the reason is the company hasn't offered any information, and I want to kind of throw this back to you, Commissioner, and Commissioners, what do you know?

You know that Tampa Electric in the hearing offered a \$2 million guarantee. Now, on the record of that proceeding you know that the customers are foregoing 3-1/2 million of economy sales. You know the customers are going to forego some benefit that the company has not quantified in the fuel docket by using system incremental costs instead of average costs.

And you know that there is some difference unquantified by the company between the separation called for in the stipulation and the \$2 million the company is proposing. But we don't know what those numbers are.

not, though, that the reason this is an issue is because these sales were made. And these sales were made, and this is in the record and has been testified to by TECO because the sales are above incremental costs so that there are benefits to help cover the fixed costs.

And that if those sales had not been made, we wouldn't even be arguing this. Those amounts that you are now saying should be separated would be in rate base and there wouldn't even be an argument about it.

MR. HOWE: That's correct. And that would --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that would be the 1 burden on retail customers. 2 MR. HOWE: Yes, sir, except retail customers 3 would have two things if they had not entered into these sales at all. They would have \$3.1/2 million of 5 their 80 percent share of economy sales, first; and, secondly, they would have the reliability of all the 7 assets they were paying for. In other words, the customers would pay less and 9 they would be getting their money's worth for all the 10 assets they were supporting in rate base. Tampa 11 Electric's proposal took both elements away and 12 offered --13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: When you say both elements, you are talking about the 80 percent share of economy 15 and what else? 16 MR. HOWE: And the reliability associated with 17 having those assets available. 18 COMMISSION STAFF: Commissioner, could I comment? 19 MR. HOWE: I don't want to speak here for FIPUG, 20 Mr. McWhirter is quite capable of that, but that 21 increases the likelihood of interruption and 22 buy-throughs for industrial customers and increases 23 their costs. 24 Commissioners -- and my point is you don't have 25

information provided by a company with the burden of proof showing you that their proposal results in net benefits. The simple fact that revenues exceeded incremental expenses doesn't mean benefits. Benefits to the customers means they would be better off with the sale, with the proposal of the company and with these sales than they would be without them. And I would suggest you have no showing at all in that regard.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, how were you able to determine then that customers are better off by separating them?

MR. HOWE: All right. Taking it by steps. First of all, no proposal at all. No sales at all to FMPA and Lakeland. Customers get \$3-1/2 million of their 80 percent share of economy. That's my starting point. The company enters into the contracts and immediately those \$3-1/2 million disappear. In their place, the company proposes to guarantee \$2 million. I do not see benefit.

Secondly, pursuant to the fuel order which conferred benefits on the customers, the company without making this proposal would have to use average fuel costs for the FMPA and Lakeland sales. In their fuel adjustment docket schedules, the use of average

costs for those wholesale sales reduces the retail fuel cost responsibility. The reason is you take total company cost, you subtract the higher number, 3 which currently is true with average versus incremental, and you have less responsibility for the 5 retail jurisdiction. I do not know exactly what that 6 dollar is. 7 COMMISSIONER DEASON: But if the sales had not 8 taken place, there wouldn't be an issue about average 9 or incremental fuel costs. The fuel costs would be 10 what fuel costs are. 11 MR. HOWE: Fuel costs would be what fuel costs 12 are and those fuel costs would reflect \$3-1/2 million 13 of economy flow-through. 14 COMMISSION STAFF: Commissioner, can I comment? 15 The \$3.5 million that Mr. Howe has referenced is 16 included in the calculation of the benefits that Tampa 17 Electric did. The 10.2 million in benefits that I 18 referenced earlier includes the cost associated with 19 the loss of the economy sales. 20 With regard to the average fuel and the 21 interpretation of the March 11th order of the 22 Commission, our interpretation, as we said, is that 23 the total benefits, if the utility can show total 24

benefits of the sale, then some other treatment, and

namely incremental fuel revenues being credited to the 1 fuel clause, can be allowed by the Commission. And we have shown taking the revenues of these 3 sales and comparing them to the incremental costs of making the sales, including fuel, O&M, SO2 allowances, 5 and we think we have captured all the costs, that 6 there are benefits. And so we would contend that we 7 have met the test of the March 11th order with regard to fuel. 9 I would also say that in the hearing there was a 10 lot of discussion about incremental costs and average 11 costs and the impact of sales on costs. And I think 12 the record is clear that crediting incremental costs 13 of making sales to the fuel clause will keep the 14 customers, the retail customers neutral with regard to 15 cases with and without the sales. 16 COMMISSIONER DEASON: This was under your latest 17 proposal you are speaking? 18 COMMISSION STAFF: Well, it's under both of our 19 proposals. Because under our hearing proposal .. 20 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Your latest proposal is 100 21 percent. 22 COMMISSION STAFF: That's correct. 23 correct. 24 MR. McWHIRTER: Mr. Deason, may I respond to your

question? As you know, all through this case I have been having to fight it with half of my brain tied 2 behind my back, because we don't know what the 3 incremental costs are. That information was denied to FIPUG. But there is a delta between incremental costs 5 and average costs. 6 It's entirely conceivable that that delta won't 7 even be made up by this additional \$10 million. The 8 average fuel cost may not fully be covered if the \$10 9 million were flowed through the fuel clause as Tampa 10 Electric --11 COMMISSIONER DEASON: But there is a \$2 million 12 quarantee. 13 MR. McWHIRTER: There is a \$2 million guarantee, 14 but that may be far less than the actual increase in 15 fuel costs. You think, your mind --16 COMMISSIONER DEASON: But the guarantee is 17 regardless of what fuel costs are. Fuel costs can go 18 through the ceiling, and as understand it, TECO is 19 still guaranteeing 2 million of benefits to be flowed 20 through the cause. 21 MR. MCWHIRTER: The point I'm trying to make, 22 Your Honor, is that if incremental fuel cost is \$63 23 million over the term of the contract, and average 24

fuel cost is \$80 million over the time of the

contract, \$2 million won't cover the delta, the difference between 63 and 80.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, now to have 63 incremental and 80 average means that you are getting it a whole lot cheaper incrementally, which means those benefits derive only because those sales were entered into to begin with.

MR. McWHIRTER: No. And that is the second point I wanted to make. You would think that because these sales have been made the price goes down. The price does not go down because these sales are made. And point in fact, because these sales are made Tampa Electric goes off system and purchases power at a much higher price in order to meet the demands of its average customer.

These incremental prices that are used are monies that comes from Tampa Electric's native customers selling as-available power as part of it, and we sell it at \$13 a megawatt, buy it back at \$40 a megawatt hour.

So, I would suggest to you that these sales didn't bring the overall price down, they just took away the opportunity of the native load customers to participate in the load cost incremental sales that were already there, and brought in higher priced

1	energy from outside the system.
2	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess I need to
3	apologize, I think that we have kind of strayed in our
4	debate here, and we are basically on the merits. And
5	what we are here for is the language in the
6	stipulation and whether it is dispositive or not of
7	the issues.
8	MR. MCWHIRTER: Yes. I was responding to your
9	question.
10	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I would like to ask a
11	question of staff. Will you give me tell me when
12	the stipulation was entered into, and when it was
13	approved? And I assume the approval had the
14	supplemental stipulation as part of it. And if that
15	is not correct, please let me know.
16	COMMISSION STAFF: The order approving the
17	stipulation is dated October 24th, 1996, and the
18	stipulation itself
19	COMMISSION STAFF: Commissioner Clark, the first
20	stipulation was signed on September 25th, the amended
21	stipulation on September 27th, 1996.
22	COMMISSIONER DEASON: The amendment was at
23	staff's request?
24	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir.
25	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that had to do with

making an exception for Polk Power, leaving that open 1 as far as how or if that would be separated? 2 MR. HOWE: Yes, sir. Commissioner Deason, it's a 3 short paragraph, I can read it to you. And it reads, "Paragraph 5(f) of the second stipulation -- " the 5 first stipulation was from a previous docket --6 "Paragraph 5(f) of the second stipulation is hereby 7 amended to add the following sentence: The parties 8 agree that if Tampa Electric makes an off system-sale 9 priced based on the unit incremental fuel costs of the 10 Polk IGCC unit, the Commission shall not be precluded 11 from determining the appropriate separation treatment 12 of the Polk IGCC unit for that specific sale." 13 And the second paragraph, it's just one sentence, 14 "The second stipulation is hereby ratified except as 15 specifically modified herein." And that is the whole 16 amendment. 17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Now, the language in 18 Paragraph (f), which is being quoted and is in staff's 19 recommendation, that was in the original and it was 20 also in the final stipulation, it's just that it was 21 modified to some extent by this amendment? 22 MR. HOWE: It was in the September 25th 23 stipulation, yes, and it was amended by this paragraph 24 I just read to you. Does that answer your question?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess I'm trying to understand, it's your position that the sales in question would have had to have been separated regardless of whether the amendment would have been put in at staff's request?

MR. HOWE: Yes, sir, because -- and I think

MR. HOWE: Yes, sir, because -- and I think properly so, staff recognized that the stipulation as originally entered into covered all future wholesale sales, and staff was concerned that an anomaly could exist if the company was able to structure a new wholesale sale priced at the incremental fuel cost of Polk, which was low, but not priced at the embedded cost of Polk. It would then be at the system average pursuant to the language in the stipulation.

So this modification was made so that sales priced at the fuel cost of Polk would be subject to this Commission's determination of appropriate separation.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And it's your position that the language in question, Paragraph (f), that that was negotiated, it was included, and it's your position that it requires the sales in question to be separated?

MR. HOWE: Yes, sir. And it's by the clear language, and it's also by the dates. Keep in mind

that we signed the stipulation on September 25th, and seven days later on October 2nd, Tampa Electric signed the letter of commitment with FMPA. The negotiations 3 for both must have been going on at the same time. COMMISSIONER DEASON: Now, Mr. Gillette, you 5 indicated that if TECO had known that this stipulation 6 required separation as indicated by Mr. Howe and Mr. 7 McWhirter, that you would not have entered into these 8 sales? 9 MR. GILLETTE: That's correct. 10 COMMISSIONER DEASON: So obviously you thought 11 that this provision did not require the sales to be 12 separated. 13 What gave you that indication that this language 14 did not require that? 15 MR. GILLETTE: We were focused on the Big Bend 16 sales. As I mentioned, there had been a lot of 17 consternation over the regulatory treatment of the Big 18 Bend sales, and we knew that the Big Bend sale 19 20

sales. As I mentioned, there had been a lot of consternation over the regulatory treatment of the Big Bend sales, and we knew that the Big Bend sale contracts were going to be winding down over time. And as those contracts wound down over time, we wanted through the stipulation the ability of that rate base that had been separated for the Big Bend sales to come back into rate base. And that was our focus and our intent in proposing --

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: But you are looking at in 1 one direction, that is getting things back in rate 2 base, you were looking in the direction if you make 3 sales you may be taking things out of rate base. MR. GILLETTE: And to the extent that the level 5 of Big Bend sales increased, as it did in 1995, we 6 would adjust the separation factors proportionately 7 upwards to separate more rate base and expenses for 8 the Big Bend sales as we had since the 1992 rate case. 9 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, if it was your 10 understanding that would apply to Big Bend, why is it 11 then it does not apply for FMPA and the other 12 contracts? 13 MR. GILLETTE: These sales are hybrid sales, they 14 are sales that are different. In the last rate case, 15 the Commission chose not to separate Schedule J sales 16 and also some of our Schedule D sales. 17 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Is the basis for your saying 18 they are hybrid is because you can provide 19 supplemental energy? 20 MR. GILLETTE: There is actually more than that, 21 Commissioner. 22 COMMISSIONER CLARK: That's part of it. 23 MR. GILLETTE: Yes, part of is it supplemental 24 energy. Another very significant part is that the 25

market is changing for wholesale sales, and the margins are significantly lower on these sales than 2 the Big Bend sales. 3 COMMISSIONER DEASON: But your stipulation doesn't say anything about a changing market. See, 5 I'm having difficulty. I'm trying to maintain the 6 sanctity of the stipulation, and all I've got is the 7 plain language on there. MR. GILLETTE: Sure. The pricing of these sales 9 is not at system average cost. And the Big Bend sales 10 at the time they were entered into, the separation of 11 the Big Bend sales was, in fact, at system average 12 cost. 13 And I understand what you are saying, 14 Commissioner, but I respectfully submit that the 15 pricing is a very, very significant difference in 16 these sales. 17 COMMISSIONER DEASON: So we are supposed to 18 interpret, and basically read your mind, that because 19 you priced them at something less than average 20 embedded incremental, that means that this paragraph 21 does not apply to those sales? I'm having a real 22 difficulty, and I'm trying to understand. 23 MR. GILLETTE: Commissioner, . understand that

difficulty, and let me see if I can help.

commissioner Clark mentioned another thing that was different about the sales. Let's talk about all the differences of sales. The pricing is different on these sales. The supplemental energy provisions are different on these sales. And the units which these sales are coming from, the Lakeland sale, for instance, is a system power sale. And the PMPA sales comes from Gannon station units, and Big Bend units are completely different.

at the time that we entered into the FMPA sale was that, yes, a regulatory treatment had to be determined for these sales, and that's why we began meeting with the various parties. Actually, Mr. Byrd called us when he was on the staff to say we need to meet and talk about these sales. And we began talking with the parties about different treatments for these sales.

And we understood that separation might be one treatment, but never during any of those discussions did any of the parties suggest that the stipulation was a bar, and that we shouldn't be meeting the seven times that we met before, and then three times after this matter was docketed.

And so we believe that the playing field was open as to the treatment for these sales, and we believe

1	that it should have been because of the significant
2	differences that these sales have compared to the Big
3	Bend sales which we were focused on at the time of the
4	stipulation.
5	COMMISSIONER DEASON: When does the stipulation
6	expire?
7	MR. GILLETTE: December 31st, 1999.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And these contracts extend
9	beyond that, is that correct?
10	MR. GILLETTE: Yes, sir. FMPA goes to 2001 and
11	Lakeland goes to 2006.
12	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Howe, is it your
13	position that once the stipulation expires, then the
14	treatment of these sales is an open issue again, or
15	the fact that this stipulation addresses it for the
16	life of the contract?
17	MR. HOWE: The stipulation is in place for its
18	own terms, through 1999. If I might, though
19	COMMISSIONER CLARK: You have answered his
20	question, so can I ask some questions? I still want
21	to understand the chronology. September 25th and 27th
22	were the stipulation and the amendments, then it was
23	approved October 24th. When were these contracts
24	entered into?
25	COMMISSION STAFF: I don't know exactly the date

that they were ... COMMISSIONER CLARK: All right. Let me ask the 2 parties. Mr. Gillette, when were these contracts 3 entered into? MR. GILLETTE: One moment. 5 COMMISSIONER CLARK: And while he is looking for 6 that, when was the issue of the appropriate treatment 7 of the fuel costs first identified, and what fuel 8 adjustment was it identified in? 9 MR. HOWE: Commissioner Clark, I can answer that. 10 I raised the issue. We raised the issue first in 11 February of 1996, the fuel issue, and it was deferred 12 from consideration until the August 1996 fuel 13 adjustment hearing. 14 It was heard at the August hearing, but then 15 briefs and so forth were allowed to be filed. 16 filed our briefs probably in November of '96. One of 17 the curious things about this and these dates is the 18 Commission was originally scheduled to vote on 19 February 4th of 1997 on the fuel issue, and there was 20 some confusion about the panel assignment. And so it 21 was deferred to the February 18th, 1997 agenda. 22 Coincidentally, the fuel adjustment hearings were 23 February 19th and 20th, so you had all of these dates. 24 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay, thanks. Mr. Gillette.

1	MR. GILLETTE: Yes, Commissioner. The Lakeland
2	letter of commitment was signed on August 19th, 1996,
3	and the FMPA letter of commitment was signed on
4	October 2nd, 1996.
5	COMMISSIONER CLARK: And just so I'm clear, Mr.
6	Gillette, the reason you think these should be treated
7	differently, or to put it in your words, the reason
8	you were not focusing on this type of agreement was
9	the pricing was different. And by that I take it you
10	mean you were not pricing it the way you had normally
11	done it, but you were doing it on an incremental cost
12	in recognition of a competitive market.
13	MR. GILLETTE: Yes.
14	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. And these were
15	different units, it wasn't Big Bend and it wasn't
16	Polk.
17	MR. GILLETTE: That's right.
18	COMMISSIONER CLARK: And it had supplemental in
19	it?
20	MR. GILLETTE: Yes, that's correct.
21	(Simultaneous conversation.)
22	COMMISSIONER CLARK: That's your position as to
23	the reason why these weren't covered by the
24	stipulation?
25	MR. GILLETTE: Yes. And given the differences in

these sales and given what Mr. McWhirter spoke about early in his presentation with regard to the Commission's past practice with respect to the treatment of the sales, the different treatment that was afforded Tampa Electric in the 1985 rate case, we were frankly relying on the Commission to look at these sales, given the very different environment in which these sales were made in, and make a decision that was fair to both the company and the customers.

me is the chronology of this. Because if the amendments were made in September 1996, and if it is correct that you signed the letter in August previous to that, and October -- I guess, it seems like when the staff said, "Wait a minute, what about the Polk," and that was addressed, it should have rung a bell that we need to address this.

I appreciate that you have a different view, and I can see where you may have that view, but what we are faced with is giving appropriate consideration to the stipulations and the terms and conditions under which we approved the stipulation. And it sure seems like if it was intended to include -- allow a different treatment, it sure should have been addressed. I mean, that's what it appears to me.

MR. GILLETTE: Commissioner, I understand what you are saying. I would respectfully submit that, again, we were focused on the Big Bend sales. The Lakeland sale, as a for instance, that you referenced, the August 19th date in which we entered the Lakeland sale, at the time that we entered the Lakeland agreement it was a non-firm transaction to be served after all of Tampa Electric's load, including interruptible customers.

We talk about differences associated with these sales and you are articulated very well and paraphrased very well what I said earlier about the differences of the sales. Lakeland was yet again different at the time we entered into it because of its non-firm nature. And, again, we believe that these sales were different.

We were not focused on the stipulation language. We believe that the other parties were not focused on the stipulation language when we began to meet with them. And we think that given that Schedule J sales are put through the fuel adjustment clause, and broker sales are not treated as separated sales, either, that these different sales deserve a different treatment. And that was our focus at the time.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other questions? Staff,

were you going to provide some comments?

COMMISSION STAFF: Not at this time.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me say, Mr. Gillette, the difficulty I'm having is that, you know, we sat through the hearing and I listened to all the evidence and your witnesses, and Public Counsel's, and FIPUG, and tried to really dig into the merits of the arguments about if there are benefits, what are the benefits, and how are they derived, and how are they going to be accounted for, and what safeguards do we need to put in place.

And then we get the recommendation. And it says, you know, this is dispositive of it, and now I hear the oral argument on it, and I appreciate you all coming forward with oral argument. And I am very hesitant or reluctant to do anything which I think is going to violate at least two of the parties' interpretation of the stipulation.

I think it does extreme harm to the process to perhaps be making interpretations of a stipulation contrary to what two parties say it was in their understanding and their -- it was something that was in their minds and they knew -- what they thought it was going to mean.

And I know you have a different point of view.

The difficulty I'm having is that I have listened to 1 all the testimony, and I think you make a very compelling case that there are benefits, that we are 3 in a different environment now, that we do have to consider competitive aspects, and that if you can 5 demonstrate that there are benefits, there are 6 revenues, incremental revenues in excess of 7 incremental costs, even considering the lost revenue 8 from the \$3-1/2 million, you make a very compelling 9 case. 10 But at the same time, I'm faced with this 11 stipulation. And I am very hesitant -- in fact, I can 12 tell you right now I cannot vote to what I would 13 consider to be perhaps a violation, and I know I've 14 got two signatories to the stipulation who are sitting 15 here today telling me that if you vote that way it is 16 a violation. 17 And I think it's going to do harm to the process, 18 not only for your company, but for other entities that 19 we regulate and we try to encourage stipulations. 20 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other comments? Is there 21 22 a motion then? COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well --23

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I would just indicate I'm

inclined to agree with Commissioner Deason. I think

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not only do you have the stipulation and the same
language in the stipulation, you also have the effect
-- the concern raised with respect to specific units
by the staff. And at that point I guess in my mind it
should have triggered that there may have been a
misunderstanding in the way it was drafted and it
should have been taken care of.

And certainly the language cited in the order

And certainly the language cited in the order seems to suggest that the stipulation was approved on the basis that it was only -- that the exception was only being made for the Polk power unit. And I would assume what we decide does not preclude a different treatment after the stipulation has expired.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I would agree that once the stipulation expires that these contracts would continue and the Commission would be free to look at the merits of the issues and determine whether it should or should not be separated and what treatment should be given.

Also, I think it's an open issue as to how we treat fuel, that the stipulation does not dictate to the Commission how we are going to treat the fuel aspect, the fuel adjustment aspect of the fuel cost.

Now I know that at least it's one position, I guess it's in staff's primary that the only way you

can show net benefits is if these sales - the
revenues are accounted for on a nonseparated basis,
and if it is separated you cannot demonstrate the
benefits. So I'm having a little bit of difficulty
with that.

Our alternative recommendation says that

Our alternative recommendation says that regardless of the stipulation there are benefits. So I'm having a little bit of difficulty. Maybe staff can help me out a little bit.

MS. KUMMER: Commissioners, the primary recommendation on fuel was based on the logic that TECO proved or used as a basis for showing of net benefits the fact that they were crediting back revenue as opposed to separating it. And their construction of net benefits disappeared if you separated, and that was the basis for staff's recommendation in the primary on fuel, based on the way TECO defined net benefits in their presentation.

and I think at least to the satisfaction of alternative staff, that incremental revenues under these sales are higher than incremental cost, even considering the lost economy sales benefit to customers, is that correct?

COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir. And that is

1	assuming that we were to adopt their proposal. I
2	think that we are on a track now where we are saying
3	that if we separate these sales are there still net
4	benefits associated with them. And alternative staff
5	would agree that there are. Then you have the
6	opportunity to treat fuel differently than prescribed
7	in the March 11th fuel order.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: So you are saying that even
9	if these sales are separated, there are still
10	benefits?
11	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir.
12	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that would justify
13	treatment of fuel costs on an incremental basis as
14	opposed to averaging them out?
15	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir.
1€	MR. GILLETTE: Commissioner, if I could make a
17	quick comment.
18	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Just a second. I'm
19	hesitant to ask Mr. Howe, but I'm going to ask him
20	what is your opinion on that? And then, Mr. Gillette,
21	I will ask you.
22	MR. HOWE: A couple of points. One is,
23	Commissioner Deason, I think if you look at the
24	alternative staff's recommendation they do not factor
25	in the lost \$3-1/2 million of economy sales. Mr.

Gillette told you that it was included in their analysis of net benefits, and I do not disagree with that it is in that \$10 million associated with the FMPA. However, only \$2 million was to be flowed through to customers.

I am reasonably confident if you were to ask

Tampa Electric, for example, do they agree that the

customers lost \$3-1/2 million of economy, and all they

are going to see guaranteed under your proposal is 2

million, they would agree with that. So --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I thought they said that the 2 million figured in that 3 million.

MP. HOWE: No, he said the 2 million was included in their calculation of net benefits, but the net benefits they calculated was \$10 million. They only guarantee \$2 million going to customers, the other they were going to book as operating revenues which would only show up on a surveillance report.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But would it perhaps increase the refund, if any, for overearning?

MR. HOWE: Well, then you've got to get into the stipulation and with that increase the refunds even more. So my point is to answer your question, I don't think the alternative staff when they said they saw net benefits, I don't think in their recommendation

you will see where they have accounted for the \$3-1/2 million of lost economy.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let's get back to the fuel. Assuming that we interpret the stipulation such that we are bound, those sales have been made, and they have got to be separated. We are taking out a tremendous amount of rate base out from the retail jurisdiction and the requirement for our retail customers to pay that support.

That is a benefit to the customers. But the sales are being made. Is it unfair then to only -- to use incremental fuel costs in the fuel adjustment section of this, of this issue, because you've got incremental costs, incremental revenue. Should there be a wash there I guess is what I'm saying?

MR. HOWE: I guess the answer, the way you phrased it first, would it be unfair, the answer would be yes. And the reason it's unfair is because the company separating wholesale sales pursuant to a stipulation with our office is not conferring any benefits. It's just the parties living up to the deal that they struck. So the company is not offering anything at all by entering into these wholesale sales that we did not negotiate.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: For something that is not

giving any benefits, you are sure fighting mighty hard 1 for it. And I don't mean that facetiously. I mean, you are doing your job in that you think that the 3 customers are going to be benefited by separating it. MR. HOWE: That's not a benefit. In other words, 5 the customers under the stipulation are entitled to 6 refunds on a 60/40 sharing above 11.75 and they get 7 100 percent above 12.75. That just falls out from the 8 way the Commission reports, you know, conducts its 9 surveillance reporting function. So, we are just 10 getting earnings above a certain level that we 11 stipulated to. I don't see it as a benefit coming 12 from the company. 13 COMMISSIONER CLARK: What you are saying is it 14 15 was part of the deal. MR. HOWE: It was part of the deal. It's nothing 16 new, it's nothing extra. 17 COMMISSIONER CLARK: And it's nothing new, and, 18 therefore, it shouldn't be counted as a benefit. 19 MR. HOWE: Now, if the company wanted to come up 20 and say we will give you even more than the 21 stipulation in return for which we get to use 22 incremental fuel costs, then I think you've got an 23

argument for net benefits. And I think the language

in the order might use the term overall benefits.

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no, I don't see that --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, I'm not trying to insinuate you're doing anything improper. You are advocating very strongly for your clients and you are doing an excellent job.

I guess the point I'm trying to make is that you are saying the stipulation requires there to be a separation. I guess what I'm saying is if it had not been for the sales, there wouldn't even be an issue to separate a tremendous amount of rate base out of the retail jurisdiction. And I think you do have to admit that by making that separation the likelihood of the company achieving earnings in excess of the threshold amount are enhanced.

MR. HOWE: Yes, which is exactly what we bargained for.

MR. McWHIRTER: Mr. Deason, in fairness to Tampa Electric, it's going to get the money from these sales and it's entitled to keep that money as it pertains to the separated rate base. So, if it keeps that money, then none of the non-fuel revenue flows back to the customers, so there is no benefit in that respect to the customers. And it would be -- I would not advocate that we keep any portion of the money that Tampa Electric gets from those wholesale sales.

MR. GILLETTE: Commissioner, if I could comment on the fuel issue that you raised. The difference, I think, that we have here is a frame of reference with regard to the March 11th order that the Commission issued. I think what OPC, respectfully, and the other parties are contending here is a heads we lose, tails we lose approach with regard to the fuel, because they are suggesting that unless we show benefits over and above crediting average costs to the fuel adjustment, then we should credit average.

And I think what the Commission intended was a symmetrical treatment, which said if there were benefits, total revenues exceeded total costs from the sales, that you could credit incremental fuel revenues to the fuel adjustment.

what would happen in the case that OPC is proposing is that we credit average system fuel costs up until the point that incremental system fuel costs exceeded average, and then we would start crediting incremental fuel costs. And I think that's an asymmetrical treatment.

And I would just at this point renew the proposal that we made to flow all of the benefits from the sales back to the customers through the fuel clause.

In so doing, the customers would receive 100 percent

of the benefits. And, again, I would point out that with regard to this whole question that is before you today with regard to separation, that as I said in my opening comments, OPC noted in their own briefs that full -- and I paraphrase -- full separation can be achieved by flowing back 100 percent of the revenues, and that is our proposal today.

And for the Commission to act in another manner than that and separate the capital and the O&M costs at system average costs, when those costs are so drastically different, it would have an extremely punitive effect on the company.

And what we have here is we have got sales that have some benefits, and we are saying we'll give all of those benefits back, but don't be punitive to us. And don't be punitive ultimately to ratepayers, because ratepayers will ultimately lose in this because we will have no choice but to exit these discretionary sales.

MR. HOWE: Commissioners, I'm sorry, I have had my brief cited twice or three times, I must correct it.

MR. SHREVE: Well, I want to correct -- did you hear what Mr. Gillette just said? He just put a threat on the table saying they are going to exit

these sales if you give them the deal that we made.

I have been going into stipulations for years and years and I have never had a situation where anybody comes in and says we want out of the deal, not because of the way the stipulation is worded, but because ware going to do something else if you don't -- if you try and live up or if you approve the deal.

when we deal with a company we are at their mercy as far as their projections and their revenues and we protect the customers with that, and in this situation we protected the customers because we set it up and said, okay, if your earnings that you are telling us about, you're not going to be able to make the -- you are not even going to be able to make the bottom of your range, that's what we are hearing.

If you are wrong, then we want protection above the midpoint and the top of that range, and we set it up in that way. At the end of the stree going to have rollover and rollover and then there is going to be a refund.

Now, Mr. Gillette doesn't talk to you about what is going to happen to that refund if you take ·· if you take the proposal they have, you are going to move millions of dollars over out of retail revenues, and that's their problem. As he has said, they weren't

focused evidently on what this was going to do, but they were in total control. They entered the agreements, they entered this, and they drafted the language.

We protected the customers. That's all we want. They are trying to move millions of dollars out of retail revenues, and I will not enter into any agreements if I'm going to have to worry about a company coming in at a later time saying, okay, you have got the deal. If we are made to live up to the deal, we are going to pull out and we are going to do something else like this. We either get the deal or we don't, and I have never had this happen before and it will never happen again.

MR. WILLIS: Jack, let me just respond very briefly. We are not in any way making a threat. What he is really citing is what we put in the record in this proceeding by Mr. Ramil, it's cited in our brief with respect to separation. It has nothing to do with why it was done. It is if that is the result, these are discretionary sales and we have stated this on the record during the hearing. This is not something new that we have brought forward today, it's just reciting what we have had --

MR. SHREVE: Mr. Gillette just made the statement

in order to influence this Commission, otherwise he 1 wouldn't have said it. 2 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let me say this, I 3 appreciate the discussion, but I think we have a stipulation here and I'm going to vote to uphold the 5 stipulation. I appreciate TECO coming forward with 6 another proposal on the table. I congratulate them 7 for that. I think it shows some effort on their part 8 trying to reach a compromise. 9 But the fact of the matter is is that I think 10 there is a binding stipulation and I'm going to vote 11 to uphold that stipulation. I think we need to 12 maintain the sanctity of that process. 13 And I guess what I was going to respond to Mr. 14 Gillette is that I appreciate his offer, but the only 15 way the Commission could entertain that is for the 16 parties that signed on the stipulation to agree to 17 that. Because as I understand the proposal, it 18 violates the requirement in the stipulation for there 19 to be a separation of the sales. 20 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other comments? Is there 21 a motion? 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: I need to take just a 23 moment and look at the issue again. 24 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think on Issue 1, move 25

1	primary staff.
2	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Second.
3	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is that your motion?
4	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes.
5	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Second.
6	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And there is a second on
7	Issue 1.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I may be debating a
9	distinction without a difference here, but
10	COMMISSIONER CLARK: No, I don't think you are.
11	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think there are benefits
12	from this sale being made.
13	COMMISSIONER CLARK: But I don't think we have to
14	reach that. I think what we should simply say is
15	that
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, see, the primary
17	recommendation starts off, "And there are no
18	benefits."
19	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes. I would amend my
20	motion, and my motion would be that these sales are
21	covered by the stipulation which requires them to be
22	separated.
23	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: And that's what I
24	intended when I seconded, because the statement had
25	been made that we were going to preserve the sanctity

	1	of the stipulation. So that's what I had intended
	2	when I seconded.
	3	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay.
	4	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There is a motion and a
	5	second. Any further discussion on Issue 1? Seeing
	6	none, all those in favor signify by saying aye.
	7	(Unanimous affirmative vote.)
	8	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Show it approved unanimously.
	9	Issue 2.
	10	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Now, staff, I need some help
	11	on how we negotiate the rest of the issues.
1	1.2	COMMISSION STAFF: I believe Issue 2 and Issue 5
	13	would become moot at that point because they deal with
	14	capital and O&M costs or non-fuel costs, and you have
	15	just upheld the stipulation.
	16	MS. KUMMER: It's actually 2, 5, and 7, I
1	17	believe. They deal with non-fuel costs and the
	18	transmission revenues, which are the total of your
8	19	non-fuel costs. Your fuel issues are 3 and 6.
	20	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, 2, 5, and 7 are
	21	non-fuel.
3	22	MS. KUMMER: Right. And that's what I believe
	23	your comments were going to.
	24	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Right. But my question, I
	25	guess, at this point is that we have come through the

hearing, we have gotten all the benefit of all the testimony and the cross examination and the briefs. We know that these contracts are scheduled to continue beyond the length of the stipulation.

Now, I don't know what effect this may or may not have on TECO's contractual obligations to these entities. I guess my question is if these contracts do extend beyond, are we going to relitigate all of this again, or should we address these -- is it too speculative now to address these issues because we don't know what the situation is going to be in the year 2000 when the stipulation expires?

MS. KUMMER: It would be my opinion that if we say at this point the stipulation rules, at the time the stipulation expires it would be fair game to look at it again. My attorney may have a different opinion of that, but for technical staff that's the way -- if you are basing your decision on the fact that the stipulation controls when it no longer is in existence --

COMMISSION STAFF: I agree with that assessment.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think the question is a

little bit different. I think what Commissioner

Deason is suggesting is we have heard all the

testimony on the issue. Does it make any -- what is

the benefit to relitigating this at a later date if we 1 have heard all the evidence and argument? Is the evidence and argument going to change in the future 3 such that it would be appropriate to relitigate it at that time? 5 MS. KUMMER: I would agree that you will be 6 hearing probably the same information again, but my 7 only point is that if you use the stipulation as the 8 basis for ordering the separation, if that is no 9 longer in effect is your decision still valid? You 10 can certainly make the decision that even after the 11 stimulation expires --12 COMMISSIONER CLARK: That's the question. 13 MS. KUMMER: Yes, I think you can do that. 14 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Should we make the decision? 15 My question is do we make that decision now or do we 16 make it when the stipulation expires, or closer to the 17 time the stipulation expires? What is the advantage 18 or disadvantage to doing either? 19 COMMISSION STAFF: If I could jump in on that, I 20 think you would want to look at changes in fuel price 21 projections to see if there are truly net benefits 22 still to be obtained. 23 COMMISSIONER CLARK: You mean there may be 24

changes in conditions that effect an analysis of net

benefits to the ratepayers?

COMMISSION STAFF: Yes. And, also, then you would know the refund amount, if any, at that time.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I agree there is a lot of merit to that, but the other side of that is that we would be putting -- we would be holding TECO to an extremely high standard in the sense that normally what we apply is at the time that you entered into the contract was it a prudent decision then based upon the information that you knew at the time the contracts were entered into.

It seems to me that it's an extra burden then to show that half way through the contracts then we are going to take another look at what the economics are at the time. That's kind of like Monday morning quarterbacking at the point to see whether the contracts were prudent and provided net benefit.

COMMISSION STAFF: I almost think you have to because of the controlling stipulation now, that they basically shouldn't have entered into the contracts to begin with, if you will, or they should have been separated ad infinitum.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I guess you can litigate it. I mean, it could be an issue, I suppose, as to what standard are they held to, what they knew

at the time they entered the contracts, or what the prevailing economics are at the time the stipulation expired.

COMMISSION STAFF: There may be -- I understand your point to go back and look at what were the circumstances at the time, but I think you would be better off waiting until knowing all of that information to decide what type of treatment.

You may want to decide to flow everything through, you may want to allow them to keep some in operating revenues, depending on the magnitude of the changes that have gone through then.

commissioner deason: See, my concern is that what type signal are we sending not only to TECO, but other parties out there in this emerging competitive market. And I think that we want to encourage particularly our utilities, our investor-owned utilities that we rate base regulate to try to make decisions, and, of course, they have the burden to demonstrate that it is in the ratepayers' interest, but to try to make decisions which are in the ratepayers' interest, which provide benefits to them, but that they need to be held to the standard of what did you know at the time that you did that and was it in the customers' interest based upon the information

you knew at the time.

And that if we start making that more and more difficult, the signal we are sending the folks is just keep the status quo and it may not be in the customers' benefit, but you don't subject yourself to any risk because you didn't take that extra step and try to enter into one of these type of contracts.

COMMISSION STAFF: It's a difficult question. I think TECO is unique in this one because of the stipulation and the refunds and the impacts this will have and the treatment this will have on the refund amount, if any, pursuant to the stipulation. That's why I think they are different from other companies out there who may be entering into these types of contracts and that kind of general signal.

MS. KUMMER: It's not like we are just jumping into the contract halfway through the life arbitrarily, and saying, well, gee whiz, we are going to recess everything, similar to the discussions we had this morning on the Lake Cogen about, you know, what do you use as costs.

But, because the stipulation is here, it's a very unique circumstance. I don't think that you are going to see this again. At least I certainly hope that we can prevent this happening again, if staff has

anything to do with it.

You know, I agree with Tom that because of the stipulation, maybe this merits different treatment than we would do to someone who does not --

commissioner DEASON: But my concern is that if we don't address this case and fashion this case, which can kind of lay out a policy as to how we are going to look, and I know that each company and each contract would be based upon the facts and circumstances of that company and the economics at the time the contract was entered into.

as to how we are going to view these things so that they will know whether they want to try to attempt to enter into some of these type -- because I think there are some benefits that can be derived, perhaps not in every situation, but perhaps there are opportunities out there. And are we sending the signal to utilities, well, just bypass those opportunities and stay on safe ground and, you know, don't worry about trying to get benefits because you may get penalized by trying to do good.

MS. KUMMER: Commissioners, I know I stood in here at one time and went through so many editions it may have gotten edited out, but I intended to have in

this recommendation -- I will try to find it if I can
-- that this only applies to Tampa Electric because of
the stipulation, and it is not intended to be a policy
statement which would apply to anyone else.

commissioner CLARK: Commissioners, I guess I'm inclined not to decide the other issues. While I agree with Commissioner Deason that the market is changing and we need to be concerned about maximizing the benefits to the ratepayers such that their costs are minimized, but I also have concerns about the impact of utilities that -- power generators who have a captive customer base from which to launch their competitive activities.

And I think we need to look at that side of it, too. So at this point I am very troubled by what is the appropriate way to look at the developing market in terms of the dichotomy between wholesale competition and the retail market where we at this point don't have the competition, and what is the impact on ratepayers by maintaining that dichotomy.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, I tend to agree with that, but I think it goes back, one of the basic questions goes back even further. I mean, here during oral argument we had presentations concerning what happened in 1984 with Big Bend and the fact that the

Commission made a decision to try to encourage off system sales to cover the incremental cost of that plant coming into rate base.

I mean, that is a basic issue which was back in 1984, and in '84 I don't think we were hearing much about retail competition and that sort of thing for electric utilities. I mean, it's just a basic question that has been around for a long time, and that is how do you encourage utilities to -- if they do have capacity which can be marketed, how do you encourage them to do that?

The only difference now is that back then there was not as much competition. Now for them to market it they perhaps have to go to different measures, and that's what TECO is saying to us, trying to say to us, is that they have to price things differently to be able to market in today's market.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes, but the difference being incremental cost as opposed to average cost with the impact on the capital customers. You know, the market is not just introducing more competition. I understand that there was some competition in the sense that there were other utilities with excess capacity, but it was generally sold on the basis of cost as opposed to price.

And, you know, I guess with that in mind, I would rather not make the decision now if I don't have to. 2 You know, I'm just not 100 percent sure that what we 3 would do today would be appropriate beyond the decision that this particular sale is covered by the 5 stipulation. 6 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So is there a motion on 2, 5, 7 and 7 that we not entertain those? How did staff 8 refer to those issues? 9 COMMISSION STAFF: Chairman Johnson, if we could 10 back up. On Issue Number 1, was that a modification 11 to the staff recommendation that should be reflected 12 as the order? 13 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes. 14 COMMISSION STAFF: And if my understanding is 15 correct, the modification is essentially that the 16 sales are covered by the stipulation, which therefore 17 requires separation. 18 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Yes. 19 COMMISSION STAFF: All right. We will make that 20 change in the order. Issues 2, 5, and 7 are non-fuel 21 issues, 3 and 6 were the fuel issues. 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Commissioner Clark, you 23 have indicated that you would prefer not taking a vote 24

on the non-fuel issues, and I guess I can agree to

that with some reluctance for the reasons I've stated.

I mean, I can see both sides of the coin. And the reason I hesitate is that I feel like that perhaps -- and I hope we are not, but I fear that perhaps we are sending a signal to not only TECO, but other utilities to not pursue opportunities that may exist because of the uncertainties involved in the treatment.

And I guess the only thing I can say is that if an opportunity exists and the utility feels it's going to interest their customers, bring it on, and we will have an open mind and we will go through and take testimony and hear all the evidence and make a decision.

MR. DUDLEY: Commissioners, what treatment would you be affording to the SO2 allowances, because it is only spoken to in Issue 2, and I guess maybe 5?

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You modified your original recommendation to include the language on SO2, correct?

MR. DUDLEY: Only to the extent that if there were any revenue shortfalls that staff recommended that those revenue shortfalls be made up out of below-the-line operating revenues. It was recommended in the discussion of Issue 1, but we had inadvertently

1	omitted it from the recommendation paragraph.
2	COMMISSION STAFF: Chairman Johnson, it's my
3	understanding that Issues 2, 5, and 7 are moot, and
4	what Mr. Dudley is discussing is the alternative staff
5	recommendation, also. So I don't know that that is
6	probative to the vote that has been taken vis-a-vis
7	Issue 1.
8	COMMISSIONER CLARK: You know, I'm getting
9	confused.
10	COMMISSIONER DEASON: SO2 pertains to fuel
11	recovery, though, right?
12	MR. DUDLEY: That is environmental cost recovery
13	clause, yes, sir.
14	COMMISSIONER DEASON: When I say fuel, I guess
15	one of the clauses that we do.
16	MS. KUMMER: It's the recovery clause as opposed
17	to base rates.
18	COMMISSIONER CLARK: So it should be in Issue 3
19	or 6.
20	MR. DUDLEY: We could have expanded Issue 3 and 6
21	to include SO2, as well.
22	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Well, let's address it in
23	the context of Issues 3 and 6, then.
24	MR. DUDLEY: That's fine.
25	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Is that acceptable?

1	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Sounds good.
2	COMMISSIONER DEASON: So we are saying 2, 5, and
3	7 are moot, is that correct?
4	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is there agreement within the
5	Commission? Okay, 2, 5, and 7, the non-fuel issues
6	will not be considered. Then we are dealing with
7	Issues 3 and 6.
8	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess I want I guess
9	Commissioner Deason was pursuing this with the notion
10	of incremental fuel and average fuel.
11	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. I had a concern that
12	I think what we have voted on on Issue 1 was our
13	interpretation of the stipulation, and we said that
14	was moot as to the regulatory and the accounting
15	treatment of separating or not separating, and the
16	staff was saying that the net benefits are
17	demonstrated by not separating and going through their
18	process and their safeguards.
19	And I was trying to ascertain whether staff still
20	feels there are net benefits from these contracts
21	simply because incremental revenue exceeds incremental
22	cost of these contracts. And I think I got one
23	indication that, yes, that is true, and that is the
24	position of staff, regardless of the stipulation.
25	Now, am I correct or incorrect?

1	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir, that's correct.
2	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Are you saying incremental
3	fuel revenue?
4	COMMISSIONER DEASON: No. All incremental
5	revenue from the contracts.
6	COMMISSION STAFF: Would exceed incremental cost.
7	Now, we had some safeguards in our proposal or
8	recommendation.
9	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And one of those concerned
10	SO2.
11	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, sir. I think with your
12	vote regarding the stipulation, though, you have to
13	consider that the surrogate to revenues is the average
14	embedded cost, which as stated by Mr. Ramil, I
15	believe, in his testimony would exceed the revenues
16	received by \$50-something-million. I don't think
17	there is any question that net benefits will be
18	derived by separating these sales.
19	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I mean, by definition
20	because and that's all the issue, because we are
21	separating on an average basis and we know that the
22	revenues are less than on what would be required on a
23	revenue requirement basis on an average basis.
24	COMMISSION STAFF: That's correct.
25	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I guess what my bottom line

concern is that I think the stipulation is binding, we 1 have made that decision, but I don't think the stipulation is binding on the treatment of the fuel 3 adjustment aspect, the non-rate base aspect of this case. 5 COMMISSION STAFF: I agree. I think the 6 stipulation is passed, you don't even need to look ... 7 there is a stipulation here. I think that TECO can 8 make an argument that if they made these sales and 9 separated these sales that there were net benefits 10 from them, and they can make the argument that 11 incremental fuel is appropriate even on that. 12 COMMISSIONER CLARK: If you credit incremental 13 fuel, it's less than average, is that right? 14 COMMISSION STAFF: In TECO's case. 15 COMMISSIONER CLARK: In TECO's case. So the 16 question I take it that Commissioner Deason's inquiry 17 is going to is since there is a benefit to having made 18 these sales and moving them out pursuant to this 19 stipulation, is it appropriate to recognize the lower 20 fuel revenue going through the fuel rather than the 21 average, is that right? 22 COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's correct. And I have 23 to ask the question that if only incremental costs are

being flowed through the clause, how are customers

24

1	harmed if you only credit incremental revenues? It's
2	a wash.
3	COMMISSION STAFF: They are different. Actually,
4	I think the math would be more appropriate to say if
5	you credit incremental, which is truly the incremental
6	to make that sale, then the customers would be no
7	worse off, no better off than they were previously.
8	If you credit average, in fact, they may be
9	better off. I think that might have gotten lost in
10	the shuffle somehow.
11	COMMISSIONER CLARK: So what I hear you saying is
12	that to be consistent with the stipulation it's
13	appropriate to do incremental.
14	COMMISSION STAFF: I believe if you are trying to
15	match costs with the credit, yes, ma'am.
16	COMMISSION STAFF: I don't agree with the answer.
17	The treatment in fuel doesn't have to be consistent
18	with the stipulation. The stipulation didn' control
19	fuel revenues. That was controlled under the fuel
20	order.
21	COMMISSIONER DEASON: And the fuel order says we
22	are going to require the crediting of average unless
23	there is a showing of benefits.
24	COMMISSION STAFF: Overall benefits, yes, sir.
25	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Overall benefits. And we

really didn't take a vote on whether we thought there
was overall benefits on TECO's proposal. What we did
say was that the stipulation controlled, and that it's
still staff's opinion that there are benefits because
shifting all of those costs out of the retail
jurisdiction is even more beneficial than what even
TECO was proposing.

COMMISSION STAFF: I agree. It was recognized in

COMMISSION STAFF: I agree. It was recognized in the primary staff analysis on Issue 1, it was recognized in OPC's brief that if you separate this stuff, we truly believe that this would result in increased refunds under the stipulation.

COMMISSION STAFF: If I may, Commissioners, point out something slightly different. The stipulation requires separation of non-fuel costs and the treatment as to the rate case. To me that means the non-fuel revenues stay with the company. If you separate it out, they keep the non-fuel revenues.

The fuel revenues from these sales do not equal incremental cost, so in order to get even to incremental cost you've got to pull from the pot of non-fuel revenues. But the stipulation is telling you that all non-fuel revenues go to the company. So I'm not quite sure how those two mesh together.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: You're saying you would

1	even take it one step further and require since we
2	are separating out, is require only the crediting of
3	the revenue derived from the contract through the
4	clause even though it may be less than incremental
5	cost?
6	COMMISSION STAFF: That may be the reading of it,
7	yes.
8	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I'm not so sure I want to
9	do that, because that certainly raises a question of
10	whether there is actual harm to the customers as a
11	result of that.
12	COMMISSION STAFF: I agree. And I think I also
13	disagree a little bit with Mr. Goad about the
14	benefits. In my mind the only benefits are there if
15	you get the dollars flowing back now. The benefits he
16	is perceiving of are a reduction in revenue
17	requirements, but that would only come about if we had
18	a rate case today.
19	COMMISSIONER DEASON: But you do agree that we
20	are under a stipulation which has earning thresholds
21	on it, and that the potential of a refund is certainly
22	enhanced by separating?
23	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes.
24	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other questions?
25	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Issue 3 is how should the

1	fuel we are on Issue 3, right?
2	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think that we should
3	require the crediting of incremental fuel costs.
4	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I agree.
5	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Inclemental fuel
6	incremental revenues such to the extent that
7	incremental costs are negated so that there is a wash
8	in fuel adjustment as a result of these contracts.
9	COMMISSION STAFF: I agree. And I believe that
10	was the intention of the March 11th fuel order that we
11	referred to.
12	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Second. And that would be
13	also for Issue 6, right? That would be a modification
14	to Issue 6? No?
15	COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, ma'am, but are you going
16	to consider SO2 within this issue, also?
17	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. And I guess the same
18	principle would apply to the extent that there are
19	incremental SO2 costs incurred, that there needs to be
20	at least that much revenue flowed through the
21	environmental cost recovery clause so that there is a
22	wash, the customers are not harmed by that treatment.
23	COMMISSION STAFF: And TECO has agreed to such.
24	MS. KUMMER: And that's even if the revenues from
25	the contracts do not cover that.

1	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Right. The contracts are
2	gone, they are separated.
3	MR. DUDLEY: Are you going to deal with the issue
4	if incremental revenues or revenues received under the
5	contract do not cover the level of costs?
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes. Regardless of what
7	revenues, the company is going to be obligated to
8	credit incremental revenues to the extent of
9	incremental costs.
10	COMMISSION STAFF: And where would those revenues
11	come from, below-the-line or above-the-line, because
12	the company has proposed
13	COMMISSIONER DEASON: I would say above-the-line.
14	It would come from above-the-line.
15	COMMISSION STAFF: Above-the-line?
16	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Above-the-line.
17	COMMISSIONER CLARK: What do you mean by above
18	and below-the-line? I mean, I assume they will come
19	from the wholesale jurisdiction because we separated
20	it out, and it will be
21	COMMISSIONER DEASON: No, we are requiring costs
22	to be flowed through to the retail jurisdiction in
23	fuel purposes, so those revenues should come from
24	above-the-line. That's where the benefit is going,
25	that's where the benefit should come from.

What that does, Commissioners, you all need to be 1 aware, because you may agree or disagree with that, what that's going to do is that could have an 3 offsetting effect on the potential for refunds, because you would be reducing above-the-line revenue. 5 But personally I think it's the only fair thing to do. COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess I need further 7 explanation on the notion of using above -- if you go 8 back to the incremental fuel revenue, we are making 9 sure it's a wash, right? So that what they incur in 10 making those sales is what they will have to -- let me 11 think. What they receive in making those sales will 12 go -- and it's incremental, it will go through the 13 fuel adjustment. 14 Now, does the notion of above-the-line, where 15 that revenue comes from above-the-line or 16 below-the-line have an impact on the fuel, incremental 17 fuel. 18 COMMISSION STAFF: It would have an impact, as 19 Mr. Deason recognized, on the potential earnings of 20 the company at that time. 21 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess you need to walk me 22 through that, then. 23 COMMISSION STAFF: Say that incremental cost of 24 making a sale was \$5, and the incremental revenue

received from the sale was only \$3. In order to make 1 the fuel clause whole, they would have to make up that difference. What the company has proposed is that 3 that difference would be made up out of above-the-line or retail operating revenues. 5 COMMISSIONER CLARK: I guess that's why I'm 6 confused, because it seems to me like it should come 7 from wholesale. 8 COMMISSION STAFF: Yes, ma am, and that's what 9 the alternate recommendation recommended. 10 MS. KUMMER: Staff would argue that if they 11 didn't get enough through the contract to cover these 12 costs then they ought to foot the bill below-the-line. 13 COMMISSIONER DEASON: And there is merit to their 14 argument. What we had is the company is already 15 saying that they are not getting enough from these 16 contracts to even cover the costs which you are 17 separating out. It's like a double whammy. I mean, 18 this is the type negative incentive you are trying to 19 send to folks who are trying to do what they think is 20 right. And that's the problem I'm having. 21 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. Now I understand what 22 the difference is. I will second your motion. 23 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There is a motion and a 24

second. Any further discussion?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Let me just -- what exactly is the motion, because from when you made to where we just arrived is something --

commissioner DEASON: Let me see if I can try to explain. The question is are we going to credit incremental revenue or average revenue through the fuel clause. And I think we have already decided we are going to do it on an incremental basis.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, that's part of your motion.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That's part of the motion. That's kind of consistent with the discussion that we have gone through. The latter part of the discussion was a question as to whether -- if there is a shortfall where is the revenue going to come from, from above-the-line operations or below-the-line operations? A short-fall being if there is a difference between incremental costs and the revenue from the contract. If the revenue is not sufficient to cover the incremental fuel costs and there is a deficit, where is that money going to come from to cover that?

Staff is recommending, and there is merit to the argument, they are recommending that that deficit should come from below-the-line operations so it would

1	not have a negative impact on the company's
2	above-the-line earnings. And it would not negatively
3	impact the potential for refunds. And like I say,
4	there is merit for that argument.
5	Given that we have already made the decision to
6	separate, and knowing that there is not even going to
7	be enough revenue to cover the rate base revenue
8	requirements of that separation, to me it would be a
9	double disincentive to also require that fuel be made
10	whole with below-the-line revenue.
11	Like I say, it's not a question of black and
12	white, that this is right, this is wrong, it's kind of
13	a policy, and I think given the situation, the facts
14	that have been developed in this case, that it would
15	be appropriate to allow them if there is a deficiency,
16	a shortfall, to allow them to make it up with
17	above-the-line revenue.
18	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Second.
19	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: There is a motion and a
20	second. Any further discussion? All those in favor
21	signify by saying aye.
22	(Unanimous affirmative vote.)
23	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Show it approved unanimously.
24	Are there any other issues?
25	COMMISSION STAFF: Issue 8 we have represented

1	does not require a vote primarily because of the way
2	it's worded. It says will the Commission's treatment
3	of the wholesale sales have an impact on the refund
4	obligation?
5	Staff's position is that the obligation is the
6	obligation, and if the issue had said the amount of
7	the refund obligation a vote would be required, but it
8	doesn't.
9	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I agree. I don't think we
10	need to vote on 8.
11	COMMISSION STAFF: Right. And the only other
12	issue is the docket closing.
13	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Move staff.
14	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Show it approved without
15	objection.
16	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We are going to take a
17	10-minute break.
18	(Recess.)
19	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We are going to reconvene the
20	agenda conference.
21	Item 8.
22	COMMISSION STAFF: Just to revisit it very
23	briefly. We did not vote on Issue 4. Issue 1 dealt
24	only with the contract between FMPA and Tampa Electric
25	Company.

1	Issue 4 deals with the contract between Tampa
2	Electric Company and the City of Lakeland. Consistent
3	with your vote on Issue 1 would be to modify the
4	primary recommendation on Issue 4 to reflect the
5	rationale expressed in the vote on Issue 1.
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: So moved.
7	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Is there a second?
8	COMMISSIONER KIESLING: Second.
9	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Show it approved without
10	objection.
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5	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
6	STATE OF FLORIDA)
7	COUNTY OF LEON)
8	I, JANE FAUROT, RPR, do hereby certify that the
9	foregoing proceeding was transcribed from cassette tape,
10	and the foregoing pages number 1 through 89 are a true and
11	correct record of the proceedings.
12	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a relative, employee,
13	attorney or counsel of any of the parties, nor relative or
14	employee of such attorney or counsel, or financially
15	interested in the foregoing action.
16	DATED THIS day of October, 1997.
17	
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20	JANE FAUROT, RPR P. O. Box 10751
21	Tallahassee, Florida 32302
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