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October 10, 1997

VIA HAND DELIVERY

Blanca S. Bayo, Director Florida Public Service Commission Division of Records & Recording 2540 Shumard Oak Blvd. - Room 110 Tallahassee, FL 32399

Docket No. 970410-EI Re: Proposal to Extend Plan for the Recording of Certain Expenses for the Years 1998 and 1999 for Florida Power & Light Company

Dear Ms. Bayo:

Enclosed please find for filing with the Public Service Commission the original pre-filed testimony of Mark Cicchetti for filing in the above-referenced docket.

thank you for your assistance in filing the above. Should you have any questions, please do not ACK AFA Di hesitate to contact the undersigned.

AFT Very truly yours, CAF Chri SALEM, SAXON & NIELSEN, P.A. CIL ian B Rush F7. Marian B. Rush MBR/cb3 Enclosure 4 cc: Attached Service List W.S.S F VTUMSTEEL/PLDG-7. FPL/JIAY012 LTR 11.14

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SERVICE LIST (PSC DOCKET NO. 970410-EI)

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE (PSC DOCKET NO. 970410-EI)

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the Direct Testimony of Mark A. Cicchetti on hehaif of AmeriSteel Corporation has been furnished via Federal Express (Saturday delivery only to FPL's counsel) this 10th day of October, 1997, to the following:

> Robert Elias, Esq. Florida Public Service Commission Gerald L. Gunter Building 2540 Shumard Oak Blvd. Room 301 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0850 Facsimile. 904-413-6250

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B. Rush MARIAN B. RUSH, ESO

Dated: October 10, 1997

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FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT

DOCKET NO. 970410-EI

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF MARK A. CICCHETTI

ON BEHALF OF AMERISTEEL CORPORATION

FILED OCTOBER 10, 1997

DOCUMENT NUMBER-DATE

Please state your name and address. 0 1 My name is Mark Anthony Cicchetti and my 2 A business address is 2947 N. Umberland Drive, 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308. 4 By whom are you employed and in what 5 Q capacity? 6 I am President of Cicchetti & Company, a A 7 financial research and consulting firm. I am also 8 employed by the Division of Bond Finance, Florida 9 State Board of Administration, where I am the 10 Manager of Arbitrage Compliance. 11 educational your outline Please 12 0 gualifications and experience. 13 I received a Bachelor of Science degree 14 A in Business Administration in 1980 and a Master of 15 Business Administration degree in Finance in 1981, 16 both from Florida State University. 17 Upon graduation I accepted a planning 18 analyst position with Flagship Banks, Inc., a bank 19 holding company. As a planning analyst my duties 20 included merger and acquisition analysis, lease-buy 21 analysis, branch feasibility analysis, and special 22

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In 1983, I accepted a regulatory analyst 2 Public position with the Florida Service 3 Commission. As a regulatory analyst, I provided 4 in-depth analysis of the cost of equity and 5 required overall rate of return in numerous major 6 and minor rate cases. I reviewed and analyzed the 7 and forecasted economic conditions 8 current surrounding those rate cases and applied financial 9 integrity tests to determine the impacts of various 10 regulatory treatments. I also co-developed an 11 integrated spreadsheet model which links all 12 elements of a rate case and calculates revenue 13 requirements. I received a meritorious service 14 award from the Florida Public Service Commission 15 for my contributions to the development of that 16 model. 17

18 In February 1987, I was promoted to Chief 19 of the Bureau of Finance. In that capacity I 20 provided expert testimony on the cost of common 21 equity, risk and return, corporate structure, 22 capital structure, and industry structure. I 23 provided technical guidance to the Office of

General Counsel regarding the development of 1 financial rules and regulations. In addition, I 2 Commission's rules authored the regarding 3 diversification and affiliated transactions, 4 chaired the Commission's Committee on Leveraged 5 Buyouts, supervised the finance bureau's regulatory 6 analysts, co-developed and presented a seminar on 7 8 public utility regulation to help educate the 9 Florida Public Service Commission attorneys, and provided technical expertise to the Commission in 10 all areas of public utility finance for all 11 12 industries.

13 In February 1990 I accepted the position of Chief of Arbitrage Compliance in the Division of 14 Bond Finance, Department of General Services. The 15 Division of Bond Finance is now under the Florida 16 State Board of Administration, and my title is 17 Manager, Arbitrage Compliance. As Manager of the 18 19 Arbitrage Compliance Section, I am responsible for assuring that over \$14 billion of State of Florida 20 21 tax-exempt securities remain in compliance with the 22 federal arbitrage requirements enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. I provide investment advice to 23 24 trust fund managers on how to maximize yields while

remaining in compliance with the federal arbitrage regulations. I designed and implemented the first statewide arbitrage compliance system which includes data gathering, financial reporting, and computation and analysis subsystems.

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6 In July 1990 I founded Cicchetti & 7 Company. Through Cicchetti & Company I provide 8 financial research and consulting services, 9 including the provision of expert testimony, in the 10 areas of public utility finance and economics.

Topics I have testified on include cost 11 of equity, capital structure, corporate structure, 12 regulatory theory, cross-subsidization, industry 13 structure, the overall cost of capital, incentive 14 regulation, the establishment of the leverage 15 formula for the water and wastewater industry, 16 reconciling rate base and capital structure, risk 17 return, and the appropriate regulatory and 18 treatment of construction work in progress, used 19 and useful property, construction cost recovery 20 charges, and the tax gross-up associated with 21 contributions-in-aid-of-construction. 22

In 1985, I was certified by the Florida Public Service Commission as a Class B Practitioner in the areas of finance and accounting.

In June, 1985, I published an article in 4 Public Utilities Fortnightly titled "Reconciling 5 Rate Base and Capital Structure: The Balance Sheet 6 Method." In September, 1986, I was awarded third 7 place in the annual, national, Competitive Papers 8 Session sponsored by Public Utilities Reports, 9 Inc., in conjunction with the University of Georgia 10 and Georgia State University, for my paper titled 11 "The Quarterly Discounted Cash Flow Model, the 12 Ratemaking Rate of Return, and the Determination of 13 Requirements for Regulated Public Revenue 14 Utilities." An updated version of that paper was 15 published in the June, 1989 edition of the National 16 Regulatory Research Institute Quarterly Bulletin. 17 I have since served twice as a referee for the 18 Competitive Papers Sessions. On June 15, 1993, I 19 published an article on incentive regulation in 20 Public Utilities Fortnightly titled "Irregular 21 Incentives." 22

I am a past President and past member of

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1 the Board of Directors of the Society of Utility 2 and Regulatory Financial Analysts (SURFA). I was 3 awarded the designation Certified Rate of Return 4 Analyst by the SURFA in 1992. I am a member of the 5 Financial Management Association International and 6 I am listed in Who's Who in the World and Who's Who 7 in America.

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8 I have made public utility and finance 9 related presentations to various groups such as the 10 Southeastern Public Utilities Conference, the 11 Society of Utility and Regulatory Financial 12 Analysts, the National Association of State 13 Treasurers, and the Government Finance Officers 14 Association.

Q Have you previously testified before this
 Commission?

A Yes, I have.

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18 Q For whom are you testifying in this 19 proceeding?

20 A I am testifying on behalf of AmeriSteel
21 Corporation ("AmeriSteel").

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Q What is the purpose of your testimony? A The purpose of my testimony is to address the issues in this docket listed in Order No. PSC-97-1035-PCO-EI.

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Q Please summarize your conclusions.

6 A The proposal to extend the Plan for 7 recording certain expenses for the years 1998 and 8 1999 for Florida Power & Light Company ("FPL") as 9 set forth in Order No. PSC-97-0499-FOF-EI is not in 10 the public interest and should be denied.

11 The Plan allows FPL to accelerate expenses that are appropriately attributable to 12 future periods, removes incentives for management 13 efficiency inherent in traditional ratemaking 14 practices, and allows additional charges without 15 addressing decreased costs and imprudently incurred 16 costs. The Plan results in unreasonable rates, 17 excessive compensation, and intergenerational 18 19 inequity.

20 Absent the expenses allowed in the Plan,
21 FPL will be in a significant overearnings situation
22 given existing base rates. Absent the expenses

allowed in the Plan, FPL's return on common equity will likely approach 16.00% in 1997. Based on staff's estimates, FPL could write-off up to \$841.2 million in 1998 and 1999 under the sales-related portion of the Plan alone.

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6 The proposed extension of the Plan allows 7 additional expenses that deviate from Uniform 8 System of Accounts guidelines and the Commission's 9 normal accounting practices. However, the record 10 in this docket provides no evidence to support 11 deviating from the Uniform System of Accounts or 12 normal Commission practice.

Q Should the Plan be extended for 1998 and
14 1999 as set forth in Order No. PSC-97-0499-FOF-EI?
15 (Issue 6).

16 A No. To put this issue in the proper
17 perspective, I believe it would be helpful to
18 provide some case background.

19On March 31, 1995, FPL petitioned the20Commission to allow FPL to increase its expenses,21effective January 1, 1995, to address the potential22for stranded investment (Petition to establish

amortization schedule for nuclear generating units 1 to address potential for stranded investment by 2 Florida Power & Light Company, Docket No. 950359-3 EI). In response to FPL's petition, the Commission 4 approved a proposal by FPL that resolved the issues 5 identified in FPL's petition. By Order No. PSC-96-6 0461-FOF-EI, FPL was required to book additional 7 amortization expense including an annual \$30 8 for its nuclear generating million units. 9 According to the Plan approved by the Commission in 10 Order No. PSC-96-0461-FOF-EI, the final accounting 11 for the annual \$30 million for the nuclear 12 generating units remains "subject to determination 13 by the Commission in a future proceeding such as a 14 generic stranded cost docket." (emphasis added) 15

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The Plan approved in 1996 also required 16 FPL to "record an additional expense in 1996 and 17 1997 equal to 100% of base revenues produced by 18 retail sales between its "low band" and "most likely 19 sales forecast for 1996 and at least 50% of the 20 base rate revenues produced by retail sales above 21 22 FPL's "most likely sales forecast" for 1996 as filed in this docket. Any additional expense recorded as 23 a result of this provision will be first applied to 24

correct the remaining reserve deficiency existing 1 in nuclear production; second, to correct the 2 reserve deficiency existing in FPL's other 3 production facilities, which was calculated to be 4 \$60,338,330 as of January 1, 1994; third, to write 5 off the net amount of book-tax timing differences 6 that were flowed through in prior years and remain 7 to be turned around in future periods; and, fourth, 8 to write off the unamortized loss on reacquired 9 debt." 10

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In April 1997, the Commission approved a 11 extend the Plan, with 12 staff proposal to modifications, for an additional two years through 13 1999. The modifications included adding items to 14 the list of additional expenses and changing the 15 priority of the items on the list. The items added 16 to the list included correction of fossil 17 dismantlement and nuclear decommissioning reserve 18 deficiencies, if unspecified 19 any, and an depreciation reserve account for production plant 20 to be used in the event any revenues associated 21 with the difference between actual and forecasted 22 revenues remain to be disposed of. 23

In the PAA in this docket, Order No. PSC-1 97-0499-FOF-EI, the Commission stated, "We believe 2 this plan is appropriate because it mitigates past 3 depreciation, prescribed with deficiencies 4 decommissioning and nuclear dismantlement, 5 accruals. The plan also brings FPL's accounting in 6 line with non-regulated companies by eliminating 7 regulatory assets such as deferred refinancing 8 costs and the assets associated with previously 9 flowed through taxes. These accounting adjustments 10 will facilitate the establishment of a level 11 "accounting" playing field between FPL and possible 12 non-regulated competitors. (emphasis added) 13

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On May 20, 1997, AmeriSteel protested the 14 the Commission's Proposed Agency Action. Staff, in 15 its recommendation dated August 14, 1997 addressing 16 AmeriSteel's protest and petition to intervene 17 stated, "Staff believes, absent an extension of the 18 plan, overearnings will exist on a prospective 19 20 basis. For this reason, some action is necessary 21 to protect ratepayer interests. Staff believes it may be necessary to attach jurisdiction 22 to overearnings effective January 1, 1998 or take some 23 other action to protect ratepayer interests. Since 24

the interim statute is based on historic (sic)
 earnings, it will not adequately protect against
 1998 overearnings." (Emphasis added)

As of June 30, 1997, the amounts allowed 4 in Order Nos. PSC-96-0461-FOF-EI and PSC-97-0499-5 associated with correction of any FOF-EI 6 depreciation reserve deficiency resulting from an 7 approved depreciation study order (\$235.6 million), 8 and the net amounts of book-tax timing differences 9 that were flowed through in prior years and 10 remained to be turned around in future periods 11 (\$79.5 million) (Items 1 and 2 in Order No. PSC-97-12 13 0499-FOF-EI) have been written-off and their treatment is a moot issue. 14

As mentioned above and shown on Exhibit 15 1, page 1 of 2, and on Exhibit 2, page 1 of 1, it 16 17 is estimated that FPL could write-off approximately \$273 million in 1997 under the Plan. FPL has 18 19 written-off \$130.6 million through July 31, 1997 and earned approximately 40 basis points above the 20 mid-point of its allowed return (100 basis points 21 22 is equal to approximately \$70 million dollars). Assuming FPL earns only the midpoint of its allowed 23

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return after writing-off the estimated amount of additional expenses, FPL's earned return on common equity, absent the additional expenses, would approach 16.00% (\$273/\$70= 3.9, 12.00 + 3.9 = 15.9).

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Further, as shown on Exhibit 1, page 2 of 6 2, which is FPL's 1997 Base Rate Revenue Forecast 7 (exclusive of revenue taxes) and Accruals of 8 Additional Amortization Expense (obtained through a 9 Production of Public Documents Request by 10 AmeriSteel), as of July 31, 1997, \$54.4 million of 11 loss on reacquired debt has been written-off in 12 1997 with \$227.6 million remaining to be written-13 off in 1997 and 1998. Through July 31, 1997, total 14 sales-related (variable) accruals of \$113.1 million 15 have been written-off in 1997. 16 The expected maximum amount of total accruals to be written-off 17 in 1997 under the Plan is \$272.5 million (Exhibit 18 19 1, Page 1 of 2).

20 As shown on Exhibit 2, which is a staff 21 workpaper (also obtained through a Production of 22 Public Documents Request by AmeriSteel; the 23 annotations on the document are staff annotations),

staff estimates that \$841.2 million could be 1 written-off in 1998 and 1999 in addition to the 2 amounts previously written-off under the Plan. The 3 identified amounts to be written-off against the 4 listed Plan items in 1998 and 1999 total \$619.1 5 million, as shown on Exhibit 2, and is comprised of 6 \$101 million of remaining loss on debt, \$33.5 7 million of fossil dismantlement deficiency, and 8 \$484.4 million of nuclear decommissioning reserve 9 The remaining difference (\$222.1 10 deficiency. million) between the total amount to be written-off 11 against specific items (\$619.1 million) and the 12 total amount expected to be available (\$841.2 13 million), would be applied to the unspecified 14 depreciation reserve to be allocated at a later 15 date, if FPL so chooses. 16

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17 Q How does the plan deviate from18 traditional ratemaking?

19AThe Plan proposes to correct reserve20deficiencies and to accelerate the write-off of21regulatory assets. Normally, reserve deficiencies22are corrected over the remaining life of the23associated facilities. Likewise, the generally24accepted ratemaking treatment for recovery of

regulatory assets, such as the unamortized loss on 1 reacquired debt, is to spread the cost over a 2 period of years to match the costs and benefits 3 over time. The Commission has routinely followed 4 this approach when setting electric utility rates. 5 Extension of the plan proposes significant 6 departures from accepted ratemaking and established 7 Commission practice for which there is no record 8 evidence. As noted previously, the identified 9 depreciation reserve deficiencies that 10 were addressed in the Plan approved for 1995-1997 have 11 been corrected. 12

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Q Please continue.

The Plan should not be extended for 1998 А 14 and 1999 because it is not in the public interest. 15 16 Given the write-offs that have already occurred, 17 extension of the Plan now addresses accelerated regulatory asset recovery, claimed deficiencies for 18 fossil dismantlement, nuclear decommissioning 19 accruals, and an unspecified depreciation reserve 20 for which there is no record justification. The 21 Plan allows FPL to accelerate expenses that are 22 appropriately attributable to future periods, 23 removes incentives for management efficiency 24

inherent in traditional ratemaking practices, and 1 addresses additional charges without addressing 2 decreased costs and imprudently incurred costs. 3 The Plan results in unreasonable rates, excessive 4 compensation, and intergenerational inequity. 5 There is no record evidence in this docket to 6 support additional expenses for FPL for the purpose 7 of eliminating potential stranded costs. 8

As shown on Exhibit 3, which is from FPL 9 10 Group's August 1997 Presentation to Security Analysts (also obtained through the Production of 11 Public Documents Request by AmeriSteel), the book 12 value of FPL's fossil units and nuclear units are, 13 respectively, 51% and 62% below industry averages -14 of several indications that FPL is 15 one comparatively well-suited to meet competition, even 16 though retail competition in the electric utility 17 industry in Florida is not expected in the near 18 Furthermore, there is evidence that FPL's 19 term. 20 assets will be worth more in a deregulated environment, and not less. A Resource Data 21 International, Inc. ("RDI") study titled "Power 22 Markets in the U. S." estimated that FPL assets are 23 undervalued by nearly \$900 million compared to 24

their expected value in a competitive generation 1 market ("Power Markets in the U.S.," Resource Data 2 International, Inc., 1994). For purposes of the 3 study, RDI defined stranded costs as the net of any 4 stranded generation assets, regulatory assets, 5 purchased power contracts, and wholesale sales 6 Furthermore, recent auctions of contracts. 7 generating assets help establish proxies for the 8 value of such assets. New England Electric System 9 recently announced the sale of 4,000 MW of fossil 10 and hydro generation assets for approximately 11 FPL owns about 13,500 MWs of fossil \$400/kw. 12 generation that, as shown on Exhibit 3, is on the 13 books at \$180/kw. At an average market value of 14 \$400/kw, FPL's fossil generating assets have an 15 indicated market value of almost \$3 billion over 16 their book value. Additionally, FPL's regulatory 17 assets represent only 8% of common equity while the 18 industry average is 19% (See Exhibit 3, Page 3 of 19 20 3).

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21 Other factors that strengthen FPL's 22 competitive position include low residential rates 23 relative to Florida and the southeast region, low 24 industrial load, high residential load, geographic

isolation from the continental U.S., lack of excess capacity, and cross-state transmission capacity limitations, especially to FPL's major load centers in South Florida. Furthermore, Florida's sensitive environment is likely to hamper attempts to increase transmission capacity into and within the state.

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8 The marketplace is well aware of the 9 threat of competition in the electric utility 10 industry. Yet, FPL Group's stock price has 11 increased approximately 40% over the last five 12 years and FPL's bond ratings were increased by 13 Standard and Poor's to AA- in 1995 and to Aa3 by 14 Moody's in 1996.

Q Why is it inappropriate to allow FPL to
write-off costs that are attributable to future
periods?

18 A The concept of intergenerational equity, 19 that lies at the core of traditional ratemaking, 20 holds that each generation of customers should pay 21 its share of the costs related to the service from 22 which they are benefitting. For example, the costs 23 associated with reacquired debt should be

distributed over appropriate future periods. It is 1 the concept of inappropriate, under 2 force current intergenerational equity, to 3 ratepayers to bear the costs of reacquired debt so 4 that future ratepayers can enjoy a cost of debt 5 below the "net" cost of debt. I will address FPL's 6 unamortized loss on reacquired debt in greater 7 detail in Issue 4. 8

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9 Q How does the Plan remove incentives for 10 management efficiency inherent in traditional 11 ratemaking practices?

Under traditional ratemaking, regulated A 12 utilities are not guaranteed recovery of costs but 13 instead are given the opportunity to recover their 14 costs including a return on their investment 15 commensurate with the risk of their investment. 16 This is accomplished by setting rates that are 17 expected to recover the utilities expected costs. 18 Under this approach, a utility has an incentive to 19 keep expenses at a level that will allow it to 20 recover its costs including its allowed return on 21 common equity. The utility has a further incentive 22 to lower costs to take advantage of the regulatory 23 lag related to the time necessary to reset rates to 24

recognize 'owered costs. In Florida, regulated utilities have the additional incentive to lower costs because they can earn up to 100 basis points over their allowed return on common equity without being subject to overearnings, all other things being equal.

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7 However, in this docket FPL's rates are 8 set at a point that will generate overearnings 9 absent additional allowed expenses. Consequently, 10 the management incentives for efficiency associated 11 with traditional ratemaking practices are removed. 12 Under the Plan, FPL can manipulate its earnings and 13 achieved return.

It has been over ten years since FPL's 14 last rate case and, absent additional allowed 15 expenses, FPL will overearn by hundreds of millions 16 of dollars. Under the Plan, FPL has complete 17 discretion with regard to 50% of the base revenues 18 produced by retail sales above FPL's 'most likely 19 sales forecast' forecasted for 1996. Because the 20 21 revenue level is based on 1996 revenues, the Plan gives FPL discretion over tens of millions of 22 dollars of expenses. This provides the opportunity 23

to "manage" the earned return. For example, FPL could forego writing-off certain expenses allowed under the Plan and instead incur an expense the Commission might not normally allow. The result being that there is still a "legitimate" expense that can be claimed and the earned return is the same as if the "legitimate" expense had been taken.

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8 Q Does the Plan allow for additional costs
9 to be charged while ignoring decreased costs and
10 imprudently incurred costs?

A Yes. In my opinion, FPL's allowed return on equity (See staff's Quarterly Report on Equity Cost Rates) and FPL's equity ratio used to monitor earnings are seriously outdated and should be reduced because they are excessive and are adding substantially and unnecessarily to the revenue requirement being borne by ratepayers.

Q Please explain.

A By reacquiring substantial amounts of debt, FPL replaced a tax deductible source of financing with a higher cost, non-tax deductible source of financing that increases FPL's after-tax overall cost of capital relative to what it would

be otherwise, increases the dollar return to investors, and reduces the amount of potential overearnings. Furthermore, as noted above, the Plan allows the unamortized loss on the reacquired debt (\$283 million) to be written-off against earnings in 1997 and 1998.

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equity ratio increased has 7 FPL's substantially since the last time rates were set. 8 The equity ratio used in the 1985 test year in the 9 last rate case was 42.3% of investor capital. 10 FPL's average equity ratio for the period ending 11 July 31, 1997, per the July 1997 Surveillance 12 Report, was 61.1% of investor capital. Generally, 13 increasing the amount of equity in the capital 14 structure, all other things being equal, decreases 15 the required return on common equity. However, 16 FPL's allowed return on common equity has not 17 changed since 1990 while, over the same period, its 18 19 equity ratio has significantly increased. 20 Additionally, FPL's equity ratio has risen to a level much greater than that required for a AA-21 rated electric utility with FPL's business 22 position, per Standard and Poor's guidelines (See 23 Exhibit 4). FPL's Business Position is rated 1, 24

above average (See Standard and Poor's, Utility 1 Credit Report, June 1996). FPL significantly 2 exceeds the equity ratio benchmark for a AA rated 3 electric utility with a Business Position of 1, 4 61.1% versus 53%. By not addressing these factors, 5 the Plan is allowing FPL to increase allowed 6 expenses while disregarding decreased costs and 7 imprudently incurred costs. 8

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9 Q Should FPL be authorized to accelerate
 10 the write-Off of Unamortized Loss on Reacquired
 11 Debt? (Issue 4)

No. The amount of unamortized loss on 12 A 13 reacquired debt that the Commission believes was prudently incurred should be amortized over the 14 remaining life of the original debt if there was 15 not a refunding, or if there was a refunding, 16 amortized over the remaining life of the original 17 debt or spread over the life of the new issue. 18 This is the Commission's normal practice, the 19 Uniform System of Accounts requirement, and the way 20 FPL must account for these costs for financial 21 reporting purposes. There is no evidence in this 22 docket to support accelerated recovery for any 23 other purpose. 24

Ratepayers in the future will enjoy the 1 benefits of reduced interest expense associated 2 with the prudently reacquired debt. Under the 3 concept of intergenerational equity, it is 4 inappropriate to force current ratepayers to bear 5 the costs of reacquiring the debt so that future 6 ratepayers can enjoy a cost of debt below the 'net' 7 cost of debt. Ratepayers bear the cost to the 8 extent that the expenses taken under the Plan 9 reduce overearnings. For other than insignificant 10 amounts, the Uniform System of Accounts requires 11 the unamortized loss on reacquired debt to be 12 amortized in the manner I am recommending. 13 Moreover, for financial reporting purposes, the 14 amortization of the loss on reacquired debt will 15 continue as if there is no write-off per the Plan. 16 In other words, even though the Commission has 17 allowed FPL to accelerate the write-off of \$283 18 19 million of unamortized loss, the Uniform System of Accounts does not allow this treatment to be used 20 for financial reporting. These Uniform System Of 21 Accounts' requirements support the conclusion that, 22 23 to achieve intergenerational equity, the loss on reacquired debt should be amortized as I 24 25 recommending.

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Recovery of regulatory assets, such as 1 the unamortized loss on reacquired debt, that are 2 considered potential stranded costs, should be 3 addressed through established means such as a 4 request for increased rates, a generic Commission 5 ruling on stranded costs, or a request for a 6 limited proceeding to allow for additional costs. 7 Such proceedings provide the opportunity to examine 8 both increased and decreased costs as well as 9 generally applicable Commission policy on stranded 10 costs. This would provide all parties due process 11 and preserve the public interest. This is 12 particularly true when the utility is in an 13 overearnings situation. 14

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15 Q What is the appropriate revenue forecast
16 to be used to determine the level of additional
17 expenses allocated to this Plan? (Issue 1)

Allowance of accelerated amortization 18 A should be based on need and should not be a 19 function of FPL's growth in revenue. If the 20 Commission allows recovery of the expenses 21 allocated to the Plan, the Commission should simply 22 direct FPL to write-off those amounts over an 23 appropriate period. The Commission should not 24

allow FPL to manipulate its earnings and achieved 1 return for the reasons previously stated regarding 2 appropriate management incentives for efficiency. 3 Should the Commission defer a decision to 0 4 decommissioning additional or allow any 5 dismantlement expense until there has been a full 6 examination of FPL's nuclear decommissioning and 7 fossil plant dismantlement studies? (Issue 2) 8 9 Yes. There is no demonstrated need to A allow the write-off of these claimed theoretical 10 reserve deficiencies in 1998 and 1999. FPL's 11 annual allowance for decommissioning costs was 12 increased as recently as 1995 from \$38 million to 13 The magnitude of the additional 14 \$85 million. expenses to be allowed under the Plan (\$33.5 15 million for fossil dismantlement and \$484.4 million 16 for nuclear decommissioning) and the potential to 17 address offsetting and decreased costs that have 18 been identified or that may be identified in the 19 upcoming studies (for example, possible decreased 20 inflation expectations) indicate the comprehensive 21 22 dismantlement and decommissioning studies, due to 23 be filed by October 1, 1998, need to be reviewed to determine if there actually is a need to book 24

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additional amortization expense. There is no record evidence indicating whether or not the claimed reserve deficiencies are life-related and if there are intergenerational equity concerns relating to accelerated amortization of these expenses.

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By any measure, the amounts associated 7 with the claimed fossil and nuclear decommissioning 8 reserve deficiencies are tremendous. In my 9 opinion, it would be prudent to have comprehensive 10 studies, in hand, that demonstrate that a 11 significant theoretical reserve deficiency exists 12 before overearnings are reduced to offset the 13 claimed deficiency. 14

15 Q Should the Commission consider whether 16 FPL has reserve depreciation surplus balances for 17 any of its plant accounts to offset depreciation 18 reserve deficiencies? (Issue 3)

19AYes. Where applicable, the Commission20should apply any depreciation reserve surplus21balances for plant accounts against depreciation22reserve deficiencies.

Should FPL be authorized to record, in an 0 1 unspecified depreciation reserve, an expense amount 2 the amounts to correct any greater than 3 depreciation reserve deficiency, write-off the 4 unamortized loss on reacquired debt, correct any 5 fossil dismantlement reserve deficiency, and 6 correct any nuclear decommissioning reserve 7 deficiency? (Issue 5) 8

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9 A No. There is no identified depreciation 10 reserve deficiency. Consequently, there is no 11 sound regulatory reason (other than for potential 12 stranded costs for which there is no record 13 evidence in this docket) to create an unspecified 14 depreciation reserve rather than providing rate 15 relief.

Q Please summarize your testimony.

The Plan should not be extended because 17 A it is not in the public interest. It allows FPL to 18 accelerate expenses that should be attributed to 19 incentives for future periods, it removes 20 management efficiency inherent in traditional 21 ratemaking practices, and it allows additional 22 charges without addressing decreased costs and 23 imprudently incurred costs. The Plan results in 24

unreasonable rates, excessive compensation, and
 intergenerational inequity.

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Recovery of regulatory assets, such as 3 the unamortized loss on reacquired debt, that could 4 be considered potential stranded costs, should be 5 addressed through established means such as a 6 request for increased rates, a generic Commission 7 ruling on stranded costs, or a request for a 8 9 limited proceeding to allow for additional costs. Such proceedings provide the opportunity to examine 10 both increased and decreased costs. This would 11 provide all parties due process and preserve the 12 13 public interest.

14 The additional amortization expense 15 allowed under the Plan for fossil dismantlement and 16 decommissioning reserve deficiencies should be 17 delayed until the upcoming comprehensive studies 18 can be reviewed to determine if there actually is a 19 need to book additional amortization expense.

20 Finally, it appears a major element of 21 the Plan is to permit FPL to offset growth in 22 revenues and earnings by accelerating the recovery

of regulatory assets to minimize FPL's potential stranded costs. There is no basis in the record to allow accelerated asset recovery in contemplation of competition or to mitigate the potential for stranded costs.

The Commission approved Plan cited in 6 Order No. PSC-96-0461-FOF-EI indicated the 7 Commission would address the final determination 8 of the fixed \$30 million of additional nuclear 9 amortization in a future proceeding such as a 10 generic stranded cost docket. I believe the 11 Commission should establish a defined regulatory 12 policy in such a docket or in a rulemaking 13 proceeding before authorizing further accelerated 14 amortization of, potentially, over \$840 million. 15

Q Does this conclude your testimony?

16 17

A Yes, it does.



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deficiencies for varieur production plant (\$47.9 M), than to the reserve to eff a portion of the nut amount of book-but limiting differences that were fic record Set 10 100 (UA W

rd (\$58.3 M). of \$78.8 MD. ra (\$20.1 M ŝ

differences (\$58.7 ki), then the Cumpany will appl **Similar** Ņ der of book n at 12-(1280 ā d loos on re accruit 10 6 In 1987, FPC will 8

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Docket No. 970410-EI

Page 1 of 2

Mark A. Cicchetti, Exhibit 1 FPL Revenue Forecast

DOCKET NO. BEASER EL					
DOCKET NO. 950359-EI ACCRUALS-TO-DATE					
Actuals through July, 1997	Accrual				
(millions of doilars)			1997	Total Accruais,	
	Targets,	4000	2013		
	1996-7	1996	Accruais	1996 and 1997	Accrual
	(See Note)	Accruals	(to date)	(to date)	Balance
1 FIXED ACCRUALS					
2 Nuclear Amortization	\$60.0	\$30.0	\$17.5	\$47.5	\$12.5
3					
4 VARIABLE ACCRUALS					
5 Reserve Deficiencies (nuclear)	\$49.2	\$49.2	\$0.0	\$49.2	\$0.0
6 Reserve Deficiencies (other)	\$60.3	\$60.3	\$0.0	\$60.3	\$0.0
7 Book-tax Timing Diff.	\$78.7	\$20.1	\$58.6	\$78.7	\$0.0
8 Loss on Reacquired Debt (\$282 M at 12-96)	\$282.0	\$0.0	\$54.4	\$54.4	\$227.6
9 Subtotal (Variable only)	\$470.2	\$129.6	\$113.1	\$242.7	\$227.6
10 (Sum of Lines 5-8)	2011/02/2	6.1223.0			
11					
12 TOTAL ACCRUALS					
13 Fixed plus Variable	\$530.2	\$159.6	\$130.6	\$290.2	\$240.1
	4000.2	4100.0	4100.0	42.00.2	
14 (Line 2 + Line 9)					


Note: Accrual Targets include amounts consistant with the amortization schedule for FPL nuclear generating units as described in Order No, PSC 95-0672-FOF-EI in Docket No. 95039-EI.

> Ducket No. 970410-EI Mark A. Cicchetti, Exhibit 1 FPL Revenue Forecast Page 2 of 2

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
		Docket No. 970410-EI Mark A. Cicchetti, Exhibit 2
	Florida Power & Light	FPL Write-Off Summary
	Write-Off Activity Summary	Page 1 of 1 Based on '97 FP&L Budget 1998 1999
4	1994 1995 1996 Projected	Projected Projected TOTAL
950359-EI: Nuclear Reserve Deficit (\$175.3) Nuclear Plant Amortization Other Production Plant (\$60.3)	\$126.0 \$49.3 30.0 30.0 60.3 20.3 59.2	\$175.3 30.0 30.0 120.0 60.3 79.5
Prior Flow Through (\$79.5) Loss on Reacquired Debt (\$282.7 of SUBTOTAL Docket 950359-EI	est.) \$126.0 \$159.9 \$230.7	\$30.0 \$30.0 \$576.6
970410-EI: Depreciation Reserve Deficiency (Remaining Debt Loss (\$101.2) Dismantlement Deficiency (\$33.5)	1	(\$xxx) ? ? 101.2 0.0 101.2 ? ? ? ?
Decommissioning Deficiency (\$45	4.4)	\$361.2 \$480.0 \$841.3
	Estimate: +DL	
	Estimate: FOL Could Actually book v#40 mill Addutioned	SLOC estimate:
	12 19D	Staff estimate: A)großed up '96 Foreacs:
		B) 10050 booking
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
FPL GROUP



Notes:_

Docket No. 970410-EI Mark A. Cicchetti, Exhibit 3 FPL Asset Book Values Page 1 of 3





Docket No. 970410-EI Mark A. Cicchetti, Exhibit 4 FPL Financial Benchmarks Page 1 of 1

STANDARD AND POOR' FINANCIAL BENCHMARKS FOR AA RATING

BUSINESS POSITION	TOTAL DEBT/TOTAL CAPITAL	EQUITY RATIO*
1	47.0%	53 0%
2	45.5%	54.5%
3	44.0%	56.0%
4	42.0%	58.0%

*The complement of the total debt to total capital benchmark.

BUSINESS POSITION	PRETAX INTEREST COVERAGE
1	3.50X
2	3.65X
3	3.80X
4	4.00X

BUSINESS POSITION

• • * *

- Above Average
- 2 Somewhat Above Average
- 3 High Average
- 4 Average

Source: Standard and Poor's Utility Financial Statistics