25

SWITHDUTALSERN THE CREEK

. :	
1	APPEARANCES:
2	REPRESENTING THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION:
3	
4	RICHARD C. BELLAK, ESQUIRE Associate General Counsel Division of Appeals
5	Florida Public Service Commission
6	2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0862
7	JOE JENKINS LESLIE PAUGH
8	
9	
10	INDBX PAGE
11	Hearing Commenced 3 Hearing Concluded 49
12	
13	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 50
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

PROCEEDINGS

MR. BELLAK: Good afternoon.

Pursuant to the notice -- the memorandum that we sent on November 12th, 1997, we wanted to schedule a meeting among parties and other interested persons with respect to this docket, 97-1313.

When we first started working on it, I -I noticed that I was getting a lot of feedback
from various interested persons, and some
filings to the effect that this was not in some
ways the usual petition for declaratory
statement, and there were numerous opinions
offered as to how it departed from the norm,
and what procedural kinds of allowances should
be made for that.

I felt that it would be useful if we got the suggestions from as many people that wanted to contribute to that dialogue as were pleased to do so.

So I welcome you to this meeting. I don't know if everyone here wishes to speak, or simply to listen to what others are saying.

But I would suggest that we'll simply go around the room in order.

б

And before you -- you give your comments,

I'd appreciate it if you'd identify yourself,

and on whose behalf you are speaking.

The notice talks about the procedural element of this. I -- I understand that in addressing the procedural element, you will want to talk to some extent about the substance so as to give an indication of where -- what direction you're heading in, and that's perfectly appropriate.

So why don't we just start going this way around the table.

MR. McWHIRTER: My name is John McWhirter, and I'm here representing IMC Agrico, which is the petitioner in the proceeding.

As I understand it, we're limiting the discussion to the self-generation petition?

MR. BELLAK: I think it's -- it's an informal discussion. If you want to go beyond that, that's not a problem.

MR. McWHIRTER: Well, our position is very simplistic. The -- the law is very clear that customers are entitled to self-generate. The only thing that gives us any doubt is the business structure that's used for

self-generation, whether we do it with internal capital or devise another approach to the financing.

And in this case, the approach that's been chosen is very similar to, if not exactly the same, as the approach that's been previously approved by the Commission in the Seminole case, and to a great degree in the Monsanto declaratory statements.

What we've done is there will be assets that will be transferred from IMC Agrico to a limited partnership. IMC Agrico will be a general partner of that partnership, and will have control of the assets. We'll assume all the risks that are incident to operation of 120 megawatts of the power plant.

For economies of scale, we've entered into an arrangement with Duke Energy Power Services, which is a company that wants to build a merchant plant in Florida.

And if the Commission approves, we would like to jointly build a facility which will be a little bit larger and, as a result, will be able to operate more efficiently, and achieve better results in keeping with the Commission's

conservation policies and rules.

So the single issue that we are asking you to approve in our petition is whether or not the business structure constitutes self-generation, and then removes the IMC Agrico component of this plant from the Commission's jurisdiction and regulation.

We strongly feel that the declaratory judgment -- or declaratory petition process is the appropriate process. It addresses only the single needs of IMC Agrico. It's -- you're not developing a theory of general statewide policy, you're not establishing significant precedent by the ruling on the specific character of our operation.

And we feel that the most important thing to us is that the issue be restricted to our petition about which there's no material factual dispute; and, secondly, that you adhere to the normal time line for dispositions of declaratory statements as provided in the statute.

And we sincerely hope that the Commission will not allow the proceeding to become a chaotic proceeding in which a lot of people

્રામાં કુંગ્રેન્ટ્રિયા કુંગ્રિયા કુંગ્રેન્ટ્રિયા કુંગ્રેન્

come in and attempt to intervene in the case. It's really one that deals only with our business structure aspect.

I think that's essentially it from our viewpoint. We welcome all these other people who've come to help with us our petition, and to enlighten as to what it's about.

One of the things it's not about is what Tampa Electric's revenue requirements are going to be after the turn of the century in this plant. It's about the business structure of our self-generation proposal.

MR. BELLAK: Thank you.

MR. McGEE: We -- my name is Jim McGee.

I'm here on behalf of Florida Power

Corporation.

Florida Power submitted a petition to intervene. It was actually filed on Friday.

And I understand, as John says, that customers are allowed to self-generate. But that -- I guess, really is the issue that's raised in this proceeding as to whether the fairly complicated proposal that IMC is putting forward represents self-generation, or whether it's some form of a retail sale.

As we read the precedent in the cases that Mr. McWhirter cites, the emphasis that the Commission has placed in the past is on the transfer of interests that are of the -- that are in the nature of ownership interests that are being transferred from the owner of the facility to the consumer of the output from that facility.

If it was a case of true self-generation, like some of the other co-gen operations that are used by IMCA, you'd have a complete identity of interest between the owner of the facility and the consumer, and we wouldn't have the issues that are presented to the Commission.

Here we have one entity who owns the facility, and we have IMCA who will consume -- and they are different entities, so I think it's appropriate that critical attention on the -- how the risks of ownership are being transferred.

And unfortunately, we haven't been able to determine how the risk of ownership will be transferred because they aren't presented in the petition. There's some general references

to how that will take place.

So from a procedural standpoint,

Florida Power thinks it's important that we have, first, the opportunity to participate in the proceeding because if it, in fact, is not a case of self-generation, then this will represent sales to a retail customer of Florida Power's.

So, number one, we'd have to have the opportunity to participate.

And number two, we have to have the procedural needs to be able to explore the -- and develop the information necessary for the Commission to determine whether or not the -- an ownership interest passes to IMCA through this lease. They allege that in their petition, and we aren't able to determine that from what's been provided so far. We need the opportunity to develop that.

MR. DOLAN: No comment.

COURT REPORTER: Your name, sir?

MR. DOLAN: Vinny Dolan. Florida Power.

I don't have any comment.

COURT REPORTER: I still have to write that down. And I have to identify, sir.

MR. SASSO: I'm Gary Sasso. I'm from Carlton, Fields also representing Florida Power Corporation. MR. WRIGHT: My name is Robert Scheffel Wright. I'm an attorney with Landers & Parsons here in Tallahassee. represent Duke Energy Power Services, comma, LLC.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

В

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Duke Energy is the joint venture partner of IMC Agrico with respect to this project, and the Duke entity would, as explained in our petitions, lease the balance of the plant's capacity that is not used by IMCA for its own self-generation purposes, and sell that power on a merchant basis to the wholesale market.

I really don't have anything to add to the comments by my colleague, Mr. McWhirter. And I agree with everything he said.

MR. GUYTON: My name is Charlie Guyton. I'm with the law firm of Steel, Hector & Davis. We represent Florida Power & Light Company, who has not yet petitioned to intervene in this case.

MR. KESSEL: I'm Roger Kessel representing Tampa Electric Company.

We have intervened in this case. We do not believe that the -- the record is adequate to grant the relief requested, mainly a determination that the project as described in the petition constitutes self-generation.

Indeed, we think that the -- the assertions are so generalized and at such a high level of description, that it really constitutes a request to -- amounts to almost a resolution in the sense of seeking authorization for something that has not yet been fully described.

The -- we believe that it's more likely than not that the -- that when the facts emerge, that the projects will constitute a retail sale by Duke Energy. We believe that we ought to be afforded the opportunity to participate in proceedings to establish that fact. Tampa Electric and its ratepayers have a significant interest, because if the -- if, in fact, it is a retail sale, there will be a significant cost shifting to our ratepayers. And if the ratepayers are not deemed to be responsible then to Tampa Electric itself for the -- for the revenue shortfalls.

This case constitutes a case of first impression in the state. The Seminole case and the -- the Monsanto case are purely financing cases.

In each of those situations, Monsanto and Seminole had complete and total control over the project. They were the sole general partners, they were the sole operators, and they were purely financing devices.

This case involves an allocation of interest in the project between IMCA and -- and Duke. And it's of critical importance for a determination as to whether or not a retail sale is involved to look very closely at each of the -- the arrangements and the definitive agreements evidencing those arrangements allocating the cost responsibility and risks, control, and economic interests of the project.

For example, it would be of critical importance to know that the market value of the assets contributed by Seminole, in fact, are in the same proportion to the claim like capacity; that there is no opportunity for capacity calls, or capacity give-ups; and that they be fixed at the outset.

б

It's of critical importance to know whether or not the lease term is co-extensive with the economic life of the assets or not.

It's of critical importance to know whether or not IMCA is assuming all the risks of ownership, including the risks of force majeure, or whether they are being laid off on -- on Duke or affiliates of Duke.

And I could go on and on and on. But that's not why we're here, to argue the substance. But to point out to the Commission, that in a case of such significance of this cage in terms of a direct challenge, we believe, to the regulatory -- to the regulatory framework of the state, that it is appropriate to -- to enable those who can contribute to the establishment of a kind of record that the Commission needs, to be confident that it's rendering an adequate decision, that we be allowed to participate. Particularly when there's no question that our interests, as a regulated utility, and the interests of our retail customers are directly and significantly affected.

MR. WILLIS: I'm Lee Willis representing

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Tampa Electric. I think that one thing that's evident by the number of people that are here, and by the calls that you've received is that this is an extremely important case. It's a watershed case. It's one that has the potential of -- of shifting the regulatory framework to some degree.

And it's extremely important that the Commission have the input from the various parties that are -- are directly affected by, and that can provide you with -- with useful information to help you develop both the facts and the -- and the policy that'll be decided here.

You -- the Commission has a -- a lot of discretion with respect to how it allows participation in declaratory judgment proceedings, and in other proceedings.

And in this instance, I think there's no question but that the importance of this, the fact that it's a question of first impression, we believe, speaks volumes for allowing full participation.

I think that the petition also speaks volumes for what's not alleged in it. I think

В

1.0

that Mr. Kessel outlined some of those things, but there is a factual dispute about what is the structure of this transaction. We've had a cursory outline of what it is. And there are innumerable ways that risks can be shifted and settled in not so subtle ways. And those things need to be explored.

In fact, we believe that you don't have sufficient allegation of sufficient detail of the particularity that's required of you to -- to reach a conclusion.

I'd also point out that there's been a lot of discussion about the Monsanto case, the Seminole fertilizer case. Well, those cases were decided with respect to the particular facts and circumstances before those particular petitioners, and shouldn't be precedent for --- for someone else.

It -- either -- either they were -- just dealt with that particular petitioner, or they attempted to do something else and was not really allowable in a petition for declaratory statement.

In any event, whatever procedures that are struck with this, it's very important that we

be allowed to participate, and that the Commission give a thorough review of the situation.

MR. BELLAK: Thank you.

Have you given any thought to the nature of the hearing as between a 127.57(2) or a (1)

MR. WILLIS: Well, we have discussed that. We believe that it's the kind of proceeding that really involves a factual dispute of disputes of material fact, and a full 120.57(1) hearing is -- is warranted in this.

MR. BELLAK: Even though it's a declaratory statement?

MR. WILLIS: Well, it -- we could call a lot of things a declaratory statement. But whether or not that's really what its nature is, or should allow to stand as such, perhaps the first action that should be considered is whether it should be denied as such because of failure to have a sufficient detail in it.

But it's extremely important to -- to flesh out and understand and develop the facts of what this proposed transaction is. There

are a lot of statements in it, and maybe it's this and maybe it's that.

There's such things as there are going to be co-partners. Well, what percentage and what -- exactly what does that mean, which is -- that one situation is very different than Seminole Fertilizer where there was a single general partner.

But facts like that I think could be -- could be best developed in a formal hearing.

MR. LONG: My name is Harry Long. I'm representing Tampa Electric Company. And I'll reserve comment for now.

Thank you.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: My name is

Joe McGlothlin. With John McWhirter, I

represent IMC Agrico.

I'll rely on my partner's comments, except to point out -- correct one statement by Mr. Kessel when he said that Tampa Electric has intervened. They filed a petition to intervene. We filed a response to that in opposition, and both those matters are pending now.

MR. BELLAK: I don't know who that's not

б

1	at the table wants to speak. So
2	MR. BRYANT: My name's Bill Bryant
3	representing Enron. And I'll reserve comment.
4	MR. JENKINS: My name is Joe Jenkins. I'm
5	with the PSC staff.
6	MR. BASFORD: I'm Dick Basford
7	representing Enron. I have no comments.
8	MS. HERSHEL: Michelle Hershel. I'm with
: 9	Florida Blectric Cooperative Association. In
10	particular, two of my members, Peace River
11	Blectric Cooperative and Seminole Electric
12	Cooperative.
13	We have not intervened, but we are
14	planning a petition to intervene.
15	MR. BELLAK: Any other comments from
16	anyone?
17	Any other comments from those who have
18	already spoken?
19	I guess that's it then. I guess we can
20	adjourn.
21	(Discussion off the record.)
22	MR. BELLAK: Okay. We apparently have all
23	of our ducks in a row, and I appreciate the
24	the input we've gotten. I don't know that we
25	have anything more to do at this particular

and the Carry of the second

meeting.

I have to discuss this aspect of the case with the prehearing officer, who is Susan Clark. And we will speedily come to a conclusion as to how to handle this procedurally. And commence whatever further processing of these declaratory statements is entailed.

MR. WILLIS: Could I just add a couple of remarks to what my colleague, Mr. McWhirter, said?

This case is not going to determine anybody's substantial interests, other than IMC's 97-1313. This is a case that involves whether the -- as John put it, any customer in Florida has a right under law to self-generate.

The question here is whether the business structure that IMC proposes to use to implement its self-generation plants is a retail sale making some party to it a public utility, or nonjurisdiction self-generation.

Secondly, as -- just as to the pure procedural issue, the petitions for declaratory statement, and declaratory statements

themselves, are exactly what they are.

Petitioners asked the Commission, based on a set of alleged facts -- or asked any Agency, based on a set of alleged facts, what the legal conclusion applying to the Agency's statutes and rules to those facts will be.

The agency grants or denies the declaratory statement, or -- you will recall, sometimes a declaratory statement is declared to the negative, and you get the opposite of what you want.

Just as a pure legal procedural matter, that's -- that's really all that's going on here. And we -- we'd submit to you that we've alleged extensive facts with probably more particularity than that that was alleged in the other cases that are -- on similar or nearly the same subject matter that the PSC has decided by declaratory statements.

MR. LONG: Well, I think, you know, the heart of the matter here is the question of whether IMC ultimately will bear all of the risks of ownership. And I would submit that none of the facts that have been asserted make that demonstration.

I think IMC's position, Duke's position is to have the Commission assume the validity of these assertions and proceed to issue a declaratory order.

But I doubt very seriously that either

Duke or IMC are prepared to come back to this

Commission once they have actually put their

deal together and -- and have those assertions

tested.

And the point is, if those assertions are not tested, and they go ahead and build the plant, the damage is done. And the damage certainty to Tampa Electric would be significant, as we have outlined in our petition to intervene.

The Commission, if it does not require these companies to be specific about their O&M agreement, their partnership agreement, and all the other key agreements that will define the risks and reward to the party, then the Commission may well lose control.

Mr. McWhirter says that his view is that this -- this proceeding is nonprecedential, it applies only to IMC. However, I find that a little bit inconsistent with his reliance on

Monsanto and -- and Seminole, which were also declaratory proceedings.

Δ

And I think the lesson is quite obvious that this matter -- whether the Commission intends it to be or not, will be precedential. And given that fact, I just don't think the Commission can afford to take these assertions at face value.

MR. McWEIRTER: Let me ask learned counsel a question. IMCA already produces
120 megawatts of power. And you've never had any trouble with it before when we sought self-generation.

What is it -- and you didn't seek the arrangements that we had with the developer under those circumstances, you didn't seek what kind of performance and guarantee requirements we had with the manufacturer.

Why is it all of a sudden that this case has become important, when it wasn't important before?

MR. LONG: Well, because we don't think this is a case of self-generation. That's the issue.

MR. McWHIRTER: And, clearly, if IMCA were

funding it itself without -- through a developer without the participation of depths, then you would have no complaint whatsoever?

MR. LONG: Well, you bring up a very good point, and one that ties into a suggestion that we had to make.

It seems to me in addressing IMC's petition, as we've said, ultimately the Commission has to see final contract language. But even before you get to that stage, it seems to me that the Commission might do well to define the guidelines and criteria that distinguish self-generation from a retail sale.

In its past orders, the Commission has focused primarily on the incidence of ownership and whether risk resides. But we think under that very broad umbrella, there are many significant -- specific inquiries that need to be made to make that ultimate judgment.

And in our view, one way that the Commission might proceed would be to bifurcate this -- this action, and have Phase I attempt to establish the guidelines so that IMC would have clear guidance, and the parties would have

clear guidance.

1.3

And in a second phase, when they have completed the details of their arrangement, we can then look at whether that final arrangement is consistent with the guidelines.

MR. McWEIRTER: I think one of the reasons the statutes set out 90 days for action is to prevent obstructionism and barriers to proceeding with a legitimate legal question that's really not a factual issue, but a legal issue.

And it seems to us that you're -- what you're saying is, let's have two proceedings, and stretch them out over -- how long a period of time did you have in mind, Harry?

MR. LONG: And how long's it going to take you to negotiate your contracts?

MR. McWHIRTER: Well, the contract is in the process of negotiation, and it could be reformed if the Commission sees some specific issues that give it concern about risk issues, or other issues that would make it retail competition.

MR. KESSEL: I think -- I think that that that's a judgment that -- that you started this

proceeding, and, obviously, you're the one that ultimately has to answer that -- answer that question as to how long it's going to take.

MR. KESSEL: You clearly have some concern with the dimensions of the project given the fact that you did come in for declaratory relief. You indicated that -- that there are no issues of law and issues of fact.

We submit to you that there are issues of law here, that it is necessary to develop a more specific criteria with respect to what constitutes ownership of purposes of self-generation.

And the concept of a bifurcated proceeding would be to use Phase I, perhaps in a one-day hearing, a 120.57(2) hearing, to -- to develop those criteria, to give the parties that are affected an opportunity to present to the Commission more specific criteria that ought to be applied in the determination that's being sought.

It's really hard to say whether or not there are issues of fact here, or simply a failure to present sufficient facts to make a determination.

б

В

But we'd submit to you that the major 1 steps would be taken if it were -- if the 2 hearing -- the proceeding were bifurcated so 3 that at least there could be appropriate 4 joinder on -- given this particular product, 5 and the generalized description that was 6 presented in the petition, what criteria, what 7 to be applied -- the criteria. And then it's 8 really your call as to whether you come back 9 10 and want that additional comfort as to whether or not the deal actually comports with those 11 criteria. 12 Mr. Kessel, the problem MR. McWHIRTER: 13 with your proposition is that you're converting 14 15 a declaratory petition proceeding, which doesn't establish policy, into a rulemaking 16 17 proceeding, which Commission policy is, in fact, established. 18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And we don't have any objection to the Commission developing a rulemaking proceeding independent of our petition.

In fact, you have a merchant plant workshop in process, and that might be the area to do it because every utility in the state ought to be able to participate, and not just

1 2

those who -- for whom IMC Agrico is presently a

4 5

So I would suggest to you that the declaratory statement could go forward in your rulemaking policy, and if the Commission wants to make law and establish criteria for its self-generation, could go on independently in another proceeding.

MR. LONG: Well, you, as premised on a motion, that a petition for declaratory relief is the appropriate vehicle, which I think is also open to question.

MR. KESSEL: The fact of the matter is that the allegations in the petition are inadequate to support a finding that there is no retail sale by Duke, and that there is sufficient attributes of ownership so that one can reach a conclusion that IMCA is engaged in that -- in true self-generation.

We're submitting to you that given the general description in your exhibit as to the limited partnership and how that's going to be constituted, that it's very appropriate for the Commission to articulate certain standards with respect to equity contributions, with respect

2.4

to lease attributes, and with respect to the other -- the other attributes of ownership, the assignment of risk, the cash flows, and what have you, that more specific criteria could be developed to provide you the interpretive relief that you want to guide your project.

There's nothing, as far as I know, in the declaratory statement rules that require a yea or nay.

And in this particular case, you're asking that the -- that approval be given on the basis of a petition that is willfully and lacking in the specific details necessary for the Commission to give a -- a responsible -- make a responsible determination.

MR. McWHIRTER: Do you agree with Mr. Long and myself that IMC Agrico has no obligation to buy electricity from Tampa Electric Company, and the only issue is whether the procedure that we've established for instructing our self-generation project is, in fact, self-generation, and not something else?

MR. KESSEL: The legal issue is whether or not it is a retail sale involved, or whether there is self-generation.

MR. McWHIRTER: And so the business structure -- you're saying the business structure is one that would create a retail sale as opposed to self-generation, and that's the only issue before the Commission.

MR. KESSEL: We are saying, based upon the allegations in the petition, that there is -there are insufficient facts alleged which would permit a determination that the project constitutes self-generation.

MR. McWHIRTER: And is there some basis that sets the precise facts that have to be alleged in order to support a petition for declaratory statement, in your opinion?

MR. KESSEL: We submit to you that a -- a more -- that criteria can be developed to be applied to the -- the particular -- the specific project which is proposed, which would provide guidance to you, the interpretive relief that you want, and in fashioning and designing your project.

MR. WILLIS: Not only that, you said it yourself that, you know, alleged with particularity what your individual circumstance is. And what that means is it means something

1.9

different in different kinds of cases.

And what we're -- we're saying is that the various high level attributes of the transaction that you outline in very broadbrush is not sufficient to meet that -- that criteria.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Well, most of TECO's comments stem from their proposition that IMCA has not adequately described the project. But in terms of consistency, which has been discussed a lot, it is TECO who is inconsistent, because it was TECO who relies on the facts that we've presented to fashion an argument that somehow our situation should be differentiated factually from the Seminole case.

ahead of the game, because we have proposed their petition to intervene on the basis that they don't have standing. And in terms of precedential value, I think one aspect of the prior cases in which parties have attempted to intervene in the declaratory statement that is pertinent here is that facts that Gulf Power wanted to intervene to the Monsanto's type of

statements, are alleged in the same type of -even though they're -- and the Commission
decided that was insufficient to establish
standing. And we've raised that here.

And so when TECO talks about bifurcating the case, you know, they're -- they haven't yet established they have any ability to participate, much less to insist that our declaratory statement case be handled in favor.

MR. LONG: Well, I'd just like to read from a BIO-GEN decision where the Commission addressed this point. It says: The Commission enjoys considerable discretion in deciding who may participate in a declaratory statement proceeding, in the form that that participation will take. Monsanto carries no precedential value here.

This is addressing Florida Power.

Florida Power is not petitioned to intervene in this case, and there are no disputed issues of material fact that would require its participation.

Our understanding of the issues raised in the petition will not be enhanced by consideration of Florida Power's answer.

б

Well, you know, I would submit that unlike Florida Power in that proceeding, we have petitioned to intervene. I think that we have demonstrated in our pleadings that a great deal of necessary information would be added to the record if we were, in fact, allowed to intervene.

So again. I think if -- if we want to look

So again, I think if -- if we want to look at these prior declaratory orders as precedent, it supports our ability to intervene in this proceeding, and to act as a full participant.

To the extent that we're going to regard these prior declaratory orders as being nonprecedential, then they're beside the fact.

MR. McWHIRTER: Harry, you're talking about a bifurcated proceeding.

MR. LONG: Yes.

MR. McWHIRTER: The first proceeding, as I understand it, would be a rule proceeding in which the Commission would develop the rules for the criteria for self-generation?

MR. LONG: No. Basically what we had in mind is that the Commission would determine the guidelines. In other words, expand on the current guideline that the full risk of

б

- 1.7 ·

ownership has to reside with the petitioner.

we think that -- that there are a great many specific tests and inquiries need to be made in order to make that ultimate judgment.

As you well know, in the partnership agreement, the O&M agreement, other site agreements, there is unlimited potential to shift risk away from IMC in the ways that are not obvious to the casual observer.

And our point is that the Commission must be aware of the details of the arrangement.

And as a first step to that, it would be helpful to all of us if the Commission could articulate, with input from the parties, what those guidelines ought to be.

MR. McWHIRTER: What you're saying is for every self-generation project, you have to have a pigeonhole. And unless it fits in this pigeonhole that's established through these criteria, that it won't work?

MR. KESSEL: No. What we are saying -- if I might respond to that -- is either you -- we've got to go to the next level of developing the criteria to be applied to this specific project, and then go the next step, if you want

all the relief you want, and compare the actual development of the documentation of those criteria.

Or in the alternative, fold your tent and go home. You're here too early. You haven't defined fully your deal, and you're asking for a declaratory judgment. And I would submit to you that that's unfair.

MR. McWHIRTER: What kind of pleadings would you submit to the Commission when you went into the joint venture for the Hardee power plant? You came in with a certificate of need. You didn't come in with an approval of the business structure, did you?

MR. KESSEL: We would submit to you that that project did not involve the issue of -- of retail -- unauthorized retail service.

MR. McWHIRTER: Now, with respect to retail service, it would appear to me that the issue is, are customers somewhere being required to pay for this plant. And there's no way that we have requested in our petition that any customer of Tampa Blectric, or any other utility, be required to pay for this plant. The entire risk of the plant lies on

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC.

IMC Agrico.

And to the extent that that risk is shared with the developer, and its merchant portion of the plant, then it has its share of the risk.

But --

MR. LONG: But isn't that irrelevant?

MR. McWHIRTER: That's where the public interest lies.

MR. LONG: But isn't that --

MR, McWHIRTER: Protecting the public.

MR. LONG: But isn't that irrelevant to the question of whether or not there's a retail sale going on here?

MR. McWHIRTER: That's what the retail sale is all about.

MR. LONG: Well, I don't quite agree with that.

MR. McWHIRTER: Do we have an obligation to buy it from you? And the law is, no, we don't have an obligation to buy it from you.

The next aspect of retail sale is if a utility is in the utility business, and customers are going to be -- some other people are going to be asked to pick up the loss, then the Commission's interested in that.

In our case, nobody has asked to pick up the loss, and there's nothing in the record that indicates that anybody is asked to pick up the loss.

So from a procedural thing, establishing some kind of criterion that must develop a pigeonhole and take away all flexibility in construction of power plants that customers might want to come up with for all time, we think would be an exercise in futility. That would quickly become obsolete as technology changes.

MR. WILLIS: But the question is whether there's a retail sale. And under the P.W. Ventures case, there only has to be one, and that is between the separate entity and IMC Agrico. One -- you have -- you have set up a separate legal entity to which -- which will transfer power back to IMCA. That should raise a flag here.

Then you have undertaken to have some sort of a relationship with that -- that entity, which we have alleged is less than a unit of interest in the project. It's not -- you're not the sole general partner, you're not --

there are a number of things that are different. And then there are numerous ways within which risk can be shifted from the customer to this other entity, where, in fact, what is occurring is a retail sale.

And the universe of factors to be considered are not the ones that you have -- have alleged in your -- your petition. And those are what need to be -- they -- the Commission needs to be aware of what all those things should be, and then test your deal against all those various factors. And that's what we want --

MR. McWHIRTER: I think the appropriate procedure, Lee, would be for you to file a petition with the Commission to establish rulemaking procedures in which all utilities in the state could come in and determine what it is that makes a self-generation plant, and what it is that makes a -- a retail sale of electricity by a utility.

And that proceeding should have plenty of study, and take as much time as you want to do it. But I don't see any justification for halting the process that we have underway, that

8.

we've had underway for a year-and-a-half now, trying to reach a logical conclusion that conforms with what the Commission has done in the past.

MR. RESSEL: We submit that the basic issue, as you did in your -- in your petition, is whether or not there's a substantial identity of interest between IMCA and -- as lessee, and -- and the project and ownership in the project. And it's perfectly appropriate to review this on a project specific basis.

Bach project is different, the parties vary. The financial, operating, and other relationships are unique to each one. You've asked for a declaratory judgment. We're -- we're indicating that you've got to provide more details in order to -- in order to make a determination as to whether or not IMCA, in fact, owns the capacity that it's -- it's buying, or whether or not another entity is, in effect, providing retail service.

And we've suggested to help the process of bifurcating it and to establish some criteria specific to this particular project to guide the Commission in making that determination.

1.2

1 MR. McWHIRTER: I haven't heard any time line. What time line did y'all have in 2 3 mind for the bifurcating process? In less than five years? 4 MR. KESSEL: I think the answer is is that 5 the development of the specific criteria could 6 7 well be done within the 90-day period. 8 Then the issue is the ball is back in your court as to how long it's going to take you to Ÿ make the factual -- the factual submission. 10 11 MR. McWHIRTER: So you're prepared to come 12 in, and by December 16th have the -- your idea 13 of what the criteria are ready for submittal to 14 the Commission? 15 MR. KESSEL: I think if the Commission 16 called a hearing, we could be prepared by that 17 date. 18 MR. BELLAK: I'm sorry. Could you repeat 19 that again? 20 MR. McWHIRTER: He says that within 21 90 days -- within the 90-day time frame, which 22 began on October 10th, that criteria could be 23 established. 24 The problem with that approach, of course, 25 is that the criteria might be established in

this particular case, but declaratory statement is not a policy-making procedure, other utilities haven't had an opportunity to participate in what would be a policy-making proceeding. And it would slow down this particular case.

And if the Commission doesn't have a policy on what self-generation is, and we can't use, as you say, Harry, previous declaratory statements for the criteria, then this case can stand on its own.

And we have pointed out the -- what we're doing with clarity. There's no -- no one has disputed what we're doing. We're just saying if you want to know more, you want to get into our confidential information.

And we're saying that the petitions, standing on their own, present a development that we think is a viable development, and the Commission can deal with that.

MR. LONG: Well, and I guess we just disagree with the assertion that there are no policy issues to your petition. I mean, that's why you have a room full of people here, because there are very significant and

far-reaching policy implications associated with your request.

MR. McGLOTHLIN: Are we through again?

MR. BELLAK: I don't know if we have any
other comments or --

MR. McGEE: One thought that crossed my mind about, you know -- I don't know whether this is appropriate or not, but I notice you have a lot of people here who probably have an interest in the companion docket. I don't know if that's the right term. The 97-1337 docket that deals with, and some of the procedural concerns that you've raised here that may or may not, depending on how you look at it, have some application in that other docket.

Would there be any benefit in terms of efficient use of people's times and economy and those sorts of things of discussing the same things for that docket?

MR. BELLAK: I have no objection to it.

If -- if you would like to.

MR. McGEE: I think there were a couple of comments that we had -- at least I think there were a couple comments. But Gary Sasso probably would be the best one to address

that.

MR. SASSO: Again, Gary Sasso of Carlton, Fields.

Some of the statements that have been made today about the appropriate role of a declaratory statement hit home in the other docket.

Obviously a declaratory statement is a vehicle by which a regulated party can ask an agency that regulates it for some clarification of its own rights and responsibilities, vis-a-vis that agency. It is not intended to be.

That means by which a party can get a -an interpretation of a significant rule or -or issue of policy that has ramifications for
other parties. And may have statewide
applicability.

And, of course, in the other docket, Duks is seeking exactly that kind of relief. It's essentially seeking a determination whether the Commission can or should receive from the current law as stated in Nassau, Florida Supreme Court decision.

So we have some grave misgivings about

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC.

whether a declaratory statement proceeding is an appropriate vehicle for entertaining those issues:

And Florida Power does intend to seek intervention in that proceeding. But, again, believes that the declaratory statement format is inappropriate for addressing those issues, and believes that there ought to be a 120.57 type proceeding used to allow all interested parties an opportunity to participate in what is a very significant statewide policy issue raised by the petition in that -- in that matter.

MR. BELLAK: Okay. Well, I'd submit to you that that 97-1337 is a straight-up petition for declaratory statement that asks the significance, is it fair, the relationship with the entities involved to the Commission in its rule as the administrator of Section 403.529.

MR. McWHIRTER: As I understand it, that petition is only to ask the Commission if we can follow the one-stop shopping process that's provided under the Power Plant Siting Act, period.

MR. WRIGHT: Well, actually, that's pretty

ACCURATE STENOTYPE REPORTERS, INC.

technically correct. It's whether the people in the -- we can initiate a need determination, which everybody in the room probably knows is a prerequisite to the proceeding under the Power Plant Siting Act, which I think, everybody knows -- at least in terms of stated positions, would let us use that process. And the Department has indicated that they would let us use the site certification process if the Commission will use the determination. MR. SASSO: If I might expand on my comments, in view of some of these comments. It's real important that this issue of

It's real important that this issue of applicant status not be viewed in a vacuum. The Power Plant Siting Act is not something that can be looked at in isolation as a view to create economic opportunities for plant development.

It's part of an intricate framework of statutory and regulatory regulation of the provision of electric service in the state.

And it was enacted as part of the same legislation that created the ten-year site plan review process. And this pattern of statutory and -- and regulatory treatment of this

industry contemplates that there's going to be a certain role for the Commission to assure adequate and reliable service. And it contemplates that that will be carried out through regulated entities. And the Power Plant Siting Act is a means by which the Commission discharges that responsibility through regulated entities.

And that is the reason that -- that we have Nassau, that's the background of the Nassau decision. It's simply a recognition of the important role, and the unique role, that regulated public utilities play in this state.

And of the fact that the Commission regulates and discharges its obligation for adequate service through these utilities.

And essentially, I mean, we can -you know, downplay what -- what Duke is seeking
in that case, but it's not simply to be given
a -- a declaration that affects only its
interest, but it's really a transformation of
the regulatory framework here. And whereas the
utilities -- the public utilities in the state
now occupy a unique position in this
framework. Duke essentially means to change

E

20°

all that.

And quite frankly, in its petition asks the Commission to interpret Florida

Supreme Court precedent. It's obviously at issue in this case.

And to say that this involves simply an isolated issue of importance only to Duke is to really bury one's head in the sand.

The Commission staff held a workshop in which many people participated quite vigorously. These issues are obviously of great importance to many people of this state.

MR. McWHIRTER: One unrelated subject.

The Commission has ex parte rules with respect
to furnishing notice of the tenor of
conversations that are had. And you indicated
a lot of people had inquired of your
department.

I -- for a procedural matter, I think it would be helpful when people do contact you, you notify the other parties and --

MR. BELLAK: Well, we have a staff contact rule, and neither the staff contact rule nor the ex parte rule in the statute, which is -- I think it's 350.042 -- both of them exempt

declaratory statement proceedings.

So I'm not assuming that those -- either the statute or the rule has any applicability.

MR. McWHIRTER: And the procedure in this case, then everyone can privately talk to the staff without notice to anyone else while you're making your decision?

MR. BELLAK: Well, it's not my decision.

All I'm doing is forwarding some
recommendations to the Commission, who will
make the decision. And they are also exempt
from the ex parte prohibition because a
declaratory statement is involved.

And my -- guessing off the top of my head as to the reasoning behind that distinction, it occurs to me that because it's purely a legal determination, and everybody is entitled to forward their opinion of legal determination.

There isn't a factual dispute, per se, at least at first blush, involved in a declaratory statement proceeding.

I know that some commenters are saying that that's the reason this goes beyond that, and I understand that. But I'm just trying to reason as to why that's exempt.

MR. McWHIRTER: Okay. But there's no prohibition against you notifying the participants in the case of the contacts that have been made so that we can respond intelligently to --

MR. BELLAK: Well, there's no prohibition. But unless I -- unless it's required, I wouldn't get into it, because I'd have to retroactively go back and think about every conversation I've ever had with anybody about this.

MR. McWHIRTER: Well, we could do it from this day forward satisfactorily.

MR. BELLAK: I know. But I think that would be vitiating the intent of excluding it. I think if the Legislature wants to exclude it in the statute, or the Commission wants to exclude it by rule, they tell us.

And if they don't, then I've got to assume they don't want us to.

Well, if there are no other comments, this has been extremely helpful, and appreciated by me particularly. I'm glad that Joe Jenkins had a chance to hear most of it. I'm sure that he appreciates it very much, too.

```
And if there are no further comments,
 1
 2
          I guess we'll adjourn.
               Thank you all.
 3
                (The informal meeting/workshop was
 4
          concluded at 2:06 p.m.)
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
1,4
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

1	CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
2	
3	
4	STATE OF FLORIDA:
5	COUNTY OF LEON:
6	I, LAURIE L. GILBERT, do hereby certify
7	that the foregoing proceedings were taken before me
8	at the time and place therein designated; that my
9	shorthand notes were thereafter translated; and the
10	foregoing pages numbered 1 through 49 are a true
11	and correct record of the aforesaid proceedings.
12	I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not a
13	relative, employee, attorney or counsel of any of
14	the parties, nor relative or employee of such
15	attorney or counsel, or financially interested in
16	the foregoing action.
17	DATED THIS 19TH day of NOVEMBER, 1997.
18	
19	Lourie & Albert
20	LAURIE L. GILBERT, RPR, CCR, CRR 100 Salem Court
21	Tallahassee, Florida 32301 850/878-2221
22	
23	
24	
25	