

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In Re: Joint Petition for)
Determination of Need for an)
Electrical Power Plant in Volusia)
County by the Utilities Commission,)
City of New Smyrna Beach, Florida,)
and Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach)
Power Company Ltd., L.L.P.

DOCKET NO. 981042-EM

October 12, 1998

RECEVED-FPSC

SECT 12 PH 4: 22

RECEVED AND
RECEVED AND

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

MICHAEL D. RIB

ON BEHALF OF

FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION

RECEIVED & FILED

FPSC-BUREAU OF RECORDS

DOCUMENT WITHER - DATE

1 308 CCT 128

FPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING

IN RE: JOINT PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF NEED FOR AN ELECTRICAL POWER PLANT IN VOLUSIA COUNTY BY THE UTILITIES COMMISSION, CITY OF NEW SMYRNA BEACH, FLORIDA AND DUKE ENERGY NEW SMYRNA BEACH POWER COMPANY LTD., L.L.P.

DOCKET NO. 981042-EM

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL D. RIB

1 Q Please state your name and business address. 2 My name is Michael D. Rib, and my address is One Power 3 Α Plaza, 263 13th Avenue South, St. Petersburg, FL 4 33701-5 5511. 6 7 By whom are you employed and in what position? Q 8 I am presently the Director of Resource Planning at 9 A Florida Power Corporation (FPC), a regulated investor-10 11 owned electric utility. 12 13 Please describe your duties and responsibilities with FPC. 14 Q 15 16 Α I am responsible for the development of energy resource plans that combine fuel and generating resource 17 18 alternatives into cost-effective and flexible plans to 19 serve our customers. I am also responsible for reporting 20 these plans to the agencies in the State, as appropriate 21 under the current regulatory framework. In the course of

1		carrying out my responsibilities, I have become generally
2		familiar with the regulatory framework applicable to
3		planning and siting new generation in Florida.
4		
5		
6	Q	Please summarize your educational background and
7		experience.
8		
9	A	I earned a B.S. degree in Mechanical Engineering from the
10		Virginia Polythechnic Institute (VPI & SU) in 1981. I am
11		a member of Pi Tau Sigma, the national honor society for
12		Mechanical Engineering and a registered Professional
13		Engineer in Florida.
14		
15		
16	Q	Please summarize your employment history and work
17		experience.
18		
19	A	Following several technical internship positions, I joined
20		FPC's staff in 1981. I worked for four years in the
21		Company's New Technology Department working on applied
22		technology development projects. From 1985 through 1993,
23		I worked in the Fossil Production area with varying
24		progressive responsibilities in plant engineering and

1		maintenance as well as environmental management and
2		project construction. In 1994, I joined the planning
3		team, with progressive responsibilities leading to my
4		current position.
5		
6		
7	Q	Have you previously appeared before regulatory
8		authorities?
9		
LO	A	I routinely present Company plans and represent the
L 1		Company's position with the Florida Public Service
12		Commission (the Commission) and the Florida Reliability
13		Coordinating Council (FRCC).
14		
15		
16		PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
17	Q	What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?
18		
19	A	I am testifying on behalf of FPC in opposition to the
20		Joint Petition for a determination of need. My testimony
21		describes the relationship between the statutory planning
22		responsibilities of retail utilities, such as FPC, and the
23		procedures for determining the need for new generation
24		capacity in this State. I also discuss how merchant

plants fall outside this process and how their
introduction into this process will impair the ability of
the Commission and retail utilities to meet their
statutory responsibilities. Finally, I explain why the
petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the proposed
Project is "needed," as that term is understood in the
utility industry in Florida.

10 Q Please summarize your testimony.

A Retail utilities in Florida, like FPC, have the statutory responsibility to plan for new generation capacity through the 10-year site plan process and to engage in related conservation planning under the Florida Energy and Efficiency Conservation Act (FEECA). These planning responsibilities are integrally related to siting new generation capacity under Section 403.519 and the Electric Power Plant Siting Act (the Siting Act) and to the development of demand side management (DSM) and conservation programs under FEECA. In fact, Section 403.519 is a part of FEECA, and the 10-year site plan requirement was adopted as part of the same law that included the Siting Act.

Utilities like FPC -- which must plan for new generation only on the basis of firm commitments that it can count on -- may not rely on Duke's mere stated intentions to market power in this State when and where it chooses. Neither can the Commission. The future intentions of merchant plant developers like Duke are not foreseeable or enforceable. Allowing merchant plants to intrude themselves into our regulatory system will serve only to create confusion and to impair planning for new generation capacity.

The "need" criteria in Section 403.519 are utility specific. Only retail utilities like FPC have a need for generating capacity since only such utilities have a statutory duty to serve customers. A merchant plant does not "need" generating capacity and certainly does not need any particular amount of such capacity. A merchant plant developer needs only profits, and can pursue them in many ways. In essence, Duke's petition and testimony are based on Duke's perception that marketing opportunities exist in Florida. But this does not amount to a showing of need in the sense that the term has been used by the industry in this State. Accordingly, the Joint Petition should be denied.

•
_

2

10-YEAR SITE PLAN PROCESS

You have indicated that you are responsible for developing
FPC's plans for generation capacity as part of its 10-year
site plan. Please describe FPC's responsibilities as a
state-regulated utility to assess and plan for adequate
generating capacity to meet its needs for electric power.

8

9

Florida law requires that FPC and other utilities like it 10 Α submit to the Commission a 10-year site plan estimating 11 12 the utility's power-generating needs and the general location of its proposed power plant sites. In recent 13 14 years, FPC has submitted updated 10-year site plans to the Commission (and formerly the Department of Community 15 16 Affairs) annually. To carry out this task, FPC must 17 analyze its existing generating capacity and firm power 18 purchase resources and evaluate whether it must secure additional capacity to serve its customers over the 19 20 planning period.

21

22 Q In addition to FPC's planning obligations under the 10-23 year site plan requirement, does FPC have other statutory 24 planning obligations relevant to this proceeding?

1		
2	A	Yes. Each investor owned utility in this State has
3		important planning obligations under FEECA. Under FEECA,
4		the Commission has developed goals for increasing the
5		efficiency of energy consumption, development of
6		cogeneration, increasing the conservation of expensive
7		resources (such as petroleum fuels), reduction and control
8		of the growth rates of electric consumption, and reduction
9		of the growth rates of weather-sensitive peak demand.
10		Each utility is required to develop plans and programs to
11		meet the overall goals within its service area, subject to
12		the Commission's approval.
13		
14		
15		CONSERVATION PLANNING UNDER FEECA
16	Q	Does the Commission have the authority to require merchant
17		plant developers to prepare conservation plans under
18		FEECA?
19		v¥ .
20	A	No. FEECA applies only to retail utilities, such as FPC.
21		In fact, in the Joint Petition, petitioners make a point
22		of stating:
23 24 25 26		As a federally-regulated public utility selling electricty only at wholesale, Duke New Smyrna does not engage directly in the implementation of end-use energy conservation programs.

1 2 3		Moreover, Duke New Smyrna is not required to have conservation goals pursuant to Section 366.82(2), Florida Statutes. (Jt. Pet., ¶ 35).
4		
5		NEED PROCEEDINGS AND GENERATION PLANNING
6	Q	Are a utility's obligations under the 10-year site plan
7		requirement and FEECA implicated in a need proceeding
8		under Section 403.519?
9		
0	A	Yes, they are. The 10-year site plan requirement, a
1		utility's planning obligations under FEECA, the Power
2		Plant Siting Act, and a need proceeding under Section
L 3		403.519 are all part of a unitary regulatory framework for
4		determining whether, when, and how state-regulated retail
15		utilities should add generating capacity. While there are
L 6		exemptions to certain of these statutory requirements
L 7		($e.g.$, for plants with smaller steam components), they do
L 8		not apply here.
L 9		
20		The related nature of these requirements may be seen
21		from the fact that the site-plan law (Section 186.801)
22		says "All findings by the commission [in its review of a
23		utility's 10-year site plan] shall be made available to
24		the Department of Environmental Protection for its
5		consideration at any subsequent electrical nower plant

1	site certification proceedings." As far as FEECA is
2	concerned, the need provision, Section 403.519, directs
3	the Commission to consider conservation measures taken by
4	or reasonably available to the applicant.

In this context, we can see that Section 403.519 is the means by which the Commission and state-regulated utilities (with a statutory obligation to serve retail customers in this State) carry out plans that will enable those utilities to discharge their obligations to provide adequate generating capacity to serve their customers, while meeting other regulatory obligations, such as those under FEECA.

16 Q Has this understanding of the statutory framework entered 17 into your planning activities for FPC?

19 A Yes. In planning future capacity needs for FPC, I am able
20 to take into account and rely upon only matters within the
21 control and subject to the regulation of the Commission -22 in short, what state-regulated utilities have done or are
23 likely to do (as reflected in their 10-year site plans and
24 FEECA programs). Planning for future capacity needs is

1		difficult enough using these assumptions. To complicate
2		matters, generation planning may not be conducted without
3		regard to transmission system constraints. So, we must
4		factor in what we know and may reasonably predict about
5		both generation resources and, with assistance,
6		transmission system constraints, given existing generation
7		resources and disclosed plans for future construction.
8		
9		
10	Q	As part of this planning process, do Florida utilities,
11		like FPC, plan to provide a reserve margin to ensure that
12		capacity will exist to cover contingencies?
13		
14	A	Yes. FPC plans for a reserve margin above the forecast
15		annual firm load peaks.
16		
17		
18	Q	In developing its 10-year site plan and in calculating its
19		reserve margin, is FPC permitted to take into account
20		plans to purchase power that are not based upon an
21		agreement that provides for the sale to FPC of firm
22		capacity and energy?
23		
24	A	No, FPC may not take the capacity into account at all.

1		
2	Q	Why not?
3		
4	A	The energy contributions would be speculative, at best.
5		Neither FPC nor the Commission can count on having
6		capacity available when FPC actually needs it absent a
7		power sales agreement.
8		
9		
10	Q	Absent a power sales agreement providing for the sale to
11		FPC of firm capacity and energy, would FPC or the
12		Commission be able to rely upon prospective purchases of
13		electrical power from a merchant power plant located
14		anywhere in the State?
15		
16	A	No. Neither FPC nor the Commission would have any
17		assurance that when FPC actually needed the power, it
18		would be available. For example, in circumstances where
19		Northern or Central Florida may be experiencing unusually
20		cold (or hot) weather, it is possible if not probable that
21		states to the north would be experiencing the same or
22		worse conditions. This might provide market opportunities
23		or even business imperatives for a merchant plant to sell
24		its power outside the State. This past summer, the Mid-

West experienced a severe heat wave leading to power shortages and sky-high rates for wholesale power. In such circumstances, neither FPC nor the Commission could expect that a merchant plant located here would agree to market its energy in this State on less favorable terms.

б

Because (1) the Commission has no regulatory jurisdiction over sales by a merchant plant, (2) such plants have no statutory duty to serve customers in this State, and (3) utilities in this State, by hypothesis, would have no contractual entitlement to firm capacity and energy, there would be no mechanism to force merchant plants to meet the needs of retail utilities in Florida when those needs are most severe. In fact, relying on the availability of merchant plant power may lull utilities and the Commission into a false sense of security.

Of course, meeting the needs of utilities during times of shortfall must be distinguished from situations where an abundance of power exists but merchant plants may simply take advantage of market opportunities to displace the output from less modern generating plants in this State. In such circumstances, it is not appropriate to say that the purchasing utilities truly "need" this

1		additional capacity to serve their customers since they
2		could meet their needs without it. In fact, displacement
3		may ultimately lead to the shut down of existing plants,
4		resulting in no net improvement in reliability.
5		
6		As is explained more fully in FPC's testimony by Mr.
7		Vincent Dolan, under the existing regulatory framework,
8		utilities and the Commission have prudently anticipated
9		that existing plants would enjoy a long, useful life, and
10		they have provided for the recovery of costs for such
11		plants over a corresponding horizon. Switching approaches
12		to a short-term market-driven approach would raise serious
13		planning and regulatory issues that may not be adequately
14		addressed in the context of an <u>ad hoc</u> proceeding for one
15		merchant plant. These issues affect how all retail
16		utilities plan for and build generating capacity in this
17		State, and they involve policy and reliability
18		implications for utility customers.
19		e ^{ast}
20		i veri de la companione
21	Q	If merchant plants were allowed to site plants under

2 Section 403.519 and the Siting Act, would this affect the 22 planning responsibilities of the Commission and utilities 23

like FPC? 24

4	
1	

2 A Yes. This would impair the ability of the Commission and 3 a utility to conduct necessary planning under the Florida 4 regulatory requirements.

As I have explained, merchant plants are not regulated by the Commission and have no statutory duty to serve. Absent power sales agreements for the sale of firm capacity and energy, they have no obligation to sell power in this State whatsoever. This could have a number of serious ramifications for planning by the Commission and state-regulated utilities.

To name some of these considerations, merchant plants would have no duty to participate in the 10-year site plan process. In fact, merchant plant advocate representatives stated in a Staff workshop that they would resist disclosing development plans for merchant plants due to competitive considerations. This means, of course, that plans for merchant plants may be disclosed routinely only at the eleventh hour, frustrating efforts by retail utilities to anticipate their development, size, location, characteristics, and contracting arrangements.

I understand that Duke has now taken the position that it is subject to the 10-year site plan requirement as a "utility" falling within the definition of Section 366.02(2). But this definition applies only to utilities that operate a generation "system" within the State of Florida, and what Duke proposes to build and operate is not a generation "system," but a single power plant like many other investor owned non-utility generators (NUGs) in the State. In any event, to say that this new power plant may be covered by the 10-year site plan process after it is built provides little comfort to planners. Duke did not participate in the 10-year site planning process before it developed its plans, and the Commission and the utilities in this State were at the mercy of Duke's whim about whether, when, or where it would seek to build a In fact, this is the second proposal Duke has advanced in two years, having abandoned the first.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Further, Duke's new position gives little or no assurance about whether plans for <u>future</u> plants would be disclosed in a 10-year site plan. If the Commission creates the precedent of granting a "need" for Duke's merchant plant, other merchant plant developers -- including other subsidiaries of Duke's parent corporation

-- could likewise enter the State, agreeing to participate in the 10-year site planning process only <u>after</u> their plants are built. This further frustrates the planning process.

Allowing merchant plant developers to site plants under Section 403.519 and the Siting Act would create other problems as well. Even if the Commission determines in a formal proceeding that a merchant plant is somehow "needed," despite the fact that only firm power commitments can satisfy a utility's need, the developer may choose to abandon the project after the need determination for any number of business reasons — thus frustrating planning expectations and wasting Commission and utility planning resources — or the developer may choose to commit the plant's output to out-of-state utilities and/or operate at partial capacity for extended periods of time.

If we assume that a "need" does exist for additional capacity, have Petitioners provided assurances in their testimony and exhibits that Duke's Project would meet any such need?

1		
2	A	No, they have not. To the contrary, in its contract
3		documents, Duke takes away with one hand what it purports
4		to be giving with the other.
5		
6		First, it is significant that the Petitioners have
7		not yet entered into a power purchase agreement. They
8		have submitted with their papers a "Participation
9		Agreement." See RLV-1. The Participation Agreement
١0		contemplates that Duke may build a 240 MW power plant, not
1		a 540 MW power plant as the Joint Petition states, and
L 2		that Duke will provide an "entitlement" to the Utilities
L 3		Commission, City of New Smyrna Beach (UCNSB) of 20 MW
L 4		not the 30 MW set forth in the Joint Petition out of
15		the 240 MW capacity. Duke retains as "Additional
16		Development Rights" (see Sec. 6.0) the right to build in
.7		excess of 240 MW and then to provide some apportioned
8		amount of an additional entitlement of 10 MW to UCNSB.
19		
20		This entitlement is qualified by Duke's determination
21		of what is in its own business interests. Under Section
2		1 1 of the Participation Agreement Duke promises to

the Facility . . . is technically capable . . . of

23

24

afford the entitlement only for "the period during which

producing electric energy at a cost that results in a
reasonable profit and cash flow to the owner of the
Facility when such energy is sold." (Emphasis added).
Under Section 1.2, the entitlement is further restricted
to such "hours during which the Facility is available."

The Participation Agreement contains other qualifications and restrictions on the availability of power from the proposed Project. For example, under Section 3.4, Duke reserves the right to <u>abandon</u> the Project based on its assessments of its business interests. Specifically, its obligation to construct the facility is subject to, among other things, "no circumstance or event existing or having occurred that has had or could reasonably be expected to have a material <u>adverse effect</u> on the feasibility, prospects or <u>business</u> of the Facility." (Emphasis added).

Significantly, <u>nothing</u> in the Participation Agreement provides any assurances whatsover that Duke would sell power from the merchant component of the Project at any time or on any terms to any utility in this State.

Although Petitioners' testimony suggests that Duke's current intention is to sell power from the merchant plant

in the State of Florida, it provides no guarantees, and
Duke nowhere represent that it has even a single firm
contract to sell power to any Florida utility. The only
assurance that Duke provides in this regard is its
unenforceable, current business intentions.

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Q As a planner, when you are attempting to assess whether generating capacity is needed for purposes of recommending that FPC request a determination of need under Section 403.519, is it appropriate to consider merchant plant development plans?

13

14 A Under the current statutory and regulatory framework, the 15 answer is no. To understand this from a planner's point 16 of view, it is important again to keep in mind that 17 Section 403.519 and the Siting Act do not exist in a 18 They are an integral part of the regulatory tools 19 in this State for accomplishing the primary statutory purpose of ensuring adequate electricity at reasonable 20 21 cost. In this State, this purpose is accomplished by the 22 Commission, as regulatory agency, and by the retail 23 utilities, as the regulated entities.

From a planning point of view, the question whether generating capacity is "needed," must be asked and answered in this context. In our regulatory system, only state-regulated utilities serve retail customers.

Therefore only state-regulated retail utilities can possibly have a "need" for generating capacity for the purpose of providing adequate electricity at a reasonable cost to the consumers of this State. For this reason, it is meaningless for a utility planner or the Commission to say that a merchant plant is "needed" unless it is needed by a particular utility.

For the same reasons, it makes no sense from the point of view of utility or Commission planning or siting to say that a merchant plant itself is ever "needed," when one takes into account what a merchant plant is. By definition, it has no obligation to sell its power to any utility in this State. Therefore, even if a particular utility or a collection of utilities may need generating capacity, they certainly do not need another power plant facility that has not committed its capacity to the retail utilities in this State. (Even the merchant plant developer does not "need" its own project; any given project represents only a speculative business venture

that may or may not generate profits for the developer.

In truth and in fact, nobody "needs" a merchant plant.)

I presume that this is the reason the Legislature, the Commission, the Florida Supreme Court, and the utilities have all recognized that it makes sense to talk about "needing" an independent power producer's capacity only in the sense of needing a <u>firm commitment</u> by such a particular power producer -- as established by a signed power purchase agreement -- to sell capacity and energy to a particular state-regulated utility with an obligation to serve the people of this State.

If the Commission were to permit Duke to build its merchant plant based on Duke's stated intention to sell power in this State on a merchant basis, FPC and other utilities would have to reconcile this with their current obligation not to rely on non-firm power in their capacity assessments. There is no viable way to do this under the current regulatory framework. FPC cannot rely on the availability of Duke's proposed generating capacity in any way. Neither can the Commission.

1	Q	You have described how "need" as used in Section 403.519
2		and in related planning activities is a utility-specific
3		concept. Are there other respects in which "need" from
4		the point of view of planning and siting must be utility-
5		specific, referring to state-regulated retail utilities?

Α

Certainly. As the Commission and the Florida Supreme

Court have recognized, the criteria in Section 403.519 are

utility-specific criteria, referring to state-regulated

utilities. The first concerns the need for "electric

system reliability and integrity." It is a truism that

the Commission oversees system reliability and integrity

under the Grid Bill through its authority to regulate the

activities of utilities such as FPC. It makes no sense to

talk about "reliability" in the context, for example, of a

merchant plant that cannot be directed to sell its output

in this State.

The next criterion is the "need for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost." Again, it makes no sense from a planning or regulatory point of view to discuss the "need" for something neither the Commmission nor a utility (with the duty to serve customers) can count on and, again, only a retail utility can possibly have a

"need" for capacity, since only such utilities serve the people in this state. Similarly, it makes no sense from a planning or regulatory point of view to talk about ensuring "reasonable cost" in the context of entities that do not charge retail customers for power.

The next criterion is "whether the proposed plant is the most cost-effective alternative available." This simply may not be addressed without asking, "alternative" to what? From the perspective of a merchant plant developer, the developer is considering alternative ways to make money. From the perspective of a state-regulated retail utility, the utility is considering alternative means to ensure sufficient generating capacity to meet its statutory obligation to serve its customers. For planning and regulatory purposes, the statutory criterion applies to decisions made by utilities with the obligation to serve and not to consideration of alternative opportunistic ventures.

The next criterion is that the "commission shall also expressly consider the conservation measures taken by or reasonably available to the applicant or its members."

The petitioners concede that Duke New Smyrna does not take

1		conservation measures required of state-regulated
2		utilities under FEECA. Accordingly, this criterion
3		like all the others must be applied for planning and
4		regulatory purposes as a retail utility-specific
5		criterion.
6		
7		·
8		PETITIONERS' FAILURE TO SHOW NEED
9	Q	Have the Petitioners demonstrated that these "need"
10		criteria are satisfied as they are used in the statute?
11		
12	A	No. They have not and cannot, given the fact that the
13		"need" criteria of the statute are utility-specific
14		criteria. Petitioners have attempted to establish need
15		through the testimony of Dr. Dale M. Nesbitt basically by
16		redefining "need" and turning the statutory criteria
17		upside down.
18		
19		Dr. Nesbitt is blunt in stating at the beginning of
20		his testimony that "I have not approached the question of
21		'need' simplistically by measuring peak Florida demand
22		(expressed in GW); adding up available installed capacity
23		(expressed in GW), and comparing the two using some
24		criterion such as reserve margin or loss-of-load

probability." Nesbitt Direct, p. 14. He says that this approach "misses the fundamental reality that some of the old installed capacity in Florida is higher in cost than the new capacity could be installed for." Id. He says that "[i]nstalling new capacity will eliminate old, uneconomic capacity, obviate the requirement to preserve and/or run it, and reduce the instrinsic cost to generate electricity in Florida." Id. pp. 14-15. He then proceeds to demonstrate that "the Project will be inframarginal relative to virtually all of the existing oil and gas power plants in Florida and will operate in preference to them." Id. p. 22 (emphasis added).

Thus, Dr. Nesbitt is frank in acknowledging that the Project is not needed to meet any perceived or actual shortfall in capacity in relation to projected load. To put this another way, the Project is not needed to enable any retail utility in Florida to serve its customers. What he is contending is that there is a market opportunity in this State for merchant plant developers like Duke to build modern, more efficient plants that will displace existing generating capacity.

Whether or not this is a good idea, it does not address the criteria of Section 403.519. To begin with, as I have explained, the statutory criteria are utility-specific. Petitioners do not even attempt to make a utility-specific showing for the merchant plant component of the Project. Further, Petitioners do not even attempt to show a need for additional capacity by looking at the need of any particular group of retail utilities and demonstrating a shortfall in capacity in relation to projected load. Rather, they start with a showing that Duke can produce energy more cheaply with its Project than some existing plants and reason from this premise that the plant is "needed."

This could be viewed as an unabashed argument in favor of an un-checked proliferation of new power plants in this State, and for a regime that contemplates waves of new construction every several years when entrepreneurs — or state utilities — perceive that new technology creates market opportunities. This is confirmed by the direct testimony of Martha O. Hesse, who anticipates the introduction in this State of a "fleet of gas-fired combined cycle plants." Hesse Direct, p. 19.

1	Of course, the construction of any new plant will
2	have an environmental impact. For this reason, the Siting
3	Act contemplates that none (over a certain size) will be
4	built unless the Commission first determines that the
5	impact is worth it, <u>i.e.</u> , that the generating capacity is
6	really "needed." Like it or not, this is a very
7	deliberate, regulatory approach to plant construction, not
8	a market-driven free-for-all. Petitioners are seeking to
9	circumvent this regulatory approach and have this
10	Commission permit a virtually unrestrained market approach
11	to the issue. Indeed, Dr. Nesbitt relies on models and
12	analyses that assume market deregulation. See, e.g., DMN-
13	15, p. 13 (demonstrating "the way the world will work"
14	"after deregulation").
15	
16	As explained more fully in FPC's testimony by Mr.
17	Dolan, Petitioners' request raises serious policy issues
18	that cannot be adequately addressed in this proceeding and
19	that, in fact, require legislative amendments to Section
20	403.519. In this same vein, Ms. Hesse admits:
21 22 23 24 25 26	Economic efficiency would be served [by merchant plants] as long as the standard assumptions of competitive markets were met. The chief of these in this case is that externalities must be appropriately valued and incorporated into the price of electricity. Whether that would be the case with a
27	fleet of gas-fired combined cycle plants would be an

1 2		<pre>empirical exercise beyond the scope of this testimony</pre>
3		Hesse Direct, p. 19 (Emphasis added). The point I wish
4		to make is that whether or not the Florida Legislature
5		would be receptive to Petitioners' arguments after
6		appropriate hearings, Petitioners' testimony does not
7		prove the existence of "need" under Section 403.519, as
8		the statute has been interpreted and applied by the
9		Commission, the Florida Supreme Court, and the regulated
10		utilities in this State.
11		
12		
13		UNECONOMIC DUPLICATION OF RESOURCES
14	Q	Assuming it had the power to do so, if the Commission
15		allowed merchant plants to be built in this State without
16		power purchase agreements with state-regulated utilities
17		for firm capacity and energy sales, would this lead to the
18		uneconomic duplication of generation and transmission
19		facilities?
20		v ·
21	A	Yes, this would occur. At the recent Staff workshop on
22		merchant plant issues, representatives of various merchant
23		plant developers stated that there was a wide-spread
24		perception that Florida provided significant economic

opportunities for merchant plant development due to its

1	demographic and geographic characteristics. I am aware
2	that such a perception exists, and it is borne out by
3	Petitioners' own testimony in this case, as discussed
4	above. Currently available planning information, however,
5	demonstrates that the retail utilities have plans in place
6	to meet their needs in their respective service
7	territories over the appropriate planning horizon
8	without relying on merchant plants accounting together
9	for all the retail customers in Florida.
10	
11	Although Dr. Nesbitt contends that Florida utilities
12	are currently planning to meet only half of a projected
13	load of 6000 MW, he does not clearly indicate the
14	timeframe over which he is projecting this load, and he
15	appears to be relying on the utilities' 1997 plans.
16	Specifically, he states:
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28	The Altos North American Regional Electricity Model projects economically viable and profitable new additions of up to 6,000 MW of new gas-fired combined cycle ("CC") power plants in Peninsular Florida, which I use synonymously with the Florida Reliability Coordinating Council ("FRCC") region, and several tens of thousands of MW of new gas CC entry elsewhere throughout North America. Our predicted substantial quantity of new installed capacity in Peninsular Florida 6,000 MW is approximately twice the quantity of new capacity that FRCC itself reported to NERC in FRCC's 1997 OE411 Annual Report.
29	Nesbitt Direct, p. 14. FRCC's 1997 10-year Plan, State of

30

Florida, projected installed capacity additions of 3,958

MW for winter, and 3,692 MW for summer. By contrast, FRCC's 1998 Regional Load and Resource Plan projected installed capacity additions of 8,039 MW for winter and 7,611 MW for summer. The plans prepared this year demonstrate that Florida utilities are planning to add significant capacity beyond that projected in 1997. Accordingly, Dr. Nesbitt is mistaken in his discussion of aggregate statewide capacity and is potentially way off the mark on the economic viability of merchant combined-cycle plants in light of the planned generation additions proposed by the regulated electric utilities in Florida. Of course, each utility must assure that it has adequate capacity to meet its own needs, and FPC is doing just that without reliance on merchant plants.

Thus, merchant plant developers will not be supplying power to meet any actual shortfall that the utilities may be experiencing. As Ms. Hesse and Dr. Nesbitt essentially concede, if merchant plants sell their power in this State at all, it will be to utilities that already have sufficient capacity to serve their customers. The net result of this is that merchant plants would simply be taking advantage of newer facilities to undercut production costs from existing facilities that state—

regulated utilities constructed -- under the auspices of the Commission -- pursuant to their statutory obligations in Florida, resulting in economic waste. The statutory and regulatory framework in this State, however, is not oriented toward encouraging a proliferation of opportunistic short-term projects in Florida that are not needed to enable state-regulated utilities to serve their customers. Whether or not this may make sense in the context of a regulatory framework that allows it and adequately ameliorates its negative impacts, it is my understanding that such a framework does not exist in Florida at this time.

Q If the Commission has a concern about whether retail utilities are taking sufficient steps to provide for adequate generating capacity to serve the customers of this State, what recourse does it have?

20 A To begin with, under the 10-year site plan process, the
21 Commission may and does interact directly with the
22 utilities to ensure that it is satisfied about the
23 planning of new generating capacity and the status of
24 utility reserve margins. If the Commission has concerns

about utility planning, FPC has stood ready and continues to stand ready to address these concerns through the site-plan process, as outlined in the statutes, and through the efforts of the FRCC, Florida's designated region of the National Electricity Reliability Council (NERC), the organization responsible for overseeing system reliability in North America.

Further, under Section 366.05, if the Commission determines that inadequacies exist with respect to the energy grids developed by state-regulated utilities, the Commission shall have the power, "after a finding that mutual benefits will accrue to the electric utilities involved, to require installation or repair of necessary facilities, including generating plants . . . with the costs to be distributed in proportion to the benefits received . . . " This provision goes on to direct that the "electric utilities involved in any action taken . . . pursuant to this subsection shall have full power and authority . . to jointly plan, finance, build, operate, or lease generating . . . facilities," using, if applicable, the provisions of Section 403.519 and the Siting Act.

1			CONCLUSION				
2	Q	Does	this	conclude	your	direct	testimony?
3							
4	A	Yes,	it d	oes.			•
5							
6							