BEFORE THE

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	FLORII	DA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
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4	In the	Matter of : DOCKET NO. 981042-EM
5	Joint petition	
6	determination of electrical power	r plant in :
7	Volusia County l Utilities Commis	
8		n, Florida, and:
	Power Company Li	
9		42
10		VOLUME 1
11		Pages 1 through 143
12		****
13	PROCEEDINGS:	HEARING
14	BEFORE:	CHAIRMAN JULIA L. JOHNSON
15		COMMISSIONER J. TERRY DEASON COMMISSIONER SUSAN F. CLARK
		COMMISSIONER JOE GARCIA COMMISSIONER E. LEON JACOBS, JR.
16		
17	DATE:	Wednesday, December 2, 1998
18	TIME:	Commenced at 9:30 a.m.
19	PLACE:	Betty Easley Conference Center
20		Room 148 4075 Esplanade Way
21		Tallahassee, Florida
	REPORTED BY:	JOY KELLY, CSR, RPR
22		Chief, Bureau of Reporting H. RUTHE POTAMI, RPR
23		Official Commission Reporter

24

APPEARANCES:

2 ROBERT SCHEFFEL WRIGHT and

JOHN T. LAVIA, III, Landers & Parsons, 310 West
College Avenue, Tallahassee, Florida 32302, and
STEVEN G. GEY, Florida State University, and MARK
SEIDENFELD, Florida State University, College of Law,
and JOSEPH A. McGLOTHLIN, McWhirter, Reeves,
McGlothlin, Davidson, Decker, Kaufman, Arnold & Steen,
117 South Gadsden Street, Tallahassee, Florida, and
PATRICK K. WIGGINS, law firm of Wiggins & Villacorta,
2145 Delta Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida, appearing
on behalf of Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna
Beach, Florida, and Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power
Company Ltd., L.L.P.

JAMES A. McGEE, Florida Power Corporation,

P. O. Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733-4042, and GARY

L. SASSO, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler,

P.A., Post Office Box 2861, St. Petersburg, Florida 33731,

appearing on behalf of Florida Power Corporation.

JAMES D. BEASLEY and LEE L. WILLIS, Ausley & McMullen, 227 South Calhoun Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32302, appearing on behalf of Tampa Electric Company.

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1	APPEARANCES CONTINUED:
2	WILLIAM B. WILLINGHAM and MICHELLE HERSHEL,
3	P. O. Box 590, Tallahassee, Florida 32302, appearing
4	on behalf of Florida Electric Cooperatives
5	Association, Inc.
6	GAIL KAMARAS, 1114 Thomasville Road,
7	Suite E, Tallahassee, Florida 32303, appearing on
8	behalf of Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation,
9	Inc.
10	JOHN T. BUTLER and CHARLES GUYTON, Steel
11	Hector & Davis, 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 601,
12	Tallahassee, Florida 32301, appearing on behalf of
13	Florida Power & Light Company.
14	ROBERT J. SNIFFEN and JON MOYLE, JR. Moyle,
15	Flanigan, Katz, Kolins, Raymond & Sheehan, P.A., 210 South
16	Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32301, representing U.S.
17	Generating Company.
18	DAVID J. WHITE, 4804 S. W. 45th Street, Suite 100,
19	Gainesville, Florida 32608, appearing on behalf of
20	Florida Wildlife Federation.
21	DONALD F. SANTA, JR., Deputy General Counsel, 220

22 West Main Street, Louisville, Kentucky 40232, appearing on behalf of LG&E Energy Corp.

24

23

APPEARANCES CONTINUED:

LESLIE J. PAUGH and GRACE JAYE, Florida

Public Service Commission, Division of Legal Services,

2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida

32399-0870, appearing on behalf of Staff of the

Commission.

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3	ITEM							PAGE	NO.
4			1	36	Co				19
5	Oral	argument Argument Argument	by by	Mr.	Guyton				50 85
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PROCEEDINGS

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(Hearing commended at 9:30 a.m.)

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Ladies and gentlemen,

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we're going to go ahead and begin the proceeding.

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We're going to begin the proceeding. Counsel, could

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you read the notice.

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MS. PAUGH: Pursuant to notice issued August

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31st, 1998, this time and place have been set for the

hearing in Docket No. 981042-EM, in re: Joint

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petition determination of need for an electrical power

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plant in Volusia County by the Utilities Commission,

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City of New Smyrna Beach, Florida, and Duke Energy New

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Smyrna Beach Power Company, Limited, L.L.P.

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CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Take appearances.

MR. GUYTON: Charles A. Guyton and

15

Cooperative Association.

16 17

Davis, appearing on behalf of Florida Power and Light

John T. Butler of the law firm of Steel, Hector and

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Company.

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MS. HERSHEL: Michelle Hershel and Bill

20

Willingham, representing the Florida Electric

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MS. KAMARAS: Gail Kamaras, representing the 22

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MR. SASSO: Gary Sasso, with Carlton,

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24

Fields, and James McGee, with Florida Power

Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation.

1	Corporation, representing Florida Power Corporation.
2	MR. BEASLEY: James D. Beasley with Lee L.
3	Willis of the law firm of Ausley McMullen. We're
4	representing Tampa Electric Company.
5	MR. SNIFFEN: Robert J. Sniffen, on behalf
6	of the firm Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Kolins, Raymond &
7	Sheehan, representing U.S. Generating Company.
8	MR. GEY: Steve Gey representing Duke New
9	Smyrna.
10	MR. SEIDENFELD: Mark Seidenfeld at Florida
11	State University College of Law representing Duke New
12	Smyrna.
13	MR. SANTA: Subject to the pending motion
13 14	for leave to intervene, Donald F. Santa, Jr., on
14	for leave to intervene, Donald F. Santa, Jr., on behalf of LG&E Energy Corp.
14 15	for leave to intervene, Donald F. Santa, Jr., on behalf of LG&E Energy Corp. MR. WRIGHT: Robert Scheffel Wright, Landers
14 15 16	for leave to intervene, Donald F. Santa, Jr., on
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14 15 16 17 18	for leave to intervene, Donald F. Santa, Jr., on behalf of LG&E Energy Corp. MR. WRIGHT: Robert Scheffel Wright, Landers & Parsons, 310 West College Avenue, Tallahassee, 32301 appearing on behalf of the Joint Petitioners, Duke
14 15 16 17 18	for leave to intervene, Donald F. Santa, Jr., on behalf of LG&E Energy Corp. MR. WRIGHT: Robert Scheffel Wright, Landers & Parsons, 310 West College Avenue, Tallahassee, 32301 appearing on behalf of the Joint Petitioners, Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Company Limited, L.L.P. and the Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna
14 15 16 17 18 19	for leave to intervene, Donald F. Santa, Jr., on behalf of LG&E Energy Corp. MR. WRIGHT: Robert Scheffel Wright, Landers & Parsons, 310 West College Avenue, Tallahassee, 32301 appearing on behalf of the Joint Petitioners, Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Company Limited, L.L.P. and the Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Also appearing in this case on behalf
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	for leave to intervene, Donald F. Santa, Jr., on behalf of LG&E Energy Corp. MR. WRIGHT: Robert Scheffel Wright, Landers & Parsons, 310 West College Avenue, Tallahassee, 32301 appearing on behalf of the Joint Petitioners, Duke Energy New Smyrna Beach Power Company Limited, L.L.P.

MR. WHITE: David White on behalf of the

proposed intervenor, Florida Wildlife Federation. MR. WRIGHT: Madam Chairman, I'd also like 2 to enter an appearance Patrick K. Wiggins, law firm of 3 Wiggins & Villacorta, also appearing on behalf of the joint petitioners. 5 Thank you. Anyone else? CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: 6 7 Staff. MS. JAYE: Grace A. Jaye on behalf of 8 Commission staff. 9 MS. PAUGH: And Leslie Paugh on behalf of 10 Commission staff. 11 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Are there any preliminary 12 13 matters? There are, Madam Chairman. This MS. PAUGH: 14 morning at 8:15 our general counsel was handed a 15 letter from Senator Lee. This letter is ex parte 16 communication. It was copied to all of the 17 Commissioners. I recommend that pursuant to the 18 l Statute 350.042, the parties be given ten days to 19 respond to this letter. It has been entered into the 20 record of this proceeding. 21 Thank you. Procedurely, 22 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: 23

if it's entered into the record, is it still considered ex parte and there's just the process for responding to the ex parte, or once it's entered into

the record, how does that affect the record at all? 2 MR. PAUGH: If it's entered into the record 3 it's no longer ex parte. 4 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Thank you. MS. PAUGH: You're welcome. 5 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any questions, 6 7 Commissioners? 8 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I want to be sure we're talking about the same letter. This is the 10 letter from Senator Lee which was handed to me by 11 Staff this morning. That's correct, Madam Chairman. 12 MS. PAUGH: Each Commissioner was copied with the letter. We have 13 made 40 copies of it and they are on the railing over 14 here, if any of the parties would like a copy. 15 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I understand that there 16 are some other matters, some pending motions, 17 unless -- is there a question? 18 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: It appears to me that 19 might be something that the parties might want to 20 respond to in brief rather than -- it appears that may 21 be something the parties may want to respond to in brief rather than the evidentiary hearing. Would you 23 agree on that? 24

MS. PAUGH: I'm sorry, Commissioner.

don't understand your question.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: It would appear that
Senator Lee's letter is of a tone that parties might
want to respond to this brief, in their briefs, rather
than through evidence offered during the hearing.

MS. PAUGH: In their posthearing brief filings you're suggesting? They certainly have that opportunity, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: All right.

chairman Johnson: Anything else? Okay. I know we have some pending motions. Counsel, how do you wish for us to proceed? How would you suggest?

MS. PAUGH: There are pending motions, Madam Chairman. They are the Louisville Gas and Electric Motion for a Qualified Representative, and the Motion to File an Amicus Memorandum. The Amicus Memorandum addresses the motions to dismiss.

In addition, oral argument is set this morning for the motions to dismiss pursuant to the Prehearing Order. There are motions to strike which also need to be addressed.

I suggest that the order that we take these motions in is the LG&E motion first, the motions to dismiss oral argument and the motions to strike third.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Counsel, one other

procedural matter, have you received a list from customers that wanted to provide public comment or have we not received such list?

MS. PAUGH: I have not received a document

MS. PAUGH: I have not received a document to that effect, but there may be individuals here who wish to comment in the public comments portion of this proceeding.

chairman Johnson: Just so I'm clear and we can adjust things accordingly, are there members of the public that will want to testify during the public comment portion of this hearing? (No response.)

Let the record reflect there are none. I will make one additional announcement, if we -- when we would start the actual proceeding to that effect, but for now let the record reflect there are no citizens to provide public comment.

MS. PAUGH: Madam Chairman, before we go on,

I believe a representative from the Florida Wildlife

Federation is here. And in case they are not aware of

it, the Petition for Intervention filed by that

organization was denied by an order of the Prehearing

Officer yesterday.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I believe that the gentlemen here, your motion then has been ruled upon?

MR. WHITE: I received a notice -- I

received a notice that the petition of the Save the Manatee Club was dismissed but I did not receive a copy of any order dismissing our motion to intervene.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Ms. Paugh.

MS. PAUGH: The Save the Manatee was also dismissed, as well as the Union of Contractors and Builders. All three petitions for intervention were denied. They were filed in Records. They may not have been issued as of yet.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I'm assuming you were here to argue that motion, but that motion has, indeed, been ruled upon.

Any other outstanding matters before we start with the petition to file the amicus?

we do that, I would recommend that we address the motion for Mr. Santa to appear as a qualified representative.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Santa.

MR. SANTA: Yes, Madam Chairman. LG&E

Energy Corp. is an energy industry holding company
headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky. In addition to
its two franchised public utility subsidiaries, LG&E
owns a number of nonutility subsidiaries, including
LG&E Power, Inc. a merchant plant developer. LPI

currently owns, operates and is developing a number of nonutility generation projects around the country.

While none of these projects are located in the state of Florida, LPI has explored opportunities in the Florida market.

Therefore, LG&E has interests that would be

Therefore, LG&E has interests that would be directly affected were the utility's motion to dismiss granted, and petitions the Commission for leave to intervene and opportunity to participate this morning.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. I believe that the first issue was just the issue of qualified representative?

MS. PAUGH: That's correct, Madam Chairman.

chairman johnson: And if you could just state why you should be considered a qualified representative or why you qualify.

wr. santa: Madam Chairman, I am the senior vice president and deputy general counsel of LG&E Energy Corp. I have been authorized by the corporate secretary and general counsel to represent the company here this morning.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And you are licensed to practice in?

MR. SANTA: I'm licensed to practice in the District of Columbia.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Counsel.

MS. PAUGH: Staff's recommendation is that the pleading filed by Mr. Santa meets all of the requirements of Rule 28-106.106(3) for Qualified Representative Status. I have a copy of the rule with me if the Commissioners would like to take a look at it.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any questions,

Commissioners? Seeing none, we will grant you that
status.

Now, more to the substantive motion, to -the motion was to file leave -- or motion for leave
for file an amicus regarding memorandum of law to
address the Commission on a motion to dismiss.

MS. PAUGH: That's correct, Madam Chairman.

Staff reviewed the motion and the memorandum of law filed by Mr. Santa. And Staff's recommendation is that the motion and the amicus memorandum meet the requirements of Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.370. That rule states "An amicus may file and serve a brief in any proceeding with written consent of all of the parties or by order of request of the court. A motion to file a brief as amicus shall state the reason for the request and the party, or interest on whose behalf the brief is filed. In addition,

pursuant to the case law of the state of Florida, amicus briefs are generally for the purpose of assisting the Court," the Commission in this instance, 3 "in cases which are of general public interest or 4 aiding in the presentation of difficult issues." 5 That's a paraphrase from the case of CG Limited, BASF, 6 A.G. versus The Fish Peddler, Inc. 683 So.2d 522, 7 Fourth DCA 1996. I have copies of that case if the 8 Commissioners are interested in taking a look at it. In short, Staff's recommendation is that the amicus 10 should be granted. 11 I know this was just CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: 12 filed on the 23rd. Were there other documents filed 13 in opposition? 14 MS. PAUGH: Not to my knowledge, Madam 15 Chairman. 16 Is there any opposition 17 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: from any of the parties? Seeing none, Commissioners, 18 any questions? Show then the Motion for Leave to File 19 the Amicus granted. 20 MS. PAUGH: Next I would suggest the 21 Commission hear the oral argument. 22 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I'm sorry. Mr. Wright, 23 do you have a question? 24

MR. WRIGHT: Not a question, Madam Chairman.

I just wanted to mention that Mr. Santa and I have discussed his participation, subject, of course, to your ruling, and we would allow him part of our time 3 in the oral argument on the motions to dismiss to present argument reflected in his amicus brief. 5 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: If I'm not mistaken, 6 7 in the Prehearing Order I limited that to some extent. What is the time limit? 8 The time limit set in the MS. PAUGH: 9 Prehearing Order are a half hour each for Florida 10 Power and Light and Florida Power, and half an hour 11 for Duke to respond to each for a total of one hour 12 for Duke. 13 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So that hour allocation 14 you will divide with Mr. Santa? 15 MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am. 16 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: We also extracted a 17 promise from Schef not to fill all of that hour. 18 (Laughter) 19 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Okay. Next I believe we 20 have the Motions to Dismiss. 21 MS. PAUGH: That's correct, Madam Chairman. 22 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Florida Power Corp. 23 MR. SASSO: Yes. Thank you, Chairman 24

Johnson, members of the Commission.

As a preliminary matter, we would respectfully request the Commission consider giving the parties some additional time for this motion.

We recognize that we participated in the prehearing conference and discussed and agreed to an hour per side. But in the course of preparing to argue these motions it became abundantly clear that the parties would require additional time to adequately present both sides.

I have discussed this with Mr. Wright in advance of the hearing, and he indicated he would have no objection to expanding the time somewhat, and Mr. Guyton likewise.

Mr. Guyton and I have attempted to coordinate so that we don't present redundant argument to the Commission. But nonetheless, we would respectfully request that we be given 45 minutes apiece, and that Duke be given equal time for its presentation as well.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And there was no objection by Duke? You all are being so cooperative this morning.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: To be quite honest,

Madam Chairman, I have had to go through all of this
testimony. And I've obviously read these motions. I

1	think we should get to the heart of the matter and I
2	think the parties can get to the heart of the matter
3	in more than enough time in 30 minutes. I think we
4	have got a hearing. We've only got three days to do
5	that hearing. If we do what the parties want here,
6	it's going to burn up the entire morning. I would
7	just think I think we were better served by just
8	getting on with this, but, again, that's your decision
9	and it's only my opinion.
10	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We might dismiss
11	depending on that edge for 15 minutes. Just kidding.
12	(Laughter)
13	MR. SASSO: We would hope it would be worth
14	the Commission's investment of time. (Laughter)
15	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: How much time would you
16	need?
17	MR. SASSO: 45 minutes a side.
18	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Oh, you did say that.
19	MR. SASSO: What I would like to do is I'll
20	attempt to limit my opening remarks.
21	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm sorry, 45 minutes a
22	side?
23	MR. SASSO: I'm sorry. 45 minutes for
24	Mr. Guyton
25	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Each motion

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I was going to say, we can take that 45 minutes a side --

MR. SASSO: 45 minutes apiece for each moving party and a commensurate amount of time for Duke to respond. I will try to limit my opening remarks to about a half an hour and reserve some time for rebuttal, if that's acceptable to the Commission.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Given the magnitude of the issues that we're dealing with and there were extensive filings, the issues at least, as they have been framed by Florida Power and Light and Florida Power Corp are pretty detailed, and there is no objection from the other side.

Commissioner Garcia, I'm appreciative of your concern. But I will allow the additional time so that we can make sure that these issues are adequately addressed and that the parties have had ample opportunity to express themselves in their positions on the record.

MR. SASSO: Thank you very much.

To begin, again, just to mention that

Mr. Guyton and I have attempted to coordinate so that

we don't present redundant argument, what we've agreed

is that I will focus my argument on the statutory

language, legislative history and development of the

applicable legislation in the state of Florida. And Mr. Guyton will emphasize the decisions of this Commission and the Florida Supreme Court as they apply to the issues before us.

I propose to deal with the legislative matters chronologically because I believe it is important to do so to appreciate fully the meaning and significance of some of these applicable provisions.

In doing so, I will focus on three main events. The 1973 enactment of the Power Plant Siting Act and the Ten Year Site Plan requirements which were enacted as part and parcel of the same law. The 1980 enactment --

chairman Johnson: I apologize for interrupting, and I'll make sure that you're given due consideration to any questions you may have and add some time.

It would be helpful for me if you could start off with a general standard of review and what we should be looking at as we make our decision on the motion to dismiss. I understand you're going to go through the history and perhaps an argument as to why or -- why they are not an applicant in your opinion. Help me understand the process and the standard I need to use as I evaluate your argument.

MR. SASSO: Yes, Madam Chairman.

To be specific, this is a pure issue of law:
Whether the legislation involved here essentially
empowers the Commission to permit Duke to attain a
determination of need for a merchant plant. The
fundamental question is one of statutory authority.

This Commission, of course, is a creature of legislation, and it obtains its authority to act from legislation. And so the threshold issue is does this Commission have authority, under existing legislation, to rule in Duke's favor on its joint petition?

The Commission obviously must address this question in the first instance, although ultimately it will be a matter for the courts to decide because the courts have the prerogative of interpreting law. But this is not an area, in our opinion, in which the Commission has discretion. We believe that the legislation is clear. And I will discuss the statutory provisions that make it so. And Mr. Guyton will discuss the decisional law that make clear that the Florida Supreme Court has already authoritatively construed this statute in a sense that binds the hands of this Commission. It based its ruling on the plain language of the statute. That being the case, we believe that the Commission is constrained to deny

Duke's joint petition, whether or not the Commission thinks it might be a good idea to have merchant plant development in this state. We don't believe that's a permissible consideration in this proceeding.

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Now, to address the legislative issues. I would begin by discussing the 1973 enactment of the Power Plant Siting Act and Ten Year Site Plan Requirements. And the first point that I would make there is that the Power Plant Siting Act, as it is commonly known today, and the Ten Year Site Plan Requirements, as they are commonly known today, were enacted originally as the same law, part of the same law. The Ten Year Site Plan obligations were moved later to be codified together with other planning legislation just as a matter of presentation and convenience. But it's significant that they were enacted together as part of the same law. And I'll explain why.

Now, this legislation in 1973 applied to the siting of plants and the development of Ten Year Site Plans by electric utilities. And that term was defined to include, quote, "any cities and towns, counties, public utility districts, regulated electric companies, electric cooperatives, and joint operating agencies, or combinations thereof, engaged in or

authorized to engaged in the business of generating, transmitting or distributing electrical energy," and that definition is now found in Section 403.503. Now, what may be gleaned from this definition? What do these entities have in common?

As this Commission held in the Ark and

Nassau case -- and I'm quoting -- "significantly each

of the entities listed under the statutory definition

may be obligated to serve customers. It is this need

resulting from a duty to serve customers which the

need determination proceeding is designed to examine.

Nonutility generators," such as Nassau and Ark, "have

no such need since they are not required to serve

customers."

So we see that each of the entities contained in the statutory definition may be obligated to serve customers. Another way of putting that is that they serve the public at retail, and, of course, merchant plants do not. The text of the 1973 law confirms this.

The law went on to provide that each electric utility must submit a Ten Year Site Plan that estimates its power generating needs, and the general location of its power plants. It's significant that the legislature referred to the electric utilities'

own power generating needs. Because only a utility
that has an obligation to serve customers can
logically speak of its own needs for generating
capacity. A merchant plant, of course, does not have
needs of its own for generating capacity. It seeks to
satisfy the needs of retail utilities which are the
only --

commissioner GARCIA: How would a
co-generator fit into that mix?

MR. SASSO: Co-generators are similarly situated to the IPP involved in this case.

Co-generators do not have standing in and of themselves to site a power plant. They can come in as a co-applicant with retail utility that asks the Commission to determine its need for generating capacity.

Now, the statute goes on to say consistent with this that "the Public Service Commission must reserve Ten Year Site Plans to determine need, quote, 'in the area to be served', close quote. Again, a clear reference to service territories of retail utilities in the state. So it's evident --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: You don't think that that refers to more of a general area of need as opposed to an area of territory to serve?

MR. SASSO: I think it's clear when one looks at the statutory provisions and this Commission's regulations implementing them that what is at issue here is the geographic area in which service is provided. And we're going to see this theme carried through in other legislation, in FEECA in particular when we discuss that.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Let me ask a question. So it's your interpretation of the Ten Year Site Plan provisions that the determination — that need and how that need is to be served is based upon the geographic area of the utility which has — which serves on a retail basis.

MR. SASSO: Yes, that's correct, sir.

Basically, the Ten Year Site Plan law and the Power

Plant Siting Act, and as I'll discuss in a moment,

FEECA, they are part of a comprehensive legislative

approach to the determination of need, the

identification of need, and the planning to meet that

need. And the retail utilities in this state are the

focal point of that in this legislation.

commissioner deason: What about the argument that the Ten Year Site Plan is really a Peninsular Florida issue, and that we look at need as a whole and not on an individual utility basis, i.e.,

if a utility does not have sufficient reserve margins in any given year, but they can rely upon reserve margins of other utilities, perhaps other generating facilities, within Peninsular Florida, then the plan is determined to be suitable.

MR. SASSO: Well, of course, the

Commission's responsibility is to ensure there's

adequate energy available throughout the state. But

it does so in a particular manner. It does so through

the regulation of retail utilities that have allocated

service territories. And what you're referring to,

sir, is sort of the aggregation of the plans of the

individual utilities. But the law in so as far as it

regulates and speaks to individual electric utilities

in a definitional sense, requires that they address

their own needs in the areas that they will serve.

commissioner GARCIA: So if Florida Corp did not meet what we thought was an adequate margin reserve on its own, then Florida Power Corp should not be able to rely on the Peninsular Florida overflow from one or another of the companies that provide power in the state to meet that need.

MR. SASSO: No, I'm not saying that, sir.

The issue is what provision is Florida Power

Corporation making to meet its need. And then one

looks at the various resources it can draw on to meet its need. But the focal point is still the need of the utility and it may draw on resources outside of its own generating fleet to do so.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: The only source of that is from another regulated utility which serves retail customers?

MR. SASSO: No. A retail utility can purchase power from -- another generating facility can purchase power through firm contracts from other sources.

commissioner deason: But they have to have a contract with the obligation of the entity to provide power under that contract so that it can be relied upon in the event of a capacity shortfall?

MR. SASSO: Well, the way that the

Commission has approached the demonstration of need is

it has required that -- utilities such as Florida

Power Corporation, not depend upon nonfirm resources

to meet its needs. It can only rely on its own

generating units or firm resources. And merchant

plants, of course, don't propose to provide firm

resources, so Florida Power Corporation cannot rely on

nonfirm merchant power to meet its needs under its

obligations in this legislation.

Now, what does Duke say to demonstrate to the Commission that it is covered under the definition that I've discussed? Well, Duke argues it meets the definition of an electric utility in two respects. It says, first, it is a regulated electric company, as that is used in the statute. And, second, even if it's not a regulated electric company, it's a joint operating agency, as that term is used in the statute.

Now, as far as regulated electric companies are concerned, the last time we were here on the declaratory statement proceeding, Duke argued well, we're an EWG, and that's how we are regulated. But, of course, there were no EWGs in 1973. So now they have argued even before 1973 wholesale generators were regulated by the Federal Power Act and therefore regulated under federal law.

commissioner GARCIA: Doesn't the statute specifically say electric utility means cities and towns?

MR. SASSO: Yes, it does. We do not contend that the Utilities Commission of New Smyrna could not come before this Commission and demonstrate that it needs 30 megawatts. But, of course, it wouldn't even have to go through the power plant siting act for 30 megawatts. But the municipality, the Utilities

Commission of New Smyrna Beach, is not here to support a need for 500 megawatts for its own system. This is really a classic case of the tail wagging the dog.

Duke really makes no bones about the fact that it's principally engaging here in a merchant plant operation.

Again, referring to this issue of regulated electric company, there's no basis or reason to assume that the state legislature in 1973 in enacting this law, intended to speak to regulation by the federal government. The use of that term, "regulated electric company," in this context clearly reflects an intent simply to affirm the state's jurisdiction over the retail utilities that it regulates.

I've provided in the form of Notice of
Filing with the Commission a number of authorities
that I'm relying on in this argument, including the
public law that was enacted in 1973 to adopt the Power
Plant Siting Act.

commissioner Jacobs: Would you argue that the City of New Smyrna Beach is prohibited from taking advantage of the benefits of the statute even though they don't have to, the benefits being centralized permitting?

MR. SASSO: Well, I don't have an answer to

FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

that question. There is an exemption for plants under 75 megawatts.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Right. That means they don't have to --

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They don't have to come. MR. SASSO: Whether they could come really isn't the issue before us for a 30-megawatt facility because that's not what they are seeking to do. They are not seeking authorization to build a 30-megawatt facility. fact, in a joint petition they say they ruled out such an option. They would not build a 30-megawatt facility. The only way that the Utilities Commission seeks to demonstrate cost-effectiveness of its option here is saying that the 500-megawatt facility is efficient, and so it's an efficient purchasing option for it. But that is like taking a sledge hammer to The Utilities Commission is seeking to swat a flea. support a 500-megawatt facility on the basis of a 30-megawatt need and that's clearly inappropriate.

Now, the public law that was adopted in 1973 contains the following description of the legislation. It says that the purpose of the bill was to provide, quote, "that the regulation of electric utilities is preempted by the state." So it's clear when one looks at the words that the legislature used to describe

what it was doing in this law, that it was speaking about state regulation of electric utilities, not federal regulation of electric utilities.

And anticipating this, Duke argues we are regulated under Chapter 366. And they rely under the definition in 366.02(2) which says electric utility means, quote, "any municipal electric utility, investor-owned electric utility or rural electric cooperative which owns, maintains or operates an electric generation, transmission or distribution system within this state."

Now, to begin with, this definition was enacted in 1989 and hardly provides guidance for what was a regulated electric company this 1973. But in any event, Duke clearly would not operate an electric system as this definition requires, even if this one plant were permitted. Further, if Duke truly were covered as an electric utility under state regulation it would lead to results that even Duke suggests wouldn't suggest apply. Namely, under Chapter 366 this Commission, quote, "shall have power over electric utilities for the following purposes. A) To prescribe uniform systems and classifications of accounts. B) To prescribe a rate structure for all electric utilities. C) To require electric power

conservation. D) To approve territorial agreements, et cetera.

All of these powers that the Commission has over "electric utilities" close quote, clearly pertain to the retail utilities in this state. They do not apply to merchant plants.

so Duke's second argument is well, if we're not a regulated electric company, we're a joint operating agency within the meaning of the Power Plant Siting Act definition. They say we really can't identify a definition of that term that would make sense in 1973. So we're going to look at a law that was enacted in 1975 to give content to that term, namely, the Joint Power Act. Well, on its face that is an argument that makes little sense but let's follow it for a while.

To begin with, a joint power operating project or joint operating power project under the 1975 law is one that is used to jointly finance, construct, operate or own a power project. What Duke and New Smyrna are proposing here is that Duke will build and own and operate the plant and will sell a miniscule amount of its output to the Utilities Commission of New Smyrna. That's not a joint operating power project within the meaning of statute.

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In any event, the history of that statute reveals a number of flaws in Duke's argument. To begin with, prior to 1975, when the Joint Power Act was enacted, a municipality was not permitted under the Florida Constitution to enter into an arrangement for a joint power project with a private entity like Duke.

The Florida Constitution was amended in 1974 to permit such arrangements to take place. So in 1973, when the Power Plant Siting Act was enacted, merchants could not have been contemplated by the Power Plant Siting Act as a joint operating agency. Municipalities weren't permitted to enter into such an alliance with private entities. Even in 1975, when the Joint Power Act as enacted, the law permitted municipalities to enter into arrangements only with investor-owned utilities then in existence. The statutes expressly limited such alliances to IOUs in existence in 1975. That wasn't changed until 1982. Moreover, until the 1980s a joint power project was not permitted to sell power outside of its own project.

So, essentially, Duke is relying on a legislative development that took place in the 1980s to give content to a term that was used 1973. We need

look no further than the 1973 status quo to give content to the term. Namely, it involved cooperations among municipal entities or governmental entities in the area of electric service, and as this Commission said, in the area of retail electric service.

Now, jumping ahead to 1980, the enactment of FEECA and the Transmission Line Siting Act. To begin with, the Transmission Line Siting Act was enacted that year, and as we've shown in the staff report that we filed with the Commission, that was patterned after the Power Plant Siting Act. We need look no further than the Transmission Line Siting Act itself because it said on its face at that time that it was incorporating by reference the definitions used in the Power Plant Siting Act for the terms "electric utility" and "applicant."

Now, it is inconceivable that the Florida

Legislature intended in 1980 that merchants would come
into the state and build transmission lines even
without the authority of eminent domain. Clearly it
used these terms and understood them to be used in a
Power Plant Siting Act to apply to the retail
utilities regulated by this Commission.

Now, FEECA was also passed in 1980. Duke concedes that the Florida Energy Efficiency and

Conservation Act, FEECA, does not apply to wholesale generators such as itself. We submit that this concession is fatal to Duke's case. Why? Because Section 403.519, the need provision that brings us here today, was enacted as part of FEECA.

Now, what is the purpose of FEECA? Well, as the Commission is aware, FEECA was enacted to encourage utilities that served retail customers to promote demand-side management and other conservation measures to reduce consumption by those customers of electricity. And, of course, this goal has no application to merchant plants.

Now, this is important, among other things, because 403.519 provides that in considering need, quote, "the Commission shall also expressly consider the conservation measures taken by, or reasonably available to, the applicant or its members which might mitigate the need for the proposed plant." Close quote. This condition, a mandatory condition as part of a need proceeding, logically applies only to a retail utility with an obligation to serve customers. Only a retail utility can mitigate its need for generating capacity by promoting conservation with its customers.

Like the Ten Year Site Plan law, FEECA

requires each utility to develop a plan for increasing energy efficiency and conservation "within its service area." Close quote. Again, a clear reference to geographical service territories of retail utilities. And most importantly, the statute expressly tied the need provision to retail utilities. Section 403.519 was originally enacted in Section 633.86 of FEECA. It was later moved to be codified adjacent to the Power Plant Siting Act just as a matter of presentation.

When FEECA was first enacted, Section

366.821 said, quote, "For purposes of this part,"

referring to FEECA as one unitary law, including the

need provision, "utility means any person or entity of

whatever form which provides electricity or natural

gas to the public."

Now, the legislature could have used the existing definitions of electric utility in FEECA because it was applying this law to gas as well as electric, so it fashioned its own. But it was entirely compatible with the existing definitions of electric utilities.

When the need provision was later moved to 403.519 as a housekeeping matter, 366.821 was corrected and it reads this way today: "For the purposes of Sections 366.80 through 366.85," which is

FEECA, "and 403.519, the need provision," which is also part of FEECA, "utility means any person or entity of whatever form which provides electricity or natural gas at retail to the public." It couldn't be clearer that 403.519, the Power Plant Siting Act, the Ten Year Site Plan law, and FEECA, as a whole, all apply to regulation of electric utilities that serve customers at retail within their respective service areas. The need provision, of course, is a condition precedent to a site certification under the Power Plant Siting Act.

Now, even after FEECA was enacted in 1990, 403.519 was enacted, keep in mind that the Power Plant Siting Act still used the definitions of "applicant" and "electric utility" under which Duke relies. There was no conflict, however, in these terms as I've described. Both statutes apply to the obligations of retail utilities that serve customers.

Under all of these Acts, retail utilities are the focal point for the determination of need, the identification of need and the meeting of need.

Now, under Duke's construction, however, there would be this hopeless conflict between the definitions used in the Power Plant Siting Act and the definitions used in the need provision which is the

point of entry to the Power Plant Siting Act. And we arrive at that conflict only because Duke parses the language. It reads these terms out of context from the whole of the legislation and basically makes a strained construction of why they fit into this scheme, when, in fact, they don't.

There's no indication in the law or in the legislative history that when the legislature enacted FEECA, which was expressly limiting the need provision, the point of entry to Power Plant Siting Act to retail utilities, they thought they were somehow reducing the scope of coverage that then existed in the Power Plant Siting Act. In fact, that same year remember they adopted a Transmission Line Siting Act which used those definitions and said it was patterned after the Power Plant Siting Act. The same year they restricted FEECA to retail utilities.

It's clear in context that the legislature was using the term "applicant" and "utility" interchangeably in these laws. In fact, 403.519 at the time used both terms in the same section. It talked about a utility making a request for action, for need, and then it talked about an applicant. It used these terms interchangeably and that was clearly the legislature's mind-set.

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Now, let's move ahead to the 1990

housekeeping amendments. In 1990 the legislature made some conforming amendments in the Transmission Line

Siting Act and the Power Plant Siting Act. And they

substituted the word "applicant" for "utility" in

403.519. And Duke's whole case rests on this change

as though, "wa-la," at this time merchants were not

permitted into the state. However, the legislature

did not change 366.821, which still says to this day

that for purposes of 403.519 utilities are retail

utilities. The need provision. And even after the

1990 housekeeping amendments, everybody recognizes

 $3 \parallel$ that it still takes a utility to get a need

determination under 403.519. In fact, this

Commission's Rule 25-22.0801 say upon its own motion

or by motion of a utility, the Commission will conduct

a need proceeding. Yet Duke wants this Commission

completely to ignore the mandate of Section 366.821

that 403.519 is limited to retail utilities because of

this housekeeping amendment.

Now, if Duke were right let's consider what this would mean.

commissioner clark: Mr. Sasso, let me just ask you, why do you characterize that as a housekeeping amendment? Which law is that you're

referring to?

MR. SASSO: This is the 1990 legislative changes to the Transmission Line Siting Act and Power Plant Siting Act.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: What is the law of Florida you're siting to? Is it 9033? Is it one you've provided us with.

MR. SASSO: Yes.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And it is 9033.

MR. SASSO: I'm sorry. It's the 1990 amendments. And in that filling, Commissioner Clark, we provided the legislative history, which I'll discuss in a moment, relating to these amendments that concerned -- Committee substitute for House Bill 3065. The amendments were to the Transmission Line Siting Act and the Power Plant Siting Act so we'll find the law still in those two statutes.

commissioner clark: But you characterize it as housekeeping. The whole bill was a revisers bill. It was not an substantive bill?

MR. SASSO: Let me discuss the legislative issue which will make clear the basis for my characterization.

The Staff analysis for that 1990 law says that the legislation, quote, "for the most part

conforms to definitions, timing and procedural provisions of the Power Plant Siting Act, and the Transmission Line Siting Act. Similar duties are created for applicants under each Act."

In a section-by-section analysis, the section on definition says that Section 403.503 amends the definition section to add or change definitions to make both the PPSA and TLSA consistent. A new emphasis on planning is reflected by the definitions.

As I've explained, the planning obligations under the Ten Year Site Plan law, Power Plant Siting Act and FEECA all relate to retail utilities that serve customers in their respective areas.

Now, importantly the Staff analysis says that application fees will increase under these changes, but that for utilities, additional costs could be transferred to the ratepayer. It's clear that the legislation — the legislature, in making these changes, understood that insofar as it was regulated utilities, that these were utilities that had ratepayers.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Where are you reading from?

MR. SASSO: This is from the materials that I filed under Tab 3 in our Notice of Filing, which is

the Final Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement relating to these changes.

The Staff further concluded that there would be no impact on competition, private enterprise and employment markets. This clearly was not an effort to open up the state to merchant plant construction.

If Duke were correct that it were, this is the situation we would have had. We would have had coverage of merchants from 1973 to 1980 under their construction of these definitions, and then FEECA was enacted. And then merchants would be excluded from 1980 to 1990 and then they would be led back in again by these conforming amendments of 1990.

There's no indication and no reasonable conclusion that the legislature intended to flip-flop fundamental coverage of electric utilities in this manner. What we have in this legislative progress is not a vacillation, but an evolution where we see the enactment of the Power Plant Siting Act and the Ten Year Site Plan law. We see additional planning obligations being placed on retail electric utilities in 1980, and then some conforming amendments made in 1990. But it's a natural progression of regulation of retail utilities in this state.

Now, Duke has taken a position that our

construction -- they've argued in their papers -- that our construction and our legal position is absurd: utter nonsense they called it. Even leads to an unconstitutional result.

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I believe it's important for the Commission to understand that Duke's retail utility has played an instrumental role in ensuring that the law of North Carolina is in accord with the law in Florida in this regard. We've included in our Notice of Filing decisions from the North Carolina Public Utilities Commission, North Carolina Court of Appeals affirming that decision that make this clear.

This case law concerns a situation that arose in 1991 when a power plant developer named Empire Power Company filed an application for certificate of need with the North Carolina Public Utilities Commission. It based its application on general load forecast at various retail utilities, and the developer stated, as the Commission recognized in its decision, that the plant will, quote, "be built at Empire's own risk", close quote, which is Duke's definition of a merchant plant in this proceeding. The developer argued that the plant was needed because it stood ready to enter into contracts with Duke and other utilities, which they didn't particularly want,

and that it stood ready to meet a statewide need.

Duke intervened in that proceeding and joined with Carolina Power and Light in asking the Commission to dismiss the developer's petition for a certificate of need because they did not have a contract with a retail utility. Public Utilities Commission of North Carolina granted that motion to dismiss without conducting an evidentiary hearing. North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. That's still good law in North Carolina.

In its brief in the Court of Appeals in that case Duke said the following at Page 8. First, the Commission found that an independent power producer, such as Empire, must present evidence for a contract for the sale of power prior to obtaining a certificate. This is a threshold requirement. Unless Empire can establish that there exists a market for its power, Empire cannot make a showing that the public convenience and necessity requires the construction of its generating system.

At Page 29 Duke argued Empire contends that the phrase "public convenience and necessity" means the public at large, not a limited number of utilities. The public at large receives its electricity from utilities certificated under GS

Section 62-110. Empire, which has not received a certificate as public utility, cannot serve the public at large. Unless it can show that a utility is willing to buy its power it cannot show a public need.

At Page 33 Duke argued, clearly the Commission properly differentiated between utilities and IPPs. Utilities in certificating a facility can show a need for the facility by demonstrating that their own customers require the electricity. The utility has a preexisting duty to sell to these customers. This is not so with an IPP. IPPs have no right or duty to sell to anyone. They can only sell electricity if they can find a utility or other entity to buy it. If there is no buyer, there can be no public need. We could not have said it better. We respectfully request that our motions to dismiss be granted.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any questions, Commissioners?

commissioner clark: Did you address -- if we conclude that they can not go through the Power Plant Siting Act, can they go through local permitting to do the same thing?

MR. SASSO: Well, the Power Plant Siting Act says that no plant may be built unless it meets the

exemption; unless it is certified under the Power

Plant Siting Act. Now, they can build a plant that is

exempt from the Power Plant Siting Act by virtue of

its size.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Tell me where that is.

MR. SASSO: It may take me a moment to find
that, Commissioner.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I want you to explain --

MR. SASSO: Here it is. I'm sorry. It's

403.506. "No construction of any new electrical or
expansion and steam generating capacity of any
existing general -- of any existing electrical power
plant may be undertaken after October 1, 1973, without
first obtaining certification in the manner herein
provided." So it's no construction of any new
electrical power plant may be undertaken after October
1973 without first obtaining certification in the
manner as herein provided. Of course, the need
certificate is a precondition to conduct of a
certification proceeding under the Power Plant Siting
Act.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So there is no opportunity to go through local permitting to do the same thing?

MR. SASSO: That's correct. Not for this 1 2 The other section I mentioned, Commissioner Clark, is at 403.508 which says an affirmative 3 determination of need by the Public Service Commission 5 pursuant to Section 403.519 shall be a condition precedent to the conduct of the certification hearing. 6 COMMISSIONER CLARK: What was a joint power 7 project when -- in 1973? 8 9 MR. SASSO: Again, there were no joint power projects in the sense used in the '75 statute. 10 '73 statute talks about joint operating agencies, and 11 the only ones that were permitted at that time were 12 essentially alliances between and among governmental 13 agencies. A municipality was not at liberty to --14 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, who were they? 15 MR. SASSO: They could have been or would 16 have been municipal entities working in cooperation 17 with one another, or they might have been other 18 governmental units. "Agency" seems to refer to a 19 20 governmental unit. But one thing we do know is what they were 21 not. What they were not is an affiliation between a 22 municipality and a private entity jointly to operate, 23 finance, construct or own a power project. 24

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask it a

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different way. What was the language used in 1973?

Was it joint power project?

MR. SASSO: No. It's joint operating agency.

joint operating agencies in existence? Is there a definition of joint operating agency?

MR. SASSO: That is not a defined term in the statute.

What this Commission indicated in the Nassau decision was it was an entity that could be obligated to serve retail customers. And it to the extent it involved a municipality, it would have involved a municipality working in alliance with another governmental unit or agency, perhaps a county.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Which you said a municipality could not until they got the law changed in '75.

MR. SASSO: Could not enter into an alliance with a private entity like Duke. It could enter into an alliance with another governmental entity. But under the Florida Constitution at that time, there was a prohibition on a governmental unit using its public authority to benefit a private company. The Constitution was amended in 1974 to permit such

arrangements.

could have joined with other municipalities, and it's your view that was what was contemplated by joint operating agencies.

MR. SASSO: That's correct. We certainly know, as I say, what was not contemplated. It did not contemplate this type of arrangement with a merchant plant.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask a bottom line question. It's your view that there will be no wholesale competition in Florida provided by entities other than utilities who provide retail service or entities which have firm contracts with those retail providers from plants built in Florida.

MR. SASSO: Plants built in Florida, that is correct.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any other questions?

MR. SASSO: Excuse me, Commissioner, except for those plants that are exempted by virtue of their size.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Cogeneration units or other generation units that may have had a contract,

those contracts were negotiated out of -- and they are still there. They are in the state. They are producing electricity but they are producing it without a contract. Are they not selling power still?

MR. SASSO: There is a distinction,

Commissioner, between what might be done under

contract law with plants that are already built, that

were already found to be needed and that were already

properly certified under the Power Plant Siting Act.

It is true that the prohibition, as it were, or the

regulation does not extend beyond that. The Power

Plant Siting Act and the need provisions must be

understood in context. They were to place a limit on

the development of new plants. Once they are in

existence, there may be some "give in the joints" as

it were.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Guyton.

MR. GUYTON: Commissioners, Florida Power and Light Company has raised six separate grounds for dismissal of the joint petition in this case. Any one of those grounds is sufficient by itself to justify dismissal, but collectively they show that the joint petition that you have before you fails to meet minimum pleading requirements under both your rules, statutes and the case law of the state, and, more

importantly, it is fundamentally inconsistent with the law of the state of Florida.

In my time today I want to focus your attention on what you, as a Commission, and, more importantly, what the Supreme Court of Florida has had to say about the proper construction of the siting act.

Now, this joint petition seeks a determination of need for a 500-megawatt unit. Only 30 megawatts of that unit is committed to any utility in the state of Florida. 470 megawatts, some 94% of the capacity of this plant, is uncommitted to any specific utility. The joint petition makes no allegation that this 470 megawatts is needed by specific utility in Florida, or that it would be a specific utility's most cost-effective alternative for meeting its needs. That is a fatal omission for the case law in Florida is quite clear as to two points.

One, the utility need criteria of Section 403.519 are utility- and unit-specific. And two, need for purposes of the Siting Act is the need of the electric utility purchasing the power.

About ten years ago, in Order 22341 -- and,
Commissioners, I need to pause here a moment and pass
out a handout that I intend for you and the parties to

have, please.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: While they are passing those out, your first two points, the 470 megawatts, that there's no allegation that those are needed. And your second point was?

MR. GUYTON: That need for purposes of a Siting Act is the need of the entity ultimately consuming the power, the electric utility purchasing the power. And as you'll see as we go through the cases that's a direct quote out of your prior decision.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: You said something else: cost-effectiveness.

MR. GUYTON: I said that as to the 470 megawatts there is no allegation that it is needed by a specific utility or that it is the most cost-effective alternative to a specific utility.

I could take you now to Tab A of this handout I've given you. It's Order 22341. You had the following to say about the need determination criteria of Section 403.519, and this is found at the bottom of Page 315 of Tab A. You said this: "The Siting Act in Section 403.519 require that this body make specific findings as to system reliability and integrity, need for adequate electricity at a

reasonable cost, and whether the proposed plant is the most cost-effective alternative available. Clearly these criteria are utility- and unit-specific.

Commissioners, this is a pure construction of the Siting Act by the Commission. It was made in a case that involved co-generators but it is a pure construction of the Siting Act by this Commission.

Now, Duke New Smyrna would have you believe this decision applies solely to co-generators and doesn't apply to it. Look at the language. You're construing the Siting Act. More importantly, the logic of this decision applies to a wholesale provider of power to an electric utility in the state. But there's also language in this order that suggests that you are dealing with an issue that transcended cogeneration. And I want you to take a look now at the first full paragraph that's on Page 320 of the decision. That reads, and I quote, "Second. An increasing share of the state's electrical needs --"

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Where are you?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Next page.

MR. GUYTON: Top of Page 320. The same decision. Tab A.

"Second. An increasing share of the state's electrical needs will be supplied by either

continue to rubber-stamp QF projects with the only criterion being that the price of electricity is equal to or less than that of the standard offer, this body that has effectively lost the ability to regulate the construction of an increasingly significant amount of generating capacity in the state."

Then in a third paragraph, a third passage I want to bring your attention to, you observed the following, further down on Page 320. "We adopt the position that, quote, 'need', end quote, for purposes of a Siting Act is the need of the entity ultimately consuming the power. The electric utility purchasing the power."

Commissioners, it is clear from this decision that you were intending to address an issue that transcended cogeneration. You were attempting to come with an appropriate interpretation of a siting act that's equally applicable to all wholesale providers of power in the state of Florida. And more importantly you were seeking to preserve your jurisdiction to regulate all of the generating capacity in the state of Florida.

Now, subsequent to Order 22341 -- excuse me.
You had occasion to restate this holding. You did it

in -- in a number of orders, but I want you to bring your attention to Order 24672. It's not in the handout. I'm just simply going to quote the passage. Here's what you had to say in that Order about 22341. "In making this determination we reasoned that the criteria set forth in the Power Plant Siting Act, including the criteria that the plant be the most cost-effective alternative available, are utility-specific." You said it there again.

Now Nassau Power Corporation appealed that order, Order 24672, to the Florida Supreme Court. They argued two things. They argued that the Commission had to follow its prior practice of presuming that certain need criteria were meet. And two, they explicitly challenged your construction that the need determination criteria of 403.519 were utility specific. Here's how the Supreme Court of Florida responded to both of those arguments. And this now is from Nassau Power versus Beard. It is Tab C in the handout that I've given to you. And there, at Page 1178 --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: You said C. It's Tab B. Right?

MR. GUYTON: It is Tab B.

At Page 1178 you had this to say as to those

arguments. "In our view, the PSC's prior practice of presuming need, as opposed to determining actual need, cannot now be used to force the PSC to abrogate its statutory responsibilities under the Siting Act. And then you'll note there's a footnote to that sentence. The Commission went on to say this in the footnote at the bottom of the page. "We reject Nassau's alternative argument that the Siting Act does not require the PSC to determine need on a utility-specific basis. They upheld you and said that criteria is utility-specific.

adopted the position that the four criteria in Section 403.519 are utility— and unit—specific, and that the need for the purposes of the Siting Act is the need of the entity ultimately consuming the power. They affirmed you. The court went on to say later in the same footnote, "The PSC's interpretation is consistent with the overall directive of Section 403.519, which requires in particular that the Commission determine the cost—effectiveness of a proposed power plant. This requirement would be rendered virtually meaningless if the PSC were required to calculate need on a statewide basis, i.e., Peninsular Florida, without considering which localities would actually

need more electricity in the future." My reference to Peninsular Florida is mine, not the Court's, obviously.

Commissioners, in light of your holding in 22341, in Order 24672, and more importantly, the decision by the Supreme Court in Nassau Power versus Beard, there's no doubt that the criteria of Section 403 are utility-specific, and that the need to be determined in a need determination proceeding is the need of the purchasing utility.

Now, the joint petition's complete failure to allege that there's a specific utility that needs 94% of the capacity of this unit, or that this is the most cost-effective alternative to a specific utility, makes this petition inconsistent with the holding of the Supreme Court in Nassau Power versus Beard in your prior decision. And that's grounds for dismissal.

Now, Duke attempts to avoid this issue by alleging that their unit is, quote, "consistent with"; not "needed by" but "consistent with," and is "a cost-effective alternative," not "the most cost-effective alternative," for Peninsular Florida.

Peninsular Florida is not an electric utility. It is a compilation. It is a planning convention in which the needs of a number of utilities

are compiled, but it is not a specific utility.

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But setting aside whether or not those allegations really meet what they have to prove, that's another argument in our Motion to Dismiss, those arguments clearly fall short alleging there's an actual need or cost-effectiveness. And it should be noted that these specific allegations run afoul of Nassau Power versus Beard. Remember Footnote 9? There the Court said that it would be -- that the use of a statewide avoided unit, or a statewide need, rather than looking to utility-specific need, would render the cost-effective criteria virtually meaningless. That's exactly what the petitioners do in the joint petition. They seek to look to a Peninsular Florida need rather than an individual utility need. Look at the paragraphs. Paragraph 17, Paragraph 19, Paragraph 21, Paragraph 27. They all refer to a statewide need, a Peninsular Florida need.

Also, remember what that the Court said that presuming need was an abrogation of your statutory responsibility. Look at paragraphs 30 and 32 of the Joint Petition. In Paragraph 30 they say "The project will necessarily provide cost-effective power to utilities that provide retail electric service in the state." That's a presumption that they are making.

In Paragraph 32 they say "The project will
necessarily be a cost-effective power supply." Once
again, they are asking you to engage in a presumption
which the Supreme Court said would be an abrogation of
your responsibilities.

commissioner deason: Mr. Guyton, let me interrupt for just a second. Why do you think the cost-effectiveness criteria was included in the requirements?

MR. GUYTON: Because I think the Siting Act, the legislature, in its wisdom, said, "If we're going to site power plants in this state and use the resources of this state and face certain environmental consequences of adding a new power plant, we need to be assured first that that plant is needed from a reliability standpoint, and that it's the most cost-effective alternative for the provision of electricity." And those determinations have to be made as a condition precedent to incurring the environmental consequences of adding a power plant.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Do you think there was any consideration to the fact that ratepayers, captive ratepayers, needed to be protected from plants being built that were not cost-effective?

MR. GUYTON: Yes, Commissioner. That's

exactly that. The utilities that were going to be building these power plants that you, as a Commission, need to assure that these power plants were going to be a cost-effective means of providing service to the ratepayers. Yes, I do think that was an important consideration.

commissioner deason: And then we'll contrast that to the situation we have here where we have a facility that's not going to be in any utility's rate base and ratepayers are not being placed at risk for the recovery of that investment.

MR. GUYTON: Well, I'm not sure that I would agree necessarily they are not being placed at risk because once one has contracts, one shifts the risk from the developer to ratepayers.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Explain to me how this facility, as it is being proposed, places ratepayers at risk.

MR. GUYTON: Well, it is envisioned they will ultimately enter into contracts with the ratepayers of the state of Florida.

at the time that contract -- if it is brought to this Commission for approval, which --

MR. GUYTON: Which, of course, it won't be.

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what our approval means of a contract. But you're saying at that point then ratepayers would be put at risk.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: It's a debate as to

MR. GUYTON: I think there will clearly be a shifting of the risk from the --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: But if this is not a cost-effective plant, there would be no contract, would there? Because there would be a more cost-effective alternative for the retail utility to provide power to their customers.

MR. GUYTON: Think of the consequence of what happens in that situation. The Siting Act is frustrating because it wasn't cost-effective. They couldn't secure the contracts. But you nonetheless went ahead and incurred the environmental consequences of having built the plant in the first place. That's why the legislature said before you get to the environmental determination, go ahead and determine whether there's a need and cost-effectiveness. why it's the precondition. That's why you do it first. That's why it's necessary in this instance for there to be a contract; for you to be able to make that determination.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Isn't the reason we do

it first is try to protect our ratepayers? Isn't -the point isn't the environmental cost. The point is
to protect our ratepayers and to get them the best
price possible. And because that money to some degree
is being financed by ratepayers, the ratepayers aren't
left on the hook.

MR. GUYTON: That's part of it. But in terms of the scope of the Siting Act, the reason that we do that first is because it's recognized there are going to be environmental consequences of the Siting Act. And the question is -- of adding a power plant. -- the question is, is it worth?

commissioner GARCIA: That isn't our
concern, is it?

we're construing a Siting Act, we're construing your function of it.

I'm not asking you to -- I'm not suggesting that you consider the environmental consequences. I'm just saying the reason you're asked to determine need and cost-effectiveness first is because there are environmental consequences that will be considered later.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Could you go back. I'm not as fast on the uptake as Commissioner Deason is.

Explain to me how the ratepayers are placed at risk with what we have before us?

MR. GUYTON: Well, several ways.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Okay.

MR. GUYTON: Although, I'll say -- I'm now moving, if you will, beyond the legal argument in some of the factual distinctions --

commissioner GARCIA: Categorize it. I want to understand it so I can follow your thinking.

MR. GUYTON: One is that there is a risk that wholesale sales that are made by utilities would no longer be made by utilities. Off-system sales by utilities would no longer be made by utilities but it soon will be displaced. Ratepayers benefit from those sales right now. Those are passed 80/20 through to the ratepayers of the state of Florida. You displace that, you lose that, you're creating a risk to the customers of electric utilities.

commissioner DEASON: Mr. Guyton, if that is not ultimately the most economic form of generation, in the long run isn't it better for customers to have that generation replaced with more cost-effective generation.

MR. GUYTON: It depends on which customers you're talking about. For the customers of the

purchasing utility, yes. For the customers of the 2 selling utility, no. And, you know, most of the utilities in the state have both. 3 4 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Explain that to me. 5 Why? 6 MR. GUYTON: Because the selling utility 7 right now enjoys the benefit of that revenue stream. 8 If they lose that revenue stream, which flows through 9 the their ratepayers, the ratepayers lose the benefit. 10 COMMISSIONER DEASON: But the revenue to one 11 entity is a cost to another. 12 MR. GUYTON: Agreed. That's why I said that 13 it would be a benefit to the purchasing utility, but it wouldn't be a benefit to the selling utility. 14 15 COMMISSIONER CLARK: You're saying we'd have 16 stranded investment without having addressed it. 17 MR. GUYTON: That's another risk that may 18 potentially be associated with this power plant. But 19 here what I'm talking about --20 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Without going too far afield, don't we want our utilities and our customers 21 to obtain the cheapest power possible? And doesn't 22 23 that benefit us either way? 24 MR. GUYTON: Absolutely. And there's nothing in the construction that I'm suggesting to you 25

that would preclude that. All we're simply saying is that ultimately there are going to be contracts for this power. You ought to go ahead and determine it up front when you're assessing need and cost-effectiveness, whether or not this is the most cost-effective alternative. You can do it now or you can do it later. The legislature would suggest you do it now. That's what the dictate of a Siting Act is. Do it on the front end rather than waiting until later. It may or may not happen later. As Commissioner Deason pointed out, there may not be contracts. At which case, it wasn't cost-effective and it wasn't needed, and -- but we've suffered the environmental consequences in having constructed a power plant.

hundred million dropped in our state. We may not have a generation unit that's cost-effective but our ratepayers aren't on the hook. Duke's ratepayers are. Not even Duke's ratepayers. Duke's investors are on the hook. I understand your environmental argument. I just want to understand from how we perceive where is the risk to the ratepayer? I understand -- let's get away from the environmental argument. I don't think that's central to us. I know it's part of the

siting, but it's not central to us. So the question is more specifically -- and forgive me, you probably have addressed it -- I just don't see where our ratepayers are at risk.

mr. GUYTON: Well, three ways, and then I'll move on -- briefly. It's a loss of potential sales for some of the selling utilities. They are fairly significant sales within the selling --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: You correct me where I'm wrong here: Don't we encourage in our sales that when there is cheap power available, that you turn down your units which may be producing more expensive power and purchase the more efficient or less costly power.

wr. GUYTON: Yes. And when a selling utility has that and sells it, those benefits run to the ratepayers of that utility. If that utility loses because of the entry of this plant or another one, then the ratepayers are not going to get the benefit of that revenue stream.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Explain that a little bit more spedifically.

MR. GUYTON: It has to do with your split of off-system sales in either the fuel or capacity clause.

something. What you're saying is -- I hear your argument as saying it has to be cost-effective to the ratepayers who will bear the cost of the unit. That's what you have to determine on your interpretation of power plant siting. And what Duke is saying is it's going to be cost-effective because it's not going to be in rate base and you just take it as needed. Then your point is it becomes not cost-effective to other utilities, such as Tampa Electric, who might have excess power that we've allowed in the rate base. Now they have no opportunity to sell it, so those ratepayers are being adversely affected and it's not cost-effective to us.

MR. GUYTON: That's right.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I point out I think the cost-effectiveness moves from the utility-specific to be a Peninsular-specific.

MR. GUYTON: No. It moves to specific utilities within the state of Florida.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay.

commissioner Jacobs: Let's take that argument then. Let's say that you have some pockets of need. And Duke would have trooped in -- instead of just one of them, they trooped in a whole series of

them, approximated not the whole 500 but some large section of that capacity. And they brought them here and said okay, now we have these municipals, whoever -- may be privates -- who have this need. We're going to put them in this application. Sounds like under your analysis that fits.

entities that needed the power and had signed contracts that showed that it was cost-effective, that's exactly right. You know, we wouldn't be here today if there were a series of contracts that showed that this power plant was needed and cost-effective. That's the missing element here. Under the case law of the state of Florida absent a utility-specific need, you can't secure a determination of need. And the way you do that is for an entity such as this is to enter into the contracts so that you know some essential information: One, who is the purchasing utility. Two, what's their need. And three, under the terms and conditions of the contract is it cost-effective.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Now, if we look around the Peninsular and we see the need but they don't have the contracts, we shouldn't consider that in this application?

MR. GUYTON: No. Because those entities have no contractual right to rely on that capacity, and they have to have a contract to be able to rely upon it. You don't know the terms and conditions under which it will be sold. They may need it but you don't know if the contract they signed a year, two years, five years from now is going to be the most cost-effective alternative to those entities. won't know that until you have that contract. That's why you, in your wisdom, and the Supreme Court affirmed you, said for an entity like this, you need to have a contract from which you can determine need and cost-effectiveness.

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commissioner deason: Mr. Guyton, I'm going to shift gears just a little bit. And it's going to be perhaps not consistent, or along the lines of your legal argument. I'm going to talk philosophy with you just a moment. Please indulge me and I hope the Chairman won't take this away from your time.

I understand the argument you're making; that within the law and Siting Act, that there's a requirement to determine need before we incur the environmental consequences of building a power plant. It's there. It's in the law. But we're in a new era now. One can debate whether this law applies to the

new era or not and that may be the ultimate outcome of your Motion to Dismiss. But on a going-forward basis, let me ask you this question: Anytime there's construction of any -- I assume any construction, there's some environmental impact. For example, let's say there's going to be a new shopping mall built within the state of Florida. There's going to be economic consequences of that. There's going to be environmental consequences of that. I don't know of any agency in the state that the shopping mall developer has to go to and say, "We want to demonstrate that there's a need for another Gayfers, and a need for another Sears, and a need for another JC Penney in this community, so let us degrade the environment a little bit, and we'll try to mitigate the amount of degradation, but there's a need for these new facilities.

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I assume that the policy and the assumption is that if investors are willing to build this facility and put their money at risk, that is a showing in and of itself and not that there's a need for these — this new shopping center. So we don't have to go through a determination of need. When they put up the money, that's showing that they think there's enough of a need for these facilities to go

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So then it's just a question of how do we minimize the impact on the environment? And if they plan to build this facility -- even if it's needed -- in a environmentally sensitive area, probably the application for the new shopping mall would be denied and that's a whole other question.

It seems to me in the era of monopolistic regulated utilities, there was a question exactly how much at risk the investors' funds were being placed at. Because if a power plant is to be built it goes into a rate base, and the Commission allows a return on it; depreciation is allowed. So there's a question as to really -- when a monopolistic regulated utility wants to build a power plant, whether they are really saying with their own dollars that "We know this plant is needed" because they are not really at risk as much as a competitive entity building a shopping mall would be. And that that was one of the reasons in the Power Plant Siting Act that there was a determination of need and cost-effectiveness because it ultimately was going to end up in a rate base that ratepayers were going to have to pay a return on and depreciation expense recovery of.

Now, tell me where I'm wrong or where you

agree or disagree.

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MR. GUYTON: Commissioner, I think I generally agree with what you have to say. Let's go through the elements of it.

You started out by saying that in a number of instances there's no prior determination of need. And that's generally true, although there are developments of regional impact, and there are some land use and land management statutes. But setting aside those, essentially there's an element in terms of taking a -- looking at economic development -- let the marketplace determine whether there ought to be an investment here. I agree with that.

What you have here is a statute that is in direct conflict with that general practice. And this statute says, "No, we're not going to let the marketplace determine need and cost-effectiveness.

Public Service Commission, that's your job. That's your job under the Power Plant Siting Act."

commissioner GARCIA: But isn't it our job because we have the responsibility to protect the ratepayer? Because we don't want to do it on the end of the project? Because we don't want your company to build a project which is unnecessary, and then we have to fold it into rates or some part of that into rates?

Isn't this done exactly the opposite to protect you and your investors and the ratepayers of Florida before that project goes up?

MR. GUYTON: Both from a cost perspective and a need perspective, yes. You were given this responsibility because you have rate setting authority and because you have Grid Bill authority. And they thought that it was important both from terms of electric system reliability and integrity, as well as cost-effectiveness, that you were the logical candidate to do this.

Should that change, because we're moving away from -- what was the term, regulated monopolistic utilities -- Commissioner Deason, we haven't moved from regulated monopolistic utilities in the state of Florida. That's indeed what we have in the state of Florida. There is no movement away from that.

away from that in generation? I mean this Commission has a rule which forces you to try to find the least-cost alternative when you put generation out. It requires you to bid against someone else to provide your own generation. So to some degree, Commissioner Deason has hit the nail on the head in terms of what we're moving away from, at least in terms of

generation.

MR. GUYTON: Indeed, there has been a movement there for some time. And how that is the Supreme Court -- have you decided this Siting Act should be interpreted in that context? That there still should be a need determination, that there should be a contract with a purchasing utility, and it has to be a utility-specific need. That's the way you decided that as you moved through the cases involving QFs and independent power producers that's still the stay of the law today. If, as a matter of philosophy, we see that there is a need to change that, that's something for the legislature to do.

What you have here is a very clear statutory scheme that's been construed not only by you on a number of occasions, but by the Supreme Court, to say this is the proper process. If you want to change that process because you have -- I won't say a new entity because I think you've looked at an independent power producer before in this same context -- if that procedure needs changing, that's not for the Commission to do. The law is well established here. And on a motion to dismiss, that's what we're trying to resolve: What the law is, not what the law should be.

commissioner DEASON: Thank you. You precisely answered my question.

MR. GUYTON: Thank you.

I'd like to move to another fundamental reason that the joint petition should be dismissed.

Neither Duke New Smyrna nor the Utilities

Commission is a proper applicant as to the 94% of the uncommitted capacity of this plant. In 1992 two entities petitioned you for determination of need:

Nassau Power Corporation and Ark Energy. They wanted to build power plants to make wholesale sales with Florida Power and Light Company. Neither entity had a contract with Florida Power and Light Company. On your own initiative you dismissed both of those need determinations because in your mind they were inconsistent with Section 403.519. That decision was made in Order No. PSC-92-1210-FOF-EQ, Tab C in my oral argument handout. It's the Ark and Nassau case.

In that case -- I'm quoting now from the bottom of 644 -- in that case you found, as to Ark and Nassau, quote, "that the petitions should be dismissed because Nassau and Ark are not proper applicants for a need determination proceeding under Section 403.519 Florida Statutes."

Commissioners, because this decision is so

close with the facts that you have before you today, I want to spend some time reviewing what you had to say and then what the Supreme Court had to say in affirming you. Because this case is a very well reasoned case. It's a thorough analysis of the law and it is dispositive in this case.

You started at the bottom of Page 644, top of Page 645, by stating that the definition of an applicant in the Siting Act turned on the definition of an electric utility, which in turn, was one of six types of entities defined in the Siting Act. You then noted that neither Nassau nor Ark was any of those entities which were included in the definition of an electric utility.

You went on to explain that each of the entities that constitute an electric utility under the Siting Act had an obligation to serve from which a need arose. Here's what you said. This is in the middle of Page 645, and I think this is the heart and soul of your decision. "Significantly, each of the entities listed under the statutory definition may be obligated to serve customers. It is this need, resulting from the duty to serve customers, which the need determination proceeding is designed to examine. Nonutility generators, such as Nassau sand Ark, have

no such need since they are not required to serve customers. The Supreme Court recently upheld this interpretation of the Siting Act. Dismissal of these need determinations is in accord with that decision. See Nassau Power versus Beard." You went on to explain that a purchasing or contracting utility was a indispensable party to a need determination proceeding. And then you concluded with the passage that's at the bottom of Page 645. "This scheme simply recognizes the utility's planning and evaluation process. It's the utility's need for power to serve its customers which must be evaluated in a need determination proceeding. Nassau Power Corporation versus Beard. A non-utility generator has no such need because it is not required to serve customers. The utility, not the cogenerator or the independent power producer, is the proper applicant.

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Now, there's more rationale, and I'd encourage you to read the remainder of this decision, because you came up with three or four more reasons that those petitions should be dismissed. We don't have time to review them this morning.

The Commission decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida. That decision is Tab D.

It's Nassau Power Corporation versus Deason. It's Tak

D in my handout. And there I'd refer you to the top of Page 398 where the Court characterized the decision below as follows, "The Commission dismissed the petition reasoning that only electric utilities or entities with whom such utilities --"

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Mr. Guyton, where are you reading now from?

MR. GUYTON: From the top of Page 398. Not the top of 398. It's the middle paragraph of Page 398.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I've got it.

MR. GUYTON: Second half of that middle paragraph.

"The Commission dismissed the petition reasoning that only electric utilities, or entities with whom such utilities have executed a power purchase contract, are proper applicants for a need determination proceeding under the Siting Act."

Then on the next column on the next page
they upheld your construction of the term "applicant."
They said "The Commission's construction of the term
'applicant' as used in Section 403.519 is consistent
with the plain language of the pertinent provisions of
the Act, and this Court's decision in Nassau Power
Corporation versus Beard."

They went on to restate the logic of your decision below. I won't take you through that entire passage in the interest of time, but I want to bring two passages to your attention. Further down on Page 398 of the decision the Court had this to say, "The Commission reasoned that a need determination proceeding is designed to examine the need resulting from an electric utility's duty to serve customers. Non-utility generators, such as Nassau, have no similar need because they are not required to serve customers."

And on the next page the Commission said once again that this decision -- or the Court said that this Commission's decision in Ark and Nassau was consistent with Nassau Power versus Beard.

As to the 470 megawatts that is uncommitted from this power plant, Duke New Smyrna is in exactly the same position as Ark and Nassau were. They don't have a contract, they don't have customers to serve, they don't have a need that arises from an obligation to serve customers. It is not under your construction of the Siting Act in the Ark and Nassau case, and Nassau Power versus Deason, what the Supreme Court had to say. These entities, Duke New Smyrna, is not a proper applicant under the Siting Act and that's

grounds for dismissal.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Let me ask a question.

MR. GUYTON: Okay.

commissionER CLARK: They are a proper applicant with respect to, what is it? 30 megawatts they want to provide to New Smyrna.

MR. GUYTON: Yes, Commissioner, they are.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: So we can move forward with this and determine just how much need there is.

Does that preclude them from building more than is necessary to meet the needs?

MR. GUYTON: Absolutely.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: It precludes them from doing that.

MR. GUYTON: You have to determine the need for the power plant. The power plant is 500 megawatts. 94% of this power plant is uncommitted to any specific utility in this state. It would make a mockery of this decision to suggest that you could commit 6% of a power plant and move forward as a proper applicant of the Power Plant Siting Act. If there were a 30-megawatt plant and they chose or opted under the Siting Act to proceed for a 30-megawatt plant, they could do so. But there is no -- and they have to be a proper applicant as to the entire amount

of the capacity.

Duke New Smyrna is not a proper applicant as to 470 megawatts of its proposed unit. Now, Duke New Smyrna attempts to distinguish this case in three respects. First they argue that the Ark and Nassau decision applies only to cogenerators, or to nonutility generators. And that they are, quote, "a regulated electric company under the Siting Act because they would be a public utility under the Federal Power Act."

Commissioners, Duke New Smyrna is in exactly the same position that Ark Energy was in the Ark and Nassau case. Ark represented itself in its petition to you as independent power project. That petition is Attachment E in my oral argument handout. And if you would turn to Page 2 of that attachment, here's what Ark said about its project. The name contract -- this is about two thirds of the way down the page.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: First page.

MR. GUYTON: Second page,

Commissioner Garcia.

"The named contracting party will be Pahokee Power Partners II Limited Partnership, which will own the facility an independent power project."

Commissioners, as an independent power

project, Ark, Pahokee would have been a public utility sub subject to regulation of FERC under the Federal Power Act. You found that they were not any of the entities under the definition of an electric utility, including a regulated electric utility. You found that in Ark and Nassau. That determination was upheld in Nassau Power versus Deason.

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There is a prior construction of the term "regulated electric company." It's right here in the Ark and Nassau decision in Nassau Power versus Beard. And it's controlling.

Second, they argue that the Ark and Nassau case, and those entities were actually trying to force FPL to buy power under a contract and that's not applicable here. They're assuming the risk of whether or not there will ultimately be a contract. But when you look at the rational of both the Commission and the Court, the fact that they were trying to compel a contract was not a consideration that entered into the reasoning of the Court. But think about it. If you think about in contrast, this distinction they bring out, Ark and Nassau were actually in a better position to show you need than Duke New Smyrna is. Because there they had identified the purchasing utility. There they identified the terms and conditions and

price. And given that you could have made a determination as to need and cost-effectiveness. You don't have that information here.

So if there is a distinction it's import is that Duke New Smyrna is worse off than Ark and Nassau.

And Ark and Nassau were dismissed.

Finally, they seize upon one isolated sentence in the Ark and Nassau decision. I want to read you the entire paragraph, because that sentence says the decision should be narrowly construed. But the entire paragraph shows that what you were trying to do was reserve the question of self-generation.

This is back in Tab C at Page 646. Here you said "In granting dismissal we are only construing who may be an applicant for a need determination under Section 403.519 Florida Statutes. We do not intend in any way to restrict the Department of Environmental Protection or Siting Board in their exercise of jurisdiction under the Power Plant Siting Act, or in their interpretation of the Act. It is also our intent that the order be narrowly construed and limited to proceedings wherein nonutility generators seek determinations of need based on a utility's need. We explicitly reserve for the future the question of whether a self-generator may be an applicant for a

need determination without a utility co-applicant."

Commissioners, I want to address briefly a third argument we've raised in our Motion to Dismiss.

The joint petition advances a theory that is fundamentally at odds with the Siting Act. Under the Siting Act it is the Commission, not the marketplace, that determines need and cost-effectiveness. That is so important a determination that it's a condition precedent to moving through the rest of the Siting Act process. Under the Siting Act the rule is very simple: If you don't need it, you don't build it. Absent need, there's no reason to face the environmental consequences of the plant.

Now, the Joint Petition is premised on a fundamentally different assumption. It says don't concern yourself too much with traditional concepts of utility need. Don't even look at specific utilities. Instead, Duke New Smyrna will assume all of the risk whether it is cost-effective and needed. Their approach is to let the marketplace determine whether there is a need for the power plant.

Commissioners, if that had been the legislature's intent, we wouldn't have had a Power Plant Siting Act. It's an abrogation of your responsibility under Nassau Power versus Beard for you

to presume need. It would be a far greater abrogation for you to defer to the market to determine whether there's a need of cost-effectiveness of a power plant.

I've covered three of the reasons why this petition should be dismissed. There are three more in our written motion to dismiss. They are all equally compelling. In the interest of time, I'm not going to address them this morning and I'll preserve whatever time I have left for rebuttal. Commissioners, thank you.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Thank you. Any questions? No additional questions for Mr. Guyton.

We're going to take a 15 minute break.

(Brief recess.)

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We're going to go back on the record. Mr. Wright.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Madam Chairman, and members of the Commission.

In our argument today I'll be presenting argument on state law issues. Mr. Santa will be presenting argument relating to federal and state energy policy issues. Professor Seindenfeld will address federal preemption as we have addressed it in our brief, and Professor Gey will address the commerce

clause implications of the arguments posed by the motions to dismiss.

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commissionER GARCIA: Schef, if you -(inaudible)

How much time are you going to take? Just so that I have an idea. Because I think it -- I know the Chairman doesn't eat, but I regularly eat, so I want to make sure that -- (Laughter)

MR. WRIGHT: Well, my understanding is that we would be allotted an hour and half based on the Chairman's ruling. I don't think we're going take anything like that long --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: That's fine.

MR. WRIGHT: There will be questions from the bench. There's no telling. Plus, if we have time left over and further rebuttal commentary, we'd expect to be allowed to use our time accordingly.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Thank you.

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioners, on these Motions to Dismiss, Florida Power and Light Company and Florida Power Corporation, the opponents of the project have the burden of demonstrating that there's no basis upon which we can proceed to obtain your decision on the merits of our application. It's just not true that we have to disprove everything. If

there's a way for you to let this project go forward to consideration on the merits, you're bound to do so.

All facts must be assumed favorable to us, and all inferences that may be derived from what we have alleged must be assumed to be favorable to us and we have alleged them. Even though it's not our burden, we will demonstrate that there are, in fact, no grounds upon which dismissal is appropriate. And there are several grounds upon which we should, and indeed we believe, upon which we must be allowed to proceed to have a hearing on the merits and receive your decision on the application for the determination of need for this project.

The best the other side really has to offer you is dicta for cases that address inapposite facts, and in cases where you, the Commission, specifically limited the holdings. The opponents have no holding in the cases sighted to bind you in any way. The interpretations they offer are contrived and would limit your ability to address the legitimate needs of Florida and our state's electric customers.

We will explain how we -- both joint petitioners, Duke New Smyrna and the Utilities

Commission of New Smyrna Beach, are proper applicants.

How and why we fit into the existing regulatory

framework. How and why you have jurisdiction over both petitioners as electric utilities under Section 366.02(2), and how you have jurisdiction and regulatory authority over both petitioners pursuant to other sections of Chapter 366.

We will explain how and why the proposed

New Smyrna Beach power project is consistent with the

purposes of state and federal energy regulation, and

state and federal energy policy, and how and why

allowing us to proceed is in harmony with applicable

federal statutory law and the United States

Constitution.

As to the state law issues, Section 403.519, which is the Commission's need determination statute, reads basically as follows, "Upon request by an applicant, or on its own motion, the Commission shall commence a proceeding to determine a need for a proposed electric power plant, subject to the Power Plant Siting Act. Section 403.503 is the definition section of the Power Plant Siting Act, and that defines "applicant" as any electric utility that applies for certification pursuant to the Act. Below, within the same definitional section, the Siting Act defines "electric utility" as cities and towns, counties, public utility districts, regulated electric

companies, electric cooperatives, joint operating agencies and combinations thereof, engaged in or authorized to engage in the generation, transmission or distribution of electric energy.

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Both joint petitioners who are here before you this morning are applicants and both are electric utilities pursuant to the plain language of these definitions. The Utilities Commission of New Smyrna Beach is a city. Duke New Smyrna is a regulated electric company authorized to engage in the business of generating electricity.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Mr. Wright, if it's a regulated electric utility, why didn't it file a Ten Year Site Plan that we just reviewed yesterday? Why didn't Duke file a Ten Year Site Plan that we just reviewed yesterday if it's an electric utility?

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Deason, frankly, I discussed — we received our tariff that authorized us to provide — approval of our tariff that authorizes us to provide service in June of this year. I discussed with Mr. Jenkins at that time whether we should file a Ten Year Site Plan. He said since we were past the filing date, which was April 1st, and we were arguably not an electric utility within the meaning of that at that time, that he didn't think it

was appropriate. Now that we had a tariff, we should file under the next filing date and that is our intention.

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commissioner deason: So why is it that you did not then but you would now. Because you have a tariff? I'm trying --

MR. WRIGHT: There's a legitimate question as to whether we were exactly an electric utility as of the filing date for this year's round of Ten Year Site Plans.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And what was that filing date?

MR. WRIGHT: April 1st.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Okay. And why was there a question April 1st but there's not a question now.

MR. WRIGHT: I think there's no question now because we have a tariff and we're clearly authorized to engage in the generation and sale of the electricity wholesale as of now. Commissioner Deason, I felt, in a abundance of caution, that I did the right thing. I consulted your chief electric and gas member as to whether he thought we should, albeit that the Ten Year Site Plan would have been late -- whether he thought we should file one this summer. He advised

me no, that we should file one at next year's Ten Year Site Plan filing.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Explain to me the tariff which now makes it clear that you are an electric utility.

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MR. WRIGHT: I'd be happy to. I would like to add that I think there are other matters, including state law matters, that specifically make us an electric utility.

But the tariff is the FERC's approval of

Duke Energy, New Smyrna Beach Power Company, Limited,

L.L.P.s Rate Schedule No. 1, which authorizes us to

enter into power sales agreements at negotiated rates

with other utilities. It is a tariff for the sale of

wholesale power.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: We don't know what those rates are going to be until they are actually negotiated.

MR. WRIGHT: That's correct. Except that you do know what the rates will be for our power sale to the Utilities Commission for New Smyrna Beach.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: For the 470 megawatts we don't know what that's going to be sold at or to whom.

MR. WRIGHT: That's correct.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Then how do we determine it's cost-effective?

MR. WRIGHT: I think you can fairly infer and conclude that it's cost-effective by the fact we will sell in the wholesale market to other utilities, and that they will only buy from us when it's cost-effective for them to do so.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So if you sell at market, whatever market is, that, by definition, is cost-effective?

MR. WRIGHT: I think so, from the purchasing utility's perspective. Because if it were not cost-effective, Commissioner Deason, they wouldn't buy it. They would chose to run their own generation or to buy from another supplier.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: In fact, we wouldn't let them buy it, Schef, if it was too expensive, would we?

MR. WRIGHT: I think that you would apply, as you normally do, a prudence review, and perhaps disallow that power.

Commissioner Deason, if I might point out, the FERC's approval of our rate Schedule No. 1 was also predicated on a finding that we lacked market power. Had they found we had market power, we would

be subject to their full rate regulation.

As I said, the Utilities Commission, City of New Smyrna Beach is a city, it is a municipal electric particular system. It is an electric utility by any definition in the statutes. Duke New Smyrna is a regulated electric company authorized by FERC and by our organizing papers to engage in the business of generating electricity and selling it at wholesale. Duke New Smyrna is a public utility under the Federal Power Act, and as I explained we are fully subject to the regulatory authority of FERC, notwithstanding the fact that we have a tariff for market-based rates. If the FERC were to determine that we have market power, they could impose their full panoply of federal rate regulation requirements upon us.

Duke New Smyrna and the Utilities Commission of New Smyrna Beach are also electric utilities pursuant to Section 366.02(2) Florida Statutes, and accordingly we are, to a significant degree — that is Duke New Smyrna is — to a signature degree an electric company, subject to the Commission's regulatory authority over such electric utilities, to the extent that it extends, including planning and emergency operations authority, plus other Grid Bill authority.

In his argument, Mr. Sasso pointed out that we would not, or probably not -- or possibly not be subject to certain requirements within Chapter 366 that apply for retail serving utilities. For example, I don't think you could prescribe a rate structure for us for our wholesale sales. We don't serve at retail so that's irrelevant. We're not subject to the conservation requirements. And because we have no retail service area, we would not be subject to territorial disputes. Territorial disputes arise when two competing utilities purport to serve or plan to serve or try to serve the same customers. However, he left out some other powers that you all have under 366, including your Grid Bill authority, with respect to planning and emergency operations. And we believe that we are an electric utility subject to your regulatory authority, pursuant to those sections of the statutes.

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"utility." It no longer says so. They changed it to say "applicant." "Applicant" is a defined term within the Power Plant Siting Act which I think 403.519 must be read in pari materia with because it prescribes and governs the Commission's role in regulation pursuant to that Siting Act.

The legislature used the word "applicant" and used it as I described above, including regulated electric companies authorized to engage in the generation, transmission, or distribution of electricity.

I think this distinction and the choice of words that the legislature used is extremely important. The legislature in 1973 specifically used the word "or" in listing or enumerating the types of entities that are included within the scope of the definition of "electric utility" and "applicant." The legislature, in choosing this language and enacting this language, specifically provided for entities engaged only in the business of generating electricity to be applicants under the Siting Act.

commissioner DEASON: Mr. Wright, do you think they had in mind it could be a generating-only utility, or do you think they meant -- or when they applied the term "distribution" to capture utilities such as Florida Public Utility's, which is a distribution-only utility?

MR. WRIGHT: I think the plain language of the statute indicates they probably meant both. Or all three.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: So you think the

legislature envisioned that there were -- or could be generating-only utilities, and that that's what they 2 3 meant by that and used the term "or." MR. WRIGHT: I think that that's -- I can't 4 tell you for sure what was in the minds of the 5 legislators, although we'll talk about that more in a 6 7 little bit. I can tell you the language that they used specifically included generation-only utilities. 8 Did anybody think about it? I don't know. Did some 9 Staff member who wrote the statute --10 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Show me that language. 11 12 MR. WRIGHT: Certainly. Look at Section 403.503(13) 13 I'm looking at it. COMMISSIONER GARCIA: 14 MR. WRIGHT: Cities and towns, counties, 15 public utility districts, regulated electric 16 companies, electric cooperatives and joint operating 17 agencies or combinations thereof, engaged in or 18 authorized to engage in, business of generating, 19 transmitting or distributing electric energy. 20 That's similar language, Commissioners, that 21 22

they used in Chapter 366.02, which refers to entities that own, maintain or operate generation, transmission or distribution facilities within the state.

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In 1972 the year before the Siting Act was

enacted, a case was decided by the United States
Supreme Court. Federal Power Commission versus
Florida Power and Light Company, in which the United
States Supreme Court upheld the Federal Power
Commission's regulatory authority over generation and
transmission at wholesale in interstate commerce.

That statute -- sorry, that case decision of the
United States Supreme Court certainly must be presumed
as being chargeable to the knowledge of the
legislators. They probably did know about that case.
They probably did know that that generation was
wholesale. And they chose the words "generation" as
an independent basis upon which an entity could be an
applicant.

The point is that --

commissioner deason: Mr. Wright, in 1972, were there any generating-only utilities which sold power wholesale and did not have any retail customers?

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Deason, I'm sure there were.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Could you identify those entities for me?

MR. WRIGHT: I can't tell you for sure who was in existence at that time. I believe some federal power administrations would have been

wholesale only. And I believe at that time there were generation and transmission cooperatives that only 2 sold at wholesale. 3 COMMISSIONER DEASON: They only sold what? 4 MR. WRIGHT: At wholesale. 5 COMMISSIONER DEASON: Were there any located 6 7 in Florida? MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Deason, I don't 8 know. I think possibly the Southeast Power 9 Administration which sells wholesale out of the Jim 10 Woodruff dam up at Chattahoochee was in existence at 11 that time. I don't know that for a fact. 12 COMMISSIONER DEASON: But they were not an 13 electric utility that was subject to the regulation of 14 the Florida Commission obviously. 15 MR. WRIGHT: At least not subject to their 16 retail -- to the Commission's retail regulation 17 because they only sell at retail -- wholesale. Sorry. 18 l COMMISSIONER CLARK: What was the sequence 19 of that? 20 MR. WRIGHT: The Federal Power Commission v 21 FPL case was 1972. And this is laid out in the brief, 22 Commissioner Clark. The Siting Act was enacted in 23 24 1973. 25 COMMISSIONER CLARK:

MR. WRIGHT: The point is that both joint 1 petitioners before you, the Utilities Commission New 2 Smyrna Beach and Duke New Smyrna, are applicants and 3 electric utilities by the plain language of the 4 The IOU opponents of the project want to 5 statutes. add a lot of language to these statutes that would plainly contravene its plain meaning. 7 They want to add utility-specific to a statute that doesn't even 8 include the word "utility". The word "utility" does 9 not appear in Section 403.519. They want to add the 10 word "retail", or the phrase "serves at retail" to the 11 same statute, and perhaps to Section 366.02(2) as 12 They want to add "state regulated" and they 13 well. want to add a contract requirement. The word 14 "contract" does not appear in 403.519. They want to 15 add that to the statute. Now they want to add the 16 entire amount of the capacity of the proposed power 17 plant as being subject to a contract. And they want 18 to read the word "or" right out of 403.519 and right 19

commissioner JACOBS: Mr. Wright, one of the main premises put forth is the cost-effectiveness argument and you agree that that is appropriate.

out of 366.02(2).

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One of the concerns I have is if you have a facility under which we're unclear the terms at which

it would sell its product, how can we ensure that this product would be cost-effective? But more importantly -- and I think in light of recent events this is a critical item -- once that entity is up and running and is engaged in commerce, it will reserve transmission capacity and what we can't be certain will be a cost-effective rate. We now know that has a whole other level of market impact. How would you address that?

MR. WRIGHT: As to the cost-effectiveness of the purchase, as I explained in the response to Commissioner Deason, the purchases, I think, would have to be cost-effective or no purchasing utility would buy it for resale. And as I explained in response to Commissioner Garcia's questions, if for some reason they were to pay us too much for our power, they would at least be subject to a prudence review to some degree.

Now, as to the transmission, the way I understand the transmission laws to work are as follows -- if I'm incorrect, I trust Mr. Santa will straighten me out.

We apply for transmission -- Duke New Smyrna, when it seeks to make wholesale sales, will apply for transmission service from the utility or

utilities, from whom it intends to purchase that transmission. There is a distinction between short-term and long-term sales -- excuse me, long term -- short-term and long-term transmission service. If it's short term, we will go to the OASIS, or open access same time information system, determine whether the transmission is available; what the price is. If it's available at a price that we think is reasonable and fair, and that is -- allows our transaction to go forward, we can buy short-term transmission capacity on that basis. That exists today.

If we want long-term firm transmission capacity on a system, we must make an application pursuant to the transmission providing utility's pro forma tariff in both Florida Power Corporation and Florida Power and Light Company with whom we would be interconnected at the New Smyrna substation owned by the Utilities Commission of the City of

New Smyrna Beach. We must make application pursuant to their pro forma tariffs. They are then entitled to do a study and tell us what, if any, transmission upgrades or improvements are necessary, and we're on the hook to pay for those costs.

We have identified -- I don't want to go too far afield, but we've identified and will present

testimony in the hearing as to what exact transmission facilities we believe are satisfactory and adequate to permit delivery of the power output -- the entire output of this project to other utilities in Peninsular Florida.

So basically we're on the hook to pay the short-term transmission rate. If it's not available we can't get it, and we're on the hook to pay the cost of any upgrades that are required in the long term. If there's a dispute as to what's required, say if we'd say \$6 million upgrades will cover the need, and one of the transmission providing utilities says no, it's going to cost you \$11.5 million, we have a proceeding at FERC.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: If you're looking for the next place to go, why don't you address our decisions that seem to indicate --

MR. WRIGHT: I missed a word. Sorry.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Would you address the decisions that Mr. Guyton brought up?

MR. WRIGHT: Certainly. That's exactly where I was going.

The holdings of the Nassau cases are very simple and straightforward. The holding of Nassau v

Beard was that the Commission -- sorry, was that

Nassau appealed the wrong order and they were out.

That was the holding. The rest was dicta.

The holding of Nassau v Deason was that where the Commission's interpretation of its own statute is not clearly erroneous, the Court will uphold. Because the Court said "We cannot conclude that the Commission's interpretation of its statute was clearly erroneous, we affirm." Those were the holdings. The rest was dicta. And I might add, dicta in cases that were on inapposite facts.

Those cases involve entities, QFs or IPPs perhaps, who were attempting to force Florida Power and Light Company in both cases to purchase the entire output of those projects for long periods of time. I believe that the subject contract in the Nassau v Beard case was a 30-year contract. I know that the subject contracts in the Nassau v Deason case were 30-year contracts with renewal options. The language as to utility-specific was all dicta.

commissioner deason: You're saying that in the Nassau v Deason case, the both bottom line was that the Court said that it could not be shown that the agency's interpretation was clearly wrong.

MR. WRIGHT: That's correct.

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COMMISSIONER DEASON: It didn't say our interpretation was right.

MR. WRIGHT: It said that the standard of review -- their job is to affirm, not necessarily to say whether it's right or wrong -- the Court's job on appeal is to affirm remand or overturn. And they said "Because we cannot conclude that the Commission's interpretation of its statute was clearly erroneous, we affirm."

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Let's go back step by step. And what was our holding?

MR. WRIGHT: Your holding?

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Yes.

that neither Ark nor Nassau were proper applicants. I don't believe we took the sentence out of context. We can read the whole paragraph to you, as Mr. Guyton did. The Commission -- and I don't know -- I know two of you were on the Commission at that time. I don't know for the edification of the other three. I will tell you that the vote on the Motions to Dismiss Nassau and Ark was 3 to 2. It was a close call. And the Commission expressly, in its Order, stated that that Order was to be narrowly construed to the circumstance in which a nonutility generator or

COMMISSIONER CLARK: In Nassau v Deason was

co-generator sought to serve a specific utility's identifying need, and where they had to contract with that dual --

commissioner GARCIA: Give me your version of the holding again? I missed it. I'm sorry. I was busy thinking who was the 3/2 and I shouldn't have been. Tell me precisely -- what your interpretation of the holding --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: I think Commissioner Clark and I disagreed.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: There you go. That settles that little question I had. (Laughter)

Just give me your holding, what you just gave Chairman Johnson.

MR. WRIGHT: Your holding, the Commission's holding, by a 3-to-2 vote in the Order below, as we might say, the Commission order that was appealed from to the Court in Nassau v Deason was that neither Ark nor Nassau were proper applicants. You specifically expressly wrote in your order that the order itself -- capital "O" order, in your decision, was to be narrowly construed, can be limited to the scenario where an entity proposed to serve a specific utility.

commissioner GARCIA: So Mr. Guyton makes a very good point. They weren't proper applicants. How

are you different?

that.

MR. WRIGHT: We are proper applicants. We are both proper applicants under the plain language of the statute. And a couple more --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Distinguish yourself from Mr. Guyton's point these are exactly the same thing.

MR. WRIGHT: We are not trying to bind FPL, of FPC or Tampa Electric Company or any other utility to pay for our plant pursuant to a long-term contract. We do have a contract with Utilities Commission of New Smyrna Beach, and we really ought not forgot them, notwithstanding the fact they are only in contract with Duke New Smyrna to take 30 megawatts of the plant's output. They are an applicant here. There's nothing in your ruling that --

MR. WRIGHT: -- say you have to have -there's nothing in your rulings that say you have to
have a contract for the entire output, nor for the
life of the project. There's nothing in the law that
says that. There's nothing in the rules that say

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: The distinguish --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: So the distinguishing factor that distinguishes this case is Mr. Guyton held

it for the -- the exact opposite proposition that you hold it to, but in your case you distinguish it by saying that in this case, in the Deason case, what the 3 companies were trying to do -- what the applicants in that case were trying to do was get FPL to contract 5 with it to produce power. And in this case you're not 6 asking for it, therefore, it's different. 7 8 MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir. COMMISSIONER JOHNSON: That's our finding? 9 I mean, when we held that they were not proper 10 applicants, what did we base that upon? We said they 11

aren't proper applicants because --

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MR. WRIGHT: Because they were not among the enumerated entities within 403.519 and did not have contracts with those who were.

I will tell you your order was issued two days after the Energy Policy Act was enacted, so clearly that was not part of what informed your vote because that took place about three weeks earlier.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So Mr. Guyton says using that language that you all are not one of the enumerated entities and do not have a contract.

MR. WRIGHT: That is his position, yes, ma'am.

> So the difference here is CHAIRMAN JOHNSON:

how we define enumerated -- whether or not you fit 2 within those enumerated categories. MR. WRIGHT: Yeah. Whether we're an 3 4 applicant. Whether both of us are applicants under 5 the plain language of the statute. 6 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Mr. Guyton also used the 7 Ark example, and I don't remember one of his 8 attachments, that demonstrated you all were -- you all were the exact same as Ark. Mr. Guyton, which --10 MR. GUYTON: That's Attachment E, Ark's Petition to Determine Need and it's the second page 11 where they say "the facility will be an independent 12 13 power producer." 14 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And your argument, 15 Mr. Guyton, was that --MR. GUYTON: Was that an independent power 16 producer would be a public utility under the Federal 17 Power Act just like Duke New Smyrna says they are a 18 public utility under the Federal Power Act. 19 And you found that this entity, which would 20 have been a Federal Power -- a public utility under 21 the Federal Power Act -- was not a regulated electric company within the meaning of the Siting Act. 23 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: And that's the 24

distinguishing factor for you, Schef. You agree with

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Mr. Guyton that Ark was not -- did not fall into the 2 category because contracting utility is not there. 3 that what you're saying? In other words, our holding wasn't wrong in that case. You don't disagree with what the Commission found. Obviously you'd like it to 5 be broader so you can walk in through the double doors. But in this case you're saying to us that 7 this -- the proposition that this case cites is 8 narrowly construed because this has to do with a contracting party. 10

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir. By its own terms.

By your orders and terms. And I will say I didn't agree with the decision. Then I represented Ark and CSW. But that's neither here nor there.

commissioner clark: Well, you're saying that it's still in harmony because you could still make that conclusion today and find that you're, nonetheless, an applicant because you are an electric utility under FERC.

MR. WRIGHT: Public utility under the Federal Power Act and an electric utility under Chapter 366, Commissioner Clark, yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Right. Because it uses the disjunctive "or."

MR. WRIGHT: That's right.

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COMMISSIONER CLARK: One other thing is you 1 confused me somewhat. What is the date of the -- what 2 is the date of the order? There are several Nassau 3 4 cases. MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am. 5 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Nassau versus Deason is 6 7 the last one. MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am. 8 **COMMISSIONER CLARK:** When was that decided? 9 Let me ask it a different way: Was that the one where 10 Commissioner Lauredo and I dissented on who was an 11 applicant? 12 || MR. WRIGHT: It was. It was decided by the 13 Court in 1994. It was decided by the Commission in 14 October or -- October of 1992. 15 COMMISSIONER CLARK: And your position is 16 what's in that holding by the Court is dicta. MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am. 18 COMMISSIONER CLARK: What about Nassau 19 versus Beard? 20 21 MR. WRIGHT: Same thing, the holding Nassau v Beard was that Nassau Power had appealed the wrong 22 23 order and they were out. COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. What Order 24 should they have appealed? The one determining the 25

need for something else?

MR. WRIGHT: I think the Order that they should have appealed by the Court's decision was Order 22341. They attempted to appeal a later Order 23246 and the Court said what they were trying to challenge is the finding in 22341. They didn't do so in time. They're out.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But what was that Order? DA finding of need.

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Clark, that was the planning hearing order establishing standard offer contract pricing. And in that light, I would point out to you that your orders, the Supreme Court decisions, and your Staff's later writings on this subject have all recognized that Nassau Power was the law of cogeneration. The Nassau Power cases.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Was the what -- MR. WRIGHT: Law of cogeneration.

commissioner clark: Why you're different is in those cases they were trying to assert an obligation on the part of the retail utilities to purchase their power. Since you're not, you don't fall within those exclusions.

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Clark, I just did not quite follow what you said.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Tell me why those cases 1 are inapposite. Is that with an "A?" 2 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: That's exactly what he 3 did say. You just restated it, because that's how I 4 understood how you distinguish it. How you 5 6 distinguish yourself from Mr. Guyton's holdings. 7 MR. WRIGHT: We are not trying to force any utility to buy the output of this project. We have no 8 legal right, as QFs do, to force any entity to buy the 9 output of this project. They'll either buy it, 10 presumably, when it's a good deal or they won't. 11 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: But you're here 12 basically because you have one that is purchasing? 13 MR. WRIGHT: We have one that is. There is 14 a public utility, and under the Federal Power Act and 15 an electric utility under your law, and we believe 16 Duke New Smyrna is a proper applicant in its own 17 right. 18 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: How do we get beyond 19 the provision which says that -- that that joint 20 applicant is appropriate only to the extent of need of 21 purchasing utility? 22 23 MR. WRIGHT: I don't see that as a provision anywhere in the statutes, rules or anywhere else. 24

That's something that the IOU's opposing this project

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are trying to read into that.

We've allege -- and this kind of goes to our response to the pleading requirements arguments -- we've alleged that Florida needs capacity and this power plant can provide some of that needed capacity. We've alleged that Florida needs adequate electricity, Peninsular Florida specifically, needs adequate electricity at a reasonable cost, and that we will provide that. We have alleged that the state needs cost-effective power and that we will provide necessarily cost-effective power.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So forget the specific -- the utility-specific requirement altogether.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir. It's not there.

And, frankly, as a matter of your jurisdiction, it
follows on some comments made by Commissioner Deason
earlier, your job is to look out for the whole state.

commissionER CLARK: Mr. Wright, you don't think that there were sort of -- there was a dual goal to the Power Plant Siting, first being that we make a determination that it's needed so that the customers of that particular utility aren't burdened with a plant that may not be needed, and that it's not built if it isn't needed?

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And that the second purpose may be that Florida, as a whole, isn't burdened with plants that nobody needs. It's an environmental issue.

MR. WRIGHT: I completely --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I'm sorry.

MR. WRIGHT: That's okay. I agree with you that the purpose of the need determination statute is to prevent captive utility ratepayers from being forced to bear the costs of power plants without some a priori determination by the Commission that that's needed and that the costs are reasonable. agree with you that the Power Plant Siting Act is an environmental statute. However, I don't think it says that the state is to minimize the number of power plants or limit the number of power plants to that number of power plants that is necessary to meet minimum reliability criteria. What the statute says is that it's the task of the Siting Board and the policy of the State of Florida to balance the need for electricity with the environmental concerns occasioned by.

Frankly, I don't think this is really appropriate to this Motion to Dismiss. But we have alleged in our pleadings and in our filings that the construction and operation of this power plant will

actually improve environmental quality. And I'd submit to you for your purposes you ought to determine whether things are okay with respect to the ratepayers -- of course, we assert that they are -- and let DEP decide whether the environmental impacts are acceptable and let the Siting Board determine whether the environmental impacts are acceptable in doing its job under the Siting Act, i.e., in balancing the need for the electricity with the environmental consequences.

It's our position, it's our factual allegation that the construction and operation of the power plant will result in a net improvement in environmental quality in Florida. And I submit to you ought to let the Siting Board decide whether we are right on that.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: How much is too much?

How many plants can we authorize them?

MR. WRIGHT: We're kind of into a philosophy discussion, but I'm happy to answer your question.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: I agree we are.

Because at some point -- on the one hand we have

before us a statute that if you interpret it the way

it is suggested here, it gives us a bright line, in

effect. It says, you know, you look at it from the

1	determination of how much you need to serve the retail
2	load in this state and maintain some measure of
3	reliability. I think that's a pretty bright line. We
4	may debate where that margin of reserve may be. But
5	what I hear you saying is perhaps it should be
6	something more than that, and let the
7	environmentalist, or the environment agency, decide
8	how much is too much.
9	MR. WRIGHT: As to the environmental impact,
LO	I think that's exactly how the law works.
L1	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Then why are we doing
L2	this? I mean.
L3	MR. WRIGHT: Because the law requires it,
L4	Commissioner Clark.
L5	COMMISSIONER CLARK: Why does the law
L6	require it?
L7	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: You're not alleging
18	that it's another one of those ministerial duties we
L9	have to carry out just to carry out.
20	MR. WRIGHT: No, sir.
21	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Why do we do it then?
22	Don't we do it to avoid encumbering ratepayers with
23	generation that's too expensive. Isn't that our part
,	of the deal?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir.

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commissioner clark: I don't mean to -- I think you need to make your argument -- at what point would you say that we ought -- would we say you ought not build any more power plants?

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Clark, the answer to that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. I don't know. I think a fair case can be made, and it's one that I would adopt and submit to you as reasonable, that where you have this project, and perhaps others, that are offering to provide power, that no captive ratepayer can be on the hook for, other than to pay for the electricity from, that their retail serving utilities buy presumably when it's cost-effective for resale to them. That to quote a Staff member in a workshop, the more the merrier as long as ratepayers are protected. Now, you know, --

commissionER GARCIA: Mr. Guyton says his ratepayers are going to be hurt. Or maybe not his ratepayers, but TECO's ratepayers. Someone is going to be hurt by your plant.

MR. WRIGHT: Well, to the extent we run, somebody is going to benefit, and to the extent we run, we're going to be displacing less efficient generation from less efficient power plants, or else we won't sell power. That means two things. That

means one, that the actual cost of what's being generated is going to be less than it would have otherwise been had the other entity did it, which means there's a net gain to the state of Florida and we're going to use less fuel altogether, which also means there's a net gain to the state of Florida.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Can I follow one more thing.

If that's your argument, the more the merrier, should it be that -- I'm sorry.

MR. WRIGHT: I want --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: You don't know where that limit is.

MR. WRIGHT: I don't know where it is,

Commissioner Clark. And that's what I was going to
say is I don't know where it is. If you get to a case
where there's a hardware, you know, actual physical
generation assets, reserve margin of 50%, arguably
that would be too much. It would be a great problem
for you to have because what you'd have would be a lot
of -- if they were merchant power plants, anyway,
you'd have them bidding against each other, and they'd
be bidding their prices down about that much above
short run marginal cost. You'd have the most reliable
power supply system in the United States, and you'd

have people bidding their power supply cost down as close as possible to short run marginal cost, which is going to benefit your ratepayers. Now is 50% too much? Arguably, yes. Its 25% too much? Arguably, no. Where's the line? I don't know.

commissioner deason: Mr. Wright, wouldn't you say then under -- I take it under your interpretation that the market would control, the point is reached when investors are no longer willing to make the investment. They think the market is saturated. They can't make a profit. So, that is a constraint, is it not?

MR. WRIGHT: That would certainly be a constraint that operates in the market. I was trying to answer Commissioner Clark's question, which is from your perspective, from the Commissioners' perspective, how much is too much.

commissionER CLARK: Well, I guess -- let me
just ask a related question and I'll let you go.

It seems to me then what your argument leads to is power plant siting, requiring them to get a need from us, should only be something we have to do if it is for the purposes of putting it into the retail rate base. And if it's not for that purpose, why should you come get a need from us? The market will

determine how much is appropriate.

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Clark, we're talking about what a law might say at some point in the future, you know, and I can't disagree with you.

I had conversations on this subject with the Staff at a workshop last year. They said, Schef, as long as transmission and reliability are covered, what do we care. I said, well, Bob, I think you probably care because you want to keep your jurisdiction, at least for now. You know, should that be law? I don't know.

I submit to you the law today is that by the plain language of the statute we are applicants and we're entitled to be here, and that the law today requires you to be an integral part of our permitting process; and that's why we're here. And we believe we have complied with all of your requirements and established more than ample evidence to satisfy every appropriate criterion in the statutes.

commissioner CLARK: Well, it just seems me that -- I think some of your arguments, as the opponents have suggested, if you parse through it, you can support your argument. But by making those arguments, it asks, in my opinion, a broader question as if you should just be able to come in as the market

bears, and it shouldn't anything we look at in terms of margin or reserve and what is needed to serve the customers in the state. Then perhaps it makes no sense for you to go through a need, yet you're required to go through a need.

It strikes me that there may be a problem with the current law. The law isn't the way perhaps it should be, given what's developing in the industry, but we're nonetheless constrained by what's in the law.

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Clark, that's possible, but the law exists as it exists today; and right now this morning we're here on a motion to dismiss as to whether we're a proper applicant.

We submit that we are under the law and that we're entitled to be here and entitled to your decision on the merits, you know. If at some point the law changes, we'll deal with it then, but right now we're here in good faith, and we believe in full compliance with your laws and rules, trying to follow the law which you have to discharge.

commissioner clark: Would we have the opportunity to say, yes, you're an applicant, but we only certify the need for 30 megawatts?

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Isn't 30 megawatts

under the threshold?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Yes, it is.

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Clark, it's not a determination of the need for megawatts; it's a determination of the need for the proposed power plant.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. So you agree --

MR. WRIGHT: So I would --

commissionER CLARK: -- with them; it's the
plant or nothing?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Let me --

MR. WRIGHT: And I would point out in that regard that you all -- I said this before. You need -- not to do -- the Utilities Commission in New Smyrna Beach, 30 megawatts may not be much to Florida Power or Florida Power & Light, but it's an awful lot, and it's an awful lot of savings to the Utilities Commission.

They are a proper applicant, they are a proper co-applicant with us and there's no requirement in your statute either that says you have to have a contract at all, let alone the entire output of the capacity.

This project -- this power plant is the

project, is the power plant that provides the

Utilities Commission of New Smyrna Beach the benefits,

the savings, the cost-effective reliable power.

They're here asking you for it.

commissioner Jacobs: You kind of implied that purchases will only occur if it were within economic dispatch of the purchasing utility. What if we were to put that as a condition, either that or emergency power?

MR. WRIGHT: Commissioner Jacobs, I -
COMMISSIONER JACOBS: For everything over
the 30; for everything over the 30.

MR. WRIGHT: I don't -- here's -- I'll tell you what I think. I think that -- I would say I think that would not be an appropriate condition to put on a determination of need, because it really goes to what you want -- I think to what you think to apply to the prudence of purchases in future transactions.

And I think you have ample regulatory authority to tell a purchasing utility that they shouldn't have bought from us or that they paid too much, and you're only going to allow what would have been reasonable and prudent under the circumstances. Did I make that clear?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: I understand what

you're saying.

my -- rhetorically sort of, why would you condition our determination of need on what is reasonable --

commissioner GARCIA: Isn't that already a condition that the companies that are utilities in the state have before us? In other words, if you put that condition on Duke Power, it's superfluous, because any of the utilities that buy from them have to buy it only under those conditions.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Right?

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: That's the question I have. Is that the case?

matter of fact that that is the case and that that can only be the case. We can't make them pay \$500 a megawatt hour when they can turn around and generate for 25. We can't make them pay \$25.50 a megawatt hour when they can turn around and generate for 25 or buy it from somebody else for 25 and a quarter. And I think we all have to assume that they will behave in an economically rational way.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: So following something that Commissioner Clark said, which sort of struck a

cord with me, her concept is that perhaps this determination of need proceeding was based on a 3 different market that existed, say, 10 years ago and 4 where no one would in theory come in and build a power plant on speculation, but now that that's happening, that you're doing it, you're coming in saying, well, there's a need out there and we're going to get it 7 from overall, that responsibility that we had. 8 proceeding, you're saying, I guess, sort of it's superfluous. 10 I mean, it's the law, and we have to do it, 11 but we don't even need to do this. This is 12 unnecessary, because our job is strictly that; 13 protecting the ratepayers? 14 MR. WRIGHT: I agree with the last part of 15 your statement that your job is to protect the rate --16 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Within the statute of 17 the siting, this is our job and our --18 MR. WRIGHT: Within all of your statutes, 19 Commissioner Garcia, including Chapter 366, including 20 21

your Grid Bill authority to which -- that you can extend to us.

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You know, do I think need determinations are superfluous --

> Well, maybe in COMMISSIONER GARCIA:

today's --

MR. WRIGHT: -- not --

just like we have --

MR. WRIGHT: Maybe, maybe not.

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: -- market environment,

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COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Just like we have the power to say to Florida Power Corp because they don't meet -- their plans are out of sync and we don't feel -- we feel that they may be out of -- the margin may not be adequate. We have the power to tell them to build.

I mean, we have to have a series of hearings and decide how we do that, but we also have the power to do that if the companies weren't forthcoming in the building of generation. I understand we haven't done that often, but we also have the power to do that also.

MR. WRIGHT: You do have that power.

commissionER DEASON: Mr. Wright, Mr. Guyton indicated that this Commission has responsibility beyond just protecting ratepayers, that we have some limited environmental jurisdictional responsibility in the sense that before we -- we have to determine that the power plant is needed so that there is not the possibility of an unneeded power plant being built

that would degradate Florida's environment. What is your response to that position?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, my response is that your job is to consider the factors in the statute, whether it would -- the need for system reliability and integrity, the need for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost, and whether the proposed power plant is the most cost-effective alternatively -- alternative available, and the other -- and other factors within your jurisdiction, including conservation.

Basically it comes down to reliability and cost-effectiveness, in my view, and that's your view -- that, in my view, is your job, and it applies to the ratepayers.

Now, certainly the Siting Act is an environmental statute, and we discussed this a little bit earlier. It is an environmental statute. It does not say limit, limit, limit. It does not say minimize the absolute number of power plants built. It says, balance the need for additional capacity which you consider with the environmental effects, and that's the job of the DEP and the Siting Board in the overall Siting Act process.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: Yes, but before it

ever gets to that stage, we have to say that the power plant is needed.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir, and you can say it's needed and the Siting Board can say it cannot licensed. It just --

COMMISSIONER DEASON: That has happened, but that first safeguard to the environment is that it's got to be determined to be needed, and that is our determination.

MR. WRIGHT: It's got to be determined to be needed -- I'm not sure that I agree that your part of that is an environmental safeguard as much as it is a ratepayer safeguard against which --

reason I'm asking the questions is that since there's no ratepayer impact — for the sake of my question there's no ratepayer impact — and I know there's other arguments — but for the sake of my question there's no ratepayer impact; therefore, there's no concern about the environment as far as we're concerned. It is not our jurisdiction if there's no ratepayer impact, which is our jurisdiction. We shouldn't be concerned. We could say it's needed, and then it's up to the environmental regulatory authority to determine what the environmental impact is.

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MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir, and to determine whether the plant should be licensed and, if so, under what conditions, taking into account the balancing of the environmental impacts that might accrue.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: As I read the statute, we can't say to DEP that, well, this power plant is needed because there's no adverse impacts on ratepayers.

MR. WRIGHT: No, you wouldn't say that, I don't think. You would say, this plant is needed because it is like -- in our view and what we've alleged is you would hopefully agree with us and issue an order saying that this plant is needed because it will improve reserve margins in Peninsular Florida, it will improve system reliability and integrity. It will provide adequate electricity at a reasonable cost, and it will be cost-effective to Florida ratepayers.

COMMISSIONER DEASON: And that goes to the merits of your application, I suppose, to your standing to be an applicant.

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, sir. But I was trying to answer your question as to what your job is in the Siting Act process.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: So that what you just

delineated would be the criteria that we need to use in order to determine whether or not there is need?

MR. WRIGHT: Yes, ma'am; in order to determine whether to grant the determination in need for New Smyrna Beach power project.

Mr. Guyton would argue that with respect to your application, you only have -- at least on its face would show a need for the 30 megawatts, and the 470, there is no need. So that's one of the facts alone upon which we should deny this. But your argument is, I guess, as it relates to the 470, that we can apply a broader test of need, and that we don't have to look at the need of the utility.

MR. WRIGHT: You don't have to look at the need of a specific utility. Our position is -- and this is an issue that's been addressed in every power plant need determination case before this Commission for probably the last 12 years, if not longer.

We submit that this power project is consistent with the need for Florida, Peninsular Florida, reliability system -- system reliability and integrity and for -- and the need of Peninsular Florida for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost. And we submit to you that you can apply those criteria

and those considerations in making the determination 2 that you're charged to make under Florida 3.519. 3 CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: And are you submitting to 4 us -- is this a case of first impression, or have we 5 applied the more general Peninsular Florida analysis 6 in the past in any way? 7 MR. WRIGHT: It's a case of first impression 8 in some ways; not in the way that your question might 9 have suggested. You have applied the criterion, the 10 question whether the proposed power project is consistent with the needs of Peninsular Florida for 11 electric system reliability and integrity and for 12 adequate electricity at a reasonable cost in numerous 13 need determination cases, some of which we have cited 14 in our papers. 15 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Should this be an open 16 bid, then? Shouldn't we have everybody here? 17 MR. WRIGHT: I don't understand your 18 question, Commissioner Jacobs. 19 Shouldn't this be an COMMISSIONER JACOBS: 20 open bid? Should we have all bidders here? 21 MR. WRIGHT: 22 No. COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Why? Why not? 23 MR. WRIGHT: Because nobody is bidding or 24 25 purporting to serve the needs of a specific utility

other than Utilities Commission of New Smyrna Beach who conducted their own evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the project and the contracts.

COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So we block out the 30 and we go for the 470, bid that out?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, what we want to do,

Commissioner Jacobs, is build a plant so that we can

then bid it into the market of those who want -- who

may want to buy it.

argument that we should look at Peninsular Florida and determine -- use that sort of in concluding the margin of reserves aren't where they should be and this will help that, then that will affect any subsequent party that wants to come in with a specific need for the retail ratepayer.

I suppose we might have two that are coming in and saying, we need it; and the question will be, well, we can't -- we actually don't need it, because those margins are now covered. And then we force them in effect to buy from you, and you get to dictate the price.

MR. WRIGHT: Well, I don't agree with that. They would be free to apply under any future scenario under the criteria in 403.519, whether the --

1 COMMISSIONER CLARK: But is your --2 MR. WRIGHT: May I please? Whether it's 3 needed for reliability and integrity, whether it's 4 needed for adequate electricity at a reasonable cost, and whether it's cost-effective. 5 6 Anybody can come in and prove that it's 7 cost-effective to them and their ratepayers. If they can prove that their alternative is more cost-effective than ours, you all aren't going to force them to buy the output of our project. 10 11 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, I think --MR. WRIGHT: And you're -- I don't believe 12 you're ever going to permit us to dictate a price. 13 COMMISSIONER CLARK: But the question is 14 that it will be a comparison of what you were doing to 15 what they propose to do, and I think that goes to 16 Commissioner Jacobs' question; shouldn't we just have 17 an open season and say it's needed, and let everybody 18 bid for it? 19 MR. WRIGHT: Not necessarily, and I think 20 that to have a -- when you want --21 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: Well --22 MR. WRIGHT: The reason for having -- reason 23

for having a bid is to protect captive ratepayers who

are going to be on the hook to pay for the costs of

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any contract or utility build option that comes out of 2 that procurement process. 3 COMMISSIONER JACOBS: So --4 MR. WRIGHT: That's not what's on the table 5 here. 6 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: So if Florida Power Corp who has -- I think they may have the petition before us -- maybe it's not here -- that they asked for a waiver on the rule to put out to bid new power, and they say to us, well, Commissioner, we can build 10 it cheaper if we don't have to put it out to bid. 11 That just costs more money, more administration. Let 12 us build it. We don't have to go before you. Let us 13 waive the rule, and we're going to build the cheapest 14 power available, and we just put it out there. 15 I mean, that's what you're asking us to do, 16 because to some degree, I think Commissioner Jacobs 17 and Commissioner Clark are right. You're basically 18 taking a future market away from these companies. 19 They have to put it out to bid. You're just building. 20 MR. WRIGHT: I don't agree --21 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: What's the difference? 22 MR. WRIGHT: I don't agree that we're taking 23 any future market away from them. 24 25 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aren't --

1 MR. WRIGHT: They can apply for a need No. 2 determination under the statute and go through the 3 same process we're going through, and if they prove 4 this, they meet the process by the same criteria --5 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: But they have a much 6 longer process by our rules. They not only have to do that, they have to prove they have a need, they've got to put it out to bid to make sure that it's the cheapest bid. Then they've got to bid against that bid if they want to try to do it themselves and beat that bid, so it is an open -- and anyone can 11 participate. 12 You, however, showed up to Florida. 13 plunk down 470 megawatts, and you start generating 15 power. You're in a much better position. MR. WRIGHT: And they have that process to 16 17 protect their captive ratepayers. You all imposed 18 that process upon them to protect their captive ratepayers from being saddled with uneconomic --19 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: All right. Let's --20 MR. WRIGHT: And it's not that --21 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Let me --22 MR. WRIGHT: That's not that --23 COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Let me then take your 24

argument a little bit further, then. Let's say

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Florida Power Corp -- and I'd love for them to do this on their next project -- that they are trying to speed up to meet -- to make sure they meet their margins, they say, Commissioners, you're not going to be on the hook for this project. We're -- the ratepayers aren't going to pay for it; we're just going to build it. Our ratepayers aren't going to be on the hook for it. We see a need in Florida, and we're going to build our own plant. Yet they can't do that.

They still have to put it up to bid, according to our rules, unless they get a waiver. They still have to let you bid for that. So I could almost imagine or see you, Schef, in a few months when they put in their project, that you're going to take your 470 megawatts, which you've already started down, and say to Florida Power Corp, well, you know what; my plant is going to be in service much quicker than yours; and you bid and beat them at it because you're already in the ground.

Aren't they at a disadvantage in this system? Aren't they at a disadvantage then? Then the point --

MR. WRIGHT: I think there are two -
COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Then the point that

Mr. Guyton made that this is about territory and about

the specific company needs is significant. And we would further go back to what Commissioner Clark said; well, maybe we should just have an open season. We determine we have a need of 700 or 1,000 megawatts or whatever, and let everyone bid so they all have a crack at it so we really do get the most efficient power --

MR. WRIGHT: Well, there are several issues inherent there. In the first place --

COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I'm sorry. I know that --

there's no harm. And what's the worst that can happen under the scenario you posed with respect to Florida Power Corporation is they wind up buying from us at a cost cheaper than they can generate for. Help me out. I think the ratepayers are better off, if that should happen.

And they may buy from us for two years or four years and reserve their construction for the next go-around to when the H or AT technologies are available and be able to take advantage of future improvements in generation technology.

And as to open season, I think the open season falls in the same category with the bid

1	process, and that is where you're determining whether
2	the whether captive ratepayers are going to be
3	stuck.
4	If you look at the health care industry
5	analog where they have batching cycles
6	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: (Inaudible comments
7	away from microphone.)
8	MR. WRIGHT: Well they do that to protect
9	the State as payor for Medicare and Medicaid patients.
10	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Well, aren't you
11	MR. WRIGHT: Same thing. And if they want
12	to
13	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: (Inaudible comments
14	away from microphone.)
15	MR. WRIGHT: I'm sorry?
16	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Aren't you saying on
17	this, there is no Florida (away from microphone)
18	MR. WRIGHT: Yes.
19	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: Yes, you're taking a
20	risk. And I agree; that's the advantage. Florida is
21	growing, but the financial markets are healthy and
22	they're willing to take the risk that Florida is going
23	to continue to grow, so you build your plant.
24	In that case you sort of have an advantage
25	over our incumbent utilities about new generation.

You can beat them to it. You can beat them -- build and be there on the ground before they can.

MR. WRIGHT: Possibly by a few months to a year; possibly not. If they are proposing, as Florida Power is in this case, to ultimately leave their ratepayers on the hook, then I'd submit to you that a bid process is appropriate.

If they were not proposing for their ratepayers to be on the hook, which is not the case before you, the answer might be different. You know, do I think that somebody else, for example Mr. Santa's company could come in and file a need determination to build a power plant for which they took the risk in the same way that Duke New Smyrna is taking the risk? Yes, sir. I mean, the law -- I think the law is what the law is. I think the law allows us, I think the law allows them; and I think it's a good thing.

COMMISSIONER CLARK: But what is the upper limit of the need to merchant plants?

MR. WRIGHT: Well, Commissioner Clark, we kind of had part of this conversation, and the answer is I don't know.

But let's take a scenario. Suppose -- let
me just throw out some numbers. There's more than
20,000 megawatts of power plant capacity on the ground

in Florida today -- and this is a matter of public record, if you look at the heat rates and all that stuff -- that is significantly less efficient than the power plant we propose to build. Suppose you wind up, or the state winds up, with a series of merchant plant need determination cases, and we get another 10,000 megawatts of what we call new and clean gas-fired combined cycle that's running at heat rates in the vicinity of the 6800. That's fully a third, probably 35 to 40% more efficient using 35 to 40% less fuel for every megawatt hour that those plants generate.

You know, is that too much? You know, in my opinion, no, ma'am; that's not too much. That's a scenario that you all should want to see occur.

would point out, that has implications for those plants that don't run -- that are less efficient that we have perhaps let in the rate base, and it is a broader issue than just how much merchant plant is enough. It has the issue of stranded investment which --

MR. WRIGHT: It's not --

COMMISSIONER CLARK: And we ought to address that head-on, rather than saying, all right, we'll just let these merchant plants in and then deal with

outfall at some other time. 2 MR. WRIGHT: Well, I think even the 3 existence of stranded costs for Florida's utilities is an open question, and it's not the issue before you in 4 this need determination proceeding. 5 This is a 500-megawatt power plant. If you 6 7 think that this implicates stranded cost recovery, and you all think it might be time to get on with addressing potential stranded cost exposure and what you're going to do about it today and what you're 10 going to do about it tomorrow and what you're going to 11 do about it in some hypothetical transition period, 12 that would be the subject for a different docket. 13 l COMMISSIONER CLARK: Well, but it's --14 MR. WRIGHT: And this 500-megawatt power 15 plant --16 COMMISSIONER CLARK: What you're 17 suggesting --18 MR. WRIGHT: -- is not going to --19 COMMISSIONER CLARK: -- has sort of the 20 21 notion of putting the cart before the horse. 22 MR. WRIGHT: Well, I don't agree. I think the horse is already here. 23 COMMISSIONER CLARK: Okay. 24 MR. WRIGHT: Madam Chairman, due to the 25

questions and answers, this has taken quite a bit longer than I expected for my prepared comments to take. I will wrap up as quickly as I can, because we do have three other members of our team to argue this motion.

chairman Johnson: After you finish, we're going to take a lunch break and allow the others to speak --

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you.

chairman Johnson: -- understanding that most of your presentation has been taken up with questions that you've been responding to.

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you, Madam Chairman.

commissioner Garcia: Madam Chairman, because I think we've taken Schef backwards and forwards a long way, and I'm sure that if we took our lunch break now, Schef would probably be able to wrap up in five minutes as opposed to spending five minutes looking for where he's going, five to ten minutes. I just don't want you to spend time and re-cover the same ground. So maybe if we just take the break and let him finish up and then go with the rest, it might be more efficient.

CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: What works for you?

MR. WRIGHT: Your pleasure, Madam Chairman.

1	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Then you're okay breaking
2	at
3	MR. WRIGHT: I'm okay breaking; I'm okay
4	continuing.
5	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: Any questions?
6	COMMISSIONER DEASON: Breaking may give him
7	his second wind. (Laughter)
8	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: I know. That's what I
9	was afraid of.
10	COMMISSIONER GARCIA: I trust him.
11	COMMISSIONER CLARK: I think it would be a
12	good idea to take a break. It doesn't matter to me.
13	CHAIRMAN JOHNSON: We're going to break
14	until 2:00.
15	(Thereupon, lunch recess was taken at
16	1:10 p.m.)
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065 40/14 310 2/3, 7/17 315 52/22 \$11.5 102/13 31st 6/8 \$25.50 124/19 32 58/21, 59/1 \$500 124/17 102/11 320 53/17, 53/22, 54/10 32301 3/12, 3/16, 7/17 32302 2/4, 2/22, 3/3 32303 3/7 32399-0870 4/5 & 2/3, 2/8, 2/10, 2/17, 2/20, 3/11, 3/13, 3/15, 7/6, 32608 3/19 7/17, 8/4, 122/17 33 45/5 33731 2/18 33733-4042 2/16 35 140/10 273 47/11 350.042 8/19 '75 47/10, 48/18 'applicant' 78/22 366 31/5, 31/20, 88/5, 94/3, 94/14, 109/22, 125/20 366.02 31/6, 88/3, 93/18, 96/22, 99/12, 99/20 'in 24/20 366.80 36/25 366.821 36/11, 36/13, 39/9, 39/18 'need' 54/11 366.85 36/25 398 78/2, 78/8, 78/5), 78/10, 79/5 1 1 1/10, 1/11, 5/2, 46/14, 91/12, 92/23 4 1.000 137/4 10 125/3 10,000 140/6 40 9/14 40% 140/10 40232 3/22 100 3/18 1114 3/6 403 57/8 403.503 23/3, 41/6, 88/19, 96/13 403.506 46/11 117 2/9 1178 55/21, 55/25 12 130/19 13 96/13 403.508 47/3 403.519 35/4, 35/14, 36/6, 36/23, 37/1, 37/5, 37/13, 38/20, 39/6, 39/10, 39/14, 39/19, 47/5, 51/20, 52/21, 52/23, 55/16, 56/14, 56/19, 75/16, 75/23, 78/22, 83/16, 88/13, 94/19, 94/22, 99/10, 99/15, 99/19, 107/14, 132/25 4075 1/20 14042 2/16 143 1/11 148 1/19 15 18/11, 85/13 17 58/16 45 17/17, 18/17, 18/21, 18/23, 19/2, 19/3 45th 3/18 470 51/11, 51/14, 52/3, 52/14, 79/16, 81/3, 91/22, 19 5/4, 58/17 1972 96/25, 97/16, 98/22 130/9, 130/12, 132/5, 135/14, 136/15 4804 3/18 1973 20/10, 22/6, 22/19, 23/19, 28/13, 28/14, 29/9, 29/18, 30/20, 31/14, 32/12, 33/10, 33/25, 34/1, 42/9, 46/14, 46/18, 47/8, 48/1, 95/8, 98/24 1974 33/8, 48/25 • 32/13, 32/19, 33/3, 33/14, 33/19 20/12, 34/6, 34/18, 34/24, 42/9, 42/12, 42/22 50 5/5 50 3/5 50% 118/18, 119/3 500 29/2, 68/1, 80/16 500 megawatt 30/14, 30/18, 51/9, 141/6, 141/15 1980s 33/20, 33/24 1982 33/19 1989 31/13 1990 37/12, 39/1, 39/2, 39/12, 40/2, 40/10, 40/24, 522 15/7 590 3/3 42/12, 42/13, 42/23 1991 43/14 1992 75/8, 110/15 1994 110/14 6 1996 15/8 1998 1/17, 6/8 6% 80/20 601 3/11 1st 89/23, 90/13, 90/15 62-110 45/1 633.86 36/7 644 75/20, 76/7 645 76/8, 76/19, 77/9 2 2 1/17, 31/6, 81/16, 88/3, 93/18, 99/12, 99/20, 104/22 646 83/13 6800 140/9 20,000 139/25 21 58/17 683 15/7 210 3/15 2145 2/11 215 3/11 220 3/21 7 700 137/4 22341 51/23, 52/19, 54/24, 55/4, 56/12, 57/5, 111/4, 75 30/2 111/6 227 2/21 23246 111/4 8 23rd 15/13 24672 55/2, 55/11, 57/5 8 44/12 80/20 63/15 25 124/19, 124/20, 124/21 25% 119/4 25-22.0801 39/15 85 5/5 8:15 8/15 2540 4/4 27 58/17 9 28-106.106 14/4 2861 2/18 29 44/21 58/8 9.370 14/20 9033 40/6, 40/9 94% 51/11, 57/13, 75/7, 80/17 981042-EM 1/4, 6/9 1 9:30 1/18, 6/2 3 14/4, 41/25, 104/22 3-to-2 105/16 3.519 131/2 3/2 105/6 30 18/3, 28/23, 28/24, 51/10, 58/21, 58/22, 80/5, 106/14, 121/24, 121/25, 122/16, 123/12, 130/9, 132/4 30-megawatt 30/7, 30/9, 30/11, 30/19, 80/22, 80/23 A.G 15/7 a.m 1/18, 6/2 ability 54/5, 87/20

abrogate 56/3

30-year 103/17, 103/19

abrogation 58/20, 59/4, 84/24, 85/1 absent 68/14, 84/12 absolute 127/20 absurd 43/2 abundance 90/21 acceptable 19/7, 115/6, 115/7 access 101/6 accord 43/8, 77/4 account 129/3 accounts 31/24 accrue 129/4 Act 20/11, 21/8, 22/7, 22/9, 25/16, 28/15, 28/24, 29/19, 32/10, 32/14, 33/3, 33/10, 33/12, 33/15, 34/7, 34/8, 34/11, 34/12, 34/15, 34/22, 35/1, 36/9, 37/5, 37/11, 37/14, 37/24, 38/1, 38/11, 38/13, 38/15, 38/16, 39/4, 40/3, 40/4, 40/16, 41/2, 41/3, 41/4, 41/12, 42/19, 45/22, 45/24, 46/2, 46/3, 46/22, 50/9, 50/12, 51/7, 51/21, 52/7, 52/23, 53/5, 53/7, 53/11, 54/12, 54/19, 55/6, 56/4, 56/8, 56/15, 59/10, 61/13, 62/8, 62/11, 62/16, 65/8, 69/21, 71/20, 72/19, 74/4, 76/9, 76/11 76/17, 77/3, 78/18, 78/24, 79/22, 79/25, 80/21, 80/23, 81/8, 81/10, 82/3, 83/19, 83/20, 84/5, 84/6, 84/9, 84/10, 84/24, 88/19, 88/20, 88/22, 88/23, 93/10, 94/22, 94/25, 95/15, 96/25, 98/23, 107/17, 108/18, 108/19, 108/22, 108/23, 109/21, 112/15, 114/12, 115/8, 127/16, 127/24, 129/24 action 38/22 Acts 37/19 Acta 3/16, 41/7, 91/7, 99/6, 99/8, 99/10, 99/13, 99/14, 99/16, 103/10 adding 59/14, 59/20, 62/11 address 12/16, 14/14, 21/12, 22/5, 26/15, 45/20, 54/16, 84/2, 85/8, 85/24, 85/25, 87/15, 87/20, 100/9, 102/17, 102/20, 140/23 addressed 10/21, 19/17, 64/16, 66/3, 85/24, 130/17 addresses 10/17 addressing 141/9 adequate 26/8, 26/18, 52/25, 102/2, 113/6, 113/7, 126/10, 127/6, 129/16, 130/24, 131/13, 133/4 adjacent 36/8 adjust 11/9 Administration 98/10, 134/12 administrations 97/25 adopt 29/18, 54/10, 117/8 adopted 30/20, 38/14, 56/13 advance 17/11 advances 84/4 advantage 29/22, 137/22, 138/20, 138/24 adverse 129/7 adversely 67/13 advised 90/25 affect 9/1, 132/14 affected 13/7, 67/13 affiliation 47/22 affirm 29/13, 103/9, 104/4, 104/6, 104/9 affirmative 47/3 affirmed 44/9, 56/17, 69/11 affirming 43/11, 76/4 afraid 143/9 agencies 22/25, 47/11, 47/14, 48/6, 49/5, 89/2, 96/18 agency 28/8, 32/9, 33/12, 47/19, 48/4, 48/7, 48/15, 70/10, 116/7 agency's 103/24 aggregation 26/12 agree 2013, 72/1, 72/3, 72/13, 99/23, 108/25, 109/13, 114/6, 114/12, 115/21, 122/7, 125/15, 128/11, 129/12, 132/23, 134/21, 134/23, 138/20, 141/22 agreed 17/5, 19/23, 64/12 agreements 32/1, 91/13 aiding 15/5 allegation 51/14, 52/4, 52/15, 115/12 allegations 58/3, 58/7 allege 57/12, 113/2 alleged 87/5, 87/6, 113/4, 113/6, 113/9, 114/24, alleging 57/19, 58/5, 116/17 alliance 33/14, 48/14, 48/19, 48/21 alliances 33/18, 47/13 allocated 26/10 allocation 16/14 allotted 86/10 allow 16/3, 19/15, 123/22, 142/7 allowed 67/11, 71/13, 86/17, 87/10 allowing 88/10 allows 71/12, 101/9, 139/16, 139/17 alternative 51/16, 52/17, 53/2, 55/8, 56/8, 57/14, 57/21, 57/22, 59/17, 61/10, 65/6, 69/8, 73/21, 127/9, 133/8 amended 33/8, 48/25 amendment 39/20, 39/25 amendments 39/2, 39/3, 39/12, 40/11, 40/13, 40/15, 42/13, 42/22 amends 41/6

Amicus 10/16, 12/14, 14/13, 14/18, 14/20, 14/23, 15/2, 15/10, 15/20, 16/5 amount 19/4, 32/23, 54/6, 70/16, 80/25, 99/17 ample 19/17, 120/18, 123/19 analog 138/5 vsia 40/24, 41/5, 41/14, 42/1, 68/6, 76/5, 131/5 uncement 11/13 Buswer 29/25, 115/20, 117/5, 119/15, 129/23, 139/10, 139/21 answered 75/2 answers 142/1 anticipating 31/4 apologize 20/14 appeal 104/6, 111/4 appealed 55/10, 77/23, 103/2, 105/17, 110/22, 110/25, 111/3 Appeals 43/11, 44/9, 44/11 appearance 8/3 APPEARANCES 2/1, 3/1, 4/1, 6/14 Appellate 14/19 applicable 20/1, 20/8, 54/19, 82/15, 88/10 applicant 20/23, 34/16, 35/17, 37/14, 38/19, 38/23, 39/5, 75/7, 76/9, 77/17, 78/20, 79/25, 80/5, 80/21, 80/25, 81/2, 83/15, 83/25, 88/16, 88/21, 94/21, 95/1, 95/11, 97/14, 106/15, 108/4, 109/18, 110/12, 112/17, 112/21, 121/14, 121/23, 122/20, 129/21 applicants 41/4, 75/22, 78/17, 87/24, 89/6, 95/15, 99/3, 104/15, 105/19, 105/25, 106/2, 106/3, 107/4, 107/11, 107/12, 108/4, 120/13 application 35/12, 41/15, 43/15, 43/17, 68/5, 68/25, 71/6, 86/24, 87/12, 101/13, 101/19, 129/20, 130/8 applied 22/19, 95/19, 131/5, 131/9 applies 35/20, 53/9, 53/12, 69/25, 81/6, 88/22, 127/14 apply 20/3, 31/20, 32/6, 34/22, 35/1, 37/7, 37/17, 53/10, 92/19, 94/4, 100/23, 100/25, 123/17, 130/12, 130/25, 132/24, 135/1 applying 36/18 appreciate 20/7 appreciative 19/14 approach 25/18, 84/20 approached 27/17 appropriate 54/18, 87/8, 90/1, 99/23, 112/21, 114/23, 120/1, 120/19, 123/15, 139/7 approval 60/24, 61/2, 89/19, 91/10, 92/23 ove 32/1 oximated 68/1 April 89/23, 90/13, 90/15 area 21/16, 24/20, 24/24, 24/25, 25/4, 25/12, 34/4, 34/5, 36/3, 71/5, 94/9 areas 26/16, 37/9, 41/13 arguably 89/24, 118/18, 119/4 argue 12/11, 17/7, 29/20, 81/5, 82/12, 130/7, 142/4 argued 28/11, 28/14, 43/1, 43/23, 44/21, 45/5, 55/12 argues 28/3, 31/4 argument 5/4, 5/5, 10/18, 10/24, 15/22, 16/4, 16/5, 17/15, 19/23, 19/24, 20/22, 20/25, 25/23, 29/17, 32/7, 32/15, 33/2, 56/8, 58/4, 63/6, 65/21, 65/24, 67/3, 67/23, 69/17, 69/20, 75/18, 81/15, 34/3, 85/20, 85/21, 85/22, 94/1, 99/23, 108/14, 117/2, 118/9, 119/20, 120/23, 130/11, 132/11, 135/25 arguments 55/18, 56/1, 58/5, 86/1, 113/3, 120/21, 120/24, 128/18 arise 94/10 arises 79/20 Ark 23/6, 23/12, 75/10, 75/18, 75/20, 75/22, 76/12, 76/25, 79/14, 79/18, 79/22, 81/5, 81/12, 81/13, 81/17, 82/1, 82/6, 82/10, 82/12, 82/22, 83/5, 83/6, 83/8, 104/15, 104/22, 105/18, 108/7, 106/9, 109/1, 109/13 Ark's 106/10 Arnold 2/8 arose 43/14, 76/18 arrangement 33/5, 49/8 arrangements 33/9, 33/16, 49/1 arrive 38/2 assert 111/20, 115/4, 124/15 assessing 65/4 assets 118/18 Assistance 3/8, 6/23 assisting 15/3 associated 64/18 Association 3/5, 6/21 assumption 70/18, 84/15 Te 60/3 red 59/15 Auachment \$1/15, \$1/16, 106/10 attachments 106/8 attain 21/4 attempt 18/20 attempted 17/14, 19/22, 111/4 attempting 54/17, 103/13 attempts 57/18, 81/4 attention 51/4, 54/9, 55/2, 79/4

August 6/7

Ausley 2/20, 7/3
authoritatively 21/21
authorities 29/16
authority 21/6, 21/8, 21/10, 34/20, 48/24, 73/6, 73/7,
88/4, 93/11, 93/22, 93/24, 93/25, 94/14, 94/17, 97/5,
123/20, 125/21, 128/24
authorization 30/9
authorize 115/18
authorized 13/19, 23/1, 89/3, 89/10, 89/18, 90/18,
93/6, 95/3, 96/19
authorizes 89/19, 91/12
available 26/8, 35/17, 53/2, 55/8, 66/11, 101/7,
101/8, 102/7, 127/9, 134/15, 137/22
Avenue 2/4, 7/17
avoid 57/18, 116/22:
avoided 58/10

B

balance 114/19, 127/21 balancing 115/8, 129/3 base 60/10, 67/8, 67/11, 71/12, 71/22, 107/11, 119/24, 140/18 based 21/23, 25/11, 43/17, 83/23, 86/10, 125/2 BASF 15/6 basis 25/13, 25/25, 29/8, 30/18, 40/22, 56/10, 56/24, 79/2, 86/23, 97/13, 101/11, 117/7 batching 138/5 Beach 1/7, 1/8, 2/13, 6/12, 6/13, 7/19, 7/21, 29/1, 29/21, 87/24, 88/7, 89/9, 91/11, 91/21, 93/3, 93/17, 99/3, 101/19, 106/12, 122/16, 123/2, 130/5, 132/1 bear 67/4, 114/9 Beard 55/19, 57/7, 57/16, 58/8, 77/5, 77/14, 78/25, 79/15, 82/10, 84/25, 103/1, 103/17, 110/20, 110/22 bears 121/1 BEASLEY 2/20, 7/2 beat 135/10, 136/18, 139/1 behave 124/22 bench 86/15 benefit 48/24, 63/14, 64/7, 64/9, 64/13, 64/14, 64/23, 66/19, 117/22, 119/3 benefits 29/22, 29/13, 66/16, 123/2
Betty 1/19
bld 73/22, 131/17, 131/21, 132/5, 132/8, 133/19, 133/24, 134/9, 134/11, 134/20, 135/8, 135/9, 135/10, 135/11, 136/10, 136/12, 136/18, 137/5, 137/25, 139/7 bidders 131/21 bidding 118/22, 118/23, 119/1, 131/24 Bill 6/19, 30/22, 40/14, 40/19, 40/20, 73/7, 93/24, 94/14, 125/21 bind 87/18, 106/8 binds 21/22 bit 66/22, 69/15, 70/15, 96/7, 127/18, 135/25, 142/1 bleck 132/4 Board 83/18, 114/18, 115/6, 115/15, 127/23, 128/4 Bob 120/8 body 52/23, 54/4 bones 29/4 bottom 49/10, 52/22, 56/7, 75/20, 76/7, 77/9, 103/22 bought 123/21 Boulevard 2/11, 4/4 bound 87/2 Bex 2/16, 2/18, 3/3 break \$5/13, 142/7, 142/17, 142/21 breaking 143/1, 143/3, 143/6 brief 9/21, 9/23, 10/4, 10/6, 14/21, 14/23, 14/25, 16/5, 44/11, 85/14, 85/25, 96/22 briefs 10/4, 15/2 bright 115/24, 116/3 bring 54/9, 55/1, 79/3, 82/21 brings 35/4 broader 109/6, 120/24, 130/13, 140/19 brought 60/23, 68/2, 68/7, 102/21 build 30/9, 30/11, 32/22, 34/19, 46/2, 70/19, 71/4, 71/15, 72/24, 75/11, B4/11, 117/4, 125/4, 126/11, 132/7, 134/1, 134/10, 134/13, 134/14, 136/6, 136/8, 138/23, 139/1, 139/13, 140/4 **Builders 12/7** building 60/2, 69/23, 71/18, 80/10, 126/15, 134/20 built 43/20, 45/25, 49/15, 49/16, 50/7, 59/24, 61/17, 70/6, 71/11, 113/24, 126/25, 127/20 burden 86/22, 87/7 burdened 113/23, 114/2 Bureau 1/22 burn 18/6 business 23/1, 89/11, 93/7, 95/14, 96/19 105/6 BUTLER 3/10, 6/16 buy 45/4, 45/14, 82/14, 92/6, 92/13, 92/15, 92/17, 100/14, 101/10, 112/8, 112/9, 112/10, 117/13, 124/9, 124/20, 132/9, 132/21, 133/10, 137/19 buyer 45/14 buying 137/15

C

calculate 56/23 Calhonn 2/21 call 104/22, 140/7 came 77/20 candidate 73/11 capacity 24/4, 24/5, 24/16, 27/15, 35/23, 46/12, 51/12, 54/7, 54/23, 57/13, 66/24, 68/2, 69/2, 75/8, 81/1, 99/17, 100/6, 101/10, 101/13, 113/4, 113/5, 122/24, 127/21, 139/25 capital 105/21 captive 59/22, 114/8, 117/11, 133/24, 135/17, 135/18, 138/2 capture 95/19 care 120/8, 120/9, 138/4 Carlton 2/17, 6/24 Carolina 43/8, 43/10, 43/11, 43/16, 44/3, 44/7, 44/9, 44/10 carried 25/6 carry 116/19 cart 141/21 case 7/21, 11/19, 15/1, 15/6, 15/8, 21/24, 23/7, 24/11, 29/3, 35/3, 39/6, 43/13, 44/12, 50/20, 50/25, 51/18, 53/6, 65/12, 68/13, 75/18, 75/19, 75/20, 76/4, 76/5, 76/6, 79/22, 81/4, 81/13, 82/13, 97/1, 97/7, 97/10, 98/22, 103/17, 103/18, 103/22, 106/25, 107/2, 107/3, 107/5, 107/6, 109/4, 109/7, 109/8, 117/7, 118/16, 124/14, 124/16, 124/17, 130/18, 131/4, 131/7, 138/24, 139/5, 139/9 case-by-case 117/6 cases 15/4, 52/10, 74/9, 87/15, 87/16, 87/18, 102/24, 103/11, 103/12, 103/14, 110/4, 111/16, 111/20, 112/1, 131/14, 140/6 categories 108/2 Categorize 63/8 categorize 63/2, 137/25 caution 90/21 Center 1/19, 70/22 central 65/25, 66/1 centralized 29/23 certificate 43/16, 44/5, 44/16, 45/2, 46/20 certificated 44/25 certificating 45/7 certification 37/10, 46/15, 46/18, 46/21, 47/6, 88/22 certified 46/1, 50/9 certify 121/24 CG 15% CHAIRMAN 1/14, 6/3, 6/14, 8/2, 8/6, 8/12, 8/14, 8/22, 9/4, 9/6, 9/12, 9/16, 10/10, 10/14, 10/25, 11/8, 11/17, 11/23, 12/4, 12/10, 12/19, 12/20, 13/10, 13/13, 13/14, 13/17, 13/22, 14/1, 14/8, 14/15, 15/12, 15/16, 15/17, 15/23, 15/25, 16/14, 16/20, 16/22, 16/23, 16/24, 17/20, 17/24, 18/10, 18/15, 18/18, 19/8, 20/14, 21/1, 45/18, 49/19, 50/17, 52/2, 52/12, 69/19, 85/11, 85/16, 85/18, 86/7, 104/10, 104/13, 105/14, 107/20, 107/25, 108/6, 108/14, 129/25, 130/6, 131/3, 141/25, 142/6, 142/10, 142/13, 142/14, 142/24, 142/25, 143/1, 143/5, 143/8 Chairman's 86/11 challenge 111/5 challenged 55/15 change 39/6, 39/9, 41/7, 73/12, 74/12, 74/17 changed 33/19, 48/17, 94/20 changes 40/3, 41/16, 41/19, 42/2, 121/18 changing 74/21 Chapter 31/5, 31/20, 88/5, 94/3, 96/22, 109/22, 125/20 characterization 40/23 characterize 39/24, 40/18 characterized 78/2 chargeable 97/9 charged 131/2 CHARLES 3/10, 6/15 Chattahoochee 96/11 cheap 66/11 cheaper 134/11, 137/16 cheapest 64/22, 134/14, 135/9 Chief 1/22, 90/22 choice 95/6 choosing 95/12 chose 80/22, 92/14, 97/12 chronologically 20 circumstance 104/25 circumstances 123/23 cited 131/14 cites 109/8 cities 22/22, 28/18, 88/24, 96/15 citizens 11/16 City 1/7, 2/12, 6/12, 7/20, 29/21, 89/9, 93/2, 93/3, 101/12 CLARK 1/15, 18/21, 19/1, 39/23, 40/5, 40/9, 40/11, 40/18, 45/20, 46/5, 46/8, 46/23, 47/3, 47/7, 47/15,

```
47/25, 48/5, 48/16, 49/2, 49/10, 49/18, 49/23, 53/20,
 64/15, 67/1, 67/16, 67/21, 30/2, 36/4, 30/8, 30/13, 90/19, 90/23, 90/25, 102/16, 102/20, 104/14, 105/10,
 109/15, 109/22, 109/23, 110/1, 110/6, 110/9, 110/16,
 110/19, 110/24, 111/8, 111/10, 111/17, 111/19, 111/24,
              , 113/19, 114/5, 115/17, 115/21, 116/11, 116/14,
5, 117/1, 117/5, 118/7, 118/12, 118/15, 119/18,
 126/2, 120/20, 121/11, 121/22, 122/3, 122/7, 122/9, 124/25, 132/10, 133/1, 133/11, 133/14, 134/18, 137/2, 139/18, 139/20, 140/15, 140/23, 141/14, 141/17,
 141/20, 141/24
 Clark's 119/15
 classic 29/3
 classifications 31/23
 clause 66/25, 86/1
clean 140/7
clear 11/8, 17/7, 21/18, 21/20, 24/21, 25/1, 30/24,
36/3, 38/18, 40/22, 41/17, 43/12, 51/18, 54/15, 74/14,
91/4, 123/24
 clearer 37/5
 clearly 29/12, 30/19, 31/15, 32/4, 34/20, 38/24, 42/5,
 45/5, 53/2, 56/12, 58/5, 61/5, 90/18, 103/6, 103/9,
 103/24, 104/8, 107/18
 close 24/20, 32/4, 35/18, 36/3, 43/21, 76/1, 104/22,
 119/2
 Chub 12/2
 co-applicant 24/14, 84/1, 122/21
 co-generator 24/9, 105/1
 Co-generators 24/10, 24/12, 53/6, 53/9
 codified 22/14, 36/8
 Cogeneration 49/24, 53/16, 54/17, 111/16, 111/18
 cogenerator 77/16
 cogenerators 54/1, 81/6
College 2/4, 2/6, 7/11, 7/17
 Columbia 13/25
 column 78/19
 combinations 22/25, 89/2, 96/18
 combined 149/8
 commence 88/17
 Commenced 1/18
 commended 6/2
 commensurate 19/4
 comment 11/2, 11/6, 11/11, 11/16
 commentary 86/16
nents 11/6, 113/17, 138/6, 138/13, 142/2
merce 85/25, 97/6, 100/5
COMMISSION 1/1, 1/7, 1/23, 2/12, 4/3, 4/6, 6/11,
7/20, 8/9, 8/11, 13/8, 14/14, 15/3, 15/22, 16/25, 17/2,
7/20, 89, 8/11, 13/8, 14/14, 15/3, 15/22, 16/25, 17/2
17/16, 19/7, 20/3, 21/4, 21/7, 21/10, 21/12, 21/17, 21/23, 21/25, 22/1, 23/6, 24/15, 24/18, 27/17, 28/2, 28/21, 28/22, 29/1, 29/16, 30/12, 30/17, 31/21, 32/3, 32/24, 34/4, 34/10, 34/23, 35/7, 35/15, 39/16, 39/17, 43/5, 43/11, 43/17, 43/19, 44/4, 44/7, 44/13, 45/6, 47/4, 48/10, 51/4, 53/5, 53/7, 55/13, 56/6, 56/12,
 56/20, 60/2, 60/24, 71/12, 72/18, 73/19, 74/22, 75/7, 77/23, 78/3, 78/14, 79/6, 79/12, 82/17, 84/6, 85/19,
 87/16, 87/24, 88/16, 89/8, 91/21, 93/2, 93/16, 97/2,
 98/15, 98/21, 99/2, 101/18, 103/1, 104/18, 104/19,
 104/23, 105/17, 106/11, 109/5, 110/14, 114/10, 122/15,
 122/19, 123/2, 126/20, 130/18, 132/1
 Commission's 18/14, 25/3, 26/7, 39/15, 78/21, 79/14, 88/14, 93/21, 94/24, 97/5, 96/17, 103/5, 103/8,
 104/7. 105/15
 COMMISSIONER 1/14, 1/15, 1/16, 9/8, 9/13, 9/19,
 9/25, 10/2, 10/8, 10/9, 16/6, 16/17, 17/23, 18/21, 18/25, 19/1, 19/14, 24/8, 24/23, 25/8, 25/22, 26/17,
 27/5, 27/12, 28/17, 29/20, 30/3, 39/23, 40/5, 40/9,
 40/11, 40/18, 41/22, 45/20, 46/5, 46/7, 46/8, 46/23,
 47/2, 47/7, 47/15, 47/25, 48/5, 48/16, 49/2, 49/10,
 49/18, 49/20, 49/23, 49/24, 50/6, 53/20, 53/21, 55/22, 59/6, 59/21, 59/25, 60/7, 60/16, 60/22, 61/1, 61/7,
59/6, 59/21, 59/25, 60/7, 60/16, 60/22, 61/1, 61/7, 61/25, 62/13, 62/24, 62/25, 63/4, 63/8, 63/19, 64/4, 64/10, 64/15, 64/20, 65/11, 65/16, 66/9, 66/21, 67/1, 67/16, 67/21, 67/12, 68/22, 69/14, 72/2, 72/20, 73/14, 73/18, 73/23, 75/1, 78/6, 78/11, 80/2, 30/4, 80/7, 30/8, 80/13, 81/19, 81/21, 86/3, 86/13, 36/18, 89/12, 89/17, 90/4, 90/11, 90/14, 90/20, 91/3, 91/16, 91/22, 92/1, 92/18, 92/13, 92/16, 92/22, 95/16, 95/25, 96/13, 96/19, 97/10, 97/19, 97/21, 90/4, 90/15, 102/16, 102/16, 102/15, 102/15, 102/16,
97/16, 97/19, 97/21, 96/4, 96/6, 96/8, 96/13, 96/19, 96/23, 96/25, 99/21, 100/12, 100/15, 102/15, 102/16, 102/20, 103/21, 104/14, 106/4, 105/9, 105/11, 105/24, 106/5, 106/17, 106/24, 107/9, 106/24, 109/15, 2, 109/23, 110/1, 110/6, 110/9, 110/11, 110/16, 9, 110/24, 111/8, 111/10, 111/17, 111/19, 111/24, 112/13, 112/12, 112/19, 113/12, 113/17, 113/19, 114/5, 115/17, 115/21, 116/11, 116/14, 116/15, 116/17, 116/21, 117/5, 116/17, 117/7, 118/15, 116/17, 118/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 116/15, 1
 119/6, 119/15, 119/18, 120/2, 120/20, 121/11, 121/22,
 121/25, 122/2, 122/3, 122/7, 122/9, 122/12, 123/5, 123/10, 123/11, 123/25, 124/5, 124/12, 124/13, 124/24,
 124/25, 125/17, 125/20, 125/25, 126/3, 126/6, 126/19,
127/25, 128/6, 128/14, 129/5, 129/19, 131/16, 131/19, 131/20, 131/23, 132/4, 132/7, 132/10, 133/1, 133/11,
```

```
133/14, 133/17, 133/22, 134/3, 134/6, 134/10, 134/17,
134/18, 134/22, 134/25, 135/5, 135/20, 135/22, 135/24, 136/24, 137/2, 137/10, 138/6, 138/10, 138/13, 138/16,
138/19, 139/18, 139/10, 140/15, 140/23, 141/14, 141/17, 141/20, 141/14, 142/14, 143/6, 143/10
Commissioners 8/18, 9/7, 14/6, 14/9, 15/9, 15/18, 45/19, 56/18, 51/24, 33/4, 54/15, 57/4, 75/25, 81/11, 81/25, 84/2, 84/22, 83/9, 86/19, 96/21, 136/4 Commissioners' 119/16
commit 80/20
committed 51/10
Committee 40/14
common 23/5
communication 8/17
community 70/14
companies 22/24, 26/21, 28/9, 89/1, 95/3, 96/17,
107/4, 124/6, 126/14, 134/19
Company 1/8, 2/14, 2/22, 3/13, 3/17, 6/13, 6/18,
7/4, 7/7, 7/19, 12/21, 13/20, 28/5, 28/7, 29/8, 29/12,
31/14, 32/8, 43/15, 41/24, 50/19, 72/23, 75/12, 75/13,
81/8, 82/9, 86/20, 89/10, 91/11, 93/6, 93/21, 97/3,
101/16, 103/14, 106/9, 108/23, 137/1, 139/12
comparison 133/15
compatible 36/20
compel $2/18
compelling 85/7
competing 94/11
competition 42/4, 49/12
competitive 71/18
compilation 57/24
compiled 58/1
complete 57/11
compliance 121/20
complied 120/17
comprehensive 25/17
concedes 34/25
concept 125/1
concepts 84/16
concern 19/15, 62/14, 84/16, 128/20
concerned 28/10, 40/14, 128/21, 128/23
concerns 43/13, 99/24, 114/20
concession 35/3
conclude 45/21, 92/4, 103/7, 104/7
concluded 42/3, 77/8
concluding 132/12
conclusion 42/15, 1109/17
condition 35/19, 37/9, 47/5, 59/19, 84/8, 123/8, 123/15, 124/2, 124/3, 124/6, 124/8
conditions 68/20, 69/4, 82/25, 124/10, 129/3
conduct 39/16, 46/10, 47/6
conducted 132/2
conducting 44/8
Conference 1/19, 17/5
confirms 23/20
conflict 37/16, 37/23, 38/2, 72/15
conforming 39/3, 42/13, 42/22
conforms 41/1
confused 110/2
consent 14/21
consequence 61/12
consequences 59/14, 59/20, 61/16, 62/10, 62/19,
62/22, 65/14, 69/23, 70/8, 70/9, 84/13, 115/10
      ervation 32/1, 35/1, 35/9, 35/16, 35/23, 36/2,
consideration 20/16, 22/4, 59/22, 60/6, 82/19, 87/2
considerations 131/1
consistent 24/17, 41/8, 56/18, 57/19, 57/20, 69/16,
78/22, 79/15, 88/7, 130/21, 131/11
constitute 76/16
Constitution 33/5, 33/8, 48/22, 48/25, 88/12 constrained 21/25, 121/9
constraint 119/12, 119/14
construct 32/20, 47/24
constructed 65/14
construction 37/22, 38/5, 42/6, 42/10, 43/1, 43/2,
44/20, 46/11, 46/16, 51/6, 53/4, 53/7, 54/6, 55/15, 64/25, 70/4, 78/20, 71/21, 79/21, 82/8, 114/25, 115/12,
137/20
construed 21/22, 74/15, 83/10, 83/21, 104/24,
105/22, 109/9
construing 53/11, 62/16, 83/14
consulted 90/22
consuming 52/8, 54/13, 56/16 consumption 35/10
contained 23/16
contains 30/21
contemplate 49/8
contemplated 33/11, 49/4, 49/7
contend 28/20
contends 44/21
content 32/13, 33/25, 34/2
context 29/12, 38/3, 38/18, 59/13, 74/5, 74/20, 104/16 continue 54/2, 138/23
```

```
CONTINUED 3/1, 4/1
 continuing 143/4
contract 27/13, 27/14, 44/6, 44/14, 49/25, 50/4, 50/7,
COMPACT 27/13, 27/14, 4446, 44/14, 49/25, 50/4, 50/7, 60/23, 61/2, 61/8, 61/23, 68/20, 69/3, 69/6, 69/9, 69/12, 74/7, 75/13, 78/17, 79/19, 81/17, 82/14, 82/16, 82/19, 99/14, 99/15, 99/18, 103/16, 103/17, 105/2, 106/19, 106/11, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/19, 106/11, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/19, 106/11, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/19, 106/11, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/13, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 111/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/5, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 107/22, 11/12, 106/20, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/22, 107/
 122/23, 134/1
contracting 77/6, 81/22, 109/2, 109/10
Contractors 12/6
 contracts 27/10, 43/24, 49/14, 50/1, 60/14, 60/20, 61/15, 65/2, 65/12, 68/9, 68/11, 68/17, 68/24, 103/18,
 103/19, 107/15, 132/3
 contractual 69/2
 contrast 60/8, $2/21
 contravene 99/7
 contrived 87/19
 control 119/8
 controlling 82/11
convenience 22/16, 44/19, 44/22
 convention 57/25
 conversation 139/21
 conversations 120/5
 cooperation 47/17
 cooperations 34/2
Cooperative 6/21, 17/21, 31/9
 Cooperatives 3/4, 22/24, 89/1, 96/17, 98/2
 coordinate 17/15, 19/22
 copied 8/17, 9/13
 copies 9/14, 15/8
copy 9/15, 12/3, 14/5
cord 125/1
 corporate 13/19
Corporation 2/15, 2/19, 7/1, 26/25, 27/19, 27/23, 55/10, 75/10, 77/13, 77/25, 78/25, 86/21, 101/15, 137/15 correct 9/12, 13/13, 14/15, 16/22, 25/14, 42/7, 47/1,
 49/6, 49/17, 66/9, 91/19, 91/25, 103/25 corrected 36/24
cost 53/1, 62/2, 64/11, 67/4, 73/4, 102/8, 102/13, 113/8, 118/1, 118/24, 119/1, 119/2, 127/7, 129/17, 130/24, 131/13, 133/4, 137/16, 141/7, 141/9 cost-effective 51/16, 52/17, 53/2, 55/8, 57/14, 57/21,
 57/22, 58/12, 58/23, 59/2, 59/17, 59/24, 60/4, 61/8, 61/10, 61/14, 63/22, 65/6, 65/12, 65/18, 67/3, 67/7,
 67/9, 67/14, 68/9, 68/12, 68/21, 69/8, 84/19, 92/2, 92/4, 92/7, 92/10, 92/13, 100/2, 100/7, 100/13, 113/10,
 113/11, 117/14, 123/3, 127/8, 129/17, 133/5, 133/7,
 cost-effectiveness 30/13, 52/13, 56/21, 58/6, 59/8, 61/20, 62/21, 65/5, 67/17, 69/13, 71/21, 72/17, 73/10,
 83/2, 84/7, 85/3, 99/22, 100/10, 127/13, 132/3
 costly 66/13
costs 41/16, 101/23, 114/9, 114/11, 133/25, 134/12,
 141/3
 Counsel 3/21, 6/5, 8/15, 10/11, 10/25, 13/18, 13/20,
 14/1
 counties 22/23, 88/25, 96/15
 country 13/2
 County
                    1/6, 6/11, 48/15
 couple 106/4
 course 16/2, 17/6, 21/7, 23/18, 24/4, 26/6, 27/22,
 28/13, 28/23, 35/11, 37/9, 46/19, 60/25, 115/4 court 14/22, 15/3, 20/3, 21/21, 43/11, 44/9, 44/11,
 51/5, 55/11, 55/17, 56/17, 57/6, 57/16, 58/9, 58/19,
 59/4, 69/10, 74/4, 74/16, 76/3, 77/2, 77/24, 78/2, 79/5,
 79/13, 79/23, 82/18, 82/20, 97/2, 97/4, 97/8, 103/6
 103/7, 103/23, 105/18, 110/14, 110/17, 111/5, 111/13
 Court's 57/2, 78/24, 104/5, 111/3
 courts 21/14, 21/15
 cover 102/11
coverage 38/12, 42/9, 42/16
covered 28/2, 31/18, 85/4, 120/7, 132/20
 crack 137/6
 created 41/4
creating 63/17
creature 21/7
 criteria 51/19, 52/21, 53/3, 55/6, 55/7, 55/14, 55/16,
 56/11, 56/13, 57/7, 58/12, 59/8, 114/17, 130/1, 130/25,
 132/25, 135/4
criterion 54/3, 120/19, 131/9
critical 100/4
 CSR 1/21
CSW 109/14
 currently 13/1
customers 11/2, 23/9, 23/10, 23/14, 23/17, 24/2, 27/7, 35/8, 35/10, 35/21, 35/24, 37/8, 37/18, 41/13,
45/9, 45/11, 48/12, 61/11, 63/18, 63/21, 63/24, 63/25, 64/1, 64/21, 76/22, 76/23, 77/2, 77/12, 77/15, 79/8, 79/11, 79/19, 79/21, 87/21, 94/12, 97/18, 113/22, 121/3
 Cutler 2/17
 cycle 144/8
 cycles 138/5
```

D

DA 111/9 dam 98/11 DATE 1/17, 89/23, 90/2, 90/9, 90/12, 110/2, 110/3 TD 3/18, 7/25 dson 2/8 Davis 3/11, 6/17 day 39/9 days 8/19, 18/4, 107/17 DCA 15/8 deal 20/5, 112/11, 116/24, 121/18, 140/25 dealing 19/9, 53/15 DEASON 1/14, 25/8, 25/22, 27/5, 27/12, 59/6, 59/21, 60/7, 60/16, 60/22, 61/1, 61/7, 62/25, 63/19, 64/10, 65/11, 69/14, 73/14, 73/14, 75/1, 77/25, 79/23, 82/7, 89/12, 89/17, 90/4, 90/11, 90/14, 90/20, 91/3, 91/6, 91/22, 92/1, 92/8, 92/13, 92/22, 95/16, 95/25, 97/16, 97/19, 97/21, 98/4, 98/6, 98/8, 98/13, 100/12, 103/4, 103/18, 103/21, 103/22, 104/1, 104/14, 105/9, 105/18, 107/3, 110/6, 113/17, 119/6, 126/19, 127/25, 128/6, 128/14, 129/5, 129/19, 143/6 debate 61/1, 69/25, 116/4 December 1/17 decide 21/14, 115/5, 115/15, 116/7, 126/13 decide 21/14, 115/5, 115/15, 116/7, 126/15
decided 74/4, 74/9, 97/1, 116/9, 116/13, 116/14
decision 18/8, 20/20, 43/12, 43/20, 48/11, 52/11,
53/9, 53/12, 53/18, 53/23, 54/16, 57/6, 57/17, 75/16,
75/25, 76/20, 77/4, 77/19, 77/23, 77/24, 78/2, 78/24,
79/2, 79/5, 79/13, 79/14, 30/19, \$1/6, \$2/10, \$3/8,
\$3/10, \$6/24, \$7/12, 97/7, 105/21, 109/13, 111/3, 121/17
decisional 21/10 decisional 21/20 decisions 20/2, 43/10, 102/18, 102/21, 111/14 Decker 2/8 declaratory 28/11 defer 85/2 define 108/1 defined 22/22, 48/8, 76/11, 94/21 defines 88/21, 88/24 definition 23/3, 23/4, 23/8, 23/16, 28/2, 28/4, 31/6, 31/12, 31/16, 32/10, 32/11, 41/6, 41/7, 43/22, 48/7, 76/8, 76/9, 76/13, 76/21, 82/4, 88/19, 92/9, 93/5, 95/11 definitional 26/15, 88/23 nitions 34/14, 36/17, 36/20, 37/14, 37/24, 37/25, , 41/1, 41/7, 41/9, 42/10, 89/8 adate 127/1 degradation 70/16 degrade 70/14 degree 62/4, 73/23, 93/19, 93/20, 100/18, 134/17 delineated 130/1 delivery 102/3 Delta 2/11 demand-side 35/9 demonstrate 28/1, 28/22, 30/13, 70/12, 87/7 demonstrated 108/8 demonstrating 45/8, 86/22 demonstration 27/17 denied 11/21, 12/8, 71/6 deny 21/25, 130/11 DEP 115/5, 127/23, 129/6 Department 83/17 depend 27/19 depends 63/24 depreciation 71/13, 71/23 Deputy 3/21, 13/18 derived 87/4 describe 30/25 described 37/17, 95/2 description 30/21 designed 23/11, 76/24, 79/7 detailed 19/12 determination 1/5, 6/10, 21/5, 23/11, 25/10, 25/18. 37/20, 39/14, 47/4, 51/9, 52/20, 55/5, 55/16, 57/9, 61/19, 61/24, 68/15, 70/23, 71/20, 72/6, 74/6, 75/9, 75/23, 76/24, 77/7, 77/13, 78/18, 79/6, 82/6, 83/2, 83/15, 84/1, 84/8, 87/12, 88/14, 113/22, 114/7, 114/10, 116/1, 122/4, 122/5, 123/16, 124/4, 125/2, 128/9, 130/4, 130/18, 131/1, 131/14, 135/2, 139/12, 140/6, 141/5 determinations 59/18, 75/15, 77/4, 83/23, 125/23 determinations 39/16, 73/15, 7/17, 83/25, 123/25
determine 24/15, 24/19, 56/9, 56/26, 61/19, 62/20,
623, 67/5, 69/12, 69/22, 72/12, 72/17, 96/9, 36/15,
, 85/2, 88/17, 92/2, 93/13, 101/6, 108/11, 115/2,
,, 120/1, 126/23, 128/25, 129/1, 130/2, 130/4,

132/12, 137/4

develop 36/1

determines \$4/7

developing 13/1, 121/8

determined 26/5, 57/9, 117/6, 128/8, 128/10

developer 12/25, 43/14, 43/19, 43/23, 60/15, 70/11 developer's 44/4

development 19/25, 22/3, 22/20, 33/24, 50/14, 72/11

determining 56/2, 110/25, 138/1

developments 72/8 dicta 87/15, 103/3, 103/10, 103/20, 110/17 dictate 65/8, 132/21, 133/13 difference 107/25, 134/22 differentiated 45/6 difficult 15/5 direct 52/10, 72/15 directive 56/19 disadvantage 136/30, 136/21 disagree 72/1, 109/4, 120/4 disagreed 105/10 disallow 92/21 discharge 121/21 discretion 21/17 discuss 21/18, 21/20, 25/7, 25/16, 40/13, 40/21 discussed 16/2, 17/5, 17/10, 28/3, 89/18, 89/21, 127/17 discussion 22/6 discussion 115/20 disjunctive 109/24 dismiss 10/17, 10/19, 10/24, 13/7, 14/14, 16/4, 16/21, dismiss 19/17, 10/19, 10/24, 13/7, 14/14, 16/4, 16/21, 18/10, 20/21, 44/4, 44/8, 45/16, 58/4, 70/2, 74/23, 84/3, 85/6, 86/2, 86/20, 104/21, 114/23, 121/14 dismissed 50/20, 50/22, 57/17, 77/3, 80/1, 83/14, 87/8 dismissed 12/2, 12/6, 75/5, 75/14, 75/21, 77/21, 78/3, 78/14, 83/6, 85/5 dismissing 12/3 dispatch 123/7 dismissing 50/20 displace 63/16 displaced 63/14 displacing 117/23 dispositive 76/6 disprove 86/25 dispute 102/10 disputes 94/10 dissented 110/11 distinction 50/5, 81/21, 83/4, 95/6, 101/2 distinctions 63/7 distinguish 81/4, 106/5, 106/17, 107/2, 112/5, 112/6 distinguishes 106/25 distinguishing 106/24, 108/25 distributing 23/2, 196/20 distribution 31/10, 89/4, 95/4, 95/19, 96/24 distribution-only 195/21 District 13/25 districts 22/23, 88/35, 96/16 divide 16/15 Division 4/3 DOCKET 1/4, 6/9, 141/13 document 11/4 documents 15/13 Doesn't 28/17, 53/10, 64/22, 86/7, 99/8 dog 29/3 dollars 71/16 domain 34/20 DONALD 3/21, 7/14 doors 109/7 double 109/6 doubt 57/7 draw 27/1, 27/3 dropped 65/17 dual 105/3, 113/20 Duke 1/8, 2/13, 6/12, 7/8, 7/11, 7/18, 16/12, 16/13, 17/18, 17/21, 19/5, 21/4, 28/1, 28/3, 28/11, 29/4, 31/4, 31/15, 31/17, 31/19, 32/20, 32/21, 33/7, 33/23, 34/24, 37/15, 38/2, 39/17, 31/21, 42/7, 42/25, 43/24, 44/2, 44/12, 44/21, 45/5, 41/20, 53/8, 57/18, 67/6, 67/24, 75/6, 79/17, 79/24, 81/2, 81/3, 81/11, 82/23, 83/5, 84/18, 87/23, 89/9, 81/15, 91/11, 93/5, 93/9, 93/16, 93/20, 99/3, 100/23, 106/14, 108/18, 112/17, 124/8, Duke's 21/11, 22/1, 32/7, 33/2, 35/3, 37/22, 39/6, 43/6, 43/21, 65/19, 65/20 during 10/5, 11/10 duties 41/3, 116/18 duty 23/10, 45/10, 45/12, 76/23, 79/8

ĸ

Easley 1/19 eat 86/7 Economic 42/1, 63/20, 70/8, 72/11, 123/7 economically 124/33 edge 18/11 edification 104/20 effect 11/5, 11/14, 115/25, 132/21 effects 127/22 efficiency 34/25, 36/2 efficiency 34/25, 66/13, 117/23, 117/24, 137/6, 140/3, 140/10, 140/17, 142/23 effort 42/5 Electric 2/22, 3/4, 6/20, 7/4, 10/14, 22/21, 22/23, 22/24, 23/22, 23/25, 36/14, 28/4, 28/5, 28/7, 28/9,

28/18, 29/8, 29/11, 30/23, 31/2, 31/3, 31/6, 31/7, 31/8, 31/10, 31/14, 31/15, 31/18, 31/22, 31/25, 32/4, 32/8, 34/4, 34/5, 34/15, 36/17, 36/19, 36/21, 37/7, 37/15, 42/16, 42/21, 51/22, 52/8, 53/13, 54/13, 57/23, 58/24, 63/18, 67/10, 73/9, 76/10, 76/14, 76/16, 78/4, 78/15, 79/8, 81/8, 82/4, 82/5, 82/9, 87/21, 88/2, 88/18, 88/21, 88/24, 88/25, 89/1, 89/4, 89/6, 89/10, 89/13, 89/16, 89/24, 90/8, 90/22, 91/5, 91/9, 93/3, 93/4, 93/6, 93/17, 93/21, 93/22, 94/16, 95/3, 95/11, 96/16, 96/17, 96/20, 98/14, 99/4, 106/9, 108/22, 109/18, 109/21, 112/16, 131/12 electrical 1/6, 6/10, 23/2, 46/11, 46/13, 46/17, 53/19. \$3/2E electricity 35/11, 36/14, 37/3, 44/25, 45/9, 45/13, 50/3, 52/25, 54/3, 57/1, 59/18, 89/11, 90/20, 93/8, 95/5, 95/14, 113/6, 113/8, 114/20, 115/9, 117/12, 127/6, 129/16, 130/24, 131/13, 133/4 element 68/13, 72/10 elements 72/4 emergency 93/24, 94/15, 123/9 eminent 34/20 Emmanuel 2/17 emphasis 41/9 emphasize 20/2 Empire 43/15, 44/14, 44/17, 44/18, 44/21, 45/1 Empire's 43/21 employment 42/5 empowers 21/4 enacted 20/12, 22/12, 22/17, 29/18, 31/13, 32/13, 33/4, 33/10, 33/15, 34/8, 35/5, 35/7, 36/7, 36/10, 37/12, 37/13, 38/8, 42/11, 97/1, 98/23, 107/17 enacting 29/9, 95/12 enactment 20/10, 20/13, 22/6, 34/6, 42/19 encourage 35/8, 66/10, 77/19 encumbering 116/22 end 54/11, 65/9, 71/22, 72/22 Energy 1/8, 2/13, 3/23, 6/12, 7/15, 7/19, 12/21, 13/19, 23/2, 26/8, 34/25, 36/2, 75/10, 81/12, 85/23, 88/8, 88/9, 89/4, 91/11, 96/20, 107/17 engage 59/3, 39/3, 39/10, 90/19, 93/7, 95/3, 96/19 engaged 22/25, 23/1, 39/2, 95/14, 96/18, 100/5 engaging 29/5 enjoys 64/7 ensure 26/7, 100/1 ensuring 43/7 enter \$/3, 33/5, 33/13, 33/16, 43/24, 48/19, 48/20, 60/20, 68/17, 91/13 entered \$/20, \$/23, \$/25, 9/2, \$2/19 enterprise 42/4 entities 23/5, 23/8, 23/15, 33/14, 34/3, 47/17, 49/12, 49/14, 68/8, 69/1, 69/8, 75/9, 76/11, 76/13, 76/16, 76/21, 78/5, 78/15, 79/24, 82/4, 82/13, 95/10, 95/13, 96/22, 97/22, 103/12, 107/14, 107/22 entitled 101/20, 120/14, 121/16 entity 27/13, 33/6, 36/13, 37/3, 45/13, 47/23, 48/11, 48/20, 48/21, 52/7, 54/12, 56/16, 64/11, 68/16, 69/11, 71/18, 74/19, 75/12, 97/13, 100/4, 105/23, 106/20, 112/9, 118/3 entry 38/1, 38/10, 66/18 enumerated 107/14, 107/22, 108/1, 108/2 enumerating 95/9 environment 76/15, 71/3, 116/7, 126/3, 127/1, 128/7, 128/20 Environmental 3/8, 6/23, 59/13, 59/20, 61/16, 61/19, 62/2, 62/10, 62/19, 62/22, 65/14, 65/21, 65/24, 69/23, 70/5, 70/9, 83/17, 84/13, 114/3, 114/13, 114/20, 115/1, 115/5, 115/7, 115/9, 115/14, 116/9, 126/22, 127/17, 127/18, 127/22, 128/12, 128/24, 128/25, 129/4 environmentalist 116/7 environmentally 71/5 envisioned 60/19, 96/1 equal 17/18, 54/3 equally 54/19, 85/6 era 69/24, 76/1, 71/8 erroneous 103/6, 103/9, 104/8 Esplanade 1/20 establish 44/17 established 74/22, 120/18 establishing 111/11 estimates 23/23 evaluate 20/25 evaluated 77/12 evaluation 77/10, 132/2 event 27/15, 31/15, 33/1 events 20/10, 100/3 evidence 10/5, 44/14, 120/18 evidentiary 9/23, 44/8 evolution 42/18 EWG 28/12 EWGs 28/13 ex 8/16, 8/24, 8/25, 9/3 examine 23/11, 76/24, 79/7 excess 67/11

excluded 42/11 exclusions 111/23 Excuse 49/20, 54/24, 101/3 executed 78/16 exempt 46/3

upted 49/21

uption 30/i, 46/1

exercise 83/18 existed 38/13, 125/3 existence 33/17, 33/19, 48/6, 50/15, 97/24, 98/11, 141/3 existing 21/10, 36/17, 36/20, 46/13, 87/25 exists 44/17, 101/11, 121/12 expanding 17/12 expansion 46/12 expect 86/16 expected 142/2 expense 71/24 expensive 66/12, 92/17, 116/23 explicitly 55/15, 83/24 explored 13/4 exposure 141/9 express 19/18 extend 50/11, 125/22 extends 93/23 extracted 16/17

P

face 32/14, 34/13, 59/13, 84/12, 130/8 facilities 26/4, 70/17, 70/25, 96/24, 102/2 facility 27/9, 30/7, 30/9, 30/12, 30/14, 30/18, 45/7, 45/8, 60/9, 60/17, 70/20, 71/4, 81/24, 99/25, 106/12 fact 29/4, 30/10, 38/6, 38/13, 38/20, 39/14, 59/22, 82/18, 87/7, 92/4, 92/16, 93/12, 98/12, 106/13, 124/16 factor 106/25, 108/25 factors 127/4, 127/10 facts 76/1, 87/3, 87/15, 103/11, 130/10 factual 63/7, 115/11 fails 50/23 failure 57/11 fair 101/9, 117/7 faith 121/19 58/5, 109/1, 111/23 137/25 noned 36/19 fast 62/25 fatal 35/3, 51/17 favor 21/11 favorable \$7/3, \$7/5 Federal 28/15, 28/16, 29/10, 31/3, 81/10, 82/2, 85/22, 85/24, 88/8, 88/9, 88/11, 93/9, 93/14, 97/2, 97/4, 97/25, 98/21, 108/17, 108/19, 108/21, 108/22, 109/21, 112/15 Federation 3/20, 8/1, 11/19 FEECA 25/6, 25/17, 34/7, 34/24, 35/1, 35/5, 35/6, 35/7, 35/25, 36/7, 36/10, 36/12, 36/17, 37/1, 37/2, 37/6, 37/12, 36/9, 38/17, 41/12, 42/10 fees 41/15 FERC 82/2, 93/6, 93/11, 93/13, 102/14, 109/19 FERC's 91/10, 92/23 Fields 2/17, 6/25 File 10/16, 12/14, 14/12, 14/13, 14/20, 14/23, 15/19, 89/13, 89/15, 89/22, 90/2, 90/25, 91/1, 139/12 filed 11/20, 12/8, 14/3, 14/17, 14/25, 15/13, 34/10, 41/25, 43/15 Filing 29/16, 40/11, 41/25, 43/9, 89/23, 90/2, 90/9, 90/12, 91/2 filings 10/7, 19/10, 114/24 MH 16/18 finance 32/19, 47/24 financed 62/5 financial 138/21 find 40/16, 45/13, 46/6, 73/20, 109/17 finding 92/24, 107/9, 111/6, 111/9 findings 52/24 fine 86/13 finish 142/6, 142/22 firm 2/10, 6/16, 7/3, 7/6, 7/23, 7/24, 8/3, 27/10, 27/21, 27/22, 49/14, 101/12 Fish 15/7 fit 24/9, 38/5, 87/25, 108/1 68/6 69/7, 142/18, 142/19 Flanigan 3/15, 7/6 flaws 33/2 flen 30/17 fleet 27/4 flip-flop 42/15
FLORIDA 1/1, 1/7, 1/20, 2/4, 2/5, 2/6, 2/9, 2/11, 2/13, 2/15, 2/16, 2/18, 2/19, 2/21, 3/3, 3/4, 3/7, 3/12, 3/13, 3/16, 3/19, 3/20, 4/2, 4/4, 6/12, 6/17, 6/20, 6/25, 7/1, 7/10, 7/21, 8/1, 11/18, 13/4, 13/5, 14/19, 15/1, 16/10, 16/11, 16/23, 19/11, 20/1, 20/3, 21/21, 25/24, 26/4, 26/17, 26/19, 26/20, 26/24, 27/18, 27/23, 33/5, 33/5, 34/17, 34/25, 49/6, 43/8, 48/22, 49/12, 49/15, 49/16, 50/18, 51/2, 51/5, 51/11, 51/15, 51/18, 54/20, 54/23, 55/11, 55/18, 36/24, 57/2, 57/22, 57/23, 58/15, 58/18, 60/21, 63/16, 67/20, 68/14, 70/7, 78/2, 73/16, 73/16, 75/24, 75/24, 83/16, 86/20, 86/21, 87/21, 93/18, 95/20, 97/3, 90/7, 98/15, 101/15, 101/16, 102/5, 103/13, 113/4, 113/6, 113/7, 114/2, 114/19, 115/14, 118/4, 118/6, 122/16, 122/17, 126/7, 129/14, 129/17, 130/21, 130/22, 130/24, 131/2, 131/11. 129/17, 130/21, 130/22, 130/24, 131/2, 131/5, 131/11, 132/11, 134/6, 135/13, 136/1, 136/8, 136/16, 137/14, 138/17, 138/20, 138/22, 139/4, 140/1 Florida's 127/1, 141/3 flows 64/8 fecal 25/21, 27/2, 37/20 focus 19/24, 20/9, 51/3 fold 72/25 follow 32/16, 55/13, 63/9, 111/25, 118/7, 121/20 follows 78/3, 88/15, 100/21, 113/17 footnote 56/5, 56/6, 56/18, 58/8 force 56/3, 82/13, 103/13, 112/7, 112/9, 132/20, 133/10 forced 114/9 forces 73/20 forecast 43/18 forgive 66/2 forgot 106/12 form 29/15, 36/14, 37/3, 63/20 forma 101/15, 101/20 forthcoming 126/14 found 23/3, 44/13, 50/8, 52/21, 75/20, 82/3, 82/5, 92/25, 108/20, 109/5 Foundation 3/8, 6/23 four 56/13, 77/20, 137/20 Fourth 15/8 FPC 106/9 FPL 82/14, 98/22, 1106/8, 107/5 framed 19/11 framework \$8/1 franchised 12/23 free 132/24 front 65/4, 65/9 frustrating 61/14 fuel 66/24, 118/5, 140/10 function 62/17 fundamental 21/6, 42/16, 75/4 funds 71/10 future 57/1, 83/24, 120/4, 123/18, 132/24, 134/19, 134/24, 137/22

7

Gadsden 2/9 GAIL 3/6, 6/22 gain 118/4, 118/6 Gainesville 3/19 GARCIA 1/15, 9/8, 16/6, 16/17, 17/23, 18/25, 19/14, 24/8, 24/23, 26/17, 211/17, 41/22, 49/24, 53/21, 55/22, 61/25, 62/13, 62/24, 63/4, 63/8, 64/4, 64/20, 65/16, 66/9, 66/21, 72/20, 73/18, 78/5, 78/11, 81/19, 81/21, 86/3, 86/13, 86/18, 93/16, 96/11, 96/14, 105/4, 105/11, 105/24, 106/5, 106/17, 106/24, 108/24, 112/3, 116/17, 116/21, 117/17, 121/25, 122/12, 124/5, 124/12, 124/24, 125/17, 125/20, 125/25, 126/3, 126/6, 134/6, 134/22, 134/25, 135/24, 135/24, 135/24, 135/24, 136/24, 137/10, 138/6, 138/10, 138/13, 138/16, 138/19, 142/14, 143/10 Garcia's 100/15 GARY 2/16, 6/24 Gas 10/14, 36/15, 36/18, 37/4, 90/22 gas-fired 140/7 Gayfers 70/12 gears 69/15 generate 124/18, 1:14/20, 137/16, 140/11 generated 118/2 Generating 3/17, 7/7, 23/1, 23/23, 24/1, 24/3, 24/5, 24/15, 26/3, 27/4, 27/9, 27/21, 35/23, 44/20, 46/12, 54/7, 54/22, 89/11, 9:3/8, 95/14, 96/19, 135/14 generating-only 9://17, 96/2, 97/17 generation 13/2, 31/10, 49/25, 63/20, 63/22, 63/23, 65/18, 73/19, 73/21, '73/23, 74/1, 89/3, 90/19, 92/14, 95/4, 96/23, 97/5, 97/11, 97/12, 98/2, 116/23, 117/24, 118/18, 126/15, 137/23, 138/25 generation-only %/8 generator 77/14, 104/25 generators 23/12, 28/14, 35/2, 76/25, 79/9, 81/7, 23/22 gentlemen 6/3, 11/24 geographic 25/4, 25/11 geographical 36/4 GEY 2/5, 7/8, 85/25 gleaned 23/4 go-around 137/21

goal 35/11, 113/20
going-forward 70/2
government 29/11
governmental 34/3, 47/13, 47/19, 47/20, 48/15,
48/21, 48/23
governs 94/24
GRACE 4/2, 8/8
grant 14/9, 130/4
granted 13/8, 15/11, 15/20, 44/7, 45/17
granting 83/14
greater 85/1
Grid 73/7, 93/24, 94/14, 125/21
ground 136/19, 139/2, 139/25, 142/21
grounds 50/19, 50/21, 57/17, 80/1, 87/8, 87/9
grow 138/23
growing 138/21
GS 44/25
guess 119/18, 125/9, 130/12
guidance 31/13
GUYTON 3/10, 6/15

H

half 16/10, 16/11, 19/6, 78/12, 86/10 hammer 30/16 hand 115/22 handed 8/15, 9/10 handout 51/25, 52/19, 55/3, 55/20, 75/18, 78/1, 81/15 hands 21/22 happy 91/6, 115/20 hardly 31/13 hardware 118/17 harm 137/13 harmony \$8/10, 109/16 head 73/24 head-on 140/24 headquartered 12/22 health 138/4 healthy 138/21 hearings 126/12 heart 18/1, 18/2, 76/19 heat 140/2, 140/8 Hector 3/11, 6/16 held 23/6, 106/25, 107/10 Help 20/24, 132/14, 137/16 helpful 20/18 HERSHEL 3/2, 6/19 history 19/25, 20/22, 33/1, 38/8, 40/12 hit 73/24 hold 107/2 holding 12/21, 54/25, 57/4, 57/15, 87/17, 102/25, 103/3, 103/4, 104/11, 104/12, 105/5, 105/8, 105/13, 105/15, 105/16, 109/3, 110/17, 110/21 holdings 87/17, 102/24, 103/10, 112/6 honest 17/23 hook 62/6, 65/19, 65/21, 101/23, 102/6, 102/8, 117/11, 133/25, 136/5, 136/7, 139/6, 139/9 hope 18/13, 69/18 hopeless 37/23 horse 141/21, 141/23 hour 16/19, 16/11, 16/12, 16/14, 16/18, 17/6, 19/6, 86/10, 124/18, 124/19, 140/11 House 40/14 housekeeping 36/23, 39/2, 39/12, 39/20, 39/25, 40/19 hundred 65/17 hurt 117/18, 117/20 hypothetical 141/12

T

i.e 25/25, 56/24, 115/8
idea 22/2, 26/6
identification 25/19, 37/21
identified 22/24, 22/25, 101/24, 101/25
identify 32/11, 97/21
identifying 105/2
ignore 39/18
II 81/23
III 2/3, 7/22
imagine 136/13
Impact 42/1, 42/4, 70/5, 71/3, 72/8, 100/8, 116/9, 128/16, 128/17, 128/19, 128/22, 128/25
impacts 115/5, 115/7, 129/4, 129/7
implementing 25/3
implicates 141/7
implications 36/1, 140/16
implied 123/5
import 83/4
impose 93/14
imposed 135/17
impression 131/4, 131/7
impreve 115/1, 129/14, 129/15

improvement 115/13 improvements 101/22, 137/23 imapposite 87/15, 103/11, 112/2 inappropriate 30/19 inaudible 86/4, 138/6, 138/13 nceivable 34/17 isistent 51/1, 57/15, 75/16 incorrect 100/21 increase 41/15 increasing 36/1, 53/19, 53/24 incumbent 138/25 incur 69/22 incurred 61/16 incurring 59/19 independent 44/13, 54/1, 74/10, 74/19, 77/16, 81/14, 81/24, 81/25, 97/13, 108/12, 108/16 indicate 102/18 indicated 17/11, 48/10, 126/20 indicates 95/23 indication 38/7, 42/14 indispensable 77/7 indulge 69/18 industry 12/21, 121/8, 138/4 infer 92/3 inferences 87/4 information 68/18, 83/3, 101/6 informed 107/18 inherent 137/9 initiative 75/14 instrumental 43/7 integral 120/15 integrity 52/25, 73/9, 127/6, 129/15, 130/23, 131/12, 133/3 intent 29/12, 83/21, 84/23 intention 90/3 interchangeably 38/20, 38/24 interconnected 101/17 interest 14/24, 15/4, 79/3, 85/7 interpret 115/23 interpretation 25/9, 54/18, 56/18, 67/5, 77/3, 83/20, 103/5, 103/8, 103/24, 104/2, 104/8, 105/7, 119/8 interpretations 87/19 interpreted 74/5 preting 21/15 rupt 59/7 interrupting 20/15 interstate 97% intervene 7/14, 12/3, 13/9 intervened 44/2 intervener 8/1 Intervention 11/20, 12/7 investment 11/20, 12/7 investment 18/14, 60/11, 64/16, 72/13, 119/10, 140/20 investor-owned 31/8, 33/17 investors 65/20, 70/19, 73/2, 119/9 investors' 71/10 IOU 99/5 IOU's 112/25 IOUs 33/18 IPP 24/11, 45/11 IPPs 45/7, 45/11, 103/12 irrelevant 94/7 isolated \$3/7 issue 13/11, 21/2, 21/9, 25/4, 25/24, 26/24, 29/7, 30/6, 40/22, 53/15, 54/16, 57/18, 60/22, 114/3, 129/12, 130/17, 140/19, 140/20, 141/4

J

issues 15/5, 19/9, 19/10, 19/16, 20/4, 22/5, 85/21,

issued 6/7, 12/9, 107/16

85/23, 88/13, 137/8 FTEM 5/3, 100/4

JACOBS 1/16, 9/19, 10/2, 10/9, 29/20, 30/3, 67/22, 68/22, 99/21, 102/15, 112/12, 112/19, 113/12, 122/2, 123/5, 123/10, 123/11, 123/25, 124/13, 131/16, 131/19, 131/20, 131/23, 132/4, 132/7, 133/22, 134/3, 134/17 Jacobe' 133/17 JAMES 2/15, 2/20, 6/25, 7/2 JAYE 4/2, 8/8 JC 70/14 Jim 98/10 72/18, 72/19, 72/20, 104/4, 104/5, 113/18, 115/8, JUE 1/15 JOHN 2/3, 3/10, 6/16, 7/22 JOHNSON 1/14, 6/3, 6/14, 8/6, 8/12, 8/22, 9/4, 9/6, 9/16, 10/10, 10/25, 11/8, 11/23, 12/4, 12/10, 12/19, 13/10, 13/14, 13/22, 14/1, 14/8, 15/12, 15/17, 15/23, 16/14, 16/20, 16/23, 16/25, 17/20, 18/10, 18/15, 18/18, 19/8, 20/14, 45/18, 49/19, 50/17, 52/2, 52/12, 85/11, 85/16, 104/10, 104/13, 105/14, 107/9, 107/20, 107/25, 108/6, 108/14, 129/25, 130/6, 131/3, 142/6, 142/10,

142/24, 143/1, 143/5, 143/8 joined 44/3, 49/3 Joint 1/5, 6/9, 7/18, 7/22, 8/5, 21/11, 22/1, 22/24, 28/7, 30/10, 32/8, 32/14, 32/17, 32/18, 32/24, 33/3, 33/6, 33/12, 33/15, 33/20, 47/7, 47/9, 47/11, 48/2, 48/3, 48/5, 48/6, 48/1, 49/4, 50/20, 50/22, 51/8, 51/13, 57/11, 58/14, 58/22, '15/5, 84/4, 84/14, 87/22, 89/1, 89/5, 96/17, 99/1, 11:1/20 jointly 32/19, 47/23 joints 50/15 JON 3/14 JOSEPH 2/7, 7/23 JOY 1/21 JULIA 1/14 jumping 34/6 June 89/20 jurisdiction 29/13, 54/22, \$3/19, \$8/1, \$8/3, 113/16, 120/9, 127/10, 128/21, 128/22 jurisdictional 126/22 justify 50/21

K

KAMARAS 3/6, 6/22 Katz 3/15, 7/6 Kaufman 2/8 KELLY 1/21 Kentucky 3/22, 12/22 kidding 18/11 knowledge 15/15, 97/9 known 22/10, 22/11 Kolina 3/15, 7/6

Light 3/13, 6/17, 16/11, 19/11, 44/3, 50/19, 57/4, 75/12, 75/13, 86/20, 97/3, 100/3, 101/16, 103/14, 111/12, 122/17 limit 16/8, 16/9, 18/20, 19/5, 50/13, 87/20, 114/15, 118/13, 127/19, 139/19 Limited 6/13, 7/19, 15/6, 16/7, 33/18, 39/19, 44/23, 81/23, 83/22, 87/17, 91/11, 105/22, 126/22 limiting 36/9 Line 34/7, 34/8, 34/12, 38/14, 39/3, 40/3, 40/15, 41/3, 49/11, 103/22, 115/24, 116/3, 119/5 lines 34/19, 69/16 Het 11/1. 11/3 listed 23/8, 76/21 listing 95/9 little 32/15, 66/21, 69/15, 70/15, 96/7, 105/12, 127/17, 135/25 load 43/18, 116/2 local 45/22, 46/24 localities 56/25 located 13/3, 96/6 location 23/24 logic 53/12, 79/1 logical 73/10 logically 24/3, 35/20 long-term 101/3, 101/4, 101/12, 106/10 lose 63/17, 64/8, 64/9 loses 66/17 loss 66/6 lost 54/5 Louisville 3/22, 10/14, 12/22 love 136/1 LPI 12/25, 13/4 hunch 142/7, 142/17

L.L.P 1/8, 2/14, 6/13, 7/19 L.L.P.s 91/12 lacked 92/24 Ladies 6/3 laid 98/22 land 72/9 Landers 2/3, 7/16 language 19/25, 21/24, 38/3, 48/1, 53/10, 53/14, 78/23, 89/7, 95/12, 95/13, 95/22, 96/7, 96/11, 96/21, 99/4, 99/6, 103/19, 106/3, 107/21, 108/5, 120/13 large 44/23, 44/24, 45/3, 68/1 later 22/14, 36/8, 36/22, 56/17, 62/23, 65/7, 65/10, 111/4, 111/14 111/4, 111/14
Laughter 16/19, 18/12, 18/14, 86/8, 105/12, 143/7
Lauredo 110/11
LAVIA 2/3, 7/22
Law 2/6, 2/10, 6/16, 7/3, 7/11, 8/3, 14/13, 14/17, 15/1, 20/12, 21/12, 21/15, 21/20, 22/12, 22/13, 22/17, 23/19, 23/21, 25/15, 36/13, 28/16, 29/10, 29/18, 30/20, 21/18, 21/1 31/1, 32/12, 32/19, 33/15, 35/25, 36/12, 36/18, 37/6, 38/7, 39/25, 40/5, 40/17, 40/24, 41/11, 42/20, 43/7, 43/8, 43/13, 44/10, 48/17, 50/7, 50/25, 51/2, 51/18, 58/13, 45/13, 46/14, 49/25, 74/11, 74/22, 74/24, 76/5, 85/21, 88/11, 88/33, 91/8, 106/21, 111/16, 111/18, 112/16, 116/10, 116/13, 116/15, 120/3, 120/10, 120/12, 120/14, 121/7, 121/16, 121/12, 121/15, 121/18, 121/21, 125/11, 139/15, 139/16, 139/17 laws 38/20, 100/20, 121/20 lead 31/19 leads 43/3, 119/20 least-cost 73/21 leave 7/14, 13/8, 14/12, 15/19, 139/5 led 42/12 LEE 2/20, 7/2, 8/16, 9/10 Lee's 10/3 left 62/6, 85/9, 86/16, 94/13 Legal 3/8, 4/3, 6/23, 43/2, 63/6, 69/17, 112/9 legislation 20/1, 21/3, 21/8, 21/9, 21/10, 21/18, 22/15, 22/19, 25/6, 25/21, 27/25, 30/21, 38/4, 40/25, 41/18 legislative 19/25, 20/5, 22/5, 25/17, 33/24, 38/8, 40/2, 40/12, 40/21, 42/17 legislators 96/6, 97/10 legislators 9646, 97/10
legislature 23/25, 29/9, 30/25, 34/18, 36/16, 38/8, 38/18, 39/2, 39/8, 41/18, 42/15, 59/11, 61/18, 65/7, 74/13, 95/1, 95/7, 95/8, 95/12, 96/1
legislature's 38/25, 84/23
legitimate 87/20, 90/7
LEON 1/16
LEON 1/16
LEON 1/16 LESLIE 4/2, 8/10 letter \$/16, \$/20, 9/9, 9/10, 9/13, 10/3 level 100/8 LG&E 3/23, 7/15, 10/23, 12/20, 12/23, 12/25, 13/6, 13/18 liberty 47/14 licensed 13/22, 13/14, 128/5, 129/2 life 106/21

M

Madam 8/2, 8/14, 9/12, 10/13, 11/17, 12/20, 13/13, 13/17, 14/15, 15/15, 15/25, 16/22, 17/24, 21/1, 85/18, 141/25, 142/13, 142/14, 142/25 magnitude 19/8 Main 3/22, 20/9, 99/22 maintain 96/23, 116/2 maintains 31/9 mail 70/6, 70/10, 71/6, 71/18 nanagement 35/9, 72/9 Manatee 12/2, 12/5 mandate 39/18 mandatory 35/19 manner 26/9, 42/17, 46/15, 46/19 margia 26/18, 116/4, 118/18, 121/2, 126/9, 132/12 marginal 118/24, 119/2 marginal 118/24, 119/2
margina 26/1, 26/3, 129/14, 132/20, 136/3
MARK 2/5, 7/10
market 13/5, 44/17, 85/2, 92/5, 92/9, 92/24, 92/25, 93/13, 100/8, 119/8, 119/10, 119/14, 119/25, 120/25, 125/3, 126/3, 132/8, 134/19, 134/24
market-based 93/12 market-based 53/12, 72/17, 84/6, 84/20 market- 42/5, 138/21 materia 94/23 materials 41/24 Matter 1/4, 11/1, 17/1, 18/1, 18/2, 21/14, 22/15, 36/9, 36/23, 74/11, 113/16, 124/16, 140/1 matters 8/13, 9/17, 12/13, 20/6, 91/7, 91/8 McGEE 2/15, 6/25 McGLOTHLIN 2/7, 2/8, 7/23 McMullen 2/21, 7/3 McWhirter 2/7, 7/23 meaning 20/7, 32/9, 32/25, 89/25, 99/7, 108/23 meaningless 56/23, 58/13 measure 116/2 measures 35/10, 35/16 Medicaid 138/9 Medicare meet 14/18, 25/19, 26/18, 26/22, 26/25, 27/1, 27/20, 27/24, 44/1, 56/23, 55/14, 58/3, 80/11, 114/16, 126/8, 7/7/4, 44/1, 58/23, 55/14, 58/3, 80/11, 114/16, 126/8, 135/4, 136/3 meeting 37/21, 51/17 meets 14/3, 28/3, 45/25 megawatt 124/18, 124/19, 140/11 megawatts 28/23, 28/25, 29/2, 30/2, 51/10, 51/11, 51/14, 52/3, 52/15, 79/16, 90/5, 80/17, 81/3, 91/22, 106/14, 121/24, 121/25, 122/4, 122/16, 130/9, 135/14, 13/26/8, 137/4, 130/15, 14/8/15 136/15, 137/4, 139/25, 140/7 member 90/23, 96/10, 117/15 members 11/9, 16/25, 35/17, 85/19, 142/4 Memorandum 10/16, 14/13, 14/16, 14/18 mention 16/1, 19/21 mentioned 47/2 merchant 12/25, 21/5, 22/2, 23/19, 24/4, 27/21, 27/24, 29/5, 32/4, 35/12, 42/4, 43/22, 49/8, 118/21, 139/19, 140/5, 140/19, 140/25 merchants 33/11, 34/18, 39/7, 42/9, 42/11

merits 86/24, 87/2, 87/11, 121/17, 129/20 merrier 117/15, 118/10 MICHELLE 3/2, 6/19 microphone 138/7, 138/14, 138/17 middle 76/19, 78/9, 78/12 on 65/17, 102/11, 102/13 37/13, 75/15, 95/17 .ud-set 38/25 minds 96/5 minimize 71/3, 114/14, 127/19 minimum 50/24, 114/17 miniscule 32/23 ministerial 116/18 minute \$5/13 minutes 17/17, 18/3, 18/11, 18/17, 18/21, 18/23, 19/2, 19/3, 142/18, 142/19 MISCELLANEOUS 5/2 missed 102/19, 105/5 missing 68/13 mistaken 16/6 mitigate 35/18, 35/22, 70/15 mix 24/9 mockery 80/19 moment 25/16, 40/13, 46/6, 51/24, 69/18 money 62/4, 70/20, 70/24, 134/12 monopolistic 71/8, 71/14, 73/13, 73/15 Monroe 3/11, 3/16 months 136/13, 139/3 morning 8/15, 9/11, 10/19, 13/9, 13/21, 17/22, 18/6, 77/22, 85/8, 89/6, 121/13 77/32, 836, 8376, 12/13, 10/23, 11/24, 12/3, 12/11, 12/17, 13/7, 14/11, 14/12, 14/14, 14/16, 14/18, 14/23, 15/19, 17/3, 18/25, 20/21, 39/15, 39/16, 44/7, 58/4, 70/2, 74/23, 84/3, 85/6, 88/16, 114/23, 121/13, 142/5 motions 9/17, 10/11, 10/13, 10/17, 10/19, 10/20, 10/23, 10/24, 16/4, 16/21, 17/7, 17/25, 45/16, 86/2, 86/19, 104/21 move 39/1, 66/6, 75/4, 80/8, 80/20 moved 22/13, 36/8, 36/22, 73/14, 74/9 movement 73/17, 73/18, 74/3 moves 67/17, 67/19 moving 19/4, 63/6, 73/12, 73/25, 84/9 MOYLE 3/14, 7/6 MR. BEASLEY 7/2 Guyton 5/5, 6/15, 17/13, 17/14, 18/24, 19/22, 20/2, 21/19, 50/17, 50/18, 52/6, 52/14, 53/22, 55/24, 59/6, 59/10, 59/25, 60/12, 60/19, 60/25, 61/5, 61/12, 62/7, 62/15, 63/3, 63/5, 63/10, 63/19, 63/24, 64/6, 64/12, 64/17, 64/24, 66/5, 66/15, 66/23, 67/15, 67/19, 68/7, 69/1, 69/14, 72/2, 73/4, 74/2, 75/3, 78/6, 78/8, 78/12, 20/3, 20/7, 20/12, 20/15, 21/20, 25/12, 102/21, 104/17, 105/24, 106/25, 107/20, 108/6, 108/9, 108/10, 108/15, 108/16, 109/1, 117/17, 126/19, 130/7, 136/25 Mr. Guyton's 106/6, 112/6 Mr. Jenkins 89/21 MR. PAUGH 9/2 MR. SANTA 7/13, 12/17, 12/19, 12/20, 13/17, 13/24, 14/3, 14/17, 16/1, 16/15, 85/21, 100/21 Mr. Santa's 139/11 Mr. Sasse 5/4, 6/24, 16/24, 18/13, 18/17, 18/19, 18/23, 19/3, 19/20, 21/1, 24/10, 25/1, 25/14, 26/6, 26/23, 27/8, 27/16, 28/20, 29/25, 30/5, 39/23, 40/2, 40/8, 40/10, 40/21, 41/24, 45/24, 46/6, 46/10, 47/1, 47/9, 47/16, 48/3, 48/8, 48/19, 49/6, 49/16, 49/20, 50/5, 94/1 MR. SEIDENFELD 7/10 MR. SNIFFEN 7/5 MR. WHITE 7/25, 11/25 MR. WHITE 7/25, 11/25
Mr. Wright 5/5, 7/16, 8/2, 15/23, 15/25, 16/16, 17/10, 85/17, 85/18, 86/9, 86/14, 86/19, 89/12, 89/17, 90/7, 90/13, 90/17, 91/6, 91/19, 91/25, 92/3, 92/11, 92/19, 95/16, 95/22, 96/4, 96/12, 96/15, 97/16, 97/19, 97/23, 98/5, 98/8, 98/16, 98/21, 99/1, 99/21, 100/10, 102/19, 102/22, 103/25, 104/3, 104/12, 105/15, 106/12, 106/19, 102/19, 102/12, 103/25, 104/3, 104/12, 105/15, 106/12, 106/19, 102/19, 102/12, 103/25, 104/3, 104/12, 105/15, 106/12, 106/19, 102/12, 103/25, 104/3, 104/12, 105/15, 106/12, 106/19, 102/12, 103/25, 104/3, 104/12, 105/15, 106/12, 106/19, 102/12, 103/25, 104/3, 104/12, 105/15, 106/12, 106/19, 102/12, 103/25, 104/3, 104/12, 105/15, 106/12, 106/19, 102/12, 103/25, 104/19, 102/12, 103/15, 106/12, 105/19, 102/12, 103/15, 106/19, 102/12, 103/15, 104/19, 102/19, 102/12, 103/15, 104/19, 102/19, 102/12, 103/15, 104/19, 102/19, 102/12, 103/15, 104/19, 102/12, 103/15, 104/19, 102/19 106/8, 106/18, 107/8, 107/13, 107/23, 108/3, 109/11, 109/20, 109/25, 110/5, 110/8, 110/13, 110/18, 110/21, 111/2, 111/10, 111/18, 111/24, 112/7, 112/14, 112/23, 113/15, 113/19, 114/4, 114/6, 115/19, 116/9, 116/13, 116/20, 116/25, 117/5, 117/21, 118/11, 118/14, 119/6, 119/13, 120/2, 121/11, 122/3, 122/8, 122/11, 122/13, 123/10, 123/13, 124/2, 124/11, 124/15, 125/15, 125/19, 7, 126/5, 126/18, 126/19, 127/3, 128/3, 128/10, , 129/9, 129/22, 130/3, 130/15, 131/7, 131/18, 133/23, 131/24, 132/6, 132/23, 133/2, 133/12, 133/20, 133/23, 134/4, 134/21, 134/23, 135/1, 135/16, 135/21, 138/23, 136/23, 137/8, 137/12, 138/8, 138/16, 138/15, 138/15, 138/15, 138/15, 138/15, 138/15, 139/3, 139/36, 140/15, 140/22, 141/2, 141/15, 141/19, 141/22, 141/25, 142/9, 142/13, 142/25, 143/3 MS. HERSHEL 6/19 MS. JAYE 8/8 MS. KAMARAS 6/22

MS. PAUGH 6/7, 8/10, 8/14, 9/5, 9/12, 9/25, 10/6,

10/13, 11/4, 11/17, 12/4, 12/5, 12/15, 13/13, 14/2, 14/15, 15/15, 15/21, 16/9, 16/22 municipal 31/7, 34/3, 47/17, 93/3 Municipalities 33/13, 33/16, 49/2, 49/3 municipality 28/25, 33/4, 47/14, 47/23, 48/13, 48/14, 48/17 municipals 68/3

N

nail 73/24

name 81/17 named 43/14, 81/2: Namau 23/7, 23/12, 48/10, 55/10, 55/19, 57/6, 57/16, 58/8, 75/10, 75/18, 7:921, 75/22, 76/12, 76/25, 77/5, 77/13, 77/25, 78/24, '79/9, 79/14, 79/15, 79/18, 79/22, 79/23, 81/5, 81/13, 81/6, 82/7, 82/10, 82/12, 82/22, 83/5, 83/6, 83/8, 84/25, 102/24, 102/25, 103/2, 103/4, 103/16, 103/18, 103/2, 104/14, 104/15, 104/22, 105/18, 105/19, 110/3, 110/6, 110/19, 110/21, 110/22, 111/15, 111/16 Nassau's 56/7 Names 3 56/7
matural 36/14, 37/4, 42/23
meccasary 61/22, 80/11, 101/22, 114/16
meccasity 44/19, 44/22
meed 1/5, 6/10, 10/31, 18/16, 20/24, 21/5, 23/9, 23/11, 23/13, 24/15, 34/19, 24/24, 25/10, 25/11, 25/18, 25/19, 25/20, 25/24, 36/22, 26/25, 27/2, 27/17, 29/2, 30/19, 33/25, 34/11, 35/4, 35/14, 35/18, 35/20, 35/22, 36/6, 36/13, 36/22, 37/1, 37/9, 37/20, 37/21, 37/25, 38/9, 38/23, 39/11, 39/13, 39/17, 43/16, 44/1, 44/5, 45/4, 45/8, 45/15, 46/19, 47/4, 50/12, 51/9, 51/19, 51/20, 51/21, 51/24, 52/6, 52/7, 52/20, 52/25, 54/12, 55/14, 55/16, 56/2, 56/9, 56/15, 56/23, 57/1, 57/8, 57/9, 57/10, 58/6, 58/10, 58/11, 58/15, 58/16, 58/18, 58/20, 59/14, 60/3, 61/20, 62/20, 65/4, 67/24, 68/4, 68/15, 68/19, 68/23, 49/5, 69/11, 69/12, 69/22, 70/12, 70/13, 70/16, 70/21, 70/23, 70/25, 71/21, 72/6, 72/17, 73/5, 74/6, 74/8, 74/12, 75/9, 75/14, 75/23, 76/18, 76/22, 76/24, 77/1, 77/4, 77/7, 77/11, 77/12, 77/15, 78/17, 79/6, 79/7, 79/10, 79/20, 80/9, 80/15, 82/23, 83/2, 83/15, 83/23, 84/1, 84/7, 84/11, 84/12, 84/17, 84/21, 85/1, 85/3, 87/13, 88/14, 88/17, 102/11, 105/2, 106/11, 111/1, 111/9, 112/21, 114/7, 114/19, 115/9, 116/1, 117/2, 119/21, 119/25, 121/4, 121/5, 121/24, 122/4, 122/5, 122/15, 123/16, 124/4, 125/2, 125/7, 125/12, 125/23, 127/5, 127/6, 127/21, 130/1, 130/2, 130/4, 130/9, 130/10, 130/13, 130/14, 130/16, 130/18, 130/4, 130/9, 130/10, 130/13, 130/14, 130/16, 130/15, 130/23, 131/14, 132/15, 132/18, 132/19, 135/1, 135/1, 136/8, 137/4, 139/12, 139/19, 140/6, 141/5 needed 43/23, 50/8, 51/14, 52/4, 52/15, 57/20, 59/15, 59/23, 65/13, 67/8, 61/8, 68/12, 71/4, 71/17, 84/19, 113/5, 113/22, 113/24, 113/25, 114/11, 121/2, 126/24, 128/2, 128/4, 128/8, 128/11, 128/23, 129/7, 129/10, 129/13, 133/3, 133/4, 133/18 meeds 23/23, 24/1, 24/3, 24/5, 24/6, 26/16, 27/20, 27/24, 28/23, 51/17, 53/19, 53/25, 57/12, 57/25, 74/21, 80/11, 87/20, 113/4, 113/6, 113/7, 113/9, 114/3, 131/11, 131/25, 137/1 negotiated 50/1, 91/13, 91/18 Neither 75/6, 75/12, 76/12, 104/15, 105/18, 109/14 net 115/13, 118/4, 118/6 net 113/13, 1184, 11849 New 1/7, 1/8, 2/12, 2/13, 6/12, 7/8, 7/11, 7/19, 7/20, 28/21, 29/1, 29/21, 32/21, 32/24, 41/8, 46/11, 46/16, 50/14, 53/8, 59/14, 69/24, 70/1, 70/6, 70/17, 70/22, 71/6, 74/18, 75/6, 79/17, 79/24, 80/6, 31/2, 81/3, 81/11, 82/23, 83/5, 84/18, 87/23, 87/24, 88/7, 89/9, 91/11, 91/21, 93/3, 93/5, 93/9, 93/16, 93/17, 93/20, 99/2, 99/3, 100/23, 101/17, 101/19, 106/11, 106/14, 108/18, 112/17, 122/15, 123/2, 130/5, 132/1, 134/9, 138/25, 139/14, 140/7 non-utility 77/14, '19/9 nonetheless 17/16, 61/15, 109/18, 121/9 monfirm 27/19, 27/24 nonsense 43/3 nonutility 12/24, 13/2, 23/12, 76/25, 81/7, 83/22, 104/25 normally 92/20 North 43/7, 43/10, 43/11, 43/16, 44/7, 44/9, 44/10 mote 56/5 notice 6/6, 6/7, 11/15, 12/1, 29/15, 41/25, 43/9 notion 141/21 number 12/24, 13/1, 29/16, 33/2, 44/23, 55/1, 57/25, 72/5, 74/16, 114/14, 114/15, 114/16, 127/20 numbers 139/24

O

Oak 4/4
OASIS 101/5
objection 17/12, 17/21, 19/13
obligated 23/9, 23/16, 48/11, 76/22

obligation 24/2, 27/13, 35/21, 76/17, 79/20, 111/21 obligations 22/13, 27/25, 37/17, 41/10, 42/21 observed 54/9 obtain 64/22, 86/23 obtaining 44/15, 46/15, 46/18 obtains 21/8 occasion 54/25 occasioned 114/20 occasions 74/16 October 46/14, 46/17, 110/15 edds 84/5 Off-system 63/12, 66/24 offer 54/4, 87/14, 87/19, 111/11 offered 10/5 offering 117/10 Office 2/18 Officer 11/22 Official 1/23 omission 51/17 open 42/6, 101/5, 131/16, 131/21, 133/18, 135/11, opening 18/20, 19/5 opening 18/20, 19/5 operate 31/15, 32/20, 32/22, 47/23, 96/23 operates 13/1, 31/9, 119/14 operating 22/24, 28/8, 32/9, 32/17, 32/18, 32/25, 33/12, 47/11, 48/3, 48/6, 48/7, 49/5, 89/1, 96/17 operation 29/6, 114/25, 115/12 operations 93/24, 94/15 opinion 18/9, 20/23, 21/16, 120/24, 140/13 opponents 86/21, 87/17, 99/5, 120/22 opportunities 13/4 opportunity 10/8, 13/9, 19/18, 46/24, 67/12, 121/23 opposed 24/25, 56/2, 142/18 opposing 112/25 opposite 73/1, 107/1 opposition 15/14, 15/17 ted **80/22** option 30/11, 30/13, 30/15, 134/1 options 103/19 Oral 5/4, 5/5, 10/18, 10/24, 15/22, 16/4, 75/17, 81/15 Order 10/20, 10/22, 11/21, 12/3, 14/22, 16/7, 16/10, 51/23, 52/19, 53/14, 54/24, 55/2, 55/4, 55/11, 56/12, 57/5, 75/17, 83/21, 103/2, 104/23, 104/24, 105/16, 105/17, 105/20, 105/21, 107/16, 110/3, 110/23, 110/24, 111/2, 111/3, 111/4, 111/9, 111/11, 129/13, 130/2, 130/3 orders 55/1, 109/12, 111/13 organization 11/21 organizing 93/7 originally 22/12, 36/7 outcome 70/1 outfall 141/1 eutput 32/23, 102/3, 102/4, 103/15, 106/15, 106/20, 112/8, 112/10, 122/23, 133/10 outstanding 12/13 overflow 26/20 overturn 104/6 owned 101/17 owns 12/24, 13/1, 31/9

P

P.A 2/18, 3/15 Pages 1/11 Pahokee \$1/22, \$2/1 paid 123/21 panoply 93/14 papers 43/1, 93/7, 131/15 paragraph 53/17, 54/8, 58/16, 58/17, 58/22, 59/1, 78/9, 78/13, 83/9, 83/11, 104/17 paragraphs 58/16, 58/21 paraphrase 15/6 parcel 20/12 pari 94/23 parse 120/22 arses 38/2 Parsons 2/3, 7/17 part 16/3, 26/12, 22/12, 22/17, 25/17, 35/5, 35/19, 36/11, 37/2, 40/25, 62/7, 65/25, 72/25, 107/18, 111/21, 116/23, 120/15, 125/15, 128/11, 139/21 parte 8/16, 8/24, 8/25, 9/3 participate 13/9, 135/12 participated 17/4 participation 16/2 parties 8/19, 9/15, 9/20, 9/22, 10/3, 14/22, 15/18, 17/3, 17/8, 18/2, 18/5, 19/17, 51/25 Partners 81/23 **Partnership** party 14/24, 19/4, 77/7, \$1/22, 109/10, 132/14 ass 51/24 passage 54/8, 55/3, 77/8, 79/3 assages 79/4 assed 34/24, 63/15 passing 52/2

natients 138/9 PATRICK 2/10, 8/3 patterned 34/10, 38/16 PAUGH 4/2, 8/10 pause 51/24 71/23, 100/16, 101/23, 102/6, 102/8, 106/10, 2, 124/17, 124/19, 133/25, 136/6 payor 138/9 Peddler 15/7 pending 7/13, 9/17, 10/11, 10/13 Peninsular 25/24, 26/4, 26/20, 56/24, 57/2, 57/22, 57/23, 58/15, 58/18, 68/23, 102/5, 113/7, 129/14, 130/21, 130/23, 131/5, 131/11, 132/11 Peninsular-specific 67/18 Penney 70/14 perceive 65/22 period 141/12 periods 103/15 permissible 22/4 permit 21/4, 33/9, 48/25, 102/3, 133/13 permitted 31/17, 33/4, 33/13, 33/15, 33/21, 39/8, 47/12 permitting 29/24, 45/22, 46/24, 120/15 perspective 73/4, 73/5, 92/12, 119/16 Petersburg 2/16, 2/18 petition 1/5, 6/10, 11/20, 12/1, 12/14, 21/11, 22/1, 30/10, 44/4, 30/20, 50/23, 51/8, 51/13, 57/15, 58/14, 58/22, 75/5, 78/4, 78/14, 81/13, 81/14, 84/4, 84/14, 85/5, 108/11, 134/7 petition's 57/11 petitioned 75/9 Petitioners 7/18, 7/22, 8/5, 58/13, 87/23, 88/2, 88/4, 89/5, 99/2 petitions 12/7, 13/8, 75/21, 77/21 philosophy 69/17, 74/11, 115/19 phrase 44/22, 99/11 physical 118/17 PLACE 1/19, 6/8, 33/9, 33/24, 50/13, 61/17, 102/17, 107/19, 137/9 placed 42/21, 60/11, 60/13, 63/1, 71/10 places 60/17 Plan 20/11, 22/7, 22/10, 22/13, 23/22, 25/9, 25/15, 25/23, 26/4, 35/25, 36/1, 37/6, 41/11, 42/20, 71/4, 89/14, 89/15, 89/22, 90/24, 91/2, 94/11 ning 22/14, 25/19, 41/9, 41/10, 42/20, 57/24, , 93/23, 94/15, 111/11 Pians 22/21, 24/19, 26/12, 90/10, 126/8
plant 1/6, 6/11, 12/25, 20/10, 21/5, 22/2, 22/7, 22/9, 24/4, 24/13, 25/16, 28/24, 29/5, 29/19, 31/17, 32/9, 32/22, 33/10, 33/12, 34/11, 34/15, 34/22, 35/18, 36/9, 37/5, 37/11, 37/13, 37/24, 38/1, 38/10, 38/13, 38/16, 39/4, 40/4, 40/16, 41/2, 41/11, 42/6, 42/19, 43/14, 39/4, 40/4, 40/16, 41/2, 41/11, 42/6, 42/19, 43/14, 43/20, 43/22, 43/23, 45/22, 45/22, 45/25, 46/2, 46/3, 46/14, 46/17, 46/21, 47/2, 49/9, 39/9, 50/12, 51/12, 53/1, 55/6, 55/7, 56/21, 59/14, 59/15, 59/20, 61/8, 61/8, 62/12, 64/18, 65/15, 66/18, 67/6, 62/12, 69/23, 71/11, 71/15, 71/16, 71/20, 72/19, 75/8, 79/17, 80/16, 80/17, 80/20, 80/21, 80/22, 80/24, 83/19, 84/13, 84/21, 84/24, 85/3, 88/18, 88/19, 88/20, 94/22, 99/18, 106/10, 113/5, 113/21, 113/24, 114/12, 114/25, 115/13, 117/20, 119/21, 122/6, 122/10, 122/25, 123/1, 125/5, 126/24, 126/25, 127/7, 128/2, 129/2, 129/6, 129/10, 129/13, 130/18, 132/7, 136/9, 136/17, 138/23, 139/13, 139/25, 140/4, 140/5, 140/19, 141/6, 141/16 plant's 106/15 plants 22/20, 23/19, 23/24, 27/22, 30/1, 32/6, 35/12, 49/15, 49/16, 49/21, 50/7, 50/14, 59/12, 59/23, 60/2, 60/3, 75/11, 114/2, 114/9, 114/15, 114/16, 115/18, 117/4, 117/24, 118/21, 127/20, 139/19, 140/11, 140/17, 140/25 played 43/6 pleading 14/3, 59/24, 113/3 pleadings 114/24 pleasure 142/25 plunk 135/14 Plus 86/15, 93/24 pockets 67/23 oint 22/8, 25/21, 27/2, 37/20, 38/1, 38/10, 52/5. 51/3, 62/2, 67/3, 67/16, 92/22, 97/15, 99/1, 105/25, 106/6, 111/12, 115/22, 117/2, 119/9, 120/3, 121/17, 122/13, 136/22, 136/24, 140/16 pointed 65/11, 94/1 1 51/18, 52/3 y 70/18, 85/23, 88/9, 107/17, 114/19 portion 11/6, 11/11 posed 86/1, 137/14 position 42/25, 43/2, 54/11, 56/13, 79/18, 81/12, 82/22, 107/23, 110/16, 115/11, 127/2, 130/16, 135/15 positions 19/18 possibility 126/25 ossible 62/4, 64/22, 119/2, 121/12

Post 2/18

posthearing 10/6

POTAMI 1/22 potential 66/6, 141/9 power 1/6, 1/8, 2/13, 2/15, 2/19, 3/13, 6/10, 6/13, 6/17, 6/25, 7/1, 7/19, 12/25, 16/11, 16/23, 19/11, 19/12, 20/10, 22/7, 2:1/9, 23/23, 23/24, 24/1, 24/13. 19/12, 20/10, 22/7, 21/9, 23/23, 23/24, 24/1, 24/13, 25/15, 26/19, 26/12, 26/24, 27/9, 27/10, 27/14, 27/19, 27/24, 28/15, 38/24, 29/18, 31/21, 31/25, 32/9, 32/14, 32/17, 32/18, 32/20, 32/25, 33/3, 33/6, 33/10, 33/12, 33/15, 33/20, 33/21, 34/11, 34/15, 34/22, 36/8, 37/5, 37/10, 37/13, 37/24, 38/1, 38/10, 38/13, 38/16, 39/4, 40/3, 44/16, 41/2, 41/11, 42/19, 43/14, 43/15, 44/3, 44/13, 44/15, 44/18, 45/21, 45/21, 45/24, 46/1, 46/3, 46/13, 46/17, 46/21, 47/7, 47/9, 47/24, 48/2, 50/4, 50/9, 50/11, 50/18, 51/22, 52/8, 52/9, 53/13, 54/1, 54/13, 54/14, 54/20, 55/6, 55/10, 55/19, 56/16, 56/21, 57/6, 57/16, 58/8, 58/23, 59/2, 59/12, 59/14, 59/20, 60/2, 60/3, 61/11, 62/11, 64/18, 64/22, 65/3, 66/15, 66/11, 66/13, 66/14, 67/6, 67/11, 68/8, 66/12, 65/15, 66/11, 66/13, 66/14, 67/6, 67/11, 68/8, 68/12, 69/23, 71/11, 71/15, 71/19, 72/19, 74/10, 74/20, 75/10, 75/11, 75/12, 75/13, '77/5, 77/11, 77/13, 77/17, 77/25, 78/16, 78/24, 79/15, 79/17, 79/23, 80/16, 80/17, 80/20, 80/21, 81/10, 81/14, 81/23, 81/24, 81/25, 82/3, 82/7, 82/10, 82/14, 83/19, 84/21, 84/23, 84/25, 85/3, 86/20, 86/21, 88/7, 88/18, 88/20, 91/11, 91/13, 91/15, 91/20, 92/21, 92/25, 93/10, 93/13, 94/22, 97/2, 97/3, 97/4, 97/18, 97/25, 96/9, 91/21, 99/17, 100/17, 101/15, 101/16, 102/3, 103/13, 107/6, 106/13, 106/16, 106/18, 106/19, 106/21, 108/22, 109/21, 110/22, 111/15, 111/16, 111/22, 112/15, 113/5, 113/10, 113/11, 113/21, 114/9, 114/12, 114/14, 114/15, 114/16, 114/25, 115/13, 117/4, 117/11, 117/24, 117/25, 118/21, 118/25, 119/1, 119/21, 122/5, 122/17, 122/25, 123/1, 123/3, 123/9, 124/8, 125/4, 126/7, 126/10, 126/13, 126/16, 126/18, 126/24, 126/25, 127/1, 127/20, 128/1, 129/6, 130/5, 130/17, 130/20, 131/10, 134/6, 134/9, 134/15, 135/15, 136/1, 136/16, 137/7, 137/15, 139/5, 139/13, 139/25, 140/4, 141/6, 141/15 powers 32/3, 94/13 PPSA 41/8 practice 13/23, 13/24, 55/13, 56/1, 72/15 precedent 37/10, 47/6, 59/19, 84/9 precedude 65/1, 80/10 precludes 80/13 precondition 46/20, 61/21 predicated 92/24 preempted 30/24 preemption 85/24 Precisiting 45/10
Prehearing 10/20, 11/21, 16/7, 16/10, 17/5
preliminary 8/12, 17/1 premised 84/14 premises 99/22 prepared 142/2 preparing 17/6 prerogative 21/15 prescribe 31/23, 31/24, 94/5 prescribes 94/23 presentation 15/5, 17/19, 22/15, 36/9, 142/11 presenting 85/20, 85/22 preserve 54/21, 85/8 president 13/18 presuming 55/14, 56/2, 58/20 presumption 58/25, 59/3 pretty 19/12, 116/3 prevent 114/8 price 54/3, 62/4, 8:\/1, 101/7, 101/8, 132/22, 133/13 prices 118/23 pricing 111/12 priori 114/10 private 33/6, 33/14, 42/4, 47/23, 48/20, 48/24 privates 68/4 pro 101/15, 101/20 problem 118/19, 121/6 procedural 11/1, 41/1 Procedure 14/19, 74/21 Precedurely 8/22 proceed 19/12, 80/23, 86/23, 87/11, 88/10 proceeding 6/4, 6/5, 8/21, 11/7, 11/14, 14/21, 22/4, 23/11, 28/11, 35/20, 39/17, 43/22, 44/2, 46/21, 57/9, 75/23, 76/24, 77/8, 77/13, 78/18, 79/7, 88/17, 102/14, 125/2, 125/9, 141/5 PROCEEDINGS 1/12, 83/22 process \$/24, 20/24, 74/17, 74/18, 77/11, \$4/10, 120/16, 127/24, 129/14, 134/2, 135/3, 135/4, 135/6, 135/16, 135/18, 138/11, 139/7 134/2 procurement produce 107/6 producer 44/13, 74/20, 77/17, 108/13, 108/17 producers 54/1, 74/10 producing 50/3, 66/12 product 100/1, 100/2 Professor 85/23, 85/25 profit 119/11

progress 42/17 progression 42/23 prohibited 29/21 prehibition 48/23, 50/10 Project 32/18, 32/26, 32/25, 33/6, 33/20, 33/22, 47/8, 47/24, 48/2, 58/12, 59/1, 72/23, 72/24, 73/3, 81/14, 81/17, 81/24, 82/1, 86/22, 87/1, 87/13, 88/7, 99/5, 102/4, 106/21, 112/8, 112/10, 112/25, 117/9, 122/25, 123/1, 130/5, 130/20, 131/10, 132/3, 133/10, 136/2, 136/5, 136/14 projects 13/2, 13/3, 47/10, 54/2, 103/15 promise 16/18 promote 35/9 promoting 35/23 propose 20/5, 27/22, 133/16, 140/4 proposed \$/1, 35/18, 53/1, 56/21, 60/17, 81/3, 88/6, 88/18, 99/17, 105/23, 122/5, 127/7, 131/10 proposing 32/21, 139/4, 139/8 proposition 107/1, 109/8 protect 62/1, 62/3, 72/21, 73/1, 125/16, 133/24, 135/17, 135/18, 138/8 protected 59/23, 117/16 protecting 125/14, 126/21 Protection 83/18 prove 58/3, 133/6, 133/8, 135/3, 135/7 provide 11/2, 11/16, 23/21, 26/21, 27/14, 27/22, 30/22, 49/13, 58/23, 58/24, 61/11, 73/22, 80/6, 89/19, 89/20, 113/5, 113/9, 113/10, 117/10, 129/16 provider 53/12 providers 49/15, 54/20 provides 3/13, 36/14, 36/14, 37/3, 123/1 provision 26/24, 35/4, 36/6, 36/13, 36/22, 37/1, 37/9, 37/25, 38/10, 39/11, 59/17, 112/20, 112/23 provisions 20/8, 21/19, 25/2, 25/10, 41/2, 50/12, 79/23 prudence 92/20, 100/17, 123/18 prudent 123/23 PSC 56/3, 56/9, 56/23 PSC's 56/1, 56/18 PSC-92-1210-FOF-EQ 75/17 PUBLIC 1/1, 4/3, 11/2, 11/6, 11/10, 11/16, 12/23, 15/4, 22/23, 23/18, 24/18, 29/18, 30/20, 36/15, 37/4, 43/10, 43/16, 44/6, 44/19, 44/22, 44/23, 44/24, 45/2, 45/4, 45/15, 47/4, 48/23, 72/18, 81/9, 82/1, 88/25, 93/9, 95/20, 96/16, 108/17, 108/19, 108/21, 109/20, 112/15, 140/1 purchase 27/9, 27/10, 66/13, 78/17, 100/11, 101/1, 103/14, 111/22 uses 190/12, 123/6, 123/18 purchasing 30/15, 51/22, 52/8, 54/13, 57/10, 64/1, 64/13, 68/18, 74/7, 77/6, 82/24, 92/11, 100/13, 112/13, 112/22, 123/7, 123/20 pure 21/2, 53/4, 53/6 purpose 15/2, 36/22, 35/6, 114/1, 114/7, 119/24 urposes 31/22, 36/11, 36/25, 39/10, 51/21, 52/6, 54/11, 56/15, 82/8, 115/2, 119/23 put 61/3, 62/5, 70/20, 70/24, 73/21, 99/22, 123/8, 123/15, 124/7, 134/9, 134/11, 134/15, 134/20, 135/8, 136/10, 136/14 putting 23/17, 119/23, 141/21

Q

QF 54/2
QFs 74/10, 103/12, 112/9
Qualified 16/15, 12/17, 13/11, 13/15, 14/4
quality 13/16
quality 115/1, 115/14
quarter 124/21
questiom 9/18, 10/1, 15/24, 15/25, 21/6, 21/13, 25/8, 30/1, 49/11, 62/11, 62/12, 66/1, 70/3, 71/2, 71/7, 71/9, 71/13, 75/2, 90/2, 83/12, 83/24, 90/7, 90/15, 90/17, 7165/12, 115/20, 119/15, 119/19, 120/24, 124/13, 128/16, 128/18, 129/23, 131/8, 131/10, 131/19, 132/18, 133/14, 133/17, 141/4
questions 9/6, 14/8, 15/19, 20/16, 45/18, 49/19, 85/12, 86/14, 100/15, 128/15, 142/1, 142/12, 143/5
quicker 136/17
quote 22/22, 24/19, 24/20, 30/23, 31/7, 31/21, 32/4, 35/15, 33/19, 36/3, 36/11, 40/25, 43/20, 43/21, 52/10, 53/18, 54/11, 55/3, 57/19, 75/21, 81/7, 117/14
quoting 23/7, 75/19

r

railing 9/14
raised 50/19, \$4/3
rate 31/24, \$6/10, \$7/8, \$7/11, 71/12, 71/22, 73/6, 91/12, 92/23, 93/1, 93/14, 94/5, 100/7, 102/7, 119/23, 125/16, 140/18
ratepayer 41/17, \$5/23, 72/22, 117/11, 128/13, 128/16, 128/17, 128/19, 128/22, 132/16

ratepayers 41/21, 59/22, 59/23, 60/5, 60/10, 60/15, 60/17, 60/21, 61/3, 62/1, 62/3, 62/3, 63/1, 63/14, 63/16, 64/9, 65/19, 65/20, 66/4, 66/17, 66/19, 67/4, 67/13, 71/22, 73/2, 114/8, 115/4, 116/22, 117/16, 117/18, 117/19, 119/3, 125/14, 126/21, 127/15, 129/8, 18, 133/7, 133/24, 135/17, 135/19, 136/5, 136/7, 7, 130/2, 139/6, 139/9 Trucs 72/25, 91/13, 91/17, 91/20, 93/12, 140/2, 140/8 rational \$2/17, 124/23 rationale 77/18 Raymond 3/15. 7/6 re 6/9 re-cover 142/20 reached 119/9 read 6/6, 17/25, 77/19, 83/9, 94/23, 99/19, 104/17, 113/1, 129/5 reading 41/22, 78/7 reads 36/24, 38/3, 53/18, 88/15 reason 14/24, 29/8, 61/25, 62/8, 62/20, 75/5, 84/12, 100/16, 128/15, 133/23 reasonable 42/14, 53/1, 101/8, 113/8, 114/11, 117/9, 123/23, 124/4, 127/7, 129/16, 130/24, 131/13, 133/4 reasoned 55/5, 76/5, 79/6 reasoning 78/4, 78/15, 82/20 reasons 71/19, 77/20, 85/4 rebuttal 19/7, 85/9, 86/16 receive 12/2, 87/11 received 11/1, 11/3, 11/4, 11/25, 12/1, 45/1, 89/18 receives 44/24 recess \$5/14 recommend 8/18, 12/15, 12/16
recommendation 14/2, 14/17, 15/10
record 8/21, 8/23, 9/1, 9/2, 11/12, 11/15, 19/19, 85/17, 140/2 Records 12/8 recovery 60/11, 71/24, 141/7 reduce 35/10 reducing 38/12 redundant 17/15, 19/23 Reeves 2/7, 7/23 reference 24/21, 34/14, 36/3, 57/1 reflect 11/12, 11/15 reflected 16/5, 41/9 pellects 29/12 nal 72/8 late 54/5, 54/22 regulated 22/23, 27/6, 28/5, 28/7, 28/9, 28/12, 28/15, 28/16, 29/7, 29/11, 31/5, 31/14, 32/8, 34/23, 41/20, 71/9, 71/14, 73/13, 73/15, 81/8, 82/5, 82/9, 88/25, **89/10, 89/13, 93/6, 95/2, 96/16, 99/13, 108/22** regulates 26/14, 29/14 regulation 26/10, 29/10, 30/23, 31/2, 31/3, 31/18, 37/7, 42/23, 50/11, 82/2, 88/8, 93/1, 93/15, 94/24, 98/14, 98/17 regulations 25/3 regulatory 87/25, 88/4, 93/11, 93/22, 94/17, 97/5, 123/19, 128/24 reject 56/7 relate 41/12 related 119/19 relates 130/12 reliability 52/24, 59/16, 73/9, 114/17, 116/3, 120/7, 127/5, 127/12, 129/15, 130/22, 131/12, 133/3 reliable 118/24, 123/3 relied 27/15 relies 37/15 rely 26/2, 26/20, 27/20, 27/23, 31/5, 69/2, 69/3 relying 29/17, 33/23 remainder 77/19 remand 104/6 remarks 18/20, 19/6 remember 38/14, 58/8, 58/19, 62/15, 108/7 render 58/12 rendered 56/22 renewal 103/19 replaced 63/22 report 34/9 RÉPORTED 1/21 Reporter 1/23 Reporting 1/22 represent 13/20 Representative 10/15, 11/18, 12/18, 13/12, 13/16,

esented \$1/13, 109/13

representing 3/16, 6/20, 6/22, 7/1, 7/4, 7/7, 7/8, 7/11

request 14/22, 14/24, 17/2, 17/17, 38/22, 45/16, 88/15

require 17/8, 31/25, 45/9, 52/23, 56/9, 116/16

required 23/13, 27/18, 56/23, 77/1, 77/15, 79/10, 102/9, 102/10, 121/5

requirement 44/16, 56/22, 69/22, 99/14, 113/13, 122/21

requirements 14/4, 14/19, 20/11, 22/8, 22/11, 50/24, 59/9, 93/15, 94/3, 94/8, 113/3, 120/17

requires 26/15, 31/16, 36/1, 44/19, 56/20, 73/22, 116/13, 120/15 requiring 119/21 resale 100/14, 117/14 reserve 19/6, 24/19, 26/1, 26/2, 26/19, 83/12, 83/24, 100/5, 116/4, 118/18, 121/2, 129/14, 137/20 erves 132/13 resolve 74/24 resources 27/1, 27/3, 27/19, 27/21, 27/23, 59/13 respect 80/5, 94/14, 115/3, 130/7, 137/14 respects 28/4, 81/5 respond 8/20, 9/21, 9/22, 10/4, 16/12, 19/5 responded 55/18 responding 8/25, 142/12 response 11/11, 100/11, 100/15, 113/3, 127/2, 127/3 responsibilities 56/4, 59/5 responsibility 26/7, 58/21, 72/21, 73/6, 84/25, 125/8, 126/20, 126/22 rest 84/9, 103/3, 103/10, 142/22 restate 54/25, 79/1 restated 112/4 restrict 83/17 restricted 38/17 rests 39/6 result 43/4, 115/13 results 31/19 remile 31/19
retail 23/18, 24/6, :/4/14, 24/21, 25/13, 25/20, 26/10, 27/7, 27/8, 29/14, 32/5, 34/5, 34/22, 35/8, 35/21, 35/22, 36/4, 36/6, 37/4, 37/8, 37/18, 37/19, 38/11, 38/17, 39/10, 39/19, 41/12, 42/21, 42/24, 43/6, 43/18, 44/6, 48/12, 49/13, 49/14, 58/24, 61/10, 94/4, 94/6, 94/9, 97/18, 98/17, 98/18, 99/11, 111/21, 116/1, 117/13, 119/23, 132/16 return 71/12, 71/23 reveals 33/2 revenue 64/7, 64/8, 64/10, 66/20 review 20/19, 77/22, 92/20, 100/18, 104/4 reviewed 14/16, 89/14, 89/16 reviewing 76/2 revisers 40/19 rhetorically 124/3 risk 43/21, 60/11, 60/13, 60/14, 60/18, 61/4, 61/6, 63/1, 63/10, 63/17, 64/17, 65/23, 66/4, 70/20, 71/10, 71/17, 82/15, 84/18, 138/20, 138/22, 139/13, 139/14 ROBERT 2/2, 3/14, 7/5, 7/16 role 43/7, 94/24 Room 1/19 round 90/9 RPR 1/21, 1/22 rubber-stamp 54/2 Rule 14/4, 14/5, 14/20, 21/11, 39/15, 73/20, 84/10, 134/9, 134/14 ruled 11/24, 12/12, 30/10 Rules 14/19, 50/24, 106/22, 112/24, 121/20, 135/6, 136/11 ruling 16/3, 21/23, 86/11, 106/16 rulings 106/19 run 58/7, 63/21, 66/16, 92/14, 117/21, 117/23, 118/24, 119/2, 140/17 running 100/5, 140/8 rural 31/8 RUTHE 1/22

8

saddled 135/19 safeguard 129/7, 129/12, 129/13 sale 44/15, 90/19, 91/14, 91/20 sales 63/11, 63/12, 63/15, 66/6, 66/8, 66/10, 66/24, 75/11, 91/13, 94/6, 190/24, 101/3 sand 76/25 SANTA 3/21, 7/14 SASSO 2/17, 6/24 satisfactory 102/2 satisfy 24/6, 120/18 saturated 119/11 Save 12/1, 12/5 savings 122/18, 123/3 scenario 105/22, 132/24, 137/14, 139/23, 140/14 Schedule 91/12, 92/23 Schef 16/18, 86/3, 92/17, 108/25, 120/6, 132/10, 136/13, 142/15, 142/17 SCHEFFEL 2/2, 7/16 scheme 38/6, 74/15, 77/9 scope 38/12, 62/8, 95/10 Sears 70/13 season 133/18, 137/3, 137/24, 137/25 cend 28/6, 32/7, 52/5, 53/18, 53/24, 59/7, 78/12, 81/20, 82/12, 106/11, 114/1, 143/7 Secretary 13/20 Section 23/3, 35/4, 36/6, 36/7, 36/10, 38/21, 39/18, 41/6, 41/7, 45/1, 47/2, 47/5, 51/19, 52/21, 52/23,

56/13, 56/19, 57/7, 68/2, 75/16, 75/23, 78/22, 83/16, 88/2, 88/13, 88/19, 88/20, 88/23, 93/18, 96/12, 99/10, ection-by-section 41/5 Sections 36/25, 88/5, 94/17 secure 61/15, 68/15 seek 58/14, 83/23 seeking 30/8, 30/17, 54/21 seeks 24/5, 30/13, 51/8, 100/24 SEIDENFELD 2/6, 7/10 Seindenfeld 25/23 seize \$3/7 self-generation \$3/12 self-generator 83/25 sell 32/22, 33/21, 45/10, 45/12, 67/12, 92/5, 92/8, 90/18, 100/1, 117/25 selling 50/4, 64/2, 64/6, 64/14, 66/7, 66/8, 66/15, 93/8 sells 66/16, 90/10 Senator 8/16, 9/10, 10/3 senior 13/17 sense 21/22, 26/15, 32/12, 32/15, 47/10, 121/4, 126/23 sensitive 71/5 sentence 56/5, 83/8, 83/9, 104/16 separate 50/19
sequence 96/19
series 67/25, 68/1, 68/11, 126/12, 140/5
serve 14/24, 23/9, 23/10, 23/13, 23/17, 23/18, 24/2, 24/25, 26/16, 35/21, 37/7, 37/18, 41/13, 45/2, 48/12, 76/17, 76/22, 76/23, 77/1, 77/11, 77/15, 79/8, 79/10, 79/19, 79/21, 94/6, 94/11, 94/12, 105/1, 105/23, 116/1, 121/2, 131/25 served 18/7, 25/11, 35/8 served' 24/20 serves 25/12, 27/6, 99/11 SERVICE 1/1, 4/3, 24/18, 24/21, 25/5, 26/11, 34/4, 34/5, 36/2, 36/4, 37/8, 47/4, 49/13, 58/24, 60/4, 72/18, 89/20, 94/9, 100/25, 101/4, 136/17 Services 4/3 serving 94/4, 117/13 set 6/8, 10/18, 16/9, 55/6 setting 58/2, 72/9, 73/6 settles 105/12 share 53/19, 53/24 Sheehan 3/15, 7/7 shift 69/15 shifting 61/6 shifts 60/14 shopping 70/6, 70/10, 70/22, 71/6, 71/18 short 15/10, 58/5, 101/5, 118/24, 119/2 short-term 101/3, 101/4, 101/10, 102/7 shortfall 27/15 Show 15/19, 45/3, 45/4, 45/8, 50/22, 82/23, 96/11. 130/9 shows \$3/11 Shumard 4/4 side 17/6, 18/17, 18/22, 19/2, 19/13, 87/14 sides 17/9 sighted \$7/18 signature 93/20 signed 68/8, 69/6 significance 20/8 mple 84/11, 102/25 simple 84/11, 102/25 Site 20/11, 22/7, 22/10, 22/13, 22/20, 23/22, 24/13, 24/19, 25/9, 25/15, 25/23, 35/25, 37/6, 37/10, 41/11, 42/20, 39/12, 39/14, 39/15, 39/22, 90/10, 90/24, 91/2 Siting 20/10, 22/7, 22/9, 22/20, 25/16, 28/24, 29/19, 32/10, 33/10, 33/12, 34/7, 34/8, 34/11, 34/12, 34/15, 34/22, 36/9, 37/5, 37/11, 37/14, 37/24, 30/1, 30/10, 34/22, 36/9, 37/5, 37/11, 37/14, 37/24, 30/1, 30/10, 38/13, 38/15, 38/16, 39/4, 40/3, 40/4, 40/6, 40/15, 40/16, 41/2, 41/3, 41/11, 42/19, 45/22, 45/24, 46/2, 46/3, 46/21, 50/9, 50/12, 51/6, 51/21, 52/7, 52/23, 53/5, 53/7, 53/11, 54/12, 54/18, 55/6, 56/4, 56/8 56/15, 59/10, 61/13, 62/8, 62/10, 62/16, 65/8, 66/1, 67/6, 69/21, 71/20, 72/19, 74/4, 76/9, 76/11, 76/17, 77/3, 78/18, 79/22, 79/25, 80/21, 80/23, 81/8, 83/18, 83/19, 84/5, 84/6, 84/9, 84/10, 84/24, 88/19, 88/20, 88/23, 94/22, 94/25, 95/15, 96/25, 96/23, 106/23, 113/21, 114/12, 114/18, 115/6, 115/8, 115/15, 119/21, 125/18, 127/16, 127/23, 127/24, 128/4, 129/24 situated 24/11 situation 42/8, 43/13, 60/8, 61/13 six 50/19, 76/10 size 46/4, 49/22 sledge 30/16 Smith 2/17 Smyrna 1/7, 1/8, 2/12, 2/13, 6/12, 6/13, 7/9, 7/12, 7/19, 7/26, 28/21, 29/1, 29/21, 32/21, 32/24, 53/8, 75/6, 79/17, 79/24, 80/6, 81/2, 81/4, 81/11, 82/23, 83/5, 84/18, 87/23, 87/24, 88/7, 89/9, 91/11, 91/21, 93/3, 93/5, 93/9, 93/16, 93/17, 93/20, 99/3, 100/24, 101/17, 101/19, 106/12, 106/14, 108/18, 112/17, 122/16, 123/2, 130/5, 132/1, 139/14

SNIFFEN 3/14, 7/5

So.2d 15/7 sold 69/5, 91/23, 97/17, 98/3, 98/4 sort 26/12, 113/20, 124/3, 124/25, 125/9, 132/12, 138/24, 141/20 sought 105/1 76/20 .ds 68/5 Buurce 27/5 sources 27/11 South 2/9, 2/21, 3/11, 3/15 Southeast 96/9 speculation 125/5 spedifically 66/22 speed 136/2 spend 76/2, 142/20 spending 142/18 split 66/23 Staff 4/5, 8/7, 8/9, 8/11, 9/11, 14/16, 34/9, 40/24, 41/14, 42/1, 42/3, 96/10, 117/15, 120/6 Staff's 14/2, 14/17, 15/10, 111/14 stage 128/1 standard 20/19, 20/24, 54/4, 104/3, 111/11 standing 24/12, 129/21 standpoint 59/16 start 11/14, 12/14, 20/19, 135/14 started 72/5, 76/7, 136/15 State 2/5, 2/6, 7/11, 13/3, 13/15, 14/23, 15/1, 20/1, 22/3, 24/22, 25/20, 26/8, 26/22, 29/9, 30/24, 31/2, 31/11, 31/18, 32/5, 34/19, 39/8, 42/6, 42/24, 50/2, 50/25, 51/2, 51/11, 53/13, 54/7, 54/20, 54/23, 58/25, 59/12, 59/13, 60/21, 63/16, 64/3, 65/17, 67/20, 68/14, 70/7, 70/10, 73/15, 73/16, 80/18, 85/21, 85/22, 88/8, 88/3, 88/13, 91/8, 96/24, 99/13, 113/9, 113/18, 114/14, 114/19, 116/2, 118/4, 118/6, 121/3, 124/7, 138/9, 140/5 state's 29/13, 53/19, 53/24, 87/21 statement 29/11, 42/1, 125/16 states 14/20, 88/11, 97/1, 97/4, 97/8, 118/25 statewide 44/1, 56/24, 58/10, 58/18 Status 14/5, 14/10, 34/1 Status 14/5, 14/10, 34/1 Statute 8/19, 21/22, 21/24, 24/17, 28/6, 28/8, 28/17, 29/22, 32/25, 33/1, 36/5, 47/10, 47/11, 48/5, 72/14, 72/16, 82/14, 94/19, 95/23, 96/10, 97/1, 99/8, 99/12, 99/16, 103/6, 103/8, 104/8, 106/4, 108/5, 114/7, 114/13, 114/17, 115/23, 120/13, 122/22, 125/17, 127/4, 7, 127/18, 129/5, 135/2 .tes 33/18, 37/17, 40/17, 50/25, 72/9, 75/24, 83/16, 93/5, 93/18, 94/18, 99/5, 99/6, 112/24, 120/19, statutory 19/24, 21/6, 21/19, 23/8, 23/16, 25/2, 56/4, 58/20, 74/14, 76/21, 88/11 stay 74/11 steam 46/12 Steel 3/10, 6/16 Steen 2/8 step 104/10, 104/11 Steve 7/8 STEVEN 2/5 stood 43/24, 44/1 straighten 100/22 strained 38/5 stranded 64/16, 140/20, 141/3, 141/7, 141/9 stream 64/7, 64/8, 66/20 Street 2/9, 2/21, 3/11, 3/16, 3/18, 3/22 strike 10/20, 10/24 strikes 121/6 struck 124/25 structure 31/24, 94/5 stuck 138/3 study 101/21 stuff 140/3 sub 82/2 Subject 7/13, 16/2, 82/2, 88/18, 93/1, 93/10, 93/21, 94/3, 94/7, 94/9, 94/16, 98/14, 98/16, 99/18, 100/17, 103/16, 103/18, 111/15, 120/5, 141/13 submit 23/22, 35/2, 115/2, 115/14, 117/8, 120/12, 121/15, 130/20, 130/25, 139/6 submitting 131/3 subsidiaries 12/23, 12/24 substantive 14/11, 46/20 substation 101/17 substitute 40/14 substituted 39/5 red 65/13 cient 26/1, 50/21 suitable 26/5 Suite 3/7, 3/11, 3/18 summer 90/25 superfluous 124/8, 125/10, 125/24 supplied 53/25 supplier 92/15 supply 39/2, 118/25, 119/1 support 29/1, 30/18, 120/23 Supreme 20/3, 21/21, 51/5, 55/11, 55/17, 57/6,

57/16, 59/4, 69/10, 74/4, 74/16, 76/3, 77/2, 77/24, 79/23, 97/2, 97/4, 97/8, 111/13 SUSAN 1/15 swat 30/17 sync 126/8 system 29/2, 31/11, 31/16, 44/20, 52/24, 73/9, 93/4, 101/6, 101/13, 118/25, 127/5, 129/15, 130/22, 131/12, 136/21 systems 31/23

T

Tab 41/25, 52/18, 52/22, 53/23, 55/19, 55/23, 55/24, 75/17, 77/24, 77/25, 13/13 table 134/4 tall 29/3 talk 69/17, 96/6 talked 38/22, 38/23 talking 9/9, 63/25, 64/19, 120/3 talks 47/11 Tallahassee 1/20, 1/4, 2/9, 2/11, 2/21, 3/3, 3/7, 3/12, 3/16, 4/4, 7/17 Tampa 2/22, 7/4, 67/10, 106/9 tariff 29/18, 89/19, 90/1, 90/6, 90/18, 91/4, 91/10, 91/14, 93/12, 101/15 tariffs 101/20 task 114/18 team 142/4 technologies 137/21 technology 137/23 TECO's 117/19 n \$/19, 20/11, 22/7, 22/10, 22/13, 22/20, 23/22, 24/19, 25/9, 25/15, 25/23, 35/25, 37/6, 41/11, 42/19, 51/23, 89/13, 89/15, 89/22, 96/9, 96/24, 91/1, 142/19 term 22/21, 28/8, 29/11, 32/11, 32/13, 33/25, 34/2, 38/19, 48/8, 73/13, 71/20, 78/21, 82/8, 94/21, 95/19, 96/3, 101/4, 101/5, 102/9 a 34/15, 34/21, 37/16, 38/3, 38/21, 38/24, 62/8, 68/20, 69/4, 72/10, 73/8, 73/24, 73/25, 82/25, 99/25, 109/11, 109/12, 121/1 territorial 32/1, 94/10 territories 24/21, 26/11, 36/4 territory 24/25, 136/25 TERRY 1/14 test 130/13 testify 11/10 nomy 17/25, 102/1 text 23/19 Thank \$/6, \$/22, 9/4, 16/24, 19/20, 75/1, 75/3, 85/9, 85/11, 85/18, 86/18, 102/15, 124/11, 142/9, 142/13 theme 25/6 theory 84/4, 125/4 they've 43/1, 135/7, 135/9 third 10/24, 54/8, 1/4/3, 140/9 thirds \$1/18 Thomasville 3/6 three 12/7, 18/4, 20/9, 66/5, 68/19, 77/20, 81/4, 85/4, 85/5, 95/24, 104/20, 107/19, 142/4 threshold 21/9, 44/16, 122/1 threw 139/24 tied 36/5 tted 36/5
TIME 1/18, 6/8, 16/3, 16/8, 16/9, 17/3, 17/8, 17/12, 17/18, 18/3, 18/14, 18/15, 19/4, 19/6, 19/15, 26/17, 28/10, 34/13, 38/21, 39/7, 47/12, 48/22, 51/3, 60/23, 69/19, 74/3, 76/2, 77/22, 79/3, 85/7, 85/9, 86/5, 86/15, 86/17, 89/21, 89/25, 97/24, 98/1, 98/12, 101/6, 103/15, 104/19, 111/6, 141/1, 141/8, 142/20 timing 41/1 TLSA 41/8 tone 10/3 Top 53/22, 76/7, 78/1, 78/8, 78/9 # 22/22, 28/19, 88/24, 96/15 traditional 84/16 transaction 101/9 transactions 123/18 transcended 53/15, 54/17 transferred 41/17 transition 141/12 transmission 31/10, 34/7, 34/8, 34/12, 34/19, 38/14, 39/3, 40/3, 40/15, 41/3, 89/3, 95/4, 96/23, 97/6, 98/2, 100/6, 100/19, 100/20, 100/23, 100/25, 101/2, 101/4, 101/7, 101/10, 101/12, 101/14, 101/21, 102/1, 102/7, 102/12, 120/7 transmitting 23/2, 96/20 trooped 67/24, 67/35 true 50/10, 72/7, 86/25 trust 100/21, 143/10 turn 66/11, 76/10, \$1/16, 124/18, 124/20 turned 76/9 two 12/23, 28/4, 40/17, 51/18, 51/20, 52/3, 55/12, 55/15, 68/19, 69/6, 75/8, 79/4, 81/18, 94/11, 104/18, 107/16, 117/25, 132/17, 136/23, 137/19 type 49/8

types 76/11, 95/9

H

U.S 3/16, 7/7 unclear 99/25 uncommitted 51/12, 75/8, 79/16, 80/17 unconstitutional 43/4 undertaken 46/14, 46/17 uneconomic 135/19 uniform 31/23 Union 12/6 unit 47/20, 48/15, 48/23, 51/9, 51/10, 57/13, 57/19, 58/10, 65/18, 67/4, 81/3 unit-specific 51/20, 53/3, 56/14 unitary 36/12 United 88/11, 97/1, 97/3, 97/8, 118/25 units 27/21, 47/19, 49/24, 49/25, 66/12 University 2/5, 2/6, 7/11 unnecessary 72/24, 125/13 unneeded 126/25 upgrades 101/22, 102/9, 102/11 upheld 56/10, 77/2, 78/20, 82/6, 97/4 uphold 103/7 upper 139/18 uptake 62/25 Utilities 1/7, 2/12, 6/11, 7/20, 22/21, 24/6, 24/22, 25/20, 26/3, 26/10, 26/13, 26/14, 27/18, 28/21, 28/25, 29/14, 39/12, 39/17, 39/23, 31/2, 31/3, 31/22, 31/25, 32/4, 32/5, 32/23, 33/17, 34/23, 35/8, 36/4, 36/6, 34/21, 34/23, 331/23, 331/1, 34/23, 33/6, 34/21, 34/21, 34/21, 37/19, 37/19, 38/11, 38/17, 39/10, 39/11, 39/19, 41/12, 41/16, 41/20, 42/16, 42/21, 42/24, 43/10, 43/17, 43/18, 43/25, 44/6, 44/24, 44/25, 45/6, 45/7, 49/13, 57/25, 58/24, 60/1, 63/11, 63/12, 63/13, 63/18, 64/3, 64/21, 66/7, 67/10, 67/20, 71/9, 73/14, 73/15, 75/6, 78/4, 78/5, 78/15, 78/16, 84/17, 87/23, 88/2, 89/7, 89/8, 91/14, 91/21, 92/5, 93/2, 93/16, 93/17, 93/22, 94/4, 94/11, 95/19, 96/2, 96/8, 97/17, 99/2, 99/4, 101/1, 101/18, 102/4, 102/12, 106/11, 111/21, 117/13, 122/15, 122/18, 123/2, 124/6, 124/9, 132/1, 138/25, 141/3 utilities' 23/25 utility 12/23, 22/23, 23/22, 24/1, 24/14, 25/12, 25/25, 26/1, 27/3, 27/6, 27/8, 28/4, 28/18, 31/6, 31/7, 31/8, 31/18, 34/16, 35/21, 35/22, 36/1, 36/13, 36/17, 37/2, 37/15, 38/19, 38/22, 39/5, 39/13, 39/16, 43/6, 44/6, 45/2, 45/3, 45/10, 45/13, 51/10, 51/13, 51/15, 51/19, 51/20, 51/22, 52/8, 52/16, 52/17, 53/3, 53/13, 54/13, 51/20, 51/22, 52/8, 52/10, 52/17, 53/3, 53/13, 53/15, 55/17, 56/14, 57/14, 57/14, 57/14, 58/1, 58/16, 61/10, 64/1, 64/2, 64/8, 64/13, 64/14, 66/16, 66/17, 68/19, 71/14, 74/7, 76/16, 76/14, 76/16, 77/6, 77/16, 80/18, 81/9, 82/1, 82/4, 82/8, 82/24, 84/1, 84/17, 8018, 81/9, 82/1, 82/4, 82/5, 82/14, 84/1, 84/17, 88/21, 88/24, 88/25, 89/13, 89/16, 99/24, 90/8, 91/5, 91/9, 93/4, 93/9, 94/16, 94/20, 95/11, 95/18, 95/21, 96/16, 94/14, 99/9, 100/13, 100/25, 105/23, 106/9, 108/17, 108/19, 108/21, 109/2, 109/19, 109/20, 109/21, 112/8, 112/15, 112/16, 112/22, 113/23, 114/8, 123/7, 123/20, 130/14, 130/16, 131/25, 134/1 willity's 13/7, 51/16, 60/10, 77/10, 77/11, 79/8 123/2, 13414, 13416, 131125, 1341 utility's 13/7, 51/16, 60/10, 77/10, 77/11, 79/8, 83/23, 92/12, 95/20, 101/14, 105/1 utility-specific 55/9, 56/10, 56/11, 57/8, 58/11, 67/17, 68/14, 74/8, 99/8, 103/20, 113/13

٧

vacillation 42/18 version 105/4 vice 13/18 vicinity 140/9 view 49/4, 49/11, 56/1, 127/13, 127/14, 129/11 Villacorta 2/10, 8/4 virtue 46/3, 49/21 VOLUME 1/10, 5/2 Volusia 1/6, 6/11 vote 104/21, 105/16, 107/18

W

wa-la 39/7 wagging 29/3 waiting 65/9 waive 134/14 waiver 134/9, 136/11 walk 109/6 Ward 2/17 Wednesday 1/17 weeks 107/19 relcome 9/5 West 2/3, 3/22, 7/17 WHITE 3/18, 7/25 wholesale 28/14, 35/1, 49/12, 53/12, 54/19, 63/11, 75/11, 90/20, 91/15, 92/5, 93/6, 94/6, 97/6, 97/12,

97/18, 98/1, 98/3, 98/5, 98/10, 98/18, 100/24
WIGGINS 2/10, 8/3, 8/4
Wildlife 3/20, 8/1, 11/18
WILLIAM 3/2
Willing 45/4, 70/19, 119/9, 138/22
LINGHAM 3/2, 6/20
LIS 2/20, 7/3
winds 140/5
wisdom 59/11, 69/10
wish 10/12, 11/6
Woodruff 98/11
word 39/5, 95/1, 95/9, 99/9, 99/11, 99/14, 99/19, 102/19
words 30/25, 95/7, 97/12, 109/3, 124/7
work 100/20
working 47/17, 48/14
works 116/10, 142/24
workshop 117/15, 120/6
worth 18/13, 62/12
wrap 142/3, 142/17
WRIGHT 2/2, 7/16
writings 111/14
written 14/21, 85/6
wrong 66/10, 71/25, 103/2, 103/24, 104/5, 109/4, 110/22
wrote 96/10, 105/20

X

X 5/1

٧

Year 20/11, 22/7, 22/10, 22/13, 22/20, 23/22, 24/19, 25/9, 25/15, 25/23, 26/2, 34/9, 35/25, 37/6, 36/14, 36/17, 41/11, 42/20, 69/6, 99/14, 99/15, 89/20, 89/22, 90/9, 90/24, 91/1, 96/25, 120/6, 139/4 year's 90/9, 91/1 years 51/23, 69/7, 125/3, 130/19, 137/19, 137/20