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BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

RECORDS AND
REPORTING

IN RE:

**INVESTIGATION INTO PRICING OF
UNBUNDLED NETWORK ELEMENTS.**

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DOCKET NO. 990649-TP


REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF JULIA O. STROW

ON BEHALF OF

INTERMEDIA COMMUNICATIONS INC.

September 10, 1999

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PPSC-RECORDS/REPORTING

1 **Q: Please state your name, employer, position and business address.**

2 **A:** My name is Julia Strow. I am employed by Intermedia Communications Inc.
3 (“Intermedia”) as Assistant Vice President, Regulatory Policy. My business address is
4 3625 Queen Palm Drive, Tampa, Florida 33619.
5

6 **Q: What are your responsibilities in that position?**

7 **A:** I am a primary interface between Intermedia and the incumbent local exchange carriers
8 (“ILECs”). In that capacity, I am involved in interconnection negotiations with – and
9 arbitrations against ILECs, and in rulemaking proceedings addressing unbundled network
10 elements, interconnection, collocation, resale, and related matters. I am also responsible
11 for strategic planning and the setting of Intermedia’s state and federal regulatory policy.
12 In addition, I testify on behalf of Intermedia in federal and state proceedings dealing with
13 local competition issues.
14

15 **Q: Have you previously filed testimony in this docket?**

16 **A:** Yes. I filed direct testimony on August 11, 1999.
17

18 **Q: What is the purpose of your testimony?**

19 **A:** The purpose of my testimony is to rebut several items in the direct testimony of
20 BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. (“BellSouth”) witnesses Varner and Hendrix and
21 GTE Florida Incorporated (“GTEFL”) witness Trimble.
22

1 **Q: Does the Commission need to debate what the FCC might or might not do in its**
2 **Rule 51.319 Proceeding?**

3 **A:** No. Under Section 251(c) of the Federal Communications Act ("the Act"), the Florida
4 Public Service Commission ("Commission") has authority to establish new unbundled
5 network elements and combinations of networks elements. While it is true that the
6 Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") will use its pending proceeding to
7 establish a *minimum* list of nationally-available UNEs, this Commission is fully
8 empowered to establish UNEs and UNE combinations in addition to those established by
9 the FCC.

10
11 Further, it is true that the FCC has not reached a decision in the proceeding on remand of
12 its Rule 51.319 Proceeding, however, the FCC is expected to adopt its final order on
13 September 15, 1999. We believe that the FCC's order will vindicate our interpretation of
14 UNEs and UNE combinations and will decisively reject the incumbent local exchange
15 carrier's ("ILEC's") interpretations. By no means is this Commission powerless to act
16 until the FCC has reached a final decision. BellSouth and GTEFL would have the
17 Commission believe that it can not make a decision on unbundled network elements
18 ("UNE") and UNE combination pricing, as well as deaveraging until the FCC reaches a
19 decision. GTEFL and BellSouth seem to believe that the FCC is going to limit the
20 availability of certain UNEs and UNE combinations.

21
22 I fundamentally disagree with these assumptions. The FCC has given no indication that
23 it will pursue the course of action assumed by BellSouth and GTEFL. To date, it has

1 done exactly the opposite. The reason the Supreme Court remanded rule 51.319 was that
2 the FCC had purposely not placed restrictions on UNEs and UNE combinations in any
3 fashion, and had failed to consider that there might be some narrow circumstances where
4 restrictions might be warranted. Although it seems likely that the FCC will consider
5 restrictions in some circumstances, it is most likely that the FCC will offer a list of
6 *minimum* UNEs and UNE combinations, and will not seek to avoid limiting a state's
7 ability to require additional UNEs and UNE combinations.' This policy will be
8 consistent with the FCC's approach to date. The FCC would have to turn on its face 180
9 degrees and completely reverse its previous policies to pursue the course of action
10 assumed by Mr. Varner. Therefore, I believe that this Commission should pursue its
11 UNE and UNE combination policies without the encumbrance of possible future FCC
12 decisions, as it is likely that the FCC will seek to avoid interfering with state decisions on
13 these matters.

14
15 **Q: Has Intermedia joined several parties in a Motion to Strike portions of the ILECs'**
16 **testimony regarding the Rule 51.319 Proceeding?**

17 **A:** Yes.

18
19 **Q: Do you believe that it is necessary to present testimony in this docket regarding the**
20 **Rule 51.319 Proceeding?**

21 **A:** No. However, in order to protect Intermedia's position on this issue should the motion
22 not be granted, I will briefly respond to some of BellSouth witness Varner's direct
23 testimony regarding the Rule 51.319 Proceeding.

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Q: BellSouth witness Varner states, p. 16 lines 13-14, “an essential component of the necessary and impair test is market data concerning the availability of UNEs in various areas of the state.” Do you agree?

A: No. Market data as proposed by Mr. Varner is only necessary if you agree with BellSouth’s interpretation of the “necessary” and “impair” standards, which I do not. I agree with the proposal set forth by ALTS in its comments to the FCC in the 319 proceeding. As ALTS and others indicated in initial comments, section 251(d)(2) contemplates two types of UNEs – proprietary and non-proprietary. For proprietary UNEs, the Commission must determine whether alternative local exchange company (“ALEC”) access to the UNE is “necessary” in that there are no real competitive alternatives, and for nonproprietary UNEs, the Commission must determine whether failure to obtain access would “impair” the ability of a ALEC to provide telecommunications services. Thus, the difference between “necessary” and “impair” appears fundamentally to be one of degree, with “necessary” presenting a slightly higher hurdle for unbundling “proprietary” elements.

This distinction recognizes that in some very narrow instances, an ILEC may not have to offer a “proprietary” telecommunications application as a UNE if an ALEC could reproduce the ILEC application relatively easily. However, if failure to gain access to a “proprietary” UNE would result in a material loss of functionality to ALECs (*e.g.*, access to information needed to electronically bond OSS systems), then it would be “necessary” for the ALECs to have access to the item as a UNE. For non-proprietary network

1 elements, the “impair” standard is invoked. Under the “impair” standard, ALTS and
2 others agreed that non-proprietary network elements must be made available to ALECs
3 unless a ubiquitous, interchangeable substitute for the ILEC UNE is readily available at a
4 reasonable price.

5
6 **Q: Mr. Varner further states, p. 16 lines 23-24, that ALECs should also provide “cost**
7 **data concerning the ability of ALECs to utilize UNEs and to utilize alternatives to**
8 **UNEs.” How do you respond?**

9 **A:** Again, you must agree with BellSouth’s and other ILECs’ interpretation of the necessary
10 and impair standards to consider this proposal, even then, I fail to see the relevance of
11 including ALEC cost data. The objective of this proceeding is not to assess ALEC cost
12 data, but rather ILEC pricing policies and rates for UNEs and UNE combinations. And
13 as explained in my answer to the previous question, I completely disagree with
14 BellSouth’s position on this issue.

15
16 **Q. BellSouth witness Varner seeks to limit UNE combinations to solely those that are**
17 **“currently combined.” Do you agree with this position?**

18 **A:** No. The Commission should allow any reasonable UNE combination, whether they are
19 currently combined or not. BellSouth’s position underscores how ILECs view ALECs –
20 not as large customers in a competitive market, but solely as competitors. When ILECs
21 view ALECs as solely competitors, there is resistance to virtually any new arrangement
22 that might be more convenient or cost-effective for the ALEC. However, if ALECs were
23 simply large customers of ILECs, and not also competitors, this docket would not be

1 necessary. ILECs would be more than happy to combine UNEs for their largest
2 customers in any reasonable manner, and charge a reasonable fee based on incremental
3 costs, as ILECs do for large customers today throughout their territories, for the
4 preponderance of their services.

5
6 Eliminating this distinction – this discrimination – is crucial to the development of local
7 competition. I believe that state commissions and the FCC are the only bodies that can
8 create an atmosphere where ILECs treat ALECs as their largest and best customers –
9 which, by the way, they are – and not solely as competitors to be thwarted.

10
11 **Q: Does the Commission have the authority to require ILECs to provide UNE**
12 **combinations such as enhanced extended link (EEL) by defining new combined**
13 **UNEs?**

14 **A:** Yes. The Commission has authority under 251(c) of the Communications Act to define
15 UNEs to include the combination of already existing separate UNEs. In fact, the
16 Commission already does this. For example, the Commission has defined NIDs, feeder
17 and distribution plant as separate UNEs, yet these can all be obtained in a combined form
18 simply by ordering a loop. This Commission is similarly empowered to define other
19 combinations as new UNEs. In fact, the Supreme Court, in reversing the 8th Circuit
20 decision, expressly found that § 251(c)(3) of the Act “does not say, or even remotely
21 imply, that elements must be provided only in this fashion [*i.e.*, discrete pieces] and never
22 in combined form.” 119 S. Ct. at 737.

1 The Eighth Circuit, in upholding shared transport as a UNE, held that the Act “expressly
2 includes both individual network facilities and the functions which those facilities
3 provide, either individually or in consort.” *SBC v. FCC*, 153 F.3d 597 (8th Cir. 1997),
4 *remanded sub nom., Ameritech Corp. v. FCC*, 119 S. Ct. 2016 (1999).

5
6 **Q: Does the Commission have the authority to require ILECs to provide UNE
7 combinations under the FCC’s rules?**

8 **A:** Yes. Section 315(b) of the FCC’s rules states that ILECs are prohibited from breaking
9 apart any network functions that they currently provide in a combined form. For
10 example, a special access circuit that currently is, or that may be, provisioned between an
11 end user and a competitive carrier is comprised of network functions in a combined form.
12 Therefore, FCC rule 315(b) requires that ILECs offer these combined functions as an
13 EEL. Further, this FCC rule was recently upheld by the Supreme Court.

14
15 **Q: BellSouth Witness Hendrix proposes only two geographic zones based on current
16 retail rate groups. Is this approach rationale?**

17 **A:** No. As I stated in my direct testimony, BellSouth currently provides a number of its
18 interstate special access services deaveraged into three separate zones, which are based
19 on population density. These zones correspond to urban, suburban and rural areas. This
20 deaveraged rate structure is effectively an admission by BellSouth that its costs – for at
21 least some retail rate elements – do vary by geographic location, and should create a
22 presumption on the part of the Commission that BellSouth’s UNE costs are similarly

1 affected by geography. These special access zones are in no way based on rate group
2 designations for residential and business local service.

3
4 **Q: Has the FCC recently reached a decision regarding density zones and pricing
5 flexibility?**

6 **A:** Yes. As noted in my direct testimony, the FCC announced that it has adopted these new
7 rules that will allow ILECs to deaverage rates for trunking services into as many zones as
8 they want. In its August 27, 1999 Order in Docket 99-206, the FCC granted price cap
9 ILECs immediate pricing flexibility. Price cap ILECs are now allowed to deaverage rates
10 for the trunking baskets, eliminating the limitation's inherent in the FCC's current density
11 zone pricing plan. These ILECs can define the scope and number of zones within a study
12 area, provided that each zone, except the highest-cost zone, accounts for at least 15
13 percent of the ILEC's trunking basket revenues in the study area and that price increases
14 within a zone do not exceed 15 percent. Price cap ILECs no longer have to file zone
15 pricing plans prior to filing tariffs.

16
17 If ILECs adopt more zones for any of their tariffed retail or wholesale services as would
18 be permitted under the FCC's new rules— either intrastate or interstate — the Commission
19 should require that UNE rates be further deaveraged into a similar number of zones.

1 **Q: If BellSouth's two geographic zones are not adequate, what level of deaveraging**
2 **should the Commission establish for local loops?**

3 **A:** The level of deaveraging for loops depends on the results of the cost studies that will be
4 filed in Phase 2 of this proceeding. GTEFL has proposed that the Commission should
5 examine deaveraging down to the wire center level or possibly even lower. Sprint also
6 suggests producing cost studies at the wire center level and then grouping the wire center
7 in zones based on the results of the cost studies. Ultimately, the Commission must wait
8 for the results of the cost studies as well as weigh the administrative costs of supporting a
9 certain level of deaveraging before making a decision. This is because the more
10 deaveraged zones, the higher the administrative costs.

11
12 **Q: BellSouth witness Varner, p. 25 lines 22-23, states that a consequence of setting**
13 **prices that don't cover total costs is, "such pricing invites inefficient entry of ALECs**
14 **by placing all of the risks of building and maintaining a network on the ILEC." Is**
15 **this the case?**

16 **A:** Absolutely not. Section 252 (d)(1) of the Communications Act, as interpreted by the
17 FCC's rules, requires that UNEs be priced on an incremental cost bases. This by
18 definition means that UNEs and UNEs combinations may not be priced to cover total
19 costs. Therefore, Mr. Varner's proposal is in direct violation of the Act and FCC's rules.

20
21 Mr. Varner's position is a typical "red herring" submitted by ILECs to try to scare
22 regulators into restricting access and/or prices to ILEC facilities. Although there may be,
23 and should be, a niche market for pure resellers, it will at best only be that: a niche. True

1 competitors, ones that intend to pursue direct, large scale competition with incumbents,
2 realize that such competition can only exist if they provide services largely over their
3 own facilities.

4
5 MCI and Sprint realized this decades ago when they decided to compete with AT&T for
6 long distance service. Although it would have been far easier, and probably more
7 efficient, to provide service via resale of AT&T's existing network, MCI and Sprint
8 chose to deploy their own facilities *nationwide* while accruing massive amounts of debt
9 to construct them.

10
11 ALECs, including Sprint, MCI/WorldCom, Intermedia, and even AT&T now, are
12 mirroring that philosophy in the local market. Intermedia is deploying its own facilities
13 as fast as its resources will allow it to construct them, also amassing significant debt in
14 the process. Although our construction plans will continue at full speed through the
15 foreseeable future, there are limits to Intermedia's ability to finance and construct new
16 facilities. These limits are why the availability of UNEs and UNE combinations is so
17 crucial. While our long-term business plan is to serve all of our customers through our
18 own network (a business plan shared by the other ALECs just mentioned, as well), it will
19 be some time, perhaps decades, before that is accomplished. If ILEC facilities and
20 combinations are not readily available at reasonable prices, I fear that none of the ALECs
21 will be around long enough to see their long-term plans bear fruit.

1 **Q: In BellSouth witness Varner’s testimony regarding the FCC’s Rule 51.319 Remand**
2 **Proceeding, he states that the state-wide availability of UNEs and UNE**
3 **combinations at cost-based rates encourage ALECs to buy UNEs from ILECs**
4 **instead of investing and installing its own facilities. Do you agree?**

5 **A:** Not at all. BellSouth continually states that if it were forced to offer UNEs in all areas it
6 would discourage ALEC investment in facilities, while also arguing that ALECs have
7 invested so much in their own facilities that certain UNEs or UNE combinations should
8 not be available. Intermedia submits that BellSouth proves too much, and indeed, that
9 the FCC’s uniform national unbundling rules have spurred and not dampened investment
10 in facilities. One of the driving forces of the FCC’s initial decision to establish uniform
11 national unbundling rules was a desire to “provide financial markets with greater
12 certainty in assessing new entrants’ business plans, thus enhancing the ability of new
13 entrants, including small entities, to raise capital.” (*Local Competition First Report and*
14 *Order* at ¶ 242.) This strategy has worked – ALECs have raised capital, and as noted by
15 the BellSouth, ALECs have used this capital to deploy their own facilities when it makes
16 economic sense to do so. For example, the availability of the unbundled switching UNE
17 has by no means discouraged ALECs, such as Intermedia, from deploying their own
18 switching facilities. As BellSouth witness Varner notes on page 11 of his testimony,
19 ALECs have already deployed at least 41 switches in Florida and 140 switches in the
20 entire BellSouth region.

21
22 Interestingly, BellSouth seems to assume that ALECs would prefer to use ILECs’
23 facilities than to self-provision or purchase wholesale facilities from non-ILEC suppliers.

1 As the record indicates, and as I have previously testified, the exact opposite is true.
2 ALECs do want to operate and control their own networks. Unfortunately, wholesale
3 alternatives to the ILECs' embedded loop and transport networks simply do not exist in
4 any meaningful way. Thus ALECs must rely on access to the ILECs' networks, if
5 ALECs are to have any meaningful opportunity to develop widespread product offerings
6 and compete in the local market.

7
8 **Q: Do you agree with most of the parties in the proceeding that the Commission should**
9 **only address the deaveraging of the local loop at this time?**

10 **A:** Yes. Most parties agree that the Commission should only address deaveraging of the
11 local loop UNE. However, as I stated in my direct testimony, this docket should only
12 require deaveraging for loops and transport at this time. These UNEs should include all
13 forms of loops and transport, including sub-loop elements and UNE combinations. Sprint
14 is the only other party that believes that transport should be deaveraged at this time, but
15 this is not based on cost studies. However, until cost studies are filed and reviewed it is
16 impossible to determine if significant cost differences exist. These UNEs should also
17 include in-building wiring, to the extent that the FCC or this Commission later defines
18 these facilities as separate UNEs. These are the unbundled elements that should have the
19 most cost differences based on geographic deaveraging. Deaveraging of further
20 unbundled elements can be accomplished in later phases of this proceeding.

1 **Q: On page 10, lines 19-20, BellSouth witness Emmerson states, “there are other costs**
2 **that a firm must also recover including shared and common costs, as well as any**
3 **shortfall in recovering its full historical costs.” Do you agree with this statement?**

4 **A:** Not at all. This position only further enforces the notion that BellSouth only looks at
5 ALECs as a competitor-competitor relationship, and not as a customer-provider
6 relationship. If BellSouth were arguing the provision of exactly the same facilities as a
7 service to its customers, particularly one that might be subject to even minimal
8 competition, it would argue vehemently that only long-run incremental costs - - or even
9 short-run incremental costs -- should be used to set a price floor for the service.
10 BellSouth has used this argument countless times in each state when introducing new
11 services over the past ten years. Yet, if it provisions essentially the same facilities to a
12 competing CLEC, then all of a sudden a reasonable allocation of the kitchen sink must be
13 included in any prices charged to the CLEC.

14
15 Again, the principle that should guide the Commission in determining whether this is a
16 reasonable approach is whether it would reasonably occur in a customer-provider
17 relationship. It is obvious that BellSouth would *never* espouse this position if providing a
18 service to a large customer in even a minimally competitive market, and therefore such a
19 position should be flatly rejected here.

20
21 Additionally, the Communications Act contains specific pricing provisions. Section
22 252(d)(1) establishes the pricing standards for unbundled network elements. In
23 particular, Section 252(d)(1) states that the just and reasonable rate for network elements

1 must be “based on the cost (determined without reference to rate-of-return or other rate-
2 based proceeding) of providing the interconnection or network element,”
3 “nondiscriminatory,” and “may include a reasonable profit.” The FCC, in adopting rules
4 implementing Section 252(d)(1), found that this section requires incremental costing. As
5 a result, inclusion of historical or embedded costs would be in direct violation of the Act
6 and the FCC rules. To the best of my knowledge, every state and federal regulatory body
7 that has addressed this issue has interpreted the Communications Act (“the Act”) to
8 require some type of long-run incremental costing as it relates to ILEC prices for
9 UNEs—which does not include historic or embedded costs.

10
11 **Q: BellSouth witness Varner, p. 21, lines 21-22, states, “prices for preexisting
12 combinations of UNEs be set at full market value. Do you agree?”**

13 **A:** No. Neither the Act nor the FCC’s pricing rules distinguish between discrete network
14 elements and elements in combination. Therefore, UNE combinations are subject to the
15 same pricing standards as individual UNEs. Mr. Varner market pricing proposal
16 therefore directly violates section 252(d)(1) of the Act and the FCC’s rules.

17
18 **Q: Must the Commission defer action on the deaveraging of UNEs and UNE
19 combinations, as argued by BellSouth and GTEFL, until it addresses universal
20 service and/or retail rate rebalancing in Florida?**

21 **A:** No. Deaveraging, universal service, and rate rebalancing do not have to be addressed at
22 the same time because they are not necessarily related. The ILECs argue that requiring
23 deaveraged UNEs and UNE combination pricing will erode the implicit subsidies in the

1 ILEC rates. This argument, however, assumes that there is currently vibrant competition
2 in the local market. This is simply not the case. Allowing the ILECs to rebalance rates
3 or creating an intrastate universal service fund before deaveraging UNEs and UNE
4 combinations will only thwart competition. The ILECs have this backwards. In order to
5 stimulate competition in the local market, UNEs and UNE combinations *must* be
6 deaveraged. Once competition develops to a significant level, then an intrastate universal
7 service fund or rate rebalancing might be necessary. In fact, in its most recent report to
8 the Legislature, the Commission recommended that no universal service fund was
9 necessary because of the *lack* of competition.

10 **Q: Does this conclude your testimony?**

11 A: Yes.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served via U.S.

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
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