



June 21, 2021

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING

Adam Teitzman, Commission Clerk
Division of the Commission Clerk
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, FL 32399

Re: Docket No. 20210015-EI
Petition by FPL for Bate Rate Increase and Rate Unification

Dear Mr. Teitzman:

Attached for filing on behalf of the CLEO Institute and Vote Solar in the above-referenced docket are the testimony and exhibits of Melissa Whited.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter. Please let me know if you should have questions regarding this submission.

Sincerely,

Katie Chiles Ottenweller
Attorney for Vote Solar
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Docket No. 20210015-EI

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the testimony and exhibits of Melissa Whited filed on behalf of The CLEO Institute and Vote Solar have been furnished by electronic mail on this 21st day of June, 2021, to the following:

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/s/ Katie Chiles Ottenweller

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

**In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida
Power and Light Company**

DOCKET NO. 20210015-EI

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF

MELISSA WHITED

ON BEHALF OF

THE CLEO INSTITUTE AND VOTE SOLAR

JUNE 21, 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY.....	3
2. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	5
3. FPL HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS CUSTOMERS NEEDS.....	7
Disconnections.....	12
Energy Efficiency and Affordability	18
Innovation for Addressing Resilience and Affordability.....	21
Low-Income Assistance Programs	22
4. SOLUTIONS.....	24
Performance Incentive Mechanisms.....	24
Expanded Disconnection Moratoria	27
Innovation in Resilience and Affordability	28
Additional Low-Income Protections.....	31

1 **1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

2 **Q Please state your name and occupation.**

3 **A** My name is Melissa Whited. I am a Principal Associate at Synapse Energy
4 Economics, Inc., located at 485 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02139.

5 **Q Please describe Synapse Energy Economics.**

6 **A** Synapse Energy Economics (Synapse) is a research and consulting firm
7 specializing in electricity and gas industry regulation, planning, and analysis. Our
8 work covers a range of issues, including economic and technical assessments of
9 demand-side and supply-side energy resources; energy efficiency policies and
10 programs; integrated resource planning; electricity market modeling and
11 assessment; renewable resource technologies and policies; and climate change
12 strategies. Synapse works for a wide range of clients, including attorneys general,
13 offices of consumer advocates, public utility commissions, environmental
14 advocates, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Department of
15 Energy, U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
16 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners. Synapse has over 30
17 professional staff with extensive experience in the electricity industry.

18 **Q Please summarize your professional and educational experience.**

19 **A** I hold a Master of Arts in Agricultural and Applied Economics and a Master of
20 Science in Environment and Resources, both from the University of Wisconsin-
21 Madison.

1 I have 12 years of experience in economic research and consulting. At Synapse, I
2 have worked extensively on issues related to utility regulatory models and rate
3 design. I have been an invited speaker in numerous industry conferences, including
4 as a panelist for the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
5 (NARUC) Subcommittee on Rate Design at the 2021 Winter Policy Summit and the
6 2018 Annual Meeting. I have sponsored testimony before the Georgia Public
7 Service Commission, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, the Rhode Island
8 Public Utilities Commission, the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, the
9 Maine Public Utilities Commission, the California Public Utilities Commission, the
10 Hawaii Public Utilities Commission, the Public Service Commission of Utah, the
11 Public Utility Commission of Texas, the Virginia State Corporation Commission,
12 the Newfoundland and Labrador Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities, the
13 Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board, and the Federal Energy Regulatory
14 Commission. My CV is attached as Exhibit MW-1.

15 **Q On whose behalf are you testifying in this case?**

16 **A** I am testifying on behalf of the CLEO Institute and Vote Solar.

17 **Q What is the purpose of this testimony?**

18 **A** My testimony demonstrates that FPL's proposal has failed to provide adequate
19 safeguards for its low-income customers who are struggling with the impacts
20 from COVID-19, unaffordable bills, and a warming climate. In my testimony, I
21 document how FPL's disconnection practices have exacerbated inequities and that
22 FPL's proposal will do little to address affordability or resilience. I propose

1 several possible solutions to help protect FPL’s most vulnerable customers,
2 improve affordability, and enhance resiliency.

3 **2. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

4 **Q Please summarize your findings.**

5 **A** My primary findings are as follows:

- 6 1. Many vulnerable customers reside in FPL’s territory. One-third of the
7 population in the counties served by FPL/Gulf Power earn less than 200% of
8 the federal poverty level,¹ and an estimated 1.4 million FPL customers live
9 in energy poverty.
- 10 2. FPL’s average residential electric bills are 13th *highest* of the 50 mainland
11 investor owned utilities with the most residential customers, contradicting
12 FPL’s claims that its customers’ bills are among the lowest in the country.
- 13 3. The Company’s proposed 18% rate increase over a four-year period worsens
14 the high energy burdens already faced by its vulnerable customers,
15 exacerbating socio-economic disparities these communities face.
- 16 4. FPL/Gulf have not done enough to address the energy burdens of their
17 customers or vulnerability to a warming climate and extreme weather events
18 such as more severe hurricanes. Instead:

¹ Florida Department of Health, Division of Public Health Statistics & Performance Management,
[http://www.flhealthcharts.com/ChartsReports/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=NonVitalIndRateOnly.DataViewer
&cid=461](http://www.flhealthcharts.com/ChartsReports/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=NonVitalIndRateOnly.DataViewer&cid=461).

- 1 ▪ FPL/Gulf prematurely resumed customer disconnections in the fall of
2 2020, well before the conclusion of the pandemic, and the
3 disconnection rates for both FPL and Gulf Power have far exceeded
4 the disconnection rates of Tampa Electric and Duke Energy Florida.
5 Unlike most other jurisdictions, FPL does not protect customers from
6 disconnections when weather conditions are hazardous.
- 7 ▪ FPL’s performance in the area of energy efficiency – a key strategy
8 for helping customers manage their energy bills – is second-worst in
9 the nation.

10 5. FPL’s proposal does not remedy these problems. Although FPL asks
11 ratepayers to fund considerable investments in grid hardening and the latest
12 monitoring technologies, it does little to help customers cope with outages
13 once the grid goes down, or to help customers reduce their energy
14 consumption through energy efficiency. It also contains no additional
15 protections for customers facing disconnection – even though disconnections
16 can be life-threatening.

17 In sum, FPL must do more to help its customers reduce their energy burden, avoid
18 disconnection, and become more resilient in the face of climate change.

19 **Q Do you have any recommendations to offer the Commission?**

20 **A Yes.** Based on my findings, I offer the following four recommendations:

- 21 1. The Commission should reject FPL’s proposed “performance incentive” of
22 50 basis points and instead adopt performance incentive mechanisms

1 focused on specific policy goals, such as reducing customer disconnections
2 and improving energy efficiency programs.

3 2. FPL should expand customer protections against disconnections during
4 emergencies (e.g., when preparing for or recovering from major storms), and
5 when temperatures are hazardous.

6 3. FPL should implement innovative programs designed to improve resilience
7 at schools, such as through expanded energy efficiency offerings, solar plus
8 storage solutions, and school bus vehicle-to-grid pilots that could provide
9 back-up power.

10 4. FPL should develop other low-income programs, such as a low-income rate
11 discount or percentage of income payment plan.

12 **3. FPL HAS FAILED TO ADEQUATELY ADDRESS CUSTOMERS NEEDS**

13 **Q What is your overall assessment of FPL’s proposal?**

14 **A** Under FPL’s proposal, residential bills are set to increase by more than 18% by
15 2025.² At the same time, many Florida communities are struggling to recover
16 financially from COVID-19 and are facing growing burdens of extreme weather
17 events, higher temperatures, and sea level rise due to climate change. These
18 impacts are not distributed equally – it is the most vulnerable customers who will
19 be hardest hit by FPL’s rate increase and who will experience the worst effects of

² Direct Testimony of FPL Witness Tiffany C. Cohen, Exhibit TCC-3, page 1 of 5 shows that a residential customer using 1,000 kWh/month will see his or her bill increase from \$99.05 in 2021 to \$117.06 in 2025.

1 the pandemic and climate change. FPL must do more to help vulnerable
2 customers reduce their bills through energy efficiency, avoid disconnection, and
3 adapt to climate change.

4 **Q Please explain what you mean by “vulnerable customers.”**

5 **A** Vulnerable customers are those who have fewer resources to respond to external
6 stressors (such as pandemics or higher electricity bills) or who are more
7 susceptible to impacts from climate change (including bearing the brunt of
8 increasingly severe hurricanes). These customers may include lower-income
9 customers,³ marginalized communities, and customers with health conditions that
10 leave them highly dependent on electricity for their health and safety.

11 Vulnerable customers are more likely to face difficulties paying their
12 bills due to higher electricity rates and are therefore at greater risk of
13 disconnection. Climate change further compounds the challenges faced by these
14 customers, as they have less capacity to prepare for and cope with the increasing
15 frequency and severity of storms, higher temperatures, sea level rise, and related
16 impacts on their health and the local economy.⁴ In order to improve equity, FPL
17 should be prioritizing actions that enable vulnerable customers to better withstand

³ As discussed later in my testimony, low-income customers pay a higher percentage of their total income towards electric bills; when customers pay more than 6 percent of household income on electric bills (or 10 percent if using electricity for heating), these households are described as “energy burdened”.

⁴ U.S. Global Change Research Program. *Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Volume II*. Washington, DC. 2018.

1 emergencies (including natural disasters and pandemics), manage their bills, and
2 become more resilient in the face of climate change.

3 **Q How will FPL’s proposal impact vulnerable customers?**

4 **A** FPL’s proposed rate increase, driven in part by its proposal to reward itself with a
5 50-basis point performance incentive for “superior performance,” is unwarranted
6 and out of touch with the struggles that its customers are facing to make ends
7 meet, avoid disconnection, and manage the impacts of climate change. Instead of
8 patting itself on the back, FPL should be acknowledging and addressing the heavy
9 energy burden faced by its customers by (1) taking immediate steps to reduce
10 customer disconnections; (2) improving its energy efficiency programs; (3)
11 facilitating resilience by expanding customer access to customer-sited generation
12 and storage for backup power; and (4) designing innovative low-income
13 programs. Performance incentives should only be provided to FPL for
14 demonstrating substantial improvements in these areas.

15 **Q Why do you contend that there is an urgent need to address energy burden?**

16 **A** One-third of the population in the counties served by FPL/Gulf Power earn less
17 than 200% of the federal poverty level, according to 2019 census data.⁵ These
18 customers tend to spend a disproportionate share of their incomes on energy costs.

⁵ Florida Department of Health, Division of Public Health Statistics & Performance Management,
[http://www.flhealthcharts.com/ChartsReports/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=NonVitalIndRateOnly.DataViewer
&cid=461](http://www.flhealthcharts.com/ChartsReports/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=NonVitalIndRateOnly.DataViewer&cid=461).

1 In 2019, the Greenlink Group estimated that 1.4 million FPL customers live in
2 energy poverty – defined as having electricity bills that exceed 6% of their
3 household income or total energy bills that exceed 10% of their income.⁶ When
4 customers must spend such a large portion of their incomes to meet their energy
5 needs, they must make difficult trade-offs, such as choosing whether to refill their
6 medications or heat or cool their homes, even when temperatures reach dangerous
7 levels.⁷

8 **Q How has the pandemic affected customer energy burdens?**

9 **A** Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the number of households
10 living in energy poverty has certainly increased. While Florida’s economy has
11 improved in recent months, unemployment is still much higher than it was before
12 the pandemic. In the counties served by FPL and Gulf Power, nearly 150,000
13 more individuals were unemployed in March 2021 relative to March 2019.
14 Further, customers who had fallen behind in their utility bills must now struggle
15 to repay past due balances in addition to new energy bills, or face disconnection.

16 **Q Has FPL taken adequate steps to make electricity bills more affordable,**
17 **protect vulnerable customers, and facilitate resilience?**

18 **A** No, FPL’s efforts fall far short in addressing energy burdens in four ways:

⁶ Florida PSC Docket No. 20190061-EI, Direct testimony of Matt Cox, PhD on behalf of Vote Solar.

⁷ Chip Berry et al., *One in three U.S. households faces a challenge in meeting energy needs*, U.S. EIA (Sept. 19, 2018), <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37072>.

- 1 1. First, FPL/Gulf have not only resumed customer disconnections well before
2 the conclusion of the pandemic, but have done so aggressively. The
3 Company’s rate of disconnections is far higher than either Tampa Electric
4 (TECO) or Duke Energy Florida (Duke), and the percent of customers
5 disconnected without restoration by FPL/Gulf is also much greater than
6 TECO or Duke.⁸ FPL/Gulf should not be rewarded with a bonus return on
7 equity (ROE) while an unreasonable share of its customers go without
8 service.
- 9 2. Second, while FPL/Gulf touts its low electricity rates, customers still pay
10 relatively high electricity bills compared to customers served by other
11 utilities, in part due to FPL’s abysmal energy efficiency offerings. FPL/Gulf
12 must take steps to help its customers, particularly its low-income customers,
13 implement more energy efficient measures to better manage their bills.
- 14 3. Third, while FPL is investing heavily in hardening its grid, the Company
15 should also be assisting communities cope with the inevitable outages after
16 major storms, such as through backup power systems for schools that serve
17 as emergency shelters.
- 18 4. Fourth, low-income customer assistance programs, other than LIHEAP, are
19 small and inadequate. FPL should propose new programs or low-income

⁸ Based on an analysis of disconnection data provided by the utilities in customer impact data related to COVID-19, as filed in Docket 20200000 and Docket 20210000, and number of residential customers from U.S. EIA Form 861 (2019).

1 rates that help to alleviate the energy poverty faced by so many of its
2 customers.

3 **Disconnections**

4 **Q Please explain your concerns with FPL/Gulf’s disconnection practices.**

5 **A** While FPL’s temporary cessation of disconnections offered vital short-term relief
6 for customers during the first six months of the pandemic, the Company resumed
7 disconnections in October of 2020 (FPL) and November of 2020 (Gulf) and has
8 vigorously continued to disconnect customers throughout the winter and spring. I
9 have several concerns with the Company’s practice in this area.

10 First, I believe it was premature for FPL/Gulf to resume disconnections
11 in the fall of 2020. The majority of states (35) mandated suspensions of utility
12 disconnections, while the states without mandatory suspensions all enacted some
13 form of voluntary moratorium.⁹ Thus while I support FPL/Gulf’s initial
14 suspension of disconnections, I do not believe that the Company’s actions went
15 beyond the measures taken in most jurisdictions, nor are their actions aligned with
16 the Company’s claim that it delivers “superior customer service.”

17 In contrast, many jurisdictions extended COVID-based disconnection
18 moratoria well beyond October, and in fact some jurisdictions continue to keep
19 such moratoria in place. The National Energy Assistance Directors Association

⁹ National Energy Assistance Directors Association, *Summary of State Utility Shut-off Moratoriums due to COVID-19*, October 19, 2020, available at <https://neada.org/utilityshutoffsuspensions/>.

1 reports that more than half of the U.S. population was protected by a COVID or
2 winter-season based disconnection moratorium through March of 2021.¹⁰ Even
3 now, Washington D.C., New York, and Virginia have maintained their
4 disconnection moratoria due to COVID.¹¹

5 Second, the disconnection rates for both FPL and Gulf Power have far
6 exceeded the disconnection rates of TECO and Duke. As shown in the graph
7 below, FPL disconnected nearly 2.5% of its residential customers in December,
8 and its disconnection rates have been more than double TECO and Duke's
9 throughout the spring.¹²


¹⁰ National Energy Assistance Directors Association, *Winter and COVID-19 Utility Shut-off Moratoriums*, March 15, 2021, available at <https://neada.org/wintercovid19moratoriums/>.

¹¹ Washington, D.C. has suspended utility disconnections for nonpayment, as reported by the Mayor's office, <https://coronavirus.dc.gov/utilityhelp>; New York State Public Service Law prohibits utilities from disconnecting for nonpayment during the pandemic and continues until the COVID-19 state of emergency is lifted or expired, or at least by December 31, 2021, and thereafter for 180 days for customers who have experienced a change in financial circumstances due to the COVID-19 state of emergency, <https://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/AskPSC.nsf/All/D3BB77AFE92D6FFF852585EE0051A13E?OpenDocument>; Virginia prohibits disconnections until the Governor determines that the prohibition does not need to be in place or until at least 60 days after the declared state of emergency ends, Virginia House Bill 5005 (the Commonwealth of Virginia Budget, Section 4-14, Enactment 7(a), as of November 18, 2020), available at <https://budget.lis.virginia.gov/item/2020/2/HB5005/Chapter/4/4-14.00/>.

¹² Utility customer impact data related to COVID-19, as filed in Docket 20200000 and Docket 20210000. <http://www.floridapsc.com/ClerkOffice/DocketFiling?docket=20210000>.

1

Figure 1. Residential Customer Disconnection Rates



2

3

4

5

Source: Analysis of disconnection data provided by the utilities in customer impact data related to COVID-19, as filed in Docket 20200000 and Docket 20210000, and number of residential customers from U.S. EIA Form 861 (2019).

6 **Q**

Has FPL provided customers with payment arrangements or other assistance to avoid disconnection?

7

8 **A**

FPL states that it has assisted customers with payment arrangements and special programs “to provide additional relief and avoid disconnection.” However, the percentage of customers disconnected calls into question the effectiveness of the Company’s efforts to mitigate the hardship faced by customers who have fallen behind on their bills during the pandemic.

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
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16

Further, once FPL and Gulf Power customers have been disconnected, they are much more likely to remain disconnected. The figure below shows that in virtually every month, the percentage of customers disconnected and not reconnected was higher for FPL and Gulf Power than TECO or Duke Energy. In

1 fact, based on the customer impact data submitted by the utilities, residential
2 customers of Gulf Power are nearly five times less likely to have their service
3 restored than TECO customers.

4 **Figure 2. Percentage of Residential Customers Disconnected without Reconnection**



5
6 Source: Analysis of disconnection data provided by the utilities in customer impact data
7 related to COVID-19, as filed in Docket 20200000 and Docket 20210000, and number
8 of residential customers from EIA Form U.S. 861 (2019).

9 **Q What do you conclude with respect to FPL’s disconnection practices?**

10 **A** FPL’s President and CEO Eric Silagy claims that the Company’s “philosophy and
11 approach... begins with delivering superior customer service and reliability.”¹³

12 The Company’s rate of disconnections implies otherwise, however. FPL/Gulf’s
13 high rates of disconnections – even during the height of the pandemic – indicate

¹³ Docket No. 20210015-EI, Silagy Direct Testimony, p. 6, lines 13-14 (filed March 12, 2021).

1 that the Company lacks either the imagination or the incentive to find more
2 effective ways of addressing energy affordability.

3 **Q How do disconnections impact customers?**

4 **A** Electricity service can mean the difference between life and death for customers.
5 According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), already before the
6 pandemic, nearly 20 percent of households reported “reducing or forgoing
7 necessities such as food and medicine to pay an energy bill,” and 11% of
8 households “reported keeping their home at an unhealthy or unsafe
9 temperature.”¹⁴

10 These impacts became even more acute during the pandemic when
11 customers were advised to remain home and schools converted to virtual
12 classrooms. A customer shut off from electricity during the pandemic could mean
13 that their children would lose access to education, and that they would need to
14 move in with friends, relatives, or public shelters, potentially exposing them to
15 COVID. A recent paper by the National Bureau of Economic Research reports
16 that COVID-19 infections rates could have been reduced by 8.7% and deaths by

¹⁴ U.S. Energy Information Administration, “One in three U.S. households faces a challenge in meeting energy needs.” September 19, 2018. Available at <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37072>.

1 14.8% had utility disconnection moratoria been in place nation-wide from the
2 start of the pandemic.¹⁵

3 Although FPL states that, “We strive to do the right thing before we are
4 ordered, or even asked, to do so,”¹⁶ so far it has failed to do enough to ensure that
5 electricity customers remain connected to vital electricity services. As I explain in
6 greater detail later in my testimony, FPL should significantly expand its
7 disconnection protection policies.

8 **Q FPL states that its incremental bad debt expense has increased by \$28.5**
9 **million since the start of the pandemic.¹⁷ Would reducing disconnections**
10 **increase bad debt expense and thus rates for all customers?**

11 **A** Possibly, but only if customers are unable to pay the amount owed through an
12 arrearage management plan, and if the bad debt is funded solely through ratepayer
13 funds. An alternative would be for shareholders to shoulder all or a portion of the
14 bad debt expense. Given that the Company’s return on common equity in May
15 2021 was 11.60%¹⁸ and that FPL’s net income increased by more than \$300

¹⁵ Kay Jowers et al. Housing Precarity & the COVID-19 Pandemic: Impacts of Utility Disconnection and Eviction Moratoria on Infections and Deaths Across US Counties. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No. 28394. January 2021, p. 11. Available at https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28394/w28394.pdf

¹⁶ Docket No. 20210015-EI, Silagy Direct Testimony, p. 16 (filed March 12, 2021).

¹⁷ FPL Response to CLEO/Vote Solar’s First Set of Interrogatories No. 33, attached as Exhibit MW-2.

¹⁸ FPL Rate of Return Surveillance Report for March 2021, filed on May 14, 2021. Available at <https://www.floridapsc.com/UtilityRegulation/SurveillanceReports?compcode=EI802>.

1 million between 2019 and 2020,¹⁹ it would be reasonable for shareholders to fund
2 some or all of the outstanding bad debt expense.

3 **Energy Efficiency and Affordability**

4 **Q FPL has relatively low electricity rates. Does this mean that electricity is**
5 **affordable for FPL's customers?**

6 **A** No, electricity rates are not the same as electricity bills. Although two utilities
7 could have the same electricity rates, customers could pay substantially different
8 bills due to differing usage levels.

9 **Q FPL Witnesses Silagy²⁰ and Reed²¹ claim that FPL has the lowest residential**
10 **bill of the largest investor-owned utilities. Is this an accurate claim?**

11 **A** No. These comparisons are made assuming that customer energy usage levels are
12 the same when they are not.²² To compare the actual bills that customers pay
13 across utilities, I used data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's
14 2019 Form 861 for various utility groups. First, I analyzed average residential
15 bills for the 50 mainland investor owned utilities with the largest number of

¹⁹ NextEra Energy, Earnings Conference Call, Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2020, January 26, 2021, slide 8. Available at <http://www.investor.nexteraenergy.com/~media/Files/N/NEE-IR/reports-and-fillings/quarterly-earnings/2020/Q4/4Q%202020%20Slides%20v%20F.pdf>.


²⁰ FPSC Docket No. 20210015-EI, Silagy Direct Testimony, p. 6, lines 7-9 (filed March 12, 2021).

²¹ FPSC Docket No. 20210015-EI, Reed Direct Testimony, page 11, lines 1-6 (filed March 12, 2021).

²² See FPSC Docket No. 20210015-EI, Silagy Direct Testimony, Exhibit ES-3, which compares bills for customers assuming usage of 1,000 kWh.

1 residential customers. Of these utilities, FPL's average residential bill was 13th
2 highest, as shown in the following figure.

3 **Figure 3. Average Residential Monthly Bill (2019)**



4

5 **Q Why are the average bills for FPL customers higher than in most other**
6 **jurisdictions?**

7 **A** Electricity bills are generally higher in FPL's territory because electricity usage is
8 higher than in many other utilities' territories. There can be numerous reasons for
9 differing usage levels, but one key reason is utility investment in energy
10 efficiency. Energy efficiency programs are an important way in which utilities can
11 help customers reduce their usage and better manage their bills. Without such
12 programs, customers may not have the knowledge, time, or funds to seek out and
13 implement energy efficiency measures on their own. Compared to other utilities,

1 FPL’s energy efficiency efforts are limited. For 2020, the American Council for
2 an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE) ranked FPL 51st out of 52 utilities.²³

3 ACEEE reports that FPL’s energy efficiency savings total just 0.06% of
4 sales – well below the national average of 1.03% and the Southeast regional
5 average of 0.47%.²⁴

6 **Q What are the consequences of under-performing in providing energy**
7 **efficiency programs?**

8 **A** The consequences of such low investments in energy efficiency put FPL
9 customers at a disadvantage daily, since they end up paying higher bills than
10 necessary. This has been particularly detrimental during the pandemic when many
11 residents have been forced to stay home, rather than going to school or work,
12 thereby increasing the energy burden for customers even further.

²³ Grace Relf, Emma Cooper, Rachel Gold, Akanksha Goyal, and Corri Waters. 2020 Utility Energy Efficiency Scorecard. ACEEE. February 2020.

²⁴ York, Dan and Charlotte Cohn. “Unrealized Potential: Expanding Energy Efficiency Opportunities for Utility Customers in Florida.” ACEEE. January 2021. Available at https://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/expanding_ee_opportunities_in_florida.pdf.

1 **Innovation for Addressing Resilience and Affordability**

2 **Q Has FPL implemented innovative programs to address customer energy**
3 **burdens and resilience?**

4 **A** No. FPL prides itself on being an “innovative industry leader”²⁵ and developing
5 “innovative and industry leading ideas,”²⁶ but its efforts appear to largely be
6 focused on utility investments and operations, such as grid hardening measures
7 and adopting the latest technology to monitor the grid (such as deploying drones
8 and robotics for inspections).²⁷ While these efforts may help to minimize outages,
9 as acknowledged by FPL President and CEO Eric Silagy, “there is no such thing
10 as a hurricane-proof electric grid.”²⁸ When severe weather takes out power to the
11 grid, vulnerable customers are often unable to evacuate and depend on critical
12 facilities (including shelters) maintaining power. It is vital that these facilities
13 have backup power, such as through customer-sited solar plus storage, to help
14 communities deal with widespread power outages. FPL’s proposal is focused
15 primarily on utility-scale storage solutions, which will not be effective when a
16 major outage occurs.

²⁵ FPSC Docket No. 20210015-EI, Silagy Direct Testimony, p. 21 (filed March 12, 2021).

²⁶ *Id.* at p. 17.

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ Ostrowski, Jeff. “Hurricane Dorian: FPL chief says ‘significant destruction’ possible.” The Palm Beach Post. September 1, 2019. Available at <https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20190901/hurricane-dorian-fpl-chief-says-ldquosignificant-destructionrdquo-possible>.

1 **Low-Income Assistance Programs**

2 **Q What forms of energy assistance programs are available to low-income**
3 **customers in FPL/Gulf’s territory?**

4 **A** The federally-funded LIHEAP program is the largest program available to low-
5 income customers of FPL/Gulf. FPL reports that in 2020, \$29 million in LIHEAP
6 funding was received.²⁹ In addition, FPL’s “Care to Share” program helps
7 customers who are experiencing temporary financial difficulties. In 2020, \$1
8 million of assistance was provided through this program.³⁰ FPL has also offered
9 temporary programs that provide credits to customers, including a bill relief credit
10 for customers impacted by COVID³¹ and the Low-Income Credit Program, which
11 is designed to expire on December 31, 2021.³²

12 **Q Are these programs effective in reaching low-income customers?**

13 **A** Unfortunately, these programs only reach a very small subset of low-income
14 customers. According to the Company, the LIHEAP program served less than
15 65,000 customers in 2020,³³ and Care to Share provided assistance to fewer than
16 3,000 customers. During COVID, the Company reports that 112,000 residential

²⁹ FPL Response to CLEO/Vote Solar 1st Interrogatories No. 40, attached as Exh. MW-5.

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ FPL Response to CLEO/Vote Solar 1st Interrogatories No. 37, attached as Exh. MW-4.

³² FPL Response to CLEO/Vote Solar 1st Interrogatories No. 39, attached as Exh. MW-3.

³³ *Id.*

1 and commercial customers took advantage of FPL’s bill relief credit offer, and
2 63,000 customers are eligible for the Low-Income Credit Program. However, both
3 the bill credits and low-income credits are temporary programs.

4 Based on recent numbers, fewer than 70,000 residential customers can be
5 expected to receive assistance through LIHEAP and Care to Share. In contrast,
6 one-third of the population in the counties served by FPL/Gulf Power earn less
7 than 200% of the federal poverty level,³⁴ and an estimated 1.4 million FPL
8 customers live in energy poverty.³⁵ In other words, only about five percent of the
9 customers who need assistance receive it through these programs.

10 **Q Has FPL proposed new programs or rates to reach more customers with high**
11 **energy burdens?**

12 **A** No, I am not aware of any proposals by FPL in this rate case that would address a
13 large portion of customers with high energy burdens.

³⁴ Florida Department of Health, Division of Public Health Statistics & Performance Management,
[http://www.flhealthcharts.com/ChartsReports/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=NonVitalIndRateOnly.DataViewer
&cid=461](http://www.flhealthcharts.com/ChartsReports/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=NonVitalIndRateOnly.DataViewer&cid=461).

³⁵ Florida PSC Docket No. 20190061-EI, Direct testimony of Matt Cox, PhD on behalf of Vote Solar.

1 **4. SOLUTIONS**

2 ***Performance Incentive Mechanisms***

3 **Q What should be done to enhance customer protections and reduce customer**
4 **energy burdens?**

5 **A** I recommend that the Commission adopt performance incentive mechanisms
6 related to energy efficiency and customer disconnections, and that protections
7 against disconnections during hazardous temperatures, storms, and other
8 emergencies be expanded.

9 **Q Is your recommendation to adopt a performance incentive mechanism**
10 **consistent with the Company’s proposal to implement a 50-basis point ROE**
11 **addor for superior performance?**

12 **A** No. The Company’s proposal for a 50-basis point reward is inappropriate as it is
13 not tied to specific, Commission-approved metrics, targets, or goals. In contrast to
14 the utility’s proposal, performance incentive mechanisms (“PIMs”) establish a
15 well-defined set of metrics with associated targets and financial implications (i.e.,
16 penalties or rewards) tied to achieving specific targets. I recommend that the
17 Commission reject the Company’s proposal for a broad 50 basis point ROE adder
18 and instead adopt PIMs tied to specific public policy goals.

1 **Q What steps should be followed when establishing performance incentive**
2 **mechanisms?**

3 **A** As described in the report *Utility Performance Incentive Mechanisms: A*
4 *Handbook for Regulators*,³⁶ the key steps for establishing a PIM are as follows:

- 5 1. Articulate the policy goals that the PIM is to achieve and assess any current
6 utility incentives or disincentives for achieving these goals in the current
7 regulatory context.
- 8 2. Identify the performance area(s) that warrant additional attention.
- 9 3. Establish specific, measurable performance metrics with reporting
10 requirements for measuring progress toward the goal(s).
- 11 4. Establish performance targets to provide utilities with clear messages
12 regarding the level of performance expected by regulators.
- 13 5. Establish penalties and rewards, as needed to provide direct financial
14 incentives for maintaining or improving performance.

15 **Q Please elaborate on your recommendation for a PIM related to utility**
16 **disconnections.**

17 **A** While I recognize that FPL has made efforts to enroll customers in Arrearage
18 Management Plans (AMPs), clearly additional effort is needed in this area due to

³⁶ Whited, Melissa, Tim Woolf, and Alice Napoleon. 2015. *Utility Performance Incentive Mechanisms: A handbook for regulators*. Prepared for the Western Interstate Energy Board by Synapse Energy Economics. Available at https://www.synapse-energy.com/sites/default/files/Utility%20Performance%20Incentive%20Mechanisms%2014-098_0.pdf.

1 the large percentage of customers disconnected by FPL/Gulf. The specific
2 solutions to address this issue will require the time and attention of FPL
3 management and customer service staff, and care should be taken to minimize
4 increases in bad debt expense. Because this can be a difficult, multifaceted issue, I
5 suggest that the Commission implement a PIM that would provide FPL with a
6 small financial incentive for reducing both bad debt and customer disconnections.

7 **Q Do you also recommend that the Commission adopt PIMs that address**
8 **energy efficiency?**

9 **A** Yes. While I understand that specific energy efficiency targets are set in the
10 Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (FEECA) docket,³⁷ I recommend
11 that the Commission implement energy efficiency performance incentive
12 mechanisms that would only reward FPL for substantial improvements in the
13 delivery of energy efficiency programs, particularly for low-income customers.
14 For example, FPL should fund emergency relief energy efficiency for customers
15 in arrears, similar to the commitment that Duke Energy Florida recently made.³⁸

16 In designing performance incentive mechanisms for energy efficiency, I
17 note that financial rewards directly based on program spending, such as a rate of
18 return on program costs, provide the wrong incentive to utilities. Such incentives

³⁷ *In re: Commission review of numeric conservation goals (Florida Power & Light Company)*, FPSC Docket No. 20190015-EG.

³⁸ *In re: Duke Energy Florida, LLC's Petition for a limited proceeding to approve 2021 settlement agreement, including general base rate increases*, Docket No. 20210016-EI, Memorandum of Understanding filed April 23, 2021.

1 encourage the utility to earn more by spending more (either by increasing rate
2 base or by increasing program costs). For this reason, I recommend establishing
3 PIMs that are tied to the net benefits provided to customers from energy
4 efficiency programs, or for significantly expanding energy efficiency access to
5 customers with high energy burdens.

6 **Expanded Disconnection Moratoria**

7 **Q What do you recommend with respect to expanding utility disconnection**
8 **protections?**

9 **A** As I have explained, electricity is a vital service, especially during times of crisis.
10 More must be done to ensure that customers who need it most are not
11 disconnected, particularly when doing so could be life-threatening. Therefore, I
12 recommend that FPL commit to suspending disconnections during emergencies
13 (e.g., when preparing for or recovering from major storms), and when
14 temperatures are hazardous. Such protections were recently agreed by Duke
15 Energy Florida in the Memorandum of Understanding filed in Docket No.
16 20210016-EI,³⁹ and have been widely adopted across the United States.

³⁹ *Id.*

1 **Q What other jurisdictions have adopted seasonal or temperature-based**
2 **moratoria on disconnections?**

3 **A** Approximately 75% of states have some form of seasonal or temperature-based
4 disconnection moratoria in place, as reported by the US Department of Health and
5 Human Services.⁴⁰ For example, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland,
6 Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island are reported to
7 prohibit disconnections during periods of excessive heat. As climate change leads
8 to record-breaking heat, FPL should implement similar protections to help protect
9 its vulnerable customers against unnecessary heat-related deaths. Likewise,
10 customers should have access to life-saving electricity when major storms are
11 imminent to enable these customers to prepare as well as possible, and for a
12 reasonable time after storms hit to enable recovery.

13 **Innovation in Resilience and Affordability**

14 **Q Has FPL implemented innovative programs to address customer energy**
15 **burdens and resilience?**

16 **A** No. As I noted earlier, although FPL prides itself on being an “innovative industry
17 leader”⁴¹ its efforts are largely be focused on utility investments and operations,

⁴⁰ The archived table of states with disconnection moratoria is available at <https://web.archive.org/web/20210318034213/https://liheapch.acf.hhs.gov/Disconnect/SeasonalDisconnect.htm>.

⁴¹ FPSC Docket No. 20210015-EI, Silagy Direct Testimony, p. 21 (filed March 12, 2021).

1 such as grid hardening measures and adopting the latest technology to monitor the
2 grid.⁴²

3 I recommend that FPL look beyond its own operations and seek new
4 ways to partner with its customers. In particular, I recommend that FPL target
5 programs that address resilience and affordability for public schools.

6 **Q Why do you recommend that FPL target programs for public schools?**

7 **A** Schools are a prime candidate for utility programs because:

- 8 • School electricity bills represent a major cost for state taxpayers, with annual
9 energy expenditures surpassing \$500 million.⁴³
- 10 • Schools serve as the primary source of public shelter during hurricanes,
11 comprising 97 percent of statewide hurricane shelter space.⁴⁴ Vulnerable
12 customers are more likely to use these shelters, as they tend to be less able to
13 travel long distances and afford private accommodations (e.g., hotels). Thus,
14 ensuring that these facilities have power, even when the rest of the grid is
15 down, would provide enhance equity by improving customers' ability to
16 withstand increasingly severe storms.

⁴² *Id.*

⁴³ Florida Department of Education. Florida School District Annual Energy Cost Information, District Annual Financial Reports, 2017-2018. Available at <http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/5599/urlt/1718AnnualEnergy.pdf>.

⁴⁴ Florida Division of Emergency Management. 2018 Statewide Emergency Shelter Plan, January 31, 2018, p. 1-4. Available at <https://www.floridadisaster.org/globalassets/dem/response/sesp/2018/2018-sesp-entire-document.pdf>.

- 1 • Some schools have adopted 100% clean energy goals (such as Miami).
2 Expanding energy efficiency and customer-sited renewable energy options
3 would help these schools meet their commitments to clean energy.⁴⁵

4 **Q What recommendations do you have for innovative programs aimed at**
5 **enhancing resilience and affordability at schools?**

6 **A** I recommend that FPL set ambitious goals for expanding its energy efficiency and
7 demand response offerings to schools to reduce energy bills, and for
8 implementing onsite renewable energy with storage to provide islandable back-up
9 power for community resilience. For example, FPL should set a goal to ensure
10 that by 2030, all schools that are able to accommodate it have installed on-site
11 solar with battery storage for resilience purposes, and a related goal to reduce
12 school building energy consumption by 25 percent. In addition, FPL should
13 investigate ways that electric school buses could potentially help provide backup
14 power in emergencies. FPL could structure this offering as a shared savings
15 mechanism between participating schools, the utility and other customers. In
16 order to ensure cost-effectiveness, the utility should issue a request for proposals
17 (RFP) to obtain pricing from other qualified vendors, rather than the utility simply
18 using such a program to expand its rate base.

⁴⁵ Harris, A. and C. Wright. ““For our children’s sake”: Miami Dade schools commit to 100% clean energy by 2030.” Miami Herald, April 21, 2021. Available at: <https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/education/article250811844.html>.

1 **Additional Low-Income Protections**

2 **Q What other forms of energy assistance do you recommend for low-income**
3 **customers?**

4 **A** Separate low-income rates or programs for low-income customers can provide
5 immediate assistance to these households. For example, a Percentage of Income
6 Payment Plan (PIPP) caps a customer’s bill at a set percentage of their income.
7 Such programs have been adopted in Ohio, Illinois, and Colorado.⁴⁶ Some
8 utilities offer separate rates for low-income customers or a percentage discount on
9 the customer’s bill. For example, California’s CARE program provides low-
10 income customers with a 30-35 percent discount on their electric bill,⁴⁷ and
11 qualified customers of Massachusetts’ investor-owned utilities are provided with
12 a discounted electricity rate. For National Grid, this discount is currently equal to
13 32 percent.⁴⁸ PIPP legislation was recently passed in Virginia, capping eligible
14 customers’ monthly electric payments at six percent of household income, with
15 options for customers to further reduce their bills through participation in

⁴⁶ In Ohio, a PIPP is available to customers whose income is at or below 150% of the federal poverty level (<https://www.duke-energy.com/home/billing/special-assistance/percentage-of-income>); in Illinois, customers receive assistance to help cover electricity bills greater than 6% of their income (<https://www.illinoislegalaid.org/legal-information/setting-utilities-percentage-income-payment-plan>) and in Colorado, the PIPP program is available to customers who have a household income at or below 185 percent of the current federal poverty level (<https://dora.colorado.gov/press-release/puc-issues-emergency-rules-to-expand-utility-programs-for-low-income-customers-during>).

⁴⁷ California Public Utilities Commission: CARE/FERA Programs, <https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/lowincomerates/>.

⁴⁸ National Grid Service Rates, Low-Income (R-2) rate, available at <https://www.nationalgridus.com/MA-Home/Rates/Service-Rates>.

1 weatherization or energy efficiency programs and energy conservation education
2 programs.⁴⁹ FPL should commit to seeking a similar program for its low-income
3 customers.

4 **Q Does this conclude your testimony?**

5 **A** Yes, it does.

⁴⁹ *An Act to amend and reenact §§ 56-576 and 56-585.6 of the Code of Virginia, relating to electric utilities; Percentage of Income Payment Program.* Available at: <https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?212+ful+HB2330ER>

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PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Synapse Energy Economics, Cambridge MA. *Principal Associate*, 2017 – present, *Senior Associate*, 2015 – 2017, *Associate*, 2012 – 2015

Consult and provide analysis of rate design proposals, alternative regulation, and other topics including distributed energy resources and electric vehicles. Develop expert witness testimony in public utility commission proceedings. Author reports on topics at the intersection of utility regulation, customer protection, and environmental impacts.

University of Wisconsin - Madison, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Madison, WI. *Teaching Assistant – Environmental Economics*, 2011 – 2012

Developed teaching materials and led discussions on cost-benefit analysis, carbon taxes and cap-and-trade programs, management of renewable and non-renewable resources, and other topics.

Public Service Commission of Wisconsin, Water Division, Madison, WI. *Program and Policy Analyst - Intern*, Summer 2009

Researched water conservation programs nationwide to develop a proposal for Wisconsin's state conservation program. Developed spreadsheet model to calculate avoided costs of water conservation in terms of energy savings and avoided emissions.

Synapse Energy Economics, Cambridge, MA. *Communications Manager*, 2005 – 2008

Developed technical proposals for state and federal agencies, environmental and public interest groups, and businesses. Edited reports on energy efficiency, integrated resource planning, greenhouse gas regulations, renewable resources, and other topics.

EDUCATION

University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI

Master of Arts in Agricultural and Applied Economics, 2012

Certificate in Energy Analysis and Policy

National Science Foundation Fellow

University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI

Master of Science in Environment and Resources, 2010

Certificate in Humans and the Global Environment

Nelson Distinguished Fellowship

Southwestern University, Georgetown, TX

Bachelor of Arts in International Studies, *Magna cum laude*, 2003.

ADDITIONAL SKILLS

- Econometric Modeling – Linear and nonlinear modeling including time-series, panel data, logit, probit, and discrete choice regression analysis
- Nonmarket Valuation Methods for Environmental Goods – Hedonic valuation, travel cost method, and contingent valuation
- Cost-Benefit Analysis
- Input-Output Modeling for Regional Economic Analysis

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

- Winner, M. Jarvin Emerson Student Paper Competition, *Journal of Regional Analysis and Policy*, 2010
- Fellowship, National Science Foundation Integrative Graduate Education and Research Traineeship (IGERT), University of Wisconsin – Madison, 2009
- Nelson Distinguished Fellowship, University of Wisconsin – Madison, 2008

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TESTIMONY

Colorado Public Utilities Commission (Proceeding No. 20AL-0432E): Answer testimony of Melissa Whited regarding inclining block rates. On behalf of Energy Outreach Colorado. March 8, 2021.

Maryland Public Service Commission (Case No. 9655): Direct and surrebuttal testimony of Melissa Whited regarding Pepco's proposed multi-year plan and performance incentive mechanisms. On behalf of Maryland Office of People's Counsel. March 3, 2021.

Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (Matter No. M09777): Direct testimony of Melissa Whited regarding Nova Scotia Power Inc.'s proposed time-varying pricing tariff application. On behalf of Counsel to the Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board. February 24, 2021.

Georgia Public Service Commission (Docket No. 42516): Direct testimony of Melissa Whited and Ben Havumaki regarding Georgia Power's proposal to increase the customer charge for residential customers. On behalf of the Sierra Club. October 17, 2019.

Maine Public Utilities Commission (Docket No. 2018-00171): Direct testimony of Melissa Whited regarding utility incentives for non-wires alternatives. On behalf of Maine Office of the Public Advocate. December 17, 2018.

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (Docket No. 4780): Direct testimony of Tim Woolf and Melissa Whited regarding National Grid's Power Sector Transformation proposals. On behalf of the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers. April 28, 2018.

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (Docket No. 4770): Direct testimony of Tim Woolf and Melissa Whited regarding National Grid's proposed performance incentive mechanisms, benefit-cost analyses, and request for recovery of costs for its Advanced Metering Functionality study and distributed energy resources enablement investments. On behalf of the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers. April 6, 2018.

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (Docket No. 4783): Direct testimony of Tim Woolf and Melissa Whited regarding National Grid's Advanced Metering Functionality Pilot. On behalf of the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers. February 22, 2018.

Virginia State Corporation Commission (Case No. PUR-2017-00044): Direct testimony of Melissa Whited regarding Rappahannock Electric Cooperative's proposed increases to fixed charges for residential customers and small business customers. On behalf of Sierra Club. September 19, 2017.

California Public Utilities Commission (Application 17-01-020, 17-01-021, and 17-01-022): Joint opening testimony with Max Baumhefner and Katherine Stainken on fast charging infrastructure and rates; joint opening testimony with Max Baumhefner and Joel Espino on medium and heavy-duty and fleet charging infrastructure and commercial EV rates; joint opening testimony with Max Baumhefner and Chris King on residential charging infrastructure and rates. Rebuttal testimony on public fast charging rate design, commercial EV rate design, and residential EV rate design. On behalf of Natural Resources Defense Council, the Greenlining Institute, Plug In America, the Coalition of California Utility Employees, Sierra Club, and the Environmental Defense Fund. July 25, August 1, August 7, and September 5, 2017.

New York Public Service Commission (Case 17-E-0238): Direct and rebuttal testimony of Tim Woolf and Melissa Whited regarding Earnings Adjustment Mechanisms proposed by National Grid. On behalf of Advanced Energy Economy Institute. August 25 and September 15, 2017.

Utah Public Service Commission (Docket No. 14-035-114): Direct testimony of Melissa Whited regarding Pacificorp's proposed rates for customers with distributed generation. On behalf of Utah Clean Energy. June 8, 2017.

Texas Public Utilities Commission (SOAH Docket No. 473-17-1764, PUC Docket No. 46449): Cross-rebuttal testimony evaluating Southwestern Electric Power Company's proposed revisions to its Distributed Renewable Generation tariff. On behalf of Sierra Club and Dr. Lawrence Brough. May 19, 2017.

Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (Docket No. 17-05): Direct and surrebuttal testimony of Tim Woolf and Melissa Whited regarding performance-based regulation, the monthly minimum reliability contribution, storage pilots, and rate design in Eversource's petition for approval of rate increases and a performance-based ratemaking mechanism. On behalf of Sunrun and the Energy Freedom Coalition of America, LLC. April 28, 2017 and May 26, 2017.

Public Utilities Commission of Hawaii (Docket No. 2015-0170): Direct testimony regarding Hawaiian Electric Light Company's proposed performance incentive mechanisms. On behalf of the Division of Consumer Advocacy. April 28, 2017.

Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (Docket No. 15-155): Joint direct and rebuttal testimony with T. Woolf regarding National Grid's rate design proposal. On behalf of Energy Freedom Coalition of America, LLC. March 18, 2016 and April 28, 2016.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Docket No. EC13-93-000): Affidavit regarding potential market power resulting from the acquisition of Ameren generation by Dynegy. On behalf of Sierra Club. August 16, 2013.

Wisconsin Senate Committee on Clean Energy: Joint testimony with M. Grabow regarding the importance of clean transportation to Wisconsin's public health and economy. February 2010.

TESTIMONY ASSISTANCE

Colorado Public Utilities Commission (Proceeding No. 16AL-0048E): Answer testimony of Tim Woolf regarding Public Service Company of Colorado's rate design proposal. On behalf of Energy Outreach Colorado. June 6, 2016.

Nevada Public Utilities Commission (Docket Nos. 15-07041 and 15-07042): Direct testimony on NV Energy's application for approval of a cost of service study and net metering tariffs. On behalf of The Alliance for Solar Choice. October 27, 2015.

Missouri Public Service Commission (Case No. ER-2014-0370): Direct and surrebuttal testimony on the topic of Kansas City Power and Light's rate design proposal. On behalf of Sierra Club. April 16, 2015 and June 5, 2015.

Wisconsin Public Service Commission (Docket No. 05-UR-107): Direct and surrebuttal testimony of Rick Hornby regarding Wisconsin Electric Power Company rate case. On behalf of The Alliance for Solar Choice. August 28, 2014 and September 22, 2014.

Maine Public Utilities Commission (Docket No. 2013-00519): Direct testimony of Richard Hornby and Martin R. Cohen on GridSolar's smart grid coordinator petition. On behalf of the Maine Office of the Public Advocate. August 28, 2014.

Maine Public Utilities Commission (Docket No. 2013-00168): Direct and surrebuttal testimony of Tim Woolf regarding Central Maine Power's request for an alternative rate plan. December 12, 2013 and March 21, 2014.

Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (Docket No. 14-04): Comments of Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources on investigation into time varying rates. On behalf of the Massachusetts Department of Energy Resources. March 10, 2014.

State of Nevada, Public Utilities Commission of Nevada (Docket No. 13-07021): Direct testimony of Frank Ackerman regarding the proposed merger of NV Energy, Inc. and MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company. On behalf of the Sierra Club. October 24, 2013.

PRESENTATIONS

Whited, M. 2021. "Evolution of Net Metering in Hawaii." Presentation to the NARUC Winter Policy Summit. February 4.

Biewald, B., M. Whited. "Evaluating and Shaping the Impacts of EVs on Customers: Tools for Consumer Advocates." Presentation at the NASUCA Mid-Year Meeting, June 19, 2019.

Whited, M. 2019. "Performance Incentive Mechanisms." Presentation to the 2019 Pennsylvania Public Utility Law Conference, Harrisburg, PA. May 31.

Whited, M. 2018. "Smart Non-Residential Rate Design: Designing for the Future." Presentation to the NARUC Annual Meeting, Orlando, FL. November 11.

Whited, M. 2016. "Energy Policy for the Future: Trends and Overview." Presentation to the National Conference of State Legislators' Capitol Forum, Washington, DC, December 8.

Whited, M. 2016. "Ratemaking for the Future: Trends and Considerations." Presentation to the Midwest Governors' Association, St. Paul, MN, July 14.

Whited, M. 2016. "Performance Based Regulation." Presentation to the NARUC Rate Design Subcommittee. September 12.

Whited, M. 2016. "Demand Charges: Impacts and Alternatives (A Skeptic's View)." EUCI 2nd Annual Residential Demand Charges Summit, Phoenix, AZ, June 7.

Whited, M. 2016. "Performance Incentive Mechanisms." Presentation to the National Governors Association, Wisconsin Workshop, Madison WI, March 29.

Whited, M., T. Woolf. 2016. "Caught in a Fix: The Problem with Fixed Charges for Electricity." Webinar presentation sponsored by Consumers Union, February.

Whited, M. 2015. "Performance Incentive Mechanisms." Presentation to the National Governors Association, Learning Lab on New Utility Business Models & the Electricity Market Structures of the Future, Boston, MA, July 28.

Whited, M. 2015. "Rate Design: Options for Addressing NEM Impacts." Presentation to the Utah Net Energy Metering Workgroup, Workshop 4, Salt Lake City, UT, July 8.

Whited, M. 2015. "Performance Incentive Mechanisms." Presentation to the e21 Initiative, St. Paul, MN, May 29.

Whited, M., F. Ackerman. 2013. "Water Constraints on Energy Production: Altering our Current Collision Course." Webinar presentation sponsored by Civil Society Institute, September 12.

Whited, M., G. Brown, K. Charipar. 2011. "Electricity Demand Response Programs and Potential in Wisconsin." Presentation to the Wisconsin Public Service Commission, April.

Whited, M. 2010. "Economic Impact of Irrigation Water Transfers in Uvalde County, Texas." Presentation at the Mid-Continent Regional Science Association's 41st Annual Conference/IMPLAN National User's 8th Biennial Conference in St. Louis, MO, June

Whited, M., M. Grabow, M. Hahn. 2009. "Valuing Bicycling's Economic and Health Impacts in Wisconsin." Presentation before the Governor's Coordinating Council on Bicycling, December.

Whited, M., D. Sheard. 2009. "Water Conservation Initiatives in Wisconsin." Presentation before the Waukesha County Water Conservation Coalition Municipal Water Conservation Subgroup, July.

Resume updated June 2021

QUESTION:

Please refer to Witness Silagy's direct testimony at pp. 21-22. State how many customers had disconnections voluntarily suspended in each month during the moratorium period, and list any costs incurred by FPL related to the suspension.

RESPONSE:

FPL voluntarily suspended collections mid-March 2020 to provide customers some relief from the financial impacts of the pandemic. In addition, when collections resumed in the fourth quarter of 2020, FPL assisted customers with payment arrangements and special programs to provide additional relief and avoid disconnection. The direct impact of the suspension of collections is reflected in FPL's bad debt expense. The incremental bad debt compared to the three-year historical average is reflected in the FPSC monthly COVID-19 Customer Impact Data Report. The cumulative incremental impact from March 2020 to March 2021 is \$28.5 million.

Because FPL voluntarily suspended disconnects and final notices, there is no data available, nor is it feasible to say how many customers would have been disconnected. FPL's response to CLEO Institute and Vote Solar's First Set of Interrogatories No. 44 subparts (h) and (m) provides historical disconnection volume for residential and commercial customers by month for reference.

QUESTION:

Please refer to Witness Silagy's direct testimony at p. 22, lines 9-14. With respect to the shareholder-funded initiatives, please state: a) the total dollar amount that shareholders have contributed to these initiatives, and how funds have been allocated across each initiative; b) how many low-income customers were eligible for each initiative; c) whether these initiatives are still underway; c) how these initiatives were communicated to eligible customers; c) how many customers actually received a financial benefit; and d) in what amounts (both in total and on average per eligible low income customer).

RESPONSE:

Please see below for the requested information for the Low Income Credit and Care To Share programs referenced in Witness Silagy's testimony. For additional advertising expenses also referenced in the testimony, please see FPL's response to CLEO Institute and Vote Solar's First Set of Interrogatories No. 40.

Low Income Credit Program

- a. The Low Income Credit Program was initiated December 1, 2020. Throughout the program period, a \$20 credit will be applied monthly to qualifying Residential customer's bills. Shareholders have contributed \$6,434,480 to this program.
- b. From December 1, 2020 to May 31, 2021, 63,281 unique accounts were eligible for the credit. The Low Income Credit Program will extend through December 31, 2021.
- c. Qualifying customers were made aware via bill message and letter. Additionally, notifications were made to key stakeholders and the media.
- d. The number of accounts receiving the \$20 monthly Low Income Credit Program was 63,281. From December 1, 2020 through May 31st, 2021, the program has paid / committed \$6,434,480.

Care To Share

- a. Please see FPL's response to CLEO Institute and Vote Solar's First Set of Interrogatories No. 41.
- b. The Care To Share program helps customers who are experiencing temporary financial difficulties. Eligibility for FPL's Care to Share program is determined by partner agencies that administer Care to Share funds using established program criteria (i.e. income level, status of FPL account). FPL does not determine individual customer eligibility. The Care To Share program is currently available to qualifying customers.
- c. Information regarding FPL's Care To Share program is made available on our website, through social media, press releases, stakeholder outreach, and agent processes. Additionally, FPL partners with agencies to communicate the availability of the funds to customers they are serving.
- d. In 2020, 2,922 customers received assistance from Care To Share for a total of \$1 MM and an average of \$343.25 per customer. From January to April 2021, 1,024 customers have received assistance from Care To Share for a total of \$380,000 and an average of \$370.92 per customer.

QUESTION:

Please refer to Witness Silagy's direct testimony at p. 22, lines 5-6. Please state: a) how many residential and small business customers were eligible for a credit; b) how this was communicated to eligible customers, c) how many customers actually received a credit; and d) what amounts were credited (both in total and on average per eligible residential and commercial customer). Please list any costs incurred by FPL, ratepayers or shareholders related to these credits.

RESPONSE:

- a. The number of FPL residential and small business customers eligible for a credit was over 151,000.
- b. Eligible FPL customers were notified via a letter or email. Customers were also informed of their eligibility status if they contacted the customer care center.
- c. As provided in the October 2020 FPSC COVID-19 Customer Impact Data Report, over 112,000 customers took advantage of FPL's bill relief credit offer.
- d. The amounts credited for FPL's residential and commercial customers totaled \$15.5 million for an average of \$138 per participating customer.

The FPL impact from the bill relief credits is part of the bad debt expense provided in response to CLEO Institute and Vote Solar's First Set of Interrogatories No. 33. Bad debt expense is included in base rates paid by customers.

QUESTION:

Please refer to Witness Silagy’s direct testimony at p. 22, lines 11-13. Please state the amount of shareholder funds allocated to additional advertising for each program listed; how this compares to existing budgets for advertising for each program; and whether this additional funding led to an increase in enrollment in these programs.

RESPONSE:

In 2020, FPL executed a nearly \$2.5 million shareholder-funded advertising campaign to enhance awareness of the numerous ways the company was providing support to customers experiencing hardship during the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. This shareholder-funded advertising campaign was not allocated to individual programs but, rather, the advertising campaign directed customers to the Company’s assistance webpage, which included information regarding FPL’s Care To Share program, as well as information regarding numerous third-party agencies that help customers both secure federal funding through the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) and participate in weatherization programs.

As indicated in the table below, direct page views FPL.com/Help increased more than a hundredfold in 2020 as compared to 2019. In fact, nearly 45% of all traffic to this webpage in 2020 occurred during the advertising campaign in April and May. As indicated in the table below, total LIHEAP and Care To Share dollars received increased in 2020 as compared to 2019. So, too, did the average payment per customer for both programs.

FPL’s existing advertising budget to promote energy efficiency tips was nearly \$9 million in 2020 and recovered through the Energy Conservation Recovery Clause (ECCR). FPL also has a \$25,000 annual budget (recovered through the ECCR) specifically to promote low-income energy savings events, which include weatherization of homes for low-income customers. Due to COVID-19 safety concerns, FPL did not conduct its Power To Save events in 2020. Still, participation the Low-Income Weatherization Program increased in 2020 as compared to 2019, as indicated in the table below. FPL does not have an existing advertising budget to specifically promote LIHEAP or Care To Share, and instead executes targeted communication to customers and partner agencies throughout the year.

Year	FPL.com/Help ⁽¹⁾	LIHEAP			Care To Share			Low-Income Weatherization Customers
		Dollars Received	Recipients	Average per customer	Dollars Received	Recipients	Average per customer	
2019	1,256	\$22,573,506	69,956	\$322.68	\$905,263	2,892	\$313.02	2,796
2020	173,008	\$28,806,573	64,858	\$444.15	\$1,002,973	2,922	\$343.25	3,137

(1) Represents direct page views to FPL.com/Help; total page views in 2020 surpassed 830,000