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September 19, 2025

VIA ELECTRONIC FILING

Adam Teitzman, Commission Clerk
Division of the Commission Clerk and Administrative Services
Florida Public Service Commission
2540 Shumard Oak Boulevard
Tallahassee, FL 32399

Re: Docket No. 20250011-EI

In re: Petition by Florida Power & Light Company

for Bate Rase Increase

Dear Mr. Teitzman:

Please find enclosed for filing in the above-referenced docket the Direct Testimony and Exhibits of John Thomas Herndon on behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida, Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc., Florida Rising, Inc., The League of United Latin American Citizens of Florida, and the Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida. This filing is being made via the Florida Public Service Commission's web-based electronic filing portal.

Please let me know if you should have questions regarding this submission.

Cordially yours,

Robert Scheffel Wrigh

RSW:rjd Enclosure

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished

by electronic mail on this 19th day of September, 2025, to the following:

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Represents: EVgo Services, LLC

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Represents: Americans for Affordable Clean Energy; Circle K Stores, Inc.; RaceTrac, Inc.; and

Wawa, Inc.

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/s/Robert Scheffel Wright
ATTORNEY

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Petition by for Rate Increase by)
Florida Power & Light Company) DOCKET NO. 20250011-EI
) FILED: SEPTEMBER 19, 2025
)

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JOHN THOMAS HERNDON

On Behalf of

The Citizens of the State of Florida,
Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc.,
Florida Rising, Inc.,
The League of United Latin American
Citizens of Florida, and
The Environmental Confederation of
Southwest Florida

IN RE: PETITION FOR RATE INCREASE BY FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, DOCKET NO. 20250011-EI

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JOHN THOMAS HERNDON

ON BEHALF OF

THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, FLORIDIANS AGAINST INCREASED RATES, INC., FLORIDA RISING, INC., THE LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS OF FLORIDA, AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONFEDERATION OF SOUTHWEST FLORIDA

1		<u>INTRODUCTION</u>
2	Q.	Please state your name and business address.
3	A.	My name is John Thomas Herndon, and my address is 63 Rocky Ridge Road
4		Highlands, North Carolina 28741.
5		
6	Q.	By whom and in what position are you employed?
7	A.	In practical terms, I am self-employed as an independent contractor. After
8		more than thirty years of service to two Florida governors, the Florida
9		Legislature, the Public Service Commission, the Florida State Board of
10		Administration, and other agencies in Florida's state government, as well as
11		brief periods in consulting, I retired from full-time employment in 2005
12		Since that time, I have worked as an independent contractor, including

service as a director and board member for several organizations and occasionally as a consultant on various matters, including utility issues.

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4 Q. On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding?

5 A. I am testifying on behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida, represented by their Office of Public Counsel ("Citizens" or "OPC"); Floridians Against 6 7 Increased Rates, Inc. ("FAIR"), a Florida not-for-profit corporation, and FAIR's members who are customers of Florida Power & Light Company 8 9 ("FPL"); Florida Rising, Inc.; the League of United Latin American Citizens of Florida ("LULAC"); and the Environmental Confederation of Southwest 10 11 Florida ("ECOSWF"). Collectively, Florida Rising, LULAC, and ECOSWF are referred to as "FEL." 12

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Q. Please summarize your educational background and professional experience.

I received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Interdisciplinary Social Services from the University of South Florida in 1968, and a Master of Social Work degree from Florida State University in 1972. Beginning in 1974, I held several positions of increasing responsibility in Florida state government, including service in the Florida Legislature as staff director of the Florida House of Representatives Appropriations Committee. After that I served six years as state budget director and later Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of Staff for

Governor Bob Graham. I then served as a Public Service Commissioner from 1986 until 1990, after which Governor Bob Martinez nominated me to serve as Director of the Florida Department of Revenue from 1990 to 1992. Governor Lawton Chiles appointed me as his Chief of Staff for three years, from 1992 until 1995. My career in Florida state government culminated with my serving six years as Executive Director of the State Board of Administration managing the state pension fund and other accounts. My professional experience also included two relatively brief periods, 1995-1996 and 2002-2005, in which I provided governmental consulting and lobbying services to a range of clients. My résumé is provided as Exhibit JTH-1 to my testimony.

A.

Q. Are you testifying as an expert in this proceeding? If so, please state the area or areas of your expertise relevant to your testimony.

Yes. From my perspective as a former member of the Florida Public Service Commission, as the Executive Director of the Florida State Board of Administration, as the Director of the Office of Planning and Budgeting in the administration of Governor Bob Graham, and as the chief of staff for Governor Bob Graham and Governor Lawton Chiles, I am testifying as an expert regarding utility ratemaking, including appropriate rates of return on common equity for investor-owned electric companies such as FPL; regarding the principles applicable to setting fair, just, and reasonable rates

for electric utility customers; and regarding sound public policy, including public interest considerations applicable to promoting electric utility service and the Commission's role in setting utility rates.

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5 Q. Have you previously testified in proceedings before utility regulatory commissions or similar authorities?

I testified before the Florida Public Service Commission 7 A. Yes. ("Commission," "Florida PSC," or "PSC") in Docket No. 20080317-EI, a 8 9 previous general rate case before the PSC involving Tampa Electric Company. I also testified in Docket No. 20210015-EI, the 2021 general rate 10 11 case for FPL. In my career, I also testified many times regarding financial, investment, and policy issues before committees and subcommittees of the 12 Florida Legislature and before the Florida Governor and Cabinet. 13

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15 Q. Are you sponsoring any exhibits with your supplemental testimony?

16 A. Yes. I am sponsoring the following exhibits:

17	Exhibit JTH-1	Résumé of John Thomas Herndon;
18		
19	Exhibit JTH-2	Florida PSC document titled "REVENUE
20		REDUCTIONS AND INCREASES ORDERED
21		BY THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE
22		COMMISSION FOR CERTAIN INVESTOR-
23		OWNED ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS
24		UTILITIES, UTILITIES FROM 1960 TO
25		PRESENT (All Utilities from 1968 to Present);
26		
27	Exhibit JTH-3	Customer Majority Parties' Proposal;

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2		Exhibit JTH-4	Reported Authorized Rates of Return on Equity,
3			Electric Utility Rate Cases Completed, 2023 to
4			Present (Exhibit LVP-2 to prefiled testimony of
5			Lisa V. Perry);
6			
7		Exhibit JTH-5	FPL Actual ROEs Compared to Approved
8			Midpoint ROEs, 2022-2025; and
9			C ' CM' El (CEDI E'l'
10		Exhibit JTH-6	Comparison of Major Elements of FPL Filing,
11			SIPs' Proposed Settlement, and CMPs' Proposal Over 2026-2029.
12			Over 2020-2029.
13 14		<u>PURPOSE ANI</u>	SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY
15	Q.	What is the purpose of v	our direct testimony in this docket?
10	v.	, muc is the purpose or y	our un eet testimony in tims doctet.
16	A.	My testimony provides n	ny opinions regarding certain major elements and
17		issues that are "on the tab	ele" in this case as they will determine the ultimate
18		revenues to be obtained by	y FPL and the rates to be paid by FPL's customers.
19		Specifically, my testimo	ny provides my opinions regarding the revenue
20		requirements to be appro-	oved by the Commission, the rate of return on
21		common equity ("ROE")	to be approved by the Commission, and FPL's
22		proposal to use a "Tax A	Adjustment Mechanism" ("TAM") to enhance its
23		earnings.	
24			
25	Q.	What is your understand	ding of the procedural status of this case and the
26		various revenue and ra	te proposals that have been presented to the
27		Commission?	

This case was initiated by Florida Power & Light Company's "("FPL") filing, on February 28, 2025, a petition for a base rate increase, including testimony, required Minimum Filing Requirements ("MFRs"), and other exhibits. As I understand the current procedural posture of the proceeding, the Florida Public Service Commission ("Commission" or "PSC") now has before it: (1) what can be referred to as FPL's "As-Filed Case," which includes FPL's originally filed testimony and exhibits in support of its initial requests for rate increases, intervenors' testimony and exhibits, and rebuttal testimony relating to FPL's original proposals; (2) a settlement agreement proposed by FPL and several intervenor parties that, if approved, would provide for different revenue and rate increases than originally proposed by FPL; and (3) a comprehensive proposal addressing the major revenue, rate, accounting, and related issues in the case (essentially the same issues covered in the proposal between FPL and the other intervenors) submitted by the Citizens, FAIR, and FEL that generally provides for lower base revenues and rates than those that would result from the settlement proposed by FPL and the intervenor parties who have joined FPL's proposal.

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For reference and clarity, I refer to the settlement proposed by FPL and certain other intervenors as the "Special Interest Parties' Proposed Settlement" or the "SIPs' Proposed Settlement." The parties to the SIPs' Proposed Settlement are FPL; the Florida Industrial Power Users Group ("FIPUG"); Florida Energy for Innovation Association, Inc.; EVgo Services,

LLC; Americans for Affordable Clean Energy, Inc.; Circle K Stores, Inc.; RaceTrac Inc.; Wawa, Inc.; Electrify America, LLC; the Florida Retail Federation; the Federal Executive Agencies; Walmart, Inc.; Armstrong World Industries, Inc.; and the Southern Alliance for Clean Energy ("SACE"). Other than FPL and SACE, it appears that all of the other SIPs are either large commercial and industrial customers or potential customers of FPL, or organizations (such as FIPUG and the FRF) that represent the interests of large commercial and industrial customers.

For additional clarity, I refer to the Citizens, FEL, and FAIR as the "Customer Majority Parties," or the "CMPs," because they are the only parties that represent the real economic interests of FPL's residential customers, who account for approximately 89 percent of all of FPL's customer accounts (and for approximately 63 percent of FPL's 2026 base rate revenues and approximately 61 percent of FPL's 2024 total revenues). Although the CMPs originally submitted, on August 26, 2025, a joint motion for approval of a joint settlement agreement to which they were the signatory parties, since the Commission's Prehearing Officer has issued an order that would dismiss the CMPs' motion, I will refer to the complete set of elements and proposed terms that were included with the CMPs' August 26 motion as the "CMPs' Proposal." The CMPs' Proposal is included in my Exhibit JTH-3. I understand this to be consistent with the Prehearing Officer's order, which stated that the CMPs would be allowed to submit position statements

or similar documents in support of the proposed terms that they had proffered in their August 26 joint motion.

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4 Q. Please summarize your opinions regarding the SIPs' Proposed 5 Settlement and the corresponding terms of the CMPs' Proposal.

My testimony provides my opinions regarding certain major financial elements of the base revenue and rate increases that are "on the table" in this case. To summarize briefly, my testimony presents and explains my opinion that the SIPs' Proposed Settlement is contrary to the public interest and that it would result in revenues and earnings for FPL, and rates for FPL's customers, that are unfair, unjust, and unreasonable. As to the specific issues that my testimony addresses, the SIPs' Proposed Settlement would result in FPL obtaining excessive revenues over the 2026-2029 period, would approve an ROE that is excessive by recognized objective measures, and would allow FPL to use its proposed Tax Adjustment Mechanism to achieve grossly excessive earnings in the same way that FPL used – I would say "abused" – the Reserve Surplus Adjustment Mechanism ("RSAM") that was approved over my objections in the settlement of FPL's 2021 rate case. (For reference, that settlement was attached to the Commission's Order No. PSC-2021-0446-S-EI, issued on December 2, 2021, in Docket No. PSC-20210015-EI.)

My testimony also presents and explains my opinions that the CMPs' Proposal regarding revenue requirements, ROE, and the TAM, as part of the complete set of elements and terms that would resolve all issues in this case, will serve the public interest and will result in rates for FPL's customers that are fair, just, and reasonable. My testimony does not address FPL's As-Filed Case except as necessary in relation to the SIPs' Proposed Settlement and the corresponding elements of the CMPs' Proposal. Suffice it to say that, while the revenue requirements and resulting rates provided by the SIPs' Proposed Settlement are less than those in FPL's As-Filed Case, the revenues, ROE, rates, and the TAM provisions in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement are still grossly excessive and contrary to the public interest, and that they would, if approved, result in rates that are unfair, unjust, and unreasonable; accordingly, I would have similar strong opinions regarding the revenue increases originally proposed by FPL in its As-Filed Case.

The major elements that I address in my testimony are: FPL's overall base revenues, including proposed revenue increases for 2026 and 2027; the ROE that would be used to set and monitor FPL's revenues and earnings; and FPL's proposal to use, within a "Rate Stabilization Mechanism" ("RSM"), a TAM, similar to the RSAM approved (over my objections) in the settlement of FPL's 2021 rate case. The reason that my testimony focuses on these issues should be obvious. They are the *raison d'être* for this case, and they ultimately account for the overwhelming majority of the rate impacts that the Commission's decisions will have on FPL and its customers who will have to pay the ultimately approved rates.

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Briefly, the Commission should reject the SIPs' Proposed Settlement and should ultimately approve revenues that will enable FPL to provide safe and reliable service while earning a fair and reasonable ROE.

The Commission should reject the SIPs' Proposed Settlement because it would enable FPL to charge its customers far more than FPL needs to provide safe and reliable service, because the ROE proposed in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement is excessive by objective standards, and because FPL's proposed TAM would be contrary to public policy and would result in unjust, unfair, and unreasonable rates being imposed on FPL's customers in two ways. The first way is that, as FPL has proven by its use of the RSAM since January 2022, FPL will almost certainly use the TAM to achieve earning far in excess of the approved midpoint ROE, which is, by definition, the fair, just, and reasonable return set by the Commission. The second way is that the TAM would allow FPL to unjustly take money paid in by its customers to cover future FPL tax obligations to enhance FPL's earnings and then effectively force future FPL customers to pay back the money that FPL used. Because the revenues would be excessive, FPL's resulting rates would be unfair, unjust, and unreasonable, and requiring FPL's customers to pay those rates would be contrary to the public interest.

The CMPs' Proposal, albeit overly generous to FPL, would provide FPL with an ROE and revenue requirements over the next four years that are reasonable in my opinion, and as I explain below, excluding the TAM will protect FPL's customers from the abuses that resulted from the RSAM.

A.

BACKGROUND - REGULATORY PRINCIPLES

Q. From your perspective as a former Florida Public Service

Commissioner, what do you believe are the primary policies and
principles that should guide the PSC's decisions in this case?

In general, the fundamental principles of setting a utility's allowed revenues and rates are simple: the utility should be allowed to recover all of its reasonable and prudent operating and maintenance ("O&M") costs, its reasonable and prudent costs of borrowing debt capital (i.e., interest expense), and a reasonable return on its reasonably and prudently incurred investments necessary to provide safe and reliable service at the lowest possible cost. In this context, "reasonable and prudent" costs must be determined as those that are <u>cost-effective</u> as compared to available alternatives, and this principle applies equally to the cost paid for a length of power line, a power pole, the interest cost on a bond, the ROE rate <u>required</u> in objective and competitive capital markets to attract equity capital, and the amount of equity capital that the utility objectively <u>needs</u> in order to support its investments.

These fundamental principles are frequently referred to as a set of policies and principles known as the "Regulatory Compact." The "bargain" contained within this Regulatory Compact is that the utility enjoys a government-protected monopoly in its service area, in return for which it is allowed to recover its necessary costs incurred in providing safe and reliable service to its captive customers. This bargain is fair to utilities because it ensures that, assuming reasonable and sound management, the utility will recover its legitimate costs and earn a fair and reasonable return, and it is fair to customers because, properly followed, it will ensure that customers receive safe and reliable utility services, like electricity, which is generally regarded as a necessity, at the lowest possible cost. In this context, costeffective means at the lowest cost available from functionally equivalent alternatives; if the utility overpays or attempts to charge rates based on such over-payments, the bargain is violated.

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Q. How does this relate to utility rates?

The utility's rates must be fair, just, and reasonable (and not unduly discriminatory). Fair, just, and reasonable rates are those that allow the utility to recover its reasonable, legitimate costs incurred through cost-effective management and to recover a reasonable and cost-effective return on its investments, also evaluated on the basis of cost-effective financing and management. Rates that include expenses for materials or labor that could

have been procured at lower cost, and rates that include excessive returns, are unfair, unjust, and unreasonable.

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THE PSC SHOULD REJECT THE SIPS' PROPOSED SETTLEMENT

- Q. Please summarize your opinions as to why the PSC should reject the
 SIPs' Proposed Settlement.
- 7 A. The Commission should reject the SIPs' Proposed Settlement because it would, if approved, give FPL revenues significantly in excess of what FPL 8 9 needs to provide safe and reliable service, because it would set FPL's rates using an ROE that is excessive by established, recognized standards 10 11 applicable to utility rate-setting, and because the TAM would enable FPL to overcharge its customers by earning excessive returns above the fair and 12 13 reasonable ROE and by unjustly using money paid in by its customers to cover FPL's tax expenses to increase FPL's earnings. All of these facts 14 render the SIPs' Proposed Settlement contrary to the public interest, and all 15 of these factors, both individually and together, will render FPL's rates 16 unfair, unjust, and unreasonable. 17

- Q. Why do you believe that the revenues that FPL would receive under the SIPs' Proposed Settlement would be excessive?
- A. The revenue increases proposed in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement are \$945 million per year to be effective in January 2026, an additional \$705 million

per year to be effective in January 2027, plus Solar and Battery Base Rate Adjustment ("SoBRA") increases of approximately \$296 million per year in 2028 and an additional \$266 million per year in 2029. Altogether, these increases would give FPL additional base rate revenues of approximately \$6.903 billion over the period from 2026 through 2029.

The revenues that FPL would receive pursuant to the SIPs' Proposed Settlement in 2026 alone would be more than \$1.5 billion greater than the revenues recommended by the Citizens' team of seven expert witnesses: where the Citizens' witnesses recommended an overall rate **reduction** of \$620 million per year in 2026, the SIPs' Proposed Settlement would give FPL a \$945 million per year **increase**, a difference of \$1.565 billion per year in 2026. The total increases that FPL would realize, even without the TAM, are approximately \$6.903 billion over the 2026-2029 period. These increases would be significantly greater than the total increases approved in the 2021 settlement, which were, at the time, estimated to be about \$4.9 billion over four years.

The sheer magnitude of the proposed increases should give the Commission pause, but in light of the expert testimony of the Citizens' witnesses (and the testimony of other parties who initially opposed FPL's rate requests), it should lead the Commission to reject the SIPs' Proposed Settlement.

Q. What impact does the ROE in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement have on FPL's revenues? How does that relate to whether the revenue increases in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement are reasonable?

The midpoint ROE provided by the SIPs' Proposed Settlement, even though reduced from FPL's original request (of 11.90 percent), is still – at 10.95 percent – excessive by objective standards and would therefore result in excessive revenues for FPL and excessive – unfair, unjust, and unreasonable - rates being charged to FPL's customer. Specifically, it is 45 basis points greater than any ROE approved, whether in a settlement or a litigated outcome, by any public utility commission or public service commission in the United States over the past two years. It is also 45 basis points greater than the highest ROEs approved in the southeastern U.S. in recent years. This excessive ROE alone would result in excess revenues of approximately \$225 million per year starting in 2026 when compared to the highest ROE approved anywhere else in the U.S., and probably more (due to sales growth) than \$900 million over the life of the SIPs' Proposed Settlement. When compared to the national average ROEs for vertically integrated utilities like FPL, about 9.83 percent in 2024 and 2025, the excess is much greater, approximately \$560 million per year or more than \$2 billion over the 2026-2029 period.

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- Q. On what evidence do you base your assertion that a midpoint ROE of 10.95 percent is excessive by recognized objective standards?
- A. The recognized standard for fair and reasonable ROEs to be established by utility regulatory authorities such as the Commission is that the allowed ROE should be equal to the returns generally being earned at the same time and in the same general part of the country on comparable investments. This is the widely recognized and followed standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in its landmark opinion in *Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia*.

Currently, the average ROE for vertically integrated utilities like FPL in the United States is about 9.80 percent. The ROE in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement exceeds that objective national value by more than 100 basis points. The ROEs approved in 2024 and 2025 for other vertically integrated electric utilities in the southeastern U.S. range from 9.70 percent for Virginia Electric & Power Co. in Virginia to 10.50 percent for Georgia Power Co. in Georgia and Tampa Electric Co. in Florida. (Please refer to my Exhibit JTH-4, which is Exhibit LVP-2 that was filed with the direct testimony of Walmart's witness Lisa V. Perry.) The SIPs not only want the Commission to approve an ROE that is more than 100 basis points above the national average, they want the Commission to approve an ROE that is 45 basis points greater than the highest ROE approved anywhere in the U.S. in the past two years. This ROE is objectively excessive and greater than necessary for FPL

to earn a reasonable return while providing safe and reliable service. Allowing such an excessive ROE would be contrary to the best interests of the 12 million Floridians who receive their residential electric service from FPL and contrary to the public of the state and the Florida economy as a whole because it would result in a massive transfer of wealth from FPL's customers to FPL's sole shareholder, NextEra Energy, Inc.

The Commission should reject the SIPs' Proposed Settlement.

A.

- Q. Please discuss the significance of the midpoint ROE as it relates to FPL's earnings, the provisions of the SIPs' Proposed Settlement, and your opinions regarding that Proposed Settlement.
 - To understand the impact and significance of the impact of the SIPs' Proposed Settlement on FPL's ability to over-earn and overcharge its customers, it is critical to understand that the midpoint ROE is, by definition, the fair and reasonable ROE as determined by the Commission. When it sets rates, the Commission, like any other regulatory authority, establishes an ROE as the reasonable return that the utility should be allowed the opportunity to earn on its equity investment. While the Commission normally approves a range of plus or minus 100 basis points above and below the established midpoint, the PSC has recognized that the midpoint ROE is itself the rate that provides a utility with "the opportunity to earn a fair and reasonable return for the provision of regulated service." *In re: Petition for*

L	Increase in Rates by Florida Power & Light Company, Order No. PSC-2010-
<u> </u>	0153-FOF-EI, Docket No. 20080677-EI, at 132.

In the settlement of FPL's 2021 rate case, the Commission initially approved an ROE of 10.60 percent, but that value was increased later in 2022 to 10.80 percent pursuant to a so-called "trigger" mechanism also approved in the 2021 settlement.

A.

Q. With this understanding, what, if any, impact would approving this ROE have on FPL's earnings and customers' rates?

First, as I discussed above, the 10.95 percent ROE is excessive by recognized regulatory rate-setting standards, and by itself would cause FPL's customers to overpay by \$900 million or more over the 2026-2029 period covered by the SIPs' Proposed Settlement.

My greater concern, which is the same concern upon which I and at least one other witness opposed the RSAM in the 2021 rate case settlement, is that by approving any given midpoint in combination with the TAM, the Commission would effectively be giving FPL a license to over-earn and overcharge its customers by up to 100 basis points. To be clear, if the Commission authorizes an ROE of 10.95 percent and allows FPL to use the RSM including the deferred tax liabilities that were part of FPL's originally proposed TAM, the Commission will be giving FPL an effective license to

overcharge its customers by \$500 million per year, and probably more than that when considering FPL's likely sales growth.

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Significantly, considering the RSM that includes the TAM deferred tax liabilities (the "RSM/TAM") that is part of the SIPs' Proposed Settlement, it is clear that FPL intends to use the RSM/TAM to achieve excessive earnings greater than – probably far greater than – just the proposed midpoint ROE of 10.95 percent. In his testimony in this case, Timothy Devlin, who served as the Commission's Executive Director, Director of Auditing and Financial Analysis, and Director of Economic Regulation in his 35 years of service to the Commission, states that FPL used the RSAM from the 2021 settlement to achieve approximately \$1.46 billion in increased earnings, and that FPL achieved earnings approximately \$1.54 billion above the approved midpoint ROE from January 2022 through the time Mr. Devlin's testimony in this case was filed. This demonstrates that FPL did not need the RSAM to earn the fair and reasonable midpoint ROEs approved by the Commission in the 2021 settlement.

The deposition testimony of FPL's President, Armando Pimentel, and its Vice President of Finance, Mr. Scott Bores, leaves no doubt that FPL intends to use the RSM/TAM in the same way that FPL has used the RSAM since January 2022. As an initial observation, in his deposition on July 18, 2025, Mr. Pimentel stated, "TAM, to me, is the same as RSAM." (Deposition of Armando Pimentel at 24.) The deposition testimony of Mr. Bores further

confirms that FPL intends to use the RSM/TAM in the same way under the SIPs' Proposed Settlement. In his deposition on September 5, 2025, Mr. Bores testified that the TAM was originally proposed to reach the midpoint ROE in 2028 and 2029. He went on to recognize that the Reserve Surplus Mechanism ("RSM") that includes deferred tax liabilities originally tagged to the TAM is a non-cash mechanism, and that FPL is able to make non-cash accounting entries to the RSM associated with the deferred tax liabilities and depreciation reserve surplus "because FPL has already collected cash from customers regarding those two items." He further agreed that if FPL's uses of the RSM "were limited to the ROE midpoint," FPL would "still be able to address unexpected expenses and revenue impacts without seeking a rate increase," but immediately qualified his statement by saying that that is "not the construct" that FPL "agreed to as part of the settlement agreement with the RSM." He further agreed that if the use of the RSM were limited to the ROE midpoint, that would "provide FPL's customers long-term bill and economic stability," but again qualified his response to the effect that that is not what FPL is proposing with respect to the RSM. Mr. Bores further agreed that if "the RSM were limited to the midpoint ROE," the RSM would "still provide significant benefits to customers through lower rates." He further agreed that "if the RSM were limited to the midpoint ROE and FPL were to earn at the midpoint through 2030," FPL would be "able to address both the additional revenue needed in 2028 and 2029, as well as any factors beyond

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the company's control," but then again stated that such use of the RSM "is not the design or ultimately what was agreed to" in the "settlement" with the SIPs. He further agreed that if FPL's use of the RSM were limited to the ROE midpoint, it would "eliminate the necessity for costly and procedurally intensive rate base proceedings during the term" (of the SIPs' Settlement Proposal) and that such limitation would also provide "the same administrative efficiency benefits," but quickly added his "same prior caveat." Finally, when asked if FPL could commit to a four-year settlement agreement if the RSM were limited to the midpoint ROE, he stated that "that is not our proposition," and that FPL is asking "for the flexibility under the RSM, just like" FPL has had under prior agreements." Deposition of Scott Bores at pages 183-88.

From the foregoing, two things are clear: First, FPL does not need the ability to use the RSM and the components thereof, including the TAM's deferred tax liabilities as proposed in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement, in order to earn a reasonable return and to realize all the benefits its claims the RSM/TAM would provide. And second, FPL intends to use the RSM/TAM to maximize its earnings up to and including achieving ROEs at or near the top of its range. Allowing this to occur would be contrary to the public interest.

Q. What would be the likely impacts on FPL's customers if FPL were allowed to use the RSM/TAM as it proposes?

A.

Given that currently, 100 basis points of ROE translates to about \$500 million per year of revenue requirements for FPL, this would give FPL the opportunity to earn up to \$2 billion in excessive earnings over the term of the SIPs' Proposed Settlement as compared to the defined fair and reasonable midpoint ROE. Significantly in this context, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that "if a public utility is consistently earning a rate of return at or near the ceiling of its authorized rate of return range, the commission may find that its rates are unjust and unreasonable" *Gulf Power Co. v. Wilson*, 597 So. 2d 270, 274 (Fla. 1992) (quoting *United Telephone Co. v. Mann*, 403 So. 2d 962, 966 (Fla. 1981)).

Separately, my Exhibit JTH-5 shows that, according to FPL's earnings surveillance reports submitted to the PSC, FPL achieved ROEs that averaged close to 100 basis points above the PSC-approved midpoint ROEs from January 2022, which is when the 2021 settlement with its RSAM became effective, through July 2025. This is clear and convincing evidence that FPL used the RSAM to earn far more than the midpoint ROE approved by the Commission.

It was contrary to the public interest for the PSC to allow FPL to use the RSAM in this way in the 2021 settlement, and FPL has proven that the concerns expressed by myself and Mr. Devlin were well-founded. In my opinion, the Commission should have intervened since 2022 to prevent FPL from using the RSAM in this way, particularly since its use depleted its depreciation reserve that would otherwise have been available to reduce FPL's rate base and thus customers' rates now and in the future.

In the same way, it would be contrary to the public interest to allow FPL to use the RSM/TAM to earn above the midpoint ROE, at whatever level the Commission sets that midpoint ROE.

Q.

In your previous answer, you explained why the RSM/TAM is contrary to the public interest based on FPL's ability to use the RSM/TAM to achieve excessive earnings. Are there additional reasons that the Commission should reject the RSM/TAM?

Yes. The RSM/TAM would allow FPL to unjustly take cash already paid in by its customers to cover future FPL tax obligations (and excess depreciation payments made by FPL's customers to the extent that RSAM funds become part of the RSM) to enhance FPL's earnings and then effectively force future FPL customers to pay back the customers' money that FPL used. Because the revenues would be excessive, FPL's resulting rates would be "unjust and unreasonable," and requiring FPL's customers to pay those rates would be contrary to the public interest.

1 2 3 4		THE FINANCIAL TERMS OF THE CMPs' PROPOSAL ARE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND WOULD RESULT IN FAIR, JUST AND REASONABLE RATES.
5	Q,	Please summarize the terms of the CMPs' Proposal for annual and total
6		revenues that FPL would be allowed to obtain, midpoint ROE, and the
7		TAM.
8	A.	The CMPs' Proposal would provide FPL with a base revenue increase of
9		\$867 million per year in 2026, an additional base revenue increase of \$403
10		million in 2027, and the opportunity for FPL to obtain, subject to
11		demonstrating cost-effectiveness or reliability need, Generation Base Rate
12		Adjustment ("GBRA") increases to recover the revenue requirements,
13		calculated using a 10.60 percent midpoint ROE, of its originally proposed
14		solar and battery resources, plus the revenue requirements for the Vandolah
15		Generating Facility that FPL is in the process of acquiring. The proposed
16		GBRA increases are approximately \$195 million per year in 2028 and \$174
17		million per year in 2029. Together, these increases provide FPL with the
18		opportunity to realize approximately \$5.241 billion in additional base rate
19		revenues over the 2026-2029 period. These proposed increases in FPL's
20		allowed revenue requirements, proposed midpoint ROE, proposed exclusion
21		of the TAM, and related provisions are presented in comparison format in
22		my Exhibit JTH-6.
23		The CMPs propose that FPL's rates be set using a midpoint ROE of

10.60 percent, which is 35 basis points less than proposed in the SIPs'

Proposed Settlement but still higher than any ROE approved by any utility regulatory commission in the United States in 2024 or 2025, and nearly 80 basis points greater than the national averages for 2024 and 2025.

The terms proposed by the CMPs are, considered relative to the terms in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement and in the specific context of resolving this case with a reasonable balancing of the competing interests of all parties to the docket, reasonable, and if approved, they would promote the public interest. Additionally, the major financial terms of the CMPs' Proposal would provide FPL with sufficient revenues to satisfy its duty to provide safe and reliable service and would result in fair, just and reasonable rates to be paid by FPL's customers. It is more than fair to say that the major financial elements of the CMPs' Proposal are generous to FPL while providing for rates that are significantly more favorable to FPL's customers than those in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement.

Q.

- As context to understanding why you believe that the CMPs' Proposal include financial terms that are fair to both FPL and FPL's customers, please summarize the positions advocated by the CMPs in the testimony that they have filed in the case.
- A. In summary, the CMPs filed testimony and exhibits by eight witnesses regarding these substantive financial and economic issues in this case. Collectively and in summary, the CMPs' testimony and exhibits advocated

for an ROE between 9.2 percent and 9.8 percent, with an equity ratio of 59.6 percent associated with the 9.2 percent ROE but a lower equity ratio of 55 percent associated with a higher ROE. The CMPs' testimony and exhibits support a rate decrease in 2026 of \$620 million per year, to be followed by a rate increase of \$35 million per year in 2027. The CMPs recommended that the 2028 and 2029 SoBRA increases be rejected and they also recommended that FPL's proposed TAM be rejected.

In summary, the CMPs Proposal represents dramatic compromises in favor of FPL as compared to the SIPs' Proposed Settlement.

Q.

Α.

Please summarize why you believe that the CMPs' Proposal regarding the critical financial elements of the case are in the public interest.

To understand why the financial elements of the CMPs' Proposal are fair to both FPL and to FPL's customers, and why the CMPs' Proposal is in the public interest, as well as fair to FPL and FPL's customers, the Commission should recognize the significant difference between the positions supported by the CMPs' testimony and exhibits and the compromises now proposed by the CMPs. In short, the increases proposed by the SIPs' Proposed Settlement are excessive; they would, if approved, represent the largest rate increases in Florida history. If granted, FPL's requests would result in unfair, unjust, and unreasonable rates being charged to FPL's customers; and, if granted, they would be contrary to the public interest of Florida and Floridians by causing

an unreasonable transfer of wealth from the pockets of FPL's customers to FPL and its sole shareholder, NextEra Energy, Inc.

The CMPs Proposal offers a package of compromises that would provide FPL with the opportunity to realize more than \$5.2 billion in additional base revenues over the 2026-2029 period, as compared to approximately \$6.9 billion over that period from the SIPs' Proposed Settlement. The CMPs' proposed revenue increases involve minimal adjustments to FPL's operation and maintenance expenditures or to FPL's actual planned rate base additions. The CMPs' Proposal would set FPL's rates, again as a compromise, using an ROE of 10.60 percent, which is higher than any ROE approved anywhere in the United States in 2024 or 2025.

The compromises offered by the CMPs will enable FPL to provide safe and reliable service while earning the highest ROE in the U.S. The CMPs' compromises are in the public interest as a settlement to resolve this contested case with a reasonable balancing of all parties' competing interests.

A.

Q. Why do you believe that the CMPs' proposed 10.60 percent ROE is reasonable and appropriate for setting FPL's rates?

The CMPs' proposed 10.60 percent ROE is reasonable and appropriate as a substantial term for resolving, by a settlement involving compromises by both sides, all issues in this rate case. As I noted above, the proposed ROE of 10.60 percent is generous to FPL when measured against objective

standards. Specifically, this proposed ROE is greater than the highest ROE authorized or approved by any public utility regulatory authority in the United States in 2024 or 2025. Additionally, relative to the standard that returns are to be comparable to those realized in the same general part of the country, the 10.60 percent ROE is greater than the highest ROEs approved for any utility in the southeastern U.S. since the beginning of 2023. (Please refer to my Exhibit JTH-4.)

Therefore, the CMPs' proposal to allow FPL to set its rates based on the highest ROE in the U.S. is obviously generous to FPL. Any objection to this ROE can only be characterized as unfounded compared to the criteria applicable to utility rate-setting.

Q.

A.

Other witnesses in this case, including those testifying on behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida and the Federal Executive Agencies, have recommended ROEs significantly less than 10.60 percent. In light of this, why would the CMPs support the highest ROE in the U.S.?

As I have observed above, this is a generous compromise offer in the CMPs' attempts to settle the case on terms that should be acceptable to FPL while significantly better for FPL's customers as compared to the rates and revenues proposed by the SIPs, including FPL.

1	Q.	What equity ratio does the CMPs' Proposal support for setting FPL's
2		base revenue requirements and base rates?
3	A.	The CMPs Proposal supports, as part of the compromises embodied in the
4		CMPs' Proposal, an equity ratio of 59.6 percent be used to establish FPL's
5		base revenues and base rates.
6		
7	Q.	Why do you believe that the proposed 59.6 percent equity ratio is
8		reasonable and appropriate for setting FPL's rates?
9	A.	As with the CMPs' proposed ROE of 10.60 percent, the proposed 59.6
10		percent equity ratio is reasonable as a substantial term for resolving all issues
11		in this rate case. If anything, this equity ratio is generous to FPL in that the
12		59.6 percent value is substantially higher than comparable values for almost
13		all comparable utilities in the U.S. This is particularly true and significant in
14		light of the CMPs' specific proposal to allow FPL to set its rates using an
15		ROE that is higher than any public utility regulatory authority has approved
16		for any utility in the past two years.
17		
18 19 20		THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND OVERALL FAIRNESS OF THE CMPs' PROPOSAL
21	Q.	In your opinion, would implementing the terms proposed by the CMPs
22		be in the public interest?

A. Yes. As I stated above, considered as a compromise resolution of this highly contested rate case, I believe that the CMPs' Proposal is in the public interest.

The CMPs' Proposal would resolve all issues and would result in rates that, considered as a set of compromises, are fair, just, and reasonable to FPL's customers and that would provide FPL with sufficient revenues to fulfill its duty of providing safe and reliable service.

It is also my opinion that, considered in the context of compromises offered to settle this case, the CMPs' Proposal is fair to FPL and its customers, that it will result in fair, just, and reasonable rates, and that, considered as a whole, it is in the public interest. Objectively, the CMPs' Proposal will provide FPL with the opportunity to get more additional base revenues – approximately \$5.2 Billion over four years – than the base revenue increases authorized by the settlement of FPL's 2021 rate case, which were approximately \$4.9 Billion.

Q.

A.

Please explain your intended meaning of the term "the public interest" as you use it in your testimony.

I believe that the "public interest" means the public welfare generally, and this includes considerations of the overall health of the Florida economy and the welfare of all Florida citizens. With respect to a specific utility such as FPL, this means at least the welfare of all of the people served and directly affected by the utility's service. This includes considerations of the

economic impacts of a utility's rates and rate increase requests on individuals, households, and businesses. To be completely clear, I am not advocating in any way that any customer classes should be subsidized by a utility's other customers or by the utility's shareholders, but I am saying that the PSC must consider the overall impacts on the Florida economy and on all customers in making its decisions on rate increases, whether pursuant to a rate increase petition or pursuant to a settlement agreement.

In short, I believe that the Commission must consider the impacts that the SIPs' Proposed Settlement would impose on all Floridians through the massive transfer of spending power and wealth from FPL's customers to FPL and its sole shareholder, NextEra Energy.

- Q. You have stated that the rate increases proposed in the SIPs' Proposed Settlement would be greater than any electric utility rate increases approved by the PSC in Florida history. Upon what do you base this statement?
- I base this statement on data presented in the Public Service Commission's report titled, "REVENUE REDUCTIONS AND INCREASES ORDERED BY THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION FOR CERTAIN INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS UTILITIES, UTILITIES FROM 1960 TO PRESENT (All Utilities from 1968 to Present)," which is included as Exhibit No. JTH-2 to my testimony. This

1		document shows the amounts requested and amounts approved for
2		Florida's investor-owned electric utilities from 1960 to the present. This
3		Commission document shows that the largest base rate increases previously
4		approved by the PSC were those approved in the settlement of FPL's 2021
5		rate case. The actual base rate increases approved in that case were \$692
6		million per year in 2022, \$560 million per year in 2023, plus solar base rate
7		increases in 2024 and 2025. These are obviously less than the increases in
8		the SIPs' Proposed Settlement.
9		
10	Q.	How do the total base rate revenues that would result from the CMPs'
11		Proposal compare to previous revenue increases that the Commission
12		has approved for FPL?
13	A.	Considered over four years, they are in fact greater than even the increases
14		approved in the 2021 settlement, approximately \$5.2 Billion available
15		
		through the CMPs' Proposal as compared to approximately \$4.9 Billion,
16		through the CMPs' Proposal as compared to approximately \$4.9 Billion, including the solar increases, through the 2021 settlement.
16 17		
17	Q.	including the solar increases, through the 2021 settlement.
17 18	Q.	including the solar increases, through the 2021 settlement. FPL'S PROPOSED "RATE STABILIZATION MECHANISM"
17 18 19	Q. A.	including the solar increases, through the 2021 settlement. FPL'S PROPOSED "RATE STABILIZATION MECHANISM" What is the "Rate Stabilization Mechanism," or "RSM" in the SIPs'

accounting entries, take money paid in by FPL's customers to cover future tax liabilities (currently held in an account or accounts as deferred tax liabilities) and excess depreciation payments and use those funds to enhance FPL's earnings, with customers then effectively being required to pay the money back over subsequent years as the accounting entry for the monies used by FPL would be amortized.

Under the SIPs' Proposed Settlement, the amount of deferred tax liabilities paid for by FPL's customers that FPL would be allowed to thus appropriate is \$1.155 billion. FPL has acknowledged that this TAM is essentially the same as the Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism ("RSAM") that FPL has been allowed to use pursuant to the settlement of its 2021 rate case.

A.

Q. Does the CMPs' Proposal include the RSM/TAM as proposed by FPL? If not, why not?

The CMPs' Proposal does not include FPL's proposed RSM/TAM for several reasons. In the first instance, the RSM/TAM would use customers' money to support FPL's earnings and then require future customers to pay that money back. In other words, FPL proposes to use customers' money now to support its earnings over the next four years and then to force future FPL customers to pay the money back into FPL's accounts. This is unfair and unjust on its face because it would, if approved, require FPL's

customers to pay for FPL's earnings. Additionally, it violates the principle of "intergenerational equity" by forcing future customers to pay, in the future, for FPL's earnings over the 2026-2029 period. The RSM/TAM also violates the related "matching principle," which requires that customers should pay for costs during the time frame when they are incurred. The TAM violates this principle most egregiously, in that FPL's current and recent customers have already paid for the future tax liabilities, such that FPL's proposal will even further distort the principle that customers should pay for costs as they are incurred.

Further, it appears virtually certain that FPL intends to use the RSM/TAM in the same way that it has used the nearly identical RSAM - to achieve earnings significantly above the midpoint ROE approved by the Commission, whatever that midpoint ROE ultimately is. The midpoint ROE is, by definition, the fair and reasonable ROE upon which a utility's rates are to be set; FPL has used the RSAM to achieve earnings that are nearly 100 basis points – that is, nearly one full percentage point – above the midpoint ROE approved by the Commission the 2021 settlement. My Exhibit JTH-5 shows that FPL's achieved ROEs exceeded its approved ROE values by an average of 94 basis points, as reported on FPL's Earnings Surveillance Reports, for the period from January 2022 through July 2025. In addition, FPL's Vice President of Finance testified in a recent deposition that the benefits of the RSM/TAM could be realized if its

use were to be capped at a midpoint ROE of 10.8 percent, but further stated that that is not what FPL has proposed. It thus appears that FPL intends to use the RSM/TAM exactly as it has used the RSAM to achieve returns that violate the basic standards of fair, just, and reasonable rate-setting.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- Q. Please summarize your opinions regarding the SIPs' Proposed
 Settlement and the CMPs' Proposal.
- 9 A. My testimony principally addresses the main financial issues in this case,
 10 i.e., revenue requirements including SoBRA and related base rate increases;
 11 ROE; equity ratio; and FPL's proposed RSM and the TAM embedded in
 12 the RSM. These elements account for the vast majority of the total revenue
 13 and rate impacts on FPL's customers.

The SIPs' Proposed Settlement would allow FPL to overcharge its customers and to achieve grossly excessive earnings. Accordingly, the SIPs' Proposed Settlement is contrary to the public interest and would result in FPL's customers paying unfair, unjust, and unreasonable rates.

Considered in the context of this case, it is my opinion that the key financial elements of the CMPs' Proposal are part of a reasonable package of compromises that reasonably balance the competing interests of FPL and its customers, and that these compromises are in the public interest. If anything, the revenue increases and ROE provided by the CMPs' Proposal

1	are overly generous to FPL, in that they would provide FPL with the
2	highest ROE approved by any regulatory authority in the U.S. in 2024 or
3	2025 and provide FPL with the opportunity to realize more in base revenue
4	increases over the next four years than even the 2021 settlement allowed.
5	Even so, the CMPs' Proposal is fair to FPL's customers when considered in
6	the balancing of interests that is required in any compromise.
7	

- 9 Majority Parties' Proposal for submitted on August 26, 2025?
- 10 A. Yes, it does.

Docket No. 20250011-EI Resume of John Thomas Herndon Exhibit JTH - 1, Page 1 of 3 September 2025

RESUME JOHN T. (TOM) HERNDON

RESIDENCE63 Rocky Ridge Road
Highlands, NC 28741

850-459-3513 (Cell) tom-herndon@comcast.net

EDUCATION

St. Petersburg Junior College, A.A., 1966 University of South Florida, Interdisciplinary Social Services, B.A., 1968 Florida State University, Master's Degree in Social Work, 1972

WORK EXPERIENCE

Independent Contractor As of October 2005

I retired from full-time employment but continue to do various consulting and board activities.

Southern Strategies Group

Governmental Consulting & Lobbying Firm

August 21,2002 to October 2005

Executive Director

State Board of Administration

November 12, 1996 to August 21, 2002

President

Tom Herndon and Associates

August 11, 1995 to November 11,1996

Chief of Staff to Governor Lawton Chiles

Executive Office of the Governor

August 10, 1992 to August 11, 1995

Executive Director

Florida Department of Revenue

April 18, 1990 to August 7, 1992

Commissioner

Florida Public Service Commission

January 6, 1986 to April 17, 1990

Chief of Staff to Governor Bob Graham

Executive Office of the Governor

July I, 1985 to January 5,1 986

Deputy Chief of Staff and Director

Office of Planning and Budgeting Executive Office of the Governor

October 1984 to July 1985

Director

Office of Planning and Budgeting

Executive Office of the Governor

August 1980 to July 1985

Staff Director

Florida House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations

August 1978 to August 1980

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Operations

Dept. Health & Rehabilitative Services

October 1977 to August 1978

Administrator, District V

State of Florida, DHRS

November 1975 to October 1977

Staff Director

House of Representatives

Committee on HRS

June 1974 to November 1975

CURRENT ACTIVITIES as INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

- Current Board Member Citizens for Lower Electric Rates: Secretary
- Current Board Member Floridians Against Increased Rates: Secretary
- Current Board member Capital Health Plan: Member of Personnel, Compensation, and Finance Committees; Chair of Audit Committee
- Current Board member **Helios Education Foundation:** Member of Executive, Finance, Public Policy and Audit Committees
- Current Board member Lawton Chiles Foundation

SELECTED PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES:

- Former Board member and member of Executive Committee of the Federation of Tax Administrators
- National Association of State Budget Officers, Chairman of Education and Human Resources Committee and Executive Committee, Southern Regional Director
- Past President of the National Governors' Association Council of State Planning Agencies for 1985-86
- Former member of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
- Former member of the Southern States Energy Board
- Former Chairman of the Florida Energy Center Advisory Board
- Council of Institutional Investors, Board of Directors and past Chair of Executive Committee
- Two term member, New York Stock Exchange's Pensions Managers Advisory Committee

CIVIC AND VOLUNTARY ACTIVITIES:

- Past President, Big Bend United Way
- Current member Lawton Chiles Foundation
- Past President, Florida Economics Club
- Past Chairman, Big Bend Child Care Coordinating Council
- Past Chairman, Florida Comprehensive Health Association
- Former Two Term Board member of the FSU Foundation
- Past Treasurer of Highlands Falls Country Club
- Past President, Highlands Falls Homeowner Association

SELECTED AWARDS:

1983	Outstanding Public Administrator by the American Society of Public Administrators
1985	Distinguished Alumnus for the University of South Florida, Florida Chapter
1990	Distinguished Alumnus for the University of South Florida, National
1990	Distinguished Alumnus for Florida State University School of Social Work
1995	Jack Brizius Memorial Roughrider Award for Excellence in Public Policy
1995	Florida Distinguished Service Medal for Exceptionally Meritorious Service to the State

Revised

06/09/2025

REVENUE REDUCTIONS AND INCREASES ORDERED BY THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION FOR CERTAIN INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS UTILITIES UTILITIES FROM 1960 TO PRESENT

(All Utilities from 1968 to Present)

ELECTRIC UTILITIES

				ELE	CTRIC UTILITIES					
Docket	Order	Date of	Effective		\$ Amount	\$	\$	Allowable Return	on Equity	Requested
No.	No.	Order	Date	Nature of Case	Requested	Reduction	Increase	Set	Range	ROE
DUKE ENERG	Y FLORIDA	A, LLC d/b/a D	UKE ENERG	Y (Formerly DUKE ENERGY FLOR	RIDA, INC. d/b/a DUKE ENER	GY (Formerly Progress	Energy FL., Inc.	(Formerly Florida	Power Corpora	ation)))
6414-EU		02-28-62	05-01-62	Company Request		1,600,000				
	3684	08-31-64	10-01-64	Company Request		513,000				
7739-PU	3843	07-22-65	08-01-65	Commission Required		2,418,638				
7767-EU	4139	03-15-67	01-01-68	Commission Required		726,000				
9426-EU	4341	04-09-68	06-01-68	Commission Required		4,094,000				
9731-EU	4488	12-31-68	02-01-69	Company Request		1,519,213				
69230-EU	4654	05-07-69	07-01-69	Commission Required		1,730,998				
69486-EU	4804	12-01-69	01-01-70	Commission Required		2,500,000				
71370-EU	5619	12-29-72	02-01-73	Company Request	18,600,000	2,000,000	1,796,096	13.75%	13.50 - 14.25%	6
7 1010-L0	5904	10-24-73	11-30-73	Company Request	10,000,000		1,558,016	10.1070	10.00 - 14.207	U
74061-EU	6094	04-05-74	04-10-74	Company Request	12,348,975		12,120,919	13.50%	13.50 - 14.25%	<u>.</u>
74461-EU	6289	09-18-74	04-10-74		14,500,000		12,120,313	13.30 /6	13.30 - 14.237	0
74806-EU	6450	01-09-75	01-29-75	Company Request	65,600,000	(Interior)	20 202 444			
74606-EU				Company Request	65,600,000	(Interim)	33,283,144	44.000/	44.20 44.000	,
770040 511	6794	07-22-75	08-22-75		22 225 222	(Final)	45,0 81,074	14.60%	14.30 - 14.90%	o .
770316-EU	7791	04-28-77	04-28-77	Company Request	62,325,262	(Interim)	60,767,961			
	8160	02-02-78	02-07-78			(Final)	59,468,468	14.30%	14.30 - 14.90%	6
800119-EU	9451	07-15-80	08-06-80	Company Request	99,000,000	(Interim)	54,6 0 6,000			
	9577	10-02-80	10-07-80			(Interim)	40 ,434,000			
	9864	03-11-80	03-22-81	Company Request		(Final)	58,378,993	15.50%	14.50 - 16.50%	6
	10162	07-27-81	07-30-81			(Reconsideration)	57 ,10 8 , 497			
820100-EU	11165	09-15-82	09-29-82	Company Request	169,225,000	(Interim)	3 3, 1 29,000			
	11628	02-17-83	02-27-83			(Final)	111,330, 000	15.85%	14.85 - 16.85%	6
830470-EU	13771	10-12-84	10-11-84	Company Request	40,827,000		10,182,000	15.55%	14.55 - 16.55%	6
			01-31-85	Company Request (CR5)	83,259,000		83,253,000	15.55%	14.55 - 16.55%	6
861096-EI	16862	11-19-86	01-01-87	Income Tax & ROE		54,000,000 #		12.50%		
870220-EI	18627	01-04-88	01-01-88	■ Complaint-Occidental	(61,679,000)	121,500,000		12.60%	12.60 - 13.60%	6
				·	, , , ,	18,500,000 #				
	20632	01-20-89	01-01-89	Complaint-Occidental	10,669,000		10 ,669,000			
				·	(11,879,000)	11,879,000 #	, ,			
891298-EI	22437	01-22-90	01-01-90	Commission Required	(,,	11,879,000				
900935-EI	23910	12-21-90	01-01-91	Company Request	11,879,000	,5. 5,555	11,879,000			
910890-EI	92-0208	04-14-92	04-23-92	Company Request	31,601,000	(Interim)	31,20 8,000			
010000 =1	92-1197	10-22-92	11-01-92	Company Request	108,096,000	(Final)	57,986,000	12.00%	11.00 - 13.009	6
	02 1101	10 22 02	04-01-93	Company Request	13,320,000 *	(i iiidi)	9,660,000 *	12.00%	11.00 - 13.00%	
			11-01-93	Company Request	24,437,000 *		18,111,000 *	12.00%	11.00 - 13.009	
000824-EI	02-0655	05-14-02	05-01-02	☐ Earnings Review	24,437,000 #	35,000,000 #	10,111,000 *	12.00 /6	11.00 - 15.007	0
000024-LI	02-0000	03-14-02	03-01-02	Earnings Review		125,000,000				
	03-0876	07-30-03		2002 Sharing		23,034,004 #				
	03-0676	07-30-03		-		23,034,004 # 18,354,585 #				
				2003 Sharing						
				2004 Sharing		9,051,959 #				
050070 51	05.0045	00.00.05	04.04.00	2005 Sharing	205 552 202	0	•	44.750/		
050078-EI	05-0945	09-28-05	01-01-06	⊕ Company Request 2006	205,556,000		0	11.75%	N/A	
070290-EI	07-0900	11-07-07	01-01-08	Hines Unit 2	36,339,546		36,339,546			
				Hines Unit 4	52,354,000		52,354,000			
080603-EI	08-0779	11-26-08	01-01-09	CR3 Uprate (MUR)	1,297,979		1,297,979			
090144-EI	09-0415	06-12-09	07-01-09	Bartow Repowering Project	126,212,000		126,212,000			
090079-EI	09-0413	06-10-09	07-01-09	Company Request	13,078,000	(Interim)	13,0 78,000			
	10-0131	03-05-10	04-04-10	Company Request	499,997,000	(Final)	0	10.50%	9.50 - 11.50%	6
	10-0398	06-18-10	07-17-10	■ Reconsideration	36,179,000		0			
120022-EI	12-0104	03-08-12	01-01-13	Settlement	150,000,000		150,000, 000			
			01-01-13			129,000,000 #		10.50%	9.50 - 11.50%	6
			01-01-14			139,000,000 #				
			01-01-15			50,000,000 #				
			01-01-16			70,000,000 #				
130208-EI	13-0597	11-12-13		Revised Settlement				10.50%	9.50 - 11.50%	6
20170183-EI	17-0451	11-20-17	2018	2nd Revised Settlement Citrus Co. GE	3RA 200,488,588		200,488,588	10.50%	9.50 - 11.50%	6
			2019	2nd Revised Settlement	67,000,000		67, 000 ,000	10.50%	9.50 - 11.50%	
			2020	2nd Revised Settlement	67,000,000		67 ,000 ,000	10.50%	9.50 - 11.50%	
			2021	2nd Revised Settlement	67,000,000		67 ,000 ,000	10.50%	9.50 - 11.50%	
					31,000,000		5.,500,000	.0.0070	0.00	-

			2019	■ SoBRA 2019	15,232,000	15,232,000			
			2020	■ SoBRA 2020	32,000,000	32,000,000			
			2021	■ SoBRA 2021	62,600,000	62,543,000			
20210016-EI	21-0202	06-04-21	2022	Settlement	67,246,000	67,246,000	9.85%	8.85 - 10.85%	
			2023	Settlement SYA	48,933,000	48,933,000	9.85%	8.85 - 10.85%	
			2024	Settlement SYA	79,199,000	79,199,000	9.85%	8.85 - 10.85%	
20240025-EI	24-0472	11-12-24	01-01-25	Settlement	502,700,000	203,000,000	10.30%	9.30-11.30%	11.15%
			01-01-26	Settlement SYA	104,500,000	59,000,000	10.30%	9.30-11.30%	11.15%
			01-01-27	Settlement SYA	128,600,000	0			11.15%
				T. 60: 1.0:					

			0.0.2.	Cottlement C 171	120,000,000		ŭ		
* Charles	٠	4 Oss time Defi		M. Chiandalina					
		# One-time Refu		Stipulation					
Docket	Order	Date of	Effective		\$ Amount	\$	\$	Allowable Return	
No.	No.	Order	. Date	Nature of Case	Requested	Reduction	Increase	Set	Range
FLORIDA POW	ER & LIGH								
6015-EU		03-25-60	04-01-60	Commission Required		200,000			
6165-EU		12-19-60	01-01-61	Commission Required		6,250,000			
U-273		05-08-64	05-08-64	Commission Required		10,000,000			
7739-PU	3737	01-11-65	02-01-65	Commission Required		3,750,000			
7759-EU	3926	11-10-65	01-01-66	Commission Required		9,467,900			
74007.511	4078-A	12-15-66	01-01-67	Commission Required	20,000,000	7,073,000	44.500.004	10.0750/	10.75 10.050
71627-EU	5620	12-29-72	01-31-73	Company Request	80,000,000		14,566,384	12.875%	12.75 - 13.25%
	5696	04-03-73	05-10-73	Company Request	79,900,000		40,062,804		12.75 - 13.25%
74500 511	5905	10-25-73	11-30-73		440,000,000		6,173,528		
74509-EU	6456	01-10-75	01-28-75	Company Request	143,000,000	(Interim)	68,983,743	40.75%	40.50 44.000
700707.511	6591	04-01-75	05-01-75		0.40.000.000	(Final)	77,377,918	13.75%	13.50 - 14.00%
760727-EU	7668	03-04-77	03-14-77	Company Request	349,000,000	(Interim)	87,877,577	40.75%	40.50 44.000/
770040 511	7943	06-16-77	07-08-77	Commission Bossins		(Final) 14,446,975 #	195,496,841	13.75%	13.50 - 14.00%
770810-EU	9025	08-22-79	11-01-79	Commission Required	470,000,000		117.000.000		
810002-EU	9941	04-09-81	04-29-81	Company Request	476,000,000	(Interim)	147,928,930	45.050/	44.05 40.050/
	10306	09-23-81	10-04-81			(Final)	257,004,289	15.85%	14.85 - 16.85%
000007 EU	10467	12-21-81	02-01-82	Common Browns	224 220 000	(Reconsideration)	255,832,324		
820097-EU	10931	06-23-82	07-22-82	Company Request	281,220,000	(Interim)	44,427,000	45.050/	44.05 40.050/
	11437 12348	12-22-82 08-09-83	12-23-82 09-07-83	Company Request	256 746 000	(Final)	100,805,000 237,816,000 ៅ	15.85%	14.85 - 16.85%
830465-EI	13537	07-24-84	09-07-83	Company Request	256,716,000 335,274,000	(Final)	81,464,000	r	
030403-⊑1	13948	12-28-84	10-31-84	Company Request	335,274,000	(Final) (Reconsideration)		15.60%	14.60 - 16.60%
	13537	07-24-84	01-31-85	Company Request	120,279,000	(Reconsideration) (Final)	84,103,000 114,984,000	15.60%	14.00 - 10.00%
	14005	01-16-85	01-31-85	Company Request	120,279,000	(Reconsideration)	120,447,000	15.60%	14.60 - 16.60%
880355-EI	19158	04-19-88	06-01-88	1987 Tax Savings		56.470.774 #	120,447,000	13.60%	14.00 - 10.00%
890319-EI	21143	04-19-66	05-01-89	1988 Tax Savings		38,221,663 #		13.60%	
090319-61	22334	12-22-89	01-01-99	1988 Tax Savings		38,460,672		13.00%	
900478-EI	23349	08-13-90	09-04-90	1989 Tax Savings		39,553,605 #			
890319-EI	23727	11-07-90	10-01-90	1988 Tax Savings		6,716,875 #			
900038-EI	23996	01-16-91	01-16-91	Earnings Review		0,710,073 #		12.80%	11.80 - 13.80%
900478-EI	24644	06-10-91	09-01-91	1989 Tax Savings		2,835,466 #		12.00 /0	11.00 - 10.00 /0
930612-EI	93-1024	07-16-93	07-13-93	ROE Review		2,000,400 #		12.00%	11.00 - 13.00%
990067-EI	99-0519	03-17-99	04-15-99	Earnings Review		350,000,000		11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
000001 E1	00 00 10	00 11 00	01 10 00	Year 1 Sharing		22,774,000 #		11.0070	10.00 12.0070
				Year 2 Sharing		108,827,000 #			
				Year 3 Sharing		86,184,000 #			
001148-EI	02-0501	04-11-02	04-15-02	Earnings Review		250,000,000			
00111021	02 000.	002	01.10.02	2002 Sharing		11,156,000 #			
				2003 Sharing		3,071,000 #			
				2004 Sharing		0			
				2005 Sharing		0			
050045-EI	05-0902	09-14-05	01-01-06	Company Request 2006	430,198,000	Ü	0	11.75%	N/A
				Company Request 2007	122,757,000		120,100,000	= /*	
060001-EI	06-1057	12-22-06	05-01-07	★ Turkey Point Unit 5	126,800,000		126,800,000		
080001-EI					(5,490,000)	5,490,000	,,		
				₩ West County Energy Center	(-,,,	_,,			
			06-09	Unit 1	138,520,000		138,520,000		
			11-09	Unit 2	127,100,000		127,100,000		
080677-EI	10-0153	03-17-10	03-01-10	Company Request 2010	1,043,535,000	(Final)	75,470,948	10.00%	9.00 - 11.00%
· -'	10-0153	03-17-10	N/A	Company Request 2011	247,367,000	(Final)	0	/ -	
	11-0089	02-01-11	N/A	Reconsideration	0	(· man)	0		
090529-EI	10-0207	04-05-10	04-26-10	Nuclear EPU Project	371,149		361,361		
100419-EI	11-0078	01-31-11	02-10-11	Nuclear EPU Project	2,199,261		2,199,261		
				- ,	_,		, ,		

Docket No. 20250011-EI PSC Rate Case History Report Exhibit JTH-2, Page 2 of 8

120015-EI	13-0023	01-14-13	01-02-13 04-23-13	Settlement Cons Conservate Settlement	350,000,000 163,673,000			350,000,000 163,673,000	10.50%	9.50% - 11.50%
			06-01-14		234,000,000			163,673,000		
			06-01-14							
120244-EI	12-0647	12-11-12	01-02-13	₩ Port Everglades Nuclear EPU Project	216,000,000 246,053,294			246,047,170		
130245-EI	14-0024	01-10-14	01-02-13	Nuclear EPU Project	113,206,484			113,030,694		
140197-EI	14-0624	12-10-14	01-02-14	EPU True-Up	113,200,404	761,690		113,030,094		
150208-EI	16-0075	02-17-16	03-01-16	Rate Reduction		222,192				
160021-EI	16-0560	12-15-16	01-01-17	Company Request 2017	866,000,000	222, 192	(Final)	400,000,000	10.55% *	9.60% - 11.6%
100021-61	10-0300	12-13-10	01-01-17	Company Request 2017 Company Request 2018 - SYA	262,000,000		(ITIIIai)	211,000,000	10.55 /6	3.0070 - 11.070
			01-01-18	2017 SoBRA						
			03-01-18	2017 SOBRA 2018 SoBRA	60,523,000 59,890,000			60,523,000 59,890,000		
			06-01-19		209,000,000			200,000,000		
			03-01-19	Pending In-Service Date of Okeechobee 2019 SoBRA						
			2020	2020 SoBRA	51,685,454 50,491,000			51,685,454 50,491,000		
20210015-EI	21-0446	12/2/2021	2022	Settlement *On Appeal*	1,075,000,000			692,000,000	10.60%	9.70 - 11.70%
20210013-LI	21-0440	12/2/2021	2023	Settlement SYA *On Appeal*	605,000,000			560,000,000	10.00 /6	3.70 - 11.70 /6
			2023	2024 SoBRA	140,000,000			TBD		
			2024	2025 SoBRA	140,000,000			TBD		
20250011-EI			01-01-26		1,545,000,000			100		11.90%
20230011-61			01-01-20	Company Requested Company Requested	927,000,000					11.90%
			01-01-27		927,000,000					11.50%
			01-01-26	Company Requested - SOBRA						
			01-01-29	Company Requested - SOBRA						
Generation Base	Rate Adjustme	nt (GBRA)		⊕ St. Lucie No. 2 Increase	@ Rate Base Reduction		# C	ne-time Refund	8	3 Stipulation
Docket	Order	Date of	Effective		\$ Amount	\$		\$	Allowable Return	' '
No.	No.	Order	Date	Nature of Case	Requested	Reduction		Increase	Set	Range
FLORIDA PUE	BLIC UTILITI	ES COMPAN	IY							
8567-EU	4506	01-14-69	06-19-69	Commission Required		34,500				
				Marianna Division						
69443-EU	4776	10-20-69	11-01-69	Company Request		48,000				
				Fernandina Division						
750289-EU	7001	11-17-75	12-17-75	Company Request	463,747			306,671	14.50%	14.25 - 14.75%
	2500			Marianna Division	450.000				40.050	10.75 10.750
770652-EU	8502	10-04-78	11-03-78	Company Request	456,200			397,840	13.25%	12.75 - 13.75%
700004 DU	0.450. 4	40.02.00	44.04.00	Marianna Division		24.057.#				
780921-PU	9456-A	10-03-80	11-01-80	Commission Required		31,257 #				
800609-EU	9613	10-27-80	11-01-80	Fernandina Division		55,227 #				
900909-EU	9013	10-27-00	11-01-60	Commission Required Marianna Division		35,227 #				
790637-EU	10261	09-03-81	10-03-81	Commission Required		26,000 #				
790007-20	10201	03-03-01	10-03-01	Fernandina Division		20,000 #				
810342-EU	10526	01-19-82	02-04-82	Company Request	(269,311)	243,311				
010042-20	10020	01-13-02	02-04-02	Fernandina Division	(200,011)	240,011				
810271-EU	10605	02-17-82	03-19-82	Commission Required		94,440 #				
01021120	10000	02 11 02	00 10 02	Fernandina Division		04,440 %				
	10832	06-02-82	07-02-82	Commission Required		16,008 #				
	.0002	00 02 02	01 02 02	Fernandina Division		10,000 //				
840100-EI	13672	09-13-84	09-13-84	Commission Required		13,152 #				
				Fernandina Division		,				
880558-EI	20472	12-20-88	12-29-88	Company Request	690,888	((Interim)	473,603		
	21532	07-12-89	06-24-89	Marianna Division	,	· ·	(Final)	539,720	13.55%	12.35 - 14.35%
881056-EI	21211	05-09-89	05-18-89	Company Request	908,662	4	(Interim)	456,195		
	22224	11-27-89	11-15-89	Fernandina Division	•	· ·	(Final)	579,872	12.85%	11.85 - 13.85%
930400-EI	93-1640	11-08-93	10-19-93	Company Request	857,520	((Interim)	137,172		
	94-0170	02-10-94	02-17-94	Marianna Division	,	,	(Final)	515,108	10.85%	9.85 - 11.85%
930720-EI	94-0983	08-12-94	09-03-94	MMFR-Fernandina			(,		11.60%	10.60 - 12.60%
961542-EI	97-0135	02-10-97	01-01-96	1995 Overearnings - Fernandina		63,506 →				2.55,0
971227-EI	97-1505	11-25-97	01-01-97	1996 Overearnings - Fernandina		136,019 →				
971228-EI	97-1487	11-24-97	01-01-97	1996 Overearnings - Marianna		37,148 →				
981678-EI	99-0022	01-04-99	01-01-98	1997 Overearnings - Fernandina		248,145 +>				
991109-EI	99-2119	10-25-99	01-01-99	1998 Overearnings - Fernandina		139,228 →				
001146-EI	00-1685	09-20-00	01-01-99	1999 Overearnings - Fernandina		8,561 +				
001147-EI	00-1883	10-16-00	01-01-00	1999 Overearnings - Fernandina		204,670 →				
030438-EI	04-0369	04-06-04	04-15-04	Company Request	4,117,121	204,010 9		1,820,373	11.50%	10.50 - 12.50%
553 100 El	2.0000	2.0007	2.1007	Marianna & Fernandina Combined	1,111,121			.,520,010	11.0070	12.00 /0

20,856,111

350,000,000

20,383,107

350,000,000

10.50%

9.50% - 11.50%

110270-EI

120015-EI

11-0575

13-0023

12-14-11

01-14-13

01-03-12

01-02-13

Nuclear EPU Project

Settlement

Docket No. 20250011-EI PSC Rate Case History Report Exhibit JTH-2, Page 3 of 8

070304-EI	07-0897	11-05-07	11-22-07	Company Request	790,784	(Interim)	790,784			
	08-0327	05-19-08	05-22-08	Company Request	5,249,895	(Final)	3,856,897	11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%	
140025-EI	14-0517	09-29-14	11-01-14	Rate Case Settlement Agreement	5,852,171		3,75 0 ,000	10.25%	9.25 - 11.25%	
20170150-EI	17-0488	12-26-17	1-1-18	Limited Proceeding Settlement Agreement	1,823,869		1,558,050	10.25%	9.25 - 11.25%	
20180048-EI	19-0010	01-02-19	01-01-19	TCJA Rate Reduction Settlement	-638,158		-638,158			
		01-02-19	01-01-21	TCJA Rate Reduction Settlement	-288,230		-288,230			
20200156-EI	20-0347	10-08-20	11-01-20	Storm Settlement Agreement(UPIS/AD)	7,306,454		3,355,080			
20240099-EI			05-20-25*	Rate Case Settlement Agreement	12,593,450		8,4 00 ,000 *	10.20%	*Settlement Agreement yet to be Approve	d.

→ Applied to Storm Damage Reserve

One-time Refund

Docket	Order	Date of	Effective		\$ Amount	\$. \$	Allowable Return	
No.	No.	Order	Date	Nature of Case	Requested	Reduction	Increase	Set	Range
GULF POWER	R COMPAN								
U-398		12-21-64	01-01-65	Company Request		424,548			
7739-PU	3849	08-04-65	10-01-65	Commission Required		677,974			
71342-PU	5471	06-30-72	07-19-72	Company Request	6,726,000	(Final)	3,722,866	44.400/	40.50 44.750
70005 511	0440	04.00.74	01-08-73	Outroop Broad	0.000.000	(Reconsideration)	2,833,425	14.13%	13.50 - 14.75%
73695-EU 74437-EU	6116 6420	04-22-74 12-20-74	01-08-75	Company Request	9,606,000	g-1	47,000,400		
74437-EU	6420 6650	05-07-75	05-07-75	Company Request	18,798,000	(Interim)	17,220,182	44.050/	44.00 44.50%
700050 511	7727		05-07-75 04-10-77	Camaaa, Baarraat	24 000 000	(Final)	17,306,001	14.25%	14.00 - 14.50%
760858-EU	7978	03-31-77	10-08-77	Company Request	31,800,000	(Final)	11,307,335 10,145,953	44.050/	44.00 44.500/
770872-EU	8305	09-27-77 05-15-78	05-16-78	Company Request	12,563,049	(Reconsideration)	6,697,331	14.25%	14.00 - 14.50%
770072-EU	5424	08-07-78	09-07-78	Company Request	12,303,049	(Interim)	10.856.437	13.50%	13.25 - 13.75%
800001-EU	9311	04-02-80	05-02-80	Company Request	46,376,576	(Final)	6,257,000	13.50%	13.25 - 13.75%
00000 I-EU	9628	11-10-80	11-10-80	Company Request	40,370,370	(Interim) (Final)	34,366,065		
	9852	03-05-81	04-01-81			(Reconsideration)	33,769,065	14.75%	13.75 - 15.75%
	9002	03-03-01	04-01-01			2,405,000 #	33,709,003	14.7370	13.73 - 13.7376
810136-EU	10557	02-01-82	02-12-82	Company Request	38,663,000	2,403,000 # (Final)	5,543,620		
010100-20	10963	07-07-82	06-17-82	Company Request	00,000,000	(Reconsideration)	6,917,897	15.85%	14.75 - 16.75%
820150-EU	11498	01-11-83	01-21-83	Company Request	36,944,000	(reconsideration)	3,366,000	15.85%	14.85 - 16.85%
840086-EI	14030	01-21-85	12-17-84	Company Request	28,447,000		4,659,000	15.60%	14.60 - 16.60%
880360-EI	19185	04-19-88	06-01-88	1987 Tax Savings	25, , 555	1,143,211 #	1,000,000	13.60%	11.55 15.5570
	20969	03-31-89	05-01-89	1987 Tax Savings		416,328 #		13.60%	
890324-EI	23536	09-27-90	10-01-90	1988 Tax Savings		3,618,332 #		,	
891345-EI	22681	03-13-90	03-10-90	Company Request	26,295,000	(Interim)	5,751,000		
	23573	10-03-90	09-13-90			(Final)	11,838,000 🕈	12.05%	11.55 - 13.55%
			09-13-92			, ,	14,131,000	12.55%	11.55 - 13.55%
930139-EI	93-0771	05-20-93	06-11-93	ROE Review				12.00%	11.00 - 13.00%
990947-EI	99-2131	10-28-99	11-04-99	Earnings Review		10,000,000			
				2000 Sharing		7,203,024 #			
				2001 Sharing		1,529,875 #			
010949-EI	02-0787	06-10-02	06-07-02	Company Request	69,867,000		53,240,000	12.00%	10.75 - 12.75%
110138-EI	11-0382	09-12-11	09-22-11	Company Request	38,549,000	38,549,000 (Interim)			
	12-0179	04-03-12	04-11-12	Company Request	93,504,000	64,101,662 (Final)		10.25%	9.25 - 11.25%
130140-EI			01-01-14	Settlement	35,000,000		35,000,000	10.25%	9.25 - 11.25%
			01-01-15		20,000,000		20,000,000		
160186-EI	17-0178	05-16-17	07-01-17	Settlement	56,000,000		56, 000 ,000	10.25%	9.25 - 11.25%
20180039	18-0548	11-19-18	01-01-19	TCJA Rate Reduction Settlement	-9,600,000		-9 ,600, 000		
				*Consolidated with Florida Power & Light Co. A	s of 1/1/2022				

Reduced by 2 Year Annual Penalty of \$2 293 000

One-time Refund

Stipulation

▼ Reduced by ∠ Yea	ir Annuai Pena	arty of \$2,293,00	JU	# One-time Retund	8 Supulation					
Docket No.	Order No.	Date of Order	Effective Date	Nature of Case	\$ Amount Requested	\$ Reduction		\$ Increase	Allowable Return o	on Equity Range
TAMPA ELECT	TRIC COMP	ANY								
6240-EU	3078	12-29-60	01-01-61	Company Request				1,585,000		
7739-PU	3782	03-25-65	04-01-65	Commission Required		1,331,000				
8935-EU	4200	05-29-67	08-01-67	Commission Required		2,608,992				
9776-EU	4490	01-06-69	02-01-69	Company Request	2,286,000			2,286,000	13.75%	
70532-EU	5278	11-30-71	01-01-72	Company Request	13,900,000			11,495,559	15.50%	
73604-EU	6133	05-02-74	06-01-74	Company Request	11,200,000			10,024,366	15.50%	
74597-EU	6539	02-28-75	03-15-75	Company Request	43,000,000	(In	iterim)	20,179,000		
	6681	05-21-75	06-20-75			((Final)	37,116,177	14.75%	
760846-EU	7987	10-04-77	10-05-77	Company Request	39,900,000			19,309,135	13.75%	13.50 - 14.00%
800011-EU	9288	03-18-80	04-17-80	Company Request	50,704,000	(In	iterim)	20,429,000		

Docket No. 20250011-EI PSC Rate Case History Report Exhibit JTH-2, Page 4 of 8

	9599	10-17-80	10-18-80			(Fin	al) 31,030,000	14.50%	13.50 - 15.50%	
	9810	02-23-81	03-01-81	Commission Required		1,078,000 #				
820007-EU	11307	11-10-82	11-20-82	Company Request	124,894,000		61,971,000	15.75%	14.75 - 16.57%	
830012-EU	11964	05-24-83	06-16-83	Company Request	80,189,000	(Inter	im) 3,391,000			
	12663	11-07-83	11-16-83			(Fin	al) 23,539,000	15.50%	14.50 - 16.50%	
850050-EI	14538	07-08-85	06-28-85	Company Request	136,518,000	(Inter	im) 21,446,000			
	15451	12-13-85	12-04-85			(Fin	al) 45,683,000	14.50%	13.50 - 15.50%	
			01-31-87				10,40 8,000 **			
			01-31-88				7,688,000 *			
880356-EI	19185	04-19-88	06-01-88	1987 Tax Savings		4,822,613 #		13.60%		
890325-EI	21136	04-27-89	05-02-89	1988 Tax Savings		21,850,882 #		13.60%		
891140-EI	22217	11-21-89	01-01-90	Commission Required		22,017,000				
900153-EI	22719	03-22-90	04-13-90	1989 Tax Savings		20,426,922 #		13.60%		
	23883	12-14-90	01-08-91	1989 Tax Savings		68,586 #		13.60%		
920062-EI	92-0022	03-10-92	04-01-92	ROE				12.50%	11.50 - 12.50%	
920324-EI	93-0165	02-02-93	02-04-93	Company Request `93	42,331,000		1,163,000	12.00%	11.00 - 13.00%	
			01-01-94	Company Request `94	30,736,000		17,412,000 *			
930987-EI	94-0337	03-25-94	02-03-94	ROE		4,000,000 (2)		11.35%	10.35 - 12.35%	
950379-EI	95-0580	05-10-95	01-01-95	1995 Overearnings				11.75%	10.75 - 12.75%	
			01-01-96			12,000,000				
	96-0670	05-20-96	10-01-96	1995 Overearnings		10,000,000 #				
				1996 Overearnings		15,000,000 #				
960409-EI	96-1300	10-24-96	10-01-97	Ε.		25,000,000 #				
950379-EI	00-1441	08-08-00	09-01-00	¶ 1997 & 1998 Overeamings		13,000,000 #				
	01-2515	12-24-01	01-01-02	1999 Overearnings		6,307,427 #				
080317-EI	09-0283	04-30-09	05-07-09	Company Request	228,167,000	(Fin	al) 104,268,536	11.25%	10.25 - 12.25%	
			01-01-10	Step Increase	0		3 3,56 1 ,370			
	09-0571	08-21-09	08-13-09	Reconsideration - Base Rates			9,335,585			
			01-01-10	Reconsideration - Step Increase			515,709			
090368-EI	10-0572	09-16-10	11-14-10	Refund	(24,000,000)	24,000,000 #				
			01-01-11	IS Customer Class Reduction	(1,280,000)	1,280,000				
130040-EI	13-0443	09-30-13	11-01-13	Settlement	57,000,000	0	57 ,000, 000	10.25%	9.25 - 11.25%	
			11-01-14		7,500,000	0	7,5 00 ,000			
			11-01-15		5,000,000	0	5 ,000, 000			
			01-01-17	GBRA	110,000,000	0	110,000, 000			
20170210-EI	15-0456	11-27-17	11-27-17	Settlement Agreement	0		0	10.25%	9.25 - 11.25%	
			2018	Settlement Agreement SoBRA 1	30,600,000		30,600, 000			
			2019	Settlement Agreement SoBRA 2	50,900,000		5 0,900, 000			
			2020	Settlement Agreement SoBRA 3	30,600,000		30,600, 000			
			2021	Settlement Agreement SoBRA 4	10,200,000		10,200, 000			
20180045-EI	18-0457	09-10-18	01-01-19	TCJA Rate Reduction Stipulation	(102,700,000)		(102,700,000)			
20210034-EI	21-0423	11-10-21	2022	Settlement (Excludes CETM)	288,360,000		122,700, 000	9.95%	9.00 - 11.00%	
			2023	Settlement GBRA	102,236,000		89 ,8 00 ,000			
			2024	Settlement GBRA	25,639,000		2 1,400, 000			
20240026-EI	25-00387	02-03-25		Company Request	297,802,000		18 4,762,364	10.50%	9.50-11.50%	11.50%
				Company Request SYA	100,074,841		8 6,627,795	10.50%	9.50-11.50%	11.50%
				Company Request SYA	71,847,925		9,089,346	10.50%	9.50-11.50%	11.50%

■ Stipulation

(2) Storm damage accrual # One-time Refund
REVENUE REDUCTIONS AND INCREASES ORDERED
BY THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION FOR CERTAIN
INVESTOR-OWNED ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS UTILITIES
UTILITIES FROM 1960 TO PRESENT
(All Utilities from 1968 to Present)

GAS UTILITIES

Docket	Order	Date of	Effective		\$ Amount	\$	\$	Allowable Return	on Equity
No.	No.	Order	Date	Nature of Case	Requested	Reduction	Increase	Set	Range
CHESAPEAKE	UTILITIES	CORPORATI	ON (Formerl	y Central Florida Gas Co	mpany and Pla <mark>nt City Natural Gas</mark> (Company)			
891179-GU	22475	01-29-90	02-01-90	Company Request	1,315,496	(Interim)	328,301		
	23166	07-10-90	07-09-90			(Final)	78 0, 097	13.00%	12.00 - 14.00%
920729-GU	92-0817	08-14-92	07-01-92	1991 Overearnings		284,782 #		12.00%	11.00 - 13.00%
920729-GU	93-0520	04-06-93	04-30-93	1991 Overearnings		116,849 +			
931099-GU	93-1772	12-10-93	01-01-94	ROE				11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
940818-GU	95-1205	09-28-95	12-31-94	1994 Overearnings		62,360 4			
970023-GU	97-0136	02-10-97	01-01-96	1995 Overearnings		229,679 +			
000108-GU	00-1416	08-03-00	08-10-00	Company Request	830,330	(Interim)	591,579		

			01-14-10	Environmental Clean-Up Surcharge		` '	239,064		
20220067-GU	23-0103	3/15/2023	3/1/2023	Company Request	112,527,439	219,191	239,004	10.25%	9.25-11.255
20220007-00	23-0103	3/13/2023	3/1/2023	Company Request	112,021,403	213,131		10.2376	3.20-11.200
FLORIDA CIT	Y GAS (For	merly City Ga	s Company	of Florida)					
6001-GU	4064	09-07-66	11-01-66	Commission Required		172,600			
				Miami Division					
8766-GU	4186	04-19-67	05-05-67	Company Request	299,963		299,963		
				Brevard Division					
8960-GU	4342	04-09-68	05-08-68	Company Request	425,802		321,647		13.00 - 13.60%
				Miami Division					
70576-GU	5164	07-16-71	08-21-71	Company Request	563,219		372,000	14.00%	13.75 - 14.25%
70577-GU				Miami Division					
70576-GU	5164	07-16-71	08-21-71	Company Request	311,595		311,595	14.00%	13.75 - 14.25%
70577-GU				Brevard Division					
74596-GU	6544	03-04-75	03-17-75	Company Request	1,484,599		1,144,428	14.50%	
				All Divisions					
810004-GU	10192	08-07-81	09-02-81	Company Request	4,451,687	(Interim)	855,455		
				All Divisions					
	10395	11-06-81	12-03-81			(Final)	3,706,276	16.00%	15.00 - 17.00%
830581-GU	13271	05-04-84	05-31-84	Company Request	4,870,385	(Interim)	2,330,555		
				All Divisions					
	13609	08-22-84	09-08-84			(Final)	3,887,830	15.75%	14.75 - 16.75%
891175-GU	23159	07-09-90	07-05-90	Company Request	6,757,589	(Interim)	2,501,885		
	24013	01-23-91	01-21-91			(Final)	3, 10 6,420	13.00%	12.00 - 14.00%
	24925	08-19-91	08-30-91	PC Debt		119,012			
931098-GU	93-1820	12-22-93	01-01-94	ROE				11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
940276-GU	94-0957	08-09-94	08-19-94	Company Request	1,193,525	(Interim)	260,169		
	94-1570	12-19-94	12-29-94		8,594,727	(Final)	1,566,657	11.30%	10.30 - 12.30%
960502-GU	96-1113	09-03-96	09-23-96	Company Request	2,312,853	(Interim)	2,151,503		
	96-1404	11-20-96	11-29-96		5,283,344	(Final)	3,752,678	11.30%	10.30 - 12.30%
000768-GU	00-2101	11-06-00	11-16-00	Company Request	1,886,605	(Interim)	1,640,777		
	01-0316	02-05-01	02-15-01		7,181,988	(Final)	5,132,356	11.50%	10.50 - 12.50%
030569-GU	03-1217	10-27-03	11-06-03	Company Request	3,548,987	(Interim)	2,942,306		
	04-0128	02-09-04	02-20-04		10,489,305	(Final)	6,699,655	11.25%	10.25 - 12.25%
20170179-GU	18-0011	01-04-18	01-11-18	Interim Rate Increase	4,893,061	(Interim)	4,893,061		
20170179-GU	18-0190	04-20-18	06-01-18	Company Request	19,300,000		11,500, 000	10.19%	9.19 - 11.19%
20180154-GU	18-0596	12-20-18	01-01-19	TCJA Rate Reduction Settlement	-304,943		-304,943		
# One-time Refund				+ Applied to environmental clean-up costs					

1,826,569

2,965,398

417,555

(Final)

(Final)

(Interim)

1,251,900

2,536,307

4**1**7,555

11.50%

10.80%

10.50 - 12.50%

9.80 - 11.80%

00-2263

09-0606

10-0029

090125-GU

11-28-00

09-08-09

01-14-10

12-07-00

09-17-09

01-14-10

Company Request

Company Request

[♣] Deferred to following year

Docket	Order	Date of	Effective		\$ Amount	\$	\$	Allowable Ret	urn on Equity
No.	No.	Order	Date	Nature of Case	Requested	Reduction	Increase	Set	Range
FLORIDA PUBI	LIC UTILITI	ES COMPAN	Υ						
9937-GU	4795-A	11-20-69	12-01-69	Company Request Sanford Division	14,128		14,128		
9935-GU	4794	11-20-69	12-01-69	Company Request Deland Division	20,692		20,692		
73589-GU	6273	09-05-74	10-05-74	Commission Required West Palm Beach Division		159,572		14.50%	14.25 - 14.75%
760469-GU	7629	02-04-77	02-21-77	Company Request	784,725		57 0, 916	14.50%	14.25 - 14.75%
800414-GU	9584	10-06-80	10-30-80	Company Request	724,983	(Interim)	282,940		
	9956	04-20-81	04-30-81			(Final)	656,907	15.00%	14.00 - 16.00%
820249-GU	11389	12-07-82	12-15-82	Company Request	1,080,199	(Interim)	725,736		
	11855	04-19-83	05-01-83			(Final)	915,806	16.04%	16.04 - 16.14%
850172-GU	15460	12-18-85	01-16-86	Company Request	1,923,989	(Interim)	697,917		
	16195	06-06-86	06-06-86			(Final)	1,283,781	14.50%	13.50 - 15.50%
900151-GU	23516	09-19-90	09-27-90	Company Request	2,239,827	(Interim)	997,055		
	23987	01-15-91	02-23-91			(Final)	2,320,561	13.00%	12.00 - 14.00%
931100-GU	94-0249	03-07-94	01-01-94	ROE				11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
940620-GU	94-1519	12-09-94	12-22-94	Company Request	496,326	(Interim)	386,927		
	95-0518	04-26-95	05-06-95		2,079,120	(Final)	1,282,001	11.40%	10.40 - 12.40%
040216-GU	04-0721	07-26-04	08-05-04	Company Request	1,490,980	(Interim)	1,236,108		
	04-1110	11-08-04	11-18-04		8,186,989	(Final)	5,865,903	11.25%	10.25 - 11.25%
050224-GU	05-0769	07-25-05	08-15-05	2002 Overearnings		142,963 (1)			

Docket No. 20250011-EI PSC Rate Case History Report Exhibit JTH-2, Page 6 of 8

[#] One-time Refund

Stipulation

⁺ Applied to environmental clean-up costs

070107-GU	07-0671	08-21-07	09-11-07	2005 Overearnings		735,182 (2)			
080514-GU	08-0697	10-20-08	11-10-08	2006 Overearnings		176,144 (2)			
080366-GU	09-0123	03-03-09	03-12-09	Company Request	984,054	(Interim)	984,054		
	09-0375	05-27-09	06-03-09	Company Request	9,917,690	(Final)	8,496,230	10.85%	9.85 - 11.85%
	09-0848	12-28-09	01-14-10	Reconsideration		527,230			
20220067-GU	23-0103	03-15-23	03-01-23	Company Request	339,094,480	995,890		10.25%	9.25-11.25%
INDIANTOWN									
020470-GU	02-1666	11-26-02	12-20-02	Company Request				11.50%	10.50 - 12.50%
030954-GU	04-0180	02-23-04	03-03-04	Company Request	138,602	(Interim)	137,014		
	04-0565	06-02-04	06-17-04		306,751	(Final)	131,539	11.50%	10.50 - 12.50%
20220067-GU	23-0103	3/15/2023	3/1/2023	Company Request	1,940,739		2,400	10.25%	9.25-10.25%

Stipulation

⁽²⁾ Applied to Storm Surcharge and Storm Reserve.

Docket No.	Order No.	Date of Order	Effective Date	Nature of Case	\$ Amount Requested	\$ Reduction	\$ Increase	Allowable Ret Set	urn on Equity Range
PEOPLES GA	S SYSTEM	, INC.							
5760-GU	3452	09-26-62		Company Request			43,771	11.32%	
				East Coast Division					
6076-GU		09-26-62		Company Request West Coast Division			137,631	11.32%	
72446-GU	5826-A	08-14-73	08-30-73	Company Request All Divisions	1,907,374		1,325,283	14.25%	14.00 - 14.50%
74767-GU	6542	03-04-75	03-20-75	Company Request All Divisions	2,986,421	(Interim)	1,165,510		
	6737	06-24-75	07-24-75			(Final)	2,203,997	14.75%	14.50 - 15.00%
760922-GU	7897	07-15-77	08-14-77	Company Request	3,930,381		2,950,310	14.75%	14.50 - 15.00%
				All Divisions					
810302-GU	10397	11-10-81	12-04-81	Company Request	15,793,907	(Interim)	6,739,616		
	11612	02-14-83	03-28-82			(Final)	10 ,836,670		
	11612-A	03-22-83	04-01-83			(Reconsideration)	9 ,40 5,473	16.00%	15.00 - 17.00%
830123-GU	12271	07-18-83	07-28-83	Company Request	12,102,111	(Interim)	3,360,776		
	12712	11-28-83	11-05-83			(Final)	6,326,005	15.75%	14.75 - 16.75%
850811-GU	15762	02-28-86	03-20-86	Company Request	11,242,000 ₪	(Interim)	2,958,000		
	16313	07-08-86	07-18-86	Company Request		(Final)	12,776,000	14.25%	13.25 - 15.25%
891353-GU	23858	12-11-90	11-16-90	Company Request	14,283,000		7,489,913	13.00%	12.00 - 14.00%
911150-GU	92-0188	04-13-92	04-24-92	Company Request	4,406,000	(Interim)	3,268,080		
	92-0924	09-03-92	09-11-92	Company Request	15,410,924	(Final)	11,861,944	12.00%	11.00 - 13.00%
931101-GU	93-1773	12-10-93	01-01-94	ROE		1,248,000 +		11.25%	10.25 - 12.25%
971310-GU	98-0329	02-24-98	12-31-96	1996 Overearnings		973,572 +			
980434-GU	98-0739	05-28-98	08-01-98	WFNG Reserve		626,334 #			
020384-GU	02-1227	09-09-02	09-19-02	Company Request	5,421,000	(Interim)	1,461,000		
	03-0038	01-06-03	01-13-03	□ Company Request	22,615,228	(Final)	12,050, 000	11.25%	10.25 - 12.25%
080318-GU	08-0696	10-20-08	10-28-08	Company Request	3,748,000	(Interim)	2,38 0 ,000		
	09-0411	06-09-09	06-18-09	Company Request	26,488,091	(Final)	19,152,365	10.75%	9.75 - 11.75%
	10-0208	04-05-10	05-04-10	Reconsideration	169,912		0		
100462-GU	11-0111	02-10-11	04-01-11	■ 2010 Overearnings	(3,000,000) #	3,000,000			
20180044-GU	18-0501	10-18-18	01-01-19	TCJA Rate Reduction Settlement	-11,599,038		-11,599,038		
20200051-GU	20-0485	12-10-20	01-01-21	Rate Case Settlement	85,300,000		58 ,000, 000	9.90%	8.90 - 11.0%
20230023-GU	23-0082	2/13/2023	0101-24	Company Request	2,355,546,414		1,781,346	10.15%	9.15-11.15%

[#] One-time Refund

⁺ Applied to environmental clean-up costs

Docket	Order	Date of	Effective		\$ Amount	\$	\$	Allowable Return	on Equity
No.	No.	Order	Date	Nature of Case	Requested	Reduction	Increase	Set	Range
ST. JOE NATURAL GAS COMPANY									
8702-GU	4138	02-16-67	04-04-67	Company Request	25,205		19,895		
820490-GU	12372	08-16-83	08-16-83	Commission Required		8,665 #		16.00%	15.70 - 17.70%
870986-GU	19793	08-11-88	08-11-88	Commission Required		138,867		13.70%	12.70 - 14.70%
890620-GU	22199	11-20-89	12-11-89	Tax Refund		24,340 #			

Stipulation

⁽¹⁾ Applied to Storm Restoration Costs, and NTAC and TCR factor final true-ups.

[₱] Due to rate restructuring and loss of load, company would have asked for \$16,461,000

931102-GU	93-1775	12-10-93	01-01-94	ROE				11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
960930-GU	96-1188	09-23-96	10-15-96	1994 Overearnings		183,339 ##			
			10-15-96	1995 Overearnings		77,979 🗯			
001447-GU	01-0465	02-26-01	02-06-01	Company Request	459,185	(Interim)	355,984		
	01-1274	06-08-01	06-14-01		551,923	(Final)	327 ,1 49	11.50%	10.50 - 12.50%
070592-GU	08-0135	03-03-08	03-13-08	Company Request	274,981	(Interim)	157,775		
	08-0436	07-08-08	07-17-08		624,166	(Final)	543,868	11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
20200039-GU	21-0196	06-03-21	2025	Storm Settlement	77,761		TBD	11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
SEBRING GAS	SYSTEM I	NC							
910873-GU	92-0229	04-20-92	03-30-92	Company Request	422,795		422,795	12.00%	11.00 - 13.00%
931103-GU	93-1774	12-10-93	01-01-94	ROE	422,130		422,100	11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
040270-GU	04-0860	09-02-04	09-16-04	Company Request	110,957	(Interim)	97,211	11.0070	10.00 12.0070
010210 00	04-1260	12-20-04	12-30-04	Company Roquos	234,641	(Final	163,262	11.50%	10.50 - 12.50%
					·	`	•		
SOUTH FLORI	DA NATURA	AL GAS COM	IPANY (Me	rged with Florida Public Utilitie	es Compa ny)				
72344-GU	5816	08-03-73	10-20-73	Company Request	96,923		82,906	14.50%	14.00 - 16.00%
810147-GU	10425	11-25-81	12-25-81	Company Request	211,907	(Interim)	89,743		
	10695	04-05-82	04-11-82		•	`(Final)	170,873		
	11280	10-29-82	09-29-82			(Reconsideration)	1 68 , 471		
830330-GU	12789	12-16-83	01-05-84	⊕ Company Request	258,651	(Interim)	217,627		
	13193	04-16-84	05-04-84			(Final)	218,564	15.75%	14.75 - 16.75%
860341-GU	16861	11-19-86	12-04-86	Company Request	343,414	(Interim)	88,392		
	17933	08-04-87	08-14-87			(Final)	49,542	13.23%	12.23 - 14.23%
900623-GU	24056	02-04-91	02-15-91	Company Request	509,765	(Interim)	297,577		
	24608	06-03-91	06-14-91			(Final)	329,255	13.00%	12.00 - 14.00%
931104-GU	93-1776	12-10-93	01-01-94	ROE				11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
WEST FLORID	A NATURAL	_ GAS COMP	PANY (Merg	ed with Peoples Gas System,	Inc.)				
8574-GU	4502	01-06-69	05-25-69	Commission Required		56,000			
				Panama City Division					
69490-GU	4878	12-19-69	01-12-70	Company Request	56,500		56,500		
				Panama City Division					
72676-GU	5685	03-29-73	04-28-73	Company Request	169,655		99 ,1 45	14.75%	
820404-GU	11516	01-18-83	02-03-83	Company Request	1,339,195	(Interim)	78 0 ,716		
	12217	07-11-83	07-11-83			(Final)	572,861	16.20%	15.20 - 17.20%
850503-GU	15527	01-06-86	01-16-86	Company Request	1,453,598	(Interim)	947,537		
	16549	09-05-86	09-04-86			(Final)	694,808	13.15%	12.15 - 14.15%
871255-GU	19239	04-28-88	05-19-88	Company Request	1,109,227	(Interim)	584,212		
	21054	04-17-89	02-25-89			(Final)	1,518,271	13.50%	12.50 - 14.50%
910778-GU	25522	12-23-91	01-02-92	Company Request	1,930,801	(Interim)	853,689		
	92-0580	06-29-92	07-08-92			(Final)	1,0 23, 1 18	12.00%	11.00 - 13.00%
931105-GU	93-1777	12-10-93	01-01-94	ROE				11.00%	10.00 - 12.00%
930091-GU	94-0452	04-14-94	06-30-94	6-30-93 Overearnings		515,622 +			
						64,006 #			

347,718 ¥

940927-GU

6-30-94 Overearnings

O:\RSW\FAIR\[Unhighlited.Copy of Electric and Gas - Increase-Decrease File.xlsx]Sheet1

08-08-95 06-30-94

95-0964

[#] One-time Refund

⁺ Applied to environmental clean-up costs

Stipulation

max Partially deferred to next rate case

BEFORE THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Power &

DOCKET NO.: 20250011-EI

Light Company.

FILED: August 26, 2025

CUSTOMER MAJORITY PARTIES' STIPULATION AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

WHEREAS, Citizens of the State of Florida, through the Florida Office of Public Counsel, Florida Rising, Inc., LULAC Florida, Inc., better known as the League of United Latin American Citizens of Florida, Environmental Confederation of Southwest Florida, Inc., and Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc., (collectively the "Customer Majority Parties" or "CMPs") have signed this Stipulation and Settlement Agreement (the "Majority Settlement Agreement"); and

WHEREAS, on December 2, 2021, the Florida Public Service Commission ("FPSC" or "Commission") entered Final Order PSC-2021-0446-S-EI approving a stipulation and settlement of FPL's rate case in Docket No. 20210015-EI, and on December 9, 2021, the Commission entered Amendatory Final Order PSC-2021-0446A-S-EI, and on March 25, 2024, the Commission entered Supplemental Final Order PSC-2024-0078-FOF-EI; and

WHEREAS, on February 28, 2025, Florida Power & Light ("FPL") filed a petition ("Petition") with the Commission for approval of base rate increases consisting of (i) an increase in rates and charges sufficient to generate additional total annual revenues of \$1.545 billion to be effective January 1, 2026; (ii) an increase in rates and charges sufficient to generate additional total annual revenues of \$927 million to be effective January 1, 2027; (iii) a Solar and Battery Base Rate Adjustment ("SoBRA") mechanism that authorizes FPL to recover costs associated with the installation and operation of solar generation and battery storage facilities in 2028 and 2029 upon a demonstration of a resource or economic need; (iv) a so-called "non-cash" mechanism that would accelerate the flowback of certain deferred tax liabilities ("DTL") to customers, which would

operate in a similar manner to the so-called "non-cash" mechanisms contained in prior FPL multi-

year settlements; (v) a storm cost recovery mechanism modeled after terms previously approved

as part of various FPL rate settlements, updated to reflect changes in costs; and (iv) a mechanism

to address potential changes to tax laws or regulations; and

WHEREAS, the Customer Majority Parties collectively engaged in the vast majority of

discovery, including over 37 sets of written discovery consisting of over 1,000 interrogatories and

requests for production of documents and noticed and primarily conducted all of the 35 depositions

in the case; and

WHEREAS, the Customer Majority Parties to this Majority Settlement Agreement have

undertaken to resolve the issues raised in Docket No. 20250011-EI so as to protect all FPL

customers from the unfair, unjust, and unreasonable rates that would result from the Stipulation

and Settlement Agreement, filed by FPL and a number of limited interest parties dominated by

large industrial and commercial customer interests (hereinafter, together with FPL, the "Special

Interest Parties" or "SIPs"), which parties collectively represent a tiny fraction of FPL customers;

and

WHEREAS, the Customer Majority Parties have entered into this Majority Settlement

Agreement in compromise of positions taken in accord with their rights and interests under

Chapters 350, 366 and 120, Florida Statutes, as applicable, and as a part of the negotiated exchange

of consideration among the Customer Majority Parties to this Majority Settlement Agreement,

each has agreed to concessions to the others with the expectation that all provisions of the Majority

Settlement Agreement will be enforced by the Commission as to all matters addressed herein with

respect to all substantially affected persons regardless of whether a court ultimately determines

such matters to reflect Commission policy, upon acceptance of the Majority Settlement Agreement

as provided herein and upon approval in the public interest;

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal

Exhibit JTH-3, Page 3 of 33

WHEREAS, as this Majority Settlement Agreement is offered in compromise of the

positions the Customer Majority Party signatories have taken in this docket, and no position taken

in this Majority Settlement Agreement by any Customer Majority Party shall be considered a

waiver of any Customer Majority Party's right to challenge FPL's Petition in a hearing and in any

appeal regarding disputed issues of fact and law in this docket pursuant to Chapters 120 and 366,

Florida Statutes and the Florida and United States Constitutions. The Customer Majority Parties

are filing this in response to the Special Interest Parties' stipulation and settlement agreement filed

on August 20, 2025; and

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing and the covenants contained

herein, the Customer Majority Parties hereby stipulate and agree:

1. Upon approval by this Commission, this Majority Settlement Agreement will become

effective on January 1, 2026 (the "Implementation Date") and continue until FPL's base

rates are next reset in a general base rate proceeding (the "Term"); provided, however,

that FPL may place interim rates into effect subject to refund pursuant to Paragraph 5 of

this Majority Settlement Agreement. The minimum term of this Majority Settlement

Agreement shall be two years, from the Implementation Date through December 31,

2027 (the "Minimum Term").

2. The Customer Majority Parties propose adjustments to rate base, net operating income,

and cost of capital, as shown in Attachment A. Those adjustments will not be challenged

during the Term for purposes of FPL's Earnings Surveillance Reports or clause filings

and will be used for proceedings conducted pursuant to section 366.071, Florida

Statutes. Additionally, all costs to fully remediate the damage resulting from multiple

washouts of the Kayak Solar Energy Center construction site in Holt, Florida, to the

Wilkinson Creek communities shall not be charged to customers and shall be recorded below the line.

Cost of Capital

3. FPL's authorized rate of return on common equity ("ROE") shall be a range of 9.6 percent to 11.6 percent and shall be used for all purposes. All rates, including those established in clause proceedings during the Term, shall be set using a 10.6 percent ROE. An equity ratio of 59.6 percent equity ratio shall be used for all regulatory purposes from January 1, 2026 to the end of the Term (and thereafter until the company's general base rates and charges are revised by a Final Order of the Commission as the result of the next subsequent general base rate proceeding), including, but not limited to, cost recovery clauses, riders, recovery mechanism(s), interim rates (to the extent authorized), and earnings surveillance reporting.

Base Revenue Requirements, Tariffs, Service Charges and Credits

- 4. (a) Effective on January 1, 2026, FPL shall be authorized to increase its base rates and service charges by an amount that is intended to generate an additional \$867 million of annual revenues, inclusive of the annual impact of the four-year amortization of the full qualifying investment tax credits ("ITC") of all battery storage facilities added during 2025, based on the projected 2026 test year billing determinants set forth in FPL's 2026 MFRs filed with the Petition.
 - (b) Effective January 1, 2027, FPL shall be authorized to increase its base rates by an amount that is intended to generate an additional \$403 million over the Company's then current base rates, inclusive of the annual impact of the four-year amortization of the full qualifying ITCs of all battery storage facilities added during 2025, based on the

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal

Exhibit JTH-3, Page 5 of 33

projected 2027 test year billing determinants set forth in FPL's 2027 MFRs filed with

the Petition. Additionally, to the extent that any batteries are approved for construction

in 2027 pursuant to Paragraph 13, FPL would also be authorized to recover the revenue

requirement associated with those batteries.

(c) The Customer Majority Parties have agreed that approval of this Majority

Settlement Agreement requires that the Commission direct FPL to file tariffs

conforming to this Majority Settlement Agreement, and the Customer Majority Parties

request that the Commission order the company to file those tariffs, as described in

Paragraph 4(a) above, which sheets shall become effective no sooner than the first day

of the first billing cycle of January 2026. The Customer Majority Parties also request

that the tariffs include the rates and charges resulting from approval of this Majority

Settlement Agreement.

(d) The Customer Majority Parties have agreed that approval of this Majority Settlement

Agreement requires that the Commission direct FPL to file tariffs conforming to this

Majority Settlement Agreement, and the Customer Majority Parties request that the

Commission order the company to file those tariffs, as described in Paragraph 4(b)

above, which tariff sheets shall become effective no sooner than the first day of the first

billing cycle of January 2027. The Customer Majority Parties also request that the tariffs

include the rates and charges resulting from approval of this Majority Settlement

Agreement. The company shall develop the base rates and charges for this increase using

the billing determinants for 2027 that the company will use to develop its cost recovery

clause factors for 2027. The Commission shall direct FPL to file its proposed tariffs to

implement the 2027 increase and supporting schedules no later than July 31, 2026, to

enable the Commission to consider and approve the tariffs such that the company may

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal

Exhibit JTH-3, Page 6 of 33

provide timely notice to customers and implement the new tariffs effective no sooner

than the first day of the first billing cycle of January 2027.

(e) As part of the negotiated exchange of consideration among the Customer Majority

Parties to this Majority Settlement Agreement, (i) the energy and demand charges for

business and commercial rates and the utility-controlled demand rates resulting from the

recalculation of rates and charges resulting from Paragraphs 4(c) and 4(d), and (ii) the

level of utility-controlled demand credits for customers receiving service pursuant to

FPL's Commercial/Industrial Load Control ("CILC") tariff and the

Commercial/Industrial Demand Reduction ("CDR") rider shall each be the same as

those currently in effect. FPL shall be entitled to recover the CILC and CDR credits

through the energy conservation cost recovery ("ECCR") Clause. The Customer

Majority Parties agree that no changes in these credits shall be implemented any earlier

than the effective date of new FPL base rates implemented pursuant to a general base

rate proceeding, and that such new CILC and CDR credits shall only be implemented

prospectively from such effective date. At such time as FPL's base rates are reset in a

general base rate proceeding, the CILC and CDR credits shall be reset.

f) The cost-of-service study that applies (i) the 12CP and 1/13 Average Demand

methodology for Production Plant, (ii) 12CP for Transmission Plant and (iii) FPL's

proposed methodology for allocating Distribution Plant, limited by the Commission's

traditional gradualism test found in Order No. PSC-2009-0283-FOF-EI, pp. 86-87. The

revenue allocation in the Majority Settlement Agreement is based on a policy that no

rate or revenue class receives (nor shall receive) an increase greater than 1.5 times the

system average percentage increase in total and no class receives (nor shall receive) a

decrease in rates. To the extent that application of the revenue allocations resulting from

Exhibit JTH-3, Page 7 of 33

the Majority Settlement Agreement cost of service methodology causes there still to be

excess revenues from classes overpaying after the application of the 1.5 times the system

average percentage increase, the Customer Majority Parties either support or do not

oppose the Commission directing that any excess be proportionately allocated to reduce

the rates of rate classes that would otherwise be entitled to a rate decrease as indicated

by the cost of service study.

(g) Base rates and credits applied to customer bills in accordance with this Paragraph

4 shall not be changed during the Minimum Term except as otherwise permitted in this

Majority Settlement Agreement. As a part of this base rate freeze, the Company will not

seek Commission approval to defer for later recovery in rates, any costs incurred or

reasonably expected to be incurred from the Implementation Date through and including

December 31, 2027, which are of the type which traditionally or historically have been

or would be recovered in base rates, unless such deferral and subsequent recovery is

expressly authorized herein or otherwise agreed to in writing by the Customer Majority

Parties.

(h) Generation Base Rate Adjustment ("GBRA")

For the period January 1, 2027, through December 31, 2029, FPL may, one time only,

file for limited rate relief as described in this paragraph. FPL shall have the option to

extend the Minimum Term and increase base rates in 2028 and 2029 by adding resources

with a demonstrated need as discussed below. FPL may elect, at its sole option, on a

one time basis, to agree not to file a general base rate case for rates effective earlier than

the first day of the first billing cycle of January 2030, if the company provides notice by

January 15, 2027 that it intends to file a limited proceeding (or proceedings as may be

necessary to implement the provisions of Paragraph 13) for a consolidated Generation

Base Rate Adjustment ("GBRA") that may consist of, up to and including, the solar and battery resources contained in its original filing for the years 2028 and 2029, the calendar year revenue requirement of which (including the impacts of 2027 SoBRA additions) is estimated to be \$195 million in 2028 and \$174 million in 2029 – calculated using a 10.6 percent midpoint ROE – based on the filed in-service dates, subject to and calculated pursuant to the provisions of Paragraph 13. This filing may include the addition of the net revenue requirement (including the impact of any battery storage resources that are avoided) associated with the Vandolah Generating Facility (at approximately 660 MW) and including the required, directly associated transmission facilities calculated on an annual revenue requirement limit through December 31, 2029, using a 10.6 percent midpoint ROE. If FPL makes this election, the CMPs commit and agree that they will not oppose such a limited proceeding GBRA filing; however, the CMPs do not waive any rights to challenge solar and battery resources additions pursuant to Paragraph 13 or the economic or resource need of the Vandolah Generating Facility for cost-recovery purposes, for purposes of the consolidated GBRA petition. The CMPs further commit to refrain from seeking to convert such proceeding into a vehicle for a "rate case" type inquiry concerning the expenses, investment, or financial results of operations of the Company and shall not apply any form of earnings test or measure (other than application of the WACC containing the authorized ROE in calculating the GBRA revenue requirement for plant additions), or consider previous or current base rate earnings in such a proceeding. Multiple base rate increases may be authorized pursuant to the single GBRA filing, but any base rate increase(s) implemented under this GBRA

¹ The CMPs expect that the Commission would enforce these forbearance provisions as to all substantially affected parties to the same extent that it would be willing to do so in any consideration of the SIP Agreement.

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 9 of 33

provision must be synchronized with the in-service date of the respective generation

asset(s).

(i) Minimum Bill

The minimum bill for residential and commercial classes (RS-1, RS-T1, GS-1, and GS-

T1) shall be no more than \$25.

(i) Transition Rider Charge and Credit

The transition rider charge for Northwest Florida (legacy Gulf Power), referenced on

Tariff Sheet 8.030.3, and the transition rider credit, heretofore applicable to legacy FPL,

referenced on Tariff Sheet 8.303.2, shall both be eliminated effective on the first day of

the first billing cycle of January 2026.

Termination

5. (a) Notwithstanding Paragraph 4 above, if FPL's earned return on common equity falls

below the bottom of its authorized range during the Minimum Term on an FPL monthly

earnings surveillance report stated on an FPSC actual, adjusted basis (as defined below),

FPL may petition the Commission to amend its base rates, either as a general base rate

proceeding under Sections 366.06 and 366.07, Florida Statutes, or pursuant to a limited

proceeding under Section 366.076, Florida Statutes. Throughout this Majority

Settlement Agreement, "FPSC actual, adjusted basis" and "actual adjusted earned

return" shall mean results reflecting all adjustments to FPL's books required by the

Commission by rule or order, but excluding pro forma, weather-related adjustments. If

FPL files a petition to initiate a general base rate proceeding pursuant to this provision,

FPL may also request an interim rate increase pursuant to the provisions of Section

366.071, Florida Statutes. Further, it is not the intent of the Customer Majority Parties

to limit the rights of any substantially affected person to petition the Commission for a

review of FPL's base rates. In any proceeding initiated pursuant to this Paragraph 5(a),

nothing in this Majority Settlement Agreement shall limit the rights of any substantially

affected person.

(b) Notwithstanding Paragraph 4 above, if during the Minimum Term of this Majority

Settlement Agreement, FPL's earned return on common equity exceeds the top of its

authorized ROE range reported in an FPL monthly earnings surveillance report stated

on an FPSC actual, adjusted basis, any party shall be entitled to petition the Commission

for a review of FPL's base rates. Further, it is not the intent of the Customer Majority

Parties to limit the rights of any substantially affected person to petition the Commission

for a review of FPL's base rates. In any proceeding initiated pursuant to this Paragraph

5(b), nothing in this Majority Settlement Agreement shall limit the rights of any

substantially affected person.

(c) Notwithstanding Paragraph 4 above, this Majority Settlement Agreement shall

terminate upon the effective date of any final order issued in any such proceeding

pursuant to this Paragraph 5 that changes FPL's base rates.

(d) This Paragraph 5 shall not: (i) be construed to bar or limit FPL to any recovery of

costs otherwise contemplated by this Majority Settlement Agreement nor, in any

proceeding initiated after a base rate proceeding filed pursuant to this Paragraph 5, shall

any substantially affected person be prohibited from taking any position or asserting the

application of law or any right or defense in litigation related to FPL's efforts to recover

such costs; (ii) apply to any request to change FPL's base rates that would become

effective after this Majority Settlement Agreement terminates; or (iii) limit any

substantially affected person's rights in proceedings concerning changes to base rates

that would become effective subsequent to the termination of this Majority Settlement

Agreement to argue that FPL's authorized ROE range or any other element used in deriving its revenue requirements or rates should differ from the range set forth in this Majority Settlement Agreement.

Large Load Contract Service

- 6. FPL's Large Load Contract Service Tariffs LLCS-1, LLCS-2, and LLCS Service Agreement tariffs ("LLCS Tariffs") shall be approved as filed on February 28, 2025, with the following modifications:
 - (a) The minimum take-or-pay demand charge for the LLCS Tariffs shall be 80 percent.
 - (b) The Commission shall direct FPL to prepare schedules reflecting the LLCS base, non-fuel energy, and applicable demand charges based on the cost of capital in Paragraph 3 and the other relevant terms of this Majority Settlement Agreement.
 - (c) The language in the LLCS Tariffs requiring that "[a]ll service required by the Customer at a Single Location shall be furnished through primary metering at the available transmission voltage at the interconnecting transmission substation(s)," is not intended to aggregate load across multiple locations in order to apply LLCS Tariffs to the customer. The LLCS Tariffs specifically mandate that each location maintain its own dedicated metering arrangement.
 - (d) With respect to the engineering and system impact studies ("System Studies") required for applicants seeking service under the LLCS Tariffs:
 - (i) The customer will have six months to execute the Construction and Operating Agreement and pay the CIAC, if any, based on the tariff in effect at that time, such period to run from the later of (x) the date on which FPL provides the Engineering Study or (y) the date the LLCS Tariff becomes effective.

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 12 of 33

- (ii) The customer is entitled, upon request, to one 3-month extension per study (9
- months total) to execute the Construction and Operating Agreement.
- (iii) The customer is not guaranteed capacity until the LLCS Service Agreement is executed and all deposits are paid.
- (iv) If the maximum acceptance period is reached and the customer does not complete paragraphs 6(d)(i) through (iii) above, the System Study will be considered null and void.
- (v) The System Study package includes a milestone schedule based on durations and not specific dates. The extension of the acceptance period does not shorten the milestone schedule. In the event the customer extends the acceptance period pursuant to Paragraph 6(d)(ii), the load ramp schedule may need to adjust to accommodate the milestone schedule.
- (vi) For System Studies accepted before the LLCS Tariff takes effect, upon approval by the Commission for good cause shown, the customer has until September 30, 2026 to execute the LLCS Service Agreement.

Contribution in Aid of Construction Tariff

7. FPL's proposed Contribution in Aid of Construction ("CIAC") tariff modification shall be approved as filed on February 28, 2025. FPL shall file a schedule attached to its monthly Earnings Surveillance Report that shows the incremental amount of CIAC collected pursuant to the tariff modification approved under this Paragraph.

Electric Vehicle Programs

8. (a) FPL's Commercial Electric Vehicle Charging Services Rider (CEVCS-1), Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Rider (GSD-1EV), Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure Rider (GSLD-1EV), Utility-Owned Public Charging for Electric Vehicles

(UEV), and FPL's Residential Electric Vehicle Charging Services (RS-1EV and RS-2EV) (the "EV Home Program") tariffs shall be approved as filed, with the following modifications:

- (i) FPL's GLD-1EV and GSLD-1EV Riders shall become permanent (i.e., nonpilot);
- (ii) FPL shall create a new GSLD-2EV Rider to allow for demand greater than 2,000 kW, which Rider shall also be permanent (i.e., non-pilot). This new rate schedule will not become effective until the new rate can be established in FPL's upgraded billing system. Until such time as the new rate schedule is established, existing customers will be allowed to exceed 2,000 kW of demand and remain in GSLD-1EV.
- (iii) FPL shall increase the rate for UEV to \$0.45/kWh. FPL agrees to increase the rate for UEV by an additional \$0.02/kWh (to \$0.47/kWh) on January 1, 2027, an additional \$0.01/kWh (to \$0.48/kWh) on January 1, 2028, and an additional \$0.01/kWh (to \$0.49/kWh) on January 1, in 2029.
- (iv) The CEVCS-1 shall continue as a pilot program, i.e., it will not become a permanent tariff program, and shall not be expanded, i.e., there will be no changes to the eligibility and other requirements of the current pilot program.
- (b) The Customer Majority Parties agree that these programs comply with the requirements of Section 366.94, Florida Statutes.
- (c) FPL shall not initiate further new investment in or construction of new FPL-owned public fast-charging infrastructure during the Term of the Majority Settlement Agreement, other than maintenance of existing ports and other existing FPL-owned public fast-charging infrastructure. Provided, however, FPL shall be permitted to

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 14 of 33

complete any ongoing construction of FPL-owned public fast-charging infrastructure that was initiated prior to the Term of this Majority Settlement Agreement, for a total of not more than 585 FPL-owned ports.

Cost Recovery Clauses

- 9. Effective January 1, 2026, all clause factors shall be allocated using the 12CP and 1/13th Average Demand methodology for Production Plant and 12CP for Transmission Plant.
- 10. Nothing shall preclude the Company from requesting Commission approval for recovery of costs (a) that are of a type which traditionally, historically and ordinarily would be, have been, or are presently recovered through cost recovery clauses or surcharges, or (b) that are incremental costs not currently recovered in base rates which the Legislature or Commission determines are clause recoverable subsequent to the approval of this Majority Settlement Agreement. FPL will not be allowed to recover through cost recovery clauses costs of types or categories that have been, and traditionally, historically and ordinarily would be, recovered through base rates; the Customer Majority Parties recognize that an authorized governmental entity may impose requirements on FPL involving new or atypical kinds of costs (including but not limited to, for example, requirements related to cyber security) in connection with the imposition of such requirements, and the Legislature and/or Commission may authorize FPL to recover those related costs through a cost recovery clause.
- 11. Nothing in this Majority Settlement Agreement shall preclude FPL from requesting the Commission to approve the recovery of costs that are recoverable through base rates under the nuclear cost recovery statute, Section 366.93, Florida Statutes, and Commission Rule 26-6.0423, F.A.C. Nothing in this Majority Settlement Agreement

prohibits a substantially affected person from participating without limitation in nuclear

cost recovery proceedings and proceedings related thereto and opposing FPL's requests.

Storm Cost Recovery Mechanism

12. FPL will be permitted to recover prudently incurred storm restoration costs through the

storm cost recovery mechanism described below:

(a) Nothing in this Majority Settlement Agreement shall preclude FPL from petitioning

the Commission to seek recovery of costs associated with any tropical systems named

by the National Hurricane Center or its successor (Storm Costs) without the application

of any form of earnings test or measure and irrespective of previous or current base rate

earnings. Recovery of storm costs from customers will begin, on an interim basis, sixty

days following the filing of a cost recovery petition and tariff with the Commission.

Consistent with the rate design method approved in Order No. PSC-2006-0464-FOF-

EI, the storm cost recovery (known as the Storm Surcharge) will be based on a 12-month

recovery period if the estimated storm costs do not exceed \$5.00/1,000 kWh on monthly

residential customer bills. The \$5.00/1,000 kWh cap will apply in aggregate for a

calendar year for the purpose of the interim recovery.

(b) In the event the storm costs exceed that level, FPL may defer the additional storm

restoration costs in excess of \$5.00/1,000 kWh on its balance sheet to be recovered in a

subsequent year or years as determined by the Commission; provided, however, that

FPL may petition the Commission to allow recovery of more than \$5.00/1,000 kWh in

the event its storm costs in a given calendar year exceed that amount, inclusive of the

amount needed to replenish the storm reserve to the level in Paragraph 12(c) below. The

period of recovery for amounts in excess of \$5.00/1,000 kWh lies within the

Commission's discretion. The Customer Majority Parties to this Majority Settlement

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 16 of 33

Agreement are not precluded from participating in any such proceedings and opposing the amount of FPL's claimed costs but not the mechanism agreed to herein, provided

that it is applied in accordance with this Majority Settlement Agreement.

(c) All storm related costs subject to interim recovery under the storm cost recovery

mechanism will be calculated and disposed of pursuant to Section 25-6.0143, F.A.C.,

and will be limited to costs resulting from a tropical system named by the National

Hurricane Center or its successor, to the estimate of incremental costs above the level

of storm reserve prior to the storm and to the replenishment of the storm reserve to \$300

million.

(d) Any proceeding to recover costs associated with any storm shall not be a vehicle

for a "rate case" type inquiry concerning the expenses, investment, or financial results

of operations of the Company and shall not apply any form of earnings test or measure

or consider previous or current base rate earnings.

(e) To the extent FPL over-collects storm costs from customers pursuant to the storm

cost recovery mechanism, FPL will refund the over-collected amounts in the same

manner in which FPL collected those amounts from each customer.

Solar and Battery Base Rate Adjustments ("SoBRA")

13. FPL will be authorized to petition the Commission to recover through its base rates costs

for solar generation projects that enter service in 2027, 2028 and 2029 and battery

storage projects that enter service in 2027, 2028 and 2029 and to reflect in such request

for cost recovery the associated impacts of projected Production Tax Credits ("PTCs")

and the four-year amortization of any ITCs that result.

(a) FPL projects that for the purposes of cost recovery set forth in this Paragraph 13, it

will undertake the construction of solar projects totaling approximately 1,192 MW in

Exhibit JTH-3, Page 17 of 33

2027, 1,490 MW in 2028, and 1,788 MW in 2029, and battery storage projects totaling

820 MW in 2027, 600 MW in 2028, and 600 MW in 2029. FPL is authorized to recover

its costs of these projects through a SoBRA. FPL will demonstrate the prudence of any

SoBRA project(s) at the time it makes its initial filing in the Fuel and Purchased Power

Cost Recovery Docket the year prior to the project's expected in-service date (the

"SoBRA Proceeding"). No substantially affected person is precluded from fully

participating in any such SoBRA Proceeding but they may not object to FPL's right to

petition for such recovery under this Paragraph 13.

(i) For solar projects, FPL must prove the prudence of any SoBRA project(s) by a

preponderance of the evidence that the solar projects subject to its SoBRA petition

are Cumulative Present Value Revenue Requirement ("CPVRR") beneficial within

10 years and have a cost benefit ratio of 1.15 to 1 compared to the projected system

CPVRR without the solar projects. FPL must also demonstrate that the cost of the

components, engineering, and construction are reasonable.

(ii) To demonstrate a resource need for the solar or battery storage projects subject

to a SoBRA petition, FPL must prove by a preponderance of the evidence a

reliability need for such incremental capacity or energy. FPL must also demonstrate

that the selected portfolio of projects are the lowest cost resource available to timely

meet the resource need, and the cost of the components, engineering, and

construction are reasonable.

(iii) Any CPVRR analyses utilized under these subsections shall not include actual

or projected state or Federal carbon emission taxes unless in effect. To the extent

that legislation or regulation enacts carbon emission taxes, the impact of such taxes

may only be included in a CPVRR analysis in the years they will be in effect.

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 18 of 33

requirements associated with the solar and battery projects to be installed during the inservice year and the impact of the conclusion of any four-year amortization of ITCs in the previous year, and (ii) the appropriate percentage increase in base rates needed to collect the estimated revenue requirements ("SoBRA Factor"). Paragraphs 13(c)

(b) In a SoBRA proceeding, FPL also will submit for approval (i) the revenue

through 13(e) below set forth the methodology for calculating the revenue requirements

and SoBRA Factor. Under no circumstances shall anything in this Majority Settlement

Agreement be interpreted to allow for double-recovery of any approved resource

additions.

(c) The SoBRA revenue requirement is intended to recover the incremental jurisdictional revenue requirement based on the first 12 months of operations of the solar and battery storage projects and associated facilities (the "Annualized Base Revenue Requirement") beginning no sooner than the date the project is placed in-service, and excluding any land component that is already included in base rates as Plant Held for

Future Use. The revenue requirement computations for the SoBRAs will be based on

the following: (i) estimated capital expenditures for each solar or battery storage project,

net of any plant held for future use projected in FPL's 2026 or 2027 Projected Test

Years, (ii) estimated depreciation expense and related accumulated depreciation

calculated using the depreciation rates for similar assets in FPL's 2025 Depreciation

Study, (iii) estimated operating and maintenance and property tax expenses, and (iv)

estimated income tax expense, including tax credits. The revenue requirements will be

calculated using FPL's approved midpoint ROE and an incremental capital structure

based on investor sources that is adjusted to reflect the depreciation-related accumulated

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal

Exhibit JTH-3, Page 19 of 33

deferred income tax proration adjustment that is required by Treasury Regulation

§1.167(1)-1(h)(6).

(d) The SoBRA revenue requirements will reflect the impacts associated with projected

PTCs and the conclusion of four-year ITC amortization accounting related to battery

storage facilities placed in-service and reflected in the previous years. At the time FPL

calculates the revenue requirement, it will also include any revenue requirement

reduction resulting from projected PTCs and the revenue needed to account for the

conclusion of the four-year ITC amortization associated with the 2025 battery storage

facilities (as part of the 2029 SoBRA revenue requirement).

(e) The SoBRA Factor is based on the ratio of projected jurisdictional annual revenue

requirements of the SoBRA project and the projected retail base revenues from the sales

of electricity during the first 12 months of operation. The corresponding fuel savings

associated with the SoBRA project will be reflected in the fuel factors effective upon

the in-service date. The SoBRA Factor, once approved by the Commission, will be

implemented on the first billing cycle day following commercial operation of the solar

and battery storage projects, by adjusting Base Charges (e.g., base charge, energy

charge, demand charge) for all service classes by an equal percentage.

(f) In the event that actual capital costs are lower than the estimated capital costs

reflected in the initial SoBRA revenue requirement filing, FPL will calculate a final

SoBRA revenue requirement based on the same inputs and methodology used for the

initial SoBRA revenue requirement, except the calculation will be updated with actual

capital expenditures. The difference between the cumulative base revenues since the

implementation of the initial adjustment and the cumulative base revenues that would

have resulted if the revised adjustment had been in place during the same time period

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal

Exhibit JTH-3, Page 20 of 33

will be credited to customers through the Capacity Cost Recovery Clause ("CCR

Clause") with interest at the 30-day commercial paper rate as specified in Rule 25-6.109,

F.A.C.. In addition, on a going forward basis, base rates will be adjusted to reflect the

revised SoBRA Factor.

(g) In the event that actual capital costs for the solar projects or battery storage projects

are higher than the projection on which the revenue requirements are based, FPL would

include the incremental costs in its monthly earnings surveillance report and reflect these

costs in its next base rate proceeding. Any higher-than-projected costs are subject to a

prudence review in FPL's next base rate proceeding.

(h) For each solar project, battery storage project, and four-year ITC amortization and

ITC conclusion approved pursuant to this Paragraph 13, the base rate increase shall be

based upon FPL's billing determinants for the first twelve (12) months following such

project's commercial in-service date, where such billing determinants are those used in

FPL's then most-current CCR Clause filings with the Commission, including, to the

extent necessary, projections of such billing determinants into a subsequent calendar

year so as to cover the first twelve (12) months of revenue requirements of each such

solar project's operation.

(i) Each SoBRA is to be reflected on FPL's customer bills by increasing base charges

and base non-clause recoverable credits by an equal percentage contemporaneously. The

calculation of the percentage change in rates is based on the ratio of the jurisdictional

Annualized Base Revenue Requirement and the forecasted retail base revenues from the

sales of electricity during the first twelve months of operation. FPL will begin applying

the incremental base rate charges for each SoBRA to meter readings made on and after

the commercial in-service date of that solar or battery generation site.

(j) FPL's base rates applied to customer bills, including the effects of the SoBRAs as implemented pursuant to this Majority Settlement Agreement (i.e., uniform percent increase for all rate classes applied to base revenues), shall continue in effect until next reset by the Commission in a general base rate proceeding.

Tax Law Changes

- 14. The following terms will apply in the event any new permanent change in federal or state tax law or tax regulations (referred to herein as the "new tax law") is effective during the Minimum Term and until base rates are next modified by the Commission:
 - (a) FPL will submit within 60 days of the effective date of the change in law a petition to open a separate docket for the purpose and limited scope of addressing the base revenue requirement impact of the new tax law. FPL will submit the calculations reflecting the impact on base revenue requirements and ask the Commission to establish an expedited procedural schedule that will allow intervenors time to review and, if necessary, respond to FPL's filing. FPL will be authorized to adjust base rates upon confirmation by the Commission that FPL appropriately calculated the impacts pursuant to the methodology set forth in Paragraph 14(b).
 - (b) The impact of the new tax law shall be calculated as follows: FPL will compare FPL's revenue requirements utilizing the new tax law against FPL's Commission-approved revenue requirements utilizing current tax law. The difference in revenue requirements will demonstrate the impact of the new tax law and that difference will be the amount of FPL's base rate adjustments for 2026 and 2027, as applicable. The adjustment for 2027 revenue requirements will remain in place for 2028 and 2029 to the extent that FPL has not exercised the option to request a general base rate increase. To the extent applicable, rate adjustments approved through proposed SoBRA or GBRA

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal

Exhibit JTH-3, Page 22 of 33

mechanism, pursuant to Paragraphs 4(h) or 13, in 2028 and 2029 will reflect then-current

tax law.

(c) For the time period between the effective date of the new tax law and implementation

of new tax-adjusted base rates, FPL will defer the impact of the new tax law to the

balance sheet for collection or refund through the CCR Clause.

(d) Deficient or excess ADIT created by such tax law changes will be deferred as a

regulatory asset or regulatory liability on the balance sheet and included within FPL's

capital structure. If the new tax law continues to prescribe the use of the Average Rate

Assumption Method, FPL will flow back or collect the protected excess or deficient

ADIT over the underlying assets' remaining life to ensure compliance with Internal

Revenue Service normalization rules. If the Tax Reform law or act is silent on the flow-

back or collection period for parts or all of the Excess and/or Deficient Deferred Taxes,

and there are no other statutes or rules that govern the flow-back or collection period for

"unprotected" amounts, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the following flow-

back or collection period(s) will apply: (i) if the cumulative "unprotected" regulatory

asset/liability balance is less than \$750 million, the flow-back/collection period for the

cumulative balance will be five years; or (ii) if the cumulative "unprotected" regulatory

asset/liability balance is equal to or greater than \$750 million, the flowback/collection

period for the cumulative balance will be ten years.

Capital Recovery Schedules

15. FPL shall be authorized to establish capital recovery schedules which shall be amortized

over ten (10) years as filed on February 28, 2025.

22

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 23 of 33

Depreciation and Dismantlement

- 16. FPL's 2025 Depreciation Study, filed as Exhibit NWA-1, satisfies Rule 25-6.0436,F.A.C. and FPL's obligation to file a depreciation study.
- 17. FPL's 2025 Dismantlement Study, filed as Exhibit NWA-2, satisfies Rule 25-6.04364, F.A.C., and FPL's obligation to file a dismantlement study.
- 18. At such time as FPL shall next file a general base rate proceeding, it shall simultaneously file new depreciation and dismantlement studies and propose to reset depreciation rates and dismantlement accruals in accordance with the results of those studies. The Customer Majority Parties will support consolidation of proceedings, if needed, to reset FPL's base rates, depreciation rates and dismantlement accruals.
- 19. Intentionally Left Blank
- 20. Intentionally Left Blank
- 21. Intentionally Left Blank

Long Duration Battery Storage Pilot

22. FPL shall be authorized to implement its Long Duration Battery Storage Pilot described in the direct testimony of Tim Oliver. This Pilot will allow FPL to gain valuable experience with advanced battery storage technologies, including (a) validating the performance and grid reliability of long-duration energy systems, (b) evaluating alternative storage technologies as complements to conventional lithium-ion batteries, (c) developing criteria for vendors regarding safety and delivery schedules, (d) optimizing charging operations to leverage low-cost solar energy during periods of reduced load, and (e) optimizing discharging operations to complement conventional batteries during extended periods of high load. The Pilot will be limited to two long-

duration battery storage systems each capable of dispatching up to 10 MW of power and storing a total of 100 megawatt-hours of energy. FPL estimates that the Long Duration Battery Storage Pilot can be put in service in 2027 at an estimated cost of \$78 million. The Customer Majority Parties agree that FPL's decision to pursue the Long Duration Battery Storage Pilot is prudent, and they waive any right to challenge this Pilot, other than the reasonableness of amounts actually expended, in any proceeding addressing the recoverability of the Long Duration Battery Storage Pilot costs. The Long Duration Battery Storage Pilot costs described herein are not incremental to the revenue requirements set forth in Paragraph 4.

Land Acquisition and Disposition

23. Any land or land rights acquired by FPL during the Term shall be included below the line for accounting purposes and shall not be included in rate base until a final prudence determination has been made in a future base rate proceeding. Upon approval of this Majority Settlement Agreement, FPL will utilize best commercial efforts to sell the long-held properties listed in Attachment B, which have been held but not placed into service for an average of 22 years. All sales of property held for future use by FPL shall be at fair market value. Gains or losses will be treated in accordance with Commission policy.

Acquisition of Vandolah Power Company, LLC

24. If FPL's Section 203 Application for the acquisition of Vandolah Power Company, LLC ("Vandolah"), a natural gas/oil-fired 660 MW generating facility, is approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and Vandolah is integrated into FPL's system, the Vandolah assets used and useful to serve the retail customers of FPL shall be utilized and dispatched as a system resource for the benefit of the general body of ratepayers, to

the same extent and in the same manner as all generation resources in service before August 26, 2025. It not the intent of this paragraph to limit the rights of any substantially affected person's participation in any proceeding relating to Vandolah, pursuant to Paragraph 4(h).

Natural Gas Financial Hedges

25. FPL shall not financially hedge natural gas during the Minimum Term and any extensions thereof. FPL shall not be prohibited from filing a petition and proposed risk management plan with the Commission to address natural gas financial hedging following expiration of the Minimum Term or any extensions thereof.

Assistance Programs and Policies for Residential Customers

- During the Term of this Majority Settlement Agreement, FPL shall not disconnect for nonpayment of bills for any customer in an FPL operational district with either (i) a forecasted 95-degree or higher temperature for the day, based on FPL's meteorological forecasts, or where a heat advisory is issued by the National Weather Service; or (ii) a forecasted temperature of 32 degrees or lower for the day, based on FPL's meteorological forecasts.
- 27. FPL shall accrue and provide a one-time funding of \$15 million during the Term to provide payment assistance (offsetting receivables) to customers that satisfy the United Way's "Asset Limited Income Constrained, Employed" (ALICE) criteria. This funding is in addition FPL's Care To Share Program, which FPL states is funded from voluntary contributions by shareholders, employees and customers.
- 28. Intentionally Left Blank

Miscellaneous

- 29. The Commission shall establish a workshop to explore a less-restrictive data center tariff that optimizes the potential mutual benefits of Florida's roll-out of large load data centers while protecting the customers, natural resources, and beauty of our state.
- 30. The Commission shall establish a workshop to explore the uniform use of a stochastic loss of load probability model to evaluate the impact of the significant additions of renewable generation and storage resources on grid reliability in a transparent format.
- 31. No party to this Majority Settlement Agreement will request, support, or seek to impose a change in the application of any provision hereof. Except as provided in Paragraph 5, a party to this Majority Settlement Agreement will neither seek nor support any change in FPL's base rates or credits applied to customer bills, including limited, interim or any other rate decreases, that would take effect prior to expiration of the Minimum Term, except for any such reduction requested by FPL or as otherwise provided for in this Majority Settlement Agreement. No substantially affected person is prohibited from seeking interim, limited, or general base rate relief, or a change to credits, to be effective following the latter of the expiration of the Minimum Term or any extensions thereof.
- 32. Nothing in this Majority Settlement Agreement will preclude FPL from filing and the Commission from approving any new or revised tariff provisions or rate schedules requested by FPL, provided that such tariff request does not increase any existing base rate component of a tariff or rate schedule during the Term unless the application of such new or revised tariff, service or rate schedule is optional to FPL's customers.
- 33. The provisions of this Majority Settlement Agreement are contingent on approval of this Majority Settlement Agreement in its entirety by the Commission without

modification. The Customer Majority Parties agree that approval of this Majority Settlement Agreement is in the public interest. The Customer Majority Parties further agree that, subject to the rights and requirement of each of them to challenge, in a hearing in this docket, FPL's February 28, 2025 Petition and case as filed, they will support this Majority Settlement Agreement and will not request or support any order, relief, outcome, or result in conflict with the terms of this Majority Settlement Agreement in any administrative or judicial proceeding relating to, reviewing, or challenging the establishment, approval, adoption, or implementation of this Majority Settlement Agreement or the subject matter hereof. No Customer Majority Party will assert in any proceeding before the Commission or any court that this Majority Settlement Agreement or any of the terms in the Majority Settlement Agreement shall have any precedential value, except to enforce the provisions of this Majority Settlement Agreement. Approval of this Majority Settlement Agreement in its entirety will resolve all matters and issues in Docket No. 20250011-EI pursuant to and in accordance with Section 120.57(4), Florida Statutes. This docket will be closed effective on the date the Commission Order approving this Majority Settlement Agreement is final, and no Customer Majority Party shall seek appellate review of any order approving this Majority Settlement Agreement issued in this Docket and each Customer Majority Party shall oppose such review. This Majority Settlement Agreement is offered in compromise of the positions that the Customer Majority Party signatories have taken in this docket, and no position taken in this Majority Settlement Agreement by any Customer Majority Party shall be considered a waiver of any Customer Majority Party's right to challenge FPL's Petition in a hearing and in any appeal regarding disputed issues of fact and law in this docket pursuant to Chapters 120

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 28 of 33

and 366, Florida Statutes and the Florida and United States Constitutions. The Customer Majority Parties are specifically filing this in response to the Special Interest Parties' settlement agreement filed on August 20, 2025.

- This Majority Settlement Agreement is dated as of August 26, 2025. It may be executed in counterpart originals, and a scanned .pdf copy of an original signature shall be deemed an original. Any person or entity that executes a signature page to this Majority Settlement Agreement shall become and be deemed a party as if it was a Customer Majority Party with the full range of rights and responsibilities provided hereunder, notwithstanding that such person or entity is not listed in the first recital above and executes the signature page subsequent to the date of this Majority Settlement Agreement, it being expressly understood that the addition of any such additional party(ies) shall not disturb or diminish the benefits of this Majority Settlement Agreement to any current Customer Majority Party.
- 35. All provisions of this Majority Settlement Agreement survive the Minimum Term unless expressly stated herein.

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 29 of 33

In Witness Whereof, the Customer Majority Parties evidence their acceptance and agreement with the provisions of this Majority Settlement Agreement by their signature.

Florida Office of Public Counsel 111 West Madison Street, Suite 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400

Walt Trierweiler
Public Counsel

Counsel for the Citizens of the State of Florida

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 30 of 33

Earthjustice

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Robert Scheffel Wright

Counsel for Floridians Against Increased Rates, Inc.

Attachment A

	Comparative Analysis and Accounting Adjustments of the Customer Majority Parties' Stipulation and Settlement Agreement									
			-				% of Filing at	% of Filing at	% of FPL SA at	
Line No.	Description	2026	2027	2028	2029	Cumulative	11.9% ROE	10.6% ROE	10.95% ROE	
1	FPL's Filing with TAM at 11.9% ROE	<u>\$1,545</u>	<u>\$927</u>	<u>\$296</u>	<u>\$266</u>	<u>\$9,819</u>	100.00%	139.28%	142.24%	
2										
3	FPL's Filing with TAM at 10.6% ROE	<u>\$882</u>	<u>\$888</u>	<u>296</u>	<u> 266</u>	<u>\$7,050</u>	<u>71.80%</u>	100.00%	<u>102.13%</u>	
4										
5	FPL and Minor Customer Groups Settlement with TAM at 10.95% ROE	<u>\$945</u>	<u>\$770</u>	<u>\$283</u>	<u>\$247</u>	<u>\$6,903</u>	<u>70.30%</u>	<u>97.91%</u>	<u>100.00%</u>	
6										
7	CMP 2-Yr. No TAM, 4-Year ITC Amort. C_{J} fset by RSAM and AOM, and 10.6% ROE	\$1,141	\$403							
8	PHFU Solar Adjustments	(65)								
9	Payroll Adjustment	(101)								
10	EV Make Ready Reduction	(5)								
11	Excess Incentive Compensation Adjustments	(60)								
12	DOL Insurance Adjustment	(5)								
13	Long-Term Incentive Compensation Adjustment	(12)								
14	Planned Generation Maintenance Adjustment	(11)								
15	Planned Transmission Maintenance Adjustment	(10)								
16	Plant Daniel Adjustment	(5.0)								
17	Working Capital RCE Adjustment	(0.5)								
18										
19					% of Filing at	% of Filing at	% of FPL SA at			
20	<u>Description</u>	<u>2026</u>	<u>2027</u>	<u>Cumulative</u>	<u>11.9% ROE</u>	<u>10.6% ROE</u>	<u>10.6% ROE</u>			
21	Two-Year Proposal by Customer Majority Parties No TAM at 10.6% ROE (SUM of Lines 8 - 17)	<u>\$867</u>	<u>\$403</u>	<u>\$2,137</u>	<u>53.20%</u>	<u>80.58%</u>	<u>80.34%</u>			
22										
23	FPL's Filing with TAM at 11.9% ROE Over Two Years Instead ϵf Four Years	\$1,545	\$927	\$4,017	100.00%	151.47%	151.02%			
24	FPL's Filing with TAM at 10.6% ROE Over Two Years Instead ϵf Four Years	\$882	\$888	\$2,652	66.02%	100.00%	99.70%			
25	SIP Settlement with TAM Over Two Years Instead cf Four Years	\$945	\$770	\$2,660	66.22%	100.30%	100.00%			
26										
27							% of Filing at	_	% of FPL SA at	
28	<u>Description</u>	2026	2027	2028	2029	Cumulative	11.9% ROE	10.6% ROE	10.95% ROE	
29	Two-Year Proposal Cumulative Revenues Hypothetical Over Next Four Years	<u>\$867</u>	<u>\$403</u>	<u>\$195</u>	<u>\$174</u>	<u>\$5,241</u>	<u>53.38%</u>	<u>74.34%</u>	<u>75.92%</u>	
30									Ţ	
31									XI I	

Docket No. 20250011-EI stomer Majority Parties' Proposal

Attachment B

Docket No. 20250011-EI Customer Majority Parties' Proposal Exhibit JTH-3, Page 33 of 33

Docket No. 20250011-El

HWS Exhibit 4

Plant Held For Future Use

Florida Power & Light Projected Test Year Ended December 31, 2026 Projected Test Year Ended December 31, 2027

Summary of Plant Held For Future Use - Long Held (Thousands of Dollars)

Line No.	Plant Category	(A) Plant	(B) Beginning 2026	(C) Ending 2026	(D) Ending 2027	(E) Date Acquired	(F) In-Service Date	(G) Years Held
140	Flant Category				2021	Acquired		T TOTA
1	TRANSMISSION FUL	ine to Portsaid Sub	27	0	0	Jan-95	Nov-26	29
2	TRANSMISSION FLE	Englewood-Placida-Myakka	298	0	0	Dec-03	Dec-26	21
3	TRANSMISSION FLO	Galloway-South Miami Loop	1,834	1,834	0	Oct-05	Jun-27	19
4	TRANSMISSION FLA	Arch Creek	683	683	683	Dec-93	Dec-28	31
5	TRANSMISSION FUN	Memphis Loop Transmission	811	811	811	Jun-12	Jun-30	12
6	TRANSMISSION FLO	Commerce Substation	179	179	179	Oct-07	Nov-31	17
7	TRANSMISSION FLO	Conservation-Levee 500KV Line	5,672	5,672	5,672	Apr-95	Feb-32	29
8	TRANSMISSION FUL	evee-South Dade	2,325	2,325	2,325	Jul-77	Jun-32	47
9	TRANSMISSION FU	/olusia-Smyrna 115kv	566	566	566	Mar-02	Jan-34	22
10	TRANSMISSION FUE	Rima Sub & Rima Volusia	620	620	620	Oct-88	Mar-34	36
11	TRANSMISSION FLO	Green Transmission Switch Station	9,778	9,778	9,778	Sep-06	Jun-34	18
12	TRANSMISSION FUR	Harbor Punta Gorda	738	738	738	Sep-08	Jun-34	16
13	TRANSMISSION FLF	^o t Sewell Sandpiper	1,767	1,767	1,767	Feb-08	Jun-34	16
14	TRANSMISSION FUE	Desoto-Orange River	901	901	901	Jul-78	Dec-34	46
15	TRANSMISSION FLF	Pirolo	1,365	1,365	1,365	Dec-12	Dec-34	12
16	TRANSMISSION FLF	Possum Transmission Switch Stati	752	752	752	Mar-08	Dec-34	16
17	DISTRIBUTION FU'	Broadmoor	937	937	937	Aug-01	Sep-24	23
18	DISTRIBUTION FU' 1	Freeline Substation	1,740	0	0	Jan-08	Oct-26	16
19	DISTRIBUTION FU'F	Portsaid Substation	487	0	0	Dec-95	Nov-26	29
20	DISTRIBUTION FU' H	Hickson Substation	2	2	2	Feb-02	Jun-28	22
21	DISTRIBUTION FU'	Chester Substation	375	375	375	Feb-04	Nov-28	20
22	DISTRIBUTION FU'	Deerwood Substation	787	787	787	Jan-06	Dec-29	18
23	DISTRIBUTION FU'	Challenger	252	252	252	Nov-94	Jun-30	30
24	DISTRIBUTION FU' 1	Terminal	135	135	135	Aug-94	Jun-30	30
25	DISTRIBUTION FU'I	Hargrove Substation	866	866	866	Jun-05	Dec-30	19
26	DISTRIBUTION FU'N	Minton Substation	1,001	1,001	1,001	Feb-04	Dec-30	20
27	DISTRIBUTION FU'F	Powerline Substation	2,510	2,510	2,510	Dec-02	Dec-30	22
28	DISTRIBUTION FU'S	Satori	118	118	118	Oct-94	Dec-30	30
29	DISTRIBUTION FU'	Asante Sub s tation	3,156	3,156	3,156	Jun-04	Jun-31	20
30	DISTRIBUTION FU'	Commerce Substation	2,739	2,739	2,739	Feb-07	Nov-31	17
31	DISTRIBUTION FU'	Ely Substation Expansion	508	508	508	Feb-02	Jun-32	22
32	DISTRIBUTION FU'	Green Frog	232	232	232	Feb-01	Jun-32	23
33	DISTRIBUTION FU'	Memphis Substation	1,029	1,029	1,029	Jan-07	Jun-32	17
34	DISTRIBUTION FU'F	Rodeo Substation	2,047	2,047	2,047	Dec-12	Jun-32	12
35	DISTRIBUTION FU'Z	Ziladen Substation	2,510	2,510	2,510	Aug-02	Jun-32	22
36	DISTRIBUTION FU	Oyster Substation	469	469	469	Sep-04	Dec-34	20
37	DISTRIBUTION FU'F	Pennsucco Expansion	1,580	1,580	1,580	Dec-10	Dec-34	14
38	RENEWABLES FUT	Hendry Solar Energy Center	5,139	5,139	0	Jun-11	Jan-27	13
39	RENEWABLES FU'	Martin Solar Energy Center	217	217	217	Dec-09	Oct-30	15
40	RENEWABLES FUT	Hendry Clean Energy Center	36,425	36,425	36,425	Jun-11	Jun-32	13
41		-	93,577	91,024	84,050		•	874
42	Average			92,300	87,537			21.85

Source: Company response to OPC 8-230.

Reported Authorized Returns on Equity, Electric Utility Rate Cases Completed, 2023 to Present

Vertically

						Integrated						
						(V) /			ROE Fully		Approved	
m	- Talifor	Parent Company	Destant	Requested		Distribution			Litigated or	Approved	Equity	Equity
State (1)	Udliky (D)	Ticker	Docket (4)	ROE	Order Date	Only (D)	Approved ROE	Difference	Settled	WACC	Ratio	Contribution
(17	14	(a)	(4)	(2)	(4)	w	(F)	(9) (6) - (5)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14) (8) X (13)
Michigan	Consumers Energy Co.	CMS	C-U-21224	10,25%	1/19/2023	v	9,90%	(35)	Settled	N/A	N/A	N/A
Minnesota	Minnesota Power Entrpre inc.	ALE	D-E-015/GR-21-335	10.25%	1/23/2013	v	9.65%	(60)	Fully Litigated	7.12%	52,50%	
Wyoming	Cheyenne Light Puel Power Co.	BKH	D-20003-2J4-ER-22	10.30%	1/26/2023	v	9.75%	(55)		7,48%	52.00%	
South Carolina	Duke Energy Progress LLC	DUK	D-2022-254-E	10.20%	2/9/2023	v	9.60%	(60)	Scitled	6.83%	52,43%	
Louisiana	Southwestern Electric Power Co	AEP	D-U-35441	10.35%	2/17/2023	v	9.50%	(85)	Settled	N/A	N/A	
Texas	Oncor Electric Delivery Co.	SRE	D-53601	10,30%	3/9/2023	D	9.70%	(60)	Fully Litigated	6.65%	42,50%	
Michigan	Upper Peninsula Power Co.		C-U-21286	10.80%	3/24/2023	v	9,90%	(90)	Settled	N/A	N/A	
California	Liberty Utilities (CelPeco Bla	AQN	A-21-05-017	10,50%	4/27/2023	v	10.00%	(50)	Settled	N/A	52,50%	N/A
Maine	Vorsant Power		D-2022-00255	9,35%	5/31/2023	D	9.35%	•	Settled	5.69%	49.00%	4,58%
Minnesota	Northern States Power Co.	XEL	D-E-002/GR-21-630	10,20%	6/1/2023	v	9.25%	(95)	NA	NA.	52,50%	4.86%
Maine	Cantral Maine Power Co.	BE	D-2022-00152	10.20%	6/6/2023	D	9.35%	(85)	Withdrawn/Reject	NA.	50.00%	4.68%
North Dakota	MDU Resources Group	MOU	C-PU-22-194	10.50%	6/6/2023	v	9.75%	(75)	Scttled	7.13%	30.81%	4.95%
New York	Consolidated Edison Co. of NY	ED	C-22-E-0054	10.00%	7/20/2023	D	9,25%	(75)	Settled	6.75%	48.00%	4.44%
Todiana	Northern IN Public Svc. Co. LLC	NI	45772	10.40%	8/2/2023	v	9,80%	(60)	Settled	6,80%	51,63%	5.06%
Taxas	Entergy Texas Inc.	ETR	D-53719	10,80%	8/3/2023	ν	9,57%	(123)	Settled	6.61%	51.21%	4,90%
North Carolina	Duke Energy Progress LLC	DUK	D-E-2 8ub 1300	10.40%	B/18/2023	v	9.80%	(60)	Settled	7.07%	53,00%	5.19%
Comediant	The United Illuminating Co.	IBE	D-22-08-08	10.20%	8/25/2023	D	8,63%		Fully Litigated	6,48%	50,00%	
Arizona	Tocson Bloctric Fower Co.	FTS	D-E-01933A-22-0107	9,75%	8/25/2023	v	9,55%	(20)	NA.	6,93%	54.32%	4.32%
Vermont	Green Mountain Power Corp.		C-23-1852-TF	9,58%	8/23/2023	v	9,58%		Fully Litigated	6.88%	49.88%	5.19%
Linbo	Avista Corp.	AVA	C-AVU-E-23-01	10,25%	8/31/2023	v	9,40%	(85)	Settled	7,19%	50.00%	4.78%
Alaska	Aleska Electric Light Power	AVA	D-U-22-078	13,45%	8/31/2023	v	11.45%		Pully Litigated	8,79%		4.70%
Colorado	Public Service Co. of CO	XEL	D-22AL-0530E	10.25%	9/6/2023	v	9.30%		Settled		60.70%	6.95%
Montana	MDU Resources Group	MDU	D-2022-11-099	10.50%	9/21/2023	v	9.65%		Settled	6.95%	55,69%	5,18%
Kentucky	Duke Energy Kentucky Inc.	DUK	C-2022-00372	10.35%	10/12/2023	v	9.75%		Pully Litigated	7.53%	30.30%	4.85%
New York	NY State Electric & Gas Corp.	IBE	C-22-E-0317	10.20%	10/12/2023	D	9.20%			NA	52.15%	5.08%
New York	Rochester Ges & Electric Corp.	IBE	C-22-E-0319	10.20%	10/12/2023	D			Settled 0 - M1 - 1	6,40%	48.00%	4.42%
Maryland	The Potomse Edison Co.	FE	C-9695	10.60%	10/18/2023	D	9,20% 9,50%		Bettled	6.67%	48.00%	4.42%
New Mexico	Southwestern Public Sve Co.	XEL	C-22-00286-UT	10.75%	10/19/2023	v	9.50%	-	Fully Litigated	6.92%	53.00%	5.04%
Montaga	NorthWestern Energy Group	MME	D-2022-7-78 (elec)	10.54%	18/25/2023	v	9,65%	• .	Settled Settled	7,17%	54.70%	5.20%
Oklahoma	Public Service Co. of OK	AEP	Ca-PUD2022-000093	10.40%	11/3/2023	v	9,30%	(011)		6.72%	48.02%	4.63%
Wisconsin	Madison Gas and Electric Co.	MORE	D-3270-UR-125 (Elec)	9.80%	11/3/2023	v	9.70%			6.69%	52,00%	4.84%
Wisconsin	Northern States Power Co.	XEL	D-4220-UR-126 (Elec)	10,25%	11/9/2023	v	9.80%		Fully Litigated Fully Litigated	NA.	55,00%	5.34%
Wisconslo.	Wiscomin Power and Light Co	LNT	D-6680-UR-124 (Blee)	10.00%	11/9/2023	v	9.80%		Pully Litigated	NA	52,50%	5.15%
New Yersey	Atlantic City Electric Co.	EXC	D-ER23020091	10.50%	11/17/2023	D	9.60%		Settled	NA 6.58%	54.00% 50,20%	5.29%
Wyoming	PacifiCorp	BRK.A	D-200000-633-ER-23	10.00%	11/28/2023	v	9.35%		Pully Litigated	7.13%	48,99%	4.82% 4.38%
Virginia	Appalachian Power Co.	AEP	PUR-2023-00002	10.60%	11/30/2023	v	9.50%		Settled	N/A	N/A	N/A
Michigan	DTE Electric Co.	DTE	C-U-21297	10.25%	12/1/2023	v	9.90%		Fully Litigated	5.56%	NA	NA.
California	ProffCorp	BRK.A	A-22-05-006	10,50%	12/14/2023	v	10.00%	•	Pully Litigated	7.34%	52.25%	5,23%
Illinois	Amereu Illinois	ARE	D-23-0082	10.50%	12/14/2023	D	8,72%		Fully Litigated	6,59%	50.00%	4.36%
Ilinois	Commonwealth Edison Co.	EXC	D-23-0055	10.65%	12/14/2023	D	8.91%		Pully Litigated	6.7094	50.00%	4.36%
						-	212 2 70	(1,4)	a way acceptance	12. 712798	"AO' DO A	4.40%

	Reported Authorized Returns on Equity, Electric Utility Rate Cases Completed, 2023 to Present											
State	Udliky	Parent Company Ticker	Docket	Requested ROE	Order Date	Vertically integrated (V) / Distribution Only (D)	Approved ROE	Difference	ROE Fully Litigated or Settled	Approved WACC	Approved Equity Ratio	Equity Contribution
(1)	(3)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	m	(B)	(7)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
								(8) - (5)				(B) X (13)
Maryland	Bultimore Gas and Electric Co.	EXC	C-9692	10.40%	12/14/2023	D	9,50%	(90)	Fully Litigated	6.77%	52.00%	4.94%
North Carolina	Duke Energy Carolinas LLC	DUK	D-B-7 Sub 1276	10.40%	12/15/2023	v	10.10%	(30)		7.50%	53.00%	5,35%
Oregon	Portland General Electric Co.	POR	D-UE-416	9.80%	12/18/2023	v	9.50%	(30)	Settled	6.99%	50,00%	4,75%
Nevada	Nevada Power Co.	BRK.A	D-23-06007	10.26%	12/26/2023	v	9.52%	(74)	Fully Litigated	7.44%	52.72%	5.02%
Iduho	Idaho Power Co.	IDA	C-IPC-E-23-11	10.40%	12/28/2023	V	9.60%	(80)	Settled.	7.25%	NA	NA
New Mexico	Public Service Co. of NM	PNM	C-22-00270-IJT	10.25%	1/3/2024	٧	9.25%	(100)	Fully Litigated	6,47%	49.61%	4.59%
Kentucky	Kingsport Power Company	AEP	C-2023-00159	9.90%	1/19/2024	v	9.75%	(15)	Settled	NA	41.25%	4.02%
Arizona	UNS Electric Inc.	FTS	D-E-04204A-22-0251	9.95%	1/31/2024	v	9.75%	(20)		7,18%	53.72%	5.24%
New Jersey	Jersey Cantral Power & Light Co.	FE.	D-HR23030144	10.40%	2/(4/2024	D	9,60%	(80)	,	7.18%	51,90%	4.98%
Virginia	Virginia Blectric & Power Co.	D	C-PUR-2023-00101	9.70%	2/28/2024	v	9.70%	-	Settled	7,05%	NA.	NA.
Michigan	Consumers Energy Co.	CM8	C-U-21389	10,25%	3/1/2024	v	9.90%	(35)		5.86%	41.13%	4.07%
Arizona	Arizona Public Service Co.	PNW	D-E-01345A-22-0144	10.25%	3/5/2024	v	9.55%	(70)		6,81%	51,93%	4,96%
West Virginia	Monongabela Power Co.	FE	C-23-0460-E-42T	10,85%	3/26/2024	v	9,80%	(105)	Settled	NA.	NA.	NA.
Indiana	ABS Indiana	ABS	Ca-45911	10.60%	4/17/2024	v	9,90%	(70)	Settled	6.58%	44.36%	4.39%
Dolaware	Delmarva Power & Light Co.	EXC	D-22-0897	10.50%	4/18/2024	α	9,60%	(90)	Settled	6,97%	50.50%	4.85%
Indiana	Indiana Michigan Power Co.	AEP	Ca-45933	10.50%	5/8/2024	v	9.85%	(65)	Settled	NA	NA	NA.
Maryland	Potomec Electris Power Co.	EXC	C-9702	10,50%	6/10/2024	D	9,50%		Fully Litizated	7.13%	50.50%	4,80%
South Carolina	Duke Energy Carolines LLC	DUK	2023-35B-E	10,50%	6/20/2024	v	9.94%	(56)	Settled	7.32%	51,21%	5.09%
Messechosetts	Fitobburg Gas & Electric Light	UTL	DPU 23-80	10.50%	6/28/2024	D	9.40%	(110)	Fully Litigated	7,46%	52.26%	4.91%
Michigan	Indiana Michigan Power Co.	AEP	U-21461	10.50%	7/2/2024	v	9.86%		Pully Litigated	6,03%	40.20%	3,96%
New York	Central Hudson Gas & Blactric	PTS	C-23-B-0418	9.80%	7/18/2024	D	9.50%		Pully Litigated	6.92%	48.00%	4.56%
South Carolina	Dominion Energy South Carolina	D	D-2024-34-E	10.60%	8/8/2024	v	9.94%	٠,	Settled	7.93%	52.51%	3.22%
Plorida	Duke Buergy Florida LLC	DUK	D-20240025-EE	31.15%	8/21/2024	v	10.30%	(85)	Settled	7.56%	45.57%	4.69%
Vermont	Green Mountain Power Corp.		C-24-1709-TF	9,97%	8/26/2024	ν	9.97%	-	Fully Litimated	7.05%	49.81%	4,97%
lows	Interstate Power & Light Co.	LNT	D-RFU-2023-0002	10.11%	9/17/2024	v	9.87%	(24)	Settled	7.29%	51,00%	5.03%
Neveda	Sierra Pacific Power Co.	BRK.A	D-24-02026	10.47%	9/18/2024	v	9.74%	(73)	Polly Litigated	7.43%	52,40%	5.10%
Oregon	Idaho Power Co.	IDA.	D-UB-426	10.40%	9/23/2024	v	9.50%		Settled	7.30%	30.00%	4.75%
Michigan	Upper Peninsula Power Co.		C-U-21555	10.70%	9/26/2024	v	9.86%	4	Settled	NA	NA	NA.
Massachusetts	Massachusetts Electric Co.	NG	DPU 23-150	10.50%	9/30/2024	D	9.35%	(ນສ)	Pully Litigated	7,09%	52.83%	4.94%
Техаз	AEP Texas inc.	AEP	D-56165	10.60%	10/8/2024	D	9.76%		Settled	6.66%	42_50%	4.15%
New Jorsey	Public Service Blectric Gas	PEG	D-ER23120924	10.40%	10/9/2024	ם	9.60%		Settled	7.07%	55.00%	5.28%
Michigan	Upper MI Buergy Rare Corp.	WBC	C-U-21541	10,25%	10/10/2024	v	9.86%		Bettled.	NA.	NA	NA.
California	Pacific Gas and Electric Co.	PCG	A-22-04-008 (Phase 2)	10.70%	10/17/2024	v	10.28%	(42)	Pully Litigated	NA.	NA	NA.
California	San Diago Gas & Electric Co.	SRE	A-22-04-012 (Phase 2)	10.65%	10/17/2024	v	10.23%	(42)	Fully Litigated	NA	NA	NA.
Celiforniu	Southern California Edison Co.	EIX	A-22-04-009 (Phase 2)	10.75%	10/17/2024	¥	10.33%	(42)	Pully Litigated	NA	NA	NA
Minnesota	Minnesota Power Entress inc.	ALB	D-E-015/GR-23-155	10.30%	10/24/2024	v	9.78%	(52)	Settled	7,25%	53.00%	5.18%
Wisconsin	Wisconsin Electric Power Co.	WEC	D-5-UR-111	10,00%	11/7/2024	v	9.80%	(20)	Pully Litigated	NA	NA	NA
Wisognsin	Wisconsin Public Service Corp.	WEC	D-6690-UR-128	10.00%	11/7/2024	v	9,60%	(20)	Pully Litigated	NA	NA	NA
Virginia	Appalashien Power Co.	AEP	PUR-2024-00024	9608.01	11/20/2024	v	9.80%	(100)	Fully Litigated	7.26%	48.24%	4.73%

10.50%

11/25/2024

D

9.50%

(100) Fully Litigated

7.29%

50,50%

EXC

PC-1176

4.80%

Docket No. 20250011-EI Authorized ROEs, 2023-2025 (Exhibit LVP-2) Exhibit JTH-4, Page 2 of 4

						Vertically Integrated (V) /			ROE Fally		Approved	
		Parent Company	70	Requested		Distribution		Theorem .	Litigated or	Approved	Equity	Equity
State (1)	Utility (2)	Ticker (5)	Docket (4)	ROE	Order Date	Only (D)	Approved ROE	Difference (9)	Settled (11)	WACC	Ratio	Contributio
117	(4)	ω,	(4)	103	(0)	***	(4)	(8) - (5)	(11)	(11)	(13)	(14) (6) X (13)
Okiahoma	Oldahoma Gas and Electric Co.	OGE	PUD2023-000087	10.50%	11/26/2024	v	9,50%	(100)	Settled	NA	53,50%	ħ
Florida	Tampa Electric Company	EMA	20240026-EI	11.50%	12/3/2024	٧	10,50%	(100)	Fully Litigated	6.90%	NA.	. 1
Oregon	PacifiCorp	BRK.A	UE-433	9.65%	12/19/2024	. •	9.50%	(15)	Pully Litigated	7,40%	50.00%	4.75
Oregen	Portland General Electric Co.	POR	UE-435	9.50%	12/20/2024	· v	9.34%		Fully Litigated	6.99%	£00,00%	4.67
Weshington	Avista Corp.	AVA	UE-240006	10.40%	12/20/2024	V	9,80%	(60)	Fully Litigated	7.32%	48.50%	4,75
North Dakote	Otter Tail Power Co.	OTTR	FU-23-342	10.60%	12/30/2024	v	10.10%		Settled	7,53%	53,50%	5.40
North Carolina	Virginia Electric & Power Co.	D	E-22, Sub 694	10.60%	1/14/2025	V	9,95%	(65)	Settled	7,30%	52,50%	5,22
Oklahoma.	Publis Service Co. of Oklahoma	AEP	PUD2023-0000B6	10.80%	1/15/2025	V	9,50%	(130)		6.98%	51,12%	4,86
Weshington	Puget Sound Energy Inc.		UH-240004	10,50%	1/15/2025	V	9,90%	(60)	Pully Litigated	7.64%	.90.00%	4,95
California	Best Valley Electric Sve. Inc.	AWR	22-08-010	11,25%	1/16/2025	v	10.00%		Settled	8,07%	37,00%	5.70
Michigan	DTE Electric Co.	DIE	U-21534	10,50%	1/23/2025	V	9.90%	(6D)	Pully Litigated	5.69%	39.23%	3.889
Indiana 	Duke Energy Indiana, LLC	DUK.	46038	10.50%	1/29/2025	V	9.75%		Pully Litigated	6.19%	43.28%	4.22
Indiana	Southern IN Gas & Electric Co.	CNP	45990	10.40%	2/3/2025	٧	9.80%	(60)	Softled	6.77%	48.25%	4.739
Florida	Florida Public Utilkies Co.	CPK	20240099-ET	11.30%	3/4/2025	V	10.15%	(115)	Fully Litigated	NA	42,42%	N.
Maine	Ventest Power		2023-00336	9.35%	3/11/2025	D	9,35%	•	Pully Litigated	6.B4%	\$0.00%	4.68%
Colorado	Black Hills Colorado Electric	BKH	24AL-0275E	9.83%	3/12/2025	v	9,40%	(43)	Pully Litigated	6,90%	48,00%	4.515
l'exes	ContacPoint Energy Houston	CNP	56211	10.40%	3/13/2025	D	9.65%	(75)	Settled	6.61%	43.25%	4.179
New York	Orange & Rookland Utilities Inc.	200	24-E-0060	10.25%	3/20/2025	D	9.75%	(50)	Sattled	7.25%	48,00%	4.689
Miohigen	Consumor Energy Co.	CMB	U-21585	10.25%	3/21/2025	V	9,90%	(35)	Fully Litigated	5.97%	41.73%	4.139
New Hampshire	Liberty Utilities Granite State	AQN	DE-23-039	10.35%	3/25/2025	D	9.10%	(125)	Pully Litigated	7.71%	52,00%	4.739
Entire Period				140								
Average	(All Utilities)		1	10.38%			9,68%	(70)		6.98%	50.09%	4.95%
Average	(Distribution Only)			10.29%			9,38%	(90)		6.85%	49.52%	4.549
Average	(Vertically Integrated Only)			10,42%			9.78%	(63)		7.94%	50.34%	5.115
Modian	(All Utilities)			10.40%			9.70%	(76)		6.99%	50.50%	4.935
Maximum	(All Utilities)			13.45%			11.45%	(290)		8.79%	60,79%	6.95%
Vilateor.	(All Utilities)			9.35%			8.63%	(72)		5.66%	39.23%	4.129
Florida				3 11.32%			10.32%	(100)		NA	NA	IN.
Settled				10.40%			9.68%	(73)		7.03%	50.43%	4.849
Fully Litigated				16.37%			9.70%	(67)		6.93%	49.69%	5.119
1923 For Decisions				45								
Average	(All Ulilias)			10,36%			9,58%	(77)		6.92%	P4 4001	4 *
Lverege Lverege	(Distribution Only)			10.26%							51.42%	4.925
Avorage	(Distribution Only, exc. IL FRP)			10.20%			9,24% 9,33%	(102)		6.56%	49.23%	4.55%
	Anthe William Amile Str. VIII LUCK			40.4079			7,3370	(87)		6.55%	49.97%	4.589

Reported Authorized Returns on	Louly, Electric l	Utility Rate Cases	Completed, 2023 to Present

State (4)	Udifity (2)	Preent Company Teker (3)	Docket (4)	Requested ROE	Order Date	Vertically Integrated (V) / Distribution Only (D) (7)	Approved ROE (6)	Difference (9) (8) - (5)	ROE Fully Litigated or Settled (11)	Approved WACC	Approved Equity Ratio (13)	Equity Contribution (14) (6) X (23)
2024												
# of Decisions				41.								
Average	(All Utilities)			10.39%			9.78%	(61)		7.08%	49.51%	4.79%
Average	(Distribution Only)			10.41%			9.53%	(88)		7.09%	50.44%	4,81%
AVITAGE	(Distribution Only, exc. IL FRF)			10.41%			9.53%	(88)		7.09%	50.44%	4,81%
Average	(Vertically Integrated Only)			18_38%			9.85%	(54)		7,07%	49.12%	4.78%
2025												
# of Decisions				14								
Average	(All Utilities)			10.45%			9.72%	(73)		6.92%	47.63%	4,65%
Average	(Distribution Only)			18.09%			3.46%	(63)		7.19%	48.31%	4,57%
Average	(Distribution Only, exc. IL FRP)			10.09%			9.46%	(63)		7.10%	48.31%	4.57%
Average	(Vertically Integrated Only)			10.59%			9.83%	(77)		6.83%	47.36%	4.69%

Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence Last Updated: 4/29/2025

1. S&P incorrectly reports the ROE ask as 10.26% and the authorized ROE as 9.56%

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY FPSC-ADJUSTED ROEs BY MONTH, 2022-2025

Docket No. 20250011-EI FPL ROEs by Month, 2022-2025 Exhibit JTH-5, Page 1 of 1

ACHIEVED - MAX ROE

4044

94.05

<u>MONTH</u>	MIDPOINT ROE	MAXIMUM ROE	ACHIEVED ROE	(BASIS POINTS)
Jan-22	10.60	11.70	11.42	82
Feb-22	10.60	11.70	11.56	96
Mar-22	10.60	11.70	11.60	100
Apr-22	10.60	11.70	11.60	100
May-22	10.60	11.70	11.60	100
Jun-22	10.60	11.70	11.60	100
Jul-22	10.60	11.70	11.60	100
Aug-22	10.60	11.70	11.70	110
Sep-22	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Oct-22	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Nov-22	10.80	11.80	11.62	82
Dec-22	10.80	11.80	11.74	94
D00 22	10.00	11.00	11.1	01
Jan-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Feb-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Mar-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Apr-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
May-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Jun-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Jul-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Aug-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Sep-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Oct-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Nov-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Dec-23	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Jan-24	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Feb-24	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Mar-24	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Apr-24	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
May-24	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Jun-24	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Jul-24	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Aug-24	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Sep-24	10.80	11.80	11.80	100
Oct-24	10.80	11.80	11.65	85
Nov-24	10.80	11.80	11.55	75
Dec-24	10.80	11.80	11.40	60
200 2-	10.00	11.00	11.40	00
Jan-25	10.80	11.80	11.60	80
Feb-25	10.80	11.80	11.60	80
Mar-25	10.80	11.80	11.60	80
Apr-25	10.80	11.80	11.60	80
May-25	10.80	11.80	11.60	80
Jun-25	10.80	11.80	11.60	80
Jul-25	10.80	11.80	11.60	80

TOTAL DIFFERENCE, ACHIEVED MINUS MAXIMUM ROES AVERAGE

SOURCE: FPL's Earnings Surveillance Reports filed with Florida PSC, 2022-2025.

EXHIBIT A COMPARISON OF MAJOR ELEMENTS OF FPL FILING, SIPS' PROPOSED SETTLEMENT, AND CMPS' PROPOSAL

Issue	FPL Filing	SIPs' Proposed Settlement	CMPs' Proposal
Midpoint ROE	11.9%	10.95%	10.6%
Residential Base Rates Bill 2026+	\$92.77 monthly/1,000kWh	\$89.17 monthly/1,000kWh	\$86.25 monthly/1,000kWh
Residential Base Rates Bill 2027+	\$99.82	\$95.10	\$89.86
General Service Base Rates Bill 2026+	\$103.00 monthly/1,200kWh	\$110.67 monthly/1,200kWh	\$96.31 monthly/1,200kWh
General Service Base Rates Bill 2027+	\$109.67	\$118.93	\$98.02
2026 Revenue Requirements	\$1.545 billion	\$945 million	\$867 million
2027 Revenue Requirements+	\$927 million	\$770 million	\$403 million
2028 Revenue Requirements+	\$296 million*	\$283 million*	\$195 million**
2029 Revenue Requirements+	\$266 million*	\$247 million*	\$174 million**
Cumulative Rate Increase+	\$9.819 billion	\$6.903 billion	\$5.241 billion
2026-2029 Excess Profit Opportunity from TAM+	\$1.717 billion	\$1.155 billion	\$0
	\$57 million Recollection Cost	\$38.5 million Recollection Cost	\$0 No Recollection Cost
2030 Recollection+	\$104 million ADIT loss effect on WACC	\$70 million ADIT loss effect on WACC	\$0 No loss effect on WACC
	RSM Double Recovery	RSM Double Recovery	NO RSM Double Recovery
	\$316 million ITC swing-back	\$315 million ITC swing-back	\$0 No ITC swing-back

⁺Estimates based on available information. *Excludes possible GBRA for Vandolah **Does not include revenue form Vandolah GBRA